Ukraine Invasion Updates, November 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2025 

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the US-proposed peace plan aims to ensure Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and economic development, during the US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach, Florida on November 30.[1] Rubio stated that the peace plan must not only end the war but also secure Ukraine's future and "long-term prosperity."[2] Rubio stated that the US-Ukrainian meeting was "very productive" and expressed optimism about the peace negotiations' progress but said that there is still "much work to do."[3] Rubio stated that the meeting built upon the results of November 23 US-European-Ukrainian talks in Geneva and confirmed that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will travel to Moscow later this week to discuss the peace deal with the Kremlin.[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will host Witkoff in Moscow before the start of Putin's visit to India on December 4.[5] Witkoff also stated that US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach went "positively" and reportedly confirmed that he will meet with Putin on December 2.[6] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov led the Ukrainian delegation on November 30 and stated that the negotiators achieved "substantial progress in advancing a dignified peace" and uniting the Ukrainian negotiating positions with the United States.[7] Umerov reported that the United States shares Ukraine's key objectives of ensuring Ukraine's security, sovereignty, and a reliable peace, and noted that Ukraine and the United States will continue consultations and work on a joint peace framework.

Russian information space voices continue to argue that the Kremlin will likely reject a ceasefire or any iteration of the US-proposed peace plan because the Kremlin views these efforts as inconsequential and as a hindrance to Russia's goals in Ukraine and globally. A prominent Russian milblogger argued on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin "clearly" outlined that he is prepared to achieve Russia's war aims via military means; therefore, all peace negotiations since the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are "not practical."[8] The milblogger added that Russia's engagement in any peace negotiations "solely" relies on Russian progress on the battlefield, which Russian forces achieve through prolonged and costly warfighting.[9] The milblogger argued that US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a ceasefire on the front line do not benefit Russia, as the ceasefire would force Russia to terminate the September 2022 mobilization decree that allows the Kremlin to retain mobilized servicemen and recruits on the battlefield indefinitely, which will reduce the size of the Russian military and deplete Russia's officer corps.[10] ISW assessed in February 2025 that Putin fears the risks and challenges associated with reintegrating veterans into Russian society and economy and thus remains unlikely to demobilize fully or rapidly — even in the event of a negotiated settlement to its war in Ukraine.[11] The milblogger also argued that a ceasefire will undermine Russia's efforts to seize illegally annexed unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and will create new "military security threats" that Russia will need to address in the near future. The milblogger's observations are in line with Putin's November 27 remarks that intensify efforts to set legal grounds using the false premise of Ukrainian threats to illegally annexed Ukrainian territories to justify a reinvasion of Ukraine at an opportune time.[12]

Former Russian officer and imprisoned prominent ultranationalist, Igor Girkin, published a letter written on November 25 in which he similarly concluded that the Kremlin will not sign any agreements on the basis of the 28-point peace proposal, because the Kremlin views this peace proposal as detrimental to its goals in Ukraine and worldwide, and that the war will continue in Ukraine.[13] Girkin argued that the agreement is unacceptable because it would signify a loss of Russian sovereignty by ceding control over the mechanism for both negotiations and imposing punishments for violating the peace settlement to the United States. Girkin argued that the Kremlin will not commit to any mechanisms that could formally recognize Russia as an aggressor and enable the U.S. to impose punishments against Russia in the event of peace agreement violations. [14] Girkin claimed the peace agreement is disadvantageous to Russia as it would force Russia to formally renunciate its claims over illegally-annexed parts of Ukraine; surrender "strategically vital" offensive positions in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; grant Ukrainian forces time to rest and reconstitute; sharply decrease Russian forces' combat readiness; and lead to a "strategic break" between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). [15]

A columnist for Russian state newswire Rossiya Segodnya stated in an interview published on November 27 that Russia neither takes the US peace proposal seriously nor expects the plan to work in any possible variation, and assessed that the Kremlin is "relaxed" about alterations to the original 28-point peace plan because the Kremlin can discuss any document.[16] The columnist argued that Russia is "pretending" that it is ready to accept the United States as a mediator but ultimately aims to conclude a treaty that provides Russia with a battlefield victory, and that Russia does not seek an immediate peace as the United States does. The columnist emphasized that Russia cannot sign any peace deals with Ukraine or Europe; that Russia's war aims include NATO's withdrawal from all of eastern Europe; and that Russia's demands for a ceasefire also include Ukraine's withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts — not just Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The columnist implied that Russia is unlikely to make any further concessions because the Kremlin believes that it has already won the war in Ukraine. The columnist's statements are consistent with Putin's November 27 interpretation of the US-proposed peace plan as a mere suggestion for discussions and demands that Ukraine cede all illegally annexed oblasts to Russia.[17] Russian officials and ultranationalists have been consistently issuing similar public rejections of the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plan did not concede to all of Russia's absolutist war demands.[18]

The Kremlin continues to advance a false narrative that Ukraine’s front line and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily. ISW continues to assess that a Russian battlefield victory is neither imminent nor inevitable and that the Russian war effort has vulnerabilities the West has not exploited. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on a Russian state television program aired on November 30 that Ukraine's battlefield and internal problems worsen every day.[19] Peskov also accused the Ukrainian government of stalling the peace negotiations process, despite the fact that Ukrainian delegations were actively negotiating the terms of the US-proposed peace deal with US counterparts since reports of the proposal emerged in mid-November 2025, including on November 30, and agreed to terms that Russia has not.[20] Peskov's latest statements are likely part of the Kremlin's consolidated cognitive effort to create a false sense of urgency over Russia's claimed inevitable victory — and that Ukraine and the West should therefore immediately concede to Russia’s demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.[21]

Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to contradict the Kremlin's efforts to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable, however. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged that the tactical battlefield situation favors Russia, particularly near Hulyaipole, but stated that Russian state media coverage of Russian progress on the battlefield once again resembles "joyfully idiotic, rosy, self-indulgent nonsense" that does not support the war effort.[22] The milblogger stated that such narratives of an imminent Russian victory create the false perception domestically that the Russian society no longer needs to urgently support the war effort against Ukraine, a competent adversary that uses NATO equipment and intelligence. The milblogger also noted that continuing the war effort in Ukraine will cost Russia further state resources amid growing societal dissatisfaction with the introduction of new fees and rising taxes in 2026.[23] The milblogger added that Russia continues to face manpower shortages and that the ongoing volunteer recruitment campaign is not generating a sufficient number of forces to demobilize Russian personnel that the Kremlin involuntarily called up in September 2022. Girkin similarly assessed in a letter published on November 26 that Russia could develop its possible future seizures of Hulyaipole and Orikhiv into operational successes only if Russia has enough reserves to exploit these tactical advances.[24] Girkin observed that the most recent six-month Russian offensive on Kupyansk did not result in a "big victory" and assessed that Russian efforts to seize the "secondary" objectives of Pokrovsk, Vovchansk, Siversk, and Lyman are only tactical and will not be quick, will not degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large, and will not collapse the front lines. Girkin implied that Russia has enough troops to support tactical advances but lacks the necessary reserves and resources to achieve its strategic goals, such as seizing Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv cities. ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the front line is serious, particularly in Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, the Kremlin's efforts to present Russia's victory in Ukraine as inevitable do not correspond to the battlefield reality.[25] It is notable that the Kremlin’s misrepresentation of the situation on the ground was so far from reality that prominent pro-war milbloggers and ultranationalist figures continue to feel compelled to issue their own corrective statements.[26]

The Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk remains prolonged and costly as Russian forces are optimized for positional warfare and can only achieve a slow rate of advance. Russian forces continue to make slow advances and have failed to seize Pokrovsk entirely despite occupying positions within the town for over 120 days.[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces to the southern outskirts of Rodynske during counterattacks.[28] Mashovets added that costly urban warfare within Pokrovsk has weakened elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), forcing the Russian military command to commit elements of the relatively elite 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) in the neighboring Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area to the 51st CAA’s efforts west of the Kazennyi Torets River (northeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya) and in the Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad direction (east and north of Pokrovsk).[29] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are unable to transport armored vehicles across the Kazennyi Torets River to their foothold west of the river, forcing Russian infantry to operate unsupported in the foothold — further constraining the rate of Russian advance on the northeastern shoulder of the Pokrovsk encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 29 and 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian bridge-laying vehicles and armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) east of Boikivka, south of Pankivka, and west of Novotoretske (all southeast of Dobropillya) as the vehicles attempted to cross the Kazennyi Torets River.[30] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 28 that Russian forces are not fully leveraging their numerical superiority in drones and manpower and that the presence of Russian forces in Pokrovsk is not a reason for Ukrainian forces to retreat from the town.[31] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 30 that Russian forces sent poorly trained, recently recruited personnel into the first wave of assaults, followed by relatively better-trained personnel.[32]

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious, however. Mashovets assessed that Russian presence in the area south of Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk) and between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad will force Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad to conduct a fighting withdrawal to avoid encirclement in Myrnohrad.[33] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces control at least half of Pokrovsk and that the Russian manpower superiority would make it difficult for Ukrainian forces to fully retake the town.[34] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that thick fog continues to degrade Ukrainian drone reconnaissance capabilities and that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV), Molniya, fixed-wing, and sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[35]

Russian drones appear to be violating Moldovan airspace during large, combined missile and drone strikes. The Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on November 29 that two Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace for one hour and 10 minutes on the night of November 28 to 29, forcing Moldova to temporarily close its airspace.[36] Russia launched a combined missile and drone strike on the night of November 28 to 29 with 632 total air targets, and Russian drones violated Romanian and Moldovan airspaces on the night of November 24 to 25 during a combined missile and drone strike with 488 total air targets against Ukraine.[37]

Ukrainian forces successfully used the Sting interceptor drone to down Russian jet-powered long-range drones for the first time as Ukraine increases technological innovation efforts to combat Russia’s long-range drone and missile campaigns. Ukrainian volunteer Serhiy Sternenko reported on November 30 that the Ukrainian forces successfully used the domestically produced Sting interceptor drone to shoot down several Geran-3 jet-powered long-range strike drones for the first time on the night of November 29 to 30.[38] Geran-3 drones have a shorter flight range than typical Geran drones but can reach higher speeds and can more easily outmaneuver air defense systems.[39] Ukrainian drone manufacturer Wild Hornets, which manufactures the Sting drone, noted in September 2025 that Ukrainian forces have achieved interception rates of about 60 to 90 percent against typical Russian Geran-2 and Gerbera drones.[40] Wild Hornets noted that it was working to increase the speed of the Stinger drone interceptors specifically to counter jet-powered Russian drones, such as the Geran-3. Russia has conducted several strikes with packages reportedly including several Geran-3 drones since late June 2025.[41] Ukrainian industry continues to innovate and produce interceptor drones and new air defense systems as well as adapt and modify allies’ air defense systems.[42]

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the US-proposed peace plan aims to ensure Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and economic development during the US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach, Florida on November 30.
• Russian information space voices continue to argue that the Kremlin will likely reject a ceasefire or any iteration of the US-proposed peace plan because the Kremlin views these efforts as inconsequential and as a hindrance to Russia's goals in Ukraine and globally.
• The Kremlin continues to advance a false narrative that Ukraine’s front line and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily. ISW continues to assess that a Russian battlefield victory is neither imminent nor inevitable and that the Russian war effort has vulnerabilities the West has not exploited.
• The Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk remains prolonged and costly as Russian forces are optimized for positional warfare and can only achieve a slow rate of advance.
• Russian drones appear to be violating Moldovan airspace during large, combined missile and drone strikes.
• Ukrainian forces successfully used the Sting interceptor drone to down Russian jet-powered long-range drones for the first time as Ukraine increases technological innovation efforts to combat Russia’s long-range drone and missile campaigns.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2025 

Russian state media is leveraging Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent statements to intensify the false narrative that the frontline in Ukraine will imminently collapse, likely in an effort to coerce the West and Ukraine into capitulating to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure itself militarily. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger observed that the Russian state media, following Putin's November 27 press conference, is widely spreading false claims that the frontline in Ukraine is collapsing as Ukrainian forces desert and surrender en masse and leave large areas undefended; that Russian forces will soon drive on Kyiv City; and that Russian forces have already defeated Ukrainian forces and only have to "finish them off."[1] The milblogger accused Russian state media of fabricating some territorial successes and amplifying Putin's exaggerated claims, using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate fake videos of Ukrainian forces surrendering, and deliberately targeting social media users. Russian state media is also trying to reinforce the Kremlin's efforts to create a perception that Russian forces will inevitably collapse sectors of the frontline in Ukraine, destroy Ukraine’s most combat-capable elite units, and degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large — and that Ukraine and the West should therefore immediately concede to Russia’s demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.[2]

The milblogger affirmed that the frontline is not collapsing; that Russia is far from victory; that Russian forces maintain the initiative at high personnel and materiel costs; that Ukrainian and Russian forces are engaged in positional warfare along the entire frontline; and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking — all of which coheres with all available open-source evidence from the battlefield.[3] The milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces continue defending in Kharkiv Oblast, including attempting to counterattack in eastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and fiercely resisting Russian assaults in Kupyansk and Borova directions (on the east [left] bank of the Oskil River). The milblogger's battlefield assessment notably contradicts Putin's November 27 claim that Russian forces have completed the seizure of Kupyansk and seized most of Vovchansk, and that Ukrainian forces are unable to defend against Russian assaults near the Oskil River. The milblogger also undermined Putin's claim that Russia is actively pursuing several encirclements and is forcing Ukrainian forces to abandon entire defensive lines. The milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces are retreating from certain tactical areas, but that these instances do not mean that Ukrainian forces are entirely abandoning defensive lines. The milblogger explained that the Ukrainian military command sometimes withdraws Ukrainian forces to reinforce other sectors of the frontline or in other to avoid encirclement - all tactics that Russian forces also actively use on the battlefield in line with standard warfighting practices. ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the frontline is serious, particularly in Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, Putin’s and Russian state media's assertions are exaggerated and do not correspond to the battlefield reality they claim to represent. It is notable that the Kremlin’s misrepresentation of the situation on the ground was so far from reality that a prominent pro-war Russian blogger felt compelled to issue his own corrective statement.

Russia launched another combined missile and drone strike primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast overnight on November 28 and 29, killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 52.[4] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 36 missiles — five Kinzhal and four Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and 23 Kh-101/Iskander-K and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles — and 596 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 558 drones and one Kinzhal missile; 12 Kh-101/Iskander-K, four Iskander-M, and two Kh-59/69 missiles — but that 35 Russian drones and an unspecified number of missiles struck 22 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force added that debris of intercepted missiles and drones fell in 17 locations. Ukrainian officials, including Ukraine's Ministry of Energy, stated that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure facilities in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts, leaving over 500,000 energy customers in Kyiv City, 100,000 in Kyiv Oblast, and nearly 8,000 in Kharkiv Oblast without power.[6] Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that Russian strikes against civilian infrastructure killed at least three people and injured at least 52, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the cargo terminal of the Nova Poshta postal service in Kyiv City.[7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes aim to undermine Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025 to 2026.[8]

Russian forces are supporting offensive operations along the frontlines and appear to be targeting Ukrainian aircraft involved in air defense operations with modified Shahed (Geran) drones. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported that Russian developers recently modernized communications and navigation systems in Geran-2 strike drones, allowing Russian forces to pilot these drones in real time.[9] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Innovation Lieutenant Colonel Yurii Myronenko told the Business Insider in an article published on November 27 that Russian forces recently started using operator-controlled Shahed drones, which communicate via antennas in occupied Ukraine, in strikes near the frontlines (as opposed to Shahed drones with preplanned routes and targets that Russian forces have historically used in strikes against Ukraine's deep rear areas).[10] Myronenko stated that it is more challenging for Ukrainian forces to counter these Shaheds because Russian drone operators can quickly react and engage with Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, which Ukrainian forces have been using to shoot down Russian drones. Business Insider noted that there have been no confirmed instances of Russian Shahed drones intercepting Ukrainian aircraft at this time. A serviceman of the Ukrainian 4th Special Purpose Regiment told Business Insider that increased Russian Shahed production rates are enabling Russian forces to increasingly use Shaheds to support offensive operations along the frontline. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) also reported that Russian forces are actively using the new Iranian-produced Shahed-107 drones on the battlefield in Ukraine.[11] ISW reported that Russian forces augmented their offensive operations against Pokrovsk with Shahed drone strikes over Spring-Summer 2025 and began to pursue moving targets, such as trains, with modified Shahed drones as early as October 2025.[12]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 28, 2025 

The frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse despite recent Russian gains and Kremlin assertions. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference with Russian state media in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on November 27 that Russia is making significant gains across the frontline such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.[1] Putin implied that some Western officials are attempting to rush the US-proposed peace plan because they fear that Russian forces will collapse sectors of the frontline in Ukraine, destroy Ukraine's most combat-capable elite units, and degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large. Putin claimed that these Western officials are willing to achieve a quick peace even at the expense of Ukrainian concessions. Putin then made a series of exaggerated claims about purported Russian battlefield gains, including that Russian forces have completed the seizure of Kupyansk; captured about 70 percent of Pokrovsk and completely encircled both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad; seized just over 21 percent of all buildings in Siversk; seized most of Vovchansk; and advanced within one to two kilometers of Hulyaipole.[2] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only seized 15.72 percent of Kupyansk, 64.48 percent of Pokrovsk, 10.14 percent of Myrnohrad, 2.16 percent of Siversk, and 35.66 percent of Vovchansk; and that Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of Hulyaipole from the east. Putin also claimed that Russian forces have seized a "significant" amount of territory in "Komsomolsk," even though there is no city in Ukraine with this name.[3] Putin may have been referring to Kostyantynivka, although ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in just 0.07 percent of Kostyantynivka. Though the situation in specific sectors of the frontline is serious, especially in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, most of Putin's assertions are exaggerated and do not correspond to the battlefield reality he claims to represent, nor do they indicate that the frontlines in Ukraine will collapse imminently.

Putin's exaggerated battlefield claims are part of his pursuit to actualize his theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russia's military and economy can outlast the West's will to support Ukraine to continue grinding advances on the frontline.[4] Putin and senior Russian defense officials have made several high-level public engagements in recent weeks to make exaggerated battlefield claims, creating the false impression that Russian forces are making greater gains than they actually are.[5] Senior Russian officials began to exaggerate Russian advances in Kupyansk in August 2025 and have claimed several times since that Russian forces have seized the town – including Putin most recently on November 20 – but even pro-war Russian milbloggers have denied the extent of these official Russian claims.[6] These exaggerated claims aim to convince the West to cease support of Ukraine and push Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands or allow Russian forces to continue their grinding offensive operations unimpeded, which would validate Putin's theory of victory. ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, however.[7]

The rate of Russian advances does not exceed a footpace in all the areas where Putin claimed that Russian forces have made significant advances. Putin praised the claimed seizure of Kupyansk as the model by which Russian forces will make advances elsewhere on the frontline.[8] Russian forces have been using a new campaign design that utilizes battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts to degrade Ukrainian logistics and defenses such that Russian infantry can infiltrate into Ukrainian rear areas, accumulate, and consolidate advances.[9] Russian forces have been most successful at applying this campaign design not in Kupyansk but in the Pokrovsk direction, where Ukrainian forces have managed to stymie the Russian rate of advance in Pokrovsk to a footpace despite Russia's operational prioritization of this effort.[10] Russian forces have not yet seized Pokrovsk, a town of 11.5 square miles (29.78 square kilometers), despite operating within the town for over 120 days.[11] Russian forces have used this campaign design to some degree in the Kupyansk direction but have not yet succeeded in replicating the advances they have made in the Pokrovsk direction, however. Russian forces failed to sufficiently degrade Ukrainian defenses in the Kupyansk direction after first infiltrating into the town in August 2025, allowing Ukrainian forces to largely push back Russian forces.[12] Russian forces continue conducting infiltration operations into Kupyansk, but Ukraine has denied Russia the rapid seizure of the town.[13] Russian forces have made the most rapid advances in recent weeks using this new campaign design in the Hulyaipole direction, but even these advances are constrained to footpace.[14] The Russian military command would likely have to commit equivalent time and resources to other areas of the frontline as it is currently committing in the Pokrovsk direction to replicate the results of the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole efforts elsewhere on the frontline or exploit gaps in Ukrainian defenses.

The current Russian force composition is not optimized to achieve or exploit a collapse of Ukrainian defenses. The war in Ukraine has become largely positional, and Russian forces writ large are sufficiently degraded such that they cannot currently conduct maneuver warfare at the scale necessary for rapid, operational-level advances that restore maneuver to the battlefield.[15] Russian forces have become optimized to fight positional warfare with low quality personnel, insufficient armor and mechanized equipment stores, and poor command and control.[16] Russian forces are currently conducting positional offensive operations as part of Putin's effort to outlast Western support for Ukraine.[17] Russian forces use three to five people on average for infiltration and assault operations, largely conducted on foot and only occasionally using light motorized civilian vehicles such as motorcycles, buggies, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[18] Ukraine's drone-based defenses, colloquially called the "wall of drones," have some vulnerabilities that Russian forces have managed to exploit to make tactically-significant advances, but overall have denied Russian forces the ability to use armored vehicles and conduct mechanized maneuver, such that it has degraded the overall quality and ability of Russian forces to conduct such operations.[19]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2025 

Data on Russian forces’ rate of advance indicates that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, and a rapid Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent. A senior US military official reportedly stated that the war will only worsen for Ukraine as Russia can fight indefinitely and that it is better for Ukraine to negotiate a peace settlement now rather than negotiate from a weaker position later.[1] The Kremlin has consistently pushed a narrative claiming that a Russian victory is inevitable — particularly since reports first emerged of the 28-point peace proposal — in order to push Ukraine and the West to acquiesce to Russia's demands. The reality on the battlefield indicates that a Russian victory in Ukraine is far from certain, however. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military commanders have been attempting to portray Russia as capable of rapidly seizing Donetsk Oblast militarily, but hard data on the rate of Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast does not indicate that Russian forces will imminently seize the rest of the oblast.[2] Russian forces have been prioritizing completing the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but have been slow to do so as Ukrainian forces have successfully stymied the rate of Russian advance in Pokrovsk to footpace. Russian forces entered Pokrovsk for the first time by July 31, and Russian forces have advanced an average of 0.12 kilometers per day in Pokrovsk from July 31 to November 26. Russian forces have not seized Pokrovsk — a town of 11.5 square miles — despite operating within the town for over 118 days. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have consolidated advances in 66 percent of Pokrovsk as of November 26, a low percentage given the time and manpower (elements of at least two combined arms armies) Russia has dedicated to pursuing this effort.

The Russian rate of advance across the theater intensified since the Alaska summit on August 15, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day across the entire theater, between August 15 and November 20, but these advances are still constrained to footpace.[3] Russian forces could seize the remainder of Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast by August 2027, assuming a constant Russian rate of advance.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire theater.[5] Russian forces have most rapidly advanced in eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts in recent weeks, inflating the theater-wide rate of advance compared to Russian forces' comparatively slower rate of advance in Donetsk Oblast.[6]

Recent Russian advances elsewhere on the frontline have largely been opportunistic and exploited seasonal weather conditions. Russian forces are pursuing an offensive campaign design that consists of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration missions to degrade the efficacy of Ukrainian defenses.[7] Russian forces leveraged this campaign design and a porous frontline in the area to make relatively rapid advances toward Hulyaipole from the northeast and east, but even these advances are constrained to footpace.[8] Russian infiltration missions elsewhere on the frontline have not resulted in advances similar to the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, however. Russian forces have leveraged infiltration missions and interdiction efforts in the Vovchansk and Kupyansk directions, but have failed to make rapid, sweeping gains this campaign design hopes to enable.[9] These Russian forces are forced to engage Ukrainian forces in attritional urban combat and make only creeping gains, all at disproportionately high manpower losses. The Russian military command would likely have to commit the time and resources to other areas of the frontline as it is currently committing in the Pokrovsk direction to replicate the results of the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole efforts elsewhere on the frontline, particularly areas that Ukrainian forces are better fit to defend.

