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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2025
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on November 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continue interdiction campaigns in the Pokrovsk direction as the rate of Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk remains temporarily decreased. ISW observed no evidence to assess that Russian forces made additional advances in the Pokrovsk direction on November 9, consistent with recent Ukrainian reporting that Russian forces have slowed their tempo of ground activity in the Pokrovsk direction to extend logistics and bring up reinforcements to southern Pokrovsk.[1] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 8 that Russian forces are in most areas of Pokrovsk but cannot encircle the town because Russian forces are only conducting infiltration missions in and through Pokrovsk from southern Pokrovsk.[2] The source stated that Russian forces are bringing mortar crews and additional drone operators into Pokrovsk to intensify the interdiction efforts against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 9 that Russian drone operators are primarily utilizing first-person view (FPV) drones and winged drones to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs.[3] The servicemember stated that Ukrainian forces are also interdicting Russian GLOCs into Pokrovsk and that Russian forces are "suffering" but noted that poor weather still affects Ukrainian drone operations, presumably operations both to interdict logistics and to strike Russian infiltration groups. The Ukrainian servicemember stated that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions throughout Pokrovsk and that Russian forces only hold positions in a certain part of Pokrovsk, likely referring to southern Pokrovsk. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting in Pokrovsk is not so intense that Pokrovsk is "engulfed in flames" and noted that machine gun fire is rare.[4] The milbloggers claimed that the main Russian force grouping in the Pokrovsk direction is operating about 10 kilometers from Pokrovsk itself and that both Russian and Ukrainian drones are reconnoitering access roads into the town. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing Dinas Microraion in eastern Pokrovsk, that they have cut Ukrainian logistics to Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and that fighting continues in northern, northeastern, and southern Pokrovsk.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increase their tempo of ground activity in Pokrovsk in the coming days as they extend logistics and bring forward personnel into the town.[6]
Russian forces are successfully interdicting Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as part of efforts to collapse Ukrainian defenses in the town. The source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence warned that Ukrainian forces have almost no logistics into Myrnohrad as Russian forces have either control or fire control over all the Ukrainian GLOCs.[7] The source stated that Ukrainian forces can no longer conduct logistics into Myrnohrad on foot due to the threat of Russian infiltration groups, drone strikes, and mines. The source stated that Russian forces are installing barbed wire and building defenses in some areas of Myrnohrad and that Russian motorcycle groups entered northern Myrnohrad. Footage published on November 8 shows Russian forces striking Myrnohrad with a purported FAB-3000 glide bomb.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian motorcycle groups reached northern Myrnohrad, and the Russian forces also advanced in northeastern and southern Myrnohrad and consolidated on its eastern outskirts.[9] Russian forces have been attempting infiltration missions into and mechanized assaults against Myrnohrad from the east, but have been unsuccessful in penetrating into Myrnohrad to the same extent as Russian forces currently operating in Pokrovsk.[10] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces assessed on November 7 that Russian forces would likely soon change their direction of attack against Myrnohrad.[11] Russian forces will most likely continue efforts to degrade Ukrainian forces' ability to defend Myrnohrad through continued infiltration missions and indirect fire against Ukrainian positions and logistics.
The ongoing US government shutdown is reportedly affecting US weapons exports to NATO allies and Ukraine. Axios reported on November 9, citing US Department of State (DoS) estimates, that the US government shutdown has delayed more than $5 billion of US weapons exports to support NATO allies and Ukraine, including AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, Aegis integrated naval combat systems, and HIMARS rocket launchers for allies including Denmark, Croatia, and Poland.[12] Axios reported that the final destination for these weapons is unclear, but noted that NATO allies are purchasing some US weapons to give to Ukraine. A senior DOS official told Axios that the US government shutdown is also slowing down congressional approvals for new weapons sales, as DoS employees involved in the process are furloughed. The senior DOS official stated that the delayed transactions include both weapons sales directly from the US government to NATO allies and licensing for private US defense companies to export weapons. ISW is unable to confirm this report.
