Iran Crisis Updates

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). CTP and ISW began publishing daily updates in September 2022 covering key events related to supreme leader succession, the Mahsa Amini protests, and regional developments. 

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The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

CTP recorded no protests in Iran on January 12.

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications.

Iran Crisis Update, January 12

January 12, 2023 | 5:30 pm ET

CTP recorded no protests in Iran for the second consecutive day on January 12, 2023. Some protest organizers called for demonstrations to commemorate executed protesters, but CTP did not record indications that these demonstrations materialized.[i] Regular expressions of anti-regime sentiment are continuing throughout Iran, however.[ii] Protest groups have also called for demonstrations on January 19—20, which coincide with scheduled university exams. Gathering students in-person to take the tests could catalyze demonstrations. Regime officials have discussed issuing localized or possibly countrywide internet shutdowns on these dates ostensibly to prevent cheating on the exams, as CTP previously reported, and could use such measures to facilitate protest suppression.[iii]

Iran Crisis Update, January 10, 2023

January 10, 2023 | 5:30 pm ET

The Iranian regime is refocusing on enforcing widespread adherence to the mandatory hijab law after briefly and informally relaxing such restrictions in previous months. Women in Iran have increasingly gone out in public without a hijab in recent months, according to some media reports. But the regime has taken several actions in recent days indicating preparations to resume mass enforcement. Iranian state media reported on January 10 that Prosecutor General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri has ordered the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) to impose the hijab requirement “decisively.” Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan—an architect of the morality patrol—as the new law enforcement commander on January 7. The LEC resumed using surveillance cameras to identify women not properly adhering to the hijab requirement in their cars on January 2 as well. Regime officials may see an opportunity to again enforce the hijab requirement as protest turnout has decreased in recent weeks and security personnel have likely regained some bandwidth. Iranian authorities may be particularly eager to resume widespread adherence to the mandatory hijab law to promote to the public the impression that the unrest has receded.

The Sari Revolutionary Court sentenced protester Javad Rouhi to death on January 10. The court convicted Rouhi of “corruption on Earth” and “waging war against God.” The Iranian Supreme Court can appeal these sentences.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime is refocusing on enforcing widespread adherence to the mandatory hijab law after briefly and informally relaxing such restrictions in previous months.
• The Sari Revolutionary Court sentenced protester Javad Rouhi to death.
• At least three protests occurred in three cities across three provinces in Iran.
• Social media accounts have claimed in recent days that the regime has arrested and sentenced an unidentified former senior official on espionage charges.
• The Parliamentary Legal and Judicial Committee reviewed and approved articles of the draft legislation to establish a police force for adolescents and children.

Iran Crisis Update, January 9, 2023

Protest coordinators and organizations may have successfully deterred the judiciary from executing two arrested protesters in Iran on January 9. Social media accounts reported that the judiciary transferred these two protesters to solitary confinement at the Rajaei Shahr prison in Karaj with imminent plans to execute them.[i] Citizens gathered outside the prison in the early morning hours of January 9 after protest organizers called for snap demonstrations there.[ii] The regime later denied that it planned to execute the protesters on January 9 but defended the death sentences.[iii] Persian-language social media accounts asserted that the snap demonstrations prevented the regime from conducting the executions.[iv] CTP cannot confirm whether the snap demonstrations actually delayed the executions, but their perceived success may encourage protest groups to organize additional gatherings outside prisons where arrested protesters are held.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to use rhetoric that suggests he is not amenable to any meaningful political or social reform in Iran. Khamenei denied that the regime was responsible for the protests and instead blamed the West exclusively in a speech in Qom on January 9.[v] He repeated his accusation that the US and European countries use information operations and propaganda to incite unrest. Khamenei acknowledged that the regime faces economic challenges but alleged that protesters used economic and political grievances as excuses to try to “destroy the strength of the country.” His rhetoric in this speech was particularly harsh compared to other recent speeches. Khamenei has previously drawn a rhetorical line between peaceful protesters and “rioters.”[vi] Khamenei did not repeat this rhetorical dichotomy in his most recent speech and only stated that all rioters are “treasonous.” CTP has previously argued that Khamenei and his inner circle continue to misdiagnose the core problems driving the protests.[vii] They have defined the unrest as a sociocultural and religious issue and seem to believe that the solution is trying to further ideologize the population. Khamenei reiterated his endorsement for this approach in his speech on January 9.

The regime is having tone-deaf conversations on women’s rights with itself, highlighting that many officials have not internalized core protester grievances. Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei and Saeid Jalili—a senior adviser to Khamenei—separately argued on January 9 that the regime is a strong proponent of gender equality and women’s rights.[viii] Ejei asserted that the mandatory hijab law empowers women. Jalili stated that the regime should promote its version of these values in its foreign policy. Another senior judicial official claimed at a ceremony honoring women’s achievements on January 9 that the West has conspired to raise marriage ages and thus reduce how many children women have as part of an effort to depress population growth in Iran.[ix] Kayhan—a hardline media outlet—finally argued on January 8 that women refusing to wear hijabs would lead to infidelity from their partners and thus damage families.[x] These statements underscore how many regime officials largely view the role of women in Iranian society through the lens of marriage and motherhood rather than as individuals with an inherent right to the personal freedoms and liberties for which the protesters have been calling.

Khamenei likely dismissed Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari as law enforcement commander due to Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the performance of the Law Enforcement Command in responding to the protests. Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan to replace Ashtari as law enforcement commander on January 7.[xi] Ashtari stated on January 9 that he “apologize[s] to the people and supreme leader for all shortcomings.”[xii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri stated on January 9 that Ashtari will now serve as his personal adviser for security and law enforcement affairs.[xiii]

Key Takeaways

• Protest coordinators and organizations may have successfully deterred the judiciary from executing two arrested protesters in Iran.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to use rhetoric that suggests he is not amenable to any meaningful political or social reform in Iran.
• The regime is having tone-deaf conversations on women’s rights with itself, highlighting that many officials have not internalized core protester grievances.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei likely dismissed Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari as law enforcement commander due to Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the performance of the Law Enforcement Command in responding to the protests.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces in Iran.
• Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid tweeted criticizing how the judiciary has handled the legal cases of arrested protesters.
• The judiciary sentenced three protesters to death.

Iran Crisis Update, January 8, 2023

January 8, 2023 | 6:00 pm ET

Protest activity increased significantly on January 8—in line with the calls from protest organizers for countrywide demonstrations to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian airplane. These protests are the most that CTP has reported in a single day since December 5, 2022.[i] Protests have seen reduced turnout in recent weeks, likely in part due to the discordant messaging and internal fissures within the protest movement.[ii] But protest coordinators and organizations aligned at least in their calls for countrywide demonstrations on January 8, demonstrating that they can still generate substantial turnout, especially when their messaging is coherent and consistent.

Iran Crisis Update, January 7, 2023

January 7, 2023 |  5:00 pm ET

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to empower hardline security figures to enforce his uncompromising position toward the protests and mandatory hijab law. Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan as law enforcement commander on January 7. Radan will thus head the Law Enforcement Command (LEC)—Iran’s national police force and first line of defense against protests. Khamenei called on Radan to provide public security, improve LEC capabilities, properly compensate LEC employees, and train specialized police units for different security missions.

Radan is a hardline member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has extensive experience crushing political dissent and protests. Radan joined the Basij and IRGC as a teenager to fight in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. He transferred to the LEC after the war, where he held several key positions, including commanding the police units responsible for Kurdistan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Khorasan, and Tehran provinces. Radan likely acquired experience quashing anti-regime dissent and militancy while overseeing police forces in the restive border provinces. Radan served as law enforcement deputy commander from 2008 to 2014, during which time he played critical roles in cracking down on the 2009 Green Movement and suppressing protests in Syria. Radan traveled to Damascus in 2011 to meet with Syrian security services and support their crackdown against the Syrian people. He finally headed the LEC Strategic Studies Center from 2014 to 2023, where he likely developed new concepts and doctrine that he could introduce to the LEC.

Radan will likely adopt a hard line on enforcing the mandatory hijab law. Radan was an architect of the morality patrol program while he was law enforcement deputy commander. He is an aggressive supporter of the hijab requirement and of penalizing citizens for attire that the regime deems inappropriate. CTP has previously argued that the regime may end or reduce the morality patrol but will likely use other means to enforce the mandatory hijab law, such as facial recognition and surveillance cameras.

Khamenei likely appointed Radan as law enforcement commander partly due to dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent in responding to the protests. Radan replaced Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari, who had held the position since 2015. The dismissal of Ashtari is particularly noteworthy given Khamenei’s apparent trust in him historically. Khamenei shuffled and replaced many senior officers responsible for internal security after previous major protest waves in Iran. But Khamenei kept Ashtari as law enforcement commander—even after the 2017-18 Dey protests and 2019 Aban protests—likely reflecting Khamenei’s confidence in him at the time. Ashtari may have since lost that confidence. It is unclear what position he will hold next.

The Judiciary executed two additional protesters—Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Mohammad Hosseini—on January 7. Iranian authorities tortured Karami and Hosseini and convicted them in sham trials for their alleged roles in killing a Basij member Ruhollah Ajamian in Karaj, Alborz Province on November 3. The regime may have timed these executions immediately before the planned protests on January 8 to intimidate citizens and reduce turnout. Karami and Hosseini mark the third and fourth individuals whom the regime has executed since protests began on September 16. Iranian human rights organizations and activists estimate that the judiciary has sentenced at least 14 other arrested protesters to death and that these individuals face imminent executions.

Protest organizers tied to the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union again failed to generate increased protest activity on January 7, despite their repeated calls for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8. Protest groups affiliated with the Iranian Neighborhood United Front have contrastingly called for protests only on January 8. CTP has previously argued that discordant messaging and internal fissures within the protest movement may be one of the factors driving decreased turnout.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to empower hardline security figures to enforce his uncompromising position toward the protests and mandatory hijab law.
• The Judiciary executed two additional protesters—Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Mohammad Hosseini.
• Protest organizers tied to the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union again failed to generate increased protest activity, despite their repeated calls for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
• Unknown gunmen shot and killed one person and injured two others at the Gachsaran Oil and Gas Company in Gachsaran, Kohgilouyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province.
• State security services arrested reformist journalist Saeid Seyf Ali, according to his wife.

Iran Crisis Update, January 6, 2023

January 6, 2023 | 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime failed to suppress demonstrations in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 6. Protesters participated in anti-regime demonstrations in Zahedan after prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid continued to criticize the regime in his weekly Friday prayer sermon. Abdol Hamid condemned Iranian leadership for extracting forced confessions from protesters and suggested that some Iranian officials were unlawfully behaving as though they possessed supreme religious authority. Abdol Hamid additionally maintained that demonstrations would continue in spite of mass arrests.

Security forces reportedly increased their presence in Zahedan and carried out mass arrests in the days preceding Abdol Hamid’s January 6 sermon, as CTP previously reported. The regime’s increased security presence and arrest campaign – both of which likely intended to disrupt protest organization and intimidate participants – did not apparently impact protest activity, however. Protest turnout in Zahedan on January 6 largely resembled protest activity recorded on December 30. Abdol Hamid’s defiance and increasingly direct criticism of the regime is likely sustaining demonstrations in Zahedan, and the inability of security to prevent demonstrations from forming within mosques may be allowing protesters to organize more easily and readily in Sistan and Baluchistan than in other provinces. The regime could further escalate against protesters and Abdol Hamid in response, although taking direct action against Abdol Hamid risks inflaming the situation.

Confusing messaging from prominent protest organizations may risk further reducing protest activity. Several neighborhood youth groups circulated a poster commemorating the four-year anniversary of the Iranian-owned Sanchi oil tanker collision and tied the incident to the Mahsa Amini protest movement. The poster did not include calls for anti-regime demonstrations, as posters circulated by protester organizations typically do; it is unclear why protest groups circulated it. Protest coordinators have additionally issued discordant instructions on countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8, possibly signaling internal disagreements within the movement. Inconsistent and misleading messaging from protest leaders may continue to degrade the movement’s effectiveness.

It is not immediately apparent how protest organizations and coordinators are seeking to reinvigorate anti-regime demonstrations or to what they attribute decreased protest activity. CTP has recorded a sustained depression in anti-regime demonstrations since December 2022, although we have yet to record a day without at least one protest that meets our reporting threshold. Social media users have circulated detailed safety instructions ahead of protests scheduled for January 8, which could suggest the groups assess that fear or intimidation is preventing greater participation in demonstrations. Neighborhood youth groups and other prominent organizations would likely need to assuage such concerns by sharing their assessments on why protest activity has decreased and through establishing a robust, internal infrastructure that would guarantee protesters’ financial and physical safety, if safety concerns are, in fact, the primary driver of lower turnout. It is not obvious that they are, however, as protesters have continued to demonstrate in many parts of the country even after brutal suppression, regime killing of protesters, and mass arrests. Protest movements can also fade as would-be protesters conclude that they must turn their attention back to their ordinary lives and livelihoods, especially in the kinds of difficult economic circumstances that reportedly are taking hold in Iran. Protest organizers in such circumstances can be challenged to find ways of identifying and providing necessary economic support to would-be demonstrators.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime failed to suppress demonstrations in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 6.
• Confusing messaging from prominent protest organizations may risk further reducing protest activity.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
• Several Friday Prayer Leaders stressed the importance of enforcing mandatory veiling laws on January 6.
• The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned seven individuals associated with Iranian drone and ballistic missile sales to Russia

Iran Crisis Update, January 5, 2023

January 5, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

Regime officials and entities are endorsing an expansive, collective-punishment model to implement mandatory veiling laws as anti-regime demonstrations enter their fourth consecutive month. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stressed the importance of the hijab on January 5. Vahidi confirmed reports that the regime began issuing texts warning unveiled women drivers to adhere to hijab laws and described veiling as a “legal issue” and core component of the Islamic Republic’s religious values.[1] The judiciary has additionally submitted for review a draft bill that would replace Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code, which outlines the consequences for failing to adhere to the state-imposed hijab law,  within the past several days.

Key Takeaways

• Regime officials and entities are endorsing an expansive, collective-punishment model to implement mandatory veiling laws as anti-regime demonstrations enter their fourth consecutive month.
• The Iranian regime is likely escalating against Prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid in an attempt to quell ongoing demonstrations throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• At least three protests occurred in three cities across three provinces.
• WhatsApp established a feature that allows Iranians to partially circumvent regime-imposed internet restrictions.
• An Iranian court sentenced a detained protester to death on December 5 for purportedly leading anti-regime demonstration efforts in Mazandaran Province.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International claimed that the IRGC sanctioned the January 3 death of IRGC officer and Tehran Basij Commander Ghasem Fathollahi.
• Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council may weaponize investigations into Soleimani’s death to target pro-Western entities in Iraq.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy Secretary Naim Qassem met with Supreme Leader Foreign Affairs Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati in Tehran on January 5.

Iran Crisis Update, January 4, 2023

January 4, 2023, 6:00 pm ET

Protester umbrella organizations appear to disagree on the timing of the upcoming planned protests. Protest coordinators from the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union have called for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian airplane.[i] Other protest groups, such as those allegedly aligned with the Iranian Neighborhood United Front, have called for demonstrations only on January 8 (the Iranian Neighborhood United Front published a statement that it claimed its members signed, but not all members have confirmed their alignment with this umbrella organization thus far).[ii] This divergence suggests that the emergence of different umbrella organizations vying for the allegiance of local groups may have created a fault line within the protest movement. Such disunity could indicate that different protest leaders are competing for influence within the movement, as CTP previously argued.[iii]

This division may be one of the factors depressing protester turnout. CTP has recorded a sustained reduction in protest activity since December 2022.[iv] We have yet to record a day without at least one protest, but the inconsistent messaging is likely generating confusion and stoking mistrust among demonstrators. Protest leaders failing to resolve dissonant calls and messages may continue to degrade the movement’s effectiveness.

The regime continues to adopt more overtly authoritarian language and policies. Senior Iranian officials have discussed implementing a countrywide internet shutdown for several hours on January 19-20 to prevent cheating on a scheduled university entrance exam. An education official, Hassan Morovati, announced these plans on January 4.[v] Science, Research, and Technology Minister Mohammad Ali Zolfi Gol denied Morovati’s claim that there will be a countrywide shutdown and asserted that the regime will only cut internet in the locations where the test is administered.[vi] Information and Communications Technology Minister Isah Zareh Pour separately stated that the State Security Council is reviewing the motion to block the internet and has not yet made a decision.[vii] This inconsistent and mixed messaging suggests that the Raisi administration has not yet reached a consensus on the potential internet shutdown. But regime officials openly discussing such extreme measures to prevent cheating on a standardized test reflects how the regime is normalizing such oppressive behavior. The regime could be considering the potential internet shutdown to expand censorship and suppress dissent rather than prevent cheating.

Key Takeaways

• Protester umbrella organizations appear to disagree on the timing of the upcoming planned protests. This division may be one of the factors depressing protester turnout.
• The regime continues to adopt more overtly authoritarian language and policies.
• At least one protest occurred in one city across one province.
• Iranian media reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has dismissed Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari as law enforcement commander.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated the mandatory hijab requirement during a meeting with female leaders.
• Likely Iranian proxies launched two rockets at US forces stationed at the Conoco International Coalition base in eastern Syria.

Iran Crisis Update, January 3, 2023

January 3, 2023, 7:00 pm ET

The organizational structure of the protest movement is continuing to evolve and morph as its leaders try to cohere the movement. Several different umbrella organizations for the smaller protest groups have emerged in recent months. These umbrella organizations include the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union (INYU) and the similarly named Iranian Neighborhood United Front (INUF), among others. The INYU and INUF have both circulated lists of their members in recent days, highlighting how some protest groups belong to both umbrella organizations, and other protest groups belong to only one.[i] This apparent disunity may indicate that different protest leaders are vying for influence within the movement. This possibly internal struggle is a somewhat natural consequence of the growing cohesion within the protest movement. It does not mean that the protest movement is irrevocably divided but is a challenge protest leaders must overcome.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei have both expressed concern about the Iranian economy in recent days, possibly indicating their doubts that President Ebrahim Raisi can improve the economic situation. Ghalibaf stated that he is trying to reach a consensus within the regime on “modernizing regime governance” to solve economic issues.[ii] Ghalibaf praised Raisi for replacing the Central Bank of Iran governor on December 29 but added that further “structural, policymaking, and managerial reforms” are necessary. Ejei similarly stated that the regime does not have a coherent economic plan.[iii] The Iranian rial has depreciated significantly in recent months, and social media users have claimed that some Iranian banks do not have enough hard currency for cash withdrawals.[iv] Ghalibaf’s and Ejei’s comments follow previous reports of frustration with the Raisi administration. The Fars News Agency bulletin that leaked in November 2022 reported that Ghalibaf told Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that the Raisi administration is indecisive and unorganized.[v]

Unidentified individuals shot and killed an IRGC member outside his home in Tehran Province on January 3.[vi] The IRGC commanded local Basij members in his neighborhood. Around 73 security personnel have died since the protests began in September 2022.[vii]

Key Takeaways

• The organizational structure of the protest movement is continuing to evolve and morph as its leaders try to cohere the movement.
• Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei have both expressed concern about the Iranian economy in recent days, possibly indicating their doubts that President Ebrahim Raisi can improve the economic situation.
• Unidentified individuals shot and killed an IRGC member outside his home in Tehran Province.
• At least two protests took place in two cities across two provinces.
• The LEC clashed with an armed “terrorist team” in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• The IRGC Intelligence Organization seized 700 kilograms of explosive materials in Gharchak, Tehran Province.

Iran Crisis Update, January 2, 2023

January 2, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian state security services have intensified their protest crackdown and social oppression in recent days. Security forces have substantially increased their presence in some cities, such as Javanroud and Semirom, according to social media users, after significant protests occurred there on December 31.[1] The Khuzestan Neighborhood Youth similarly reported that security forces disrupted electricity and telephone lines and shot at citizens in Izeh on January 1.[2] The regime has escalated efforts to reimpose social control as well. Security forces have arrested two reformist journalists in recent days and resumed using surveillance cameras to identify women not properly adhering to the mandatory hijab law in cars.[3]

The regime is likely escalating out of concern that protests are reigniting. Demonstrations saw a relative spike from December 29-31 compared to recent weeks.[4] Protest coordinators and organizations furthermore have called for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shooting down a Ukrainian civil airplane.[5]

This regime escalation could tire security forces ahead of the planned protests and strikes on January 6-8. The regime is seemingly strugging to secure small towns, such as Izeh, Javanroud, and Semirom, and has deployed a large number of security forces to these locations. One social media account claimed, for instance, that 1,000 officers from the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Special Units deployed to Semirom, although this number could be an exxageration.[6] The regime commonly shuffles its security forces around Iran to wherever they are needed most—typically major cities and the restive border regions--because it does not have enough forces to cover the entire country.[7] The regime will likely redeploy some—if not most—of the security personnel in Izeh, Javanroud, and Semirom to other locations ahead of the planned January 6-8 protests and strikes, likely tiring these forces in the process and possibly straining their morale. LEC Tehran Provincial Commander Brigadier General Hossein Rahimi denied that police personnel are experiencing fatigue or low morale on January 2—comments which suggest that the security forces are indeed facing these issues, occasioning Rahimi’s denial.[8]

One IRGC member died and three other members were injured during protests in Semirom, Esfahan Province on December 31.[9] Protesters gathered in front of a local government building and lit fires in the street in Semirom on December 31, as CTP previously reported.[10] Around 72 security officers have died since the protests began in September 2022.[11]

The IRGC or its foreign proxies could attack US positions in Iraq and Syria in the days surrounding the three-year anniversary of the US killing Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis. The IRGC and its proxies have organized attacks during the previous anniversaries in recent years. The IRGC released a statement on January 2 reiterating its pledge to avenge Soleimani.[12] Other senior Iranian military officers and proxy outlets echoed these threats on January 2.[13] Iraqi protesters gathered in Baghdad to commemorate the anniversary as well.[14] Social media users reported that Iranian proxies in Iraq planned to coordinate protests in front of the US Embassy in Baghdad, although CTP cannot corroborate these reports at the time of this writing.[15]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian state security services have intensified their protest crackdown and social oppression in recent days. The regime is likely escalating out of concern that protests are reigniting. This regime escalation could exhaust security forces ahead of the planned protests and strikes on January 6-8.
• One IRGC member died and three other members were injured during protests in Semirom, Esfahan Province.
• The IRGC and/or its foreign proxies could attack US positions in Iraq and Syria in the days surrounding the three-year anniversary of the US killing Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis.
• At least one protest occurred on January 1, and three protests occurred in two cities across two provinces on January 2.
• A telecommunications union chief, Mehdi Mohebi, stated that around 800 Starlink devices are active in Iran.
• The Sari Revolutionary Court sentenced 18-year-old protester Mehdi Mohammadi Fard to death, according to a HRANA report.
• Some Iranian banks are prohibiting cash withdrawals, according to social media users.

Iran Crisis Update, December 31

December 31, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Note: CTP will not publish a daily Iran Crisis Update on January 1, 2023, for the New Year’s holiday. CTP will resume daily publishing on January 2.

Recent comments from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) leaders reflect the ongoing divisions within the regime, and especially the IRGC, over the protests. Brigadier General Hamid Abazari stated on December 30 that some military commanders have “stood against values, the supreme leader, and the regime,” suggesting infighting over how to manage the ongoing unrest.[1] Abazari also criticized officials who have not publicly condemned the protests. Former Basij Organization Chief Brigadier General Gholam Hossein Gheyb Parvar, who is now responsible for organizing and training elite Basij units specialized in protest suppression, echoed Abazari’s criticism on December 31.[2] Iranian media identified Abazari as an adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami. The IRGC’s public relations wing released a statement on December 31 rejecting Abazari’s remarks and denying that he is an adviser to Salami.[3] The statement said that Abazari was expressing his personal opinion but not using accurate information.

Abazari’s remarks indicate that the divisions in the IRGC are between high-ranking officers. Abazari stated that the commanders to whom he referred had served in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and are now generals. The commanders from this generation are currently in their 50s and 60s and generally serving in the highest echelons of the armed forces.

CTP has repeatedly argued that the protests and regime crackdown have fractured the Iranian political and security establishments.[4] The ineffectiveness and brutality of the crackdown have likely stoked these tensions.

Protests have been occurring at a lower tempo since late November, which may be partly driving the debate among regime officials.[5] The reduced protest activity has likely prompted intra-regime discussions about whether to continue the intense crackdown or begin relaxing the suppression. Iranian authorities have likely eased the suppression in at least some locations, possibly due to their eagerness to return to the pre-September 2022 status quo.[6] The regime does not seem to have sustained its IRGC Ground Forces combat deployments throughout Kurdistan Province, for instance.[7] Iranian leaders face a dilemma, however, given that the reduced suppression appears to be creating space for more protests that could in turn cause further fracturing within the regime.

The Iranian Supreme Court accepted the appeal of 26-year-old protester Sahand Nour Mohammad Zadeh on December 31, whom the Judiciary had previously sentenced to death.[8] A court in Alborz Province had convicted Mohammad Zadeh of “waging war against God.”[9] The IRGC Intelligence Organization arrested Mohammad Zadeh at his home on October 4 after identifying him barricading a street in CCTV footage.[10]

Key Takeaways

• Recent comments from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps leaders reflect the ongoing divisions within the regime, and especially the IRGC, over the protests. Protests have been occurring at a lower tempo late November, which may be partly driving the debate among regime officials.
• The Iranian Supreme Court accepted the appeal of 26-year-old protester Sahand Nour Mohammad Zadeh, who the Judiciary previously sentenced to death.
• At least seven protests occurred in seven cities across six provinces.
• Education official Hamid Nikzad stated that the Education ministry would require new teachers to attend seminary training.

Iran Crisis Update, December 30

December 30, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid is likely trying to balance his political positions to maximize his domestic support and achieve meaningful reform. The rhetoric that he used in his weekly Friday sermon in Zahedan on December 30 reflected his efforts to appeal to multiple different constituencies.[i] Abdol Hamid regularly criticizes the regime mistreatment of the Baloch minority but emphasized opposition to Baloch separatism in his sermon. He instead lauded unity among Iranians likely to assuage supporters’ potential concerns that he is stoking societal divisions. Abdol Hamid reiterated his support for women's rights during his sermon but added that he believes that most Iranian women support wearing the hijab, possibly to appeal to more conservative supporters. He finally rejected the notion that he is using his platform for “fame” or “power” but framed himself positively as a political leader. He discussed briefly that he would not imprison political protesters or women protesting the hijab if he had such authority. It is unclear whether Abdol Hamid was referring to a particular accusation that he has a personal agenda. His remarks highlight his efforts to appeal to a broad base of Iranians without unnecessarily alienating a specific constituency.

Abdol Hamid’s downplaying of Baloch separatism may be in response to limited separatist voices in the protest movement. The Zahedan Neighborhood Youth referred to the city by its old name—Dozap—in a tweet on December 30.[ii] Local Baloch tribes used the name Dozop until shortly after the Pahlavi dynasty came to power. The Zahedan group may have used the name Dozop to evoke Baloch nationalism, suggesting that some limited separatist trends may exist in the protest movement.

The ongoing protests have likely altered the trajectory of Iran’s political and internal security environment permanently. Every major protest wave in the history of the Islamic Republic has had such an effect to some extent—Iran has never simply returned to its previous state after each wave. CTP is not prepared yet to forecast exactly how this protest movement will evolve and shape the future of Iran. Some Western reports have suggested that the most likely scenario is that the regime succeeds in using suppression to end the protests.[iii] But this movement has generated a long-lasting impact that makes returning to the situation of pre-September 2022 Iran extraordinarily unlikely. The regime could eventually quell the unrest (although it has thus far failed to do so), but this movement has already begun to cohere into a more enduring opposition that will likely outlive this specific protest wave. Some components of this movement may already meet the US military definition of an early-stage insurgency, as CTP previously argued.[iv] Protesters are developing the networks and infrastructure necessary to stage a protracted struggle against the regime. Western analysts and observers should account for these trends when forecasting the trajectory of the protest movement rather than forecasting a return to the pre-September 2022 status quo.

Protest coordinators and organizations called for demonstrations and strikes in Tehran, especially around bazaars, on December 31.[v]

Key Takeaways

• Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid is likely trying to balance his political positions to maximize his domestic support and achieve meaningful reform.
• The ongoing protests have likely altered the trajectory of Iran’s political and internal security environment permanently.
• At least eight protests occurred in eight cities across six provinces.
• Unidentified militants shot at an LEC patrol in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, injuring one police officer.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and injured a seminary student in Qom on December 20 and a second seminary student.
• Senior military officers threatened to escalate regionally against Israel.

Iran Crisis Update, December 29

December 29, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Funerals and commemoration ceremonies for killed protesters are continuing to sustain anti-regime activity throughout Iran as demonstrations enter their fifteenth consecutive week. Protest organizations successfully coordinated anti-regime demonstrations across five Iranian provinces on December 29. Six of the seven anti-regime protests that CTP observed on December 29 corresponded with prior protest calls from anti-regime organizations, suggesting that these groups may have assisted in generating turnout. CTP additionally observed estimated crowds of over 100 protesters in three of the seven recorded protests on December 29. Previous anti-regime demonstrations commemorating killed protesters have historically generated higher attendance as well. CTP previously reported that protesters have found secular martyrs around whom to rally and who sustain the momentum of the Mahsa Amini movement. The regime may struggle to preempt further commemoration ceremonies and funerals for such secular martyrs in the coming weeks.

The Iranian regime has reportedly purchased Sukhoi Su-35 fighters from Russia. The Times of Israel reported that Russia is preparing to supply Iran with up to 24 Su-35 war planes in the near future, citing Western intelligence officials. Asa’ib Ahl al Haq-affiliated Sabreen News additionally claimed that Iran will station a squadron of Russian Su-35 fighter jets at the 8^th Shakari Base in Esfahan Province. US intelligence officials had previously warned of strengthening Russo-Iranian ties on December 17. Russian Su-35 fighters are fourth-generation aircraft without stealth characteristics and thus pose a limited threat to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional adversaries. Iran may employ them to support IRGC and Iranian proxy militia personnel in Iraq and Syria, however. The Iranians have long sought Russian combat aircraft, likely in part to reduce their reliance on the Russian Air Force to provide air support to the activities of Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Syria.

Key Takeaways

• Funerals and commemoration ceremonies for killed protesters are continuing to sustain anti-regime activity throughout Iran as demonstrations enter their fifteenth consecutive week.
• The Iranian regime has reportedly purchased Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia.
• At least seven protests occurred in six cities across five provinces.
• President Ebrahim Raisi appointed Mohammad Reza Farzin as the new Central Bank of Iran Chief.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International circulated footage of Golestan Province Governor General Ali Mohammad Zanganeh requesting that local government officials refuse providing services to unveiled women.
• UK-based Amwaj Media reported that prominent Iranian hardliners are pursuing political reform in attempt to preempt further unrest, citing an inside source.
• A website purporting to represent the Iranian Sunni community reported that Iranian authorities arrested a Sunni scholar in Khorasan Razavi Province on December 27.