Ukrainian forces have proven effective at constraining Russian advances and conducting successful counteroffensives, particularly when well-staffed and well-equipped. Ukraine notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast and elsewhere in northern Ukraine in April 2022, liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast in a surprise counteroffensive in September and October 2022, and forced Russian forces to withdraw from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022 following a successful summer-fall interdiction campaign.[10] Ukrainian forces have liberated over 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have seized since 2022 and forced Russia to expend manpower, equipment, time, and energy on attritional offensives that generate losses disproportionately high relative to the amount of gains.[11] Ukrainian forces have thwarted the Russian offensives into northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in Spring 2024 and January 2025, respectively.[12] Ukraine has forced Russia into a positional war that denies Russia the ability to conduct operational maneuver. ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military assistance and weapon sales to Ukraine, in concert with strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, can enable Ukraine to stop Russian battlefield advances cold, especially if Ukrainian forces leverage their well-developed fortifications in Donetsk Oblast.[13]

Kremlin officials continue setting conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist demands. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 26  that "there can be no talk of any concessions or any surrender" of the "key aspects" of Russia's challenges with Ukraine in response to the US peace plan.[14] Ryabkov stated Russia “is prepared to achieve its stated goals” in negotiations – referring to Russia's long-held and oft-repeated demands — and noted that Russia will continue its war in Ukraine if there are “any setbacks” in negotiations.[15] Ryabkov reiterated that Russia’s position has not changed and invoked the alleged “understanding” that the United States and Russia reached at the August 2025 Alaska summit, despite the fact that there are no public-facing agreements resulting from the summit.[16] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to exploit the lack of clarity about the Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to compromise and its commitment to achieving nothing short of a full victory in Ukraine.[17] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 26 that ”it is too early to say” when responding to a question asserting that Ukraine and Russia had never been so close to concluding a peace deal, a further indication that the Kremlin is distancing itself from the peace proposal, likely because Russia intends to reject it.[18]

The Kremlin is reportedly concerned that the United States will correctly interpret Russia as unwilling to meaningfully engage in negotiations and accept any peace deal that compromises its ability to achieve its maximalist claims. Bloomberg published on November 25 the transcript of an October 29 call between lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in which Ushakov expressed concerns about Dmitriev’s plan to present a peace proposal based on Russia’s position to the United States.[19] Ushakov stated that Russia needs the "maximum" of its demands and asked, "otherwise, what's the point" of passing on proposals to the United States. Ushakov stated that the United States “might not take [Russia’s proposal] and say that it was agreed with [Russia],“ expressing concern that the United States might not understand and accept all of Russia’s demands. Russia has not engaged in meaningful negotiations since launching the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and continues to reject terms that compromise on any of its maximalist demands.[20] Kremlin officials continue to deflect blame for Russia’s willingness to negotiate through a variety of means, including shifting blame for the lack of meaningful negotiations onto Ukraine and Europe.[21] US Vice President VD Vance stated that Russia is ”asking for too much” to end the war in Ukraine in May 2025.[22]

Recent Ukrainian counterattacks may further delay Russian forces’ seizure of Pokrovsk, though the situation in Pokrovsk remains serious and dynamic at this time. Recent Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Pokrovsk and northwest of the town continue to slow the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured key positions in northwestern and western Pokrovsk during counterattacks, and a Ukrainian journalist reported that Ukrainian forces advanced near the Donetska Railway line in northern Pokrovsk and prevented Russian forces from advancing toward Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[23] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces likely hold positions in northern Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 26 indicates that Russian forces also infiltrated into positions in northeastern Pokrovsk.[24] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the northwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), cohering with Ukrainian reports of advancing in northern Pokrovsk.[25] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces likely hold positions in northern Pokrovsk. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Pokrovsk and that the frontline largely runs along the Donetska Railway line, cohering with recent reports indicating that Russian forces have seized the area south of the Donetska Railway line.[26] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces continue attempts to encircle Myrnohrad and attack the town from the north and south, and Myrnohrad City Military Administration Head Yuriy Tretyak stated that Russian forces are attacking from the west near Rivne and Svitle, all likely in an attempt to fix Ukrainian forces within Myrnohrad while also tightening the encirclement around Myrnohrad.[27]  Ukraine's East Group of Forces reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces are adapting to Russian attempts to cut off Ukrainian logistics into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, including by building protective corridors with nets, covering logistics routes with air defenses, and using heavy drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics.[28] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after a 21-month campaign, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[29]

Russia continues setting conditions to deploy active reservists to combat against Ukraine. A Russian milblogger stated on November 26 that Russian reserve units in Belgorod Oblast, including volunteer self-defense detachments, BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and Orlan anti-drone units, recently received howitzers and other artillery systems, electronic warfare (EW) systems, thermobaric weapons, and all-terrain vehicles.[30] Reserve territorial defense units assigned with protecting rear-area critical infrastructure do not require such heavy equipment suited for offensive operations. This report, therefore, indicates that Russia is setting conditions to deploy Belgorod Oblast active reservists for combat missions, as ISW recently assessed.[31] Russia recently passed a law allowing active reservists to participate in special training sessions to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure facilities in Russia.[32] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin continues to prepare to employ active reservists in combat in Ukraine.[33]

Russia’s long-range strike campaign is increasingly killing and injuring civilians. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported on November 25 that Russian forces significantly increased long-range strikes in 2025, killing 548 civilians and injuring 3,592 civilians from January to October.[34] The HRMMU reported that this was a 26 percent increase in civilian deaths from January to October 2024, in which long-range strikes killed 434 civilians and injured 2,045 civilians. Russian forces have conducted at least 15 combined strikes against Ukraine with strike packages of over 500 long-range weapons each, with a record high strike of 823 total drones and missiles on September 7, 2025.[35] The HRMMU reported that Russian strikes inflicted four times more total casualties in Kyiv City from January to October 2025 than in all of 2024 and that long-range strikes inflicted significant increases in civilian casualties in Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia cities as well.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to leveraging its long-range strikes that target Ukraine’s civilian populace in an effort to sow fear and demoralize the Ukrainian people and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Data on Russian forces’ rate of advance indicates that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, and a rapid Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent.
• Recent Russian advances elsewhere on the frontline have largely been opportunistic and exploited seasonal weather conditions.
• Ukrainian forces have proven effective at constraining Russian advances and conducting successful counteroffensives, particularly when well-staffed and well-equipped.
• Kremlin officials continue setting conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist demands.
• The Kremlin is reportedly concerned that the United States will correctly interpret Russia as unwilling to meaningfully engage in negotiations and accept any peace deal that compromises its ability to achieve its maximalist claims.
• Recent Ukrainian counterattacks may further delay Russian forces’ seizure of Pokrovsk, though the situation in Pokrovsk remains serious and dynamic at this time.
• Russia continues setting conditions to deploy active reservists to combat against Ukraine.
• Russia’s long-range strike campaign is increasingly killing and injuring civilians.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2025 

The Trump administration continues efforts to negotiate a peace deal to end Russia's war against Ukraine. US President Donald Trump stated on November 25 that Ukraine and the United States "fine-tuned" the initially proposed 28-point peace plan with additional input from Ukraine and Russia and that there are "only a few" remaining points of disagreement.[1] Trump stated that he directed US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll to meet with a Ukrainian delegation at an unspecified location.[2] Trump stated that he looks forward to meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Putin "soon," but only when the peace deal is "final" or "in its final stages."[3] Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Tolbert, Driscoll's spokesperson, stated that Driscoll and his team spoke with a Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi on November 24 and 25.[4] Axios and ABC reported that sources stated that Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov was also in Abu Dhabi, but it is unclear whether Budanov met with the Russian delegation or just the American one.[5]

Ukrainian officials continue to express support for the latest 19-point peace plan and demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to engage in further talks. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak told Axios on November 25 that US and Ukrainian officials have agreed in principle on most aspects of the latest peace proposal and that Zelensky wants to negotiate territorial concessions with Trump directly.[6] Yermak stated that the updated draft text on security guarantees "looks very solid" and that the United States had a "positive reaction" to the prospect of enshrining the security guarantees for Ukraine in a formal treaty. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated that Ukraine is looking to organize a meeting between Zelensky and Trump in Washington in November 2025 to complete the final steps and "make a deal" with Trump.[7] The Financial Times (FT) reported that senior Ukrainian officials stated that Trump and Zelensky would decide on the most sensitive issues in the proposed peace deal, such as territorial issues and US security guarantees for Ukraine, but noted that Ukraine agreed to cap its military at 800,000 personnel.[8] Ukraine has roughly 900,000 active servicemembers.[9]

Russian officials are attempting to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to compromise and its commitment to its maximalist demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on November 25 that the Russian stance towards the peace proposals will "fundamentally" change should the updated peace plan "erase" the "spirit and letter" of alleged agreements from the Alaska summit.[10] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky reiterated Russia's call for any peace settlement to address the war's "root causes"- a deliberately vague term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand for its original war justifications and demands - and claimed that Russia reached an "understanding" with the United States at the Alaska summit.[11] The exact parameters of the US-Russian discussions at the Alaska summit remain unclear, and the parties did not issue official statements about any agreements they reached during the summit.[12] Putin used the press conference at the Alaska summit to reiterate his demands about the "root causes," and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to several Russian and US media outlets directly after the summit to clarify to the West that Russia’s demands to end the war had not changed.[13] High-ranking Russian officials, including Putin, have responded to the various peace plan proposals in recent days by reiterating their commitment to alleged US-Russian agreements from the Alaska summit.[14] The Kremlin has previously pointed to the 2022 Istanbul agreements, which clearly and publicly documented Russia's maximalist demands for Ukraine's capitulation, as their preferred basis of any future agreements.[15] The Kremlin appears to now be exploiting the lack of official, publicly available agreements from the Alaska summit to appear as a good-faith participant in negotiations and is willing to compromise on its original war demands. Kremlin officials' continued public rejections of the US- and Ukraine-proposed peace plans and repeated statements about the "root causes" of the war, however, demonstrate that the Kremlin remains committed to its original war aims from 2021 and 2022. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, a key pro-war constituency for Putin, also continued to reject the peace proposals on November 25 and advocate that Russia continue the war, further demonstrating how the Kremlin has failed to set conditions for the Russian people to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.[16]

 The Washington Post reported on November 25 that a former senior Kremlin official with knowledge of the negotiations acknowledged that the initial 28-point peace plan was a "pro-Russian plan" but stated that some elements of the plan were still unacceptable for Russia.[17] A Russian academic close to senior Russian diplomats told the Washington Post that the 28-point plan was "not good enough" for Russia as it did not address the Kremlin's longstanding demands to remove the current democratically elected Ukrainian government and demilitarize Ukraine by crippling Ukraine's military capacity. The Russian academic claimed that Putin likely does not want Trump to see him as the "main obstacle to peace," but that it is unclear how flexible Putin will be and on what issues he will yield. The source claimed that Putin's position likely hinges on his view of Russia's "reserves of stability" in the face of growing sanctions pressure and that Putin may take a more flexible position if he thinks that "problems are building and next year will be more difficult" for Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely face a series of military and economic issues in the medium-term and that the United States can leverage economic measures coupled with weapons sales to Ukraine to push Putin to come to the negotiating table ready to make compromises to end the war.[18]

Russia killed at least seven Ukrainian civilians and injured at least 20 in Kyiv City and struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure during combined missile and drone strikes on the night of November 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 22 missiles and 464 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, and that 26 missiles and drones struck 15 locations and falling debris hit 12 locations.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force specified that Russian forces launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles; three Iskander-M ballistic missiles; eight Kalibr and seven Iskander-K cruise missiles; and about 250 Shahed drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kinzhal, three Iskander-M, five Iskander-K, and five Kalibr missiles and 438 drones. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts; and stated that the government will impose rolling blackouts across Ukraine starting on November 26 due to reduced power generation.[20] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the November 24 to 25 strikes left over 102,000 Ukrainian energy consumers without power.[21] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that Russian forces primarily targeted Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast and that Russian strikes against residential buildings and a supermarket warehouse killed seven and injured 20 people in Kyiv City.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged port infrastructure in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast and civilian infrastructure elsewhere in the oblast, injuring six civilians.[23] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Ukrzaliznytsya railway energy infrastructure in Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv Oblast and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Sumy, Cherkasy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[24]

Russian drones violated Romanian and Moldovan airspaces on the night of November 24 to 25 during combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine. The Romanian Ministry of National Defense detected two drones over Romania's Tulcea and Galați counties (both in southeastern Romania) about an hour apart on the morning of November 25 and reported that NATO scrambled two German Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft and two F-16 aircraft to intercept the drones.[25] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense stated that fighter jets tracked the first drone until it reentered Ukrainian airspace and that the second drone was moving towards the Vrancea County, over 100 kilometers away from the Romanian-Ukrainian border.[26] Romanian Defense Minister Ionut Mosteanu stated that the fighter jets nearly shot down the second drone, which repeatedly entered Romania's airspace, but held off due to concerns of debris causing damage on the ground.[27] Mosteanu stated that Romanian authorities later found a Russian drone without an explosive device in Vaslui County (about 250 to 300 kilometers from Ukraine) in what may be the deepest violation of Romanian airspace since February 2022, emphasizing that Romania is facing a "new Russian provocation."[28] Moldova's Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that six Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace overnight, and Moldovan Police reported that a Russian Gerbera drone crashed into a house in Cuhurestii de Jos, northern Moldova.[29] Moldova's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the Russian ambassador over the drone incursions on November 25.[30]

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to leverage their new offensive template to seize Pokrovsk and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). ISW has previously assessed that Russia's new offensive template is comprised of heavy battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration tactics.[31] Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on November 25 that Russian forces control Pokrovsk, south of the Donetska Railway, which is consistent with Russian and Ukrainian reporting of the situation in the area south of the railway in recent days.[32] Ukrainska Pravda reported that the current frontline in Pokrovsk largely runs along the northern outskirts of the town. A senior officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske on October 31 that Russian forces were operating in roughly 60 percent of Pokrovsk as of late October.[33] Ukrainska Pravda reported on November 25 that Ukrainian counterattacks in Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) were initially successful, but that Russian forces later retook the settlement.[34] A Ukrainian deputy battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Ukrainska Pravda that Russian forces have brought tanks and mortars into Pokrovsk since November 19 – indicating that Russian forces have been able to deploy heavy equipment into Pokrovsk despite Ukrainian interdiction efforts.[35]

Russian forces continue efforts to infiltrate Myrnohrad and sever tactical Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk, consistent with the new Russian offensive template that seeks to interdict tactical GLOCs after an operational interdiction campaign. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces assessed on November 25 that Russian forces will attempt to sever the GLOCs between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the near future.[36] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces are reinforcing units within Myrnohrad to defend the southern outskirts of the town, where Russian forces are accumulating. A Ukrainian officer operating in Myrnohrad told Ukrainska Pravda that the Ukrainian GLOCs to Myrnohrad lie entirely within the contested ”gray zone” over which neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces exert firm control.[37] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in Myrnohrad told Hromadske on October 31 that Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators were already within range to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs connecting Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[38] Geolocated footage published on November 25 shows Ukrainian servicemembers taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) along Tsentralna Street in central Myrnohrad, indicating that Russian forces recently managed to infiltrate deep into central Myrnohrad but are not yet comfortably exercising control over this area.[39]

Russian forces are employing their new offensive template in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, setting conditions for a future dedicated effort to seize Kostyantynivka and threaten the Ukrainian Fortress Belt from the south. A Ukrainian drone platoon commander operating in the Kostyantynivka direction told Ukrainska Pravda on November 25 that Russian forces have been entering Kostyantynivka for over a month (since about mid-October 2025) and are regularly engaging Ukrainian forces with small arms.[40] The drone platoon commander reported that the Russian presence in Kostyantynivka is no longer restricted to small sabotage and reconnaissance groups. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 25 that fighting is ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[41] Russian forces have been heavily striking Kostyantynivka and its environs in recent months, likely as part of an operational-level BAI campaign aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics and defensive ability ahead of dedicated ground operations to seize the city and the rest of Ukraine's Fortress Belt.[42] Russian and Ukrainian sources recently indicated that Russian forces had deprioritized the seizure of Kostyantynivka to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk, but that the Russian military command would likely reprioritize the seizure of Kostyantynivka after taking Pokrovsk.[43] The Russian military command likely seeks to continue interdiction efforts and infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka to set conditions for a future dedicated effort to seize the city at a time of its choosing.

Key Takeaways:

• The Trump administration continues efforts to negotiate a peace deal to end Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials continue to express support for the latest 19-point peace plan and demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to engage in further talks.
• Russian officials are attempting to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to compromise and its commitment to its maximalist demands.
• Russia killed at least seven Ukrainian civilians and injured at least 20 in Kyiv City and struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure during combined missile and drone strikes on the night of November 24 to 25.
• Russian drones violated Romanian and Moldovan airspaces on the night of November 24 to 25 during combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.
• The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to leverage their new offensive template to seize Pokrovsk and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.
• Russian forces are employing their new offensive template in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, setting conditions for a future dedicated effort to seize Kostyantynivka and threaten the Ukrainian Fortress Belt from the south.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2025 

US and Ukrainian delegations reportedly narrowed down the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan to 19 points.[i] An official briefed on the negotiations told the Washington Post that the peace plan to end Russia's war in Ukraine now has 19 points and is based on the original US proposal, but that US and Ukrainian delegations have not yet agreed upon the final number of points.[ii] Oleksandr Bevz, advisor to Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, stated that Ukrainian and US negotiators agreed to remove points unrelated to Ukraine, such as those regarding US-Russian bilateral engagement and those involving Europe.[iii] Bevz stated that Ukrainian and US negotiators also agreed to resolve issues about Ukraine’s accession to NATO based on NATO's consensus decision-making structure.[iv] Bevz stated that Ukrainian negotiators clarified to US officials that Ukraine is willing to start discussions about territory from the current frontline and does not want to engage with Russian offers to swap territory. People familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that European officials noted that the most recent version of the peace plan no longer includes proposals for roughly $100 billion in frozen Russian assets to go toward US-led efforts to rebuild Ukraine.[v] Ukrainian news agency RBK-Ukraine reported, citing unspecified sources, that the delegations adjusted a significant number of issues, such as those related to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the size of the Ukrainian military, and prisoner of war (POW) and prisoner exchanges.[vi] RBK-Ukraine's sources reportedly stated that the delegations agreed that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky should discuss and agree upon points related to territorial issues and Ukraine's accession into NATO. Sources told RBK-Ukraine that the United States will work with Ukraine to agree on the final points of the plan before engaging with European partners on points that directly concern Europe.[vii] The sources reportedly stated that the United States will then use "carrots and sticks" to convince Russia of the plan.

The persistent Russian rate of advance does not indicate that Russian forces will imminently seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast. CBS reported on November 23 that a US official stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that he will take all of Donetsk Oblast "one way or another" either through a negotiated settlement or military means.[viii] The Kremlin has been doubling down on spreading the false narrative that a Russian victory is inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should immediately acquiesce to Russian demands.[ix] Russia's imminent seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not guaranteed, as Russia's rate of advance has been constrained to a foot pace – even in the past three months when Russian forces have been making relatively quicker gains on the battlefield.[x] ISW continues to assess that the Russian effort to seize Donetsk Oblast will be a yearslong battle that would cost Russia significant amounts of manpower and materiel.[xi] Russian forces have not shown an ability to seize large population centers like those in the Fortress Belt – the backbone of Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast – since 2022 and have tried and failed to seize the Fortress Belt itself since 2014.

Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continue rejecting the original and revised US-proposed peace plan drafts and are attempting to portray Europe as responsible for the Russian rejection. Russian officials and ultranationalist voices have been rejecting the 28-point US peace plan since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plan did not concede to all of Russia's absolutist war demands.[xii] Russian officials and ultranationalist voices are simultaneously misrepresenting revisions to the original plan and European involvement as undermining the peace process, likely in an effort to deflect from Russia's own rejection of the deal. Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on November 24 that the European version of the peace proposal is unacceptable for Russia, and Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed that the European proposal would only continue the war.[xiii] Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Chairperson Svetlana Zhurova claimed that continued US changes to the peace plan will "drag on" the negotiations "endlessly."[xiv] Zhurova claimed that the only two relevant negotiating parties are Russia and the United States, implying that any peace plans must exclude Ukrainian and European inputs.[xv] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, a key pro-war constituency for Russian President Vladimir Putin, continued to reject the modified peace proposal, criticize the United States for moving away from Russian demands, and claim that Europe only wants to continue the war in Ukraine.[xvi] The milbloggers called for Russia to achieve its war aims by force instead.[xvii] The Kremlin has refused to meaningfully negotiate in response to all US-led peace initiatives thus far in 2025, and has shown no willingness to make the significant compromises required of a negotiation process.[xviii] The Kremlin very likely aims to prolong negotiations to end the war to allow Russian forces to continue advancing on the battlefield. The Kremlin likely plans to use Russian advances to further intensify information operations aimed at convincing the West and Ukraine that a Russian military victory is inevitable and that Ukraine should capitulate to Russia's demands. The Kremlin continues to show no willingness to compromise for good-faith peace negotiations and has not set conditions for Russians to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence and continue to counterattack within Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces likely remain unable to rapidly seize Pokrovsk at this time. Geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in northwestern Pokrovsk, where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[xix] Geolocated footage published on November 24 shows Ukrainian forces patrolling in northern Pokrovsk in areas where Russian forces previously infiltrated, and a Ukrainian assault regiment operating in Pokrovsk reported that Ukrainian forces cleared central Pokrovsk of Russian forces.[xx] Other Ukrainian military and media sources provided contradictory accounts of reported Ukrainian clearing operations within Pokrovsk, however. Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk and a Ukrainian journalist reported on November 23 and 24 that Ukrainian forces cleared several streets and areas near the Donetska railway and E-50 highway and that Ukrainian forces continue to control some neighborhoods within Pokrovsk.[xxi] A Ukrainian military source stated on November 23 that Ukrainian forces cleared "specific areas" within Pokrovsk and assessed that these advances may improve the tactical situation for Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk but would not impact the operational situation in the area.[xxii] Other Ukrainian military sources refuted on November 24 reports that Ukrainian forces cleared central Pokrovsk.[xxiii] All of the Ukrainian reporting continues to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain positions and some degree of ability to operate within Pokrovsk despite weeks of intensified Russian efforts to seize the town.

Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with drones and the disjointed nature of Russian infiltration tactics likely continue to hinder Russian efforts to mass troops necessary to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk within the town. A Ukrainian military source noted on November 24 that effective Ukrainian drone interdiction of Russian GLOCs has cut logistics to 90 percent of Russian assault groups within Pokrovsk, slowing the pace of the Russian advance within the town.[xxiv] The Ukrainian military source added that Russian forces within Pokrovsk, who number over 500, are relatively uncoordinated and sometimes commit friendly fire incidents. The Ukrainian military source reported that Russian forces still have extensive fire control within Pokrovsk and are employing drones to significantly interdict Ukrainian GLOCs, however. The Ukrainian journalist noted that Russian forces continue to take advantage of poor weather conditions to accumulate forces and reenter areas that Ukrainian forces previously cleared, leading to back-and-forth fighting within the town.[xxv] ISW continues to assess that seasonal foggy and rainy weather conditions are hindering Ukrainian drone operations in eastern Ukraine, allowing Russian forces to conduct ground operations into and within Pokrovsk with less threats from Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and strikes.[xxvi]

Russian forces continue to leverage their new offensive template, which heavily relies on battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration tactics, to advance in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Zatyshshya (roughly 2.6 kilometers east of Hulyaipole).[xxvii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also stated that Russian forces seized the settlement.[xxviii] A Ukrainian servicemember stated on November 24 that fighting has begun for Zatyshshya.[xxix] Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have been operating in Hulyaipole for a week (since roughly November 17).[xxx] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are assaulting the settlement, but another milblogger directly refuted this claim.[xxxi] Russian forces have been using prolonged BAI campaigns to degrade Ukrainian drone-based defenses and logistics; infiltration missions to identify, worsen, and exploit weak points in Ukrainian defenses; and mass small group assaults to make rapid advances and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw.[xxxii] Reports of limited Russian infiltrations into Hulyaipole are in line with this new campaign design.

Belarusian balloons continue incursions in NATO airspace in Lithuania and Latvia. Lithuanian National Crisis Management Center (NKMC) Head Vilmantas Vitkauskas reported on November 24 that the Vilnius International Airport temporarily suspended operations twice on November 24 due to an unspecified number of balloons flying towards the airport from Belarusian airspace.[xxxiii] Vitkauskas stated that authorities detected over 40 balloons over Lithuanian airspace and about 30 Belarusian balloons in Latvian airspace overnight on November 23 to November 24.[xxxiv] The Lithuanian Border Service previously closed land border crossings with Belarus on the evening of October 26 due to repeated aerial incursions into Lithuanian airspace, but reopened the border after midnight on November 20.[xxxv] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and the ongoing Russian airspace violations are likely part of ”Phase Zero” – Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase – to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xxxvi] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, thus, Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian delegations reportedly narrowed down the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan to 19 points.
• The persistent Russian rate of advance does not indicate that Russian forces will imminently seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continue rejecting the original and revised US-proposed peace plan drafts and are attempting to portray Europe as responsible for the Russian rejection.
• Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence and continue to counterattack within Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces likely remain unable to rapidly seize Pokrovsk at this time.
• Russian forces continue to leverage their new offensive template, which heavily relies on battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration tactics, to advance in the Hulyaipole direction.
• Belarusian balloons continue incursions in NATO airspace in Lithuania and Latvia.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 23, 2025 

US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes. US President Donald Trump stated on November 22 that the 28-point peace plan is not his final offer to Ukraine.[i] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated to Fox on November 23 that the peace plan is a "work in progress" and that there are issues that the parties must codify and explain further.[ii] Kellogg stated that there likely needs to be an annex document outlining security guarantees for Ukraine. Kellogg stated that the United States does not want a repeat of the Budapest Memorandum or Minsk Agreements, Russian-preferable agreements that gave Ukraine vague security assurances in exchange for Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament in 1994 and a 2015 failed ceasefire protocol that greatly advantaged Russia and led to the full-scale invasion in 2022, respectively.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that, after the US-Ukrainian-European meetings on November 23 in Geneva, the peace plan is a "living, breathing document" that changes with new input every day.[iii] Rubio added that the parties in Geneva "really moved forward" and that there is no concrete deadline for Ukraine to sign the peace plan, stating that the United States wants to finalize the deal "as soon as possible," even if that is after the initial November 27 deadline.[iv] Rubio stated that the United States recognizes that Ukraine needs security guarantees as part of a peace settlement and that achieving peace will "require for Ukraine to feel as if it is safe" from renewed invasions or attacks.[v] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated, after the Geneva meetings, that "a lot is changing" and that talks will continue later on November 23.[vi] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, who is leading the newly formed Ukrainian negotiating delegation, stated that delegations will continue working on November 23 and in the coming days to create a joint proposal between the United States, Ukraine, and European allies.[vii]

Western reporting also suggests that the United States is open to amending the peace plan, including points about the Ukrainian military and post-war security guarantees. The Washington Post reported on November 22 that US officials stated that the Trump administration recognizes that the security guarantees in the initial 28-point plan are "not strong enough yet."[viii] US officials reportedly stated that US President Donald Trump may raise or remove the 600,000 cap on Ukraine's military or may consider supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk long-range missiles in the event of a peace agreement to bolster postwar deterrence. The Washington Post reported that a US official stated that the United States and US allies would help Ukraine build a security "wall" along the ceasefire line using unspecified advanced technology. A US official stated that Zelensky responded to the US peace proposal by proposing a ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure, but that Russia then responded by labeling such a ceasefire as a "nonstarter."

European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan. Western outlets reported that France, the United Kingdom, and Germany drafted a counterproposal ahead of their talks with Ukrainian and American delegations in Geneva on November 23.[ix] The 24-point counterproposal reportedly includes calls for an immediate ceasefire to precede discussions about territorial issues; for the cap on Ukraine's military to be 800,000 "in peacetime;" for Ukraine to receive a security guarantee from the United States similar to North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5; for the use of frozen Russian assets to fully reconstruct and financially compensate Ukraine; for Ukrainian membership in NATO to depend on consensus from alliance members; and for Ukraine to decide on the presence of foreign troops from guarantor states on Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin has already previously explicitly rejected a number of these proposals, including the deployment of foreign troops to post-war Ukraine.[x]

Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia's longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 22 that Russia cannot deviate from Russian President Vladimir Putin's stated demands at the Alaska summit in August 2025 and reiterated Russia's commitment to addressing the "root causes" of the war.[xi] Ryabkov defined the "root causes" as NATO expansion, weapon deployments to Eastern Europe, and alleged discrimination against Russian people, Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Rybakov's November 22 definition of the alleged root causes aligns with numerous other high ranking Kremlin officials' statements on the matter.[xii] Ryabkov also noted that Russia will continue to act in its national interests regardless of sanctions, signaling that the Kremlin will remain committed to its war effort in Ukraine even in the face of potential future economic pressures against Russia. Putin notably demonstrated at the Alaska summit that he had not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine.[xiii] Ryabkov's reiteration of the importance of eliminating the "root causes" of the war and of Putin's position at the Alaska summit further indicates that the Kremlin has not abandoned its original war aims and justifications, including demanding that NATO remove its Open Door Policy.