European officials continue to report and respond to aerial incursions in European airspace. Lithuanian officials reported on November 9 that Lithuanian authorities temporarily closed the Vilnius Airport on the night of November 8 to 9 after observing an unspecified number of balloons flying toward the airport from Belarusian airspace.[13] The Lithuanian Border Service indefinitely closed its border with Belarus on October 26 in response to intensified Belarusian balloon incursions, which have continued since October 26.[14] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine; thus, Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological conditions-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[15] UK Chief of the Defense Staff Sir Richard Knighton told the BBC on November 9 that the United Kingdom is sending military personnel and equipment to Belgium following a series of repeated unidentified drone incursions into Belgian airspace near critical infrastructure between October 31 and November 6.[16] The BBC noted that the United Kingdom is likely sending elements of its Royal Air Force (RAF) No. 2 Force Protection Wing to support the Belgian military. ISW reported on November 7 that German troops similarly arrived in Belgium to assist the Belgian military in implementing unspecified drone detection and defense measures.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations and non-conventional activity are likely part of Phase Zero efforts.[18]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continue interdiction campaigns in the Pokrovsk direction as the rate of Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk remains temporarily decreased.
- Russian forces are successfully interdicting Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as part of efforts to collapse Ukrainian defenses in the town.
- The ongoing US government shutdown is reportedly affecting US weapons exports to NATO allies and Ukraine.
- European officials continue to report and respond to aerial incursions in European airspace.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Hulyaipole.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector overnight on November 8 to 9. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, implied on November 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Voronezh Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHPP) in Voronezh Oblast and an electrical substation in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[19] Geolocated footage published on November 8 and 9 shows visible damage to the Voronezh CHPP and to the T-24 Electrical Substation in Taganrog.[20] Open-source analysts reported that Ukrainian drones struck the Voronezh CHPP, the main heating supplier for the surrounding residential and commercial area, and damaged a substation in Taganrog.[21] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that several explosions damaged a substation in Taganrog and disrupted power and water supplies for most raions in the city.[22] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on November 9 that Russian forces downed several drones overnight and that a fire broke out at an unspecified utility facility.[23] Taganrog City Mayor Svetlana Kambulova claimed on November 9 that an ”emergency shutdown of a high-voltage power line” caused power outages in several raions of Taganrog, but that authorities later restored power to most of the city.[24]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 9 but did not advance.
Fighting continued in northern Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Oleksiivka, on November 8 and 9.[25]
A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 9 that intensive Ukrainian drone operations are destroying insufficiently fortified Russian strongpoints and significantly hindering Russian drone operations in the Sumy direction.[26] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 9 that drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment recently began striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) but noted that they are less effective than drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.[27]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 9 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Vovchansk City Stadium in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and over a section of the T-2104 Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway in southern Vovchansk.[28]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Synelnykove, and Tykhe on November 8 and 9.[29]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast confirmed that Ukrainian forces observed a buildup of 600 Russian soldiers near Vovchansk.[30] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces continue to use small infantry group tactics and have not employed heavy equipment in northern Kharkiv Oblast since June 2025. The spokesperson noted that the Russian military command deploys fireteams consisting of two to three poorly trained penal recruits in the first wave of its attacks and follows them with more well-trained soldiers. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces include sufficient penal recruits to continue such attritional assaults. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Vovchansk reported that Russian forces have intensified artillery and air strikes against Vovchansk since the beginning of Summer 2025 and specifically target Ukrainian drone operators to degrade Ukrainian strike capabilities.[31] The spokesperson added that the Russian military command continues to pursue broader objectives in northern Kharkiv Oblast beyond the seizure of Vovchansk. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have recently prioritized conducting strikes against military industrial facilities in Chuhuiv.[32]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian equipment in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on November 9.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the east (left) bank of the Oskil River east of Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[35]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building on the H-26 Kupyansk-Kharkiv City highway in southwestern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[36] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on November 8 and 9.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack near Kupyansk from Osynovo (south of Kupyansk) and near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk).[38]