Iran Crisis Update, December 28

December 28, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Iranian security officials and entities attempted to declare an end to protest activity on December 28 despite ongoing acts of anti-regime defiance documented throughout the country. The Artesh praised Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian security forces for quelling protests in a December 28 statement commemorating regime-organized counter-protests to the 2009 Green Movement. The Armed Forces General Staff—the most senior military body in Iran—also issued a statement commemorating the 2009 pro-regime counter-protests and claimed that the regime had neutralized the threat of recent anti-regime demonstrations. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami similarly gave a speech claiming that the regime had decisively defeated unrest and accusing the US and Israel of fomenting dissent. Salami acknowledged that protest activity may resume at a later date.

These declarations of victory appear premature.  The regime has not deterred Iranians from continuing to participate in anti-regime protests and strikes, particularly in in historically restive provinces. Social media users have documented regular protest activity in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province since late September, for example. Protest activity has additionally increased in cities throughout Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan Provinces in recent days. CTP is currently hypothesizing that the regime may have pulled back some of the IRGC deployments in these areas, facilitating an uptick in anti-regime demonstrations.

Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions have the potential to further inflame anti-regime demonstrations throughout the country. The Iranian rial has depreciated by approximately 25 percent against the US dollar since protests began on September 16, hitting another historic low on December 28 at 422,000 rials per dollar on the black market. Half of the currency’s losses have occurred in the last three weeks, indicating the downward trend is accelerating.

Iranian officials have blamed the protest movement for the rial’s decline and corresponding economic maladies, but the regime’s foreign policy adventures likely play a significant role. A December 28 New York Times report stated that the Biden Administration is attempting to prevent Iran from acquiring the Western-made components necessary to manufacture suicide drones for Russian use in Ukraine. Part of the Biden Administration’s strategy involves aggressively applying export controls and sanctioning private actors linked to the drone supply chain. The US and other Western countries pursuing a similar course of action have consequently restricted Iran’s overall import and export activity. Heavy scrutiny from US compliance officials and the Iranian regime's resultant irregular payment arrangements have likely dissuaded some international vendors from doing business in Iran, regardless of the businesses’ connection to drone supply chains. A December 21 Reuters report, for example, stated that the regime’s “complex and erratic” sanctions-evasion tactics recently created a massive backlog of merchant ships containing sanctions-exempt cargo outside Iranian ports. These unfavorable business conditions are likely discouraging private actors from engaging with the Iranian economy, driving the rial’s exchange rate down further.

The US and other Western countries pursuing a similar course of action have likely dissuaded international vendors from doing business in Iran – regardless of the businesses’ connection to drone supply chains – and driven down the rial’s exchange rate, according to the Times. A December 21 Reuters report, for example, stated that the regime’s ”complex and erratic” sanction-evading payment methods have recently created a massive backlog of merchant ships containing sanctions-exempt cargo outside Iranian ports.

The regime may increase the likelihood of a surge in protest activity by exacerbating economic conditions. Western responses to Iran’s enabling the brutal Russian targeting of Ukrainian civilians and an increasingly worthless currency are aggravating issues in Iran’s already ailing economy and may prevent the country from importing sufficient quantities of foodstuffs, refined petroleum products, and other resources necessary for stable economic conditions.

Natural gas shortages may reinvigorate anti-regime grievances as Iran’s economic situation worsens. Iranian officials previously endorsed leveraging the European energy crisis imposed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to increase Iranian natural gas exports. Iran is, however, now suffering from the same energy shortages that it sought to capitalize on. The Raisi administration has expressed concern about the need to conserve gas in recent weeks. A Gilan Province official additionally declared December 22 a local holiday for conserving energy, as CTP previously reported.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian security officials and entities attempted to declare an end to protest activity on December 28 despite ongoing acts of anti-regime defiance documented throughout the country.
• Iran’s deteriorating economic and energy conditions have the potential to further inflame anti-regime demonstrations.
• At least four protests occurred in four cities across four provinces.
• Protest coordinators reiterated calls for anti-regime protests and strikes on December 29 and January 6-8.
• President Ebrahim Raisi and his cabinet appointed Hossein Mehrab as Khuzestan provincial governor on December 28.
• Former reformist President Hassan Rouhani discussed solutions to anti-regime activity with former governors from his administration on December 26.
• Social media users reported that petrochemical workers in Abadan, Khuzestan Province participated in anti-regime strikes for a third consecutive day.
• The Turkish, Russia, and Syrian Defense Ministers held a trilateral meeting on December 28 in Moscow.

Iran Crisis Update, December 27

December 27, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Some elements of the Iranian regime are increasingly framing the protest movement as an insurgency. Mohsen Heydari—a representative of Khuzestan Province in the Assembly of Experts—stated that the judiciary should convict protesters of baghi (armed insurrection) rather than moharebeh (waging war against God) on December 27.[i] The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for selecting the supreme leader. Baghi is a relatively new legal concept that Parliament introduced to the Iranian penal code in 2013.[ii]

Iran Crisis Update, December 26

December 26, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Protest coordinators and organizations are encouraging citizens to demonstrate more regularly and spontaneously rather than awaiting planned protests. The United Neighborhood Youth called for decentralized demonstrations and for protesters to “break the cycle of waiting.” The Karaj Neighborhood Youth published a graphic illustrating the protest activity that preceded the Iranian revolution in 1979 to argue that the movement must sustain itself through an extended period of spikes and lulls to gradually weaken the regime.

These protest coordinators and organizations are likely trying to reverse a natural consequence of the growing cohesion within the movement. Many protesters may be increasingly awaiting calls for protests and other guidance rather than acting independently as the movement has developed more obvious leadership. But these protest coordinators and organizations have demonstrated that they cannot consistently generate significant surges in protest activity themselves, possibly due to mistrust toward them among demonstrators and/or the challenges of organizing under the tremendous pressure the regime is exerting against them. The persistence of protests has been a remarkable feature of this movement and has put great strains on the regime and its security forces.  If the protesters can resume more decentralized and less predictable activities, they can add to that strain even with small numbers of demonstrators in the streets at a time.

Protest coordinators and organizations are continuing their efforts to stoke a fiscal crisis and disrupt the transportation sector. The Hamedan Neighborhood Youth reiterated its calls for citizens to withdraw their savings to further encourage a run on the banks. The Iranian rial reached a new record low, selling for around 415,200 to the US dollar, on December 26. The United Neighborhood Youth separately called for countrywide protests and strikes on January 6-8 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the IRGC shooting down a Ukrainian civilian airplane. The group urged protests and strikes around airports, fire stations, and ports in particular. It remains unclear what net effect the fiscal crisis and strikes will have on the Iranian economy, but the continuation of this protest movement seems likely to generate some level of economic disruption.

Mounting economic issues could drive further protest activity in turn, creating a self-reinforcing cycle. Economic issues have fueled several violent protest waves in Iran in recent years, including the 2017-18 Dey protests and 2019 Aban protests. The Gilan Neighborhood Youth called on protesters to remember the Dey protests, which began on December 28, 2017, and were focused largely on economic hardship and rising prices. The dollar sold for around 42,010 Iranian rial when the Dey protests began.

The regime is further shuffling the authorities responsible for internal security in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, likely to improve efforts to stabilize the province. President Ebrahim Raisi and his cabinet approved the appointment of IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Karami as Sistan and Baluchistan provincial governor on December 25. Karami has been the commander of the IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Headquarters—the military entity that oversees the IRGC conventional units and internal security in Sistan and Baluchistan and Kerman provinces—since February 2020. Karami will chair the Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Security Council in his capacity as governor, coordinating and overseeing security affairs in the province. He may hold even more authority and influence if he continues to command the Quds Operational Headquarters as well; IRGC leadership has yet to appoint his replacement. The Law Enforcement Command (LEC) previously installed a new commander for Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 9 as part of this effort to improve how the regime imposes social control there.

The Khuzestan Neighborhood Youth posted a tweet claiming that the regime escalated against Izeh, Khuzestan Province residents on December 25 and 26. The regime deployed a large number of security forces and completely disrupted local internet services, according to the Khuzestan group. The Khuzestan group reported the sound of gunfire and claimed that security forces blocked major roads leading into and out of the city. The Khuzestan group also called for unrest in other locations throughout Khuzestan Province to stretch the bandwidth of security forces and prevent them from concentrating around Izeh. CTP cannot verify any of these rumors. They are plausible, however, given that Iranian authorities likely expected unrest in Izeh on December 26—the 40^th day since the Izeh terror attack on November 16.

Key Takeaways

• Protest coordinators and organizations are encouraging citizens to demonstrate more regularly and spontaneously rather than awaiting planned protests. These protest coordinators and organizations are likely trying to reverse a natural consequence of the growing cohesion within the movement.
• Protest coordinators and organizations are continuing their efforts to cause a fiscal crisis for the regime and disrupt the transportation sector. Mounting economic issues could drive further protest activity in turn, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.
• The regime is further shuffling the authorities responsible for internal security in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, likely to improve efforts to stabilize the province.
• The Khuzestan Neighborhood Youth posted a tweet claiming that the regime escalated against Izeh, Khuzestan Province residents.
• At least five protests occurred in three cities across three provinces on December 25, and at least seven protests occurred in six cities across five provinces on December 26.
• Elon Musk tweeted that almost 100 Starlink devices are currently operating in Iran.

Iran Crisis Update, December 24

The Iranian Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of 22-year-old protester Mohammad Ghobadlou on December 24 after rejecting his appeal.[i] The Judiciary convicted Ghobadlou of “corruption on earth” and sentenced him to death in October 2022. This charge—corruption on earth—is an extremely broad charge that the Judiciary often uses to justify executions. The Iranian penal code states that this charge can be brought against an individual who “extensively commits a felony against the bodily entity of the people, offenses against internal or international security of the state, spreads lies, disrupts the economic system of the state, commits arson or destroys properties, distributes poisonous and bacterial and dangerous materials, or [establishes, aids, or abets] places of corruption and prostitution.”[ii] The Supreme Court published earlier on December 24 that it had accepted the appeals of Ghobadlou and Saman Seyyedi Yasin—two protesters on death row—but later retracted that report and stated that it had accepted the appeal of Yasin but upheld Ghobadlou’s death sentence.[iii]

Protest activity increased only marginally for the planned demonstrations on December 24, likely in part due to inclement weather conditions. Calls for protests have largely failed to generate surges in turnout since mid-November 2022. CTP continues to assess that this reduced protest activity does not, however, indicate the end of the anti-regime movement.[iv] The ongoing protests—even at low levels—likely continue to strain the bandwidth, energy, and morale of security forces.[v]

Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Ensieh Khazali commemorated Women’s Week in Iran on December 24.[vi] Khazali celebrated the position of women under the Islamic Republic and accused foreign enemies of trying to promote immorality among Iranian women. She added that the regime will hold events and programs during Women’s Week to “raise awareness among Iranian women” about the role of foreign actors in stoking protests. The UN Economic and Social Council previously voted to expel Iran from the Commission on the Status of Women on December 14 in response to the regime’s oppression of millions of Iranian women.[vii]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of 22-year-old protester Mohammad Ghobadlou after rejecting his appeal.
• Protest activity increased only marginally for the planned demonstrations, likely in part due to inclement weather conditions. At least seven protests occurred in six cities across six provinces.
• Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Ensieh Khazali commemorated Women’s Week in Iran.
• Some Iranian economic and political actors have acknowledged the economic consequences of the regime’s internet disruptions.
• Iranian media reported that the Iranian rial reached a new record low of around 400,800 to the US dollar.

Iran Crisis Update, December 23

The Iranian regime is likely in a mounting confrontation with citizens in Izeh, Khuzestan Province. Izeh has seen weeks of violence since November 2022. Unidentified gunmen shot and killed at least six people and injured another 15 at a shopping center in Izeh on November 16. Iranian state media attributed the attack to the Islamic State, although the group has not claimed responsibility. Security forces conducted a direct-action raid in Izeh on December 20 targeting individuals for their alleged roles in the terror attack. Unconfirmed social media accounts have claimed that security forces have begun killing and mass arresting citizens in Izeh since the raid. Others have claimed that the regime has imposed a total internet blackout there and established checkpoints on the major roads leading into and out of the city. This most recent reported escalation suggests that citizens may have protested and reacted angrily to the raid. The information space remains incredibly murky, and obtaining reliable and verifiable information is thus difficult.

The ongoing situation in Izeh underscores the credibility crisis that the regime faces. Several conflicting rumors are circulating in the Persian-language information space. Some, including the mother of one of the victims, have claimed that the regime conducted the November 16 terror attack—not the Islamic State. Protest organizations and other social media accounts are separately claiming that the individuals killed and arrested in the December 20 raid were innocent. CTP cannot assess the veracity of any of these rumors. The prevalence of such rumors highlights the mistrust of the population toward the political establishment, however, as the regime’s abuse of its people continues to undermine its credibility.

Unidentified individuals detonated explosives at a Basij base in Ghahdrijan, Esfahan Province on December 23, marking a possible inflection in protester tactics. Protesters have regularly thrown Molotov cocktails at security forces’ facilities throughout this protest wave, but CTP has not previously observed the use of explosives like the ones used in this attack. The attackers may have produced improvised explosives themselves or accessed materials from industrial or military sources.

Vice News published on December 17 a video indicating dissent among the state security services. Vice News interviewed an alleged former employee of the Intelligence and Security Ministry who defected during the crackdown. The individual claimed that some Law Enforcement Command (LEC) members have opposed the crackdown and that the IRGC Intelligence Organization has arrested them. The Vice News video also interviewed a reported Basij member who similarly expressed frustration over the brutality of the crackdown. CTP cannot verify the authenticity of this report, but it is consistent with previously observed trends. The regime has long struggled with dissent among the security services during violent crackdowns. Iranian security personnel, especially the less ideological, have sometimes refused to use extreme force against their fellow citizens. The arrest of these dissenting security officers could spread frustration among their families and security units.

These defections highlight one of the many challenges that the protests pose to regime longevity. The ongoing protests—even at low levels—continue to strain the bandwidth, energy, and morale of security forces, increasing the likelihood of further dissent. Protesters can likely sustain varying levels of demonstrations and strikes longer than the regime can sustain its crackdown.

The recent behavior of the regime demonstrates that it will likely keep the mandatory hijab law but look for new, and perhaps more effective, ways to enforce it rather than using the morality patrol. The regime has not yet released an opinion on the hijab requirement even though it pledged to do so by December 16. The continued silence suggests that Iranian leaders have decided to maintain the law but want to avoid enflaming protests with a public announcement. CTP has previously argued that the idea that the regime will relax its hijab law is fundamentally incompatible with the vision that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has for the future of the country.

Some Iranian officials have described alternatives to using the morality patrol to enforce the hijab requirement. Former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb stated that the morality patrols do not work, and that the regime needs to evaluate different methods on December 23. Parliamentarian Hossin Jalali similarly stated that the regime is enforcing the hijab requirement “through smart methods,” implying the use of advanced technologies such as facial recognition and surveillance cameras. CTP has previously suggested that the regime could adopt such an approach. This emphasis on alternative enforcement methods underscores that the potential abolition of the morality patrol, which is not yet confirmed, does not mean that the regime will relax its mandatory hijab policies. The regime might instead continue to expand an Orwellian surveillance-punishment model relying on collective punishment through shutting down non-compliant businesses and remote punishments such as seizing financial assets in state banks as alternatives to physical confrontation.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime is in a mounting confrontation with citizens in Izeh, Khuzestan Province. The ongoing situation in Izeh underscores the credibility crisis that the regime faces.
• Unidentified individuals detonated explosives at a Basij base in Ghahdrijan, Esfahan Province, marking a possible inflection in protester tactics.
• Vice News published a video indicating dissent among the state security services.
• The recent behavior of the regime demonstrates that it will likely keep the mandatory hijab law but look for new, and perhaps more effective, ways to enforce it rather than using the morality patrol.
• At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces. Citizens frustrated by the regime’s suppression of Sunnis played a prominent role in the protests
• Protest activity may increase on December 24 to commemorate 100 consecutive days of demonstrations.

Iran Crisis Update, December 22

December 22, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Social media accounts reported that Iranian security forces have begun violently killing and mass arresting citizens in Izeh, Khuzestan Province since December 21.[i] Some accounts have claimed that the regime has arrested over 350 individuals thus far and completely disrupted internet services in the area.[ii] Others have claimed that the regime has established checkpoints on the major roads leading into and out of the city.[iii] CTP cannot verify these reports at this time, and the information space remains extremely muddy. We will provide more information on the situation in Izeh in future updates.

This reported escalation follows weeks of violence in Izeh. Unidentified gunmen shot and killed at least six Izeh residents and injured at least 15 on November 16.[iv] Iranian state media described the event as a “terrorist attack,” while the mother of one of victims—nine-year-old Kian Pirfalak—accused security forces of conducting the attack.[v] The regime tried to blame the attack on the Islamic State in the following days.[vi] Security forces killed two and arrested another two in Izeh for their alleged roles in the attack on December 20.[vii]

Key Takeaways

• Social media accounts have reported that Iranian security forces have begun violently killing and mass arresting citizens in Izeh, Khuzestan Province since December 21.
• One of Iran’s most senior military officers discussed how the regime can adapt to control its domestic information space.
• At least three protests occurred in three cities across two provinces.
• The Tehran and Mashhad neighborhood youth groups announced their alignment and solidarity with a group called the Seventh of Aban Front.
• Protest coordinators and organizations called for protests and strikes throughout Tehran on December 24.
• Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib appointed a new Director General of Intelligence for West Azerbaijan Province.
• The Wall Street Journal reported that anti-regime actors have smuggled roughly 200 Starlink devices into Iranian territory.

Iran Crisis Update, December 21

December 20, 2022 | 5:30 pm ET

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to be personally directing the regime’s approach to protests in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Senior Iranian cleric Mostafa Mohami stated during a meeting with local university students on December 21 that Khamenei has taken a “personal interest” in the unrest in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[i] Mohami asserted that Iranian authorities had taken a different approach in Sistan and Baluchistan Province—framing this approach as a marker of Khamenei’s interest in the region. He added that Khamenei instructed the Supreme National Security Council—the regime’s most senior foreign and security policy body—to listen to the demands of the people of the province.

Iran Crisis Update, December 20

December 20, 2022 | 6:00 pm ET

Protest activity did not surge significantly outside of the Iranian capital region on December 20, despite calls from protest coordinators and organizations for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on December 19-21. CTP has observed slowly diminishing protest turnout since the regime intensified its protest crackdown in mid-November 2022. The regime issued its first death sentence on November 13 and deployed the IRGC Ground Forces in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces beginning on November 19.[i] These escalations combined with the colder weather, mass arrests, and possible disorganization among protester coordinators may have led to the declining turnout over the past month.

Iran Crisis Update, December 19

December 19, 2022 | 6:30 pm ET

Some protest coordinators and organizations are trying to reclaim religion from the regime, essentially arguing that one can be devoutly religious and still oppose the Islamic Republic. The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth published a statement from “a group of Iranian Muslim and Shia youth” that accused Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei of using religion to control and manipulate.[i] The statement argued that Khamenei does not represent true Islamic values but is rather undermining religion. The framing of the group as representing “Muslims and Shia” is noteworthy and may suggest outreach to the Sunni community in Iran. The Mashhad group separately asserted that the regime has not upheld some of the founding principles in the constitution.[ii] CTP has previously reported how protesters have tried to reclaim ideas of revolution, Iranian nationalism, and secular martyrdom from the regime for their own movement.[iii] The regime has long labored to appropriate many of these ideas for its own purposes.

The fact that Mashhad youth may spearhead this effort to reclaim religion is notable given the significance of the city to the Iranian clerical and religious community. Mashhad is the home of the Imam Reza shrine—one of the most significant religious locations in Iran. The Mashhad Friday prayer leader, Ahmad Alam ol Hoda, is an outspoken hardliner and the father-in-law of President Ebrahim Raisi, who himself was born in Mashhad.

The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth explained part of its protest doctrine on December 19, promoting the idea of decentralized, “neighborhood-based” protests.[iv] Protest coordinators and organizations frequently use this term, neighborhood-based protests, when planning demonstrations. The Mashhad group explained that neighborhood-based protests involve small groups of protesters shuffling to different nearby neighborhoods where they know the environment but will not be recognized by other locals. Protester lookouts warn the small crowds to disperse into nearby alleyways to avoid incoming security forces, and these crowds reconstitute once the security forces leave. The Mashhad group argued that simultaneous, neighborhood-based protests throughout a city exhaust and strain the bandwidth of security forces, creating a “cat-and-mouse game.” This theory is consistent with CTP’s assessment that security forces have faced bandwidth constraints, exhaustion, and low morale since September 2022.[v]

Key Takeaways

• Some protest coordinators and organizations are trying to reclaim religion from the regime, essentially arguing that one can be devoutly religious and still oppose the Islamic Republic.
• The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth explained part of its protest doctrine, promoting the idea of decentralized, “neighborhood-based” protests.
• The regime is torturing arrested protesters to extract forced confessions.
• At least 10 protests took place in five cities across four provinces.
• Anti-regime militancy has increased in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since December 18.
• The Guardian reported that dozens to possibly a few hundred protesters have fled Iran into Iraqi Kurdistan since the protests began in September 2022.

Iran Crisis Update, December 18

December 18, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and significant parts of his inner circle are continuing to misdiagnose the core problems driving the ongoing protests. Senior officials close to Khamenei and his inner circle emphasized the need to promote engagement and interactions between Iranian religious institutions and universities on December 18. The officials framed such cooperation as the correct response to the protests and necessary to establish an “Islamic civilization.”  These officials include Alireza Arafi (a senior cleric and Guardian Council member), Ahmad Marvi (the custodian of Astan Quds Razavi), and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi (the president of Islamic Azad University). Either Khamenei or his inner circle have selected each of these individuals for their current positions. Their rhetoric likely reflects a predominant sentiment in the office of the supreme leader.

Khamenei and his inner circle have defined the protests as a sociocultural and religious issue and seem to believe that the solution is trying to further ideologize the population. These ideas are not entirely new; Khamenei and his advisers have articulated this theory for years. But Khamenei’s insistence on viewing the current protests through this lens will impede—if not prevent entirely—any serious effort to address protester grievances.

Protests and strikes may increase in the coming days. Protest coordinators and organizations have repeatedly published calls for protests and strikes on December 19-21.

Some protesters have increasingly focused on imposing economic pressure on the regime as the Iranian rial continues to devaluate. The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth reiterated on December 18 calls for citizens to withdraw their money from banks and warned that Anonymous hackers will conduct cyberattacks against banks in the coming days. The Mashhad group separately claimed that workers at several prominent Iranian ports will join the planned strikes on December 19-21.

The net effect of the ongoing protests and strikes could further stress the Iranian economy and its supply lines, especially if the port strikes materialize and are sustained. Oil and gas workers protested in at least four cities on December 17, as CTP previously reported. It is too soon to assess whether these protests and strikes will amount to any serious economic disruption, however. CTP will continue to develop this assessment in future updates.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and significant parts of his inner circle are continuing to misdiagnose the core problems driving the ongoing protests.
• At least two protests took place in two cities across two provinces. Protests and strikes may increase in the coming days.
• Some protesters have increasingly focused on imposing economic pressure on the regime as the Iranian rial continues to devaluate.
• LEC Tehran Provincial Commander Brigadier General Hossein Rahimi announced the seizure of a man-portable rocket launcher and around 50 other small arms.
• An LEC Border Guard regiment commander, Colonel Hossein Ali Farahi, announced that the LEC clashed with unidentified militants near Esfandak, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Unidentified individuals stabbed and wounded four clerics in Qom City, Qom Province.

Iran Crisis Update, December 17

December 17, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Iranian security personnel clashed with prisoners in Karaj, Alborz Province on December 17, reportedly killing one and injuring up to 100 others. A foreign-based Iranian human rights organization reported that Karaj Central Prison security personnel violently suppressed prisoners protesting inmate executions and other acts of violence, citing an informed source. The source alleged that protests erupted after security personnel transferred four prisoners to solitary confinement and intended to execute them at an unspecified time. Inmates from units two, three, and five reportedly chanted anti-regime slogans and broke doors and cameras within the prison.[1] Prison guards opened fire on the protesting inmates in an attempt to quell the unrest, resulting in roughly 100 inmate casualties and at least one death.[2] Karaj residents and social media users additionally reported local internet outages and a heavy security presence in the vicinity of the Karaj Central Prison on the evening of December 17.[3]

State-affiliated media and a local judiciary official confirmed clashes between prison guards and inmates held in the narcotics ward of the Karaj Central Prison on December 17. Iranian media initially claimed that some inmates had set fire to blankets, which security personnel allegedly contained rapidly and without casualties.[4] The Alborz Province Judiciary Chief later acknowledged that the clashes resulted in the death of one inmate and injured several others but claimed that casualties were sustained by prisoners ”throwing stones” at one another for unspecified reasons.[5]

The regime’s violent suppression tactics suggest incompetence and mismanagement within the Karaj Central Prison. Large-scale riots are indicative of poorly-run prisons with insufficient resources. Competent prison authorities and guards should be able to control prisoners without resorting to lethal force. Losing control over a state-owned facility to this extent constitutes a significant failure of the regime, which may be struggling to handle the enormous influx of inmates it has generated by mass arrests of protesters.

Some protest organizations could be playing increasingly prominent roles within a localized and relatively de-centralized anti-regime actor nexus. The Neighborhood Youth Group of Karaj circulated a five-point plan on how to sustain acts of anti-regime defiance on December 16, as CTP previously reported.[6] The group called on its followers to plan protests in crowded and well-known areas and conceptualize new ways to demonstrate against the regime. Social media users documented several protests on multiple Tehran subway platforms the next day on December 17.[7] CTP has observed protest activity in Tehran metro stations before, and this protest location is not novel. Increased anti-regime demonstrations within Tehran subways could nevertheless suggest that protesters are adapting their tactics to adhere to the Neighborhood Youth Group of Karaj’s recommendations. IRGC Intelligence Organization officers similarly described an arrested 15-person protest organization located in a town neighboring Karaj as local leaders on December 17, although the regime has previously used similar language to characterize arrested protest coordinators in other areas.[8]

The regime may struggle to contain decentralized protest and strike coordinators. Anti-regime activity and calls for unrest on December 17 showed participation from diverse swaths of the Iranian population, including medical professionals, workers, and neighborhood youth groups.[9] Iranian media has publicized the arrest of several leaders within the protest movement in the past several weeks. These arrests have not stopped the movement, however, which continues to adapt under regime pressure and to put renewed pressure on the regime in turn.  The absence of public leadership and coordination among multiple anti-regime actors will likely complicate security efforts to stop the unrest.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian security personnel clashed with prisoners in Karaj, Alborz Province, reportedly killing one and injuring up to 100 others.
• Some protest organizations could be playing increasingly prominent roles within a localized and relatively de-centralized anti-regime actor nexus.
• At least 11 protests took place in seven cities across five provinces
• The Iranian rial reached a new all-time low.
• Iranian media reported that Meta rejected regime demands to nominate a representative to Iran, setting conditions to block or permanently restrict domestic access to Instagram and WhatsApp.
• A large, unattributed explosion occurred in Kani Qirzhala, Erbil Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.
• Turkish forces shelled alleged Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militia positions near Amedi, Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iran Crisis Update, December 16

December 16, 5:00 pm ET

Protest organizations and coordinators are increasingly promoting consistent and sustainable acts of anti-regime defiance as the Mahsa Amini protest movement enters its fourth consecutive month. The United Neighborhood Youth of Iran circulated a translated, two-page text attributed to American author Robert Greene on December 16 that encouraged protesters to continue anti-regime demonstrations and overthrow the regime.[i] The text called on protesters to remain united and engaged in anti-regime activity. It is unclear where this text originated from, although it was likely adapted from Greene’s December 7 Youtube video on the Mahsa Amini movement.[ii] The Neighborhood Youth Group of Karaj also circulated the translated text and issued a five-point plan that incorporated Greene’s recommendations. The group framed the plan as a progressive and natural next step of the protest movement.[iii] The Karaj group called for regular acts of anti-regime defiance to sustain the protest movement, including:

• Chanting anti-regime slogans every night;
• Writing anti-regime slogans throughout the city;
• Distributing written calls to protests and other information pertaining to protest activity to reach populations that are less active on social media;
• Thinking of new and innovative ways to demonstrate against the regime;
• Engaging in new protest activity in crowded and well-known areas.[iv]

The Neighborhood Youth of Karaj Group’s plan, if successfully implemented, would likely pose a challenge to local security personnel attempting to quell acts of unrest throughout different areas of the city. The group’s emphasis on non-protest related acts of anti-regime defiance could also invite participation from broader segments of the Iranian population.

Increased calls for non-protest related acts of anti-regime dissent do not mean that protests will entirely subside, however. Social media users circulated calls for countrywide strikes and protests on December 19, 20, and 21, as CTP reported on December 14.[v] Protest organizations have recently demonstrated the capability to coordinate large-scale, country-wide strikes and increased protest activity from December 5, 6, and 7 as well.[vi]

Iranian Parliament and the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council did not release an opinion on the mandatory veiling law--or how the regime chooses to police this law--on December 16. Prosecutor General Mohammad Javad Montazeri had stated on December 1 that Iranian officials were examining mandatory veiling and would release their findings by December 16.[vii]

Key Takeaways

• Protest organizations and coordinators are increasingly promoting consistent and sustainable acts of anti-regime defiance as the Mahsa Amini protest movement enters its fourth consecutive month.
• The Iranian Parliament and the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council did not release an opinion on the mandatory veiling law or how the regime chooses to police that law on December 16.
• At least eight protests took place in six cities across four provinces.
• Prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid condemned the regime for sentencing arrested protesters to death in his weekly Friday sermon in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• A pro-Iran Iraqi official stated that former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi would be arrested in connection with IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis' deaths.

Iran Crisis Update, December 15

December 15, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is likely conducting an information operation to discredit the neighborhood youth protest organizations among demonstrators. IRGC-affiliated media outlets and social media accounts claimed on December 15 that these neighborhood groups have helped security forces identify and arrest protesters who send the groups information.[i] These IRGC outlets claimed, contradictorily, that the neighborhood groups are reporting protesters to perpetuate unrest in Iran. These outlets also accused these neighborhood groups of having ties to Saudi Arabia and the Mojahedin-e Khalq. The claims that these neighborhood groups are simultaneously cooperating with the regime and its external adversaries seem incompatible but are likely part of an information effort to confuse protesters and sow distrust. The IRGC is likely trying to deter protester cooperation with these groups and prevent protesters from attending the groups’ planned demonstrations. These IRGC reports are the first major regime acknowledgement of the neighborhood youth groups, reflecting how seriously the regime perceives the threat they now pose.

Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi discussed expanding regime censorship in a speech on December 15—comments which the regime later denied that Vahidi made. Vahidi warned that an uncontrolled internet will destroy the minds and spirit of Iranian youth and that therefore “cyberspace is becoming completely restricted.”[ii] The Interior Ministry soon denied that Vahidi made such remarks.[iii] Iranian state media excluded Vahidi’s remarks about censorship in its reporting on his speech.[iv]

Key Takeaways

• The IRGC is likely conducting an information operation to discredit some protester coordinators among demonstrators.
• Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi discussed expanding regime censorship in a speech—comments which the regime later denied Vahidi made.
• At least three protests took place in three cities across three provinces.