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that the US peace plan aims to preserve a "threat on the Russian border," likely referring to Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state and Russia's shared border with longstanding NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic states.[xiv] Zhuravlev claimed that the Kremlin must treat the plan with "extreme caution" and as a "starting point for negotiations" rather than an ultimate peace settlement. Zhuravlev added that the reported European counterproposal conditions are "completely unacceptable for Russia." Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly remarked that possible Western transfers of long-range missiles, such as Tomahawks, to Ukraine under the peace plan would contradict Russia's "demilitarization" objective, which effectively aims to destroy the Ukrainian military such that it cannot protect itself from renewed Russian aggression.[xv] Chepa implied that Russia perceives any security assistance or guarantees for Ukraine as a threat to Russia, and Russian state media framed Chepa's statements as a "warning" explaining why the peace deal is "unacceptable" to Russia.[xvi] Member of the Belarusian National Assembly's House of Representatives Vadim Gigin, who is also a prominent propagandist in the Russian and Belarusian information spaces, stated on Russian state television that Russia cannot agree to the peace plan due to "mutual mistrust" between Russia and the United States and that there is no mechanism for implementing such an agreement.[xvii] These various statements continue to indicate that the Kremlin is disinterested in making any compromises in a peace deal and is setting domestic information conditions to reject the peace plan.

Russian ultranationalists, a key pro-war constituency for Putin, similarly argued that Russia should not accept any peace plan and should instead continue its war against Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that a peace plan could deprive Russia of the opportunity to seize more territory in Ukraine and interpreted Putin's November 21 remarks about the US-proposed peace plan as a reiteration of Russia's commitment to fighting while it can still advance.[xviii] The milblogger concluded that Russia's ability to sustain the war effort will determine the war’s outcome, not a diplomatic settlement. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russia's war aims are not limited to the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but encompass all territories "enshrined in the [Russian] constitution," referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in 2022.[xix] The milblogger implied that Russia is willing to continue the war so that it can demand a demilitarized zone that extends all the way to Poland, implying that Russia maintains its maximalist territorial goals in Ukraine. Other Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reiterated that Russia would only agree to a peace plan that encompasses all of Russia's demands.[xx] Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers have been rejecting the US-proposed 28-point peace plan and reiterating Russia's commitment to its original, maximalist war aims since Western media began reporting on the proposal on November 20.[xxi] These statements continue to indicate that Russia is unlikely to accept any proposed peace plan that falls short of Ukrainian capitulation. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions.[xxii]

The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning. The Kremlin has been doubling down on the false narrative that Russian battlefield successes are so widespread that a Russian victory is inevitable.[xxiii] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable and that the "realities on the ground" show that Russia faces many obstacles in its path to seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian rate of advance intensified since the Alaska summit, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day between August 15 and November 20. Russian gains notably have still been confined to a foot pace even during this period of faster advances. Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027 at this rate of advance, assuming Russian forces can maintain the current faster rate of advance, Ukrainian defenses remain strong, and Western weapons provisions to Ukraine remain consistent. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to push Ukraine to hand over this territory to save Russia significant amounts of time, effort, manpower, and resources that it could use elsewhere in Ukraine during renewed aggression.

The actual timeline on which Russian forces could potentially seize all of Donetsk Oblast is likely even longer. Foggy and rainy weather has contributed to Russia's faster tempo in Fall 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian drone operations have not been as effective.[xxiv] These seasonal weather conditions are not permanent, and the rate of Russian advance will likely slow as weather conditions stabilize. Russian advances since August 15 have also not faced heavily fortified, large population centers the size of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt.[xxv] Russia's recent rate of advance of 9.3 square kilometers per day was also notably across the entire theater, and the calculation that Russian forces could seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by August 2027 is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces would commit the same forces, resources, and energy that they have deployed across the frontline since August 15 to fighting in Donetsk Oblast only. The Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire front. Continued European military assistance and European-financed American weapons sales to Ukraine could also strengthen Ukraine's defenses, possibly reversing some Russian gains and slowing this protracted timeline even further.

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket by advancing on the northern shoulder of the encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xxvi] Additional geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xxvii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces are completing clearing operations in Pokrovsk.[xxviii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have created a "kill zone" (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) between Pokrovsk and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad). The milblogger claimed that Russian assault activity is increasing in Myrnohrad and that drone operators are entering the town. The milblogger claimed that it is highly probable that the rest of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is a contested "gray zone."

Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack and maintain a limited presence within and around Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 23 that fighting is ongoing in central Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian forces from accumulating enough forces to push into the northern part of the town.[xxix] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces are suffering heavy losses during their attempts to advance into northern Pokrovsk via the Donetska Railway. A Russian milblogger also acknowledged on November 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain a scattered presence between Kozatske (east of Myrnohrad) and Promin (just south of Kozatske).[xxx] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in northern Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[xxxi]

Ukrainian forces are also conducting tactical-level air interdiction lines of effort against Russian logistics that support the Pokrovsk effort. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on November 23 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian forces participating in offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.[xxxii] The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position on a dominant height at an industrial facility in Pokrovsk that Russian snipers used to exert fire control over the surrounding area. The SSO reported that Russian forces were also accumulating personnel in the area. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration in Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk and east of Dobropillya) of elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) that were trying to close the encirclement around Pokrovsk from the north. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration point and drone ammunition depot of elements of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and in occupied Sontsivka (in the Russian tactical rear 27 kilometers south of Pokrovsk). The SSO reported a strike against another ammunition depot in occupied Dokuchayevsk (in the Russian operational rear 71 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk) from where Russian forces stored, distributed, and shipped equipment to forces attacking in the Pokrovsk direction.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[xxxiii] Russia will likely try to exploit the eventual seizure of Pokrovsk for informational effect to forward the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Russian victory on the battlefield is not inevitable, however, and it notably took Russian forces 21 months to advance roughly 40 kilometers and begin to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket.[xxxiv] A campaign to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, including Ukraine's much larger and more populous Fortress Belt, would take several years of arduous battles, and Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities the size of those in the Fortress Belt since 2022.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes.
• European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan.
• Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia's longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance.
• The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning.
• The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks.
• Ukrainian forces are also conducting tactical-level air interdiction lines of effort against Russian logistics that support the Pokrovsk effort.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Pokrovsk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 22, 2025 

Russian officials and state media continue to set information conditions to reject the US-proposed 28-point peace plan, indicating that the Kremlin is actively conditioning the Russian people to not accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa commented on the peace plan, stating that any plan must adhere to Russia's full demands.[i] Chepa reiterated that Russia's objective is for any peace settlement to address the alleged "root causes" of its war in Ukraine, a deliberately vague term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand for its original war justifications and demands, such as the destruction of Ukrainian sovereignty and the NATO alliance.[ii] Chepa implied that the proposed peace plan offers more concessions to Russia than previous proposals but is still insufficient to address Russia's maximalist demands. Russian state TV channels and milbloggers highlighted similar narratives, including those about how Russia would only participate in a peace plan that eliminates the root causes of the war ­— implying that Russia is not interested in any peace negotiations until it accomplishes its goals on the battlefield.[iii] State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia will not give up any territories in Ukraine that it has illegally annexed, even areas that Russia does not fully occupy such as Zaporizhia Oblast.[iv] Kolesnik's statement indicates that the Kremlin is uninterested in making any territorial compromises. Kolesnik also reiterated the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, such that Ukraine should submit to Russia's full demands now.[v] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky stated that the peace plan is a "good basis" for a settlement but that Russian advances in eastern Ukraine are "equally compelling arguments" — implying that Russia remains committed to continuing its war in Ukraine on the battlefield.[vi] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions.[vii]

Ukrainian, American, and European delegations will meet on November 23 to discuss the US-proposed peace plan to end the war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on November 22 that Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak will lead a new Ukrainian negotiating delegation.[viii] The delegation includes: National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov, Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Head Oleh Ivashchenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsya, First Deputy National Security and Defense Council Secretary Yevheniy Ostryanskyy, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Deputy Head Oleksandr Pokland, and Advisor to the Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Oleksandr Bevz. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian, American, British, French, and German delegations will meet on November 23 in Switzerland to discuss the proposed 28-point peace plan.[ix] Reuters reported that a US official stated that US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll, whom US President Donald Trump reportedly appointed as a special envoy in the peace negotiations, will attend the upcoming talks in Geneva alongside US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.[x]

Ukrainian military officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces are pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk — in contrast to repeated Russian claims of seizing the town. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on November 21 that Russian forces continue to try to infiltrate into Kupyansk, but that the number of Russian soldiers in the northern part of the town has decreased to about 40 personnel.[xi] The Russian military command began to exaggerate Russian successes in Kupyansk in late August 2025 — a narrative that the Kremlin has only intensified in recent weeks.[xii] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev notably claimed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 20 that Russian forces had seized Kupyansk, and Russian milbloggers subsequently denied this claim.[xiii] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction continue to contest the town and are in the process of rolling back a Russian effort to infiltrate the town.[xiv] ISW has not observed sufficient geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized close to all of Kupyansk as of November 22.

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue attempts to seize Pokrovsk itself and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). Russian milbloggers claimed on November 21 and 22 that Russian forces seized Pokrovsk and advanced north of the town.[xv] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad highway in southern Rivne (between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad).[xvi] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have begun attacking into Myrnohrad along the T-0504 from Rivne and advanced in eastern Myrnohrad, likely in an attempt to fix Ukrainian forces within Myrnohrad while also tightening the encirclement around Myrnohrad and blocking Ukrainian egress routes from the town.[xvii] A Ukrainian servicemember acknowledged on November 21 that Ukrainian forces "completely" lost Pokrovsk and noted that Russian forces are attempting to narrow the egress route near Myrnohrad and Rivne.[xviii] The servicemember further stated that Russian forces have cut off all logistics into Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces will likely be unable to withdraw from the remaining, limited opening in the pocket.

The Russian military command continues to focus a significant number of forces to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, which is resulting in heavy Russian losses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 22 that Russia has concentrated over 150,000 servicemembers for offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.[xix] Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov told German outlet Die Zeit on November 20 that the Russian military command has amassed a large number of troops to take Pokrovsk and that there are about 400 Russian soldiers within the town.[xx] Hnatov noted that urban areas are easier to defend and more difficult to seize, resulting in high Russian losses. The Ukrainian Eastern Operation Task Force reported on November 22 that Russian forces are maintaining a high intensity of attacks and are primarily concentrating efforts on seizing Pokrovsk itself, despite heavy losses forcing the Russian military command to tap into operational reserves.[xxi] The Russian military command notably redeployed elements of the relatively elite 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to the Pokrovsk direction to support Russian efforts to seize the pocket, likely due to the slowing tempo of Russian advances in the area.[xxii] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after a 21-month campaign, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[xxiii]

Authorities recently reported multiple drone sightings over air bases and airports in the Netherlands. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans reported that authorities observed unidentified drones flying over Volkel Air Base near Eindhoven, a Royal Netherlands Air Force base that hosts a US Air Force squadron as part of NATO, on the evening of November 21.[xxiv] Brekelmans reported that attempts to shoot down the drones were unsuccessful and that authorities never recovered the drones after they flew away. Brekelmans reported that authorities also observed multiple drones at Eindhoven Airport on November 22 and subsequently suspended civilian and military air traffic.[xxv] Dutch authorities have not identified an actor behind the drone overflights as of this writing. These are the latest in a series of drone sightings over European airports and air bases in recent weeks, which come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[xxvi]

Ukrainian forces reportedly recently downed at least 19 Kinzhal ballistic missiles with electronic warfare (EW), likely in response to Ukraine's Patriot air defense interceptor missile shortages and Russian Kinzhal modifications. Servicemembers of the Ukrainian Night Watch EW unit told online outlet 404 in an article published on November 20 that the unit downed 19 Kinzhals over the past two weeks (roughly from November 6 to 20) and later revealed to Forbes that the unit may have downed 21 Kinzhals over an unspecified time period.[xxvii] Night Watch servicemembers stated that they use the Lima EW jamming system, which spoofs the Kinzhals' navigation system by creating a disruption field that prevents the missile from communicating with satellites within the Russian GLONASS system. The Lima EW system causes the missile to become confused about its location and rapidly change direction at a high speed, putting excessive stress on the airframe that causes the missile to ultimately fail to reach its target. A Night Watch servicemember noted that Ukrainian forces began to jam Kinzhals with the Lima system as an adaptation to Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptors and limitations of the air defense systems, likely referring to Russia's new technological innovations that allow Kinzhals to bypass Patriots. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 3 that Russia likely recently modified its Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles to execute unexpected diversionary maneuvers during the terminal flight phase to “confuse” Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missiles.[xxviii] Ukrainian forces have still been able to down Russian ballistic missiles with Patriot systems since the reported Russian modifications.[xxix] Ukrainian forces will continue to need both new EW systems and Patriot systems to repel persistent Russian drone and missile threats, particularly Russian ballistic missiles, despite these successful Ukrainian adaptations, in order to ensure continuous and reliable defenses throughout the country.

Russian forces are continuing to commit war crimes on the battlefield in Ukraine, particularly near Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation on November 22 into a video showing Russian forces executing five captured and unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) on November 19.[xxx] Article 13 of the Geneva Convention prohibits any unlawful act or omission by the detaining power which causes death or seriously endangers the health of a POW while in custody.[xxxi] ISW has observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Pokrovsk direction in recent weeks as Russian forces have approached and infiltrated the town.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials and state media continue to set information conditions to reject the US-proposed 28-point peace plan, indicating that the Kremlin is actively conditioning the Russian people to not accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian, American, and European delegations will meet on November 23 to discuss the US-proposed peace plan to end the war.
• Ukrainian military officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces are pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk — in contrast to repeated Russian claims of seizing the town.
• The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue attempts to seize Pokrovsk itself and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).
• Authorities recently reported multiple drone sightings over air bases and airports in the Netherlands.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly recently downed at least 19 Kinzhal ballistic missiles with electronic warfare (EW), likely in response to Ukraine's Patriot air defense interceptor missile shortages and Russian Kinzhal modifications.
• Russian forces are continuing to commit war crimes on the battlefield in Ukraine, particularly near Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2025 

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to indicate that his demands have not fundamentally changed since the August 2025 Alaska summit. Putin held a Security Council meeting on November 21 and explicitly addressed the US-proposed 28-point peace plan to end the war in Ukraine.[1] Putin stated that the Kremlin has received a copy of the proposed deal and that US President Donald Trump had already proposed a peace plan to Russia before the Alaska summit. Putin stated that Russia agrees with the proposals that he and Trump discussed during the Alaska summit. Other Russian officials, including Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, have also responded to the 28-point peace plan by reiterating Russia's commitment to the Alaska summit principles.[2] The exact parameters of discussions at the Alaska summit between Trump and Putin remain unclear, but Putin used the press conference at the summit to reiterate his demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war (Kremlin shorthand for demanding its original war aims about NATO expansion and the removal of the current Ukrainian government).[3] US officials noted after the summit that Putin was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine, and Putin reportedly indicated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) could be a possible guarantor.[4] Russian officials reiterated their demands after the summit that European-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and the deployment of European peacekeeping contingents to Ukraine are unacceptable and made several statements following the summit that Russia's conditions for ending the war had not changed.[5]

Peskov also reiterated on November 21 that the Kremlin would rather negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine and bilateral US-Russia issues separately, contrary to the Trump administration's stated interest and the terms of the 28-point peace proposal.[6] The Kremlin has historically used public statements to clarify Russia's negotiating positions to the West, such as when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to several Russian and US media outlets in August 2025 after the Alaska summit to reiterate that Russia's demands to end the war had not changed.[7] Kremlin officials have offered no variance on their longstanding position to date.

Reported Russian government insiders also indicated that the Kremlin does not support the proposed 28-point peace plan. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on November 21 that diplomatic sources and sources close to the Kremlin stated that the provisions in the 28-point peace plan should be seen more as a basis of a future agreement and not an agreement that Putin would formally sign.[8] One source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that the plan in its current form is "not ready" and that Russia objects to the proposed security guarantees for Ukraine, the cap on the Ukrainian military much greater than that Russia demanded in 2022, the proposed method of sanctions relief for Russia (likely referring to the lack of set conditions under which the United States would lift sanctions), and use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. A high-ranking Russian federal government source working on the peace negotiations reportedly stated that Trump is in a hurry to conclude a deal but that Putin is "not so much." The source reportedly stated that the current document has too many vague points that postpone the resolution of contentious issues between Russia and Ukraine "indefinitely." The source expressed doubt that Russia would ratify an agreement that does not clarify in detail Russia's issues, including borders and deadlines to fulfill the document's conditions. The source noted that Putin's visit to a command post of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces on November 20 in a military uniform "demonstrate[d] his firm position" while the "entire planet is discussing a peace plan."

Russian officials are setting informational conditions to reject the 28-point peace plan, which acquiesces to many — but not all — of Russia's persistent war demands. Putin and other prominent Russian officials continue to reiterate publicly that Russia will achieve its war goals militarily. Putin reiterated on November 21 that Russia is open to achieving peace through diplomatic means but that Russia is "happy" to continue pursuing its war goals militarily.[9] Putin visited a command post of the Russian Western Group of Forces on November 20 and stated that the most important task is to achieve Russia's war goals, which Putin claimed the "Fatherland" and "people of Russia" had set before the Kremlin.[10] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov told Putin at the meeting that Russian forces will continue their mission to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in accordance with the military's existing plans. These statements reinforce to the Russian people that they should expect Russia to occupy the entirety of all four oblasts.

Other Russian officials are signaling more directly to the Russian populace that the 28-point peace deal is unacceptable for Russia. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated that a peace plan is not in Russia's interests, given Russian advances in Ukraine, and claimed that Russia cannot trust the West to uphold the terms of the peace deal, including the point that NATO would not expand.[11] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that the 28-point peace proposal will not lead to a sustainable peace and that no US- or European-proposed agreements will ever lead to such a peace.[12] Zhuravlev claimed that the war can only end with Russia's "unequivocal victory on the front" and with "Ukraine's capitulation."

The Kremlin has thus far failed to set conditions for the Russian people to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.[13] Commentary from Russian ultranationalists — Putin's main constituency — indicates that the people upon whom Putin relies for support retain the same expectations for the war that Putin introduced in February 2022, despite the new 28-point proposal. Russian ultranationalist voices criticized the 28-point peace plan for requiring Russia to give up its war goals.[14] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers also criticized the peace proposal as unsustainable and claimed that such a deal would lead to further confrontation in the future.[15] The milbloggers broadly expressed support for continuing the war and claimed that the proposal does not benefit Russia and contains some unacceptable stipulations that must change.[16] A prominent milblogger criticized the deal for not giving Russia all of the Ukrainian oblasts it has illegally annexed, including areas that Russia does not currently occupy in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[17] Official Russian reactions, including from Putin, in response to the 28-point peace plan reinforce, rather than reject, the expectation that Russia will achieve all of its war goals before agreeing to peace.

The Kremlin has similarly rejected US-proposed ceasefires and negotiations in recent months, while Ukraine has consistently shown a willingness to engage and compromise. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated Ukraine's willingness to work with the United States on the proposed peace plan, even though the plan imposes major concessions on Ukraine, few on Russia, and largely amounts to Ukraine's surrender.[18] Putin stated that the 28-point peace proposal "could form the basis" of a permanent peace but requires a substantive discussion.[19] Putin and other Kremlin officials reiterated the Kremlin's commitment to achieving its original war goals through diplomatic means, but have rejected prior US-led proposals.[20] Ukraine has agreed to every ceasefire and prisoner exchange that the Trump administration has proposed to date and demonstrated a willingness to compromise on terms for a permanent peace. The sudden and public imposition of the plan on Ukraine, while also requiring Ukraine to make a rapid decision about the plan with less than a week of consideration time, makes Ukraine appear to be the unwilling party that is blocking progress, even though the Kremlin itself has expressed disapproval of the plan.[21] The Kremlin likely seeks to divide Ukraine from the United States such that Russia can continue its war against Ukraine without US and Western support and backing.

The proposed peace plan would not bring Russia and Ukraine closer to a just and lasting peace but would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine in the future. Axios reported on November 21 that the 28-point plan includes “Article 5-like” security guarantees for Ukraine — referring to NATO’s collective defense clause — but that these guarantees would only last for 10 years and need to be renewed.[22] The time limit on security guarantees for Ukraine would allow Russia to reinvade Ukraine with an experienced, rested, and reconstituted military after the guarantees expire.[23] The battle lines set forth by the proposed peace plan would additionally heavily favor another Russian invasion.[24] Any peace deal that requires Ukraine to withdraw from Donetsk Oblast would force Ukraine to withdraw to lines that would largely be indefensible against renewed Russian aggression and likely allow Russia to launch renewed pushes into southern Kharkiv Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts from the proposed ”frozen” frontline.

Putin and Russian military commanders continue to promote the false narrative that a Russian victory is inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands. Putin notably wore a military uniform for his November 20 meeting at the Western Grouping of Forces command post– the fourth time he has worn a military uniform to a public event since the start of the full-scale invasion and only a few weeks after his second and third times doing so in mid-September and late October 2025.[25] Gerasimov opened his report by claiming that Russian forces are advancing on virtually all fronts on the battlefield. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces have seized over 80 percent of Vovchansk and over 75 percent of Pokrovsk. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized 34 percent of Vovchansk and 46 percent of Pokrovsk, however. Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Medvedev, who recently became the commander after serving as the grouping's chief of staff, claimed that Russian forces have taken control of eastern and southeastern Kostyantynivka and have started to clear the central area. ISW has only observed evidence of Russian infiltration missions into limited areas in southeastern Kostyantynivka, however. Medvedev stated that the Russian military command plans to seize most of Kostyantynivka by mid-December 2025. Putin responded that it is not important to set specific deadlines, but Medvedev's statement is an attempt to paint the Russian military command as confident in its ability to seize rapidly the southern tip of Ukraine's heavily fortified Fortress Belt.

The Russian military command continued to exaggerate claims about successes in Kupyansk – a narrative the Kremlin began to heavily promote in late August 2025.[26] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized all of Kupyansk.[27] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized and maintain control over Kupyansk, but that Russian forces are still destroying small, scattered Ukrainian groups in the town. Kuzovlev claimed that elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division are cooperating with elements of the 47th Tank Division and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) to destroy the Ukrainian forces encircled on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction. Putin claimed during the November 21 Security Council meeting that Kupyansk is a recent example of what Russian forces will "inevitably" repeat in other areas of the front.[28] Kupyansk is notably one area of the front where Ukrainian forces have been successfully pushing back Russian offensive efforts.[29] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction are in the process of successfully rolling back a Russian effort to seize a settlement of this scale for the first time in recent years.[30]

The Russian military command continued to use flag raising across the battlefield to support its allegations of Russian successes. Geolocate footage published on November 21 shows small groups of two to five Russian servicemembers raising flags in Kupyansk, Novoselivka, Stavky, and Yampil — four settlements that the Russian military commanders claimed that Russian forces had seized in the meeting with Putin.[31] ISW assesses that these flag raisings were part of Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). Russia has increasingly relied on footage showing Russian flag raisings to claim advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[32] The Russian military command likely timed the flag raisings with the meeting with Putin in order to garner informational effects and provide alleged evidence to back the commanders' claims.

Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials both refuted many of the Russian commanders' claimed successes. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that there is no evidence of Russian control of the area south of Svativska Street in central Kupyansk or the industrial area east of the railway.[33] The milblogger also noted that Kuzovlev's claim that Russian forces seized Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) is also "uncertain" as there is no evidence or footage of Russian forces raising flags in the settlement, and the situation near the bridgehead in the area remains "tense." A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces stated that Gerasimov's claim about the seizure of Kupyansk is unconfirmed, and another milblogger claimed that it is premature to talk about the seizure of Yampil.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff denied claims that Russian forces seized Kupyansk, stating that Ukrainian efforts to detect and eliminate the Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that infiltrated into the town and its suburbs are ongoing.[35] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported that groups of Russian soldiers numbering about 40 total personnel are scattered in northern Kupyansk.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly denied the claimed seizure of Yampil and percentages of Vovchansk and Pokrovsk that Russian forces control.

Russia’s battlefield successes are not inevitable, and the Kremlin is intensifying efforts to aggrandize recent Russian military activity to advocate that Ukraine surrender terrain in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to actually seize without several years of campaigning. Russian forces seized approximately 908 square kilometers of additional territory (about the area of Berlin) in all of Ukraine since the Alaska summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 15. Some of these territorial gains were enabled by seasonal weather (fog and rain), which degraded Ukraine’s use of drones, and the rate of Russian advance will likely slow as weather conditions stabilize. Continued European military assistance and European-financed American weapons sales to Ukraine will likely enable Ukrainian forces to defend Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast for several years, and possibly even reverse some Russian gains. Russia is facing mounting materiel, manpower, and economic challenges that will continue to compound and constrain Russia’s ability to resource the war as it protracts.[37] Russia is therefore heavily vested in compelling Ukraine to surrender critical terrain that the Russian military is very unlikely to obtain by force on any rapid timeline.

Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in the Pokrovsk direction, where the situation remains serious and dynamic. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in and around Pokrovsk and continue to hold back Russian advances in the area. Geolocated footage published on November 20 and 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway and northeast of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[38] Pokrovsk itself remains contested, underscoring the fluid and interspersed nature of the frontline. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 21 that Ukrainian forces hold defined lines in northern Pokrovsk and maintain positions south of the Donetska Railway line.[39] The 7th Corps reported that Ukrainian forces are also clearing Russian forces from the northern outskirts of Myrnohrad. Russian milbloggers also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within Pokrovsk itself; between Kozatske (east of Myrnohrad) and Promin (just southeast of Kozatske); and between Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and the railway line that runs northeast of Sukhyi Yar.[40]

Russian forces continue to use drones and glide bombs to target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion reported that Russian forces are heavily striking Pokrovsk with guided glide bombs and are relying on the Russian Rubikon Center for Unmanned Technologies — the elements that have been largely responsible for successes in Russia's battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts.[41] The spokesperson added that Rubikon has an unlimited number of drones and highly trained operators in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces have increased their use of fiber optic drones with longer ranges and are focusing on striking Ukrainian drone operators.[42] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are also using "waiter" drones along Ukrainian GLOCs.