Russian milbloggers posted footage on November 9 purportedly showing Russian first-person view (FPV) drone and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strikes against a Ukrainian vehicle-launched bridge over the Oskil River near Osynovo, likely to interdict Ukrainian logistics.[39]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Borova toward Tverdokhlibove and southeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and toward Chervonyi Stav on November 9.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Derylove, and Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Maslyakivka; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 8 and 9.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Drobysheve and Stavky.[43]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are accumulating on the eastern outskirts of Lyman and preparing to establish logistics for forward positions in support of an assault on the city.[44]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 237th Tank Regiment, and of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 8 and 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Siversk and in central Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[46]
Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Zvanivka, and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on November 8 and 9.[47]
Mykolaivka Military Administration Head Volodymyr Proskunin reported on November 9 that Russian forces struck Mykolaivka (west of Siversk) with five glide bombs on the night of November 7 to 8, damaging residential infrastructure.[48]
Order of Battle: Assault elements and drone operators of the Russian Zarya Battalion of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating east of Siversk.[49]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Chasiv Yar (east of Kostyantynivka), which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized as of August 1.[50]
Refinement of areas under Russian control: ISW revised its map layer for the Russian control of terrain line in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 9 to delineate more clearly the currently occupied and controlled Russian positions in Ukraine, given that the Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 9 that significant fighting is taking place near Zaliznyanske (northeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces do not maintain control over the settlement.[51]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Zaliznyanske and toward Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 8 and 9.[52]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA) and the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[53] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), including artillery elements and Molniya loitering munition and FPV drone operators, reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[54] FPV drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka, Pavlivka, and Toretske (all southwest of Druzhkivka).[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 9 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on November 8 and 9.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shakhove.[57]
The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported on November 9 that Russian forces continue to exploit concealment that dense forest groves provide during attacks.[58] The commander noted that the inability of Russian forces to reach Ukrainian positions on foot due to effective Ukrainian drone surveillance forced the Russian military command to resort to launching mechanized assaults in the area in October 2025. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces employed Vampire bomber drones to strike Russian armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) during an October 9 reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 36 of 42 vehicles that Russian forces committed to the assault.[59] The commander added that Ukrainian forces took Russian prisoners of war (POWs) who had not eaten or drunk potable water for several weeks due to ineffective Russian logistics in the area. The commander noted that Russian forces in the area include ex-convicts, naval infantry elements that the Russian military command transferred from Kursk Oblast, and servicemembers aged 30 to 40.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) and the 57th Spetsnaz Company reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 9 but did not make confirmed advances.
Refinement of areas under Russian control: ISW revised its map layer for the Russian control of terrain line in the Pokrovsk direction on November 9 to delineate more clearly the currently occupied and controlled Russian positions in Ukraine, given that the Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 7 and 8 that significant fighting is taking place near Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces do not maintain control over the settlement.[61]
Russian forces attacked near and in Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, Mykolaivka, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne, Promin, Kozatske, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on November 8 and 9.[62] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[63]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad.[64] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Myrnohrad.[65]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on November 8 and 9.[66]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve, Oleksandrohrad, and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove, Yalta, and Stepove and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Pryvillya, Zlahoda, Danylivka, and Yehorivka on November 8 and 9.[67]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dnipropetrovsk direction.[68]
Geolocated satellite imagery confirms that Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian drone warehouses in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated satellite imagery published on November 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Shahed drone warehouse and damaged another during an FP-2 medium-range drone strike against the occupied Donetsk Airport overnight on November 5 to 6.[69]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 9 shows Russian servicemembers raising Russian flags at multiple locations in Rybne (northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[70] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Rybne.[71]
Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole toward Rivnopillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Uspenivka, Solodke, Novomykolaivka, and Krasnohirske and toward Novouspenivske and Yablukove; and east of Hulyaipole near Poltavka toward Zelenyi Hai and Vesele on November 8 and 9.[72]