Iran Crisis Update, December 14

December 14, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian economy appears to be entering a period of potentially significant disruption. Protester coordinators and other social media users have called on Iranians to urgently withdraw their bank account savings and buy gold in recent days.[i] Social media accounts reported many Iranians doing so on December 14, although CTP cannot verify this reported bank run nor is it prepared to assess the scale.[ii] These reports coincide with the continued devaluation of the Iranian rial, which hit a new all-time low of around 385,000 to the US dollar on December 14.[iii] A public relations official in the Raisi administration acknowledged that the protests have increased economic uncertainty and thus fueled this fiscal crisis.[iv]

Iranian media has reported an uptick in some business executives and officials resigning or being arrested or fired in recent weeks. These executives include prominent individuals in the construction, financial services, and steel industries.[v] The Raisi administration replaced the Central Bank of Iran official responsible for the foreign exchange department on December 14 as well.[vi] At least some of these changes are likely tied to the fiscal crisis.

CTP is not prepared to assess how this fiscal crisis may affect the Iranian economy or whether the regime will successfully manage it. This crisis may nevertheless encourage protest coordinators and organizations to consider further strikes and other means of economic pressure against the regime.

President Ebrahim Raisi met with officials from the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters on December 14, likely to discuss cooperation toward addressing the fiscal crisis.[vii] This headquarters is a prominent civil engineering and construction firm controlled directly by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is involved in large swaths of the Iranian economy, including but not limited to port services, oil and gas, drilling, construction, telecommunications, and financial services.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian economy appears to be entering a period of potentially significant disruption.
• UN member states voted to expel Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of Women.
• At least one protest occurred.
• Social media users circulated calls for countrywide strikes and protests on December 19, 20, and 21.
• Iran-affiliated leadership from Lebanon and Iraq met in Baghdad.

Iran Crisis Update, December 13

December 13, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime has replaced key clerics responsible for indoctrinating a significant portion of the security forces, possibly to improve efforts to ideologically control security officers. Senior Iranian cleric Abdollah Hajji Sadeghi appointed three new clerics to key leadership posts in the Basij Organization on December 13.[1] Hajji Sadeghi is responsible for representing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). He appointed:

• Ali Rezaei as supreme leader representative to the Basij Organization;
• Karim Sararfaraz as supreme leader deputy representative to the Basij Organization; and
• Mahmoud Mohammadi Shahroudi as Basij Professors, Students, and Clerics Organization chief.

Khamenei maintains a network of clerical representatives, such as Hajji Sadeghi, who oversee every echelon of the state security services and act as political commissars.[2] They control the security services’ ideological-political training (i.e., indoctrination), the dissemination of propaganda, the spiritual commitment of security personnel, and seek to ensure the services’ subordination to the will of the supreme leader.

It is unclear why Hajji Sadeghi ordered these changes now, although they may be related to the protest crackdown. He may have sought to install new figures to reinforce the ideological commitment of Basij security officers. The Islamic Republic has experienced small-scale defections and insubordinations among security personnel during protest crackdowns throughout its history, and Iranian authorities likely seek to mitigate that risk.[3] The new supreme leader representative to the Basij Organization, Ali Rezaei, is particularly well-positioned to oversee these efforts in the Basij given his experience. Rezaei managed ideological education and training in the Basij before his promotion.[4]

It is noteworthy that Hajji Sadeghi passed over Mahmoud Mohammadi Shahroudi for both the roles of supreme leader representative and deputy representative to the Basij. Shahroudi was the supreme leader deputy representative to the Basij before the latest appointments and would therefore have been a logical candidate to become the new overall supreme leader representative to the Basij. Hajji Sadeghi instead appointed Shahroudi to head the Basij Professors, Students, and Clerics Organization, which Hajji Sadeghi may have meant as a demotion. Hajji Sadegh’s decision to clean house likely reflects his desire to significantly change the regime approach to indoctrinating and monitoring Basij personnel.

Ensuring the ideological subordination and loyalty of Basij personnel is essential to sustaining the regime protest crackdown. The Basij operates quasi-professional paramilitary units that the regime uses to violently suppress dissent and support the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) against protests.[5] These units receive varying levels of ideological-political training and instruction in civil defense, counterinsurgency, and security operations. Losing the loyalty of these security personnel would deprive the regime of a key instrument in its repressive toolkit and possibly strengthen the protest movement if any significant number of those officers provide demonstrators their expertise and support.

The broad mission set of the Basij Organization may complicate regime efforts to find effective commanders and managers for it. The Basij penetrates every segment of Iranian society, with duties that include organizing and recruiting regime supporters, indoctrinating its members, producing state propaganda, conducting moral policing, and suppressing political opposition in addition to its role within the security forces.[6]

Protest coordinators and organizations have planned more anti-regime demonstrations in the coming days. Social media account 1500 Tasvir stated that protesters will commemorate the execution of Mohsen Shekari in Tehran on December 14.[7] The Karaj Neighborhood Youth called for protests on December 15 to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed protester Mehdi Hazrati.[8] The United Neighborhood Youth called for countrywide protests on December 20-21 in response to the execution of arrested protesters.[9]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime appointed key clerics responsible for indoctrinating a significant portion of the security forces, possibly to improve efforts to ideologically subordinate security officers.
• Protest coordinators and organizations have planned more anti-regime demonstrations in the coming days.
• At least eight protests occurred in five cities across five provinces on December 13.
• Tehran Prosecutor General Ali Alghasi Mehr announced that 400 detained protesters were assigned prison sentences.
• The LEC Intelligence Organization announced the arrest of an unspecified number of actors for targeting trucks.
• The Parliamentary Judiciary and Legal Committee approved three articles of a bill that would establish a police force for children and adolescents.

Iran Crisis Update, December 12

December 12, 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime executed a protester for the second time since the Mahsa Amini protests began as part of the regime's effort to deter protest turnout and instill terror among the public. The Judiciary publicly executed 23-year-old Majid Reza Rahnavard on December 12 for “waging war against God” after he killed two security officers.[i] Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei defended the regime’s decision to execute arrested prisoners and instructed judges and judicial authorities to ignore critics on December 12.[ii] Ejei’s remarks reaffirm his commitment to conducting these brutal executions despite some political and religious figures condemning the executions in recent days.[iii] The Judiciary previously executed a protester on December 8.[iv]

The Judiciary allowed the mother of Majid Reza Rahnavard to visit him in prison the day before his execution, possibly as a psychological terror tactic against the protest movement.[v] The Judiciary did not inform Rahnavard or his mother about the imminent execution. This tactic is possibly meant to keep arrested protesters and their families in constant fear.

Protest coordinators and organizations called for snap demonstrations in response to the execution of Majid Reza Rahnavard and seemingly succeeded in generating turnout on short notice. The neighborhood youth groups in Tehran, Karaj, Mashhad called for snap protests after the execution, and small demonstrations occurred in each city. CTP cannot confirm that the neighborhood youth groups and their calls were solely responsible for the demonstrations, however.

The ineffectiveness and brutal nature of the regime protest crackdown have continued to fragment the Iranian political elite. Mohammad Sarafaraz—the former president of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) from 2014-16—criticized the crackdown in a video posted to YouTube on December 10.[vi] IRIB is a prominent state-run media corporation, the head of which is directly appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Sarafaraz reportedly resigned as IRIB president in 2016 over conflicts with Mojtaba Khamenei—the son of the supreme leader.[vii] Sarafaraz in the YouTube video condemned the abuse, arrest, and killing of protesters and the inability of the regime to provide for its people. He specifically blamed Mojtaba Khamenei for the regime’s oppressive policies. Sarafaraz added that he has prepared his will because “some kind of accident. . . may happen to [him]. . . for saying these words.”[viii] Sarafaraz is currently a member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council—a regime policy body responsible for internet regulations and state censorship. CTP previously assessed that the ineffectiveness of the crackdown is allowing and encouraging some in the political and religious establishments to criticize and debate more openly.[ix]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime executed a protester for the second time since the Mahsa Amini protests began as part of the regime effort to deter protest turnout and instill terror among the public.
• Protest coordinators and organizations called for demonstrations in response to the execution of Majid Reza Rahnavard and seemed to have limited success in generating turnout on short notice.
• The ineffectiveness and brutal nature of the regime protest crackdown has continued to fragment Iranian political elite.
• At least seven protests occurred in four cities across four provinces.

Iran Crisis Update, December 11

December 11, 6:00 pm ET

Some Iranian political and religious figures are debating the use of the death penalty against arrested protesters. Various reformist leaders, Qom seminary officials, and prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, among others, have separately criticized death sentences for arrested protesters in recent days.[i] These officials were responding to the Judiciary executing a protester on December 8 for the first time since the Mahsa Amini protests began.[ii] The Judiciary has sentenced at least 10 other arrested protesters to death thus far. No senior official involved in issuing and implementing the death sentences has voiced opposition to them, however, indicating that the regime will likely continue the executions.

These criticisms over the death penalty represent yet another issue dividing parts of the political and religious establishments over the protest crackdown. Iranian leaders have also debated continuing the morality patrol and how much force to use against protesters in recent months, as CTP previously reported.[iii]

Key Takeaways

• Some Iranian political and religious leaders are debating the regime’s use of the death penalty against arrested protesters.
• The ineffectiveness of the regime protest crackdown has likely allowed and encouraged some Iranian officials to criticize and debate more openly.
• Some protest coordinators and organizations called for protests on December 12.
• At least six protests occurred in six cities across six provinces.
• The IRGC claimed to have thwarted a plot to assassinate Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Alam ol Hoda.
• The United Neighborhood Youth released a 43-point political manifesto.
• Protest coordinators and organizations continued trying to divide state security services in support of the protesters.
• The Iranian rial dropped to a new all-time low against the US dollar.

Iran Crisis Update, December 10

December 10, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime is using protester executions to instill terror among the population. The Judiciary upheld a death sentence for 23-year-old Mahan Sadrat Madani on December 10.[1] The regime charged Madani with "waging war against God” after he was arrested for brandishing a knife and protesting. The regime has set this low standard for the death penalty because of how easily protesters can identify with Madani and the nine other demonstrators currently on death row. Iranian authorities likely intend  these executions to deter further protest turnout. This approach could easily backfire on the regime, however. Many protesters will likely sympathize with Madani and the others on death row, possibly inciting further popular unrest.

The regime’s disrespectful handling of the bodies of dead protesters could further inflame popular resentment. The regime has buried many killed protesters—including Mohsen Shekari, whom the regime executed on December 8—in unmarked graves to prevent citizens from gathering at their gravesites.[2] The regime has informed the deceased‘s families of the burial only afterward in many instances. This mistreatment sharply contrasts with the way Iranian leaders are treating Rostam Ghassemi—the former roads and urban development minister and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) brigadier general who died of cancer on December 8.[3] Iranian state media reported that the body of Ghassemi arrived in Tehran on December 10 after he died seeking medical treatment in China.[4] The regime has planned a funeral for Ghassemi on December 11, during which senior political and security leaders will likely gather to pay their respects. Iranian state media will likely cover the funeral and include remarks from senior officials. It is neither surprising nor unusual for the regime to observe the death of a senior IRGC officer in this fashion, but Ghassemi’s treatment seems jarringly tone-deaf considering the regime’s unnecessary and intentional mistreatment of dead protesters.

Prominent Iraqi Shia cleric and spiritual leader Ali al Sistani reportedly expressed concern about “the situation in Iran and the Shia religion,” according to reformist Iranian cleric Mohammad Ashrafi Esfahani on December 10.[5] Esfahani added that Sistani sent messages to regime leadership about the protests but has not received a response. Esfahani claimed that Sistani made these remarks to him while meeting in Iraq. Sistani is Iraq’s most senior Shia religious authority and has many followers across Iran and Iraq. It is unclear whether Esfahani accurately conveyed Sistani’s comments, but even the impression that Sistani supports the protesters and has criticized the regime crackdown could stoke further public opposition to the Islamic Republic and undermine the regime among religious Iranians. Certain segments of the Iranian clerical establishment have already criticized the regime over the death of Mahsa Amini and the protest crackdown, as CTP previously reported.[6]

Sistani has not formally commented on the protests thus far nor has he commented on past major protest waves in Iran. Sistani has occasionally issued public statements clarifying his position when individuals attribute comments to him.[7] Sistani could signal his approval of Esfahani’s claims silently if Sistani does not issue a public statement on the matter in the coming days.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime is using protester executions to instill terror among the population.
• The regime’s disrespectful handling of the bodies of dead protesters could further inflame popular resentment.
• Prominent Iraqi Shia cleric and spiritual leader Ali al Sistani reportedly expressed concern about “the situation in Iran and the Shia religion,” according to reformist Iranian cleric Mohammad Ashrafi Esfahani.
• At least 15 protests took place in nine cities across nine provinces.
• The Karaj Neighborhood Youth seemed to successfully coordinate demonstrations.
• Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement Majid Mir Ahmadi stated that over 20,000 security officers have been injured in the protests.

Iran Crisis Update, December 9

December 9, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Mass protester arrests and detentions are likely impacting protest turnout. An anti-regime Iranian human rights organization estimated in November that over 18,000 Iranians had been arrested for acts of dissidence since the Mahsa Amini protest wave commenced on September 16.[i] The regime has repeatedly promoted the arrest of individuals it claims to be protest organizers as well. The Qom Province IRGC Intelligence Organization announced on December 8 that it had arrested leaders of an anti-regime protest organization that was active on social media, for example.[ii] The arrest of protesters—particularly within key nodes of protest organizations—may have resulted in lower turnout for anti-regime demonstrations planned for December 5-7. Significant strike activity documented on these dates suggests that protest organizers are still capable of coordinating widespread acts of anti-regime defiance, however.[iii]

Some social media users voiced skepticism of groups purporting to represent local protest organizations on social media, reflecting the complex information environment in which dissidents are operating. The Neighborhood Youth of Karaj group issued a statement acknowledging distrust of the organization on December 9. The group claimed that it did not advertise a protest in Karaj, Alborz Province on December 8 because the protest was coordinated by regime actors.[iv] CTP cannot verify the authenticity of this protest group, nor can most protesters. However, the group’s statement and subsequent exchanges with its followers suggest that protest coordinators are being held accountable for their perceived successes and failures as they learn to operate in a heavily censored information space.[v] These exchanges also highlight efforts by Iranians to verify or discredit organizations with online presences. This process is vital for the success of the protest movement considering the real risk that regime agents posing as protest organizations could misdirect protesters.  It also adds an additional vulnerability to the movement, however, because the regime can use agents to cause mistrust of legitimate protest groups. Iranians are likely using a hybrid approach to validating calls for protests that involves both online and direct person-to-person communications.

The Iranian regime may exploit the death of a Sunni cleric to crack down on acts of dissidence in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Unidentified assailants reportedly kidnapped, shot, and killed Khash city Sunni Friday Prayer Leader Moulavi Abdol Vahed Rigi in the vicinity of Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on December 8. Pro-regime media outlets described Rigi as a “martyr” and circulated footage of Rigi showing support for Khamenei with Friday Prayer Leader Policy Council Chief Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari in November.[vi] The Supreme Leader dispatched a high-ranking delegation headed by Ali Akbari to Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 13 in a likely effort to escalate against prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, who has repeatedly voiced support for anti-regime demonstrations since Mahsa Amini’s death on September 16.[vii]

Some social media users alleged that regime actors killed Rigi, although there is no evidence to corroborate this claim.[viii] A state-run media outlet suggested that armed groups killed Rigi in an attempt to foment religious divisions within the province, citing a clip wherein Rigi alluded to threats he had received from unnamed terrorist groups.[ix] Pro-regime social media actors additionally accused Abdol Hamid’s followers of killing Rigi for supporting Khamenei.[x] The regime may seek to frame Abdol Hamid and his followers for Rigi’s death in an attempt to undermine Abdol Hamid’s popularity throughout Sistan and Baluchistan. Iranian leadership may also use Rigi’s death to justify violently suppressing protests throughout the province.

Iran Crisis Update, December 8

December 8, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime executed a protester on December 8 for the first time since the Mahsa Amini protests began. The Judiciary announced the execution of 23-year-old Mohsen Shekari after convicting him of “waging war against God.” Security forces arrested Shekari for blocking a road and attacking a security officer with a machete during protests in Tehran in September 2022.[i]

The regime is likely using the execution to deter protest participation and instill fear in demonstrators. The execution and the manner in which it was carried out could have the opposite effect, however. Social media reports indicate that neither Shekari nor his family were informed of his impending execution beforehand and that the regime disposed of his body, depriving his family of the opportunity to bury him and of the location of a grave at which to mourn him.[ii] Protest coordinators and organizations condemned the execution and promised to avenge Shekari.[iii] The regime likely sought to avoid giving protesters the opportunity to rally in advance of Shekari’s execution and to deprive them of a gravesite around which to rally future commemoration ceremonies that could in turn become demonstrations.  The covert burial of Shekari, however, opens possibilities for protesters to choose to commemorate him at any location or several. The regime has sentenced 10 other arrested protesters to death at the time of this writing and thus could conduct additional executions in the coming weeks.[iv] Executions could reinvigorate the ongoing protests in the same way that funerals and commemoration ceremonies for killed protesters have.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime executed a protester on December 8 for the first time since the Mahsa Amini protests began.
• At least nine protests took place in seven cities across six provinces.
• Two Iranian security personnel have died since December 7.
• Hossein Taeb discussed the alleged Western-Israeli hybrid war against Iran.

Iran Crisis Update, December 7

December 7, 2022 | 7:00 pm ET

Anti-regime strikes and demonstrations sustained momentum on December 7 as nation-wide calls to protest entered their third and final day. Social media users documented significant strike activity in commercial centers throughout Iran on December 7, in line with the calls from protest coordinators and organizations for countrywide strikes from December 5 – 7. Protest activity similarly continued into December 7, particularly among university students. CTP documented larger crowd sizes on December 7 than on December 5 and 6, although fewer overall protests occurred on December 7 than on December 5, a pattern corresponding to some protest organizations’ calls for more concentrated demonstrations on the last day.

Protest activity on December 7 largely adhered to instructions issued by various local protest organization groups, albeit on a smaller scale than called for. Social media users documented protest activity in the vicinity of Azadi Square on December 7, mirroring instructions provided by online protest groups. Protesters formed in smaller groups throughout Tehran before marching to Azadi square, similarly mirroring the organization group’s calls for localized groups separately meeting at a common location. Tehran and Esfahan protest participants did not engage in chants and were largely masked and wearing dark colors as called for by some organizers, demonstrating the capability of the protest organizations to generate coordinated acts of anti-regime defiance.  

Some social media users are circulating renewed calls for silent, anti-regime demonstrations on December 10, although these calls have not yet been endorsed by prominent protest organization groups.

Regime officials and entities defended protracted internet restrictions as a means to quell unrest on December 7. President Ebrahim Raisi endorsed cyber censorship and restrictions in a Tehran University address aimed at commemorating Student’s Day on 7. Raisi asserted that businesses should be pressured into using domestic social media platforms and insinuated that internet restrictions would subside if protest activity ceases. Social media users claimed that security personnel vetted and approved speech attendees and documented large crowds of Tehran University students protesting Raisi’s speech. Raisi’s comments coincide with reports that the Iranian National Cyberspace Center issued an ultimatum to Meta platforms on December 7. The National Cyberspace Center is an entity subordinate to Iran’s Supreme Cyberspace Council, which is responsible for crafting policies that limit domestic access to online media outlets and social media platforms. The National Cyberspace Center accused Meta of violating Iranian sovereignty and stated that it must nominate a representative to Iran by December 17. The center’s warning may presage prolonged internet restrictions as the regime seeks to prevent further unrest and preempt greater coordination among protest organization groups.

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity on December 7 largely adhered to instructions issued by various local protest organization groups, demonstrating the capability of the protest organizations to generate coordinated acts of anti-regime defiance.
• Regime officials and entities defended ongoing internet restrictions as a means to quell unrest on December 7.
• At least 19 protests took place in 13 cities across nine provinces on December 7.
• An anti-regime outlet claimed that some Iranian officials are arranging for asylum in Venezuela in the event of regime change.
• The sister of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a public letter on December 7 urging security personnel to defect in support of anti-regime protesters.
• Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib accused German officials of supporting anti-regime dissident groups in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iran Crisis Update, December 6

December 6, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Countrywide strikes continued throughout Iran on December 6. The extent of the ongoing strikes demonstrates the continued momentum of the protest movement even though strikes do not appear as dramatic as crowded demonstrations in images and videos. The regime has threatened strikers but cannot easily force them to stop.[1] Some businesses and shops that have not been able to close completely have instead refused customers service and transactions, according to some journalists.[2]

Protest turnout decreased significantly, however, possibly due to divisions and poor planning in the protest movement. CTP recorded protests in around five cities on December 6, despite widely-circulated calls for demonstrations from protest coordinators and organizations.[3] Social media users indicated that some protesters were confused about the planned protests and others disagreed with designated locations.[4] The relative uptick in protests and strikes that began on December 6 will likely continue on December 7, but protest coordinators and organizations will need to overcome these shortcomings if they are to sustain this movement.[5]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council (SCCR) on December 6, possibly to discuss the morality patrol and mandatory hijab law.[6] Khamenei called for cultural reconstruction during the meeting but did not explicitly mention the morality patrol or hijab requirement. The SCCR is a regime policy body that prepares resolutions on cultural, religious, and social affairs, which Parliament then approves or rejects. SCCR members include President Ebrahim Raisi, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei--all of whom attended the meeting with Khamenei. Khamenei may have issued a final decision on whether to continue the morality patrol during the meeting. Prosecutor General Mohammad Javad Montazeri previously stated on December 1 that Parliament and the SCCR would issue an opinion on the subject by December 16.[7]

Western observers should avoid overstating a potential regime decision to end the morality patrol and misframing it as a meaningful concession. The regime would likely enforce the mandatory hijab law through various other means. Some regime officials have discussed using surveillance cameras with facial-recognition software to identify women not properly following the hijab requirement, as CTP previously reported.[8] A parliamentarian suggested that the regime could block the bank accounts of repeat offenders.[9] It is furthermore unclear whether a regime concession on the morality patrol would satisfy protesters given the wide range of their frustrations and grievances against the political establishment. The regime may, in fact, be attempting to put the issue of hijab back at the center of public discourse in the hopes of obfuscating or diverting the increasingly political and revolutionary tone of the protest movement.

Key Takeaways

• Countrywide strikes continued throughout Iran.
• Protest turnout decreased significantly, however, possibly due to divisions and poor planning in the protest movement.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, possibly to discuss the morality patrol and mandatory hijab law.
• At least 13 protests took place in five cities across five provinces.
• Judiciary spokesperson Massoud Setayeshi announced the issuance of death sentences to five arrested protesters.

Iran Crisis Update, December 5

December 5, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Protest activity and strikes in Iran increased significantly on December 5—in line with the calls from protest coordinators and organizations for countrywide demonstrations until December 7. These strikes are the most reported in a single day since CTP began publishing daily updates on September 28. This dramatic increase in public expressions of dissent will likely continue until at least December 7. The latest protest activity and strikes highlight once again the capability of the protest coordinators and organizations to generate countrywide demonstrations against the regime—even after a few days of reduced protests and strikes.

The regime responded to the increased protest activity and strikes by downplaying their extent and threatening them. Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), reported that only few strikes occurred on December 5. Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei ordered the relevant authorities to identify, arrest, and prosecute protesters organizing and promoting the countrywide strikes “quickly and decisively.” Ejei accused protesters of coercing and manipulating the owners of businesses and shops to strike.

Iranian media and officials published conflicting messages on December 5 on whether the regime will abolish the morality patrol. The spokesperson for the Enjoining Good and Forbidding Wrong Headquarters, Ali Khan Mohammadi, stated that the “mission [of the guidance patrol] has ended.” This headquarters is responsible for determining and enforcing certain religious and social standards in Iran. Reformist-affiliated newspaper Ham Mihan contrastingly reported that morality patrols have increased in Qom. The spokesperson for the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Tehran Provincial unit refused to clarify the status of the morality patrol in a call with a journalist. This inconsistent reporting suggests that the regime may have either failed to coordinate its messaging properly or has not yet reached a consensus over whether to continue the morality patrol.

Prosecutor General Mohammad Javad Montazeri stated on December 1 that Parliament and the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council will announce an opinion on the mandatory hijab law by December 16—leaving the possibility that the regime will announce changes to the morality patrol by then.

The regime will likely maintain and continue enforcing its mandatory hijab law regardless of whether it abolishes the morality patrol, however. Regime officials have suggested using facial recognition technologies for such enforcement. Khan Mohammadi discussed using new enforcement methods, such as advanced technologies, likely referring to the face-recognizing surveillance cameras that the regime has installed in cities and towns throughout Iran. The secretary of the Enjoining Good and Forbidding Wrong Headquarters, Mohammad Saleh Hashemi Golpayegani, previously suggested using facial recognition software to enforce the mandatory hijab law in August 2022.

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity and strikes increased significantly—in line with the calls from protest coordinators and organizations for countrywide demonstrations until December 7.
• Iranian media and officials published conflicting messages on whether the regime will abolish the morality patrol.
• At least 29 protests took place in 18 cities across 16 provinces.
• Social media users reported significant countrywide strikes in 73 cities across 27 provinces, although this number is almost certainly higher.
• The Mashhad and Karaj neighborhood youth groups called on protesters to identify and mark businesses and shops not participating in the countrywide strikes.
• LEC Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Ghanbari announced the death of an LEC officer who unidentified gunmen attacked and injured in Chabahar.

Iran Crisis Update, December 4

December 4, 2022 | 5:30 pm ET

Western media inaccurately reported that the Iranian regime abolished its morality patrol on December 4.[1] The regime has not made such a concession. Western outlets misinterpreted remarks from Prosecutor General Mohammad Javad Montazeri on December 3. Montazeri noted in response to a journalist’s question that security forces have reduced morality patrols in recent months—a statement that some Western media has mistakenly framed as confirmation that the regime abolished the patrols.[2] Iranian state media later clarified that Montazeri was only acknowledging the reduced morality patrols rather than announcing an end to the program.[3] No other Iranian official has indicated that the regime has ended the patrol.

The regime could still offer limited concessions, such as relaxed veiling enforcement, to quell the ongoing protests. Montazeri stated on December 1 that Parliament and the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council will announce an opinion on the mandatory hijab law by December 16.[4]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would likely view any such reform as temporary pragmatism to ensure regime survival. Khamenei has continually argued that the regime has not yet sufficiently ideologized the population, framing social indoctrination as the true solution to many of Iran’s problems.[5] Khamenei has popularized within regime discourse since 2019 the notion that the Islamic Republic has entered a new phase in which the government and society must reaffirm and strengthen their commitment to the state’s revolutionary and religious ideals.[6] The idea that the regime under Khamenei will relax policies such as mandatory veiling is fundamentally incompatible with his vision for the future.

Thirty neighborhood youth groups announced the formation of an umbrella organization—the Neighborhood Youth Alliance—on December 4.[7] The alliance stated that its objectives are ”to coordinate planning to advance the revolution to victory and also create the necessary infrastructure to manage the country’s affairs during the critical periods of the transition of power.” The alliance emphasized its support for a democratic government and universal human rights. The emergence of the Neighborhood Youth Alliance reflects the growing organization of parts of the protest movement and indicates the possible emergence of more centralized leadership.

Inclement weather may negatively affect turnout during the planned protests on December 5-7. Many cities and towns across Iran, including Tehran, are forecasted to receive cold weather and precipitation—rain and snow—throughout the day on December 5.[8] Such conditions could reduce the length and size of the planned protests.

Key Takeaways

• Western media inaccurately reported that the regime abolished its morality patrol.
• Thirty neighborhood youth groups announced the formation of an umbrella organization—the Neighborhood Youth Alliance.
• Inclement weather may negatively affect turnout during the planned protests on December 5-7.
• At least nine protests took place in nine cities across seven provinces.
• Law Enforcement Command Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Ghanbari announced that unidentified gunmen attacked and injured two LEC officers in Chabahar.
• Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani met with several prominent hardline, moderate, and reformist politicians likely to discuss cooperation to quell the protests.
• Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs Majid Mir Ahmadi tried to emphasize the economic consequences of the protests, possibly to fracture the protest movement.
• The office of prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid released a statement trying to dissociate his criticism of the regime from Baloch separatistism.

Iran Crisis Update, December 3

December 3 | 5:30 pm ET

Protest coordinators and organizations continued issuing guidance on December 3 in preparation for the planned countrywide protests and strikes on December 5-7. The Hamedan Neighborhood Youth posted instructions on how to make hand-thrown explosives, Molotov cocktails, and pepper spray.[i] The Karaj Neighborhood Youth and others published maps of planned protest locations.[ii] The Shiraz Neighborhood Youth advised citizens to prepare basic necessities and cash for themselves given the planned strikes.[iii]

Iran Crisis Update, December 2

December 2 | 5:00 pm ET

The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth issued further instructions for the planned protests on December 5-7. The Mashhad group called for street protests on December 5, protests moving toward and occupying government buildings on December 6, and countrywide protests and marches in solidarity with university students on December 7. These instructions partially mirror those distributed by the Tehran Neighborhood Youth, which similarly differentiated planned protest activities by day, as CTP previously reported.

The Mashhad group provided additional guidance on how to degrade the regime’s capability to crack down on protests on December 2. The group called on protesters to target security forces on motorcycles, noting the importance of motorcycle units to the regime protest crackdown. Some of the most elite regime security units, such as the Basij Imam Ali battalions, use motorcycles to disperse and intimidate crowds and rapidly traverse busy city streets. The regime formed some of these units after the Green Movement in 2009, specifically to improve its effectiveness in suppressing protests in dense urban areas. The Mashhad group previously called on its ”operational teams” to destroy CCTV cameras to prevent the state security services from using them to identify protesters on December 1.

The behavior of the Mashhad Neighborhood Youth suggests that it may be more coordinated and organized than some other youth groups in the protest movement. The Mashhad group has repeatedly issued guidance and instructions to its operational teams since November 2022, as CTP previously reported, in addition to advising protesters. The Mashhad group was also the first and second signatory of the joint youth group statements issued on November 22 and 27, respectively, suggesting that the group may have played a role in organizing the statements among the youth groups.

Anti-regime outlet Iran International published an article on December 2 suggesting that the regime is struggling to sustain the necessary equipment and manpower to continue its protest crackdown. The article reported that the regime has sought advisors and the purchase of protest suppression equipment from Russia to support the crackdown. Senior US officials warned on October 26 that Russia may advise the regime protest crackdown. The Iran International article separately reported that an unidentified senior IRGC officer claimed that the IRGC tried to mobilize 1,000 retired personnel for the crackdown to mitigate manpower shortages, but that only 300 retirees were willing to help. Iran International previously reported on October 14 that the IRGC called on retirees to report to the Mohammad Rasoul Ollah headquarters—the IRGC unit responsible for security in Tehran Province. CTP cannot verify any of the reports from Iran International.

