Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 6, 2025

November 6, 2025, 9:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on November 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command is reportedly augmenting its troop presence in the Pokrovsk direction, likely to consolidate the gains Russian forces initially secured through infiltration missions and advance further through the town. Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Balahan (east of Pokrovsk and east of Myrnohrad).[i] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in northeastern Pokrovsk and east of Pokrovsk.[ii] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and seized part of the Pokrovska Mine complex north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[iii] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) at dawn on November 5 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed three vehicles. Russian forces have rarely employed mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction recently, apart from mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[iv] Ukrainian officials continued to note how Russian forces are disguising themselves as civilians, a war crime under the Geneva Convention, in line with recent reports of Russian perfidy in the area.[v]

Ukrainian officials reported a recent increase in Russian assault and accumulation efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. The 7th Corps reported on November 6 that Russian forces significantly increased the number of assaults in the corps' area of responsibility (AoR).[vi] The corps reported that Russian forces attacked on average 13 times per day in September 2025, but conducted 30 assaults on November 5. The Ukrainian General Staff 0800 November 11 report, which covers activity between 0800 November 10 and 0800 November 11, reported that there were 276 combat engagements along the entire frontline — 100 of which were in the Pokrovsk direction.[vii] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion reported that Russian forces in Pokrovsk are exploiting poor weather conditions to gather in large groups and enter the town in motorcycles or buggies.[viii] The commander noted that Russian forces are starting to bring in provisions and are trying to infiltrate further into northern Pokrovsk and into Ukrainian rear positions where mortar crews and drone pilots are located.[ix] The commander stated that Russian forces have infiltrated practically all over Pokrovsk such that Russian and Ukrainian positions are interspersed house-to-house. A Ukrainian servicemember reported that Russian forces have already conducted three rotations in the Pokrovsk direction after suffering heavy losses in the past four months.[x] The servicemember confirmed that the Russian military command committed unspecified Spetsnaz and naval infantry elements to the Pokrovsk direction. Russian efforts to infiltrate and then consolidate gains in Pokrovsk notably differs from Russia's efforts in the Dobropillya salient, where Russian forces made initial infiltrations but failed to deploy reinforcements to consolidate the gains before Ukrainian efforts to push Russian troops back.

Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to erode frontline forces and eventually facilitate frontline gains. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia announced on November 6 that it will temporarily close the railway line from Husarivka, Kharkiv Oblast (west of Slovyansk, about 45 kilometers from the frontline) to Slovyansk (about 29 kilometers from the frontline) and Kramatorsk (about 22 kilometers from the frontline).[xi] Ukrzaliznytsia stated that it will also close the railway between Bantysheve (west of Slovyansk, about 40 kilometers from the frontline) and Kramatorsk and between Slovyansk and Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman, about 20 kilometers from the frontline). Ukrzaliznytsia cited “security factors” for the closures — likely referring to the recent intensification of Russian strikes against railways.

Russia has been intensifying its strike campaign against railway infrastructure. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast news channel D1 reported on November 6 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a railway station in Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (about 104 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of November 5 to 6, heavily damaging the station building.[xii] The Kamyanske drone strike comes against the backdrop of Russian attempts to interdict ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, including recent strikes against bridges in the Velykomykhailivka direction.[xiii] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction recently noted that the Russian strikes against bridges in the direction are degrading Ukrainian logistics to set conditions for Russian attacks.[xiv] Russian forces have also been targeting trains in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts with modified Shahed-type drones as of early October 2025 and struck a passenger train at the railway station in Shostka, Sumy Oblast on October 4 and high-speed rail infrastructure in Kozyatyn, Vinnytsia Oblast on August 28.[xv] Russia’s BAI campaign that involves strikes against targets in the near rear of the frontline, such as roads, railways and bridges that support GLOCs, aims to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline forces.[xvi] ISW recently assessed, for example, that Russia's BAI efforts over the past five months set conditions for recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[xvii] Russia's recent BAI efforts against rail infrastructure aim to disrupt Ukraine's use of its intermediate rear area for logistics, particularly along the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway (about 20 to 35 kilometers from the frontline) and T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway (about 14 to 30 kilometers from the frontline) — both critical arteries that supply Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[xviii] The Russian military command may intend to shift its focus to attacking the fortress belt after the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) in the future and is using its BAI campaign to set conditions for such attacks now. It remains unclear if Russia's success in using its BAI campaign to facilitate advances in the Pokrovsk direction will be exportable to other areas of the front, however.[xix] Denying Russia’s BAI campaign will likely be critical for an effective Ukrainian defense of the fortress belt. Ukrainian forces should also invest in systematically degrading attacking Russian forces’ operational GLOCs through a Ukrainian BAI campaign as well.