Russian military command appears to be redeploying relatively elite forces to the Pokrovsk direction, likely in response to the slowed rate of Russian advances. The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 21 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to the Pokrovsk direction.[43] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed in early September 2025 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the division from the Sumy direction to an unspecified area, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in late September 2025 that the command transferred elements of the 76th VDV Division to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the south Donetsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka directions) and to the AoR of the 35th CAA (EMD) in the Hulyaipole direction.[44] The Russian military command may have planned in September to deploy elements of the division to offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk or Zaporizhia oblasts, but may have deployed the forces to the Pokrovsk direction due to the slowed rate of Russian advances and continued Ukrainian resistance in the area. Russia has used the redeployment of elements of the 76th VDV Division to respond to critical situations on the front in the past, including deployments to Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and to Kursk Oblast during the Ukrainian incursion in 2024.[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to indicate that his demands have not fundamentally changed since the August 2025 Alaska summit.
• Reported Russian government insiders also indicated that the Kremlin does not support the proposed 28-point peace plan.
• Russian officials are setting informational conditions to reject the 28-point peace plan, which acquiesces to many — but not all — of Russia's persistent war demands.
• The Kremlin has thus far failed to set conditions for the Russian people to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin has similarly rejected US-proposed ceasefires and negotiations in recent months, while Ukraine has consistently shown a willingness to engage and compromise.
• The proposed peace plan would not bring Russia and Ukraine closer to a just and lasting peace but would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine in the future.
• Putin and Russian military commanders continue to promote the false narrative that a Russian victory is inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands.
• Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials both refuted many of the Russian commanders' claimed successes.
• Russia’s battlefield successes are not inevitable, and the Kremlin is intensifying efforts to aggrandize recent Russian military activity to advocate that Ukraine surrender terrain in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to actually seize.
• Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in the Pokrovsk direction, where the situation remains serious and dynamic.
• Russian military command appears to be redeploying relatively elite forces to the Pokrovsk direction, likely in response to the slowed rate of Russian advances.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2025

All available reporting continues to indicate that the stipulations of the reported 28-point Russia-US peace plan amount to Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia's original war demands. Western media outlets and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Honcharenko published on November 20 all 28 points of the reported peace plan.[1] The reported provisions include that:

• Ukraine will withdraw from the remainder of unoccupied Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) and this area will become a "neutral demilitarized buffer zone" internationally-recognized as Russian territory;
• All of Crimea, Donetsk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast will be recognized as de facto Russian territory, including by the United States;
• The conflict will freeze along the current frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts;
• Russia will relinquish the territory it controls outside of occupied Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts;
• Ukraine's military will be capped at a maximum of 600,000 personnel;
• Ukraine must enshrine in its constitution that it will not seek NATO membership, and NATO agrees to include statute provisions that it will not admit Ukraine any time in the future;
• It is “expected” that NATO will not further expand;
• NATO will not deploy troops to Ukraine;
• Ukraine will receive "reliable" security guarantees, including from the United States, for which the United States will receive unspecified compensation;
• The US guarantee holds that a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine would provoke a coordinated military response, reimpose all international sanctions against Russia, and revoke all other benefits to Russia listed in the proposal;
• The US security guarantee will be revoked if Ukraine invades Russia or launches missiles at Moscow or St. Petersburg;
• Ukraine must reject and prohibit "all Nazi ideologies" and hold elections within 100 days of codifying the agreement;
• Ukraine will receive funds and assistance from the United States, proceeds from frozen Russian assets, and the international community for reconstruction and energy infrastructure modernization.

ISW is unable to confirm the exact provisions of the reported peace plan at the time of this writing. A US official told PBS Newshour and Axios that the White House views the plan as a "live" or "working" document that can change based on further discussions.[2] Many of the points from the reported peace plan text cohere with prior Western reporting of the peace plan from November 19 and 20.[3] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed on November 20 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have been working to develop a plan since roughly mid-October 2025 and that they have engaged both Russia and Ukraine "equally."[4] Key Russian officials continue to deny the reported peace plan.[5]

There are no provisions in the reported peace plan in which Russia makes any concessions, and ISW continues to assess that accepting Russian demands would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. Many of the provisions in the full text of the reported plan align with the Kremlin's original 2022 Istanbul demands, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, even though the battlefield situation has changed markedly in the years since and has forced Russia to resort to grinding, foot-pace offensives to make marginal tactical advances.[6] The Kremlin has continuously reiterated that it intends to achieve all of its war goals either diplomatically or militarily, setting informational conditions to justify renewed aggression against Ukraine at a later date.[7] Russian officials have also set informational conditions to justify the aggression for the occupation of Ukraine beyond the five regions it has illegally annexed.[8] This reported plan would capitulate to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory, which is predicated on the assumption that Russia's military and economy can outlast Western support to Ukraine, and would reinforce the Kremlin's belief that the Kremlin can achieve its maximalist objectives against Ukraine and elsewhere with minimal international consequences.[9] Russia would therefore be likely to launch renewed aggression against Ukraine with a blooded, rested, and reconstituted military at a time of its choosing on battle lines in Ukraine that would heavily favor Russia.[10] A Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would force Ukraine to withdraw to lines that would largely be indefensible against renewed Russian aggression from positions in the oblast, and would also provide Russia with easy access to seize Ukraine's Fortress Belt – Ukraine's key defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that is a critical logistics and defense industrial hub – if left undefended in a demilitarized buffer zone.[11] Russian forces would likely be able to launch renewed pushes into southern Kharkiv Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts from the proposed ”frozen” frontline. ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military assistance and weapon sales to Ukraine, in concert with strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, can enable Ukraine to inflict more severe battlefield losses on Russia and therefore challenge Putin’s theory of victory.[12] The reported peace plan, by contrast, cedes all Western and Ukrainian leverage to Russia.

Russian officials continue to react to the reported 28-point peace plan by reiterating their commitment to Russia's original war aims and blaming Ukraine for Russia's own unwillingness to compromise.[13] Senior Russian officials reiterated on November 19 and 20 the Kremlin’s demand that an end to the war address its alleged “root causes” of the war, which the Kremlin has long used as shorthand for its original war justifications, and amplified the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is committed to negotiations but deflected blame onto Ukraine and the West for the stall in peace negotiations as a result of Russia's unwillingness to make concessions to end the war.[15] Some Russian officials expressed doubt about or rejected components of the reported peace deal despite the significant benefits it would afford Russia. Some Western media outlets reported that the plan holds that Russia would make lend-lease payments to Ukraine for its occupation of Donbas, a provision that Russian State Duma Committee on Economic Policy Deputy Chairperson Artem Kiryanov explicitly rejected as “completely unacceptable” and “unworthy” of serious discussion.[16] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that discussions on the reported 28-point plan may “take some time" and deflected blame from Russia’s continued intransigence in negotiations to discredit the Ukrainian government and Europe.[17]

The Kremlin continues to use a combination of economic incentives and nuclear saber-rattling to extract concessions from the United States to normalize US-Russian relations without making reciprocal concessions to end the war. The reported peace proposal also stipulates that the United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation treaties including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), that Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy including multi-staged sanction relief and a bilateral US-Russian long-term economic cooperation agreements, and that about 50 percent of the profits from frozen Russian assets will be invested in a joint US-Russian investment vehicle.[18] The Kremlin has repeatedly used economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[19] These concessions would give away leverage that is crucial to US President Donald Trump’s stated objective of achieving an enduring, just, and mutually beneficial peace in Ukraine.

Russian forces operating in the Hulyaipole direction continue to employ their new offensive template that relies on a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults to advance.[20] The situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains serious as Russian forces continue efforts to isolate Hulyaipole from the north and advance on the town from the northeast and east.[21] Geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Russian forces likely recently seized Vesele (east of Hulyaipole).[22] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Vesele.[23] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction (north of Hulyaipole) reported on November 20 that Russian forces exploit foliage, terrain features such as ravines and lowlands, and fog to avoid Ukrainian drone detection.[24] A servicemember of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) acknowledged on November 20 that Russian forces exploited fog during the claimed seizure of Hai (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), which the Russian MoD claimed to have seized as of November 17.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are exploiting the cover of fog that inhibits Ukrainian drone operations to launch attacks.[26]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2025 

Russia killed at least 26 Ukrainian civilians and injured at least 139 on the night of November 18 to 19 during its combined missile and drone strikes that disproportionately impacted civilian areas. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 40 Kh-101 cruise missiles, seven Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, and 476 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 300 were Shaheds — at Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 34 Kh-101 cruise missiles, seven Kalibr cruise missiles, and 442 drones, and that seven missiles and 34 drones struck 14 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that at least one Kh-101 cruise missile struck a high-rise apartment building in Ternopil City, killing at least 26 civilians and injuring at least 93 civilians.[2] Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported that there are still 26 people missing and suspected to be under the rubble in Ternopil City.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential areas, critical infrastructure, and public transport in Kharkiv City and Kharkiv Oblast with 18 Geran-2 (Shahed-type) drones, injuring at least 46 civilians.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck industrial and energy infrastructure in Lviv Oblast; energy infrastructure in Ivano-Frankivsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; and power lines in Khmelnytskyi Oblast.[5] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure forced Ukraine to introduce emergency power outages in several oblasts, as Russian strikes have forced Ukraine to do every night for several weeks.[6]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2025 

Russian forces are struggling to focus on a single decisive objective in the Pokrovsk direction and instead continue simultaneous attempts to close the encirclement of the wider Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket while also attacking within both towns. The Russian military command does not appear to be focusing forces and means on completing the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, which would normally be the fastest and least costly way to seize the entire area, and instead continues to pursue some level of head-on attacks. Geolocated footage published on November 18 and reportedly filmed on November 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northeastern Pokrovsk.[1] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Airborne Assault Forces reported on November 18 that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to infiltrate into Myrnohrad from the side of Krasnyi Lyman (north of Myrnohrad) — indicating that Russian forces operating north of Myrnohrad are not focused on advancing westward to close the encirclement but are attempting to attack southward directly into Myrnohrad.[2] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 18 that Russian forces are attempting to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Myrnohrad from the northwest and west.[3] Russian forces are also conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions throughout the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, likely to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and to destroy buildings and other shelters that Ukrainian forces use as part of their wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in the area.

Russian forces are likely struggling to complete the encirclement in part due to the threat that Ukrainian forces are posing to Russia's northern shoulder of the pocket. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating north of Myrnohrad on the northern shoulder but have been unable to sufficiently push to close the encirclement from the northeast.[4] The 51st CAA's opportunistic penetration in the Dobropillya tactical area (northeast of Pokrovsk) in August 2025 created vulnerabilities for Russian forces that Ukrainian forces have since exploited to threaten the rear of the 51st CAA elements fighting northeast of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command may assess that elements of the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), which are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk, can more effectively complete the encirclement from the western flank instead. The 2nd CAA continues to dedicate forces and means to attacks within Pokrovsk itself and north of the town, however, and does not seem to be prioritizing efforts to close the pocket from the west.

Russian forces are trying to employ their new offensive template in the Siversk and Slovyansk-Lyman directions to set conditions for an advance on Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the northeast and east. Russian forces have been employing a new operational template that relies on a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults.[5] ISW has recently reported on applications of this operational template in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[6] Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 123nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), recently infiltrated into southern and eastern Siversk, although ISW assesses this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that observed Russian infiltrations in southern Siversk suggest that Russian forces will try to covertly concentrate forces in the town in an effort to repeat the "Pokrovsk scenario."[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed on November 18 that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) seized Platonivka (northwest of Siversk) after conducting a feint, attacking under the cover of fog and rain when Ukrainian forces had limited drone support, and conducting first-person view (FPV) drone and artillery strikes.[9] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian seizure of Platonivka allows Russian forces to interdict the T-0513 Lyman-Siversk highway, although ISW has not observed geolocated footage confirming the alleged seizure.[10] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces have prevented Russian forces from reaching the T-0513 road.[11] Ukrainian military sources recently observed that Russian forces were conducting infiltration missions in groups of one to three personnel in order to accumulate forces in the Siversk direction and anticipated that Russian forces would conduct larger mechanized assaults in the winter after the ground freezes.[12] Ukrainian military sources also observed that Russian forces simultaneously saturated Ukraine's forward positions with various drones in an effort to sever Ukrainian logistics.[13]

Russian forces are similarly using infiltration tactics in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction against the backdrop of poor weather conditions and ongoing efforts to disrupt Ukraine's ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. The spokesperson of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps reported on November 18 that Russian forces are trying to infiltrate and establish forward positions in the Lyman direction in an effort to set conditions to conduct further flank attacks and to take Ukrainian forces into semi-encirclements.[14] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces conduct infiltration missions during rainy and foggy conditions that hinder Ukraine's ability to use drones. The spokesperson observed that Russian forces are trying to overwhelm the Ukrainian defensive system — likely referring to Ukraine's tactical “wall of drones” defensive barrier. The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are trying to undermine Ukraine's logistics with tactical drone strikes and infiltration missions that aim to accumulate forces for subsequent larger assaults. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction similarly reported on November 18 that Russian forces are trying to set conditions for assaults in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) by using FPV drones and fiber-optic sleeper drones to undermine Ukrainian logistics.[15] The NCO added that Russian forces are also using drones to coordinate artillery strikes before launching assaults.

ISW recently assessed that Russian forces have initially made significant advances in and around Pokrovsk after successfully achieving partial battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects that degraded Ukrainian GLOCs and enabled Russian infiltration missions.[16] Russian forces also relied on poor weather conditions to bypass the Ukrainian "wall of drones" and infiltrate weak spots in the Ukrainian defensive lines in the Pokrovsk direction.[17] Russian forces have been attempting to replicate this new campaign design in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions.[18] Russian forces appear to be employing this campaign design in the Siversk and Slovyansk-Lyman directions to put pressure on the Fortress Belt - Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces will likely further conduct infiltrations into Siversk and may attempt to infiltrate into Lyman but will likely need to allocate significant manpower, materiel, and time to recreate their Pokrovsk successes.[19] Russian forces have been faltering in their ability to coherently apply this offensive template in the Pokrovsk direction, highlighting the broader challenges Russian forces will face when operationalizing this campaign design throughout the entire theater.

Russian military commanders continue to order Russian forces to commit war crimes on the battlefield. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on November 18 that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Battalion of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) used two adults and one child as human shields during an assault on the northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk on November 10.[20] The SBU noted that the Russian military command gave the order to the battalion over a radio transceiver. Article 28 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War prohibits the use of civilians as "human shields."[21] The reported incident is in line with ISW’s long-held assessment that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[22] ISW has also observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Pokrovsk direction in recent weeks as Russian forces have approached and infiltrated the town.[23]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS missile strike against military targets within Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 18 that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike using ATACMS missiles against unspecified military targets in Russian territory.[24] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military has previously exploited sanctuary space on the Ukrainian-Russian border to facilitate ground operations in Ukraine and that hundreds of known military objects in Russia are in ATACMS range.[25]

Ukraine continues to collaborate with its European partners on the joint production of interceptor drones. Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom CEO Herman Smetanin announced on November 18 that Ukroboronprom and Czech aviation parts supplier Air Team signed an agreement on the joint development and production of interceptor drones.[26] The Ukrainian-Czech agreement comes against the backdrop of the recent launch of Ukrainian serial production of the ”Octopus” interceptor drone and the announcement of joint efforts between the Ukrainian and French defense industrial bases to produce interceptor drones.[27] Europe can learn important lessons from Ukraine’s air defense to understand how tactical and technological measures can counter Russia’s evolving aerial threats. ISW continues to assess that the West should support Ukraine’s interceptor drone program not only for Ukraine’s defense against Russian strikes, but also for the defense of Europe.[28]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16 that appeared to target the regional headquarters of major Ukrainian broadcasters. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 18 that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and 114 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which 70 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[29] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 101 drones, that four missiles and 13 drones hit 15 locations, and that drone debris hit two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged residential, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts and resulted in civilian deaths.[30] Ukrainian broadcasters Suspilne and Ukraine Radio Dnipro reported on November 18 that Russian forces struck both of their headquarters in Dnipro City.[31] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on November 18 that Russian forces severely damaged Suspilne Dnipro headquarters.[32]

Polish officials attributed the recent sabotage attacks against a Polish railway to Russian security services. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on November 18 that Russian secret services recruited two Ukrainian citizens who used explosives to damage two segments of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Mika and Lublin on November 16.[33] Polish Special Services Spokesperson Jacek Dobrzynski stated that “everything" indicates that Russian special services commissioned the sabotage attacks.[34] Tusk stated that the suspected saboteurs entered Poland from Belarus in Fall 2025 and returned to Belarus following the attacks.[35] Polish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz stated on November 18 that the sabotage attacks are part of Russia’s broader effort to “destroy community, destroy alliances, and sow uncertainty.”[36] Chief of the Polish General Staff Wiesław Kukula similarly stated on November 17 that Poland is in a ”pre-war situation” in which Russia is creating favorable conditions for “potential aggression on Polish territory.”[37] These official Polish statements cohere with ISW’s continued assessment that Russia is intensifying its ”Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[38]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17, 2025 

Russian forces may be attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk itself while also encircling Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket from the west, likely because Russian forces have found such an encirclement more feasible than an encirclement from the east. Elements of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attempting to close the encirclement of the pocket from the southwest and northeast of Pokrovsk, respectively, but are each struggling to concentrate forces and make significant advances. The 51st CAA is fighting in two directions that are not mutually supportive because the CAA is simultaneously trying to advance north of Pokrovsk, close the encirclement, and reduce the pocket around Pokrovsk. This split focus is likely hindering the 51st CAA's efforts to close the Ukrainian pocket, consistent with Russian forces’ pattern of pursuing different objectives in an operational direction rather than concentrating efforts on a single decisive objective.[i] SMD elements northeast of Pokrovsk are simultaneously attempting to attack in multiple directions, particularly around Dobropillya. Elements of the 51st CAA are attacking southwestward to seize Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) to close the encirclement. Russian naval infantry elements, likely operationally subordinated to the neighboring Russian 8th CAA (SMD), are attacking southeast of Dobropillya toward Sofiivka and Novopavlivka.[ii] Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking the base of the Dobropillya salient from the west and east, likely to blunt Russian attacks in the area to advance north.[iii] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) counterattacked along the Zapovidne-Ivanivka line (southeast of Dobropillya) and the Mayak-Nove Shakhove line (east of Dobropillya), likely to defend against these Ukrainian counterattacks.[iv]

Russian forces likely initially seized on an opportunity to advance in the Dobropillya direction in part to portray Russian forces as making significant advances ahead of the August 2025 Alaska summit, but the resulting vulnerabilities from failing to make operationally significant advances in the area may be hindering Russian efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk pocket at this time.[v] A Russian milblogger acknowledged at the height of the Dobropillya effort in August 2025 that the base of the Russian penetration was too narrow to develop stable logistics, making the salient vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks.[vi] Elements of the 51st CAA have since deprioritized the Dobropillya effort to focus on collapsing the Pokrovsk pocket, but the 51st CAA must now divide its attention between advancing northeast and north of Pokrovsk while still defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dobropillya direction that now threaten Russia's near rear on the eastern flank of Pokrovsk.[vii]

The 2nd CAA is also struggling to concentrate sufficiently to close the pocket from the southwest. Mashovets reported that elements of the 2nd CAA attacked near Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that the 2nd CAA is dispersing its offensive efforts to both close the Ukrainian pocket from the west as well as to advance within Pokrovsk and north from the town.[viii] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) to prevent Ukraine from conducting an orderly withdrawal that would negate the potential operational impact of the future Russian seizure of Pokrovsk. The 2nd CAA has made speedier advances within Pokrovsk and on the western flank of the pocket than the 51st CAA has made on the eastern flank, but has failed to seize Pokrovsk and collapse the pocket at this time since rapidly infiltrating into the town in late October 2025.[ix] Russian forces fighting in the Pokrovsk direction have taken some of the highest losses on the battlefield in recent months, and elements of the 51st and 2nd CAAs are likely degraded as they attempt to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[x] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.

Russian forces may attempt to use vehicles to transport troops, likely under the cover of fog, in order to speed up the clearing of Pokrovsk itself. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are specifically clearing the T-0504 Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad and O0544 Hrodivka-Myrnohrad roads (both east of Myrnohrad) to allow vehicle-borne Russian soldiers to enter Myrnohrad.[xi] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are using the cover of fog that inhibits Ukrainian drone operations to transport troops into Pokrovsk.[xii] Mashovets stated that the continued Ukrainian presence in northern Pokrovsk is forcing small Russian infantry groups in the area to fight under conditions of a sub-tactical encirclement in the area, while the Ukrainian forces remaining south of the Donetska Railway in Pokrovsk are fighting in similar conditions. The inability of Russian small group infiltration tactics to generate sufficient mass to clear Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk presently will likely force Russian forces to resort to using vehicles during inclement weather conditions to transport large numbers of troops into Pokrovsk.

Russia is reportedly continuing to struggle to replace its battlefield losses with new recruits. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 17 that Russian federal budget expenditure data shows that 262,700 people signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and received one-time sign-up bonuses between January and September 2025 — an average of roughly 29,189 new recruits per month.[xiii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered about 28,400 to 48,000 losses per month between January and September 2025.[xiv] The data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces suffered an average of roughly 35,400 losses per month — more than the reported average monthly recruitment rate. Russia's main method for generating manpower through high financial incentives and price surging has reportedly been losing momentum and hitting diminishing returns in recent months.[xv] ISW continues to assess that Russia's recent law on the deployment of active reservists within Russia and occupied Ukraine is part of wider efforts to set conditions to deploy involuntarily called up active reservists to combat operations in Ukraine in an effort to offset these decreasing recruitment rates.[xvi]

Saboteurs recently damaged at least two segments of a Polish railway on a route to Ukraine. Polish police reported that a train conductor observed damage to a portion of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Życzyn, Poland on the morning of November 16.[xvii] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on November 17 that an explosion from an act of sabotage destroyed portions of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Mika and Lublin.[xviii] Polish authorities have not attributed the explosions to a specific actor as of this writing. Investigative journalist Christo Grozev published images of a damaged rail track near Warsaw and an electrical cable laid across the track on the route to Rzeszów.[xix] Grozev assessed that the cable was 300 meters long and led to a nearby parking lot, allowing a saboteur to remotely detonate an explosive device. It is unclear whether this incident on the Warsaw–Rzeszów railway line is connected to the incidents on the Warsaw-Lublin line. The Lublin-Warsaw and Warsaw–Rzeszów railway lines support Western military assistance deliveries to Ukraine.[xx] The rail line explosions come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[xxi]

France agreed to sell Ukraine weapons systems, such as fighter jets and air defense systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a declaration of intent on November 17, allowing Ukraine to purchase military equipment from France.[xxii] Zelensky reported that the document will allow Ukraine to purchase 100 Rafale F4 fighter aircraft by 2035, radars for air defense systems, air-to-air missiles, aerial bombs, and eight SAMP/T air defense systems with six launchers each. The document calls for technology transfers and joint production of Rafale aircraft in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian and French defense industrial bases (DIBs) will begin joint production of interceptor drones and work to develop components for Ukrainian drones in 2025.[xxiii] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told CNN on September 3 that only US-made Patriot systems and French- and Italian-made SAMP/T air defense systems can intercept Russian ballistic missiles.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces may be attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk itself while also encircling Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket from the west, likely because Russian forces have found such an encirclement more feasible than an encirclement from the east.
• Russian forces may attempt to use vehicles to transport troops, likely under the cover of fog, in order to speed up the clearing of Pokrovsk itself.
• Russia is reportedly continuing to struggle to replace its battlefield losses with new recruits.
• Saboteurs recently damaged at least two segments of a Polish railway on a route to Ukraine.
• France agreed to sell Ukraine weapons systems, such as fighter jets and air defense systems.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 16, 2025 

Russian forces are attempting to complete their encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces’ recent attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian lines north of Pokrovsk indicate that Russian forces are prioritizing efforts to complete the encirclement, aiming to physically sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) north of Pokrovsk that supply forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). This assessment modifies ISW's previous observation that Russian forces were apparently focusing on seizing the town of Pokrovsk rather than on completing the encirclement.[1] Geolocated footage published on November 16 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly fireteam-sized infiltration mission north of Pokrovsk.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted the infiltration mission northward from Pokrovsk itself.[3] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces killed or wounded the Russian forces involved. It is unclear, therefore, if Russian forces retain positions in this area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 16 that Russian forces have reverted to conducting infiltrations into Pokrovsk in small infantry groups of two to three servicemembers instead of mechanized assaults, likely in reaction to the failure of such assaults.[4] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the neighboring Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area told CNN on November 16 that the size of Russian infiltration groups has recently dropped from five to seven servicemembers to a maximum of three servicemembers.[5] A Ukrainian drone operator in the Pokrovsk direction told CNN that Russian forces’ infiltration tactics are predicated on the assumption that lone survivors of three-member infiltration groups can gain footholds, emphasizing the costly nature of such tactics. The failure of mechanized assaults to rapidly bring large numbers of Russian forces into the town and the costly nature of infiltration-based troop accumulation may constrain Russian forces’ ability to reinforce troops within Pokrovsk, delaying Russian forces’ seizure of the town.

Foggy conditions impede both sides' operations, and both sides have developed approaches to mitigate their effects. A Russian milblogger acknowledged that foggy weather conditions disadvantage Russian as well as Ukrainian forces.[6] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces are able to exit Pokrovsk under the cover of fog and that foggy conditions are impeding Russian drone operations – likely facilitating continued Ukrainian logistics to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. A Ukrainian mechanized brigade operating in the neighboring Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that Ukrainian forces employed unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to detect a Russian mechanized assault toward Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka) that exploited foggy conditions.[7] The brigade reported that the UGVs then transmitted coordinates for first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that repelled the mechanized assault, indicating that Ukrainian forces are developing countermeasures to Russian forces’ exploitation of foggy conditions to launch assaults.[8] Foggy conditions are seasonal and will lift at some point, and it is unclear which side will benefit more from clearer weather.

The logistical situation for Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad remains difficult. The Ukrainian combat medic operating in the Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad area told CNN that Russian drone fire control of Ukrainian GLOCs leading to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad prevents Ukrainian vehicles from moving closer than 10 to 15 kilometers from Pokrovsk, hindering casualty evacuation efforts.[9] The medic noted that Russian forces focused fire on Red Cross-marked UGVs that Ukrainian forces use for casualty evacuation in violation of international law.

The situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains very serious as Russian forces continue to advance and maintain intensified offensive operations. Russian forces are attempting to isolate Hulyaipole from the northeast, likely to support Russian efforts to seize the town from the east. Russian forces continued to advance toward Hulyaipole and the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway, which is one of Ukraine’s main GLOCs supplying Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on November 15 and 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Rivnopillya (northeast of Hulyaipole) and advanced east of Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole) along the O-080618 Hulyaipole-Malynivka highway.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Rivnopillya.[11] Recent Russian advances bring Russian forces within a roughly eight-kilometer range northeast of Hulyaipole and within about four kilometers east of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn acknowledged on November 15 that recent Russian advances threaten to cut off Hulyaipole from GLOCs, including the T-0401 highway.[12] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka, which runs directly along the T-0401 highway. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on November 15 that Russian infiltration operations in the Hulyaipole direction can now penetrate into Ukrainian defenses up to five kilometers past the frontline.[13] Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) appear to be operating near Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole), confirming that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade from positions south of Hulyaipole to reinforce efforts east of Hulyaipole.[14]

Ukrainian forces report that they are successfully pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk. These reports are generally consistent with ISW’s assessments. Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported on November 16 that Ukrainian forces control Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces have cut off Russian forces in northern Kupyansk from logistics.[15] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force noted that Russian forces are attempting to claim successful advances through fabricated flag raisings that Russian soldiers on the ground conduct with flags received in drone drops and supply packages. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 16 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Osynovo (south of Kupyansk) and Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from western Kupyansk and that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are infiltrating the town.[17] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk, and on October 26 that Russian forces encircled 18 Ukrainian battalions in Kupyansk.[18] ISW assessed that both claims were exaggerations of Russian gains in Kupyansk. The Joint Forces Task Force report suggests that Ukrainian forces are in the process of successfully rolling back a Russian effort to seize a settlement at this scale for the first time in recent years.