Key Takeaways

• The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth issued further instructions for the planned protests on December 5-7.
• The behavior of the Mashhad Neighborhood Youth suggests that it may be more coordinated and organized than some other youth groups in the protest movement.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International published an article suggesting that the regime is struggling to shore up the necessary equipment and manpower to continue its protest crackdown.
• At least seven protests took place in seven cities across six provinces on December 2.
• Unidentified individuals attacked Deputy Industry, Mining, and Trade Minister for General Industries Mohammad Mehdi Baradaran on his way home.
• Prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid condemned the regime’s protest suppression response in his Friday prayer sermon in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Prosecutor General Mohammad Javad Montazeri stated that Parliament and the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council will announce an opinion on the mandatory hijab law by December 17.

Iran Crisis Update, December 1

December 1 | 5:00 pm ET

Protesters in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province rhetorically defended prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid against the regime on December 1, underscoring the dilemma the regime faces in its protest crackdown. Protesters gathered and erected a large poster of Abdol Hamid in a city square. The poster read that Abdol Hamid is the protesters’ “red line,” implying that they will not tolerate the regime arresting him or suppressing his message. The protesters may be responding to the purported internal regime memo that the Black Reward hacker group released on November 30. The memo reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tried to discredit and threatened to arrest Abdol Hamid for his role in inspiring protests, although CTP cannot verify these claims. Abdol Hamid’s message is seemingly resonating with a growing number of Iranians, especially in the Iranian Sunni community. Any regime action to silence him risks inflaming protests and anti-regime frustrations further. The regime may target individuals close to Abdol Hamid as a less escalatory step to silence him.  The protestors today posed an additional dilemma for the regime, however, since failure to act against Abdol Hamid after the erection of the poster could make it appear that the regime was daunted by the protester threats and thus encourage similar defiance and threats elsewhere.

The Raisi administration may be conducting a purge of local officials across Iran to install more loyal cadres. Parliamentarian Jalal Mahmoud Zadeh accused President Ebrahim Raisi and Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi of conducting this purge in some towns such as Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province on December 1. Raisi has historically used his authorities in different regime positions to purge political opponents. Mahmoud Zadeh represents Mahabad in Parliament and has previously criticized the security forces’ crackdown there. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed conventional ground units to violently suppress protesters in Mahabad on November 19, as CTP previously reported.

The Raisi administration may be trying to remove local officials who opposed the brutality of the regime crackdown. IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported on October 19 that two percent of arrested protesters were government employees.

Key Takeaways

• Protesters in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province rhetorically defended prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid against the regime.
• The Raisi administration may be conducting a purge of local officials across Iran to install more loyal cadres.
• At least five protests took place in four cities across four provinces.
• Neighborhood youth groups disseminated instructions on how to prevent state security services from collecting intelligence on protesters in preparation for the planned protests on December 5-7.

Iran Crisis Update, November 30

November 30, 2022 | 5:30 pm ET

Protest activity may increase on December 5-7. An increasingly wide range of protest coordinators and organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations on these days. These organizers include neighborhood youth groups and Shirin—a Persian-language social media account that previously tweeted a political manifesto calling for the establishment of a democratic, secular Iranian republic.[i] Protest activity did not surge during the last planned demonstrations on November 24-26, however, possibly due to poor coordination.[ii]

The recent calls for protests may highlight the increasing organization and sophistication of the protest movement as well as some fractures. Thirty neighborhood youth groups published a joint statement on November 27 announcing the planned protests on December 5-7.[iii] More neighborhood youth groups signed this joint statement than the last one on November 22, which had 29 signatories.[iv] A neighborhood youth group from Tehran notably signed the November 22 statement but not the November 27 one—the only group missing from the original 29 signatories. The Karaj neighborhood youth group refused to explain when a social media user asked why the Tehran group did not sign the second statement.[v]

The nature of the planned protests furthermore suggests that at least some protest organizers are adapting to more effectively counter regime repression. The Tehran Neighborhood Youth released on November 30 its own call for demonstrations on December 5-7 and offered more specific instructions.[vi]The group advised against simultaneous protests and strikes because the reduction in regular traffic caused by strikes allows security forces to more easily crack down. The group accordingly called for countrywide strikes on December 5, scattered protests on December 6, and concentrated protests around universities on December 7.

Anti-regime outlet Iran International published on November 30 a purportedly internal regime memo discussing the protests.[vii] Iran International claimed that it received the document from Black Reward—the anti-regime group that hacked Fars News Agency and claimed to have recovered internal data, documents, and files on November 25.[viii] CTP cannot verify this document and is treating it with great skepticism. We offer no assessment of its authenticity apart from noting that the style and word choice of portions of the document seem unusual for native Persian speakers. We are nevertheless reporting some of the key points of the document to make them accessible in English.[ix] The document claims the following:

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei believes that protests will continue for the foreseeable future. Khamenei called on the state security apparatus to more effectively fight in the “media war” against the West.
• Khamenei criticized President Ebrahim Raisi, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami over their handling of the protests. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized Raisi’s indecisiveness.
• Khamenei ordered the regime to discredit prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid for his role in inspiring protests. Khamenei ordered Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari to threaten to arrest Abdol Hamid after he refused to stop publicly criticizing the regime.
• The Interior Ministry found that most Iranians do not believe the protests will soon end nor do they trust state media. The ministry also concluded many protesters are no longer afraid of the security forces.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US-sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi (AQR) Custodian Ahmad Marvi in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province on November 30, possibly to discuss commercial or financial cooperation.[x] AQR is a parastatal economic conglomerate that is responsible for the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad and controls a vast network of commercial interests active in agriculture, energy, financial services, information technology, and manufacturing.[xi] AQR is a “vital economic artery” for regime officials and has ties to the IRGC.[xii] Marvi is a close associate of Supreme Leader Khamenei and has headed AQR since March 2019.[xiii] The US has sanctioned both AQR and Marvi for their ties to Khamenei.[xiv] Iranian state media has not explicitly reported on the Sudani-Marvi meeting at the time of this writing but has published photos depicting the two together.[xv]

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity may increase on December 5-7.
• The recent calls for protests may highlight the increasing organization and sophistication of the protest movement as well as some fractures.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International published a purportedly internal regime memo discussing the protests.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US-sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi (AQR) Custodian Ahmad Marvi in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, possibly to discuss commercial or financial cooperation.
• At least nine protests took place in seven cities across six provinces.
• An Intelligence and Security Ministry member died due to an unspecified cause in Zabol, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

Iran Crisis Update, November 29

November 29, 2022 | 5:30 pm ET

Some Iranian protesters celebrated the US victory over Iran in the World Cup on November 29. Iranians in Alborz, Kermanshah, Kurdistan, and Tehran provinces, among other locations, cheered and gathered during and after the match in opposition to the Iranian national team.[i] Some reportedly launched fireworks in Saghez, Kurdistan Province after the American team scored a goal.[ii] CTP cannot assess how widespread this sentiment may be among Iranian protesters, but the reported celebrations indicate how politicized the Iranian national soccer team has become among at least some protesters. Iranian citizens cheering a US victory over Iran underscores the depth of popular frustration against the regime.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its proxies in Iraq threatened on November 29 to incite conflict and unrest in Saudi Arabia—especially among the Shia population—likely in retaliation for the alleged Saudi role in stoking protests in Iran. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel accused the Saudi government of planning to suppress Shia culture and identity on Tarout Island—an island off the Saudi coast in the Persian Gulf.[iii] The Telegram channel reported that Tarout Island is predominantly Shia. Iranian proxy Kataib Hezbollah furthermore called for regional countries ”victimized” by Saudi Arabia “to transfer conflict from their countries to the streets of Riyadh.”[iv]

Key Takeaways

• Some Iranian protesters celebrated the US victory over Iran in the World Cup.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its proxies in Iraq threatened to incite conflict and unrest in Saudi Arabia—especially among the Shia population—likely in retaliation the alleged Saudi role in stoking protests in Iran.
• At least nine protests took place in eight cities across seven provinces.
• Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid continues to inspire public displays of dissent in the Iranian Sunni population.
• A Basij member died due to an unspecified cause around Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani paid an official visit to Tehran likely to discuss Iranian drone and missile strikes into Iraqi Kurdistan and related security issues with senior Iranian officials.

Iran Crisis Update, November 28

Social media users circulated calls for protests following the US-Iran world cup match on November 29 although it is unclear to what extent these demonstrations will materialize. Some protest organization groups and other prominent social media users circulated calls for protests on November 29, possibly in an attempt to coopt or challenge pro-regime celebrations on city streets. Some social media users disagreed with the November 29 call to protests and highlighted pre-organized protests scheduled for December 5-7. Another anti-regime social media user circulated ways to support the protest movement until demonstrations resume on December 5, further suggesting that protesters remain focused on unrest planned for December 5-7. The Neighborhood Youth of Karaj protest organization similarly alluded to requiring more time to reinforce its organizational capabilities and supplies before protests resume on December 5, as CTP previously reported. Recent social media activity from groups purporting to be protest organizations suggest diverging approaches to coordinating unrest, one of which calls for large crowds and emphasizes continuous protest activity, the other of which seemingly requires more time and preparation. This rhetorical schism could indicate that protest organization groups remain primarily local and lack a coherent, nation-wide structure.

Anti-regime Black Reward hacker group claimed to have leaked a conversation between Basij Deputy Commander Ghassem Ghoureishi and state-affiliated media actors referencing intra-regime fissures over ongoing protests. Black Reward claimed a cyberattack on IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency’s website on November 25, which Fars later confirmed. The recorded discussion between Ghoureishi and his subordinates purportedly originated from Fars’ digital archives. The two-and-a-half-hour-long audio file confirmed extensive protest activity and other acts of defiance on November 15, including significant strikes in 22 of Iran’s 31 provinces and almost complete store closures in Tehran city. Ghouresishi additionally stated that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, President Ebrahim Raisi, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately met with reformists at unspecified dates, possibly corroborating prior reporting that senior Iranian officials had met with prominent reformists to discuss strategies to quell ongoing unrest. The audio file also referenced directives allegedly given by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to violently crack down on dissent. One of the speakers noted that Khamenei complained that members of the Expediency Discernment Council—a council that mediates between regime entities and advises the supreme leader—had failed to condemn demonstrations and separately warned LEC Commander Hossein Ashtari against failing to sufficiently suppress protests. The conversation similarly included referenced waning morale among security personnel.

Black Reward has previously described itself as a group of anti-regime Iranian hackers who support the Mahsa Amini protest movement, although no entity has been able to confirm the group’s identity nor the veracity of their information. The group previously claimed to have hacked sensitive information relating to the Iranian nuclear program on October 21. CTP cannot authenticate Black Reward’s leaked audio file. The conversation does allude to intra-regime fractures congruent with CTP’s prior reporting and assessments, however, and is completely plausible if not verifiable. CTP does not regard this audio file as independent confirmation of previous assessments, however, as it has not been authenticated by any reputable actor.

The Iranian regime is coordinating with Qatari officials to suppress public acts of defiance among Iranians in Doha, including members of the Iranian national football team. An anonymous FIFA security official told CNN that IRGC members chastised Iranian players for failing to sing the national anthem in the November 21 match against England, suggesting that Qatar either assisted with or permitted IRGC extraterritorial operations in Doha. The source added that Iranian officials had threatened to torture the family members of Iran team players who demonstrated sympathy with anti-regime protesters and forbade them from interacting with foreigners. The New York Times similarly reported on November 21 that Qatari officials banned Iranian fans from attending matches if they possessed pre-1979 Iranian flags, further corroborating reports of Qatari-Iranian cooperation to suppress anti-regime activity in Doha. Anti-regime outlet Iran International additionally published a November 27 report claiming that Iranian and Qatari officials secretly coordinated to control which Iranians attend the World Cup matches. The November 27 report included the leaked Black Reward audio file allegedly featuring Ghoureishi, wherein an official claimed that Basij officials had identified over 500 "counterrevolutionaries” attending the tournament. Ghoureishi claimed that Qatari officials promised to prevent Iranian attendees from displaying pre-1979 flags and engaging in other acts of dissent.

Key Takeaways

• Social media users circulated calls for protests following the US-Iran world cup match on November 29, although it is unclear to what extent these demonstrations will materialize.
• The anti-regime Black Reward hacker group claimed to have leaked a conversation between Basij Deputy Commander Ghassem Ghoureishi and state-affiliated media actors referencing intra-regime fissures over ongoing protests.
• The Iranian regime is coordinating with Qatari officials to suppress public acts of defiance among Iranians in Doha, including members of the Iranian national football team.
• At least 10 protests took place in six cities across six provinces on November 28.
• Social media users documented trucker strikes throughout Iran for the third consecutive day.
• IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir Ali Haji Zadeh announced that over 300 protesters and security personnel have died since anti-regime protests began on September 16, although this number is almost certainly higher.
• The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has stationed security forces at the Iran-Iraq border, decreasing the likelihood of an IRGC ground incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iran Crisis Update, November 27

Iranian protest organization groups may be reinforcing their organizational capabilities as protest activity entered a relative lull over the past several days. The Neighborhood Youth of Karaj issued a statement on November 26 suggesting that nation-wide calls for protests on November 24-26, which failed to significantly increase protest turnout, were poorly coordinated. The group stated that it had endorsed calls for protests on these dates but was not responsible for organizing them. Its statement suggested, in fact, that at least one such call that was attributed to it was a fake. 

Calls for protests on November 24-26 suggested that protesters congregate in large crowds on pre-designated streets.[i] The advance notice would have likely provided security personnel with ample time to prepare, thereby increasing the risk to protest participants as CTP previously observed.[ii] Calls for large crowds concentrated in a single location would have additionally decreased the effectiveness of the protests, as the scattered nature of anti-regime demonstrations has strained security forces’ limited bandwidth over the past several weeks. The Neighborhood Youth of Karaj‘s hints that unknown actors published a call for more dangerous and less effective protests in its name raise the possibility that pro-regime actors might be attempting to shape protest efforts in ways that would facilitate regime crackdowns, although the group makes no such accusation. It is also possible that some other group or individual sympathetic to the protest movement issued the ”fake” call unwisely but without ill intent.

The Neighborhood Youth of Karaj added that its organization consisted of field leaders and researchers who carefully selected protest dates and locations, suggesting that some anti-regime protest groups have established organizational structures.[iii] The group’s statement endorsed calls for protests on December 5-7, possibly providing the group with enough time to regenerate necessary organizational capabilities and/or supplies. Another anti-regime social media user that frequently circulates calls for protests urged protesters to practice patience, start recruiting members, and collect ammunition in preparation for the next protest wave.[iv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian protest organization groups may be reinforcing their organizational capabilities as protest activity entered a relative lull over the past several days.
• At least six protests took place in four cities across four provinces on November 27.
• IRGC Commander Hossein Salami warned Israel, Saudi Arabia, the US and the UK against supporting anti-regime protests in a speech to Basij members in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Regime and IRGC media channels published a video threatening to attack Azerbaijan using rhetoric common during the Iran-Iraq War.
• Cultural and parliamentary entities have proposed legal measures to expedite the suppression of protesters and reward elite members of the regime.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia Al Sudani will travel to Tehran on November 29 ostensibly to mediate tensions between Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Iran Crisis Update, November 26

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly rejected the possibility of compromise or reform to placate the ongoing protests on November 26. Khamenei reiterated his hard line on the protests and his accusation that foreign actors incited the unrest. He ended his speech with a Quranic verse that social media users interpreted as further affirmation that he will not make concessions.[i] Khamenei made these remarks in a meeting with Basij members and lauded their role in protest suppression.

Khamenei may have meant to use his speech to signal to other senior regime officials his disapproval of cooperating with reformists to quell the protests. Some regime power centers have signaled their willingness to cooperate with reformists and possibly implement limited reform in recent weeks. President Ebrahim Raisi and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani discussed implementing unspecified “liberalizing measures” with reformist leaders, including members of the Khomeini and Rafsanjani families, in exchange for help quelling protests in late October and possibly early November, according to the Wall Street Journal.[ii] Other senior regime officials, including Mojtaba Khamenei, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi have met with reformist politicians in recent days as well.[iii] If true, it is noteworthy that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has seemingly not yet agreed to meet with reformists given that many of his counterparts across the Islamic Republic have. A prominent journal published by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) furthermore responded positively on November 21 to former reformist President Mohammad Khatami’s calls for dialogue to address protester grievances.[iv]

Khamenei has conversely rejected reformist outreach. Mohammad Ali Abtahi—who is a close political associate of Khatami—stated on November 26 that Khatami wrote a letter to Khamenei about the protests.[v] Abtahi added that “there is no sign that [Khamenei] has considered” the letter. Khamenei’s apparent rejection of Khatami may indicate a divide between the supreme leader and some of his subordinates over how to engage the reformists. One should not overstate any such potential disagreement, however. It is highly unlikely that any senior regime officials considering cooperation with reformists would disobey or ignore Khamenei’s orders.

Many regime officials support Khamenei’s uncompromising stance toward the protests, on the other hand. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi expressed implicit support for the regime using more brutality in the protest crackdown on November 21.[vi] Some hardline media outlets have similarly called for security forces to use less restraint against protesters.[vii] This rhetoric indicates that at least some regime circles prefer more repression rather than limited reform.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly rejected the possibility of compromise or reform to placate the ongoing protests. Khamenei may have meant to use his speech to signal to other senior regime officials his disapproval of cooperating with reformists to quell the protests.
• President Ebrahim Raisi visited members of the Basij special forces on November 25, confirming their involvement in the protest crackdown.
• Protest coordinators and organizations have called for protests throughout Iran from December 5 to 7.
• Protests centered primarily around universities, highlighting once again the different demographics that comprise the protest movement
• At least 15 protests took place in four cities across four provinces.
• Dozens of local leaders from Baneh, Kurdistan Province issued a video statement condemning the regime crackdown and expressing support for the protesters.
• Iranian-backed militants fired two rockets at US patrol base in Hasaka Province, Syria.

Iran Crisis Update, November 25

Protests continued but did not surge across Iran on November 24 and 25 despite calls for protests. Protest coordinators and organizations called for countrywide demonstrations from November 24-26 in solidarity with the protesters in Kurdistan Province.[i] Some protest organizations requested that protesters congregate on the main streets in each city, possibly to demonstrate large crowd sizes. It is unclear why these calls did not materialize. Security forces may have successfully preempted the planned protests, concentrating security personnel along the main streets and thereby deterring protesters, though CTP cannot corroborate this hypothesis at this time. CTP previously argued that the nature of the planned protests increased the risk to protesters because the advance notice gave the regime time to prepare and a single set of locations at which to concentrate security personnel.[ii] The scattered nature of the protests throughout most of this wave has strained security forces’ limited bandwidth.

The regime’s protest crackdown and abuse of arrested demonstrators will alienate large swaths of the population and entrench anti-regime sentiment throughout Iran for decades. US-based NGO Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI) estimated on November 25 that the regime has arrested over 18,000 protesters thus far.[iii] HRAI estimated that 110 of these arrested protesters are children and teenagers. These numbers, if true, are significantly greater than those from previous major protest waves in Iran. The regime arrested around 4,000 protesters during the 2009 Green Movement and around 8,000 during the 2019 Bloody Aban protests.[iv] CNN published a report on November 21 detailing the horrific acts of sexual assault and violence the regime is committing against arrested protesters.[v] A young Iranian protester told NPR on November 23 that she would prefer that the regime killed her rather than arresting her.[vi] These horrible abuses will continually fuel anger and resentment toward this regime, underscoring the long-term challenge the Islamic Republic is creating for itself by the brutality it is using to oppress these protesters.

Key Takeaways

• Protests continued but did not surge across Iran despite calls for protests.
• The regime’s protest crackdown and abuse of arrested demonstrators will alienate large swaths of the population and entrench anti-regime sentiment throughout Iran for a long time.
• Citizens in Mazandaran Province sent medical supplies to protesters in Kurdistan Province, according to Radio Farda.
• Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid continued to inspire protests throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Hacker group Black Reward defaced the website of IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency.
• The IRGC Ground Forces has deployed armored and special forces units to unspecified locations in northwestern and western Iran, likely to crack down on protesters and deter further demonstrations.
• US-based NGO Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI) estimated that the regime has arrested over 18,000 protesters thus far.

Iran Crisis Update, November 23

Protest activity and strikes will likely increase in the coming days. Protest coordinators and organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations from November 24-26 in solidarity with the protesters in Kurdistan Province. The regime has deployed the IRGC Ground Forces to cities and towns throughout Kurdistan Province to brutally crack down on protesters, as CTP previously reported. Twenty-nine neighborhood youth groups issued a joint statement on November 23 calling for the upcoming protests, demonstrating a degree of overt coordination that CTP has not previously observed.

The nature of the planned protests increases the risk to protesters. Protest coordinators and organizations have called for protesters to congregate on the major city streets in each city. Some social media accounts have published routes protesters should use in Tehran. The advance notice that protesters will gather on these main streets gives security forces time to prepare and a single known location at which to concentrate security personnel. The scattered nature of the protests up until this point has strained security forces’ limited bandwidth. Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib alluded to this vulnerability on November 9, as CTP previously reported.

Supreme leader succession is heavily coloring how the Iranian political and security establishment responds to the protests. Mojtaba Khamenei—the son of Ali Khamenei and a potential successor—has reportedly held several private meetings in recent days possibly in part to reassert his influence within the regime. Mojtaba reportedly met with his political ally Hossein Taeb to discuss Taeb’s return to the security apparatus after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei dismissed him as IRGC Intelligence Organization chief in June 2022. Taeb’s removal may have degraded Mojtaba’s reach into the security sphere. Mojtaba also reportedly met with Fatemeh Hashemi Rafsanjani—the daughter of former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mojtaba complained about his political marginalization in the meeting, according to some Iranian outlets, although it is far from clear whether these reports are accurate. These reports coincide with social media rumors claiming that Khamenei has rejected Mojtaba as a potential successor. CTP cannot confirm any of these reports. These rumors and possible leaks underscore, however, the extent to which discussion about supreme leader succession and the associated political maneuvering likely remains prevalent in some regime circles. The struggle to determine who will replace Ali Khamenei may be fueling the intra-regime disagreements over protest suppression as well.

Mojtaba’s meeting with Fatemeh Hashemi Rafsanjani is particularly noteworthy given the reports that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani met with members of the Rafsanjani family to discuss cooperating to quell protests. It is unclear whether Mojtaba’s possible meeting was related to this matter.

Khamenei’s rumored rejection of Mojtaba as a successor, if true, does not necessarily eliminate Mojtaba’s chances at supreme leadership. The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for selecting the next supreme leader and will at least formally approve Khamenei’s successor. Khamenei has likely communicated his preferences privately to his inner circle, but he cannot appoint his successor directly. He can instead try to shape the Assembly of Experts’ vote that will occur after his death and the preferences of other regime power centers while he is still alive.

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated on November 23 that the Iraqi central government committed to disarming and removing Kurdish militants from the Iran-Iraq border region. Amir Abdollahian’s comments follow discussions between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government on border security on November 22. Iranian political and security leaders have repeatedly demanded that Iraqi authorities disarm and remove Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan in recent weeks due to the militants’ perceived role in stoking protests. It remains unclear whether the Iraqi central government will satisfy Iranian demands. Amir Abdollahian’s comments may provide the regime—and the Raisi administration more specifically—an offramp after Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh issued an ultimatum with a deadline in 10 days for Iraq to address the Kurdish militant issue on November 21. Iraqi officials have not commented on Abdollahian’s statement as of this publication.

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity and strikes will likely increase in the coming days.
• The nature of the planned protests increases the risk to protesters.
• Supreme leader succession is heavily coloring how the Iranian political and security establishment responds to the protests.
• Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that the Iraqi central government committed to disarming and removing Kurdish militants from the Iran-Iraq border region.
• At least 16 protests took place in 11 cities across 11 provinces.
• Unidentified individuals attacked and killed a Basij member in Marivan, Kurdistan Province.

Iran Crisis Update, November 22

Regime officials close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have expressed openness to political reform to placate protesters, although it is unlikely that any such reform would fundamentally change the regime’s behavior or nature. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani discussed implementing unspecified “liberalizing measures” with reformist leaders, including members of the Khomeini and Rafsanjani families, in exchange for help quelling protests in late October, according to the Wall Street Journal.[i] Ali Reza Panahian—a cleric close to Khamenei and his son, Mojtaba—called for greater transparency and popular participation in government on November 22 as well.[ii] It is unclear to what exactly Shamkhani and Panahian were referring, but these reports suggest that at least some in Iran’s political establishment are considering some semblance of reform to address the ongoing protests. Any such change would likely be limited and would not curtail the activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which reports directly to the supreme leader.

Public remarks from Hassan Khomeini—the reformist grandson of Ruhollah Khomeini—on November 7 may have been a byproduct of Shamkhani’s appeal to the reformist leaders. Khomeini called for a “majority-based democracy” and indirectly criticized the Guardian Council—the state body constitutionally responsible for approving and vetting electoral candidates—in his remarks.[iii] Khomeini also denounced violence and condemned the role of foreign actors in stoking protests. The Islamic Republic News Agency—a Raisi administration mouthpiece—circulated Khomeini’s remarks, as CTP previously reported.[iv]

Protest activity decreased across Iran on November 22 as the Persian calendar month Aban ended. Protest coordinators and organizations had previously called on protesters to demonstrate throughout Aban, which ended on November 21, to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the regime’s crackdown on the Bloody Aban protest wave in November 2019.[v] The reduced turnout on November 22 is therefore unsurprising and does not indicate that this protest wave is yet close to over. Some social media users have begun calling for protests on November 24.[vi]

The Iraqi central government may be coordinating with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to partially address Iranian complaints about Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced that the Iraqi central government is considering deploying forces to border regions in response to Iranian drone and missile attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan on November 22.[vii] Iraqi central government and KRG officials discussed the recent Iranian and Turkish strikes into Iraqi territory and border security on November 22.[viii] Iranian political and security leaders have repeatedly demanded that Iraqi authorities disarm Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan in recent weeks.[ix]

Key Takeaways

• Regime officials close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have expressed openness to political reform to placate protesters, although it is unlikely that any such reform would fundamentally change the regime’s behavior or nature.
• The Iraqi central government may be coordinating with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to partially address Iranian complaints about Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan.
• Protest activity decreased across Iran as the Persian calendar month Aban ended, but at least 14 protests took place in 10 cities across eight provinces.
• IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi expressed implicit support for the regime using more brutality in its protest crackdown on November 21.
• The IRGC Ground Forces conducted a drone and missile attack on anti-regime Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan for the second consecutive day on November 22.

Iran Crisis Update, November 21

November 21, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime has adopted what increasingly resembles a counter-insurgency approach rather than a counter-protest one to manage the ongoing unrest. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that IRGC Ground Forces are clearing some cities in West Azerbaijan Province, including Boukan, Mahabad, Oshnaviyeh, Piranshahr, and other unnamed locations, of anti-regime elements on November 21.[1] These IRGC military units are likely using extreme force and indiscriminately killing civilians to quell protests. Security forces are conducting a brutal crackdown in Javanroud, Kermanshah Province as well. Security forces have isolated Javanroud, blocking major roads into the city, and shot live ammunition and nerve gas at protesters.[2] The closure of these major roads will impede most travel into and out of Javanroud given the rugged terrain surrounding the city. The IRGC Ground Forces 4^th Ansar ol Rasoul Operational Brigade is headquartered in Javanroud and could support the regime crackdown there and in nearby locations.[3] This increasing regime brutality accords with CTP’s previous assessment that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has likely greenlit the security forces to intensify their crackdown.[4]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime has adopted what increasingly resembles a counter-insurgency approach rather than a counter-protest one to manage the ongoing unrest.
• The regime has expanded its internet and telecommunications disruptions, limiting the amount of open-source information available on the situations in northwestern and western Iran.
• Parliamentarian Jalal Mahmoud Zadeh called for an investigation into the regime crackdown in Mahabad on November 21—the latest dissent by a lawmaker representing a location in which the regime has conducted a brutal crackdown.
• Iranian ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh issued an ultimatum with a deadline in 10 days for Iraq to disarm Kurdish militant groups or face unspecified consequences.
• At least 16 protests took place in 12 cities across eight provinces.
• LEC Fars Provincial Commander Brigadier General Roham Bakhsh Habibi announced the arrest of eight members of the Shiraz Neighborhood Youth.
• Several dozen Sunni clerics and religious leaders in Kurdistan Province issued a video statement expressing support for the protesters.
• Supreme Leader Military Adviser IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi warned that protests will continue unless the regime addresses the people’s frustrations.

Iran Crisis Update, November 20

November 20, 2022 |  5:30 pm ET

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei likely issued an unpublished directive to violently suppress anti-regime protests within the past few days. The Supreme Leader discussed protests in a speech in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on November 19. Khamenei’s speech did not contain significant rhetorical inflections or escalations in the way he discussed quelling unrest compared to prior speeches made in the past several weeks. Several senior regime officials called for a decisive crackdown on demonstrations on November 20, however, as regime violence against protesters in northwestern Iran escalated, suggesting that Khamenei likely greenlit the increased use of force against protesters. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stressed that responsible entities should take urgent and decisive action against “rioters” and blamed Western actors for unrest, mirroring Khamenei’s November 19 rhetoric, on November 20. IRGC Ground Forces Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit Commander in Esfahan Province Mojtaba Fada similarly promised a firm response to unrest “at the slightest hint from the [supreme] leader,” likely referencing Khamenei’s November 19 speech. The unit published a statement announcing the arrest of a ”terrorist team” that had killed security personnel in Esfahan Province and possessed firearms and hand-made bombs on the same day. Artesh Executive Deputy Mohammad Mahmoudi additionally stated that the Artesh was at the peak of its operational readiness and was prepared to carry out all its assigned missions on November 20. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Ali Haji Zadeh also discussed the importance of following the Supreme Leader’s directives in a meeting on November 20.

The inflection in regime rhetoric coincides with significant escalations against protesters, particularly throughout northwestern provinces, within the past 24 hours. Reports shared on social media suggested that security personnel shot indiscriminately at protesters in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province on November 19. Iranian authorities deployed elements of the IRGC Ground Forces from the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shahada Northwestern Operational Base in Ourmia, West Azerbaijan Province to suppress protests in Mahabad on November 19, as CTP has previously reported. Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that local authorities told Mahabad residents that the local governor would deliver a speech but instead opened fire at the assembled crowd on November 20. Footage shows regime personnel in technicals apparently shooting heavy machine guns, and heavy machine gun fire is audible in several videos. Social media users have documented the increased use of force against protesters in other areas as well. Security personnel were documented shooting at protesters in several cities including Piranshahr and Takab in West Azerbaijan Province, Javanroud in Kermansah Province, and Marivan in Kurdistan Province on November 20. Social media users additionally recorded footage of helicopters circling Mahabad and Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province. Protesters continued to engage in anti-regime demonstrations despite this increased regime violence on November 20.