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte noted on November 5 how the term “hybrid warfare" inaccurately describes Russia’s intensified attacks and malign actions against NATO – in line with ISW's ongoing assessment. Rutte advised against using the word “hybrid” to describe recent Russian assassination attempts and repeated incursions into NATO airspace.[xx] Rutte also stated on November 6 that Russia is increasing its cooperation with Iran, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea to destabilize Europe and prepare for long-term confrontation.[xxi] Rutte’s statement coheres with ISW’s assessment that Russia’s ongoing airspace violations and non-conventional activity against NATO states are part of an intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign meant to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set psychological, informational, and political conditions for a potential Russian war against NATO.[xxii]

Authorities reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Hannover airport in Germany on the evening of November 5. German authorities temporarily closed the Hannover airport overnight after pilots spotted an unidentified drone.[xxiii] Deutsche Welle reported that the drone flew over a nearby industrial zone.[xxiv] German authorities have not officially attributed this drone sighting to a specific actor as of this writing. This most recent incursion is the third time authorities have closed a German airport due to drones this week.[xxv] Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever responded to similar drone flights over Belgian airports and critical infrastructure in recent days, stating on November 6 that he will hold an emergency government security council meeting.[xxvi]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation and reject efforts by Russian ultranationalists to frame Russia as an exclusively Orthodox Christian and ethnically Russian nation. Putin emphasized in a November 5 speech to the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations that Russia’s war in Ukraine is consolidating interethnic unity and that the "addition" of Crimea and the four occupied oblasts of Ukraine has expanded Russia.[xxvii] Putin called for Russia to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russian society. Putin explicitly defined Russia as a multiethnic state and claimed that he would declare 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia. Putin called for Russia to replace the ideologically driven concept of the "Soviet people" with patriotism, which Putin defined as a love for Russia with the clear understanding that this is inclusive of all people and ethnic groups of Russia. Putin continued to accuse foreign intelligence services and foreign-sponsored “provocateurs” of attempting to undermine Russian interethnic unity, repeating calls on Russians to unite against external threats.[xxviii] Putin also claimed on November 4 in a speech celebrating National Unity Day that Russia is committed to unity based on shared spiritual values and that Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), is working to promote cooperation among all forces in Russia and Russian communities abroad.[xxix] Putin’s statements show his continued commitment to portraying Russia as an inclusive multiethnic and multireligious state to engender civic — rather than ethnic — nationalism.  ISW continues to assess that Putin must balance between demands from the Russian ultranationalist community — one of Putin's main constituencies — for restrictions against migrants on the one hand, with the need for migration to address Russia's labor shortages and long-term demographic issues.[xxx]

The Kremlin continues to spread narratives about alleged Western provocations to create the appearance of external and internal enemies who aim to undermine the Russian state. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on November 6 that British authorities, with support from British think-tank Chatham House, are attempting to organize sabotage at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in occupied Ukraine.[xxxi] The SVR has been releasing similar claims more frequently since mid-September 2025, constituting a concerted pattern of activity that is likely part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” informational, political, and psychological condition setting phase for a higher level of NATO-Russia conflict.[xxxii] The Kremlin often uses the SVR to spread unfounded allegations designed to weaken support for Ukraine and sow doubt about the nature of Russia's own provocations against NATO members.