Ukrainian Assault Forces Commander Colonel Valentyn Manko reported on November 9 that Ukrainian forces cleared Solodke and Rivnopillya, implying that Russian forces had previously infiltrated into the settlements.[73] ISW has not yet observed evidence of Russian infiltration missions in the area. Manko reported that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Uspenivka, following the publication of geolocated footage on November 7 that indicates that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[74] ISW has not yet observed geolocated evidence to verify the continued presence of Ukrainian forces in Uspenivka. Manko noted that Russian forces are accumulating personnel and reinforcing units in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast in preparation to resume assaults.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Uspenivka.[75]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Stepove, Plavni, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk, and toward Novoandriivka on November 8 and 9.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Mala Tokmachka.[77]
Order of Battle: Strike drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery near Chervona Krynytsia (northeast of Orikhiv).[78] Drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Orikhiv direction.[79]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Kherson direction on November 8 and 9 but did not advance.[80]
The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on November 9 that its agents sabotaged the Dzhankoy-Sevastopol railway line south of the 1457 km railway siding (north of occupied Simferopol), a key ground line of communication (GLOC) for Russian forces in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions.[81] The Atesh group noted that the sabotage forced Russian authorities to suspend train traffic, which disrupted ammunition, fuel, and equipment deliveries.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 69 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — including roughly 50 Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 34 drones and that 32 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[83]
Ukraine continues to suffer from power outages following Russia’s combined missile and drone strike against critical Ukrainian infrastructure on November 7 to 8. Ukrainian Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk reported on November 8 that the Russian strikes were the fifth attack against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and seventh against natural gas infrastructure since the beginning of October 2025.[84] Poltava Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Kohut reported on November 9 that the Russian strikes continue to leave 75 percent of Poltava Oblast without power, and Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that 100,000 subscribers in Kharkiv Oblast remain without power.[85]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/
[2] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22722
[3] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1159932-68-oebr-pro-pokrovsk-pozicii-voroga-znahodatsa-na-pevnij-dilanci-mista/
[4] https://t.me/rybar/75066; https://t.me/bayraktar1070/5870
[5] https://t.me/rusich_army/26716 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68712; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35899; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897; https://t.me/epoddubny/25458
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/
[7] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22722
[8] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186263
[9] https://t.me/epoddubny/25458; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32746; https://t.me/rusich_army/26716; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103443
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/
[12] https://www.axios.com/2025/11/09/government-shutdown-arms-sales-nato-ukraine
[13] https://www.delfi dot lt/ru/news/live/rabota-vilnyusskogo-aeroporta-byla-vremenno-priostanovlena-120171640; https://www.lrt dot lt/ru/novosti/17/2740026/v-subbotu-vozdushnyi-shar-kontrabandistov-zaletel-v-osobo-opasnuiu-zonu; https://suspilne dot media/1160192-vilnuskij-aeroport-vkotre-prizupinav-robotu-cerez-povitrani-kuli-z-bilorusi/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2025/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/
[16] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3dn2ep584ko
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/
[19] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10027
[20] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1987488411414913472; https://t.me/don_mash/10700 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1987342198401343924; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1987338815497728151; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1987420427455705437; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1987409356988817833; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1987408715394224148
[21] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1987421183021883837?s=20 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1987408715394224148 ; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1987448909627863100?s=20
[22] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/explosion-in-taganrog-city-left-without-power-and-water/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/96862 ; https://t.me/astrapress/96864 ; https://t.me/astrapress/96879 ; https://t.me/astrapress/96880
[23] https://t.me/gusev_36/4827
[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/347620; https://t.me/tass_agency/347631 ; https://t.me/KambulovaSvetlana/7969; https://t.me/KambulovaSvetlana/7972
[25] https://t.me/severnnyi/5667 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197
[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/26714
[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/5674
[28] https://t.me/rybar/75060; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14555
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19727 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5667 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371
[30] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1159688-nakopicenna-rosian-u-vovcansku-oficerka-57-i-ompbr-rozpovila-so-vidomo-pro-cih-okupantiv-i-akou-nini-e-taktika-rf/
[31] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1159764-z-travna-2024-roku-ce-e-odin-velikij-sturm-vijskova-57-i-brigadi-rozpovila-pro-situaciu-u-rajoni-vovcanska/
[32] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14555
[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186352
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228
[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/31863; https://t.me/soniah_hub/13086
[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10474; https://t.me/aeronavtyua/4645
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19727; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897