The Kremlin used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate Russia’s objective of absorbing all of Ukraine into Russia – possibly under the control of Medvedchuk himself. Medvedchuk’s statements are consistent with ISW’s assessments that Russia aims to absorb all of Ukraine and with US President Donald Trump’s statements that Putin “wants all of it.”[19] Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Putin, whom Putin initially wanted to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following Russia’s full-scale invasion, claimed in an interview that Kremlin newswire TASS published on November 15 that he believes that Ukraine will not “survive as a state” in the future.[20] Medvedchuk stated that he considers the reunification of Ukraine with Russia a strategic goal and called the preservation of an independent Ukraine a threat to Russia, claiming that an independent Ukraine will inevitably become a springboard for the “collective West.” Medvedchuk’s statements imply that Medvedchuk does not see himself as the future president of an independent Ukraine, but merely as the leader of his Other Ukraine organization – a Russian organization conducting the explicit Russification of Ukraine. Medvedchuk’s statements indicate that the Kremlin seeks to absorb all of Ukraine into Russia, not just the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly promoted Russia’s far-reaching territorial objectives involving the absorption of nearly all of Ukraine into Russia.[21]

Medvedchuk and other Russian officials are attempting to position him and his organization, Other Ukraine, as responsible for the absorption of Ukraine into Russia and the complete destruction of an independent Ukrainian political and cultural identity. Medvedchuk boasted about the success of forced integration efforts and continued to advance the false Russian narrative that Ukrainians want to be Russified.[22] Medvedchuk continued to promote the Other Ukraine organization that he created in January 2023 as a mechanism for Russification efforts through the claim that the organization has created six centers to ”assist“ former Ukrainian citizens in Russia.[23] Medvedchuk stated that he has repeatedly met with Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin to advance cooperation between the Other Ukraine organization and State Duma committees.[24] Medvedchuk stated that Volodin issued an order to include representatives of Other Ukraine in working committees and commissions of state duma committees. Medvedchuk's claims, not yet substantiated by other Russian officials, are an attempt to elevate Medvedchuk and his Other Ukraine project to the status of leaders of the Kremlin's project to Russify Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to encourage war crimes against Ukrainian servicemembers and civilians on the battlefield. Far-right Russian paramilitary unit Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group leader Alexei Milchakov amplified photos of the November 15 execution of three Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) and claimed that he would offer cash prizes to the first three people who submit a photo with “clearly executed prisoners in the background.”[25] Milchakov operates as both the leader of a Russian paramilitary unit and a prominent voice in the Russian milblogger information space, and his calls to commit war crimes against Ukrainian servicemembers reflect Russian forces’ widely accepted cultural and systemic practice of committing war crimes on the battlefield.

The Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 16 that it opened an investigation into Russian forces’ November 14 execution of three Ukrainian POWs in the Hulyaipole direction.[26] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence posted footage on November 15 showing Russian forces murdering two surrendering Ukrainian POWs on the outskirts of Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole).[27] A returned Ukrainian civilian whom Russian occupation authorities detained in occupied Donetsk Oblast in 2020 told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Russian occupation authorities brutally tortured him.[28] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are attempting to complete their encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
• The situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains very serious as Russian forces continue to advance and maintain intensified offensive operations.
• Ukrainian forces report that they are successfully pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk. These reports are generally consistent with ISW’s assessments.
• The Kremlin used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate Russia’s objective of absorbing all of Ukraine into Russia – possibly under the control of Medvedchuk himself. Medvedchuk’s statements are consistent with ISW’s assessments that Russia aims to absorb all of Ukraine and with US President Donald Trump’s statements that Putin “wants all of it.”
• Russian forces continue to encourage war crimes against Ukrainian servicemembers and civilians on the battlefield.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2025 

Russian forces used weather conditions to exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine's drone-based battlefield defenses in the Novopavlivka direction, highlighting Ukraine's need for traditional weapons systems. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian armored vehicles in northeastern Novopavlivka.[i] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached Novopavlivka's northwestern outskirts during the mechanized assault.[ii] Ukrainian volunteer Serhii Sternenko reported on November 15 that Russian forces took advantage of poor weather conditions to enter Novopavlivka several times with equipment and land infantry.[iii] Sternenko stated that Russian forces set up a pontoon bridge between Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and Dachne (east of Yalta) and moved about 10 pieces of equipment across the Vovcha River.[iv] Sternenko stated that Ukrainian forces detected the Russian forces too late but struck two tanks and five infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Russian milbloggers also reported on Russian forces' use of heavy fog during the assault and claimed that Russian forces were able to cross the pontoon bridge twice.[v] One milblogger noted that Russian forces were able to use the second wave of the attack to send in reinforcements to support the troops that dismounted after the first wave.[vi] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) with conducting the mechanized assault.[vii]

Russian forces have recently been exploiting foggy weather to attack throughout the front, particularly in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[viii] The Novopavlivka sector of the front has been relatively quieter in recent weeks, as Russian forces have been concentrating on offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. Elements of the 41st CAA, whose area of responsibility (AoR) covers the Novopavlivka direction, have notably been supporting elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) on the southern flank of Pokrovsk.[ix] The November 14 company-sized mechanized assault into Novopavlivka after a lull in the area demonstrates how Russian forces are trying to find opportunities to exploit a key weakness in Ukrainian defenses — the inability of Ukrainian drones to effectively function in poor weather conditions like fog and rain. Ukraine has thus far in the war based its defense on drones largely out of necessity. Ukraine's "wall of drones" defensive barrier uses a large number of tactical strike drones and loitering munitions to destroy Russian manpower and equipment on the front line.[x] Ukrainian forces adopted this defensive approach in part to offset manpower and equipment shortages while protecting over 1,200 kilometers of front line from Russian advances. Sparsely held Ukrainian defensive positions have facilitated recent Russian infiltration efforts, and shortages of artillery and other traditional systems have limited Ukrainian forces’ ability to operate when bad weather disrupted some drone operations.[xi] Western provisions of traditional systems like artillery are key to Ukraine's ability to build out a layered defense system that is not dependent on any one type of weapon, such that the defenses are vulnerable and exploitable. Russia's exploitation of this vulnerability further highlights the way that traditional weapons systems are not obsolete in modern warfare.

Ukrainian forces appear to be trying to replicate Russia's battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign on a limited scale. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces conducted an airstrike against the M-30 road that runs between Pokrovsk and Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian near rear).[xii] The corps reported that the airstrike impeded Russian forces from using the route to infiltrate Pokrovsk with light equipment. Geolocated footage of the strike published by the 7th Corps shows that Ukrainian forces struck the M-30 between Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka (just southeast of Pokrovsk).[xiii] Russian forces notably recently advanced into Pokrovsk on motorcycles, buggies, and transport trucks along the M-30 under heavy fog.[xiv] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces reported on November 14 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian transport communications facility and a Russian manpower concentration near Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk in the Russian near rear) with a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb.[xv] A Ukrainian source reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces also conducted a strike with a GBU-62 bomb against a road bridge in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast that Russian forces used for logistics.[xvi]

Russian forces have spent months conducting a strike campaign that achieved partial BAI efforts to shape the battlefield and set conditions for Russia's recent advances in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[xvii] The limited Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and force concentrations are a step toward denying Russia the relative sanctuary that Russian forces have enjoyed in near rear areas.[xviii] A dramatically expanded Ukrainian BAI effort could disrupt the operations of the current Russian offensive approach. Russia's BAI campaign notably began months before the recent intensification of offensive operations on the ground, however, and Ukraine should similarly work to incorporate BAI efforts into its longer-term campaign design.

Russia's large-scale production of glide bombs and Shahed-type drones will continue to facilitate Russia's BAI campaign on the front. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi told Reuters in an article published on November 14 that Russia plans to produce up to 120,000 glide bombs in 2025, including 500 of the longer-range glide bomb variants that can fly up to 200 kilometers.[xix] Reuters noted that the 120,000 figure includes both new glide bomb production and the modernization of existing unguided bombs into guided versions. Skibitskyi stated that Russia is working to further modify the bombs to fly up to 400 kilometers. Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces have recently been launching 200 to 250 glide bombs daily — a sharp rise from an average of 170 per day in October 2025. Skibitskyi noted that Ukrainian forces can shoot down glide bombs, but that the quantity Russia is currently using is "enormous." Skibitskyi also reported that Russia will make about 70,000 long-range drones in 2025, including 30,000 Shahed-type drones. Skibitskyi's report is largely in line with GUR Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Yusov's statement in early September 2025 that Russia can produce 2,700 Shahed-type drones per month.[xx] ISW observed that Russia began using modified glide bombs with extended ranges of 100 to 180 kilometers against Ukrainian cities in October 2025.[xxi] Glide bombs have been integral to Russia's BAI campaign in the Kursk, Kostyantynivka, Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[xxii] Russian forces have also begun to use Shahed drones to strike targets in the immediate and near rear areas as Russia's Shahed production increased dramatically over Spring-Summer 2025. Russian forces have augmented their tactical drone campaign against Ukrainian ammunition depots and fortified defensive structures with guided glide bombs and Shahed drone strikes as these weapons deliver larger payloads than tactical drones, allowing Russian forces to target fortified structures.

North Korea continues to provide military support to Russia and may be preparing to provide Russia with drones in the future. Skibitskyi told Reuters that Russian forces were able to maintain their rate of fire on the battlefield in 2024 thanks to artillery shell shipments from North Korea, but that North Korean stocks have run low, such that North Korea halved the number of shells it sent to Russia in 2025.[xxiii] Skibitskyi stated that North Korea has sent a total of 6.5 million shells to Russia since 2023. North Korea reportedly did not deliver any ammunition to Russia in September 2025 but resumed shipments in October 2025. Russia reportedly had to ship about half of the delivered shells to plants for improvements since the shells were old. Skibitskyi noted that North Korea has started mass production of short-range first-person view (FPV) drones and medium-range strike drones on North Korean territory. ISW observed reports on November 14 that Russia is planning for roughly 12,000 North Korean workers to join the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan by the end of 2025 to work at Russia’s factory producing Shahed-type drones — likely in addition to the 25,000 workers that North Korea was reportedly considering sending to the ASEZ in June 2025.[xxiv] Thousands of North Koreans learning how to assemble Shaheds will offer North Korea valuable lessons about large-scale production of modern long-range strike drones, and North Korea may be cooperating with Russia to produce various types of drones in North Korea for Russia in the face of dwindling North Korean artillery shell stores.

Russian forces continue their BAI campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to facilitate battlefield gains. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba told The Guardian in an article published on November 15 that Russian forces have increased their strikes against Ukraine’s rail system threefold since July 2025.[xxv] Kuleba noted that Russian forces have struck railway infrastructure 800 times since January 2025, damaging more than 3,000 objects and totaling one billion dollars' worth of damage. Kuleba added that Russia’s strike campaign has three objectives: to destroy Ukrainian logistics in the south to prevent the movement of goods such as Ukrainian grain to seaports; to disrupt rail traffic to cut off frontline oblasts; and to ”destroy everything” in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Head of Ukraine's railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia, Oleksandr Pertsovskyi, added that Russian forces use Shahed-type drones to target individual locomotives. The station head of a rail station in Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces targeted Lozova as it is a major junction that connects to Dnipro City, Slovyansk, Poltava City, and Kharkiv City. ISW previously reported that Russian forces have been using modified Shahed-type drones equipped with a thermal imaging camera and a video stream to pursue moving targets, such as trains, in real time in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.[xxvi] Russia recently intensified its BAI efforts against rail infrastructure to disrupt Ukraine’s use of its intermediate rear area for logistics, particularly along the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway (about 20 to 35 kilometers from the frontline) and T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway (about 14 to 30 kilometers from the front line) — both critical arteries that supply Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[xxvii]

Russia's long-range drone and missile strike tactics are precisely targeting gas infrastructure in Ukraine during the heating season. Ukrainian state-owned gas enterprise Naftogaz Chief Executive Serhii Koretskyi told the New York Times (NYT) in an article published on November 15 that Russia began to strike Ukrainian gas infrastructure in 2025 after Ukraine halted the transport of Russian gas to Europe on January 1, 2025.[xxviii] Koretskyi reported that Naftogaz spent the summer of 2025 repairing gas infrastructure that Russian forces struck at the end of Winter 2024-2025 when Russia knocked out about 40 percent of Ukraine's gas production capacity. The NYT noted that Russian forces renewed these strikes in October 2025, and a European official source stated that Russian forces struck Naftogaz’s facilities seven times in October 2025, knocking out 60 percent of Ukraine's gas production capacity. Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia knows the location of Ukraine's gas infrastructure as it dates back to Soviet times. Koretskyi noted that Russian missile and drone strikes cannot reach Ukraine's underground gas storage facilities, but that Russia is striking the compressor pumps that pump the gas from underground and the pipelines that distribute gas throughout the country. Russian forces' targeting of specific types of Ukrainian gas infrastructure demonstrates the sophistication of their strike campaigns with the explicit goal of complicating living conditions for Ukrainian civilians in the wintertime.

Russia appears to be setting conditions to deploy involuntarily called up reservists to occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to commit them to combat operations. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported on November 15 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) gathered the first group of involuntarily called up active reservists as part of Russia’s recent initiative to covertly mobilize and deploy reservists to protect critical infrastructure.[xxix] Kharchenko stated that the Russian MoD sent the active reservists to training centers to train for two months. Russia's recent law on active reservists calls for their deployment to areas of Russia, and ISW continues to assess that Russia may attempt to send active reservists to areas of occupied Ukraine as the Kremlin defines the four illegally annexed oblasts in Ukraine as part of Russia.[xxx] Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on November 10 that Russia plans to use reservists in oblasts that border Ukraine to combat Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, evacuate populations, and support “counterterrorism” operations; and may use this legal language to deploy active reservists to areas of occupied Ukraine that border unoccupied oblasts in Ukraine.[xxxi]

Russian forces continue to boast about executing Ukrainian servicemembers. The far-right Russian paramilitary unit Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group acknowledged on its Telegram channel on November 15 that it executed three Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of the front.[xxxii] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that Rusich Group leader Alexei Milchakov — who is a self-proclaimed Nazi — is serving within the 417th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[xxxiii] ISW last observed reports of the battalion operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late October 2025.[xxxiv] Butusov reported that the execution occurred near Pokrovsk, however, but noted that Russian milbloggers have complained that Milchakov and the Rusich Group do not participate in combat operations but engage in propaganda activities in the rear. The Rusich Group's public acknowledgement of its war crimes is in line with ISW's long-held assessment that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[xxxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces used weather conditions to exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine's drone-based battlefield defenses in the Novopavlivka direction, highlighting Ukraine's need for traditional weapons systems.
• Ukrainian forces appear to be trying to replicate Russia's battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign on a limited scale.
• Russia's large-scale production of glide bombs and Shahed-type drones will continue to facilitate Russia's BAI campaign on the front.
• North Korea continues to provide military support to Russia and may be preparing to provide Russia with drones in the future.
• Russian forces continue their BAI campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to facilitate battlefield gains.
• Russia's long-range drone and missile strike tactics are precisely targeting gas infrastructure in Ukraine during the heating season.
• Russia appears to be setting conditions to deploy involuntarily called up reservists to occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to commit them to combat operations.
• Russian forces continue to boast about executing Ukrainian servicemembers.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2025 

The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk over efforts to close the wider Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk over the last several days sugge Russian forces may be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk for a number of reasons. Russian leadership may seek to exploit the informational effects that the town's seizure will likely generate, or may hope that the seizure of Pokrovsk will facilitate a subsequent effort to close the pocket. Ukrainian counterattacks on the northern shoulder of the pocket and a continued Ukrainian presence within Pokrovsk are complicating Russian advances and Russia's ability to close the pocket, but that fact should not be enough in itself to cause the Russian command to be distracted from the effort from the south. The 51st CAA has also been struggling to advance from the northeast, moving more slowly than the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) is .[2] The 51st CAA's slower tempo could also be contributing to Russia's apparent and possibly temporary prioritization of the seizure of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command is notably not pursuing the standard measures one would expect in such a battlefield configuration, namely focusing forces and means on completing the encirclement, which would normally be the fastest and least costly way to seize the entire area. The Russian military command can change its focus at any time, however.

Russian forces continue to advance within the pocket in the Pokrovsk direction. rovsk and in ad.dditional geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted infiltration operations in southeastern .[4] Pokrovsk itself remains contested, however, and Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions within the settlement. Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk, contrary to Russian claims of Russian advances.eolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that both Ukrainian and Russian forces hold positions in northern Pokrovsk.[6] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Russian forces do not control all of the town and that there is fighting ongoing in northern and eastern Pokrovsk.[7]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a concentration of Russian servicemembers of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade and 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA) in Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk), where they had recently accumulated in a building during adverse weather conditions.[9] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces reported on November 14 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian transport communications facility and a concentration of Russian forces near Shevchenko (in the Russian near rear south of Pokrovsk) with a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb.[10] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack near Rodynske.[11]

Russia continues to rely on North Korea for manpower to offset Russia's labor and military personnel shortages. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) on November 14 reported Russian plans for roughly 12,000 North Korean workers to join the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan by the end of 2025 to work at Russia's factory producing Shahed-type drones.[12] The GUR reported that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) met with local government officials and representatives of the North Korean company Jihyang Technology Trade Company in October 2025 to discuss the details. The GUR stated that the Jihyang Company is responsible for the search and selection of North Korean workers to go to Russia, and the company is reportedly a front company for Green Pine, a US sanctioned company that is a hub for North Korea's weapons trade and has aided North Korea's nuclear program.[13] Japanese outlet NHK reported in June 2025 that North Korea was “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the ASEZ, and the reported 12,000 North Koreans going to the drone factory by the end of the year are likely in addition to these 25,000.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 14 that North Korean sappers are demining in Kursk Oblast alongside Russian sappers.[15] The Russian MoD noted that the North Korean sappers previously underwent training at Russian engineering troop training centers. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported in early November 2025 that North Korea deployed roughly 5,000 military engineering troops to Russia, that there were 10,000 North Korean troops near the Russian-Ukrainian border performing "security duties," and that another 1,000 troops were clearing mines.[16] ISW continues to assess that the deployment of North Korean troops to support roles frees up Russian forces to deploy to the battlefield.[17] North Korean workers at the ASEZ will also notably be able to take lessons on large-scale drone production back to North Korea.

Ukrainian forces continue to enhance their air defense system against Russian strikes in ways that offer Europe and the United States valuable lessons. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis Shmyhal announced on November 14 that Ukraine launched serial production in Ukraine of the “Octopus” interceptor drone with three manufacturers beginning immediately and 11 others preparing production lines.[18] Shmyhal noted that the interceptor drones are able to operate at night, in electronic warfare (EW) contested environments, and at low altitudes. Shmyhal reported that the Octopus can intercept Russian Shahed-type drones. Shmyhal’s announcement follows a similar announcement on October 20 about the production of the Octopus drones in the UK.[19] Business Insider reported on November 12 that European defense company Atreyd stated that it shipped its "drone wall" system to Ukraine. The "drone wall" reportedly consists of a collection of first-person view (FPV) drones that launch from designated platforms if radar systems detect a threat, and the drones are arrayed in layers and spaced apart. The FPVs intercept Russian drones by detonating nearby. The system reportedly relies on artificial intelligence (AI) to operate autonomously, and one operator will be able to control 100 drones. Business Insider reported that the "drone wall" system is able to operate in GPS-denied areas as it uses pre-installed 3D maps of the area, augmenting the system’s electronic warfare (EW) resilience. The system’s drones are able to operate at various altitudes and are equipped with identification technology to prevent friendly fire. Business Insider noted that system operators will not require any specialized training nor prior drone pilot training. Atreyd noted that the system will likely be operational in Ukraine within a few weeks and that Ukraine will employ the system to defend its cities and critical infrastructure, but may deploy systems closer to the frontline to intercept Russian glide bombs later. Atreyd’s "drone wall" system is defensive in nature and notably differs from Ukraine’s tactical ”wall of drones” concept, which uses a large number of tactical strike drones and loitering munitions to destroy manpower and equipment on the frontline.[21] Europe can glean important lessons from Ukraine’s air defense measures, including its future employment of Atreyd’s system, to understand how innovations in tactics and technology can counter Russia's evolving aerial threats. ISW continues to assess that the West should support Ukraine's interceptor drone program not only for Ukraine's defense against Russian strikes but also for the defense of Europe.[22]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 13 and 14 that largely targeted Ukrainian civilian areas. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Ryazan Oblast; one Zirkon anti-ship missile from an unspecified location; six Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles from the waters near occupied Crimea and in the Black Sea; and nine Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 430 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including roughly 300 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kinzhal missiles, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, all six Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles, and 405 drones; that one missile and 23 drones struck 13 locations; and that drone debris fell at 44 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces concentrated their strikes on Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes mainly targeted Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts, injuring dozens of civilians and killing at least four.[24] Zelensky highlighted how Ukraine’s air defense systems, including US-made Patriot systems, neutralized 14 Russian missiles.[25] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that the Russian strikes injured 35 civilians and killed six in Kyiv Oblast.[26] A Russian Iskander missile damaged part of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Kyiv City.[27] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in southern Odesa Oblast, killing two and injuring 1orsk.[28] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to leveraging its long-range strikes that target Ukraine’s civilian populace in an effort to sow fear and demoralize the Ukrainian people.[29]

Ukrainian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Russian energy and military infrastructure on the night of November 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian ship base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai with drones and Neptune missiles.[30] Ukrainian forces reportedly damaged port infrastructure, the Sheskharis oil terminal, and a launcher and missile storage area of an S-400 air defense system. The Sheskharis terminal is one of the largest oil tanker complexes for the transshipment of oil and petroleum products in southern Russia and supplies Russian forces operating in Ukraine. A source in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Ukrainian strikes damaged oil tankers, pipeline infrastructure, and pumping units as well as an S-300/400 air defense system at the base of the Russian 1537th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (7th Airborne [VDV] Division).[31] Geolocated footage published on November 13 and 14 shows an explosion at the base of the 1537th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Novorossiysk and a large fire near the Novorossiysk oil terminal.[32] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged the oil depot at the Sheskharis transshipment complex and that falling drone debris started a fire.[33] The headquarters claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a civilian vessel in the port of Novorossiysk.[34] Reuters reported on November 14 that industry sources stated that the Novorossiysk port halted exports and Transneft suspended crude supplies to the outlet following the Ukrainian strikes.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast, which supplies the Russian military.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also damaged infrastructure at the Krystal Plant fuel and lubricants storage enterprise in Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast. Ukrainian strikes reportedly caused fires at both enterprises in Saratov Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the fire at the oil refinery likely originated at the fuel storage tank.[37] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a drone strike damaged civilian infrastructure in Saratov City.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk over efforts to close the wider Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area.
• Russia continues to rely on North Korea for manpower to offset Russia's labor and military personnel shortages.
• Ukrainian forces continue to enhance their air defense system against Russian strikes in ways that offer Europe and the United States valuable lessons.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 13 and 14 that largely targeted Ukrainian civilian areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Russian energy and military infrastructure on the night of November 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Borova and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2025 

Russian forces continue to advance and to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, exploiting the effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and poor weather that hampers Ukrainian drone observation. Russian forces continued their advance toward Hulyaipole and the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway — one of the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Ukrainian forces in the town. Ukrainian and Russian statements indicate that Russian forces have advanced to positions near the villages of Solodke, Yablukove, and Vesele, within a roughly nine-kilometer range northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[1] Russian forces conducted infiltration operations further north toward Danylivka on the T-0401 highway as well.  ISW assesses that the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and elements of the 36th CAA are attempting to isolate and possibly encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through a combination of BAI, infiltration tactics, and advances. Elements of the Russian 35th CAA, deployed to the south and southwest of Hulyaipole, have reportedly redeployed to the 5th CAA sector.[2] The Russian military command thus seems unlikely to launch an effort to encircle Hulyaipole from the south at this time, likely because Ukrainian defenses in the area are strongest in that direction. The prospects for and timeline of this Russian effort remain unclear at this time, but the situation in the Hulyaipole direction is serious.

Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Russian servicemembers raising Russian flags in Danylivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka on the T-0401 highway) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission, likely through Tsehelne and Yehorivka (both just east of Danylivka and southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[3] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Rivnopillya (northeast of Hulyaipole) and that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Danylivka.[4] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Rivnopillya on the evening of November 11, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on November 13 that Russian forces are operating near Solodke (north of Rivnopillya), Yablukove (south of Rivnopillya), and Vesele (southeast of Rivnopillya), indicating that Russian forces continue relatively rapid advances northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[5]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 13 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) reached the Novooleksandrivka-Oleksiivka line (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), gained a foothold east of Yehorivka, and achieved “tactical successes” in the Yehorivka-Danylivka direction within the last two weeks.[6] Mashovets added that Russian forces also crossed the Yanchur River near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) and advanced west to the Solodke-Rivnopillya line, covering a distance of seven kilometers.[7]

Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has concentrated elements of up to nine brigades and regiments, including one tank brigade, and up to six other regiment- and battalion-sized units and detachments, along a 41-kilometer front.[8] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command committed elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade and the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th CAA, EMD) to reinforce the efforts of the Russian 5th CAA and its 127th Motorized Rifle Division, likely east and northeast of Hulyaipole[9] Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command may also redeploy elements of the Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD], operationally subordinated to the Dnepr Grouping of Forces) from western Zaporizhia Oblast and elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 41st CAA (both of the Central Grouping of Forces) to further reinforce efforts in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions[10][11]

ISW continues to assess that the effects of a monthslong Russian BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian GLOCs in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions — including roads, highways, and railway lines — and worsening weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone effectiveness — have facilitated recent Russian advances.[12] A servicemember of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) acknowledged on November 13 that Russian forces take advantage of foggy and rainy weather conditions to conduct assaults.[13] A Russian milblogger published footage on November 13 reportedly showing elements of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) conducting FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velykomykhailivka.[14]

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) by advancing through Rodynske, northeast of Pokrovsk, but the settlement remains contested. Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Rodynske, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in southern Rodynske.[15] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces established a foothold in Rodynske, however.[16]

Pokrovsk itself remains contested as well. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control areas of Pokrovsk south of the railway but that heavy fighting continues in northern Pokrovsk.[17] Geolocated footage published on November 12 and 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in the Pokrovsk City Council building in central Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces still operate in northwestern and north of Pokrovsk.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian positions on the western outskirts of Pokrovsk and near the entrance to Pokrovsk, likely referring to its northwestern entrance.[19] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces also cleared Russian positions in northern Pokrovsk, secured a logistics route into the town, and are operating along the Donetska railway.[20]  A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and will conduct assaults to draw fire from and subsequently attack Ukrainian drone and artillery crew positions.[21] The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces can strike a single Ukrainian position in the area with up to 10 Molniya strike drones, six bomber drones, and artillery and mortar fire within an hour.