Russia continues to develop its modernization and refurbishment programs of older, lower quality tanks, likely for the battlefield in Ukraine where Russia's tank use is limited. A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery assessed on November 6 that Russia’s 103rd Armor Repair Plant (BTRZ) near Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai, the main refurbishment and modernization plant of Russian T-62 tanks, will be able to maintain an annual refurbishment and modernization rate of 300 to 500 T-62 tanks by the end of 2025 after experiencing a spike in activity this year.[xxxiii] The source noted that Russia had a pre-war total of 1,822 T-62 tanks in storage and has pulled 1,000 for refurbishment or modernization in 2025, leaving no tanks in "decent" condition left in storage. The source reported that Russian vehicles in storage bases are no longer in good enough condition to send to the front without refurbishment. The source previously reported in early October 2025 that Russia had roughly 885 T-62 tanks in reserve and was also increasing its refurbishment programs for T-72 tanks.[xxxiv] The source noted that Russian forces have recently exploited worsening weather conditions to resume limited mechanized assaults in Ukraine, which coheres with ISW's ongoing assessment and observed patterns on the battlefield.[xxxv] Russian forces, however, are mainly using tanks in Ukraine to transport infantry or as localized firepower in ways that do not currently require more modern or better condition vehicles. ISW continues to assess that Russia's refurbishment of older tanks is likely for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term, and Russia's reported long-term efforts to increase T-90 tank production are likely not intended for immediate use in Ukraine.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command is reportedly augmenting its troop presence in the Pokrovsk direction, likely to consolidate the gains Russian forces initially secured through infiltration missions and advance further through the town.
• Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to erode frontline forces and eventually facilitate frontline gains.
• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte noted on November 5 how the term “hybrid warfare" inaccurately describes Russia’s intensified attacks and malign actions against NATO — in line with ISW's ongoing assessment.
• Authorities reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Hannover airport in Germany on the evening of November 5.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation and reject efforts by Russian ultranationalists to frame Russia as an exclusively Orthodox Christian and ethnically Russian nation.
• The Kremlin continues to spread narratives about alleged Western provocations to create the appearance of external and internal enemies who aim to undermine the Russian state.
• Russia continues to develop its modernization and refurbishment programs of older, lower quality tanks, likely for the battlefield in Ukraine where Russia's tank use is limited.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Siversk and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Important note on mapping methodology. ISW made a significant mapping methodology change on November 6, 2025, to better visualize the new phenomenon of the interspersion of Russian and Ukrainian frontline positions. These changes include the introduction of the “Assessed Russian Infiltration Areas in Ukraine” polygon, which represents ISW’s assessment of areas through or about which Russian infantry have conducted infiltration missions. An infiltration is “a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires.” (FM3-90). ISW does not assess individual infiltration events to represent Russian advances or control over territory until there is evidence of a consolidated Russian position. ISW will enhance the spatial granularity of its understanding of the interspersion of Russian and Ukrainian positions as possible and will map identified Ukrainian-held strong points within infiltration points as well as available data and ISW policy permits. Such instances will appear as island exclaves of claimed Ukrainian counteroffensive positions surrounded by assessed Russian infiltration areas polygons. Such a mapping technique was not needed before 2025 because Russian and Ukrainian frontline positions had previously been largely continuous. Since mid-2025 the frontlines have become intermingled and the frontlines less readily demarcatable.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine continued its long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector on the night of November 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Volgograd Oil Refinery overnight.[xxxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the oil refinery has an annual processing volume of 15.7 million tons (nearly six percent of Russia's total oil refining capacity) and that explosions and a fire occurred after the strikes. Reuters reported on November 6, citing three sources familiar with the matter, that the Volgograd Oil Refinery halted operations after the Ukrainian strikes damaged the plant's CDU-5 primary processing unit and a hydrocracker.[xxxviii] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed on November 6 that Ukrainian drone debris started a fire in an industrial zone in Volgograd City’s Krasnoarmeysky Raion, the location of the refinery.[xxxix] ISW previously observed reports that Ukrainian forces struck the refinery on September 18.[xl] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on November 6 that geolocated footage shows fires at the Kostroma State District Thermal Power Plant in Volgorechensk after two to three Ukrainian drone strikes.[xli] Kostroma Oblast Governor Sergei Sitnikov claimed on November 6 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against the facility overnight.[xlii] Astra noted that the power plant is Russia's third largest thermal power plant.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[xliii]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City toward Pavlivka and north of Sumy City near Varachyne, on November 5 and 6.[xliv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Kindrativka, and Varachyne (all north of Sumy City).[xlv]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border detachment operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported that Russian forces have decreased the number of ground assaults and artillery and guided glide bomb strikes compared to two to three months ago.[xlvi] The spokesperson stated that the terrain in the area hinders Russian sabotage activity. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are withdrawing from Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) as elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment are entering the settlement.[xlvii] The milblogger published footage reportedly showing a detachment of the 9th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment incorporating wounded soldiers in Dichnya (west of Kursk City).[xlviii]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian vehicle in Seredino-Budska Hromada on November 6, injuring all four civilian passengers.[xlix] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces similarly conducted a drone strike against a civilian vehicle in the same area that killed and injured civilians on November 5.[l]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st and 119th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[li] Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[lii] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[liii] Elements of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating near Korenevo, Kursk Oblast (northeast of Glushkovo).[liv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[lv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Synelnykove and advanced near Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[lvi]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on November 5 and 6.[lvii]