The increase in regime violence against protesters and the deployment of combat units of the IRGC Ground Forces could be related to rumors that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani has been fired or has resigned. The rumors remain unconfirmed and, although Shamkhani has not appeared or made any statements since they surfaced his silence is not particularly unusual. Pressure on or removal of Shamkhani could reflect a change in the balance of power within the regime inner circle, however, of the sort that could have led to a change in the supreme leader’s guidance about responding to the protests. It is equally possible, however, that regime officials presented the supreme leader with reports on the situation and its trajectory that persuaded him to order the escalation in anti-protester violence without any changes in personnel.

The IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shahada Northwestern operational base announced that it is reinforcing its forces on November 20, suggesting that crackdowns will likely endure and may extend to other cities throughout the region. Social media footage additionally shows what appears to be at least 26 IRGC Ground Forces and Iranian Law Enforcement Command vehicles in Mahabad on November 20. The Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shahada base statement warned of decisive action against purported US-affiliated “anti-Iranian” terrorist groups throughout the area, possibly setting conditions to deploy troops to other cities within Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan Provinces in the coming days.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has likely issued an unpublished directive to violently suppress anti-regime protests within the past few days.
• The IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shahada Northwestern operational base announced that it is reinforcing its forces on November 20, suggesting that crackdowns will likely endure and may extend to other cities throughout the region.
• The IRGC attacked a series of anti-regime Kurdish militia positions in Iraqi Kurdistan.
• Protests occurred in at least 18 cities in eight provinces. At least six protests with 100 or more estimated participants took place in six cities across four provinces on November 20.
• Tehran Judiciary officials sentenced a sixth arrested protester to death on November 20.

Iran Crisis Update, November 19

November 19, 2022 |  6:30 pm ET

Unverified reporting and social media footage suggests that the regime deployed the IRGC Ground Forces to violently suppress protests in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province on November 19. An Iranian Kurdish human rights organization reported that Iranian officials had deployed a significant number of armed troops from the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Third Special Forces Division in Ourmia, West Azerbaijan Province amidst reports of widespread unrest.[i] Footage circulating on social media shows numerous armored vehicles within and in the vicinity of Mahabad on November 19.[ii] Other footage has audible sounds of artillery being fired.[iii] Iranian social media users are reporting heavy gunfire, the indiscriminate use of violence--including shooting into residents’ homes--and electricity cuts throughout the city.[iv]

This is seemingly the first time that the regime has deployed the IRGC Ground Forces as combat units to suppress unrest since protests commenced on September 16, marking a significant escalation in the regime’s protest response. IRGC Ground Forces personnel have been reportedly killed in previous incidents suggesting that elements of the IRGC Ground Forces have been involved in protest suppression, but this is likely the first time an IRGC Ground Forces unit has deployed with combat kit.[v] This deployment signals the extent to which the regime views ongoing protests as a threat.

The commitment of IRGC combat units to unrest suppression could be related in part to uncorroborated reports about the formation of a new anti-regime Kurdish militia in Mahabad. The militia referred to itself as the “Guerrillas of Ishtar” and claimed responsibility for killing three regime security personnel.[vi] CTP cannot independently verify the veracity of this claim. The regime may have decided to escalate its violent suppression partly for fear that more organized violent resistance could emerge.

An IRGC Ground Forces deployment may also signal bandwidth constraints within Iranian security services; the IRGC Ground Forces historically participate in protest crackdowns when the Iranian Law Enforcement Command has failed to contain upheaval.[vii] The IRGC Ground Forces’ reported deployment may additionally make the possibility of an Iranian incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan less likely, as the regime may struggle to balance the commitment of IRGC Ground Forces combat units to internal unrest suppression at the same time as it attempts a ground incursion, depending on the scale of both possible operations. IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani reportedly warned that the IRGC will conduct ground operations against anti-regime militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan unless the Iraqi army fortifies the Iran-Iraq Kurdistan border and disarms all anti-regime Kurdish militias operating within Iraqi Kurdistan on November 18.[viii]

The regime’s violent escalation in Mahabad may backfire and instead intensify anti-regime demonstrations. Iranian social media users quickly called for nation-wide demonstrations on November 20 to condemn the regime’s protest suppression tactics in Mahabad on November 19.[ix]

The number and scale of ongoing, anti-regime protests have already intensified in recent days. Protest organizations have successfully extended protest activity beyond the Bloody Aban demonstrations planned for November 15, 16, and 17 and sustained momentum on November 18 and November 19.[x] Protest activity may continue at its current level for the next two days as protest organization groups are calling for further unrest until November 21, the final day of the Iranian calendar month of Aban.[xi] This level of sustained protest activity marks an inflection in the pattern established by protesters in recent weeks, wherein high protest activity was followed by decreased demonstrations in the days thereafter. The scale of protests has also maintained its momentum in recent days. Footage shows that larger crowds have participated in anti-regime demonstrations on November 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 compared to prior days. The number and scale of protests in the past several days is similar to those at the beginning of the Mahsa Amini protest movement in mid-September 2022.

Protests have also become increasingly violent--for protesters and security personnel alike—in recent days. An Iran-focused human rights organization increased its estimate of killed protesters from 342 on November 16 to 378 on November 19, indicating that roughly nine percent of all Iranians killed while participating in the Mahsa Amini protest movement died within that three-day period.[xii]  Footage documenting funerals for killed protesters have also increased in number in recent days, further corroborating reports of increased violence. Estimates suggest that recent deaths have still not surpassed the death toll recorded in mid-to-late September, however. Iranian security personnel have sustained relatively significant casualties since November 15 as well, a change from protest activity in prior weeks. At least six security personnel died on November 17, two on November 16, and possibly three on November 15.[xiii]

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to blame anti-regime demonstrations on Western actors in a speech in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on November 19. Khamenei framed popular protests as an extension of America’s so-called soft power war waged against the Islamic Republic targeting Iranian youth. Khamenei noted that Iranian officials were also susceptible to and propagating Western soft power tactics, possibly corroborating reports of fissures within senior members of the regime as CTP reported on November 18.[xiv] The Supreme Leader drew a rhetorical distinction between peaceful protesters and “rioters.”[xv]

Key Takeaways

• Unverified reporting suggests that the regime deployed the IRGC Ground Forces to violently suppress protests in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province on November 19, marking a violent escalation in the regime’s response to protests.
• The number and scale of ongoing, anti-regime protests have intensified and become increasingly violent in recent days.
• Protests occurred in at least 20 cities in 10 provinces. 14 protests with 100 or more estimated participants took place in nine cities across six provinces on November 19.
• Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to blame anti-regime demonstrations on Western actors on November 19.
• Israeli combat aircraft conducted airstrikes against multiple Syria Arab Army and IRGC or Iranian proxy militia positions in western Syria on November 19.

Iran Crisis Update, November 18

November 18, 2022 | 4:30 pm ET

The ongoing, anti-regime protests are likely creating fractures among senior regime officials within the Iranian security establishment. Uncorroborated social media accounts circulated reports that the regime’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) held two emergency meetings that resulted in SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani’s resignation.[1]  Anti-regime outlet Iran International previously reported that some hardliners were advocating for Shamkhani’s dismissal on November 6, citing an informed source.[2] Another unverified social media account reported that Saeed Jalili--a hardliner who served as the SNSC secretary from 2007-2013—blamed unidentified security officials for failing to violently suppress anti-regime demonstrations. The account additionally claimed that IRGC and Iranian Law Enforcement Command officials expressed concerns about bandwidth constraints and low morale among personnel.[3] CTP cannot verify these rumors and such accounts should be treated with skepticism. SNSC-affiliated Nour News Agency denied that Shamkhani has resigned on November 18, suggesting that the report had garnered enough attention to merit a statement.[4]  Nour’s denial is not dispositive, as the outlet has been known to deny things that have turned out to be true.

Regime officials and regime-affiliated actors alluded to disagreements over protest suppression tactics within the Iranian security apparatus on November 18, however. A Raisi administration official stated that the regime could expeditiously end unrest as soon as “the relevant authorities were willing” on November 18, suggesting divisions within the regime about how much violence security personnel should use to quell protesters.[5] A regime-affiliated cleric in a Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari town similarly stated that officials who lacked the courage to do “great things” should be removed from power and replaced by others more capable of implementing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s vision.[6]  Hardline editor Hossein Shariatmadari, who is reportedly a close confidante of the Supreme Leader,[7] additionally advocated for greater use of force against protesters on November 18.[8] Statements calling to violently escalate against protesters—and criticizing the officials who are purportedly failing to implement this tactic—corroborate CTP’s previous assessments that critical nodes of the regime are unable to reach a consensus on how to confront the Mahsa Amini protests.[9]

Key Takeaways

• The ongoing, anti-regime protests are likely creating fractures among senior regime officials within the Iranian security establishment and may have led to the departure of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani.
• Iraqi Kurdistan is at risk of invasion by Turkish forces from the north and Iranian forces from the east.
• At least 33 protests took place in 31 cities across 13 provinces on November 18.
• Prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid continued to criticize the regime’s violent protest suppression response on November 18 during his weekly Friday prayer sermon.
• Protesters allegedly burned the former home of Islamic Republic Founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Khomein, Markazi Province on November 17.

Iran Crisis Update, November 17

November 17, 5:00 pm ET

Certain components of the ongoing protest movement in Iran may have reached the threshold identified in US military doctrine for a “latent and incipient” insurgency. American counter-insurgency doctrine, using a modified version of the Maoist insurgency framework, defines the lowest level of insurgency as follows:

“The first phase is latent and incipient. During this phase, activities include the emergence of insurgent leadership, creation of initial organizational infrastructure, training, acquisition of resources, and political actions, such as organizing protests. A group that eventually becomes members of an insurgency may simply be a legitimate political group at this stage. Governmental actions and changes in society can transform political groups into insurgencies.”

Components of the protest movement are approaching or have already achieved some of these requirements. The neighborhood youth groups and other protest organizations have seemingly continued playing significant roles in coordinating and planning demonstrations on specific days and in specific locations. These protest organizations are also encouraging and supporting citizens to attack and undermine the regime. The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth, for instance, published statements on November 16 and 17 calling on protesters to cooperate with one another to wage partisan warfare, block roads, and use explosives against security forces, among other activities, and referred to its “operational teams,” implying some level of organization. The group advised protesters to wear protective clothing “according to previous training.” The Mashhad youth group also stated that it is fighting a “full-scale war” against the regime—rhetoric that is consistent with the revolutionary tone used by other protest organizations in recent weeks.

CTP has documented previous instances of protesters cooperating with one another. Protesters have coordinated extensively in certain locations in recent weeks using militant tactics to respond to the regime crackdown. Protesters are furthermore developing the infrastructure necessary to stage a protracted struggle against the regime, such as establishing an informal medical care network.

CTP cannot verify that any of these youth groups and other protest organizations are  in control of the movement or able to carry through on some of their directives. The regime has indicated that at least some of these groups have a local presence. Iranian state media reported on November 17 that the IRGC Intelligence Organization arrested over 25 members of the Oroumiyeh Neighborhood Youth. An unidentified source spoke to Mehr News Agency claiming that the group organized the blocking of roads and destruction of public property. The Twitter account of the Oroumiyeh Neighborhood Youth has continued posting since the reported arrests.

CTP is not prepared to forecast the trajectory of these protester networks or how they will behave in the weeks and months ahead. We have not yet observed clear signs of coordination across these groups at this time. CTP will continually update and reevaluate this analysis based on observed indicators, which we will continue reporting in these daily updates.

Regime security personnel sustained relatively significant casualties on November 17. At least six security personnel have died across Iran in the past 24 hours. Unidentified individuals stabbed and killed two Basij members and injured three more in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province. Unidentified individuals also stabbed and killed a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province. An LEC Special Units member died on November 17 after unidentified gunmen shot him in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on November 16. And two LEC Border Guards members died in an unspecified “accident” near Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Anti-regime militancy and smuggling is common around Saravan.

Protest organizations are trying to sustain the recent high protester turnout for at least three to four more days. Protests have surged across Iran since November 15 in commemoration of the three-year anniversary of the regime’s crackdown on the Bloody Aban protest wave in November 2019. The Karaj Neighborhood Youth called for these commemorative protests to continue until November 20. The Countrywide Youth similarly called for these protests to continue until November 21. Protest turnout in the coming days may offer insight into how influential these particular protest organizations are.

Key Takeaways

• Certain components of the ongoing protest movement in Iran may have reached the threshold identified in US military doctrine for a “latent and incipient” insurgency.
• Regime security personnel sustained relatively significant casualties.
• Protest organizations are trying to sustain the recent high protester turnout for at least three to four more days.
• At least 40 protests took place in 33 cities across 18 provinces.
• The regime may be trying to blame the Izeh attack on the Islamic State (IS) as part of an effort to associate the protests with terrorism.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International published purported leaked memos from the Artesh Ground Forces.
• Likely Iranian proxies conducted a rocket attack on US forces in northeastern Syria.

Iran Crisis Update, November 16

November 16, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Protest activity continued to surge on November 16, occurring in at least 29 cities in 19 provinces. Protests will likely continue throughout Iran on November 17—the final day of the three-day commemoration of the Bloody Aban protest wave in November 2019—and concentrate in Sistan and Baluchistan on Friday, November 18. Security forces are continuing to crack down and use lethal force but are not using their full capabilities, likely to avoid angering protesters further and creating more 40-day commemoration ceremonies around which demonstrators will rally. The regime continues to seem like it does not have a coherent theory about how to address the protests, likely due to disagreements within the political and security establishment.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s efforts to discourage prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid from publicly criticizing the regime have likely failed. Abdol Hamid tweeted on November 16, criticizing the clerical delegation that Khamenei sent to Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[i] The delegation—led by Friday Prayer Leader Policy Council Chairman Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari—met with Abdol Hamid and other local leaders likely to communicate Khamenei’s directive to stop instigating protests in the province.[ii] Abdol Hamid accused the delegation of intimidating and threatening people rather than consoling them in his tweet. Abdol Hamid’s public criticism days after meeting the delegation indicates that he will continue publicly condemning the regime crackdown and supporting protesters. Abdol Hamid and his supporters will likely inspire further protests throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province during his Friday sermon on November 18 as they have done almost every Friday since the brutal regime crackdown in Zahedan on September 30.[iii]

A false claim is circulating online that the Iranian Parliament has sentenced 15,000 arrested protesters to death. Many online users, including Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, have propagated this misinformation unwittingly.[iv] This claim is based on the actual reporting that 277 parliamentarians signed a letter calling for the judiciary to harshly and rapidly prosecute arrested protesters on November 6.[v] The judiciary has sentenced at least five protesters to death thus far and will likely execute more, but the regime has not likely decided to kill 15,000 arrested protesters. This misinformation is distracting public attention from the atrocities and human right violations that the regime is actually committing against its people.

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity continued to surge, occurring in 29 cities in 19 provinces.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s efforts to discourage prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid from publicly criticizing the regime have likely failed.
• A false claim is circulating online that the Iranian Parliament has sentenced 15,000 arrested protesters to death.
• BBC published a purported leaked audio tape revealing internal disagreements within the regime over the cause of and correct response to the protests.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed at least six people and injured at least 15 at a shopping center in Izeh, Khuzestan Province.
• Unidentified gunmen shot at Basij and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) personnel, killing two, in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.
• The judiciary sentenced three protesters to death.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or one of its proxies likely conducted a kamikaze drone attack on an Israeli-owned tanker in the Gulf of Oman.

Iran Crisis Update, November 15

November 15, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Protest activity increased significantly on November 15 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the regime’s brutal crackdown on the Bloody Aban protest wave. These current protests are the most reported in a single day since CTP began publishing daily updates on September 28. Protest coordinators and organizations have called for protesters to sustain these demonstrations across Iran on November 16 and 17. Protesters continue to demonstrate an extremely impressive amount of courage and determination despite the regime’s brutality and expanding censorship. Iranian political and security leaders likely expected their use of force to quickly quell the protests after a few weeks as they did in November 2019 and other previous protest movements.

The regime’s abuse and mistreatment of children is likely one of the factors driving these enduring protests. The New York Times published an article on November 14 detailing human rights violations that the regime is committing against arrested children.iv Security forces have killed at least 43 children in their crackdown as well. The extent of the regime’s cruelty toward children may be new information to many observers in the West but is likely not to the Iranian protesters. 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) will likely resume its campaign to expel US military forces from the region in the coming months. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on November 15 to meet with senior Iraqi political and proxy leaders. These Iraqi officials included President Abdul Latif Rashid and Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani. Ghaani discussed the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Iranian drone and missile attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan, among other issues. Forcing the American military from the region is one of Tehran’s greatest strategic objectives, and the installment of an Iran-friendly government in Baghdad will likely facilitate this effort. The IRGC will likely organize militia attacks against US positions and pressure Iraqi officials to seek the exit of American troops in new rounds of the Washington-Baghdad strategic dialogue. The perceived role of the US in stoking the protests and supporting anti-regime Kurdish militant groups in Iraqi Kurdistan may increase the urgency Iranian leaders assign to this effort. 

Key Takeaways 

• Protest activity increased significantly on November 15 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the regime’s brutal crackdown on the Bloody Aban protest wave. 
• The regime’s abuse and mistreatment of children is likely one of the factors driving these enduring protests. 
• The IRGC will likely resume its campaign to expel US military forces from the region in the coming months. 
• At least 54 protests took place in 36 cities across 24 provinces. 
• Three security personnel may have died in the protests. 
• President Ebrahim Raisi sent First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber to Qom likely to unite influential clerics behind the regime and especially the Raisi administration. 

Iran Crisis Update, November 14

November 14, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Protest activity and strikes will likely increase from November 15 to 17. Protest coordinators and organizers have reiterated their calls for protests and countrywide strikes on these days and also urged citizens to not pay their utility bills.[i] Social media accounts published videos on November 14 claiming to depict protesters traveling from Tabriz, East Azerbaijan to Tehran to demonstrate and “conquer” Tehran.[ii] Other protesters have used similar rhetoric in recent days, calling for citizens to conquer a main Tehran highway during the upcoming protests, as CTP previously reported.[iii]

Social media accounts are increasingly framing the ongoing protests as the culmination of past protest waves in Iran, which could increase protest turnout. Protest videos circulating on social media have connected the planned protests on November 15 to previous events, especially protest waves, in the Islamic Republic’s history, such as the regime’s mass execution of political prisoners in 1988 and the crackdowns on the student protests in 1999, the Green Movement in 2009, and the Bloody Aban protests in 2019.[iv] This broadening message could resonate across the many different socio-economic classes and communities that have led past protest movements in Iran.

Former reformist President Mohammad Khatami called for reform in an Instagram post on November 14.[v] Khatami stated that the current governance in Iran is “wrong and erroneous” and called on Iranian authorities to empathize with and understand protester demands, especially the demands of the Iranian youth. Khatami stated that the collapse of the Islamic Republic is “not possible nor desirable” but warned that the regime failing to reform could lead to “social collapse.” The Instagram post is Khatami’s first major comment about the protests after he briefly criticized violence following the Shiraz attack on October 26.[vi] The regime has banned state media from mentioning Khatami since at least 2010 to censor him and diminish his public presence.[vii]

The IRGC resumed attacks on anti-regime Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan on November 14 in retaliation for their perceived role in stoking protests. The IRGC conducted a drone and missile attack on the Zirgwez region of Sulaymaniyah Province, reportedly killing at least two Kurdish militants and injuring several others.[viii] IRGC-affiliated media referenced the IRGC statement from September 28 vowing to attack Kurdish militant positions until they no longer threaten the regime in its reporting on the attack.[ix] IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pak Pour reiterated the regime claim that Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan are stoking the protests and conducting terrorist attacks in Iran on November 14.[x] The IRGC previously attacked Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for 12 consecutive days from September 27 to October 7.[xi]

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity and strikes will likely increase from November 15 to 17.
• Social media accounts are increasingly framing the ongoing protests as the culmination of past protest waves in Iran, which could increase protest turnout.
• Former reformist President Mohammad Khatami called for reform in an Instagram post.
• The IRGC resumed attacks on anti-regime Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan in retaliation for their perceived role in stoking protests.
• At least 10 protests took place in nine cities across nine provinces.
• Hardline parliamentarian Morteza Mahmoudvand criticized the 227 parliamentarians who signed a letter calling for the harsh and rapid prosecution of arrested protesters.
• The New York Times published an article detailing human rights violations that the regime is committing against arrested children.

Iran Crisis Update, November 13

November 13, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is likely escalating against prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, who has become increasingly critical of the regime in recent weeks. Iranian media reported that Khamenei dispatched a high-ranking delegation headed by Friday Prayer Leader Policy Council Chief Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari to Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 13.[1] Ali Akbari has previously advocated for harsh sentences for protesters and called people participating in anti-regime demonstrations “barbaric rioters.”[2] Ali Akbari had a meeting with Abdol Hamid and other local Sunni academics in which Abdol Hamid reportedly described the regime’s recent protest crackdowns throughout Sistan and Baluchistan as an example of discrimination against the Iranian Sunni community according to an outlet claiming direct or indirect access to Abdol Hamid. Abdol Hamid additionally criticized the regime for failing to publicly condemn security forces’ violent suppression of anti-regime demonstrations in Zahedan and Khash cities.[3] Abdol Hamid has voiced similar criticisms of the regime in recent weeks, and some of his commentary has likely incited further unrest throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[4] Social media users have documented hundreds of Zahedan residents participating in anti-regime protests following Abdol Hamid’s Friday prayer sermons in recent weeks.[5] Ali Akbari’s meeting with Abdol Hamid is likely intended to discourage him from further public criticism of the regime. Abdol Hamid faces a decision point to cease stoking unrest or disobey what was likely a directive from the supreme leader to stop doing so. Abdol Hamid’s initial comments suggest that he may choose to do the latter.

Ali Akbari’s visit could also signal Khamenei’s disapproval of how local provincial leaders are responding to anti-regime protests throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Ali Akbari’s visit in and of itself is somewhat anomalous: Khamenei has representatives in each of Iran’s 31 provinces, and therefore should not typically require further representation in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[6] Ali Akbari insinuated that the Sistan and Baluchistan supreme leader representative and provincial governor had taken some measures to confront ongoing unrest, but that his team would implement a “special plan” detailed by the Supreme Leader.[7] Ali Akbari’s comments could suggest that the supreme leader blames provincial officials for failing to quell ongoing unrest in Sistan and Baluchistan or that Khamenei has lost confidence in them to do so.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Tehran on November 12. Raisi and Putin reportedly discussed bilateral cooperation on economic and political issues.[8] Iranian media did not appear to advertise the call. Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev additionally met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani on November 8, possibly to discuss the potential sale of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia, as CTP previously reported.[9]

Putin’s continued engagement with the Iranian regime over security cooperation could indicate that Iranian negotiators may be asking for more than Putin is readily willing to offer in return for Iranian missiles and drones.  

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is likely escalating against prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, who has become increasingly critical of the regime in recent weeks.
• Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 12 and may have discussed Iranian ballistic missile sales to Russia.
• At least 12 protests took place in seven cities across five provinces.
• The mistreatment of imprisoned Iranian human rights activist Hossein Ronaghi may reinvigorate ongoing, anti-regime protests.
• The Iranian judiciary issued preliminary sentences against protesters arrested in Tehran Province, including one death sentence.
• Israeli combat aircraft conducted an airstrike against on a likely Iranian precision-guided munition cache at Shayrat Airbase, Homs Province, Syria.

Iran Crisis Update, November 12

November 12, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Protest coordinators and organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations from November 15 to 17 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Bloody Aban protest wave in November 2019. Citizens took to the streets in around 100 cities in the Bloody Aban protest wave in response to a sudden regime decision to cut fuel subsidies. Estimates of civilians killed by security forces during Bloody Aban range from 304 to 1,500. Some protest organizers have published instructions to “conquer” a main Tehran highway on November 15, blocking the road with cars to restrict security forces’ movement. Persian-language social media accounts have described the ongoing protests as the continuation of the Bloody Aban protest wave in recent weeks, as CTP previously reported. Invoking popular frustrations toward the regime about the Bloody Aban crackdown could reinvigorate this protest movement, which has seen reduced turnout in recent days.

Iranian clerical, political, and security leaders are arguing to the domestic population that the collapse of the Islamic Republic would lead to chaos and civil war. Iranian authorities likely seek to convince the population that the protests will ultimately worsen the state of the country rather than achieve meaningful reform. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Political Deputy Brigadier General Yadollah Javani accused the West, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of stoking the protests to “Syrianize” Iran on November 11.[vi] This regime narrative has become increasingly prevalent in recent weeks. Iranian clerics, military commanders, parliamentarians, and state media have used similar rhetoric, asserting that the protests will create instability similar to the Syrian civil war in Iran rather than lead to a democratic, secular republic.

Key Takeaways

• Protest coordinators and organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations from November 15 to 17 to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Bloody Aban protest wave in November 2019. Citizens took to the streets in around 100 cities in the Bloody Aban protest wave in response to a sudden regime decision to cut fuel subsidies.
• Iranian clerical, political, and security leaders are arguing to the domestic population that the collapse of the Islamic Republic would lead to chaos and civil war.
• At least 12 protests took place in 10 cities across nine provinces.
• Unidentified militants killed a member of the IRGC Ground Forces 25^th Karbala Operational Division at an unspecified location in northwestern Iran.
• Senior Shia cleric Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani issued a fatwa requiring Muslims to defend themselves and others if an armed stranger attacks them, according to anti-regime outlet IranWire.

Iran Crisis Update, November 11

November 11, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Overall protest turnout throughout Iran has diminished in recent days but surged in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 11. Protests have occurred almost every Friday in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since the brutal regime crackdown in Zahedan on September 30.[i] The Friday protest activity on November 11 was the most geographically widespread yet, occurring in at least six cities in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The previous Friday, November 4, saw protest activity in five cities in the province.[ii]

This protest turnout across an increasing number of cities in southeastern Iran accords with CTP’s previous assessment that prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid and his supporters may begin inspiring protests throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province rather than in just Zahedan.[iii] Abdol Hamid again criticized the regime and expressed support for protesters during his Friday sermon in Zahedan on November 11.[iv] Abdol Hamid also commended Chabahar parliamentarian Moinoddin Saeedi, who criticized on November 9 the regime protest crackdown.[v] Abdol Hamid’s message may be resonating with a growing portion of the Sunni Baloch community in southeastern Iran.

US defense officials continue to warn of a potential Iranian attack into Saudi Arabia or Iraq in retaliation for the alleged roles of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in stoking the protests. Two Defense Department officials told Politico that Iran continues to plan to attack Saudi Arabia, likely targeting its energy infrastructure, and that Iran also poses an increased threat to targets in Iraq.[vi] US and Saudi officials previously warned of an imminent Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia and Iraq in a Wall Street Journal report on November 1, though the disclosure of this intelligence may have delayed the Iranian attack.[vii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi repeated the threat that the regime will retaliate against foreign and domestic actors who stoked the protests on November 11.[viii]

Iran may have already tried and failed to attack US positions in Syria on November 9. Syrian media outlet DeirEzzor24 reported that Russian military police arrested two individuals tied to the IRGC who were preparing to conduct a rocket attack on US forces at the Conoco gas field in eastern Syria.[ix] Iranian-backed militias have attacked this location previously.[x] CTP previously assessed that Tehran and its proxies may attack US positions in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for the alleged US role in stoking protests and for an Israeli drone strike on an Iranian convoy in eastern Syria on November 8.[xi] CTP cannot verify the report from DeirEzzor24, however.

Iran Crisis Update, November 10

November 10, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The ongoing protests are creating fractures within the Iranian hardliner camp. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and his inner circle have clashed politically with other hardliners who have taken harsher stances against the protests, according to Iranian media.[i] Ghalibaf and his inner circle have blamed these hardliners—specifically Saeed Jalili and others in the Stability Front party—for stoking unrest among disaffected Iranian youth.[ii] Jalili was the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council from 2007 to 2013. One parliamentarian reportedly close to Ghalibaf wrote an op-ed accusing parliamentarians close to Jalili of having inflexible and uncompromising views and calling media affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) “harsh and violent“ on October 25. Ghalibaf endorsed economic and sociopolitical reform in a parliamentary address on November 5, describing changes made within the parameters of the Islamic Republic as “legitimate and necessary.”[iii] Ghalibaf likely seeks to use such promises of reform to placate protesters. Ghalibaf will not likely support meaningful political reform, however.

Some senior Raisi administration officials have similarly called for limited political reform in recent days likely to appease protesters. Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts Minister Ezzatollah Zarghami suggested that the regime could lift mandatory veiling laws without damaging the foundation of the Islamic Republic on November 6.[iv] He also expressed implicit support for easing censorship laws and internet restrictions and acknowledged that many Iranians do not trust state media. Zarghami previously headed state-run media conglomerate Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. Raisi administration spokesperson Ali Bahadori Jahromi stressed the importance of political plurality in a meeting with university students and faculty in Mashhad on November 10, although he did not explicitly endorse reform.[v] President Ebrahim Raisi has yet to show any support for meaningful reform, and it is unclear whether there are divisions between him and some of his cabinet members. It is also unclear to what extent these cabinet members align with Ghalibaf and his inner circle. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is nevertheless unlikely to concede on political reform.

Some parliamentarians representing restive border regions are increasingly criticizing the regime’s brutality, publicly, possibly reflecting division within the regime over ethnic and regional lines as well. Hardline parliamentarian Behzad Rahmini from Saghez, Kurdistan Province—where Mahsa Amini lived and was buried—criticized the 227 parliamentarians who signed a letter calling on the judiciary to harshly prosecute protesters.[i] A parliamentarian from Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province similarly condemned the regime’s protest suppression response in a parliamentary address on November 6 and resigned on November 9. Chabahar Parliamentarian Moinuddin Saeedi specifically criticized security forces’ protest crackdown in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30, which he referred to as ”Bloody Friday.”[ii] Saeedi later reportedly gave a speech criticizing the regime in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[iii]

Key Takeaways

• The ongoing protests are creating fractures within the Iranian hardliner camp.
• At least six protests took place in five cities across four provinces, although protest activity will likely increase on November 11.
• Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib stated that foreign agents sought to spread protests throughout different parts of Iranian cities, thereby stretching security forces thin.
• IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pak Pour met with Shia and Sunni leaders at an undisclosed location in Sistan and Baluchistan Province likely as part of regime preparations to suppress planned protests on November 11.
• Some Raisi administration officials have advocated for political reform in recent days, likely to appease protesters.
• Social media accounts reported that hundreds of citizens protested against the Saudi government in Qatif, Saudi Arabia on November 10.

Iran Crisis Update, November 9

November 9, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Iran and its proxies may attack US positions in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for an Israeli drone strike on an Iranian convoy in eastern Syria on November 8. The Israeli strike killed at least 10 individuals including an unknown number of Iranians, according to the Wall Street Journal. The convoy was reportedly transporting missiles, munitions, and oil into Syria from Iraq. Media affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and a senior official from Iranian proxy Kataib Hezbollah blamed the attack on the US and Israel.