A Russian milblogger complained that recent footage of Russian forces conducting logistics into Pokrovsk under the cover of fog allowed Ukrainian forces to interdict the effort. Russian milbloggers broadly amplified footage on November 10 and 11 showing Russian motorcycles, buggies, and transport trucks advancing into Pokrovsk under heavy fog, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) social media accounts geolocated the footage to southern Pokrovsk along the M-30 Selydove-Pokrovsk highway by November 11.[22] Russian milbloggers praised the tactic of advancing under fog cover that inhibits Ukrainian drone surveillance.[23] Another milblogger complained on November 12, however, that the "idiot who filmed" the video published it online and "so popular [mil]bloggers" underestimated the threat of Ukrainian artillery in a drone-dominated war, suggesting that the publication of the footage allowed Ukrainian artillery to strike Russian forces involved in the logistics effort.[24]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin remains unwilling to compromise on its long-held maximalist war aims that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera requested an interview from Lavrov, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published the alleged full transcript of the interview on November 13.[25] Lavrov claimed that the war in Ukraine is "not a war for territory" or an effort to bring Ukraine back within Russia's sphere of influence, but is meant to "reliably guarantee Russia's security" and to "thwart NATO and EU plans" to turn Ukraine into a "puppet state" hostile to Russia. Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine must commit to "neutrality" and adhere to the international agreements under which Russia recognized Ukrainian independence — implying that Ukraine has no sovereignty as long as it does not acquiesce to Russia's demands, which would certainly deprive Ukraine of its sovereignty. The Kremlin has consistently reiterated its commitment to its original war demands, which include Ukrainian "neutrality," the removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO’s Open Door Policy.[26] Lavrov's November 13 interview with a prominent Italian newspaper was likely meant to rebroadcast this commitment to a European audience as part of ongoing efforts to convince the West to cease supporting Ukraine as it defends against Russia's war of aggression.  

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 12 and 13 with the second known use of FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces employed FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles and long-range Bars and Lyutyi drones in overnight strikes and published footage showing Ukrainian forces launching Flamingo cruise missiles, but did not specify against which exact targets.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had stated on October 9 that Ukrainian forces employed Flamingo missiles in combat for the first time during the previous week but did not identify their targets.[28] A Ukrainian channel reporting on Mykolaiv Oblast reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces struck Oryol City (roughly 173 kilometers from Ukraine) with an FP-5 Flamingo missile and posted footage of the missile.[29] Geolocated imagery shows damage to boiler and turbine buildings at the Oryol Thermal Power Plant in Oryol City.[30]  Russian authorities issued a missile warning for Oryol Oblast overnight, and Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on November 13 that Russian air defenses destroyed unspecified objects in the air over Oryol Oblast overnight.[31] Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows a fire, likely at a primary oil processing unit, at the Nizhnekamsk Oil Refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan.[32] Refinery officials acknowledged a fire at the plant but did not identify the cause.[33]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows the aftermath of a Russian drone strike against civilians traveling along the P-79 Kupyansk-Borova highway north of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova).[34] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 13 that the strike murdered three civilians and injured a fourth civilian heading southward toward Borova to receive humanitarian aid and pensions.[35] The deliberate murder of civilians is a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[36] Russian forces use tactics to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) that involve indiscriminately striking vehicles and people traveling on roadways, frequently leading to Ukrainian civilian casualties. ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[37]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide monetary aid to Ukraine, including to support military requirements. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union (EU) provided Ukraine with an additional 6 billion euros (roughly $7 billion) in direct budget assistance on November 13.[38] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced on November 13 that Ukraine received the final tranche of funding, worth 4.1 billion euros (roughly $4.8 billion), from the interest on seized Russian assets through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) framework and 1.8 billion euros (roughly $2 billion) of funding through the EU’s Ukraine Facility program.[39] NATO announced on November 13 that several European states will fund a joint $500 million military equipment and munitions package for Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[40] Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden will contribute to the joint package.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to advance and to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, exploiting the effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and poor weather that hampers Ukrainian drone observation.
• Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks.
• A Russian milblogger complained that recent footage of Russian forces conducting logistics into Pokrovsk under the cover of fog allowed Ukrainian forces to interdict the effort.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin remains unwilling to compromise on its long-held maximalist war aims that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 12 and 13 with the second known use of FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles.
• Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide monetary aid to Ukraine, including to support military requirements.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2025 

The situation in the Hulyaipole direction is deteriorating, although Russian forces will probably spend considerable time setting conditions for efforts to seize the settlement. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on November 12 that the situation in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) directions has “significantly worsened” as Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions and have seized three unspecified settlements.[1] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from positions near Novouspenivske and Nove (both northeast of Hulyaipole) and that fighting is ongoing for Rivnopillya, Yablukove, and Solodke (all northeast of Hulyaipole and west to northwest of Nove and Novouspenivka).[2] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on November 12 that mixed-weapon Russian strikes destroyed Ukrainian defensive positions and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the Rivnopillya area on the evening of November 11.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Yablukove (north of Hulyaipole), west of Rybne, south of Solodke, and west of Nove (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[4] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern boundary of Yablukove and that the terrain in the Hulyaipole area favors rapid advances but that Ukrainian mining operations are hindering them.[5]

Russian forces will likely attempt to isolate and encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through infiltration tactics. This new campaign design consists of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that degrades Ukraine's ability to sustain frontline forces such that Ukraine cannot defend against subsequent Russian offensive operations in the area; tactical interdiction efforts targeting local supply lines and Ukrainian drone operators; infiltration missions intended to identify, worsen, and exploit the resulting weak points in Ukrainian defenses such that Ukraine defenses become disorganized; and mass small group assaults to make rapid advances and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from an area.[6] Russian forces have been conducting a monthslong BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, including highways, roads, and railway lines.[7] This campaign is similar to the BAI campaign that Russian forces waged against Pokrovsk starting in Spring-Summer 2025, ahead of intensified operations to seize the town beginning in October 2025.[8] Russian forces intensified infiltration missions and have been making relatively quick advances in the Hulyaipole direction in recent weeks, and Russian milbloggers have identified interdicting and cutting the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway as a goal of these Russian advances.[9]

Elements of three Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) are currently arrayed to either conduct or support offensive operations against Hulyaipole. Elements of the Russian 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are currently responsible for and advancing in the area northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[10] Elements of the 5th CAA will likely push west to cut the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway before pursuing a relatively small encirclement. The Russian military command could choose to pursue a wider encirclement of Hulyaipole, which would threaten a larger portion of Ukrainian forces and land in the pocket at the expense of more time and resources. Elements of the 5th CAA are currently better arrayed to conduct a smaller encirclement of Hulyaipole that would more likely result in more limited advances and inflict fewer losses on Ukrainian forces, but would likely allow Russian forces to make an operationally significant advance in a shorter amount of time at a lower resource cost. Elements of the Russian 29th CAA (EMD) are operating on the northern flank of the 5th CAA in the area southeast to southwest of Velykomykhailivka.[11] Elements of the 29th CAA will likely pursue operations supporting Russian efforts to advance southwest and west of Velykomykhailivka toward Pokrovske, which could reinforce efforts to seize Hulyaipole given the area's proximity to Ukrainian GLOCs supporting Hulyaipole, such as the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway. Elements of the 35th CAA (EMD) are operating southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne, but elements of the 35th CAA have not begun actively pursuing offensive operations in the area south and southwest of Hulyaipole in recent weeks. The Ukrainian defenses in the Hulyaipole direction are best suited to defend against pushes from the south, so it is unlikely that elements of the 35th CAA would activate in this area as long as these defenses pose a significant challenge to Russian forces.[12]

Ukrainian forces will need to defend against Russian operational-level BAI and tactical-level interdiction to counter this new Russian campaign design. Russian operational-level BAI campaigns supporting offensive pushes in the Pokrovsk, Hulyaipole, and Kupyansk directions have lasted for months and preceded intensified Russian infiltrations toward or in the towns.[13] Russian forces begin these BAI campaigns by interdicting major Ukrainian GLOCs at operational depth using artillery, air, and drone strikes conducted by elite drone units. This interdiction campaign aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses sufficiently to allow Russian drone and artillery crews to advance to within tactical range of these GLOCs and local logistics lines to Ukrainian forward positions and thereby to intensify interdiction efforts at the tactical level as well. Russian BAI and tactical interdiction campaigns also intensively target Ukrainian drone operators and artillery crews, which are integral parts of Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian infiltration missions and infiltration assaults. Degrading Ukraine's drone and artillery capabilities creates holes in Ukrainian defenses that Russian forces can exploit for more rapid gains. Russian technological and operational-tactical innovations are the primary factors facilitating Russian advances in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk areas. Ukrainian forces will have to develop technological, operational, and tactical responses to this new Russian approach in order to disrupt it.

Russian forces will likely collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but the significance of seizing these towns will depend on the circumstances and conduct of the Ukrainian withdrawal.  Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk.[14] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced southwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), in eastern Novopidhorodne, and south of Molodetske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[15] Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces either maintain positions or recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk and Zakhidnyi Microraion (central Myrnohrad), areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[16] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 12 that Russian forces launched a large-scale multi-day motorized assault against Pokrovsk employing light equipment on the M-30 Selydove-Pokrovsk highway that runs through eastern Pokrovsk.[17] The corps reported that Russian forces have established firing positions in multiple areas of Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces still maintain logistics to Pokrovsk. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in Myrnohrad reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad continue to receive supplies.[18] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske, but did not retake the settlement.[19] The milblogger added that Russian forces continue to employ glide bomb strikes to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Myrnohrad.

ISW previously assessed that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would achieve an operationally-significant effect of depriving Ukraine of its use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub — an objective that Russia already achieved by July 2025.[20] The further operational significance of the seizure of Pokrovsk remains unclear but depends on several factors, including whether Ukrainian forces conduct an orderly withdrawal or disorderly retreat; whether Ukrainian forces are able to conduct a successful defense after the collapse of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket; and Russian forces’ ability to exploit the collapse of the pocket and conduct a successful pursuit.

Russian milbloggers are mounting a concerted informational campaign prematurely calling the fall of Pokrovsk, likely to influence the information space. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the majority of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) is a contested ”gray zone” and that Russian forces have "firm control" of Pokrovsk, having exploited recent thick fogs – likely referring to recent footage of Russian servicemembers entering Pokrovsk on motorcycles.[21] Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed on November 11 and 12 that Russian forces had nearly seized Pokrovsk.[22] Milbloggers and the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) also amplified artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of alleged Ukrainian mass surrenders in Myrnohrad, whose authenticity the Ukrainian General Staff and many of the milbloggers themselves refuted.[23] One milblogger claimed that Ukraine is distributing the footage in order to discredit and drown out "legitimate" footage showing the conditions of Ukrainian forces in the pocket — still portraying Russian forces as exerting more control in the area than available evidence currently supports.[24] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 46 percent of Pokrovsk and 10 percent of Myrnohrad.

The Russian military command continues efforts to consolidate and integrate drone units into conventional military structures, but the position of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies relative to the new Unmanned Systems Forces remains unclear. Deputy Commander of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Sergei Ishtuganov announced on November 11 that the Russian MoD created an independent Unmanned Systems Forces service that includes drone regiments, battalions, and other units.[25] ISW observed Russian efforts to establish a separate Unmanned Systems Forces service beginning in Summer 2024.[26] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced in December 2024 that the Russian MoD would establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as an independent service by the third quarter of 2025.[27] Ishtuganov stated that Russian forces will assign drone operators, engineers, technicians, and other support personnel to such elements, which coordinate with Russian manufacturers on drone and electronic warfare (EW) development.[28] These efforts are in line with the Russian MoD’s efforts to centralize Russian drone procurement and establish control over informal drone units that organically emerged within Russian military units since 2022.[29] Ishtuganov reiterated Russian intentions to create a dedicated higher military school for drone operators.[30] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree in July 2025 to create a higher military school for drone operators by 2027.[31] Ishtuganov and other Russian sources notably did not clarify the relationship of the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone crews to the newly-formed Russian Unmanned Systems Forces.

The Kremlin is conducting multiple information operations against the Baltic states as it did to justify the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of Phase Zero conditions-setting for a possible attack on the Baltic states at some point in the future. ISW is not currently forecasting an imminent Russian attack on the Baltics. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to Russian media on November 11 in which he brought together several Russian long-running information operations about the Baltic states.[32] Lavrov accused the Baltic states of "Russophobia," "anti-Russian" sentiments, and the mistreatment of Russian speakers and of failing to adhere to agreements with Russia. Lavrov presented the Baltic states as puppets of the United Kingdom, implying that they have lost their sovereignty. Lavrov suggested that they are not really European, implying that they belong properly to Russia and not Europe.[33] Lavrov also described the Baltic states as threatening Russia and claimed that "some figures" in the European Union have been "egging on" the Baltic states by suggesting that Kaliningrad Oblast could be "razed." The Kremlin has used similar informational lines against the Baltic states previously, but Lavrov's presentation of all of them together in a single statement is noteworthy.[34] Lavrov's accusations, both direct and veiled, against the Baltic states closely parallel the accusations the Kremlin has made against Ukraine to justify its illegal occupation of Crimea and parts of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in 2014 and the 2022 full-scale invasion.[35] Lavrov's November 11 statements are the continuation of ongoing Kremlin efforts to set informational conditions for a possible future attack on one or all Baltic states, and are thus part of ongoing Russian Phase Zero operations to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. ISW has observed no direct indicators of Russian preparations to attack NATO states imminently, and Phase Zero conditions-setting efforts can last for years. The Kremlin can also choose not to attack even after setting conditions to do so. ISW's assessments that these and other activities constitute Phase Zero conditions-setting efforts are meant to call attention to the parallels with pre-2022 Russian conditions-setting efforts vis-a-vis Ukraine but are not an imminent attack warning at this time.

Officials reported aerial incursions in French and Lithuanian airspace. French radio station Europe 1 reported on November 12 that French law enforcement observed an unidentified drone made several flights over the Mulhouse rail yard while French Leclerc battle tanks were in transit on the night of November 11 to 12.[36] Europe 1 reported that an unidentified drone flew twice over the ammunition production building of the Bergerac gunpowder factory in France on the night of November 10 to 11, and a source close to the investigation stated that the site’s jamming and identification system malfunctioned and failed to intercept the drone.[37] Lithuanian broadcaster LRT reported on November 11 that Lithuanian border guards intercepted eight balloons smuggling goods from Belarus to Lithuania, one of which border guards seized at the Rūdninkai training ground in the Šalčininkai district.[38] The various incursions into European airspace in recent weeks come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• The situation in the Hulyaipole direction is deteriorating, although Russian forces will probably spend considerable time setting conditions for efforts to seize the settlement.
• Russian forces will likely attempt to isolate and encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through infiltration tactics.

• Elements of three Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) are currently arrayed to either conduct or support offensive operations against Hulyaipole.

• Ukrainian forces will need to defend against Russian operational-level BAI and tactical-level interdiction to counter this new Russian campaign design.
• Russian forces will likely collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but the significance of seizing these towns will depend on the circumstances and conduct of the Ukrainian withdrawal.
• Russian milbloggers are mounting a concerted informational campaign prematurely calling the fall of Pokrovsk, likely to influence the information space.
• The Russian military command continues efforts to consolidate and integrate drone units into conventional military structures, but the position of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies relative to the new Unmanned Systems Forces remains unclear.
• The Kremlin is conducting multiple information operations against the Baltic states as it did to justify the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of Phase Zero conditions-setting for a possible attack on the Baltic states at some point in the future. ISW is not currently forecasting an imminent Russian attack on the Baltics.
• Officials reported aerial incursions in French and Lithuanian airspace.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2025 

The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively slow, likely in part because the Russian military command continues to pursue grinding offensive operations throughout the theater. ISW has continued to observe relatively little geolocated footage of Russian advances in and near Pokrovsk in early November 2025 compared to confirmed advances in mid- to late-October 2025. Geolocated footage published on November 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Pokrovsk and marginally advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), respectively.[i] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk; in northern, northeastern, and eastern Pokrovsk; to western Myrnohrad from positions within Pokrovsk; east and northeast of Myrnohrad; and within eastern Myrnohrad.[ii] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk), Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), Kotlyne, and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[iii] Russian milbloggers refuted claims of substantial Russian advances northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne from Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), however.[iv] Russian forces are struggling to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction by advancing on the northern shoulder of the pocket near Rodynske, where they pose the greatest threat of closing the encirclement. Elements of the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have been fighting on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, including near Rodynske, in recent weeks and have been struggling to make advances comparable to the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), which has been fighting and making gains on the western flank.[v]

Russian forces appear to be struggling to conduct successful ground assaults to take and hold additional ground despite having conducted a successful battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign and infiltration missions to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[vi] The urban terrain of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad is not conducive to mechanized, motorized, or mass infantry assaults intended to expand control of terrain, unlike Russian infiltration missions. The Russian military command has dedicated better-trained and better-equipped units to BAI and infiltration missions than they have to ground assaults. Elite dedicated drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are responsible for interdicting Ukrainian logistics and downing Ukrainian drones in the Pokrovsk direction, and Spetsnaz elements are responsible for initial infiltration missions aimed at disorganizing Ukrainian defenses and creating holes for standard Russian infantry to exploit on subsequent infiltration missions.[vii] Russian forces are also struggling to extend logistics that would more easily enable Russian infantry who have already infiltrated into Pokrovsk to consolidate positions and accumulate personnel for further assaults.[viii]

Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will likely take more time and suffer more casualties to do so than if the Russian military command focused more resources from elsewhere on the front in this direction. The Russian military command has chosen to maintain several offensive operations across the theater simultaneously, including northern Kharkiv Oblast in the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions; eastern Kharkiv Oblast in the Kupyansk direction; northeast of the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Siversk direction; near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border junction in the Velykomykhailivka direction; and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian forces have struggled to sustain simultaneous offensive operations on non-mutually supportive axes for much of the war.[ix] Russia's persistent dedication of manpower and resources to various directions and grinding advances, rather than prioritizing resources to the Pokrovsk direction, will prolong the Russian campaign to seize Pokrovsk. The Russian military command has proven willing to tolerate the significant losses and time required for such campaigns.[x] The Russian military command may fear that reducing the Russian force presence or tempo of offensive operations anywhere else in the theater may provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to make gains or redeploy forces elsewhere. The Russian military command also likely seeks to maintain the facade that Russian forces are making substantial advances across the entire theater, contrary to the battlefield reality, and redeploying forces and means away from some areas of the front at the scale necessary to quickly collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction would undermine this Russian narrative.[xi]

Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and other areas of eastern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Okhotnyche (northeast of Hulyaipole).[xii] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Uspenivka and Novomykolaivka and from positions near Okhotnyche, Novouspenivske, and Nove (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[xiii] Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags in Novouspenivske in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xiv] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on November 10 that the contested "gray zone" in the Solodke-Novomykolaivka-Rivnopillya area (northeast of Hulyaipole) has grown significantly recently.[xv] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces seized Novouspenivske.[xvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Solodke and advanced west of Zlahoda, to the eastern outskirts of Yablukove (all north of Hulyaipole), west of Novouspenivske, and east of Vesele (east of Hulyaipole).[xvii] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that supply Hulyaipole from Pokrovske (north of Hulyaipole).[xviii] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces recently intensified artillery strikes in the Hulyaipole direction, firing roughly 2,000 shells in 400 artillery strikes per day ahead of the Ukrainian withdrawals.[xix]

Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of recent foggy weather to use infiltration tactics to advance toward Hulyaipole from the east.[xx] Ukrainian military sources fighting in the Hulyaipole direction told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction are using weather conditions in which Ukrainian drones cannot fly to advance in small groups on foot or on motorcycles.[xxi] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces noted that Russian forces have been exploiting fog that hinders Ukrainian drone surveillance in recent attempts to penetrate the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk on light vehicles, consistent with ISW's recent observations that Russian forces take advantage of poor weather to conduct ground operations in the area.[xxii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of morning and evening fog to intensify offensive operations.[xxiii]

A month-long BAI campaign likely facilitated recent Russian advances in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions. The campaign involved artillery, air, and drone strikes in Ukraine's near rear against targets such as roads, railways, and bridges that support Ukrainian GLOCs, aiming to degrade Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline forces and defend against subsequent Russian offensive operations.[xxiv] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction recently noted that the Russian airstrikes against bridges near Pokrovske (west of Velykomykhailivka) degraded Ukrainian logistics ahead of Russian advances.[xxv] The drone battalion commander added that Russian forces systematically employed fiber-optic sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in that direction. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes near Rivnopillya and Yablukove (both northeast of Hulyaipole) to set conditions for further Russian advances in the area.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved low-altitude air superiority by targeting Ukrainian drone operators and therefore degrading Ukrainian drone operations before recently intensifying offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of November 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast overnight.[xxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported the refinery processes over 20 petroleum products, including gasoline, fuel oil, and diesel fuel. Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows fires near the facility.[xxviii] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed on November 11 that overnight Ukrainian drone strikes damaged unspecified civilian infrastructure facilities.[xxix] This attack marks the fourth Ukrainian drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery within a month.[xxx] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Orsknefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast overnight, damaging an AVT primary oil refining unit.[xxxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility processes over 30 petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation gasoline, and fuel oil. The Ukrainian General Staff added that the facility processes 6.6 million tons of oil annually. Geolocated footage shows smoke from a fire at the facility, and additional footage shows a drone flying in the area ahead of the strike.[xxxii] Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on November 11 that falling drone fragments damaged an unspecified industrial facility overnight.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively slow, likely in part because the Russian military command continues to pursue grinding offensive operations throughout the theater.
• Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will likely take more time and suffer more casualties to do so than if the Russian military command focused more resources from elsewhere on the front in this direction.
• Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and other areas of eastern Ukraine.
• A monthslong battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign likely facilitated recent Russian advances in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of November 10 to 11.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2025 

The situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area remains difficult as Ukrainian forces fight to hold the shoulders of the pocket and Russian forces continue to advance in the area. Ukrainian forces reportedly recently cleared Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), in an attempt to hold the northern shoulder of the pocket.[1] Ukrainian forces are simultaneously counterattacking within Pokrovsk and on its western outskirts to prevent further Russian advances on the southern shoulder of the pocket.[2] Russian advances in northern and western Pokrovsk have slowed in recent days, likely due to continued Ukrainian efforts to counterattack.[3] Russian forces continue to advance in eastern and southern Pokrovsk, which could indicate that Russian forces may attempt to create a sub-pocket to support Russian efforts to encircle Ukrainian forces in the town and ultimately force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the broader pocket. Russian forces also likely maintain fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the pocket, complicating Ukrainian logistics. Russian forces appear to be working simultaneously to complete the encirclement of the entire pocket and to reduce the pocket itself. The prospects and timeline for those efforts remain unclear.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 10 that Ukrainian forces cleared Rodynske, and geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Ukrainian and Russian forces both recently advanced in southern Rodynske, in part contradicting Mashovets’ report.[4] Additional geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[5] Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in southern Hnativka (east of Pokrovsk), in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[6] Ukrainian military sources reported on November 9 and 10 that Russian forces have resumed a higher intensity of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction and continue to suffer heavy losses.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 November 10 situation report, which covers activity between 0800 November 19 and 0800 November 10, reported that there were 265 combat engagements along the entire front line — 97 of which were in the Pokrovsk direction alone.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 9 that the Russian military command had committed 170,000 servicemembers to offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction but that Russian forces suffered a record 25,000 killed and wounded in the area in October 2025 alone.[9] Russian forces reportedly suffered roughly 15,000 casualties in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025, by comparison.[10]

The Kremlin continues to publicly and clearly reiterate its maximalist demands and unwillingness to engage in negotiations that result in anything less than full Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 10 that Russia will only end the war when it achieves the "goals that it set initially." Kremlin officials have routinely referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged “root causes” of the war, which Russian officials have defined as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[11] The Kremlin's original war aims include the removal of the current Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government, Ukraine’s commitment not to join NATO, and the revocation of NATO’s Open Door Policy.