Ukraine's Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group reported on November 6 that Ukrainian forces quickly struck and killed the Russian troops who filmed a flag raising in southern Vovchansk on November 5.[lviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are using sleeper drones to ambush Ukrainian vehicles.[lix]

Order of Battle: Elements, including artillery elements, of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate near Vovchansk.[lx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[lxi]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka and Odradne on November 5 and 6.[lxii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kupyansk and north of Myrove and Sobolivka (both west of Kupyansk).[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk toward Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; south of Kupyansk toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on November 5 and 6.[lxiv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Monachynivka (northwest of Kupyansk), Nechvolodivka  (west of Kupyansk), Blahodativka (southwest of Kupyansk), Osynovo (south of Kupyansk),  and Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk).[lxv][lxvi]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on November 6 that Russian forces continue to attack within Kupyansk and that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can maintain reliable logistics within the urban terrain.[lxvii] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are employing the same tactics as elsewhere in the theater — occupying buildings that offer protection from drone strikes in order to accumulate manpower for subsequent attacks. A Russian soldier claimed on November 5 that Russian forces only need to clear approximately 130 buildings within Kupyansk and that Russian forces will seize Kupyansk within a week (no later than November 12).[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of mobilized personnel; reportedly of the 6th CAA) are reportedly operating near and within Kupyansk.[lxix] Elements of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on November 5 and 6.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Lyman, south of Novoselivka, west of Serednie (both northwest of Lyman), and west of Zarichne (east of Lyman).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Korovii Yar, Kolodyazi, Drobysheve, Derylove, Novoselivka, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 5 and 6.[lxxiii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 6 that Russian forces are conducting Molniya, Kub, and Lancet loitering munition strikes and attacking on motorcycles and electric scooters.[lxxiv]  The spokesperson reported that Russian drone operators are well-trained and that Russian forces are evacuating drone pilots to other locations when they come under Ukrainian drone strikes to reduce pilot casualties. A Russian milblogger claimed that northern and northwestern Yampil are contested “gray zones.”[lxxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) and the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[lxxvi]

Ukrainian Security Services conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in October. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported on November 6 that SBU drones destroyed a fuel and lubricants depot in occupied Starobilsk, an ammunition depot in Voevodivka, Russian command posts and equipment repair bases in Troitskyi Raion, automated rail control equipment used for ammunition and food supplies in Shchastynskyi Raion, and Russian drone control points in the Lysychansk-Bakhmut direction in October 2025.[lxxvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Donetska Railway south of Siversk.[lxxviii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of and within Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[lxxix]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Zvanivka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and Pereizne on November 5 and 6.[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating south of Siversk.[lxxxi] Elements of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Zvanivka.[lxxxii]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 3 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxxiii]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[lxxxiv] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Russian forces attacked north of Kostyantynivka toward Vyrolyubivka and Fedorivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novomarkove, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Predtechyne, and Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on November 5 and 6.[lxxxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Sofiivka.[lxxxvi]

Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov reported on November 6 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck a car in Kostyantynivka, injuring one civilian.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Gorynych Anti-Terrorist Unit (Federal Security Service [FSB] Presidential Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[lxxxviii] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in Novopavlivka and Rayske (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne, Mayak, and Dorozhnie on November 5 and 6.[xc] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Shakhove.[xci]

Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Sukhetske, and Zatyshok; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 5 and 6.[xcii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Hryshyne (west of Pokrovsk) and near Zatyshok and Boikivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[xciii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone control centers near Balahan (east of Pokrovsk).[xciv] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[xcv] Elements of the 35th and 74th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 1441st and 1435th motorized rifle regiments (both likely comprised of mobilized personnel; reportedly of the 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Hryshyne.[xcvi] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA), 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), and 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) (also known as the Somalia Battalion) are reportedly operating in central and eastern Pokrovsk.[xcvii] Elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[xcviii] Drone operators of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU], reportedly operationally subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces [GoF]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Pokrovsk direction.[xcix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Novopavlivka, north of Dachne and northeast and north of Ivanivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[c]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on November 5 and 6.[ci]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA) are reportedly operating between Dachne and Filiya.[cii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[ciii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Zlahoda on November 5 and 6.[civ]

Ukrainian forces conducted a combined drone and missile strike against the occupied Donetsk Airport overnight on November 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on November 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted a joint strike against a Russian base near the occupied Donetsk Airport used to store, equip, and launch Shahed-type drones.[cv] Ukraine's Special Forces (SSO) posted footage showing a Ukrainian strike against the Russian base.[cvi] A Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces stored up to 1,000 Shahed-type drones at the occupied Donetsk Airport and over 1,500 warheads at the time of the strike and that the Ukrainian strike involved missiles and drones that destroyed ammunition and fuel warehouses, a pre-launch drone preparation point, and electronic and communication nodes.[cvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Pryvilne, Nove, Pavlivka, Uspenivka, Novomykolaivka, and Okhotnyche; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai on November 5 and 6.[cviii]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on November 6 that Russian forces are intensifying glide bomb, artillery, multi-launch rocket system (MLRS), and drone strikes in the Hulyaipole direction.[cix] The brigade reported that Russian forces continue to use small group tactics. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on November 6 that the area near Pavlivka is a contested “gray zone.”[cx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Vremivka (Hulyaipole) direction.[cxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Plavni on November 5 and 6.[cxii]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on November 6 that the area near Plavni is a contested “gray zone” and that Russian forces are exploiting dense vegetation in the former Kakhovka Reservoir (west of Orikhiv) to attack Ukrainian forces near Prymorske.[cxiii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including the 162nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), and the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to the VDV) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[cxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 5 and 6.[cxv]

Ukrainian Kherson City Military Administration head Yaroslav Shanko and the Kherson Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 6 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a bus in Dniprovskyi Raion, Kherson City, injuring three civilians, including a 14-year-old girl.[cxvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[cxvii]

Ukrainian forces recently conducted a drone strike against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against an oil depot in occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea, damaging a storage tank and fuel cistern, and two oil depots in occupied Simferopol, Crimea, damaging storage tanks at both.[cxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff report likely confirms strikes that ISW observed reporting of on October 29.[cxix]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 6 that Russian forces launched 135 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including roughly 90 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[cxx] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 108 drones and that 27 drones struck 13 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, rail, and energy infrastructure in Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[cxxi] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on November 6 that Russian strikes cut power to eight coal mines in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, temporarily trapping 2,595 miners underground.[cxxii]

See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Ukrainian railways.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.