Iran has increasingly attacked US positions in Iraq and Syria as part of its cycle of escalation with Israel over the past year. A senior IRGC commander, Major General Gholam Ali Rashid, stated in December 2021 that the regime would attack “all centers, bases, routes, and spaces used as sources or routes for [Israeli] aggression,” holding the US accountable for potential Israeli attacks.

Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari emphasized that the regime has the capacity to use more extreme force against protesters on November 9. Heydari referred to protesters as “flies” and stated that “they will have no place in the country” if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei orders a more brutal crackdown. Iranian leaders have increasingly tasked the Artesh Ground Forces with some internal security missions, such as guarding sensitive facilities and locations to relieve other security forces, during protests in recent years.

The potential involvement of the Artesh in protest suppression, even in a limited capacity, would provide Iranian authorities additional assets to quash internal unrest. The Artesh Ground Forces has more than twice as many service members as the IRGC Ground Forces does, operates the bulk of the country’s helicopter and tank arsenals, and has concentrated many of its units in border areas. These qualities, combined with its use to relieve other security forces, make the Artesh a powerful instrument for protest suppression, particularly in the border regions where significant protest activity has been concentrated.

Raisi administration officials are threatening citizens who provide information to anti-regime outlet Iran International to deter protesters from speaking to it about the protests and regime crackdown. Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mehdi Esmaili referred to Iran International as “terrorist media” and stated that the regime will punish individuals cooperating with it on November 9. Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib stated that the regime views communicating with Iran International as cooperating with terrorists and threatening national security on November 8, as CTP previously reported.

Key Takeaways

• Iran and its proxies may attack US positions in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for an Israeli drone strike on an Iranian convoy in eastern Syria.
• Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari emphasized that the regime has the capacity to use more extreme force against protesters.
• Raisi administration officials are threatening citizens who provide information to anti-regime outlet Iran International to deter protesters from speaking to it about the protests and regime crackdown.
• At least 19 protests took place in 15 cities across 11 provinces.
• An unidentified individual drove a car into a group of security personnel and killed a Basij member in Bandar-e Kia Shahr, Gilan Province.
• Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari reappointed Brigadier General Mohammad Ghanbari as LEC Sistan and Baluchistan provincial commander.

Iran Crisis Update, November 8

November 8, 2022 | 5:30 pm ET

Protests may increase in the coming days to commemorate the regime’s brutal crackdown in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30. November 9 marks the 40^th day since security forces indiscriminately shot and killed civilians, including children, as they gathered for Friday prayers and protested in Zahedan on September 30.[i] Protester death tolls from that day range from 66 to 96, although the actual number could be higher.[ii]  Iranian mourners and protesters have regularly gathered for 40-day commemorations for killed demonstrators in recent weeks and may do so again on November 9 for those killed in Zahedan.[iii] This commemoration is primarily a Shia tradition, and most of Sistan and Baluchistan Province’s population is Sunni. Protesters may still gather there and elsewhere throughout Iran on November 9 in solidarity with the people of Zahedan. Protest organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations, and especially in Zahedan, on Friday, November 11 as well.[iv] Friday protests have become common across Sistan and Baluchistan Province since the September 30 crackdown.[v]

[The following paragraph was also published in ISW’s Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8.] Iranian state-run outlet Nour News Agency reported that Russian National Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev arrived in Tehran on November 8, likely to discuss the potential sale of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia.[vi] Nour News Agency announced Patrushev’s arrival in an English-language tweet, stating Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani invited Patrushev and noted that Patrushev will also meet with other high-ranking Iranian political and economic officials to discuss Russo-Iranian cooperation.[vii] Nour News Agency is affiliated with the SNSC. The SNSC likely announced Patrushev’s arrival in Iran to highlight the deepening cooperation between Moscow and Tehran to an international audience (rather than domestically), as well as to implicitly highlight that a high-ranking Russian official turned to Iran for help in Ukraine. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani notably traveled to Moscow in 2015 to appeal to Russia to intervene in the Syrian Civil War.[viii] Tehran is likely eager to publicly signal this rebalancing of its strategic partnership with Moscow, especially to regional Iranian adversaries with which the Kremlin occasionally cooperates such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Patrushev’s visit to Iran notably comes amid reports that the Iranian regime is seeking Russian help with protest suppression, although it is unclear if this will be discussed by Patrushev and his Iranian counterpart.[ix]

Patrushev’s visit comes amid some domestic criticism of Iranian military support to Russia. Masih Mohajeri—the editor of Iranian newspaper Jomhouri Eslami—criticized on November 7 the regime’s decision to support the Kremlin.[x] Mohajeri added that the regime should have told Russia not to use Iranian drones in Ukraine. Mohajeri’s remarks reflect the reservations among some in Iran about pursuing the strategic partnership with Moscow that Supreme Ali Khamenei has supported.

Key Takeaways

• Protests may increase in the coming days to commemorate the regime’s brutal crackdown in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30.
• Iranian state-run outlet Nour News Agency reported that Russian National Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev arrived in Tehran on November 8, likely to discuss the potential sale of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia.
• At least 12 protests took place in nine cities across eight provinces.
• The Jaish al Adl spokesperson claimed that the regime crackdown in Zahedan on September 30 has increased the group’s recruitment, according to UK-based Midstone Centre.
• The IRGC may have deployed some of its Iraqi proxies to support the protest crackdown.
• SNSC-affiliated Nour News Agency accused unnamed American and Mossad officials of meeting with anti-regime Kurdish militant groups in Iraqi Kurdistan over the past two months.

Iran Crisis Update, November 7

November 7, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Some elements of the Iranian regime have suggested political reform to assuage protesters’ frustrations, although such reform is highly unlikely. Hassan Khomeini—the reformist grandson of Ruhollah Khomeini—called for a “majority-based democracy” in Iran on November 7. Khomeini also implicitly criticized the Guardian Council—the state body constitutionally responsible for approving and vetting electoral candidates—for disqualifying prominent moderates and reformists from running in recent elections.

The Raisi administration amplified Khomeini’s remarks likely to placate disaffected citizens rather than support meaningful reform. The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA)--a Raisi administration mouthpiece--circulated Khomeini’s remarks and emphasized his calls for democracy. President Ebrahim Raisi uses IRNA to promote pro-regime narratives and positive framing around his administration. IRNA’s circulation of Khomeini’s remarks is surprising given that the Guardian Council played a prominent role in helping Raisi win the presidential election in June 2021. Raisi likely circulated this idea of reform—knowing it is improbable—to reduce protest activity. He is likely seeking additional ways to curb the ongoing protests given that the brutal crackdown has largely failed to stop protests.

The regime will not likely implement any electoral reform. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei often uses the Guardian Council to manipulate elections and install his preferred candidates. Khamenei has allowed the Guardian Council to intervene more aggressively in elections in recent years to ensure hardliner victories in key elections, including the February 2020 legislative elections and the June 2021 presidential election. Khamenei has historically emphasized the need to establish a hardline presidential administration in Iran to achieve his grand strategic ambition of forming a transnational Islamic civilization. He likely considers the Guardian Council an essential tool toward realizing this vision and will not reduce its role in influencing elections.

Iranian security services have begun linking the Shiraz attack, which the Islamic State (IS) claimed, to Azerbaijan and accusing the Azerbaijani military of supporting Salafi-jihadi terrorism. The Intelligence and Security Ministry announced on November 7 the arrest of 26 terrorists connected to the Shiraz attack and claimed that the lead coordinator of the attack was an Azerbaijani citizen who received guidance from extremist groups in Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. The ministry accused this individual of cooperating with Islamic State‘s Khorasan Province (ISKP). A Telegram account affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) separately claimed on November 7 that the Azerbaijani military is promoting Wahabism and providing irregular warfare training to Salafi-jihadi militants who fought in Syria.

This hostile rhetoric follows IRGC calls to annex parts of Azerbaijan. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel claimed that citizens of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic requested to join Iran on November 6. IRGC Telegram channels called on the regime to economically and militarily support separatist movements in the Nakhchivan republic to join Iran on October 23, as CTP previously reported.

IS central and ISKP have celebrated the Shiraz attack and called for more attacks against Shia targets in Iran. It remains unclear whether IS central or ISKP had any role in preparing the attack or whether IS central and ISKP are celebrating the attack opportunistically. ISKP has used increasingly threatening rhetoric toward Iran since as early as June 2022. IS central media outlets have begun increasingly translating Arabic-language propaganda into Persian since the Shiraz attack as well.

Key Takeaways

• Some elements of the Iranian regime have suggested political reform to assuage protester frustrations, although such reform is highly unlikely.
• Iranian security services have begun connecting Azerbaijan to the Shiraz attack and accusing Baku of supporting Salafi-jihadi terrorism.
• IS central and ISKP have celebrated the Shiraz attack and called for more attacks against Shia targets in Iran.
• At least 14 protests took place in 12 cities across seven provinces.
• Jaish al Adl released a statement calling for protesters to organize armed resistance against the regime.
• Five Basij university student organizations in Tehran penned an open letter urging officials to take action against Western embassies—specifically the UK and Germany—for their alleged role in stoking the ongoing protests.
• Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei called on judicial authorities to expedite the prosecution and sentencing of arrested protesters.

Iran Crisis Update, November 6

The regime continued linking the ongoing protests with terrorism on November 6 as part of an information operation to delegitimize protesters and their grievances. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf accused the US and Israel of stoking the protests to create a new ISIS in Iran.[i] A group of 227 parliamentarians signed a letter similarly blaming the US for the unrest and comparing protesters to ISIS militants, calling for harsh and rapid prosecutions.[ii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Telegram channels previously characterized protesters as ”domestic ISIS” on November 3, as CTP previously reported.[iii]

The regime will likely use this framing of protesters as terrorists to justify brutal crackdowns and harsh judicial sentences in the days and weeks ahead.[iv]

Iranian state media has claimed that the regime has arrested terrorists trying to support the protests throughout the country, including reporting that security forces arrested “terrorist teams” in Esfahan, Fars, Kermanshah, and Khuzestan provinces on November 6.[v] Iranian state media claimed that these groups sought to organize and stoke protests and assassinate prominent Arab leaders in Khuzestan Province.[vi] Law Enforcement Deputy Commander Ghassem Rezaei claimed on November 5 that the regime has arrested dozens of individuals tied to the Shiraz attack.[vii] Rezaei stated that these individuals planned large-scale sabotage and suicide operations in Iran. CTP cannot verify whether the regime arrested anyone in these reported incidents.

Key Takeaways

• The regime continued linking the ongoing protests with terrorism as part of an information operation to delegitimize protesters and their grievances.
• A security officer killed four LEC members at an LEC station in Bampour, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• At least 17 protests took place in 10 cities across eight provinces on November 6.
• An unverified social media account alleged the presence of an Afghan proxy force member during a protest crackdown in Arak, Markazi Province.
• Security forces seized weapons shipments in northwestern and southeastern Iran.
• At least two unidentified gunmen attacked an IRGC facility in Mahshahr, Khuzestan Province.

Iran Crisis Update, November 5

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid may begin regularly instigating protests throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province rather than in just Zahedan. Protests occurred in at least five cities in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 4, including Zahedan, where Abdol Hamid has instigated protests during his Friday sermons in recent weeks. Abdol Hamid called for a referendum on the Islamic Republic during his Friday Prayer sermon on November 4. Abdol Hamid’s criticism of the regime may be resonating with a larger portion of the Sunni Baloch community, indirectly stoking additional demonstrations against the political establishment.

Abdol Hamid issued two statements criticizing the regime’s violent protest crackdown and expressing support for protesters outside of Zahedan on November 5. Abdol Hamid condemned Iranian security personnel’s November 4 protest crackdown in Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province and referred to killed protesters as “martyrs.” Abdol Hamid similarly penned an open letter circulated by state-affiliated media enumerating grievances against the regime. Abdol Hamid stated that government officials did not sufficiently investigate protest crackdowns in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30, when security personnel killed over 90 demonstrators and bystanders. Abdol Hamid added that the regime had overstated the role of foreign influence in instigating unrest and stressed that the Islamic Republic had oppressed Baloch women. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency criticized Abdol Hamid for his November 4 comments and accused him of fomenting unrest.

The regime is attempting mobilize its supporters around a religious holiday honoring a historic female Shia martyr and framing its policies as pro-women. A senior Iranian cleric presented the martyr as a model of female Islamic dignity on November 5. A female Basij Organization member similarly denounced Western standards of gender equality at a pro-regime rally in Tehran. Armed Forces General Staff Cultural and Propaganda Deputy Abol Fazl Sherkachi also claimed that the regime defended Iranian women against Western countries that sought to commoditize them on November 5. A regime-affiliated cultural official additionally framed Western feminism as an information operation against Iranian women on November 5. The regime is framing its policies as pro-women to undermine criticisms fueled by the Mahsa Amini protests.

Key Takeaways

• Prominent Sunni cleric Maulana Abdol Hamid may begin regularly instigating protests throughout Sistan and Baluchistan Province rather than in just Zahedan.
• The regime is attempting mobilize its supporters around a religious holiday honoring a historic female Shia martyr and framing its policies as pro-women.
• At least 19 protests took place in 11 cities across nine provinces.
• President Ebrahim Raisi called anti-regime protesters “rioters” who were helping foment unrest in Iran.
• Senior Iranian officials discussed accelerating the prosecution of arrested protesters.

Iran Crisis Update, November 4

Parents of Iranian youth spearheading ongoing demonstrations are increasingly describing protests as a revolutionary movement, mirroring their children’s rhetoric. The father of one killed protester told mourners that his son described Mahsa Amini’s death as an impetus for change and stated that ”there will be no revolution until blood is shed” at his 40-day commemoration ceremony on October 29.[i] Another father of a killed protester similarly described his son as a martyr of freedom at his funeral on October 31.[ii] The mother of another killed protester described her son as someone who gave his life to the Iranian nation at his 40-day commemoration ceremony on November 4.[iii] The parent of a young Iranian protester told Reuters that she felt compelled to ”reclaim Iran” for her daughters and all Iranian girls in an article published on November 3.[iv]

Iranian youth participating in demonstrations have long described protests as revolutionary in nature and have expressed a readiness to die for their beliefs.[v] Disillusioned youth likely no longer view reform as a viable option—by some reformists’ own admission—and young, arrested protesters allegedly told security officials that they aimed to overthrow the regime.[vi]

Protesters are reclaiming revolutionary motifs, like martyrdom, leveraged by the regime to sustain protests. Funerals and ceremonies commemorating killed protesters have become prominent occasions of unrest within the past several days. Thousands of protesters gathered in Saghez, Kurdistan Province to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed Mahsa Amini on October 26, as CTP previously reported.[vii] Large crowds have similarly gathered to commemorate killed protesters on October 27, 28, 29, 31 and November 1, 2, and 3.[viii]  CTP assessed that funerals and commemoration ceremonies sparked significant protest activity in eight of 17 documented protest locations on November 3.[ix] Social media users have similarly begun referencing killed protesters as martyrs of a new, Iranian revolution.[x] Some protesters’ tombs bear symbols connected to the Mahsa Amini protest wave, signaling their community’s perception of their role as martyrs within the movement.[xi]

Protesters’ growing efforts to reclaim the ideas of revolution, Iranian nationalism, and secular martyrdom from the regime for their own movement is a notable inflection. The regime has accustomed Iranians to use revolutionary phrases and nationalist images and ideas and to venerate martyrs for over four decades. If protesters are successful in repurposing these habits for their own movement, then they may be able to build considerable and sustainable momentum for their efforts.

Key Takeaways

• Parents of Iranian youth spearheading ongoing demonstrations are increasingly describing protests as a revolutionary movement, mirroring their children’s rhetoric.
• At least 14 protests took place in 11 cities across six provinces.
• Violent clashes erupted between security forces and protesters in Khash, Rask, Saravan, and Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchistan Province following Friday prayer sermons.
• President Ebrahim Raisi criticized US President Joe Biden for pledging to “free Iran” during a campaign rally in California.
• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami warned that Iran will retaliate against the US and its allies for their purported role in fomenting ongoing unrest at a regime-organized rally.

Iran Crisis Update, November 3

November 3, 2022 | 6:00 PM ET

Violent clashes erupted between security forces and protesters in Karaj, Alborz Province on November 3. Mourners and protesters gathered around Karaj, which is just outside Tehran City, to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed Hadis Najafi.[i] Security forces blocked roads leading to the cemetery where Najafi is buried and fired live ammunition and tear gas at protesters.[ii] Protesters attacked security forces stations and vehicles.[iii] Protesters stabbed and killed a Basij member and injured five Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers.[iv] Protesters also severely injured a cleric.[v]

IRGC Telegram channels characterized the protesters as “domestic ISIS” to demonize them and frame them as rioters and terrorists to the rest of the population.[vi] Iran similarly framed all the Syrian opposition as ISIS in the Syrian civil war to turn domestic and international audiences against the opposition and rally support for despot Bashar al Assad.[vii] The IRGC is feeding the narrative that the US is stoking the protests by referring to protesters as ISIS because Iranian leaders frequently argue that the US created ISIS.[viii]

Protesters coordinated extensively to respond to the regime crackdown in Karaj, possibly reflecting growing organization within the movement. Some transported stones via truck to throw at security forces.[ix] Others made Molotov cocktails.[x] Protesters lined up behind barriers to throw stones and possibly Molotov cocktails at security personnel.[xi] Protesters also built a wall of cinderblocks to block a street.[xii] This organization to resist repression in Karaj resembles the tactics that protesters used against security forces in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province on October 28.[xiii]

The regime may be struggling to reach a consensus on how to manage the protests at this stage. The regime has not seemingly deployed the full extent of its internal security services to the crackdown yet despite the warning from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami calling for the immediate end of protests on October 30.[xiv] Some Iranian officials likely recognize that conducting an even more brutal crackdown will produce more secular martyrs and 40-day ceremonies around which protesters will rally. President Ebrahim Raisi also may lack the decisiveness to manage the crackdown competently, although he is not the only senior decisionmaker involved in the protest suppression.

American and Persian Gulf officials told the Wall Street Journal that the likelihood of an imminent Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia and other neighboring countries has decreased but is not gone entirely.[xv] American and Saudi officials previously warned that Iran would attack Saudi Arabia and possibly Erbil in retaliation for the perceived role of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in stoking the ongoing protests.[xvi] Tehran will nevertheless likely conduct a dramatic attack abroad--likely with drones and missiles--in retaliation for the Shiraz attack in the coming days or weeks for the domestic Iranian audience.

Key Takeaways

• Violent clashes erupted between security forces and protesters in Karaj, Alborz Province on November 3.
• Protesters coordinated extensively to respond to the regime crackdown in Karaj, possibly reflecting growing organization within the movement.
• The regime may be struggling to reach a consensus on how to manage the protests at this stage.
• American and Persian Gulf officials told the Wall Street Journal that the likelihood of an imminent Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia and other neighboring countries has decreased but is not gone entirely.
• At least 22 protests took place in 17 cities across 12 provinces.
• The IRGC Intelligence Organization arrested three members of an “anti-security team” in Ilam City, Ilam Province.
• LEC Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Commander Ahmad Taheri announced that unidentified gunmen shot and killed a Shia cleric in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Skirmishes may erupt between pro- and anti-regime protesters on November 4.
• The Artesh may have prepared its forces to participate in protest suppression in Zahedan.
• An IRGC Telegram channel circulated on November 3 an op-ed calling for the IRGC Quds Force to establish a 30-kilometer-deep buffer zone into Iraqi Kurdistan to counter anti-regime Kurdish militants there.
• Turkey reaffirmed its support for Azerbaijan amid the growing tensions between Tehran and Baku.

Iran Crisis Update, November 2

November 2, 2022 | 6:00 PM ET

Iran is signaling its readiness to attack Saudi Arabia and possibly Erbil ostensibly in retaliation for the Shiraz terror attack but primarily for the alleged role of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in stoking protests. The regime raised the red flag of Imam Hossein above the Shah Cheragh Mosque—the target of the terror attack—in Shiraz, Fars Province on October 30. The red flag represents revenge for an unjust death in Shia Islamic tradition. The regime takes down the flag once it has taken revenge. The regime raised the red flag last in Qom after the US killed Qassem Soleimani and before the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted a ballistic missile attack on US forces in Iraq in January 2020. IRGC Telegram channels posted videos depicting a hypothetical Iranian drone attack on Saudi energy infrastructure on November 2.

An Iranian proxy Telegram channel recirculated on November 2 the Iran International report claiming that the regime flew around 150 proxy fighters from Baghdad to Mashhad to suppress protests. Iran International claimed on November 1 that the regime sent fighters from Kataib Hezbollah and other unspecified Iraqi militias. The Iranian proxy account reported that the regime also flew in personnel from Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and did not deny the reports. The IRGC Quds Force used Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba extensively in its military intervention into Syria to defend the Assad regime.

Key Takeaways

• Iran is signaling its readiness to attack Saudi Arabia and possibly Erbil ostensibly in retaliation for the Shiraz terror attack but primarily for the alleged role of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in stoking protests.
• An Iranian proxy Telegram channel recirculated the Iran International report claiming that the regime flew around 150 proxy fighters from Baghdad to Mashhad to suppress protests.
• At least 22 protests took place in 14 cities across nine provinces.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his claims that the West and Israel are stoking the protests in a speech to a group of university students.
• Parliamentarian Mohammad Saleh Jokar accused the Iranian diaspora of organizing terrorist attacks in Iran and called for their punishment.
• Kurdistan Chief Provincial Justice Hossein Hosseini announced the seizure of a cache of 49 hand grenades in Baneh, Kurdistan Province.
• Unidentified individuals shot at a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) station in Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, injuring one police officer.

Iran Crisis Update, November 1

November 1, 2022 | 5:00 PM ET

American and Saudi officials have warned of an imminent Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia and possibly Erbil, according to the Wall Street Journal. These warnings accord with CTP’s previous forecasts that Iran may attack American, Israeli, or Saudi targets in retaliation for their alleged roles in stoking the protests and facilitating the Shiraz terror attack. Iranian leaders will likely seek to externalize their responses to protests caused entirely by regime domestic policies as part of their refusal to accept that their policies alone have caused this much unrest.

Such attacks could threaten American servicemembers in the Middle East. Iranian officials have historically accused the US of cooperating with Israeli and Kurdish agents in Iraqi Kurdistan to undermine regime stability. Tehran could use its drone and missile forces or its proxies to attack positions in Iraqi Kurdistan that it has accused the US and Israel of using to facilitate clandestine activities against the Islamic Republic. These positions could include the US presences at Erbil International Airport and the al Harir airbase.

The Iranians have more freedom to attack enemy targets in Iraq since the Iraqi government formation process ended. The newly approved Iraqi prime minister, Mohammad Shia al Sudani, is an Iran-friendly politician who will likely allow the IRGC and its proxies to expand their economic, political, and security influence throughout Iraq much more than his predecessor. Tehran risked derailing its efforts to install a friendly prime minister if it had escalated against the US in Iraq before the government formation process ended.

The regime could attack Saudi Arabia from Yemen, Iraq, or Iran itself. The IRGC has long furnished the al Houthi movement with advanced drone and missile systems to conduct attacks into Saudi Arabia. The expiration of the UN-mediated truce to the Yemeni civil war on October 2 again allows Iran and the Houthis the opportunity to conduct attacks into the Gulf states. The IRGC has increasingly instructed its Iraqi militias to conduct drone attacks into Saudi Arabia since May 2019 as well. The IRGC also conducted a large-scale drone and missile attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq crude-processing plant in September 2019, temporarily cutting Saudi oil production in half. Iran’s support to the Houthis and Iraqi groups allows the IRGC to attack Saudi Arabia from multiple directions and thereby strain Saudi air defenses.

Key Takeaways

• American and Saudi officials have warned of an imminent Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia and possibly Erbil, according to the Wall Street Journal.
• At least 30 protests took place in 15 cities across 11 provinces.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that the regime flew around 150 personnel from Kataib Hezbollah and other Iraqi proxies from Baghdad to Mashhad to support the protest crackdown. This report cannot be substantiated.
• Protesters have halted operations at some industrial and mining sites in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

Iran Crisis Update, October 31

October 31, 2022 | 5:00 PM ET

The regime has begun indicting and sentencing arrested protesters as part of the increasingly harsh and uncompromising stance that the regime has adopted toward the ongoing protests. Tehran Provincial Chief Justice Ali al Ghasi Mehr announced the indictment of around 1,000 protesters on October 31. Shiraz Provincial Chief Justice Asadollah Jafari announced the indictment of 70 protesters, six of whom the regime has already found guilty. Mehr and Jafari both noted that the judiciary will open protester trials to the public. The regime will likely use these show trials to make an example of some arrested protesters and deter future demonstrations.  If the regime shows trials, convictions, and then death sentences of teenagers, it may further fuel rather than diminish enthusiasm for demonstrations.

Regime officials have begun using increasingly harsh rhetoric toward the protests, framing the demonstrations and the Shiraz terror attack as connected and parts of the Western-led hybrid war against Iran. Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei stated that individuals who participate in multiple protests are “in the enemy’s ranks” and thus subject to more severe sentences on October 31. Ejei ordered the judiciary to work with media services to identify individuals who attend multiple protests. Ejei did not provide a legal basis for this new standard of evidence, suggesting that the judiciary will prosecute some protesters as foreign agents under the presumption of guilt. Hardline parliamentarian Brigadier General Mohammad Esmail Kowsari threatened that the regime will intensify its crackdown on October 31. Kowsari is a retired Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer who has historically supported and overseen brutal crackdowns on protesters.

The regime is increasing its outreach to university students to placate student protesters. Parliament Speaker (and former IRGC Brigadier General) Mohammad Bagheri Ghalibaf met with university students to solicit criticisms and feedback on October 31. Ghalibaf stated his intent to hold such a meeting again. Iranian state media reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will meet with university students on November 2 as well. Khamenei will likely use the meeting to affirm the importance of students to the country and reiterate his harsh stance on the protests. These meetings come after Raisi administration spokesperson Ali Bahadori Jahromi visited universities on October 24 and 25 to discuss popular grievances, as CTP previously reported. Students heckled and chanted anti-regime slogans at Jahromi on both dates.

Key Takeaways

• Regime officials have begun indicting and sentencing arrested protesters as part of the increasingly harsh and uncompromising stance that the regime has adopted toward the ongoing protests.
• Regime officials have begun using increasingly harsh rhetoric toward the protests, framing the demonstrations and the Shiraz terror attack as connected and part of the Western-led hybrid war against Iran.
• At least 30 anti-regime protests occurred in 17 cities in 14 provinces.
• Parliamentarian Mehdi Bagheri stated that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) is not currently operating the guidance patrol (morality patrol) because of manpower shortages.
• Medical professionals in Kurdistan Province condemned the regime crackdown on October 31, according to unverified social media reports.
• Reformist-affiliated Ham Miham newspaper published an article calling on LEC officers to protect Iranian protesters from the LEC Special Units—the regime’s highly trained, anti-riot police.

Iran Crisis Update, October 30

October 30, 2022 | 5:00 PM ET

The regime is escalating its protest crackdown in a way that could fuel an enduring and increasingly violent uprising against the political establishment. Protests continued on October 30 despite the call from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami for the immediate end of protests on October 29.[i] Protest organizations have called for more demonstrations from November 1-3.[ii] The regime will likely intensify its crackdown further in the coming days as protests continue. Such an escalation will likely cause protesters to either stop demonstrating or escalate further themselves in response.

Protesters are developing the infrastructure necessary to stage a protracted struggle against the regime. NBC News reported on October 29 that protesters have established an informal medical care network for injured demonstrators—another sign of the growing coordination and organization within the movement.[iii] Physicians are treating injured protesters in private homes so that protesters can avoid clinics and hospitals. Security forces have denied medical care to some injured protesters and used hospitals to identify and track them.[iv] The Tehran Neighborhood Youth published a statement praising medical professionals who joined the protests on October 30.[v] CTP has previously reported on protesters’ impressive ability to coordinate large-scale demonstrations on specific dates and organize militant tactics against security forces.[vi] The formation of an informal medical network could facilitate other forms of logistical cooperation among disaffected citizens.

The regime’s increasing violence against university and high school students will likely entrench anti-regime sentiments among its young population, which will likely last for decades. Security forces continued using violence against students for the second consecutive day on October 30, clashing with students and firing live ammunition in one instance.[vii] Security forces violently arrested students and injured high schoolers on October 12, 24, 29, as CTP previously reported.[viii] Amnesty International reported that Iranian security personnel killed at least 23 children in the Mahsa Amini protests on October 13, a figure that has almost certainly grown in recent days.[ix] This repression will likely alienate these youth from the regime for most if not all of their lives.

Repressing children may decrease the willingness of some security officers to continue cracking down, on the other hand. Less ideological security personnel may struggle to sustain this level of violence against children. CTP has not yet observed indications of insubordination among security personnel in recent days and will continue to update this assessment. The regime appears concerned about the morale of its security forces, however.  Parliament approved a motion to increase the salary of military and security personnel by 20 percent on October 30, likely to mitigate the risk of defections and insubordination among the security forces.[x]

Key Takeaways

• The regime may inadvertently push the ongoing protests to become an enduring uprising against the political establishment.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 22 cities in 15 provinces.
• Unidentified individuals killed a Law Enforcement Command officer in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• The IRGC Intelligence Organization arrested three individuals who were preparing Molotov cocktails in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province.

Iran Crisis Update, October 29

October 29, 2022 | 6:00 PM ET

IRGC Commander Hossein Salami set conditions to violently escalate the suppression of ongoing, anti-regime demonstrations on October 29. Salami described the Shah Cheragh Shrine attack in Shiraz on October 26 as an extension of Western-led anti-regime protests. Salami called protestors a deluded minority and threatened to kill people who continue to participate in demonstrations.[i] Salami claimed that protestors lacked humanity or souls later that day.[ii] IRGC-affiliated entities similarly linked anti-regime protests to the Shiraz attack. Student Basij chanted “death to rioters” at government-organized rallies for Shiraz victims, and IRGC-affiliated media commissioned graphic art which depicted the protests as a cover for ISIS on October 29.[iii]

Increased IRGC calls to crack down on protesters coincide with increased reports of security force violence at university protests on October 29. Social media users reported that Iranian security personnel violently arrested several university student protesters in Esfahan, Khuzestan, and Khorasan Razavi Provinces and shot at high school student protesters in Kurdistan Province on October 29.[iv] Other reports suggest that Iranian authorities barricaded student protesters in campus buildings in Lorestan and Tehran Provinces.[v] Iranian security personnel additionally fired live ammunition at medical students protesting in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, causing several casualties.[vi]

Iranian protesters are reclaiming motifs historically leveraged by the regime, like martyrdom, to reinvigorate anti-regime demonstrations. Funerals and ceremonies commemorating protesters killed by Iranian security personnel have generated significant protest activity in recent days. Thousands of protesters gathered in Saghez, Kurdistan Province to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed Mahsa Amini on October 26, as CTP previously reported.[vii] Large crowds have similarly gathered to commemorate killed protesters on October 27, 28, and 29.[viii] Hundreds of protesters chanted anti-regime slogans at the funeral of Mehrshad Shahidi in Markazi Province and at the 40^th day commemoration ceremonies of Minou Majidi and Reza Shahparnia in Kermanshah Province on October 29.[ix] Shahparnia’s father told mourners that his son described Mahsa Amini’s death as an impetus for change and stated that ”there will be no revolution until blood is shed.”[x] Social media users are also increasingly describing killed protesters as martyrs.[xi] Protesters’ use of ”martyr” to describe their comrades killed by the regime has increased after the regime attempted to repurpose the protest chant ”woman, life, freedom” into ”woman, life, martyrdom” at pro-regime rallies and as the regime has begun to describe those killed in the Shiraz attack as martyrs.