The Kremlin has begun involuntary partial reserve call-ups as part of its wider initiative to build out its active reserve, likely for use in combat in Ukraine. Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on November 10 that at least 19 federal subjects are beginning to train active reservists for units that Russian authorities will deploy to protect critical infrastructure facilities.[12] The formation of reservist elements to protect infrastructure comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on November 5, allowing Russia to train reservists to defend critical infrastructure in Russia.[13] Kommersant stated that some federal subjects began forming specialized reservist units before the legislative amendments came into force and that Russia plans to use reservists in oblasts that border Ukraine to combat Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, evacuate populations, and support “counterterrorism” operations.[14] Kommersant claimed that Russia is including a provision in the contracts that reservists sign that contains language about reservists only deploying within their home regions. The recent law allowing Russia to train active reservists in wartime and peacetime did not include a provision geographically restricting reservists' deployment locations, even though Russian officials had claimed that Russian authorities would only send reservists to protect critical infrastructure within their home region.[15] The Kremlin has previously ignored contractual obligations that interfere with its ability to conduct the war in Ukraine as it chooses, and Putin has previously manipulated laws to both overtly and covertly violate contractual agreements without outright breaking the law.[16] Russian officials notably violated contract agreements as the Kremlin has forced those who signed short-term military contracts with expiration dates to serve for an indefinite period.[17]

ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the need to protect critical infrastructure as an excuse to conceal wider efforts to prepare active reservists for deployment, including to Ukraine.[18] Kommersant noted that several regions that Ukrainian forces frequently target, including the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, have begun calling up reserve units.[19] Moscow Oblast is notably absent from the list of regions that have begun to form reservist units, even though Ukrainian forces have frequently struck infrastructure in the oblast. Russian officials have previously concentrated military personnel recruitment efforts on regions in central Russia, and the Kremlin is likely similarly concentrating involuntary partial call-up efforts in central regions in order to shield larger and more politically important population centers, such as Moscow City, from force generation efforts.[20]

The head of a major Russian bank acknowledged Russia’s economic struggles in a high-level meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref told Putin on November 10 that Sberbank is growing at a “very modest pace” due to “challenging macroeconomic conditions.”[21] Gref stated that some of the bank’s portfolios are shrinking, including its consumer loan portfolio, and that growth in 2025 is “worse than [Sberbank] expected." Gref’s statements are notable as Russian officials have largely refrained from admitting to any weakness in Russia’s economy and as the Kremlin has undertaken an information campaign to portray the Russian economy as stable and strong.[22]

Officials continue to report aerial incursions in Belgian airspace. Belgian authorities spotted drones over the Liège Airport and briefly suspended air traffic on the evening of November 9.[23] The spokesperson of Belgian energy provider Engie reported that authorities also spotted five drones flying over the Doel Nuclear Power Plant near the port of Antwerp on the evening of November 9 and that the drones were in the air for about an hour but did not affect the plant‘s operations. The November 9 drone overflights are the latest in a series of similar overflights over Belgian airports and military infrastructure in recent weeks.[24] Authorities have not identified the actors behind the November 9 drone overflights in Belgium, but Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken stated on November 8 that Russia may be responsible for the repeated drone incursions into European airspace as part of efforts to intimidate European states and deter continued aid to Ukraine.[25] The Russian Embassy in Belgium responded to Francken’s statement, claiming that there is no evidence of Russia’s involvement.[26] The various incursions into European airspace in recent weeks come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[27]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2025 

Russian and Ukrainian forces continue interdiction campaigns in the Pokrovsk direction as the rate of Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk remains temporarily decreased. ISW observed no evidence to assess that Russian forces made additional advances in the Pokrovsk direction on November 9, consistent with recent Ukrainian reporting that Russian forces have slowed their tempo of ground activity in the Pokrovsk direction to extend logistics and bring up reinforcements to southern Pokrovsk.[1] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 8 that Russian forces are in most areas of Pokrovsk but cannot encircle the town because Russian forces are only conducting infiltration missions in and through Pokrovsk from southern Pokrovsk.[2] The source stated that Russian forces are bringing mortar crews and additional drone operators into Pokrovsk to intensify the interdiction efforts against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 9 that Russian drone operators are primarily utilizing first-person view (FPV) drones and winged drones to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs.[3] The servicemember stated that Ukrainian forces are also interdicting Russian GLOCs into Pokrovsk and that Russian forces are "suffering" but noted that poor weather still affects Ukrainian drone operations, presumably operations both to interdict logistics and to strike Russian infiltration groups. The Ukrainian servicemember stated that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions throughout Pokrovsk and that Russian forces only hold positions in a certain part of Pokrovsk, likely referring to southern Pokrovsk. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting in Pokrovsk is not so intense that Pokrovsk is "engulfed in flames" and noted that machine gun fire is rare.[4] The milbloggers claimed that the main Russian force grouping in the Pokrovsk direction is operating about 10 kilometers from Pokrovsk itself and that both Russian and Ukrainian drones are reconnoitering access roads into the town. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing Dinas Microraion in eastern Pokrovsk, that they have cut Ukrainian logistics to Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and that fighting continues in northern, northeastern, and southern Pokrovsk.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increase their tempo of ground activity in Pokrovsk in the coming days as they extend logistics and bring forward personnel into the town.[6]

Russian forces are successfully interdicting Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as part of efforts to collapse Ukrainian defenses in the town. The source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence warned that Ukrainian forces have almost no logistics into Myrnohrad as Russian forces have either control or fire control over all the Ukrainian GLOCs.[7] The source stated that Ukrainian forces can no longer conduct logistics into Myrnohrad on foot due to the threat of Russian infiltration groups, drone strikes, and mines. The source stated that Russian forces are installing barbed wire and building defenses in some areas of Myrnohrad and that Russian motorcycle groups entered northern Myrnohrad. Footage published on November 8 shows Russian forces striking Myrnohrad with a purported FAB-3000 glide bomb.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian motorcycle groups reached northern Myrnohrad, and the Russian forces also advanced in northeastern and southern Myrnohrad and consolidated on its eastern outskirts.[9] Russian forces have been attempting infiltration missions into and mechanized assaults against Myrnohrad from the east, but have been unsuccessful in penetrating into Myrnohrad to the same extent as Russian forces currently operating in Pokrovsk.[10] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces assessed on November 7 that Russian forces would likely soon change their direction of attack against Myrnohrad.[11] Russian forces will most likely continue efforts to degrade Ukrainian forces' ability to defend Myrnohrad through continued infiltration missions and indirect fire against Ukrainian positions and logistics.

The ongoing US government shutdown is reportedly affecting US weapons exports to NATO allies and Ukraine. Axios reported on November 9, citing US Department of State (DoS) estimates, that the US government shutdown has delayed more than $5 billion of US weapons exports to support NATO allies and Ukraine, including AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, Aegis integrated naval combat systems, and HIMARS rocket launchers for allies including Denmark, Croatia, and Poland.[12] Axios reported that the final destination for these weapons is unclear, but noted that NATO allies are purchasing some US weapons to give to Ukraine. A senior DOS official told Axios that the US government shutdown is also slowing down congressional approvals for new weapons sales, as DoS employees involved in the process are furloughed. The senior DOS official stated that the delayed transactions include both weapons sales directly from the US government to NATO allies and licensing for private US defense companies to export weapons. ISW is unable to confirm this report.

European officials continue to report and respond to aerial incursions in European airspace. Lithuanian officials reported on November 9 that Lithuanian authorities temporarily closed the Vilnius Airport on the night of November 8 to 9 after observing an unspecified number of balloons flying toward the airport from Belarusian airspace.[13] The Lithuanian Border Service indefinitely closed its border with Belarus on October 26 in response to intensified Belarusian balloon incursions, which have continued since October 26.[14] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine; thus, Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological conditions-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[15] UK Chief of the Defense Staff Sir Richard Knighton told the BBC on November 9 that the United Kingdom is sending military personnel and equipment to Belgium following a series of repeated unidentified drone incursions into Belgian airspace near critical infrastructure between October 31 and November 6.[16] The BBC noted that the United Kingdom is likely sending elements of its Royal Air Force (RAF) No. 2 Force Protection Wing to support the Belgian military. ISW reported on November 7 that German troops similarly arrived in Belgium to assist the Belgian military in implementing unspecified drone detection and defense measures.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations and non-conventional activity are likely part of Phase Zero efforts.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Ukrainian forces continue interdiction campaigns in the Pokrovsk direction as the rate of Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk remains temporarily decreased.
• Russian forces are successfully interdicting Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as part of efforts to collapse Ukrainian defenses in the town.
• The ongoing US government shutdown is reportedly affecting US weapons exports to NATO allies and Ukraine.
• European officials continue to report and respond to aerial incursions in European airspace.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8, 2025 

The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction has temporarily slowed but will likely increase again in the coming days as Russian forces extend logistics and bring reinforcements in the area. Geolocated footage published on November 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced into northern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), a relatively small quantity and area of assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction compared to recent days.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized western Rivne (east of Pokrovsk along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway), seized most of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk), and advanced in eastern and southeastern Myrnohrad.[2] One milblogger claimed that small Russian assault groups are approaching the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in eastern Pokrovsk and are fighting in northern Pokrovsk but are struggling to consolidate positions due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 7 that much of Pokrovsk is a contested "gray zone" but noted that Russian forces have forward positions in northern Pokrovsk while elements of the main Russian force grouping have positions in southern Pokrovsk.[4] Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev stated on November 8 that Russian forces do not aim to establish a foothold within Pokrovsk itself but continue efforts to penetrate through the town to its northern outskirts and are dressing as civilians, a resort to perfidy under international law, to do so.[5] Okishev stated that Ukrainian forces partially restored their logistics north of Pokrovsk and transported ammunition into the town.

Ukrainian military sources have indicated in recent days that Russian forces are somewhat slowing down their offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction while waiting for reinforcements and are attempting to establish defenses and extend logistics into southern Pokrovsk.[6] Mashovets reported that Russian forces quickly established strong defenses near Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are attempting to send reinforcements toward Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Krasnyi Lyman and are sending small and large groups toward Krasnyi Lyman.[7] Russian forces will likely increase the tempo of their offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction in the coming days as Russian forces continue establishing defenses and logistics in the town.

Russia launched over 500 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight on November 7 to 8 as it continues its long-range strike campaign against critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 503 drones and missiles, including 25 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts; 10 Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; seven Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; and three Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea.[8] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 458 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 300 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense downed 406 drones and nine missiles, 26 missiles and 52 drones struck 25 locations, and downed debris fell on four locations. The Kirovohrad Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces struck the Kremenchuk Hydroelectric Power Plant in Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast, with nearly 15 drones and two missiles.[9] The Horishneplavnika City Council reported that Russian forces conducted missile strikes against several energy facilities in Horishni Plavni, Poltava Oblast, causing significant damage and power outages in the city.[10] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces struck an energy infrastructure facility in Odesa Oblast, causing fires.[11] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces conducted a combined Geran-2 drone and Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against energy and gas infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, killing a gas company operator.[12]

Ukrainian State-owned company Tsentrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused fires and stopped electricity output at the Zmievska Thermal Power Plant in Slobozhanske, Kharkiv Oblast, and the Trupilska Thermal Power Plant in Ukrainka, Kyiv Oblast.[13] Russian opposition outlet SOTA noted that these two thermal power plants supplied 14 percent of Ukraine’s electricity.[14] Tsentrenergo reported that Russian forces used an unprecedented number of drones and missiles, amounting to several per minute, against the plants on November 7 to 8 and that the strikes destroyed all restoration progress made at the plants after Russian strikes damaged the plants in 2024. Russia has recently increased strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale ahead of winter 2025-2026, in what ISW continues to assess is a Russian effort to degrade Ukraine’s energy security and industrial capacity and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[15]

Russian forces also struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts. Acting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vladyslav Haivanenko reported that Russian strikes killed three civilians and injured 12 others.[16] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Russian missile and drone strikes injured five civilians and damaged residential infrastructure.[17] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts.[18]

Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian strikes against railway infrastructure in Poltava Oblast resulted in several train delays and disrupted power supply to several stations.[19] Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces struck a key railway depot in Hrebinka, Poltava Oblast, which connects Kyiv and Poltava oblasts.[20] ISW recently assessed that Russia has been intensifying its strike campaign against railway infrastructure as part of its battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts aimed at disrupting Ukraine’s use of its intermediate rear area for logistics.[21]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Sanchik as Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics on November 8.[22] Sanchik became SMD commander in November 2024.[23] Sanchik previously served as the commander of the 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) from 2020 to 2023 and deputy commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) from 2017 to 2020, but publicly available information on Sanchik's career remains limited.[24] Sanchik is replacing Colonel General Andrei Bulyga, who served as deputy defense minister for logistics since March 2024.[25] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed hope that the appointment of a Russian commander with a good reputation as the deputy defense minister for logistics may spearhead fundamental changes in Russia’s logistics system.[26] The milblogger claimed that Sanchik's experience in various command positions will help with supplies, even though Sanchik lacks a logistics-focused background.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Yuriy Cherevashenko as the commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Air Defense Systems service on November 7.[27] Zelensky tasked Cherevashenko with scaling up the development of Ukraine's unmanned elements in the Air Force, the introduction of drones, and strengthening air defense with the latest weapon systems. Ukraine announced the creation of the Unmanned Air Defense Systems service, which will deploy units equipped with interceptor drones to combat Russian Shahed drones, on September 26.[28] The command-and-control relationships between these units and tactical ground force units, who also have organic tactical air defenses, remain unclear.

Key Takeaways:

• The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction has temporarily slowed but will likely increase again in the coming days as Russian forces extend logistics and bring reinforcements in the area.
• Russia launched over 500 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight on November 7 to 8 as it continues its long-range strike campaign against critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of winter 2025-2026.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Sanchik as Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics on November 8.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Yuriy Cherevashenko as the commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Air Defense Systems service on November 7.
• Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2025 

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction and are reportedly extending logistics to southern Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northeastern and to the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk as well as in southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and north of Myrnohrad.[1] Additional geolocated footage published on November 7 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk and immediately north of Myrnohrad).[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the northwestern, northern, and northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Rih (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), advanced southwest of Krasnyi Lyman and Rodynske, and advanced into eastern Rivne (east of Pokrovsk).[4] Some milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing in Rodynske, however.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to drive trucks and motorcycles into southern Pokrovsk to deliver supplies and that these attempts mark the first time that Russian forces have begun operating vehicles in Pokrovsk.[6] Russian forces have been conducting logistics into Pokrovsk primarily with drones.[7] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces confirmed on November 7 that Russian forces are attempting to extend logistics to southern Pokrovsk using motorcycles.[8] The corps reported that Russian forces have reduced their activity and the frequency of their movements within Pokrovsk in order to minimize losses as Russian forces await reinforcements. The corps noted that Russian forces have unsuccessfully attacked Myrnohrad from the east several times and assessed that Russian forces will likely attack the town from a different direction in the near future. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces began attacking Myrnohrad from the west on November 7.[9] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces raised a flag at the Pokrovsk City Council building in central Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and recaptured and cleared the building.[10] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces established an observation post at the city council building before Ukrainian forces recaptured it.

Layoffs at Russia's primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), indicate that Russia may be struggling to balance civilian and defense industrial needs as economic restrictions increasingly degrade Russia's economic performance. Yekaterinburg local news outlet E1 reported on November 6, citing employee-provided documents, that UVZ plans to lay off up to 10 percent of employees by February 2026 and implement a hiring freeze.[11] UVZ employees told E1 that the reduction in staff amounts to up to 50 percent of total employees for most departments. UVZ’s press service stated on November 6 that the manufacturer is “streamlining management and administration expenses“ and denied reports of a hiring freeze.[12] UVZ announced on October 10 that it will shift some employees to a four-day work week starting on December 15, citing declining demand for civilian vehicle production.[13] UVZ is Russia’s sole producer of modern tanks, therefore it is noteworthy that recent civilian shift reductions and planned factory layoffs may be impacting a key defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise and potentially reducing the production of Russian tanks.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have deprioritized tank production to shift to a more drone-centric and dismounted infantry-based force that employs light vehicles such as buggies and motorcycles for mobility rather than armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).[15] Drone innovations throughout the war and the creation of kill zones in which any tanks or other AFVs are prime targets have rendered armored vehicles less effective for Russia's tactics to advance, which rely on mass infantry assaults, infiltration missions, motorcycles and small vehicles, and drone strikes.[16]

Sanctions and restrictions on Russian oil exports may be hindering the Kremlin's attempts to make capital investments in the Russian DIB at the expense of civilian production. Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy on October 23.[17] The Kremlin notably also plans to decrease its defense budget to 38 percent of total expenditures in 2026, down from 41 percent in 2025, as it plans to increase the value-added tax (VAT) likely to fund defense expenditures.[18] The Russian government may be attempting to shield the Russian DIB from the slowdown affecting civilian industry, and the reported UVZ layoffs indicate that Russia's widespread economic problems could affect defense production. The reported UVZ layoffs suggest that the Russian DIB may not be able to drive economic growth and that the Kremlin will need to further redirect resources to the DIB from civilian industry.[19] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely attempting to make investment capital available to the DIB amid a lack of demand for investment capital in civilian industries.[20]

The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues efforts to develop local arms production and export capabilities. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on November 7 that Ukraine will make its DIB self-financing through profits that managed arms exports generate.[21] Kamyshin stated that Ukraine’s DIB has an annual production capacity of $35 billion dollars in 2025 and can reach $60 billion in 2026, over $35 billion of which will be for long-range capabilities.[22] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on November 7 that Ukraine and Sweden finalized an agreement to localize the production of Swedish Gripen fighter jets by 2033.[23]

European authorities continue to report unidentified drone incursions into NATO airspace. The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration (LFV) reported that there were reports of at least one unidentified drone flying over the Gothenburg Landvetter Airport on the evening of November 6, forcing authorities to divert or cancel over a dozen flights.[24] A Swedish police spokesperson told Reuters that authorities are investigating suspected aviation sabotage.[25] Belgian authorities temporarily closed the Brussels Airport on the evening of November 6 after Skeyes air traffic controller observed an unidentified drone, marking the airport's third closure in a week.[26] Belgian police confirmed on November 6 that unidentified drones flew near the Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK CEN) in Mol, Belgium as well as the European Quarter, which houses several European Union (EU) buildings.[27] The Flemish Public Broadcasting Company (VRT) reported on November 6, citing unspecified sources, that German troops arrived in Belgium to assist the Belgian military in implementing unspecified drone detection and defense measures.[28] The repeated unidentified drone incursions near European airports and critical infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO. [29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction and are reportedly extending logistics to southern Pokrovsk.
• Layoffs at Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), indicate that Russia may be struggling to balance civilian and defense industrial needs as economic restrictions increasingly degrade Russia's economic performance.
• The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues efforts to develop local arms production and export capabilities.
• European authorities continue to report unidentified drone incursions into NATO airspace.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Lyman, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 6, 2025 

The Russian military command is reportedly augmenting its troop presence in the Pokrovsk direction, likely to consolidate the gains Russian forces initially secured through infiltration missions and advance further through the town. Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Balahan (east of Pokrovsk and east of Myrnohrad).[i] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in northeastern Pokrovsk and east of Pokrovsk.[ii] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and seized part of the Pokrovska Mine complex north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[iii] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) at dawn on November 5 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed three vehicles. Russian forces have rarely employed mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction recently, apart from mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[iv] Ukrainian officials continued to note how Russian forces are disguising themselves as civilians, a war crime under the Geneva Convention, in line with recent reports of Russian perfidy in the area.[v]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2025 

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to try to blame US President Donald Trump for the nuclear arms modernization and buildup program that Russia began years ago. Putin held an award ceremony on November 4 for the developers of the new Burevestnik missile and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, in which he continued to laud the weapons' purported technical capabilities.[1] Putin held a Russian Security Council meeting on November 5 in which Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, and Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov offered their assessments of US President Donald Trump's statements since October 29 that the United States would start testing its nuclear weapons.[2] Belousov advised Putin to begin preparation for "full-scale" nuclear testing immediately, and Putin called for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), special services, and relevant civilian agencies to submit proposals on the possible start of nuclear weapons tests. The Kremlin officials continued to interpret that Trump's recent statements meant that the United States would begin testing nuclear warheads. Trump did not specify if the United States would test nuclear warheads or the delivery systems, however, and US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated on November 2 that Trump is likely referring to tests of delivery systems.[3] Russia has violated the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and likely restarted low-yield nuclear tests in 2019 in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).[4] Russia's latest weapons developments fundamentally do not change the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, even if the technical details that Putin is touting are true — as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently noted.[5]

Russia's grinding advances in the Pokrovsk direction continue to absorb significant Russian losses. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on November 5 that SBU units operating in the Pokrovsk direction killed over 1,500 Russian servicemembers and destroyed 20 tanks, 62 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 532 transport vehicles in October 2025.[6] The SBU's numbers only account for casualties inflicted by SBU forces, and total Russian losses in the area are likely much higher. Geolocated footage published on November 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 4 and 5 that Russian forces advanced within northeastern Pokrovsk, southeast of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), and southwest of Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk).[8] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 5 that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts against Ukrainian forces in southern Pokrovsk and are wearing civilian clothes as part of deception tactics — considered perfidy under international law.[9] ISW has recently observed multiple reports of Russian forces committing acts of perfidy in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces have leveraged infiltration tactics to penetrate the town between Ukrainian positions.[10]

The Russian military command has committed significant portions of the 2nd, 41st, and 51st combined arms armies (CAA) to the Pokrovsk direction, indicating its prioritization of the seizure of the pocket.[11] Elements of the Russian 35th and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in western Pokrovsk; and elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA), the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), and the 1452nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 41st CAA) are reportedly operating in eastern Pokrovsk.[12] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in Rodynske; elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk); elements of the 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk); and elements of the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[13]Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have been taking some of the highest losses on the battlefield in recent months, and the 21-month campaign to seize Pokrovsk has likely degraded these three CAAs.[14] The servicemember noted that Russian forces rarely employ mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction, apart from near Myrnohrad. ISW recently observed reporting of Russian mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[15]

North Korea is reportedly deploying additional troops to support roles in the Russian rear. South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency, citing South Korean parliamentarians who received a briefing from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on November 4 that North Korea deployed roughly 5,000 military engineering troops to Russia, likely to restore infrastructure.[16] South Korean intelligence reportedly assessed that North Korea is training and selecting personnel in preparation for additional troop deployments to Russia. The NIS reportedly stated that there are currently about 10,000 North Korean troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border performing "security duties," and another 1,000 are clearing mines. ISW continues to assess that it is unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy for combat operations to Ukrainian territory, which would mark a significant inflection, but that North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would free up Russian forces to deploy to the battlefield.[17] ISW previously observed reports that North Korean military personnel and “technical advisers” were operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast, and it is unclear if Russia plans to deploy the North Korean troops to restore infrastructure in Russia or occupied Ukraine.[18]

The Kremlin continues to set conditions to deploy active reservists to combat in Ukraine. Russia recently passed a law allowing active reservists to participate in special training sessions to ensure the protection of critical facilities in Russia.[19] Russian officials previously claimed that Russian authorities will only send reservists to protect critical infrastructure within their home region, but the law notably does not include such restrictions.[20] The Kremlin defines the four illegally annexed oblasts in Ukraine as part of Russia, such that the law's lack of territorial restrictions could allow Russia to send active reservists to areas of occupied Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin also passed a law on November 5 extending the monthly payments that Russian contract soldiers receive to any military personnel serving to repel an armed invasion of Russia, during an armed provocation on the state border or in Russian territory, or near areas in which Russia is conducting a "special military operation."[21] Russian officials have long discussed extending benefits to personnel serving in border regions after domestic backlash following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in 2024.[22] The timing of Putin’s decision to pass the law suggests that it may also be related to the recent law on the deployment of active reservists. The Kremlin may be using the clause in the law about those serving near a "special military operation" to set conditions for the deployment — and payment —of active reservists to combat in Ukraine, as ISW continues to assess.[23] The Kremlin is likely framing its recent legal changes regarding active reservists as only part of plans to protect infrastructure in order to conceal longer-term plans to deploy them to Ukraine. A source in one of Russia’s largest oil and gas companies notably told Russian opposition outlet Verstka that the company’s security personnel “do not have high expectations” of the active reservists who will protect critical infrastructure and that only real army air defense systems can offer adequate protection.[24]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor General Andriy Leshchenko reported on November 4that Russian forces have committed over 190,000 war crimes since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and that Russia is conducting a "planned state policy" of crimes against the Ukrainian people.[25] Ukrainian Department of Counteracting Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict Head Yuriy Rud reported that Russian forces have conducted over 5,100 drone strikes against civilians so far in 2025 — twice the total number in all of 2024. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on November 5 that Ukrainian intelligence officers assessed that the November 3 Russian drone strike that killed two Ukrainian civilians in the Borova direction likely occurred as the civilians were evacuating from Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[26] Kupyanksyi Raion Police Department Head Kyrylo Schcherbinsky reported that the civilians were walking from Kruhlyakivka toward occupied Berestove (east of Kruhlyakivka) and that the direction of the drone strike indicated that Russian forces were responsible. The watermark of the footage showing the strike showed the insignia of the Russian 96th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]).[27] ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[28]

Authorities reported unidentified drone incursions near the Brussels and Liege airports in Belgium on the evening of November 4. Belgian authorities closed the Brussels Airport due to an unidentified drone.[29] Authorities reopened the Brussels Airport approximately two hours later but closed the airport again after subsequent drone sightings. Belgian authorities also closed the Liege Airport due to unidentified drone sightings.[30] Belgian officials reported that there were three unidentified drones flying over the Kleine Brogel Air Base from October 31 to November 2.[31] Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken stated that the repeated drone overflights are “in line with the hybrid techniques seen in other countries” and that the actors organized them "in a very structured way.”[32] Belgian authorities have not officially attributed these latest drone sightings to a specific actor as of this writing. The repeated unidentified drone incursions near Belgian critical infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political and psychological conditions for a potential Russian war against NATO.[33]

Key Takeaways:

•       Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to try to blame US President Donald Trump for the nuclear arms modernization and buildup program that Russia began years ago.
•       Russia's grinding advances in the Pokrovsk direction continue to absorb significant Russian losses.
•       North Korea is reportedly deploying additional troops to support roles in the Russian rear.
•       The Kremlin continues to set conditions to deploy active reservists to combat in Ukraine.
•       Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
•       Authorities reported unidentified drone incursions near the Brussels and Liege airports in Belgium on the evening of November 4.
•       Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Vovchansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka. Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4, 2025 

Recent Russian advances through Pokrovsk are the culmination of a 21-month campaign to seize the town and a five-month dedicated battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effort to degrade Ukrainian defensive capabilities. Russian gains on the Pokrovsk sector have been in large part enabled by the Russian targeting of Ukrainian drone capabilities. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are sending nearly 100 fireteams consisting of up to three personnel each into Pokrovsk per day.[1] The Ukrainian drone unit stated that these Russian fireteams are overwhelming Ukrainian positions such that Ukrainian drone operators do not have time to launch drones. Ukrainian military sources have recently reported that Russian infiltration groups are deliberately targeting Ukrainian drone crews to engage them in close combat, inhibiting Ukrainian drone operations.[2] Combined Russian ground tactics and the implementation of BAI effects have created an environment in which it is very difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate drones. BAI is the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term; it aims to deny the adversary the use of crucial logistics lines and facilities necessary to sustain battlefield operations.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets indicated that Russian forces created the drone denial environment in Pokrovsk using dedicated tactics that degraded the organization and efficacy of Ukrainian defensive and drone operations ahead of Russian infiltration missions, which also further degraded these Ukrainian operations.[4] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command established a new three-phased process for infiltrations: preparation, execution, and exploitation.[5] Mashovets stated that in the preparation phase, the military command prioritizes identifying Ukrainian tactical and tactical-operational ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supporting forward Ukrainian positions, Ukrainian drone operator positions and drone launch sites, and other exploitable areas.[6] Mashovets stated that Russian forces send in Spetsnaz forces to conduct the initial infiltration missions and subsequent surprise attacks against Ukrainian positions during the preparation phase, after which standard assault forces conduct their own infiltration missions in the execution phase.[7] Mashovets stated that Russian forces send out many small assault groups for further infiltration missions and to consolidate and reinforce positions during the exploitation phase, likely hoping to overwhelm Ukrainian forces while sustaining heavy casualties.[8] Mashovets’ reporting is consistent with ISW’s recent observations of the conduct of Russian infiltration missions.[9]

The current battlespace in the Pokrovsk direction took Russian forces 21 months to achieve. Russian forces took 21 months to advance the 39 kilometers (just over 24 miles) from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk. Russian forces first began the Pokrovsk effort in February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka and began setting conditions to take Pokrovsk through direct frontal assaults in March 2024.[10] This effort failed, however, and Russian forces instead shifted to an envelopment campaign in Fall 2024.[11] Russian forces conducted a short series of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction in Winter 2025 but did not reprioritize the direction again until July 2025.[12] Successful Ukrainian drone operations largely stymied Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction from late 2024 into Summer 2025.[13]

Russian forces began achieving partial BAI effects against Ukrainian GLOCs in the Pokrovsk direction in July 2025, at which point Russian forces effectively denied Ukrainian forces the ability to use Pokrovsk as a logistics hub.[14] Russian technical innovations, such as first person view (FPV) drones with increased ranges, thermobaric warheads, and "sleeper" or "waiter" drones along GLOCs, allowed Russian forces to generate BAI effects and restrict Ukrainian troop movements, evacuations, and logistics.[15] Russia also deployed elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to the Pokrovsk direction and other priority sectors in Donetsk Oblast to focus on interdicting Ukrainian GLOCs and eliminating Ukrainian drone operators.[16] Russian forces began attempts to infiltrate into Pokrovsk in late July 2025 in tandem with their dedicated BAI efforts in the area.[17] Russian forces achieved a limited penetration northeast of Pokrovsk in the Dobropillya tactical direction in August 2025, likely taking advantage of a porous frontline while seeking to secure the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.[18] Mashovets stated on November 4 that Russia created the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to primarily target and strike Ukrainian drone crews and noted that Russian forces prioritize Ukrainian drone crews in tactical, operational, and strategic-level strikes.[19]

These Russian BAI interdiction efforts have not proven as effective across the entire frontline, however, and will not necessarily be exportable to other parts of the theater. The urban environment in Pokrovsk has provided Russian forces with cover and concealment for infiltration groups and drone crews that are absent in other areas of the frontline, and Russia has dedicated staggering and unsustainable amounts of manpower and materiel to seizing Pokrovsk.[20] Russian forces briefly deprioritized the Pokrovsk effort to focus on the Dobropillya tactical penetration in August 2025.[21] Russian forces failed to exploit this penetration, however, likely in part due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian forces attempting to advance across open terrain. Russian forces then shifted back to prioritizing the Pokrovsk direction by September 2025, and Ukrainian forces have been successfully clearing the Dobropillya salient as Russian forces continue efforts in the Pokrovsk direction as of November 2025.[22] Russian forces have also been attempting to penetrate weak points in Ukrainian defenses and advance near and into Kupyansk, but have not succeeded in destabilizing Ukrainian defenses to the same degree as in Pokrovsk.[23] The differences between the Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk and Pokrovsk are likely in part due to the open terrain surrounding Kupyansk and Russia's inability to dedicate the same degree of manpower and resources to offensive efforts in the Kupyansk direction, especially as the Russian effort to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction is ongoing. Russian forces have also not prioritized generating BAI-type effects in the Kupyansk direction to the same degree as Pokrovsk. Russia would have to commit to potentially years-long, resource-intensive ground operations and BAI implementation to recreate the conditions in Pokrovsk elsewhere in the theater.