[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/30371; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14555; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103459
[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103460; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/26617; https://t.me/milinfolive/160133
[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103459
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19727; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68713; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897
[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68713
[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/82992; https://t.me/mod_russia/58296
[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10469 ; https://t.me/sowaFm/651 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10470; https://t.me/zarya_1msb/108
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186353
[48] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1160170-pat-fugasnih-aviabomb-vdarili-po-mikolaivci-aki-naslidki-obstrilu-z-7-na-8-listopada/
[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10470; https://t.me/zarya_1msb/108
[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10475; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1987310286936670263; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371
[53] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6151
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103454
[55] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14546
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35896; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897
[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/09/vorog-kynuv-u-bij-svoyih-morpihiv-bo-motostrileczki-brygady-sterlysya-ob-nas-dmytro-palisa/
[59] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2025/
[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103440
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31161; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176
[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35896 ; https://t.me/rybar/75066 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/26716 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68712 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35897 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22722; https://t.me/milinfolive/160080 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197
[63] https://t.me/tass_agency/347621
[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103456 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14547
[65] https://t.me/epoddubny/25458
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197
[67] https://t.me/wargonzo/30371; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197
[68] https://t.me/milinfolive/160119
[69] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6845; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/
[70] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10472; https://t.me/voin_dv/17613; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1987435712661364988
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/58309 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35915; https://t.me/voin_dv/17613
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1325650935387210; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1160180-sili-oboroni-zupinili-prosuvanna-armii-rf-na-shodi-zaporizkoi-oblasti-komanduvac-sturmovih-vijsk-manko/
[73] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1325650935387210; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1160180-sili-oboroni-zupinili-prosuvanna-armii-rf-na-shodi-zaporizkoi-oblasti-komanduvac-sturmovih-vijsk-manko/
[74] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/
[75] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186307
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30371
[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/83014 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35920
[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/83014 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35920
[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35904; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/30337; https://t.me/russian_airborne/11806
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31205 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31197
[81] https://t.me/atesh_ua/8527; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1159956-agenti-ruhu-ates-zaavili-pro-diversiu-na-zaliznici-bila-simferopola/
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/46907
[83] https://www.facebook.com/Chaus.Viacheslav/posts/pfbid0nHWZZq8c79cwf7gtys3fnTD4nvAuWhpqZcEKNj1RJyG9BytqsEw9gQ7T2yAG3r8Dl; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1159986-v-nic-na-9-listopada-armia-rf-atakuvala-bezpilotnikami-pidpriemstvo-u-korukivci-na-cernigivsini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122133311246971242&id=61579137283645&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=vc3TfJ6KoWjYZSlN; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1160014-armia-rf-atakuvala-civilnu-infrastrukturu-u-novgorodi-siverskomu-na-prikordonni-cernigivsini/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/25500; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1159928-udari-rf-po-sinelnikivsini-nikopolsini-ta-pavlogradu-zbiti-droni-poranenij-ak-minula-nic-proti-9-listopada/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/12212; https://www.facebook.com/share/1F1nPfEaNM/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1159950-armia-rf-atakuvala-civilnu-infrastrukturu-na-odesini-postrazdalih-nemae/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/52757 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/12214; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1160106-rosijski-bezpilotniki-atakuvali-pivden-odesini-poskodzeno-garazi-ta-sklinna-zitlovogo-budinoku/ ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/1082; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1159966-armia-rf-udarila-bpla-po-putivlskij-gromadi-na-sumsini/
[84] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM; https://suspilne dot media/1159902-odna-z-najbilsih-atak-same-balisticnimi-raketami-ministerka-energetiki-pro-naslidki-obstrilu-rf/
[85] https://www.facebook.com/oleksiikuleba/posts/pfbid0TfkVDHhy9tjKF7fY48HQCpL5WVNcYqJK9CF7Qd69USGQSPcfPsDAvy8LYptGvhCRl; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1160178-blizko-100-tisac-abonentiv-na-harkivsini-perebuvaut-bez-svitla-vodo-ta-teplopostacanna/ ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1160120-tri-cverti-poltavsini-vnaslidok-obstrilu-8-listopada-zalisilisa-bez-elektriki-volodimir-kogut/