A leaked Iranian government report and chants observed in anti-regime demonstrations suggest that protesters are increasingly willing to risk arrest, and possibly death, to incite political change. Anti-regime outlet IranWire reported that most arrested protesters told authorities that they sought to overthrow the Islamic Republic, citing a classified Iranian government report.[xii] The report allegedly identified the average age of arrested protesters as 17 and assessed that anti-regime demonstrations would continue. The report supposedly added that most protesters told interrogators that they had nothing to lose.[xiii] That comment could reflect frustration with endemic economic problems in Iran, but could also reflect a change in the attitude of young Iranians that should worry the regime.  Anti-regime slogans documented in recent weeks reflect a similar willingness to risk arrest and death in order to facilitate change. Protesters have been documented chanting slogans like ”we will fight, we will die, we will take Iran back,” and ”this is the year of blood, Khamenei will be overthrown” in recent weeks.[xiv] These chants suggest that regime may have succeeded in its efforts to make Iranians more willing to sacrifice their lives...but not for the regime.

Key Takeaways

• IRGC Commander Hossein Salami set conditions to violently escalate the suppression of ongoing, anti-regime demonstrations on October 29.
• Social media users documented increased reports of security forces violence at university protests on October 29.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 22 cities in 14 provinces on October 29.
• Anti-regime outlet IranWire reported that most arrested protesters told authorities that they sought to overthrow the Islamic Republic, citing a classified Iranian government report.
• Iranian protesters were documented chanting slogans questioning ISIS’ responsibility for the October 26 Shiraz attack.
• Iraqi proxy Telegram channels repeated regime narratives blaming Saudi Arabia for the October 26 Shah Cheragh Shrine attack.

Iran Crisis Update, October 28

October 28, 2022 | 6:00 PM ET

Iranian security personnel fired live ammunition and tear gas at anti-regime demonstrators in Zahedan, Sistan Baluchistan Province on October 28 as protesters commemorated the regime’s brutal crackdown there four weeks earlier.[1] Iranian security forces may have deployed snipers to help violently suppress dissent.[2] Iranian social media users reported that security forces killed at least two protesters-- possibly including a 12-year-old boy--although the true figure is likely higher.[3] Cybersecurity watchdog NetBlocks confirmed severe internet disruptions in Zahedan on October 28.[4] Protests likely commenced during Friday prayer sermons at the Makki Grand Mosque in Zahedan, where hundreds of worshippers gathered to commemorate the regime’s violent September 30 crackdown on anti-regime demonstrations.[5] Some worshippers carried signs with slogans unique to the Mahsa Amini protest wave, including ”woman, life, freedom.”[6] Online footage shows significant crowds participating in anti-regime protests throughout the city later that day.[7] Anti-regime demonstrations in Zahedan may become increasingly common on Fridays as residents seek to commemorate protesters killed by regime security personnel.

Uncorroborated reports suggest that Iranian authorities may seek to arrest senior Iranian Sunni cleric Maulvi Abdol Hamid, who has become increasingly critical of the regime in recent weeks.[8] Abdol Hamid and regime officials have rhetorically clashed in recent days over the regime’s brutal protest crackdown in Zahedan, as CTP previously reported.[9] Large crowds purportedly gathered in the vicinity of the Makki Grand Mosque to preemptively condemn or prevent Abdol Hamid’s arrest on October 28.[10] Abdol Hamid’s arrest would likely stoke further anti-regime sentiment and unrest among Zahedan residents and possibly the broader Iranian Sunni community.

Key Takeaways

• Demonstrations in Zahedan may become increasingly common on Fridays as residents seek to commemorate protesters killed by regime security personnel.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 23 cities in 11 provinces on October 28.
• Mahabad protesters are employing increasingly organized and militant tactics to resist regime attempts to suppress demonstrations, including creating durable barricades.
• Iranian intelligence organizations published a joint statement blaming ongoing unrest on the US and its allies.
• Unverified reports claimed that Iranian officials and their families are attempting to flee the country.
• Iranian proxy media amplified pro-regime demonstrations in a likely attempt to deflect attention from ongoing unrest.

Iran Crisis Update, October 27

October 27, 2022 | 8:00 pm ET

Protesters are establishing routines for when they protest and how they prepare. Protesters have established a routine of demonstrating on Wednesdays and Saturdays.[i] CTP has consistently documented increased protest activity on these days in recent weeks.[ii] Some Iranians have established routines of barricading streets ahead of protests.[iii] University students are increasingly engaging in regular and sustained acts of defiance such as boycotting gender segregation in educational facilities, especially on days when there are few other protests across Iran.[iv] These sustained protest patterns are facilitating coordination and pose an enduring threat to the regime and its security forces.

Iran may attack US, Israeli, or Saudi interests and targets in retaliation for the Shiraz attack. Senior Iranian political and security leaders blamed the Shiraz attack on Iran’s enemies, specifically the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and vowed to retaliate on October 27. These officials include Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Ebrahim Raisi, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami, among others.[v] Khamenei’s senior military adviser, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, framed the attack and protests as part of the US-Israeli-Saudi effort to destabilize the Islamic Republic.[vi]

Bagheri and Raisi argued that the protests enabled the Shiraz attack, indicating that the regime may intensify its crackdown.[vii] This rhetoric matches the statements from Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on October 26, as CTP previously reported.[viii]

IRGC-affiliated media suggested that the individual who attacked the Shiraz shrine was Afghan, building on the narrative that the attacker was an Islamic State member. IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported that the attacker was 23-year-old Hamid Badakhshan on October 27.[ix] The last name implies that he was from Badakhshan Province in Afghanistan, although the name could be an adopted pseudonym. It is unclear whether this reporting is accurate. The Islamic State Khorasan Province—the Islamic State branch in Afghanistan—expressed support for the protesters on October 26.[x]

Protest activity will likely increase in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on October 28, marking four weeks since the regime’s brutal crackdown there on September 30.[xi] Large crowds are already reportedly gathering around the Makki Grand Mosque in Zahedan in anticipation of planned protests on October 28.[xii]

Senior Iranian Sunni cleric Maulvi Abdol Hamid and other local clerics may play an increasingly prominent role in leading protests in Zahedan. Abdol Hamid and regime officials have rhetorically clashed in recent days over the regime’s brutal protest crackdown in Zahedan, as CTP previously reported.[xiii] Another Iranian Sunni cleric in Zahedan, Abdol Ghaffar Naghshbandi, called on other Sunni clerics to clarify their stance on the protests on October 27.[xiv]

The regime is likely deploying security forces to Zahedan to preempt the protests and prepare to crack down. Social media accounts reported that anti-riot and military forces deployed in Zahedan on October 27.[xv] Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that some of these security forces transferred to Zahedan from neighboring Kerman Province.[xvi] The regime shuffles its elite security forces around the country to where they are needed most during mass unrest.[xvii]

The Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Security Council fired the Law Enforcement Command’s Zahedan commander and 16 of his subordinates on October 27.[xviii] Iranian regime-affiliated media described the dismissal as the culmination of an investigation into Iranian security forces’ brutal suppression of September 30 protests in Zahedan.[xix] One Iranian outlet acknowledged that clashes between provincial LEC officers and armed gunmen resulted in the casualties and deaths of several bystanders, including worshippers at a local mosque, citing official legal documents.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• Protesters are increasingly establishing routines for when they protest and how they prepare.
• Iran may attack US, Israeli, or Saudi interests and targets in retaliation for the Shiraz attack.
• Senior Iranian leaders argued that the protests enabled the Shiraz attack, indicating that the regime may intensify its crackdown.
• IRGC-affiliated media suggested that the individual who attacked the Shiraz shrine was Afghan, building on the narrative that the attacker was an Islamic State member.
• Protest activity will likely increase in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on October 28, marking four weeks since the regime’s brutal crackdown there on September 30.
• The Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Security Council fired the Law Enforcement Command’s Zahedan commander and 16 of his subordinates.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 23 cities in 12 provinces.
• At least 100 mourners and protesters gathered in Veysian, Lorestan Province to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed Nika Shakarami.
• Thirty-six security forces members have been killed in the ongoing protests as of October 27.
• The Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council called for countrywide, pro-regime protests on October 28 to condemn the US and Israel for their alleged roles in stoking the protests.

Iran Crisis Update, October 26

October 26, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The ongoing, anti-regime protests in Iran expanded significantly on October 26, occurring in at least 33 cities in 23 provinces. These protests are the most reported in a single day since CTP began publishing daily protest updates on September 28. Thousands of Iranians took to the streets to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed Mahsa Amini. Protesters shot and killed an IRGC intelligence officer in Maleyer, Hamedan Province, raising the death toll of security forces members to at least 33 since this protest wave began on September 16.

The largest gathering occurred in Saghez, Kurdistan Province—Mahsa Amini’s hometown and resting place. Iranian state media reported that around 10,000 individuals gathered in Saghez to commemorate Mahsa Amini, although the actual number could be higher. The regime blocked roads around Saghez to prevent protests. Videos on social media depict mourners and protesters traveling on foot to the cemetery in Saghez, walking along roads and through fields. Security forces attacked and arrested protesters at the cemetery.

Protest organizations have called on disaffected citizens to sustain this large-scale turnout daily. Some protest organizations have called for demonstrators to commemorate on October 27 the 40^th day since Nika Shakarami died. These protest organizations have also noted that Cyrus the Great Day is October 29—another date around which protesters could rally. The regime has long sought to incorporate historical Persian nationalism into its ideology, and protest calls such as this one are part of an effort to reclaim pride in Persian history for the anti-regime movement.

The regime will likely exploit a militant attack on a Shia shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province to deflate the protests. At least one gunman entered the Shah Cheragh Mosque in Shiraz and shot worshippers on October 26, killing around 15 and injuring around 40, according to Iranian state media. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack although it is very unlikely that the Islamic State was directly involved in it.

The regime will use this attack to redirect Iranian public attention away from the protests and channel anger toward foreign adversaries such as the Islamic State and Saudi Arabia. Outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) reported that the gunman was a non-Iranian Wahhabist. An IRGC-affiliated journalist claimed that Saudi Arabia ordered the attack and called on the IRGC to retaliate. The regime may attack Islamic State positions abroad or Saudi Arabia in retaliation for the militant attack in Shiraz. The regime conducted ballistic missile attacks against Islamic State targets in eastern Syria after the group claimed responsibility for attacks in Iran in June 2017 and September 2018. The regime could do so again to draw public attention away from the protests. The regime also seeks to retaliate against Saudi Arabia for its alleged role in stoking the protests as CTP previously reported.

The regime may also use this attack to justify more violent protest suppression. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf accused protesters of enabling anti-regime militants to conduct the attack.

The Islamic State is trying to capitalize on the shrine attack and protests to stoke instability and sectarian conflict in Iran. The Islamic State likely claimed responsibility for the attack opportunistically without having ordered or directly enabled it. The attack does not match the typical Islamic State attack pattern, suggesting that the group may not have explicitly directed the attack. The attacker was not wearing a suicide vest and was captured wounded but alive--a very unusual occurrence for Islamic State terrorists. Islamic State statements claiming credit for the attack were also confused, offered no details other than those already available in the media when they were released and lacked the specificity that is common in claims of credit for attacks that the Islamic State actually directs. The Islamic State has previously claimed attacks opportunistically such as the Las Vegas shooting in October 2017. The Islamic State Khorasan Province expressed support for protesters fighting the regime on October 26 as well likely to further stoke sectarian divides. The effort to fuel sectarian violence has been a hallmark of the Islamic State and its predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, distinguishing it from al Qaeda affiliates that are usually more reluctant to stoke sectarian hostilities directly.

White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated that Russia may be advising the Iranian regime’s protest crackdown on October 26. Moscow has extensive experience in protest crackdowns domestically and abroad. The Kremlin advised and supported the suppression of protests in Belarus in late 2020 and Kazakhstan in early 2022. Russian security personnel participated directly in both of those crackdowns, but CTP has not yet observed indications that Russians are in Iran actively helping the regime crack down at the moment.

Key Takeaways

• The ongoing, anti-regime protests in Iran expanded significantly on October 26, occurring in at least 33 cities in 23 provinces.
• The regime will likely exploit a militant attack on a Shia shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province to contain the protests.
• The Islamic State is trying to capitalize on the shrine attack and protests to stoke instability and sectarian conflict in Iran.
• US officials stated that Russia may be advising the Iranian regime’s protest crackdown.
• IRGC-affiliated media continued to spread disinformation to downplay protests and discredit frustrated citizens.

Iran Crisis Update, October 25

October 25, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Protest activity will likely increase—possibly significantly—on October 26 to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed Mahsa Amini. Protest organizations such as the neighborhood youth groups have continued to call for countrywide demonstrations on October 26.[1] Many protest organizations continue to use revolutionary rhetoric in describing the planned demonstrations.[2] Iranians commonly hold a commemoration on the 40^th day after a death. Anti-regime protests similarly erupted 40 days after security forces killed Neda Agha Soltan—a young Iranian protester—during the Green Movement in 2009.[3] Security forces killed Agha Soltan on June 20, 2009, and the commemoration was on July 30, 2009.[4]

The regime has likely prepared to preempt and crush the planned protests on October 26, especially given their potential to strengthen the protest movement. The regime will likely disrupt internet services and telecommunications in the early morning throughout Iran to stymie protester coordination and organization. The regime will also likely deploy security forces ostentatiously throughout major cities to deter and intimidate demonstrators and use force if the protests gain traction.

Protesters may coordinate further demonstrations against the Islamic Republic for the 40-day commemorations of other secular martyrs, such as Nika Shakarami and Sarina Esmail Zadeh, in this protest movement.[5] Forty days after Shakarami disappeared is October 30, and 40 days after Esmail Zadeh died is November 2.

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity will likely increase—possibly significantly—on October 26 to commemorate the 40^th day since the regime killed Mahsa Amini.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 13 cities in 11 provinces.
• University students heckled a senior Raisi administration official attempting to engage student protesters for the second consecutive day.
• The IRGC announced that unidentified militants killed one IRGC member and one Basij member in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

Iran Crisis Update | October 24

October 24 | 6:00 pm ET

Some Iranian social media users are invoking the November 2019 gasoline protests as the ongoing, anti-regime protests enter the Persian calendar month of Aban (October 23-November 21, 2022). Some Persian-language accounts have described the ongoing protests as the continuation of the gasoline protests, which are often referred to as the Aban protests since they occurred primarily from November 15-19, 2019. Estimates of civilians killed by the state security services in November 2019 range from 304 to 1,500.

Iranian security forces reportedly searched and beat several students attending the Sadr vocational high school in Tehran on October 24. The Education Ministry denied reports of violent clashes between security forces and students but acknowledged that school faculty searched and seized some students’ cellphones and that some students experienced blood pressure drops and required medical attention. The Education Ministry and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) denied reports of student deaths. The LEC blamed reports of unrest on clashes between ”thugs” in the vicinity of the Sadr high school. Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported a heavy security presence at the Loghman hospital in Tehran, where a Sadr student is reportedly being treated after she was hospitalized for her injuries.

University students chanted anti-regime slogans at a senior Raisi administration official attempting to engage student protestors on October 24. Raisi Administration Spokesperson Ali Bahadori Jahromi gave a speech at the Khajeh Nasir Tousi University of Technology in Tehran but left the premises after students continued to chant anti-regime slogans during his address. President Ebrahim Raisi had previously endorsed engaging with disaffected students on October 23.

Key Takeaways

• Some Iranian social media users are invoking the November 2019 gasoline protests as the ongoing, anti-regime protests enter the Persian calendar month of
• Iranian security forces reportedly searched and beat several students attending the Sadr vocational high school in Tehran
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 11 provinces.
• Iranian teachers continued to strike in solidarity with student protesters.
• A Tehran water official stated that Tehran Province may face water shortages within the next 100 days.
• An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Telegram channel advertised a fake VPN service on October 24 likely to monitor and identify protesters trying to circumvent the regime’s internet restrictions.

Iran Crisis Update | October 23

October 23, 2022 | 4:30 PM ET

Iranian university and high school students are sustaining the momentum of the ongoing anti-regime protest movement, leading the demonstrations into their 37^th consecutive day. Iranian students led 15 of 16 documented protests on October 23.[i] Some students are challenging regime regulations within academic spaces. Sharif University students reportedly repelled Iranian security forces trying to enforce gender segregation on campus on October 23, for instance.[ii] The surge in student protest activity on October 23 compared to recent days suggests that students remain capable of successfully coordinating countrywide demonstrations despite intensifying regime censorship and disruptions to telecommunications.

Some Iranian teachers are publicly supporting student protesters. Iranian teachers in at least nine cities in five provinces participated in strikes condemning the regime’s detention of and violence toward high school protesters on October 23.[iii] The Iranian Educators Trade Union Organization called for additional countrywide strikes on October 24.[iv]

Iranian officials are increasingly framing educational institutions as the nuclei of anti-regime sentiment and the ongoing unrest. An Iranian parliamentarian stated that Iran’s enemies are using Iranian schools to foment unrest on October 23, echoing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s address on October 19.[v] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami similarly framed Iranian schools as an ideological battlefield on October 16.[vi]

A senior Iranian Sunni cleric—Maulvi Abdol Hamid—may emerge as a local protest leader in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Abdol Hamid is a historically vocal regime critic and the Sunni religious leader in Zahedan. Abdol Hamid and regime officials have rhetorically clashed in recent days over the regime’s brutal protest crackdown in Zahedan on September 30.[vii] Abdol Hamid criticized Khamenei during a Friday sermon on October 21 after which hundreds of protesters took to the streets in Zahedan.[viii] The IRGC and Interior Ministry separately accused Abdol Hamid of instigating the protests during his sermon.[ix] Abdol Hamid responded to the IRGC and Interior Ministry on October 23, reaffirming his support for the protesters and calling for the arrest of the individuals responsible for the crackdown.[x] Abdol Hamid also criticized President Ebrahim Raisi for ignoring the people’s demands and refusing to sympathize.[xi] Abdol Hamid could instigate future anti-regime demonstrations and sentiment in Zahedan as the countrywide protest wave continues.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian university and high school students are sustaining the momentum of the ongoing protest movement, leading the demonstrations into their 37^th consecutive day.
• A senior Iranian Sunni cleric—Maulvi Abdol Hamid—may emerge as a local protest leader in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 16 cities in 13 provinces.
• Iranian state media and proxy Telegram channels reported that unidentified militants launched four rockets at the al Omar oilfield, which houses US forces, in eastern Syria.

Iran Crisis Update | October 22

October 22, 2022 | 5:00 PM ET

Anti-regime protests in Iran occurred in at least 24 cities in 18 provinces on October 22—a significant increase from the protest activity in recent days. Protest organizations called for countrywide demonstrations on October 22 as CTP previously reported.[1] Protestors are continuing to organize demonstrations despite ongoing and severe internet and telecommunications censorship. The protest organizations have called for additional demonstrations on October 26—the 40th day since the morality patrol killed Mahsa Amini.[2]

Some marginalized segments of the reformist faction are continuing to criticize the regime crackdown. The reformist son of former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani suggested amending the constitution to address popular grievances on October 22.[3] Reformist politician Abbas Ahmad Akhoundi called on the Iranian clerical establishment to publicly support the protesters and condemn crackdowns on October 22.[4] Akhoundi was a senior cabinet official under both Rafsanjani and former President Hassan Rouhani.[5] Akhoundi’s comments follow unconfirmed reports of rifts between the regime and some members of its clerical establishment as CTP previously reported.[6] Persian-language media outlet Zeitoon published a statement allegedly from students and teachers at the Tehran, Mashhad, and Qom seminaries on September 30, condemning Khamenei and the regime crackdown on the protests.[7] Other senior clerics such as Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaghegh Damad, Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani issued statements on criticizing state security services for the death of Mahsa Amini on September 17.[8] One of Iran’s most senior Sunni clerics—Maulvi Abdol Hamid—similarly criticized the regime on October 21 for its brutal suppression of protests in Zahedan on September 30.[9]

Key Takeaways

• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 24 cities in 18 provinces on October 22—a significant increase from the protest activity in recent days.
• Some marginalized segments of the reformist faction are continuing to criticize the regime crackdown.
• Anti-regime hacker group Black Reward published 50 gigabytes of documents related to the Iranian nuclear program.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and regime media channels claimed a new separatist movement has formed in Azerbaijan’s autonomous Nakhchivan region.

Iran Crisis Update | October 21

October 21, 2022 | 5:30 PM ET

The regime’s use of extreme violence against protesters in Sistan and Baluchistan Province is likely entrenching long-term frustration against the political establishment there. One of Iran’s most senior Sunni clerics—Maulvi Abdol Hamid—criticized the regime on October 21 for its brutal suppression of protests in Zahedan on September 30. Abdol Hamid stated that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was responsible for the crackdown, which may have killed over 90 protesters. Hamid is the Sunni Friday prayer leader in Zahedan. Large-scale protests erupted in Zahedan on October 21 in part to commemorate the three-week anniversary of the crackdown. Salafi jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl published a video on October 20, expressing support for the protesters and threatening to attack the regime, as CTP previously reported. There is no evidence to suggest that Jaish al Adl was involved in the October 21 protests.

Key Takeaways

• The regime’s use of extreme violence against protesters in Sistan and Baluchistan Province is likely entrenching long-term frustration against the political establishment there.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least three cities in three provinces.
• Unknown hackers claimed to have hacked the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

Iran Crisis Update | October 20

October 20, 2022 | 4:30 PM ET

Anti-regime protests continued to subside in extent and scale on October 20 but may increase on October 22 and 26. CTP noted protest activity in five cities in five provinces on October 20—a notably low level of protest activity given the calls for protests on October 20 and protesters’ previous successes in coordinating countrywide demonstrations. Protest organizations had called for demonstrations specifically in Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, and Zanjan provinces.[1] Protest organizations have also called for protests throughout Iran on October 22 and 26—the latter being the 40^th day since Mahsa Amini died.[2]

The regime may have used the forces it previously mobilized for a military exercise to deter and/or suppress protests in northern Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces conducted an exercise around the Iran-Azerbaijan border from October 17 to 20 in part to threaten Azerbaijan and also possibly to prepare to suppress nearby protests.[3] Iranian social media users reported severe internet disruptions in Tabriz on October 20.[4] The IRGC military exercises that occurred in the vicinity of Tabriz may have facilitated the regime’s ability to restrict protest organizers’ internet and telecommunication access and establish a security presence in the city. The main IRGC combat elements in the area are the 2^nd Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade and the 31^st Ashoura Mechanized Division, which likely participated in the exercise.[5]

Key Takeaways

• Anti-regime protests continued to subside in extent and scale, occurring in at least five cities in five provinces on October 20.
• Protests may increase on October 22 and 26.
• Salafi Jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl published a video threatening to overthrow the regime and expressing support for Iranian protestors.

Iran Crisis Update, October 19

October 19, 2022 | 6:00 pm ET

Anti-regime protests have subsided in extent and scale in recent days but may increase on October 20 and 26. Many instances of recent protest activity include fewer than 20 demonstrators and therefore do not meet CTP’s threshold for reporting. The Tehran Neighborhood Youth called for protests on October 22 and October 26, the latter being the 40^th day since the Iranian morality patrol killed Mahsa Amini. Iranians commonly hold a commemoration on the 40^th day after a person’s death. Protest organizations may seek to use the 40^th-day commemoration to reignite widespread demonstrations.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) continued to threaten Azerbaijan militarily for allegedly hosting Israeli intelligence agents on October 19. The IRGC Ground Forces constructed a bridge over the Aras River near the Iran-Azerbaijan border at the end of its three-day military exercise, which began on October 17. IRGC armored and engineering elements crossed the bridge. CTP cannot assess whether IRGC forces entered Azerbaijani territory because the exact location of the exercise is unclear. The IRGC likely sought to use the exercise to signal its capability to attack Azerbaijan and strike targets in Azerbaijani territory, however. CTP previously reported that Iranian officials and state media assert that Israel is using Azerbaijan as an intelligence base to instigate protests. Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have flared over Armenia in recent months, which also likely informed the regime decision to conduct the exercise.

Key Takeaways

• Anti-regime protests have subsided in size and scale in recent days but may increase on October 20 and 26.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 10 cities in 8 provinces on October 19.
• The IRGC continued to threaten Azerbaijan militarily for allegedly hosting Israeli intelligence agents on October 19.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech praising Iranian academics in a meeting with Iranian university science students and faculty members on October 19.
• IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported that most arrested protestors are younger than 35.

Iran Crisis Update, October 18

October 18, 2022 | 3:30 PM ET

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s refusal to concede on the mandatory hijab law is likely driving fissures among the political elite. Retired Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) general Hossein Alaei expressed sympathy for some protester grievances and suggested abolishing the morality patrol on October 18.[i] Alaei’s statement follows several moderate and reformist politicians taking similarly sympathetic position in recent days. Three reformists separately proposed reforms to address public frustrations on October 17, as CTP previously reported.[ii] Former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani stated that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij Organization should not be responsible for enforcing the mandatory hijab law on October 12.[iii] Khamenei has shown no indication that he will remove the hijab requirement or offer a similar concession to the people and has instead taken a hard line toward the protests in his recent speeches.[iv] Khamenei has thus taken a position that some members of the regime--even the most ideological--may not be willing to defend.

Alaei previously published a letter in 2012 criticizing the regime and Khamenei for repressing the 2009 Green Movement.[v] Senior IRGC commanders responded at the time, condemning Alaei and visiting his home to discuss the letter.[vi] The IRGC leadership seemingly convinced Alaei to stop criticizing the regime and Khamenei publicly, but his latest remarks indicate that he is again breaking from the political and security establishments.

The ongoing crackdown demonstrates how heavily the regime has begun using advanced and emerging technologies to impose social control. The Wall Street Journal reported on October 18 that the regime is using drones to surveil protests and public cameras and food-delivery services to track and identify protesters.[vii] Iranian leaders have built an increasingly adaptive and sophisticated police and surveillance state in recent years to secure their hold on power.[viii] They have observed how technology can secure other autocratic governments, looking to China as a model, and seek to emulate it.[ix] The regime is accordingly developing technologies such as artificial intelligence, facial recognition, and their national intranet to identify and monitor dissidents and assert greater control over the information space.[x]  The regime’s years-long efforts to create these capabilities have shown remarkable limitations in the face of the current protest wave—something these capabilities were explicitly and clearly intended to prevent.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s refusal to concede on the mandatory hijab law is likely driving fissures among the political elite.
• The ongoing crackdown demonstrates how heavily the regime has begun using advanced and emerging technologies to impose social control.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least nine cities in eight provinces.
• Worker strikes expanded to new locations and economic sectors.
• Protest organizations called for demonstrations in West Azerbaijan, Ilam, Kermanshah, and Kurdistan provinces on October 19.
• A Persian-language Telegram account posted instructions for protesters on how to use handguns.
• Iran may attack Saudi Arabia in retaliation for the perceived Saudi role in stoking the protests.

Iran Crisis Update, October 17

October 17,2022 | 6:30 PM ET

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) began a three-day military exercise along the Iran-Azerbaijan border on October 17 likely to threaten Azerbaijan for allegedly hosting Israeli intelligence agents.[i] The IRGC is using this exercise to demonstrate its capability to attack Azerbaijan and strike targets in Azerbaijani territory. The exercise includes artillery, helicopters, tanks, and missiles.[ii] The IRGC announced plans to practice bridging the river that divides Iran and Azerbaijan for the first time during this exercise.[iii] The IRGC is using the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missile, which has a reported operational range of 120 kilometers, in this exercise.[iv] IRGC-affiliated media boasted that the IRGC has previously used these missiles for cross-border attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan.[v] An IRGC-affiliated journalist tweeted that the exercise signals the readiness of the IRGC to confront Azerbaijan.[vi]

Key Takeaways

• The IRGC threatened Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia for their alleged roles in stoking the ongoing, anti-regime protests.
• The IRGC could use the troops it mobilized for the military exercise to violently suppress planned protests in northwestern Iran on October 20.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 10 cities in 9 provinces.
• The New York Times reported that the regime may have deployed special forces from the IRGC Ground Forces in recent days to suppress protests in Tehran and other major cities.
• Several reformist politicians proposed reforms to end the current crisis.
• The Jerusalem Post reported that the IRGC is using members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi proxies to suppress protests in Iran, citing unidentified sources.

Iran Crisis Update, October 16

October 16, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The IRGC may resume attacks against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan in the coming days. IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) media outlets blamed Kurdish militants’ presence in Iraqi Kurdistan for ongoing, anti-regime protests on October 16. LH-owned Al Ahed News recirculated an IRGC-owned media outlet article that claimed that Mossad agents have been working with Kurdish Komala militants to establish sabotage networks in Iran since 2021. IRGC Telegram channels also posted an October 16 statement from the chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Mohammad Bagheri, warning that the IRGC will resume attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) fails to “deport or disarm the local militias.”

LH and IRGC rhetoric coincide with reports that the KRG refused Iran's demands to disarm and remove anti-Iranian regime militants from Iraqi Kurdistan. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian made the demand in a meeting with KRG Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed in Tehran on October 16. Iran International claimed on October 16 that KRG envoy to Iran Nazim Dabbagh admitted that the KRG had warned anti-regime Kurdish militants prior to IRGC attacks.

Recent progress on forming an Iran-friendly government in Baghdad has lowered the risk that renewed attacks would harm Iran’s political influence over the Iraqi government. The IRGC paused attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan on October 8 likely in part to avoid undermining Iran-aligned Iraqi political factions’ efforts to form a government. Iran-backed political factions made significant progress on government formation by installing officials favored by the Iran-backed Shia Coordination Framework as the new Iraqi president and the new Iraqi Prime Minister on October 13. Newly installed Iraqi Prime Minister and Iran-backed Shia Coordination Framework official Mohammad al-Sudani announced that he expects to finish forming a cabinet weeks ahead of his November 12 deadline.

Key Takeaways

• The IRGC may resume attacks against on positions in Iraqi Kurdistan in the coming days.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 14 cities in 12 provinces on October 16.
• Iranian state-run outlets have struggled to cohere a unified narrative following reports of violence at Evin Prison in Tehran.
• Iranian security forces are increasingly targeting high schools in an attempt to quell unrest, could reinvigorate ongoing protests.
• Iranian officials are increasingly describing ongoing protests as being revolutionary in nature and acknowledge that recent demonstrations target the foundation of the regime.