Russian forces continue advancing through Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 3 and 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern, northern, and northeastern Pokrovsk.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within, northwest of, and west of Pokrovsk beyond what available geolocated footage indicates.[25] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Russian forces have not yet seized the entirety of Pokrovsk and that fighting continues in the town, particularly in northern and eastern Pokrovsk, and that Russian forces are consolidating positions in central and eastern Pokrovsk.[26] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces "control" northern Pokrovsk, however.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and other milbloggers claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are conducting airstrikes against Rodynske as fighting continues in the settlement.[28] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced close to Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and that fighting is ongoing along the M-30 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway southeast of the settlement.[29] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults to try to enter Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 3 that there are about 260 to 300 Russian soldiers within Pokrovsk and that 30 percent of all fighting in the theater is occurring near Pokrovsk.[31]

Ukrainian forces continue defensive efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 4 that GUR units continue operations in the Pokrovsk direction after having conducted a heliborne assault west of Pokrovsk on October 31.[32] The GUR reported that its forces opened a ground corridor to bring in reinforcements to Pokrovsk and are conducting operations to improve frontline logistics and prevent Russian forces from expanding their fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs.[33] The GUR separately reported on November 4 that it conducted a strike with an FP-2 drone against a headquarters of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies in occupied Avdiivka and killed Rubikon officers and drone operators.[34] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk, Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), Zatyshok, and Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk).[35]  Ukrainian forces also continue counterattacks on the eastern flank of the Russian Pokrovsk effort in the Dobropillya tactical area to relieve pressure on Pokrovsk. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 3 that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest from Vilne (east of Dobropillya) and Nove Shakhove (southeast of Dobropillya, severing the road that connects Nove Shakhove to Shakhove (southeast of Dobropillya) and attempting to split the Dobropillya salient in two.[36] The Russian milblogger noted that footage of a Russian mechanized column stuck in the Kazennyi Torets River near Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) during a failed October 25 mechanized assault indicates that autumn weather conditions are impeding Russian mechanized operations.[37] Senior Ukrainian officers reported to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on November 4 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Shakhove.[38]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two laws on November 4 that likely aim to facilitate the use of Russia's inactive reserve in a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the use of the active reserve in combat in Ukraine. Putin signed a law allowing Russian military conscription administrative processes to occur year-round, as opposed to the current system that only processes conscripts during the semi-annual spring and fall cycles.[39] The law will come into effect on January 1, 2026, at which point military registration and enlistment offices will be able to issue conscription summonses, organize medical examinations, and hold draft board meetings year-round instead of only twice a year. ISW continues to assess that the year-round conscription process aims to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia’s force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups.[40] Changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military and would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently during both a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO.

Putin also signed a law requiring active reservists to participate in special training to protect critical and other infrastructure in Russia.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) first proposed a version of this law in October 2025 that would have permitted the Russian military to use Russia’s active reserve (“human mobilization reserve”) in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.[42] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated on October 13 that the prior draft of the law would allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[43] The version of the law that Putin signed into law only calls for active reservists to protect Russian infrastructure facilities, but ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the deployment of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure to set conditions to mobilize active reservists for combat in the future, including in Ukraine.[44]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against two civilians carrying a white flag in Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) and walking their dog on November 3.[45] The drone strike killed the two civilians and the dog. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces have been unable to evacuate or identify the bodies.[46] The deliberate execution of civilians is a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[47] The civilians in the footage, aside from being hors de combat due to their clear civilian status, were also holding a white flag--a clear sign of surrender and request for safety. ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[48]

Key Takeaways:

• Recent Russian advances through Pokrovsk are the culmination of a 21-month campaign to seize the town and a five-month dedicated battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effort to degrade Ukrainian defensive capabilities.
• The current battlespace in the Pokrovsk direction took Russian forces 21 months to achieve.
• Russian forces began achieving partial BAI effects against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction in July 2025, at which point Russian forces effectively denied Ukrainian forces the ability to use Pokrovsk as a logistics hub.
• These Russian BAI interdiction efforts have not proven as effective across the entire frontline, however, and will not necessarily be exportable to other parts of the theater.
• Russian forces continue advancing through Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian forces continue defensive efforts in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two laws on November 4 that likely aim to facilitate the use of Russia's inactive reserve in a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the use of the active reserve in combat in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and within and near Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2025 

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction and appear to be operating with increasing comfort within Pokrovsk itself. Geolocated footage published on November 3 indicates that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently advanced in southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and that Russian forces advanced in eastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[1] Additional geolocated footage published on November 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian servicemembers in northwestern Pokrovsk engaged in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[2] A Ukrainian officer reported on November 3 that Russian forces continue efforts to infiltrate further into Pokrovsk and are attempting to establish observation posts and concentrate personnel within the town.[3] The Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces are attempting to establish defenses in unspecified areas of Pokrovsk. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 1 that Russian forces continue to infiltrate into Pokrovsk from the Zvirove-Shevchenko-Novopavlivka area (south to southwest of Pokrovsk) and are accumulating on the northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk near Rivne and on the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk.[4] The source also stated that Russian forces are beginning to establish forward observation posts and drone operator positions as Russian forces accumulate a sufficient amount of manpower in Pokrovsk and "settle" into these positions. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on November 3 showing Russian forces reportedly interacting with and evacuating civilians from within Pokrovsk, and Russian milbloggers claimed on November 2 and 3 that Russian soldiers are checking the documents of civilians in the town.[5]

Ukrainian forces continue defensive efforts and counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on November 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Rodynske, an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian sources maintained a presence.[6] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Ukrainian forces "created opportunities" to resupply and reinforce troops in the Pokrovsk direction in the last few days.[7] The corps stated that Ukrainian forces prevented Russian forces from further advances in northern Pokrovsk and from cutting the H-32 Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad highway.

Ukrainian forces have liberated a significant portion of the Russian penetration in the Dobropillya direction on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk effort. Ukrainian forces have been steadily liberating and clearing the Russian penetration near Dobropillya in recent weeks. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 2 that Ukrainian forces liberated Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and published a map claiming that Russian forces hold positions no farther north than the area south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 26 that Ukrainian forces liberated Kucheriv Yar sometime between October 16 and 26, and ISW assessed at the time that Ukrainian forces also liberated Zolotyi Kolodyaz (just northwest of Kucheriv Yar).[9] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 31 that Ukrainian forces liberated Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[10] Russian and Ukrainian sources have also recently reported fighting and Ukrainian counterattacks at the base of the salient near Mayak and Zapovidne (both southeast of Dobropillya) without reporting fighting in the penetration northeast and east of Dobropillya, suggesting that these areas are no longer contested.[11]

Ukrainian efforts to cut off the Russian salient east of Dobropillya are likely generating tactical effects on Russian efforts to encircle the Ukrainian pocket near Pokrovsk. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on November 3 that Ukrainian forces are increasing pressure on the Dobropillya salient, forcing Russian forces to disperse their troops and complicating Russia's main efforts near Pokrovsk.[12] Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have been attempting to widen and exploit the penetration since August 2025 while also attacking east, northeast, and north of Pokrovsk.[13] Mashovets assessed on October 20 that the 51st CAA was bogged down in the Dobropillya direction to the detriment of its offensive operations north of Pokrovsk and subsequently reported on October 27 that the 51st CAA sharply reduced its activity in the Dobropillya salient in order to focus on offensive operations on the northern and eastern flank of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area.[14] The Russian military command also deployed naval infantry units to support 51st CAA attacks near the base of the Dobropillya salient after initially redeploying the naval infantry elements to support the 8th CAA (SMD) in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area - demonstrating how Ukrainian efforts to halt Russia's exploitation of its Dobropillya penetration have tied up relatively elite Russian naval infantry elements.[15]

Elements of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) have been leading the Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk and encircle the Ukrainian pocket from the south and southwest.[16] The 2nd CAA has had more success than the elements of the 51st CAA operating on the eastern and northern flank of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket have been having. Ukrainian efforts in the Dobropillya salient have likely slowed the 51st CAA's efforts to seize Myrnohrad and encircle the pocket from the north and northeast. Ukraine's counterattacks against the Dobropillya salient during ongoing Russian efforts to encircle the Pokrovsk pocket are a notable inflection compared to how Ukrainian forces reacted to previous Russian encirclement efforts. Ukrainian forces appear to be trying to counterattack on a different but supporting sector in order to pressure one flank of the Russian encirclement effort.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated the Kremlin's objective of taking control of all of Ukraine. Medvedev claimed on his English- and Russian-language Telegram channels on November 3 that the more the West supports Ukraine, the larger the amount of Ukrainian territory that Russia will "eventually return to its native Russia."[17] Medvedev called for "Russia's" citizens and Russian power to "return...to ancestral Russian lands" in Ukraine. Medvedev's statement mirrors claims that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been making consistently since before the full-scale invasion that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and that "Ukraine is [Russia's]."[18] Medvedev also forwarded narratives to try to persuade Europe to halt aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its original war aims in Ukraine and is unwilling to negotiate on terms less than Ukraine's complete capitulation.[19]

A Kremlin official recently highlighted Russia's weapons deliveries to Venezuela. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov stated on November 1 that Russia is one of Venezuela's "key" military-technical partners and that Russia supplies Venezuela with "virtually the entire range of weapons, from small arms to aircraft."[20] Zhuravlyov stated that Russian Su-30 fighter jets make up the "backbone" of the Venezuelan Air Force and that Russia's delivery of "several" S-300VM air defense systems has strengthened Venezuelan defenses. Zhuravlyov stated that Russia also recently delivered an unspecified number of Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M2E air defense systems to Venezuela. Zhuravlyov stated that he sees no obstacles to Russian supplies of Oreshnik ballistic missiles or Kalibr cruise missiles to Venezuela.

Ukraine’s European allies provided Ukraine with long-range missiles and air defense systems. Bloomberg reported on November 3, citing anonymous sources, that the UK recently delivered an unspecified number of Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine.[21] The sources stated that the UK delivery is meant to ensure that Ukraine has sufficient stocks of Storm Shadow missiles ahead of Winter 2025-2026, when Russia will likely increase strikes against Ukrainian civilian areas. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 2 that Germany helped Ukraine acquire an unspecified number of Patriot air defense systems, which Zelensky stated have arrived in Ukraine.[22] Zelensky noted that Ukraine still needs more Patriot air defense systems to protect all of Ukraine's critical infrastructure and cities from Russian strikes. Patriot air defense systems remain Ukraine’s only air defense systems capable of reliably downing Russian ballistic missiles. ISW continues to assess that a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including more Patriot systems, would degrade Russia’s ability to conduct strikes.[23]

Authorities reported more unidentified drone sightings near German airports. German police reported an unidentified drone flying near Bremen Airport on the evening of November 2, forcing the airport to suspend flights for one hour.[24] German authorities similarly suspended flights at the Berlin Brandenburg Airport due to an unidentified drone on the evening of October 31.[25] German authorities have not linked the drone sightings near the airports to Russian actors as of this writing. The repeated unidentified drone incursions near critical German infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia’s continued efforts to destabilize Europe and undermine NATO’s cohesion.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction and appear to be operating with increasing comfort within Pokrovsk itself.
• Ukrainian forces continue defensive efforts and counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Ukrainian forces have liberated a significant portion of the Russian penetration in the Dobropillya direction on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk effort.
• Ukrainian efforts to cut off the Russian salient east of Dobropillya are likely generating tactical effects on Russian efforts to encircle the Ukrainian pocket near Pokrovsk.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated the Kremlin's objective of taking control of all of Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European allies provided Ukraine with long-range missiles and air defense systems.
• Authorities reported more unidentified drone sightings near German airports.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Siversk and Pokrovsk, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2025 

Russian forces continue to intensify offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk to seize the town and collapse the Ukrainian pocket. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently made tactical advances in the Pokrovsk area. Geolocated footage published on November 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Pokrovsk.[1] Additional geolocated footage published on November 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian soldiers in northern Pokrovsk conducting what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[2] Ukrainian military sources and Russian milbloggers recently stated that Russian forces are infiltrating into northern Pokrovsk.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern, central, and southern Pokrovsk; in northern and southeastern Myrnohrad; and south of Hnativka and Rih (all east of Pokrovsk).[4] A Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces recaptured territory north of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[5] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 2 that Ukrainian forces recaptured 400 square meters in an unspecified area of the Pokrovsk direction, likely referring to recent tactical counterattacks north and northwest of Pokrovsk.[6]

Russian forces have likely deprioritized offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in favor of completing the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian assault tactics in the Pokrovsk direction are resulting in high casualty rates. A Ukrainian non-commissioned officer (NCO) operating in the Pokrovsk direction recently reported that Russian forces have decreased the intensity of assaults in the Kostyantynivka direction following a failed mechanized assault on October 27, and a Russian milblogger assessed on November 1 that Russia will likely prioritize seizing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad before renewing significant efforts to seize Kostyantynivka.[7] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 1 that Russian assault units search for routes to bypass Ukrainian strongpoints in Pokrovsk and infiltrate into the Ukrainian near-rear while other Russian units — likely drone or artillery crews or lesser-quality infantry — work to destroy the Ukrainian strongpoint.[8] The commander stated that Russian forces send untrained soldiers on assaults to draw Ukrainian drone and artillery fire, revealing the positions of Ukrainian drone and artillery crews, after which trained Russian assault infantry attempt to engage these Ukrainian crews in close combat. The commander stated that Russian forces regularly attack along the same routes, resulting in heavy casualties. The commander stated that Russian forces are constantly committing new units to battle and sending reinforcements to the area. A Ukrainian military-focused Telegram channel published images showing high concentrations of Russian casualties near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and attributed the high casualty rate to Ukrainian drone strikes.[9] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 2 that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) sustained such heavy personnel losses that they are now combat ineffective and withdrawing, and that elements of the 108th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Tank Regiment (both 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Arm [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are replacing them.[10] The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on November 1, citing sources in the brigade, that elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are suffering heavy casualties and high rates of desertion.[11] The Atesh group noted that the brigade is getting no rest and not evacuating wounded from the battlefield, which both contribute to the high casualty rate.

Ukrainian forces struck oil and electrical infrastructure in Russia on the night of November 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 2 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tuapse oil terminal and its surrounding infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai overnight, and geolocated footage published on November 1 shows fires burning at the port's berth complex and an oil tanker moored at the port.[12] Sources in Ukraine's Security Service told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the strikes caused a fire on an oil tanker, disabled four berths, and damaged buildings at the port.[13] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that at least three Russian shadow fleet tankers were moored at the Tuapse terminal at the time of the strike and noted that the port accounts for 20 percent of Russia’s crude oil exports.[14] Krasnodar Krai regional authorities claimed that drone debris damaged a tanker and an oil terminal in Tuapse and caused a fire.[15] Russian state oil company Rosneft stated that the Tuapse oil terminal processes about 17 million tons per year, and the terminal mainly exports petroleum products from Rosneft’s Tuapse, Achinsk, and Samara refineries and transships third party resources.[16]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, implied on November 2 that Ukrainian strikes caused fires at substations in Kursk and Lipetsk oblasts and a thermal power plant in Oryol Oblast.[17] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on November 2 that USF and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck five substations, including near Gryazi, Lipetsk Oblast, on the night of November 1 to 2.[18]

Belgian officials reported unidentified drone incursions near the Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium from October 31 to November 2. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken reported on November 2 that there were three reports of large drones flying at higher-than-typical altitudes above the Kleine Brogel Air Base on the night of November 1 to 2.[19] Francken stated that the drones were clearly conducting a mission involving Kleine Brogel Air Base and that Belgian forces unsuccessfully attempted to jam and intercept down the drone. Belgian authorities also investigated reports of drones near Kline Brogel Airbase on the night of October 31 to November 1.[20] Belgian media noted that Kleine Borgel Air Base will host F-35 fighter jets in 2027.[21]

Russian authorities continued attempts to shut down Russian insider source VChK-OGPU as part of a crackdown on social media sources that share insider information about the Kremlin and Russian security services. Russian insider channel VChK-OGPU stated on its website that Russian authorities instructed Telegram administrators to remove its reserve Telegram accounts, VChK-OGPU-Info and VChK-OGPU-Info2, on November 2 after instructing Telegram to remove VChK-OGPU's main account and arresting one of the channel's authors on November 1.[22] The Kremlin likely targeted VChK-OGPU as part of a wider effort to cleanse the Russian information space of sources that publish information that the Kremlin deems threatening to the regime’s stability.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to intensify offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk to seize the town and collapse the Ukrainian pocket. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently made tactical advances in the Pokrovsk area.
• Russian forces have likely deprioritized offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in favor of completing the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian assault tactics in the Pokrovsk direction are resulting in high casualty rates.
• Ukrainian forces struck oil and electrical infrastructure in Russia on the night of November 1 to 2.
• Belgian officials reported unidentified drone incursions near the Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium from October 31 to November 2.
• Russian authorities continued attempts to shut down Russian insider source VChK-OGPU as part of a crackdown on social media sources that share insider information about the Kremlin and Russian security services.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2025 

Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk to seize the town. Geolocated footage published on October 31 and November 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and southeastern Pokrovsk.[i] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in central Pokrovsk beyond what the geolocated footage supports, in northeastern Pokrovsk, and northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[ii] A senior officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske on October 31 that Russian forces are operating in roughly 60 percent of Pokrovsk and have entered Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[iii] Geolocated footage published on October 31 and November 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[iv] The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating to the east in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area (northeast of Pokrovsk) reported on November 1 that Russian forces significantly decreased offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction after a failed mechanized assault on October 27 and suggested that Russian forces may have redeployed forces from this direction to reinforce Russian efforts against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[v] A Ukrainian drone operator operating in Pokrovsk indicated to Hromadske that Russian forces are tactically isolating some Ukrainian positions.[vi] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Hromadske that Ukrainian logistics in the direction are “complicated” but that Russian forces have not cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Ukrainian servicemember operating in Myrnohrad told Hromadske that the Russian forces operating in northern Pokrovsk and northeastern Myrnohrad "feel completely at ease" and that Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators are within range to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs connecting Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. An officer of a Ukrainian unit operating in Myrnohrad told Hromadske that Russian forces have almost complete fire control over the narrow Ukrainian GLOC supplying Myrnohrad. The porous nature of the frontline and ubiquity of drones in this area continue to obscure the tactical picture in Pokrovsk, and ISW will provide an updated assessment as the situation becomes clearer.

Ukrainian forces conducted a heliborne air assault operation west of Pokrovsk on October 31. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 1 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful air assault operation near Pokrovsk.[vii] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on October 31 that elements of the GUR Special Forces conducted the operation, which involved multiple helicopters, and entered areas that the Russian military command previously claimed to have seized.[viii] The GUR sources stated that these areas are critically important for Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on October 31 shows Ukrainian servicemembers disembarking from a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter west of Pokrovsk in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[ix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 1 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian counterattack.[x] A Russian milblogger noted on November 1 that the ability of Ukrainian helicopters to penetrate into airspace saturated with Russian drones without sustaining losses “raises questions,” presumably about the strength of the Russian air defense umbrella in the Pokrovsk direction.[xi]

Close combat, urban terrain, and weather conditions are impacting Ukrainian and Russian drone warfare and Russian infiltration tactics in and around Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian officer told Hromadske on October 31 that Ukrainian infantry operating on the forward edges do not regularly engage Russian forces in close combat, as Russian forces instead engage Ukrainian drone and mortar crews in near rear areas.[xii] ISW has recently observed reports that Russian infiltration groups are deliberately engaging Ukrainian drone and artillery crews in Pokrovsk to inhibit Ukrainian strikes.[xiii] A Ukrainian drone operator told Hromadske that the threat of Russian infiltration groups is forcing Ukrainian drone operators to limit the duration of drone flights because the drone operators also have to engage in small arms combat to repel Russian infiltrations in the near rear.[xiv] The Ukrainian drone operator stated that constant Russian infiltrations into Pokrovsk are forcing Ukrainian forces to pull back the second echelon of drone operators, preventing Ukrainian forces from striking Russian forces on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. A high-ranking Ukrainian officer told Hromadske that about 30 to 40 Russian personnel can infiltrate into Pokrovsk when rainy or foggy weather inhibits Ukrainian drone operations, while no more than 10 Russian soldiers can infiltrate during fair weather when Ukrainian forces can operate drones. ISW has observed reports that Russian forces intensify infiltration efforts during poor weather and that precipitation inhibits both Russian and Ukrainian drone operations.[xv] Another Ukrainian drone pilot indicated to Hromadske that Russian and Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk are fighting for control over high-rise buildings and elevated terrain from which to conduct drone operations, particularly against enemy GLOCs at a distance of 30 kilometers.[xvi]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Moscow Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces struck three lines of the Koltsevoy oil refinery in Ramensky Raion, Moscow Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 31 shows explosions at the pipeline.[xvii] The GUR reported that the Koltsevoy pipeline is 400 kilometers long and transports fuel from the Ryazan, Novgorod, and Moscow oil refineries. The GUR reported that the Koltsevoy pipeline could pump up to 7.4 million tons of fuel annually, including three million tons of aviation fuel, 2.8 million tons of diesel fuel, and 1.6 million tons of gasoline. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 11 drones over Moscow Oblast overnight.[xviii]

Polish fighter jets intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the third time in three days, and German officials reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Berlin Brandenburg Airport. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on October 31 that two Polish MiG-29 fighter jets intercepted a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace over the Baltic Sea on October 31.[xix] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that the Russian aircraft was operating without a registered flight plan or an active transponder but did not violate Polish airspace. Polish fighter jets also intercepted Russian reconnaissance aircraft on October 29 and 30.[xx] German authorities at the Berlin Brandenburg Airport confirmed on November 1 that German police spotted an unidentified drone flying near the airport on the evening of October 31, forcing the airport to suspend flights for two hours and divert 11 aircraft.[xxi]

Russian authorities continue cracking down on Russian social media sources who share insider information about the Kremlin and Russian security services. Russian insider channel VChK-OGPU-Info reported on October 31 that Telegram administrators blocked the main VChK-OGPU channel at the behest of Russian authorities for alleged “doxxing and extortion.”[xxii] VChK-OGPU-Info claimed that Telegram removed other channels considered "irritants" to Russian law enforcement and intelligence agencies and that only Telegram management could have removed the account from Telegram. The channel also claimed that Russian forces detained one of the channel's authors in St. Petersburg on October 30. VChK-OGPU claims to have sources affiliated with Russian law enforcement and has offered purported insights into Kremlin factional dynamics, internal assessments of Russian government policies, significant changes in the Russian MoD, and leaks of information regarding the MoD and Russian military.[xxiii]

The Kremlin likely targeted VChK-OGPU as part of a wider effort to cleanse the Russian information space of sources that publish information that the Kremlin deems threatening to the regime's stability. Telegram first deleted the VChK-OGPU channel and several other channels in April 2025, reportedly at the behest of Russian authorities, forcing VChK-OGPU to rely on a backup.[xxiv] Russian law enforcement also detained three employees of the state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru in June 2025 for allegedly receiving funding from an organization designated as a foreign agent and bribing Russian law enforcement to obtain sensitive internal reports.[xxv] Russian authorities raided in late July 2025 the offices of Baza, a Russian outlet affiliated with Russian law enforcement, as part of an abuse of power investigation against Russian police officers who allegedly disclosed sensitive information to Baza.[xxvi] Both publications notably maintained relations within Russia’s internal government systems and previously published information that the Russian government seemingly hoped to withhold from domestic and foreign audiences.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk to seize the town.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a heliborne air assault operation west of Pokrovsk on October 31.
• Close combat, urban terrain, and weather conditions are impacting Ukrainian and Russian drone warfare and Russian infiltration tactics in and around Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Moscow Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1.
• Polish fighter jets intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the third time in three days, and German officials reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Berlin Brandenburg Airport.
• Russian authorities continue cracking down on Russian social media sources who share insider information about the Kremlin and Russian security services.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk.

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