Iran Crisis Update, October 15

October 15, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

A major fire broke out at the Evin prison in Tehran on October 15, and the regime used live rounds and tear gas against prisoners and nearby protestors. Iranian state media made the unsubstantiated claim that inmates started the fire.[1] Regime security forces used violence against prisoners and nearby protesters during the fire.[2] Persian-language social media accounts reported that security forces have blocked roads to the prison and fired live rounds and tear gas.[3] Social media users and western media outlets reported explosions and gunshots around Evin Prison.[4]

The regime uses Evin Prison to hold political prisoners and individuals detained on security-related charges, among others.[5] Prison guards and security officials harshly abuse and mistreat inmates there.[6] The judiciary manages the prison, but the Intelligence and Security Ministry and IRGC Intelligence Organization control some parts of the facility as well.[7] The regime holds several dual nationals at Evin Prison, including US-Iranian citizens Siamak Namazi and Emad Shargi.[8]

Social media users have suggested without substantiation that the regime intentionally started the fire, possibly to justify the killing of arrested protesters at the prison.[9] Yasser Hashemi Rafsanjani—the son of late President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—claimed that Iranian authorities advised his brother not to return to Evin Prison on October 15 when his brother was scheduled to return from a furlough.[10] CTP cannot validate these rumors.

Key Takeaways

• A major fire broke out at the Evin prison in Tehran on October 15, and the regime used live rounds and tear gas against prisoners and nearby protestors.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 22 cities in 16 provinces, although this number is almost certainly higher.
• A Persian-language social media account tweeted a political manifesto, calling for a peaceful transition to establish a democratic, secular Iranian government.
• IRGC-affiliated Telegram channels claimed that unidentified militants fired six rockets at the al Omar oilfield, which houses US servicemembers, in eastern Syria.

Iran Crisis Update, October 14

October 14, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) may be mobilizing retired servicemembers and other affiliated officers to suppress protests in Tehran on October 15. Iran International reported that the IRGC has called on its retirees and other affiliates to report to the Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Corps headquarters—the IRGC unit responsible for security in Tehran Province. The regime is likely preparing for the planned countrywide protests on October 15. Trying to mobilize retirees and other affiliates would indicate that Iranian leaders are increasingly concerned by the mounting unrest.

CTP cannot verify this reporting. Iran International is UK-based and has an explicit anti-regime agenda. Individuals tied to the Saudi royal family reportedly fund it. The report that the IRGC is trying to mobilize retirees and others is consistent with CTP’s previous assessments that Iranian security forces are struggling with bandwidth constraints, exhaustion and low morale.

Demonstrators have killed more Iranian security personnel in the current protest wave than in any previous wave in the regime’s history according to regime statistics. Iranian state media reported that 26 security personnel have died. One IRGC major and one Basij Organization member were killed in Beyram, Fars Province on October 14. The regime claims that protestors killed them. Beyram is a small town in a rural area. The killing of security officers there reflects the expansion of anti-regime violence to small towns deep in Iran in addition to major cities and border regions. The second most deadly wave for regime personnel according to regime statistics was the 2009 Green Movement, during which 23 security officers died.

Key Takeaways

• The IRGC may be mobilizing retired servicemembers and other affiliated officers to suppress protests in Tehran on October 15.
• Protesters have killed more Iranian security personnel in the current protest wave than in any previous wave in the regime’s history according to regime statistics.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 11 cities in seven provinces.
• Social media accounts that are representing themselves as youth groups organizing and coordinating protests called for countrywide unrest on October 15.

Iran Crisis Update, October 13

October 13, 2022 | 5:30 PM ET

Expanding protests could strain Iranian state security services beyond their capabilities to respond in the coming days. Anti-regime protest organizations and social media accounts have called for protests in Khuzestan Province on October 14 and throughout the country on October 15. A group called the Youth of the Whole Country, which began tweeting on October 11, has repeated these calls and stated that it seeks to overthrow the regime. The group added that it has coordinated with local protest leaders throughout Iran. Numerous other Persian-language social media accounts with similar naming conventions are circulating on Twitter, claiming to represent Iranian protesters in cities across the country. The Youth of Tehran Neighborhoods tweeted that the October 15 demonstrations will be “the beginning of the end [for the regime].”

CTP cannot verify that the authenticity of these groups or their claims to be leading protests in Iran. The Youth of the Whole Country notably states that its members are inside and outside Iran. These calls for protests on October 14 and 15 will likely bring more Iranians onto the streets in any event.

Such a scenario would strain the regime’s capability to suppress protests in major cities and border regions at the same time. The regime relies on relatively small numbers highly ideologically committed and well-trained security units for protest crackdowns, which introduces a vulnerability in the security apparatus: Iranian leaders do not have enough of these forces to cover all of Iran. The regime has historically shuffled these elite security forces around the country to where they are needed most—typically the restive border regions. The regime has conducted brutal crackdowns on demonstrators in northwestern Kurdistan Province and southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent weeks and is likely focused on preventing any insurgent groups from gaining traction in these regions. The regime may face the added pressure of trying to control protests in Khuzestan Province, where anti-regime violence is common, on October 14 and in major cities across Iran on October 15.

Simultaneous protests across Iran—in major cities and the border regions—could overwhelm security forces and prevent them from being able to control demonstrations in some locations. Such a scenario will not likely collapse the regime in itself, but it would certainly pressure it significantly.

Key Takeaways

• Expanding protests could strain Iranian state security services beyond their capabilities to respond in the coming days
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 12 provinces.
• The Iraqi parliament elected Kurdish compromise candidate Abdul Latif Rashid as president.

Iran Crisis Update, October 12

October 12, 2022 | 5:00 PM ET

Iranian leadership is still largely speaking to itself rather than to the Iranian people. Iranian officials continue to ignore protester grievances and are instead emphasizing their readiness to brutally crack down. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressed the protests publicly for the second time on October 12, reiterating his accusation that foreign enemies are responsible for the unrest. He dismissed the protests as minor events. Khamenei did not mention Mahsa Amini or the citizens killed in the protests. Khamenei likely sought to reaffirm to the political and security establishment his approval of the brutal crackdown while portraying strength.

Other Iranian officials are following Khamenei’s lead, ignoring protester grievances and boasting of their tools of repression. President Ebrahim Raisi met with the Supreme Cyberspace Council on October 11 to discuss efforts to develop the national intranet. The regime uses this intranet to substitute for foreign internet services, asserting greater control over the Iranian information space. A senior Law Enforcement Command (LEC) official, Brigadier General Hassan Karami, boasted that the LEC Special Units use miniature drones to track protesters who flee into alleyways. Karami commands the Special Units, which is the LEC’s highly trained, anti-riot force. These units are heavily involved in the ongoing crackdown.

This messaging suggests that the regime will not make concessions to the protesters. This rhetoric will not assuage protester frustrations either. Regime officials may hope that the protests will lose momentum with time and brutality and slowly dissipate, but their actions and failures even to speak to their people directly are more likely to fuel continued unrest.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian leadership is still largely speaking to itself rather than to the Iranian people.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 29 cities in 18 provinces.
• Protesters continue to demonstrate their capability to coordinate large-scale demonstrations despite expanding regime censorship and increasingly violent suppression.
• Commercial and industrial groups are increasingly attempting to coordinate protests and strikes between cities.
• Iranian proxy media channels in Iraq and Lebanon emphasized anti-West messaging from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s October 12 speech.

Iran Crisis Update, October 11

October 11, 2022 | 6:00 PM ET

Unconfirmed reports suggest that the Iranian regime is amassing military and security forces in Kurdistan Province to violently suppress protests and possibly also to conduct a ground operation into Iraqi Kurdistan.[1] Social media rumors reported on October 10 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) have transferred forces from Hamedan, Yazd, and elsewhere to Sanandaj, where the regime is conducting a brutal crackdown.[2] Anti-regime outlet IranWire and a UK-based Sky News journalist reported that the regime is concentrating forces in Kurdistan Province.[3]

CTP cannot verify these reports and advises caution when evaluating these reports in light of the many, often-conflicting, information operations being conducted by the regime and its opponents.

Iran Crisis Update, October 10

October 10 | 5:00 PM ET

The ongoing, anti-regime protests could interact with and feed off of preexisting insurgencies in Iran. There are at least three active but low-level insurgencies in Iran’s northwestern, southwestern, and southeastern border regions. Iranian Arab, Baloch, and Kurdish militant groups have leveraged economic and political frustrations among marginalized minorities in Iran to fuel these groups’ anti-regime agendas for decades. These groups, which include the Kurdistan Free Life Party and Jaish al Adl, have historically conducted attacks into Iran and clashed with state security services regularly.

The greatest violence in the current protest movement has been in northwestern Kurdistan Province and southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province partly because insurgent groups operate in these areas. These groups are likely trying to coopt and stoke the unrest to fight the regime. State security services are using greater force in these areas as well.

Demonstrations in the Iranian heartland may already be approaching the threshold identified in US military doctrine for a “latent and incipient” insurgency. CTP has not yet observed clear indicators that the protest movement has crossed the threshold and is not prepared to forecast that it will. American counter-insurgency doctrine, using a modified version of the Maoist insurgency framework, defines the lowest level of insurgency as follows:

“The first phase is latent and incipient. During this phase, activities include the emergence of insurgent leadership, creation of initial organizational infrastructure, training, acquisition of resources, and political actions, such as organizing protests. A group that eventually becomes members of an insurgency may simply be a legitimate political group at this stage. Governmental actions and changes in society can transform political groups into insurgencies.”

Protestor organizations are understandably cautious about leaving observable traces in the open source, making it impossible to gauge their extent, capabilities, or intentions at this time. But the appearance of nascent protestor organizations like the Neighborhood Youth of Tehran suggesting that they can do more than simply generate protests—specifically preventing regime security forces from entering certain areas of Tehran and other cities—could indicate an inflection in their capabilities or intentions. The slogans and chants calling for the overthrow of the regime, particularly those saying that this is not a protest but a revolution, are another possible indicator.

Evaluating the movement of a protest movement along insurgency phases derived from Maoist theory is problematic, to be sure. Maoist theory and US counter-insurgency doctrine assumes the existence of a group intending to overthrow a government before large demonstrations begin and may not adequately cover the case of a protest movement that transforms over time into an insurgency. 

The Syrian civil war, however, followed a similar path to the one Iranian protest may be on—peaceful protests were met by violent oppression that fractured the security forces. Security force defectors joining the protests helped organize them and prepare them to defend themselves against increasing regime violence. Limited indications of Iranian security force defections are emerging, although some Iranian security forces have joined protestors in previous protest waves without turning them into organized insurgencies. The risk to the Iranian regime is there, however, if the current protest wave interacts with Iran’s long-standing insurgencies and the regime’s brutal response in ways that propel it along the insurgency spectrum.

Key Takeaways

• Ongoing, anti-regime protests could interact with and feed off of preexisting insurgencies in Iran in ways that could prolong, reinvigorate, and exacerbate the unrest.
• Iranian security forces have launched a brutal crackdown on protestors in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province.
• Thousands of oil workers reportedly participated in strikes and anti-regime protests on October 10, which could pose a significant threat to the regime’s oil production if prolonged.
• Protest activity will likely increase in size and scale on October 12.
• Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei adopted a conciliatory tone toward protesters on October 10, breaking with the pattern of regime senior leader statements since Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s speech on October 3.

Iran Crisis Update, October 9

October 9, 2022 | 6:00 PM ET

Iran may be preparing to escalate militarily against its foreign adversaries, including the US, in response to the ongoing, anti-regime protests. Likely Iranian-backed militants conducted a rocket attack against a US military base in northeastern Syria on October 8. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior political and security officials have accused the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of coopting and stoking the protests in recent days.[i] Senior Iranian military officers released a statement vowing to retaliate on October 6.[ii] Iranian forces or proxies may conduct additional attacks against US positions in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Syria, in response to what they claim is Washington’s role in the protests.

Iranian proxies may also escalate against Turkey to redirect Iraqi resentment over Iranian attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan toward Ankara rather than Tehran. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militants conducted a rocket attack on a Turkish military base in Mosul Province on October 8.[iii] Liwa Ahrar al Iraq—a front group that Iranian-backed Iraqi militants use to claim attacks against Turkish forces —claimed responsibility. Iranian-backed Iraqi militants frequently used Liwa Ahrar al Iraq to claim attacks against Turkish positions during a period of escalatory attacks in June and July 2022.[iv] The Iraqi public and political establishment rallied against Turkey and its attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan during this period. Liwa Ahrar al Iraq resurfacing to claim attacks on Turkish forces may indicate that Iran and its proxies are preparing to escalate against Turkish forces and seek to again divert Iraqi citizens’ and officials’ anger toward Ankara rather than Tehran.

Key Takeaways

• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 18 cities in 15 provinces.
• Anti-regime group The Neighborhood Youth of Tehran announced their expansion to other unnamed cities in Iran.
• Some low-level military and security personnel may have defected.
• Iranian leadership may have ordered the IRGC Ground Forces to participate directly in the protest crackdown.

Iran Crisis Update, October 8

October 8, 2022 | 6:30 PM ET

The Iranian regime’s rhetorical responses to ongoing anti-regime protests may suggest that senior regime officials are posing for the benefit of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or other key power centers rather than trying to reach their restive populace. Regime disinformation about brutality against demonstrators is increasingly disconnected from reality and more likely to stoke protestor anger than to assuage it. President Ebrahim Raisi spoke at a women’s university in Tehran to illustrate that he retains support from young Iranian women in the face of mass protests by young women against the regime.[1] IRGC-affiliated media outlets are similarly propagating disinformation about protestor deaths, claiming that several protestors died from an underlying illness, suicide, and other causes unrelated to police brutality.[2] Uncorroborated reports suggest that the regime edited the Telegram account of Sarina Esmail Zadeh—whom Iranian security forces brutally killed during an anti-regime protest—to support to the regime’s narrative that she committed suicide.[3]

These kinds of regime messages are unusually disconnected from reality and alienating to protestors and those who sympathize with them. These narratives may be directed instead at an internal audience. Khamenei appeared in stable condition during an appearance on October 3 and has seemingly recovered from reports of deteriorating health.[4] Recent regime messaging nevertheless suggests that discussions surrounding supreme leader succession are ongoing. The regime’s tone-deaf messaging could be intended to shape the perceptions of leaders, like Khamenei, who receive information about ongoing protests indirectly and possibly via television, about how well regime officials and possible successors are doing rather than those, like the protesters and the outside world, who can see the situation for themselves more directly.

The growing gap between the fictional world described by regime messaging and the reality on the ground will likely inflame demonstrations, in any event.

Key Takeaways

• Regime messaging suggests that key regime officials could be posing to gain or retain favor as part of efforts to shape the succession to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rather than focusing on responding to protestor grievances.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 29 Iranian cities in 20 provinces.
• Iranian security forces are using increasingly violent and lethal means to suppress protests.
• Protestors have demonstrated the capacity to coordinate demonstrations despite extensive internet and telecommunication restrictions.
• Protest rhetoric has evolved to include revolutionary calls to topple the regime.
• Oil industry workers and bazaar merchants participated in strikes on October 8.
• The IRGC did not attack anti-regime Kurdish militia positions for the first time since September 26, likely in part because the Iraqi parliament met to discuss the attacks.

Iran Crisis Update, October 7

October 7, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Regime disinformation about protester deaths may further stoke anti-regime sentiment and even revitalize anti-regime demonstrations. The regime released a report on October 8 alleging that Mahsa Amini died from an underlying illness, refuting evidence that she died from police brutality.[1] Iranian authorities are trying to deflect blame for Amini’s death. Regime-affiliated media outlets and officials similarly claimed that Sarina Esmail Zadeh and Nika Shakarami—two teenage protestors brutally killed by security forces--committed suicide.[2] Iranian social media users are increasingly commemorating Esmail Zadeh and Shakarami, who are serving as secular martyrs around whom protesters can rally.[3]

Iran Crisis Update, October 6

October 6, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Iran may attack the US, Israeli, and/or Saudi targets in retaliation for the role Iranian officials claim those countries have played in stoking the ongoing, anti-regime protests. This assessment is based on rhetoric from Iranian military leaders on October 6. Senior Iranian military officers released a statement accusing the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of coopting and stoking the protests and vowed to retaliate.[1] The content and nature of the statement suggests that the heads of each major military and security body approved its release. The statement did not list the names of these officers but noted that they are from the following military bodies:

• The Armed Forces General Staff;
• The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters (the body that commands and coordinates all Iranian operational military activity);
• The Artesh (Iran’s conventional military);
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); and
• The Law Enforcement Command.

The regime could use its proxy and partner militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen to attack US forces and US regional partners. Yemen’s civil war truce expired on October 2, allowing the regime to resume using the Houthis to attack the Gulf states.

The security forces’ statement suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei likely was indeed seriously ill in recent weeks but has recovered. The officers reaffirmed the armed forces’ allegiance to Khamenei and wished him good health and a long life. Western reporting indicates that Khamenei’s health declined significantly in early September.[2] Khamenei spoke to a military officer graduation ceremony on October 3, appearing no more unhealthy than he has seemed in recent months.[3]

The military officers reiterated their uncompromising stance toward the protests in the statement. They labeled protesters “seditionists” and vowed to defeat them. These remarks match the aggressive rhetoric that Khamenei and other senior political and security officials have used in recent days.  The regime labeled the protesters in the 2009 Green Movement and other major protest waves “seditionists.”

Some university faculty called for further protests on October 8.[4] University students have previously shown that they can coordinate widespread demonstrations in this protest wave, and the university faculty may be similarly capable of doing so.

This protest movement is unlike previous protest waves in Iran, and its trajectory is therefore difficult to forecast. Protester grievances are primarily political but resonate across many different communities and socio-economic classes in Iran. The last major political (as opposed to economic) protest movement in Iran was the Green Movement, which lasted throughout 2009.  It is thus unclear whether this protest movement will last for weeks or months.

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s senior military leadership accused the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of stoking the ongoing, anti-regime protests and vowed to retaliate.
• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least eight cities in five provinces.
• Protests could increase in extent and size on October 8.
• The IRGC conducted an artillery strike on Sidekan in Iraqi Kurdistan for the eleventh consecutive day.

Iran Crisis Update, October 5

Anti-regime protests seemingly subsided in extent and size on October 5. October 5 marks the death of a prominent Shia Imam and is a national holiday in Iran, possibly explaining the decrease in protest activity in Iranian high schools. The regime’s ongoing internet and telecommunication restrictions are likely limiting the open-source information available on anti-regime demonstrations.

Key Takeaways

• Anti-regime protests may have occurred in at least four cities in four provinces—a significant decrease from the previous day’s protest activity.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that Iran is using orbit jamming to block the network’s satellite signal into Iran.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted an artillery strike on Sidekan in Iraqi Kurdistan for the tenth consecutive day.

Iran Crisis Update, October 4

October 4, 2022 | 3:00 pm ET

University and high school students have begun largely leading the ongoing protest movement in Iran—at least for the moment. Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 14 provinces on October 4, primarily around universities and high schools. Students expressed frustration with the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The student protesters are a generation younger than the youth who played a prominent role in the Green Movement in 2009, during which Iranians took to the streets to protest the fraud-plagued reelection of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. These protests will likely influence this younger generation’s formative years in a fashion similar to the way the Green Movement affected the Iranian youth at the time. It will be interesting to observe how the experiences in those earlier demonstrations of the parents of young people protesting today shape both generations.

It is unclear how long the university and high school students will sustain their protests. The regime may not use the same brutality and force that it has previously used throughout the crackdown against young people. The continuation of the student demonstrations could afford the other segments of the protest movement time to rest before returning to the streets, however.

Key Takeaways

• Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 14 provinces.
• Senior Iranian political and security officials overwhelmingly echoed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s hard line on the protests.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) continued attacking anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the ninth consecutive day.
• Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) promoted a conspiracy theory alleging Mahsa Amini committed suicide to trigger civil unrest in Iran.

Iran Crisis Update, October 3

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since September 21.[1] He spoke to a military officer graduation ceremony alongside the regime’s most senior military leaders. Khamenei appeared in stable condition during his speech.

Khamenei condemned the ongoing, anti-regime protests during his speech—his first public acknowledgment of the protests. Khamenei accused the US and Israel of stoking the protests and said that the greatest victims were the state security services “and the Iranian nation.” Khamenei honored the security personnel killed in the protests.

Khamenei may have decided to meet the military leadership for his first address on the protests to signal his support for the security establishment and for a hard line on the demonstrations. Khamenei has not typically made public spectacles of meetings with senior military officers in previous major protest waves, although he has held such meetings during non-crisis periods. The following individuals joined Khamenei:

• Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri
• IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami
• Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi
• LEC Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari
• Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani
• Interior Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi

Khamenei stated that some of the regime’s strongest female supporters do not wear the full hijab in public, indicating that the regime may relax its hijab enforcement to placate protesters. Khamenei’s remark does not likely signify a reversal of the mandatory hijab law but rather a message to the security establishment to enforce it less aggressively. Khamenei also expressed regret over the death of Mahsa Amini.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since September 21 to condemn the ongoing, anti-regime protests.
• Protests increased in number to at least 18 Iranian cities in 16 provinces.
• University students and faculty staged widespread protests in response to the regime’s brutal crackdown on Sharif University students.
• Iranian proxies pivoted their media messaging to match Khamenei’s speech.

Iran Crisis Update, October 2

October 2, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

The continued public absence of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may be hindering regime officials’ efforts to develop a coherent response to the ongoing, anti-regime protests. Khamenei has not addressed the protests nor made a public appearance since September 21, possibly due to his reportedly worsening health.[1] An unidentified Iranian official told Reuters that intra-regime disagreements over supreme leader succession and protest management are dividing the regime elite.[2] This division suggests that Khamenei is not playing his usual role of cohering the regime during a crisis.

Khamenei’s silence may have opened a leadership vacuum that other regime authorities are having to fill. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) leaders struck a more conciliatory tone on October 2 as university students have adopted an increasingly prominent role in the protest movement. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami said, “we consider [the protesting youth] our friends, and we will not allow the enemy to attack you.”[3] Salami was referring to his allegation that Iran’s international adversaries are coopting and stoking the protests to destabilize the regime. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri met with students and celebrated their role in advancing the regime and revolution.[4] Khamenei would ordinarily play a prominent role in such messaging during a crisis, and his silence is abnormal.

President Ebrahim Raisi has played a minor role thus far in communicating to the protesters or the Iranian population.  His low profile is remarkable given his legal responsibilities for maintaining public order in Iran.  He may seek to avoid becoming the face of the crackdown to preserve his chances to be accepted as the next supreme leader, but it is hard to see his relative silence as anything other than weakness.

Anti-regime outlet IranWire has published reports claiming that security leaders have disagreed over how to respond to the protests, further indicating that they may lack guidance from the supreme leader. IranWire reported on September 24 that IRGC leaders accused other security bodies suppressing protests of negligence, citing an unidentified former Iranian official.[5] IranWire also reported on September 29 that senior IRGC officers have disagreed with the brutal treatment of protesters and instead advocated for fighting anti-regime Kurdish groups in northwestern Iran.[6] CTP cannot verify these reports.

Khamenei’s absence may be emboldening segments of the clerical establishment, especially in Qom, to criticize and pressure the regime more openly. Two senior clerics—Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaghegh Damad and Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani—issued statements on September 17, criticizing state security services for the death of Mahsa Amini.[7] Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani called on the regime to listen to the people’s grievances on September 25.[8] Persian-language media outlet Zeitoon published a statement allegedly from students and teachers at the Tehran, Mashhad, and Qom seminaries on September 30, condemning Khamenei and the regime crackdown on the protests.[9]

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement.
• Anti-regime protests decreased in number across Iran but were significantly more violent in Tehran.
• Social media rumors claimed that state security services are facing significant bandwidth constraints in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces.
• Iran’s Iraqi proxies are attempting to decouple anti-corruption Tishreen movement protests from Iraqi nationalists’ anti-Iran sentiments.
• Solidarity protests against the Iranian regime spread to Lebanon.
• The IRGC attacked anti-regime Kurdish militia positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the seventh consecutive day.

Iran Crisis Update, October 1

October 1, 2022 | 2:30 pm ET

Iranian protesters successfully planned anti-regime demonstrations in at least 21 Iranian cities in 17 provinces on October 1 despite regime censorship. Protestors had announced plans over the past few days for protests on October 1 as CTP has previously reported. The successful coordination of these demonstrations despite internet restrictions suggests that protesters—specifically university students—have found ways to organize.

These protests pose a serious and increasing threat to the regime as their grievances resonate across a growing range of Iranians. These protests now include many marginalized minorities, merchants, students, and urban elite.

Protesters have found secular martyrs around whom to rally. Mahsa Amini is the most prominent symbol of this movement, especially among social media users. Protesters have chanted slogans from a viral Iranian protest song titled “Baraaye,” which lists popular grievances against the regime. State security services arrested the author of this song, Shervin Hajipour, on September 29. These individuals provide resonant symbols for the protesters similar to how protesters rallied against the regime killing of Neda Agha Soltan during the 2009 Green Movement, when Iranians took to the streets to protest the fraud-plagued reelection of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement.
• Ongoing, anti-regime protests expanded to at involve least 20 Iranian cities in 17 provinces.
• Demonstrations in Iraq planned for other purposes adopted an anti-Iran tone and expressed solidarity with Iranian protests.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah criticized Iraqi protesters for chanting against the Iranian regime but did not make the anti-Iran protests a focal point of his address.

Iran Crisis Update, September 30

September 30, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Anti-regime protests are continuing in at least 10 major cities in eight provinces and escalated violently in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30. Protesters clashed with security forces in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, attacking local police stations and killing the provincial head of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) intelligence.[1] Social media users suggested that state security services deployed helicopters to abet their crackdown.[2] These clashes are among the most violent in the ongoing protest wave thus far.

The security situation around Zahedan could worsen in the coming days and weeks, straining state security services more than they already are. Anti-regime militancy is common around Zahedan, where Salafi-jihadi groups such as Jaish al Adl operate. An Iranian Baluch militant group, Anonymous Tigers of Baluchistan, reportedly released a video on September 30 threatening to escalate further against the regime in response to the clashes on September 30.[3] State security services have struggled with bandwidth constraints and exhaustion throughout Iran during the ongoing, countrywide protests, and escalations around Zahedan will impose additional pressure.

A senior Iranian military official, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, threatened to attack US forces in Iraq in retaliation for the US shootdown of an Iranian drone illegally operating in Iraqi airspace near an American military base.[4] Bagheri also suggested that Iran would attack US bases in Iraq for supporting anti-regime Kurdish groups. The IRGC has conducted six consecutive days of attacks on anti-regime Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan.[5] Bagheri accused the US of using its Harir airbase in Erbil Province to coordinate with and support these groups in September 2021.[6] Iranian proxies in Iraq accused Omar Mahmoudzadeh, the American whom the IRGC killed in Iraqi Kurdistan on September 28, of training anti-regime Kurdish militants.[7]

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance on September 30.
• The ongoing, anti-regime protests occurred in at least 10 cities in eight provinces and were especially violent in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30.
• Iran’s most senior military official threatened to attack US bases in Iraq.

Iran Crisis Update, September 29

September 29, 2022 | 3:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime’s extensive internet and telecommunications censorship is severely limiting the open-source information available on ongoing anti-regime protests in Iran. Iranian state media and officials have confirmed that they are blocking domestic access to Western social media applications such as WhatsApp and Instagram to impede protester coordination and organization and limit the free flow of information September 22.[1] Iranian internet users reported restricted access to foreign domains—including Google—and difficulties accessing Google Play and Apple’s App store, preventing users’ efforts to download VPNs.[2] CTP cannot verify most protest footage circulating on social media. Iranian authorities previously blocked internet access in 2019 gasoline protests.[3]

Uncorroborated social media reports suggest that Iran loosened internet restrictions around Tehran on September 29 but may continue blocking some social media platforms such as Instagram.[4] Some Iranian officials have called on the regime to permanently block Instagram in recent days.[5] Iranian newspapers have similarly reported that Instagram could be permanently blocked even after protests subside.[6]

Iran will likely continue improving its censorship infrastructure—possibly with support from China—to suppress future protests more effectively. Iranian authorities have praised the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control of its domestic information space and signed agreements on cyber and law enforcement cooperation with China[7]. Some Iranian internet experts have compared Iranian internet disruptions prior to the ongoing protests to the CCP’s internet filtering system.[8] The regime may increasingly mirror the Chinese model of internet sovereignty as it seeks to preempt and quell unrest.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement on September 29.
• Anti-regime protests likely occurred in at least six Iranian cities on September 29, but demonstrations appear to have subsided overall for now.
• Anti-regime protests may increase inside and outside of Iran on October 1.
• The IRGC conducted an artillery attack into Iraqi Kurdistan on September 29, marking the sixth consecutive day of such attacks.

Iran Crisis Update, September 28

September 28, 2022 | 5:00 pm ET

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is at least temporarily unable to perform his normal duties. Khamenei has been unusually absent in recent days amidst countrywide, anti-regime protests, which began on September 16. Rumors have circulated that Khamenei’s health has deteriorated significantly since early September.[1] CTP cannot verify these rumors about Khamenei’s health, and such reports should be treated with skepticism. There are indications that Khamenei is ill or incapacitated, however. Regime power centers are behaving as if succession is either imminent or underway. President Ebrahim Raisi—a prominent frontrunner to succeed Khamenei—is positioning himself to become the next supreme leader with support from senior officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

The ongoing Mahsa Amini protests are straining the regime’s capability and willingness to crack down but are not yet existential to the regime. Protests began on September 16 in response to the regime’s brutal killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini.[2] Protests have concentrated primarily in ethnically Kurdish regions of Iran, where Amini lived, and Tehran but spread rapidly to other locations and demographics.[3] State security services have launched a bloody crackdown against the ongoing protests but have struggled with bandwidth constraints and exhaustion according to some Iranian media outlets.[4] Tehran security officials reported that 185 Basij members were injured in the protests with five in critical condition.[5] The Basij is a paramilitary branch of the IRGC responsible for civil defense and social control. These protests do not appear close to collapsing the regime at this time, however.

The IRGC may assess that anti-regime Kurdish militants operating around the Iran-Iraq-Turkey border are arming and stoking the protests. The IRGC has conducted five consecutive days of attacks involving artillery, drones, and missiles into Iraqi Kurdistan.[6] Iranian state media have claimed that anti-regime Kurdish groups are fomenting instability against the regime.[7] CTP cannot verify these allegations. The most recent round of IRGC attacks on September 28 killed an American citizen, Omar Mahmoudzadeh, in Iraqi Kurdistan.[8]

The regime’s brutal crackdown and continuing IRGC attacks are stoking unrest in Kurdish communities throughout the region. Demonstrations expressing solidarity with the Iranian protesters occurred in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan and Qamishli in northern Syria on September 28.[9]

Key Takeaways

• Circumstantial evidence suggests that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is at least temporarily unable to perform his normal duties.
• Regime power centers are behaving as if succession is either imminent or underway.
• The ongoing Mahsa Amini protests may be challenging the regime’s capability and willingness to crackdown but do not appear close to collapsing the regime.
• The IRGC may assess that anti-regime Kurdish militants operating around the Iran-Iraq-Turkey border are arming and stoking the protests.
• The IRGC conducted a large-scale attack into Iraqi Kurdistan on September 28, killing one American.