Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on November 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk over efforts to close the wider Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk over the last several days sugge Russian forces may be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk for a number of reasons. Russian leadership may seek to exploit the informational effects that the town's seizure will likely generate, or may hope that the seizure of Pokrovsk will facilitate a subsequent effort to close the pocket. Ukrainian counterattacks on the northern shoulder of the pocket and a continued Ukrainian presence within Pokrovsk are complicating Russian advances and Russia's ability to close the pocket, but that fact should not be enough in itself to cause the Russian command to be distracted from the effort from the south. The 51st CAA has also been struggling to advance from the northeast, moving more slowly than the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) is .[2] The 51st CAA's slower tempo could also be contributing to Russia's apparent and possibly temporary prioritization of the seizure of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command is notably not pursuing the standard measures one would expect in such a battlefield configuration, namely focusing forces and means on completing the encirclement, which would normally be the fastest and least costly way to seize the entire area. The Russian military command can change its focus at any time, however.

Russian forces continue to advance within the pocket in the Pokrovsk direction. rovsk and in ad.dditional geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted infiltration operations in southeastern .[4] Pokrovsk itself remains contested, however, and Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions within the settlement. Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk, contrary to Russian claims of Russian advances.eolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that both Ukrainian and Russian forces hold positions in northern Pokrovsk.[6] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Russian forces do not control all of the town and that there is fighting ongoing in northern and eastern Pokrovsk.[7]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a concentration of Russian servicemembers of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade and 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA) in Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk), where they had recently accumulated in a building during adverse weather conditions.[9] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces reported on November 14 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian transport communications facility and a concentration of Russian forces near Shevchenko (in the Russian near rear south of Pokrovsk) with a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb.[10] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack near Rodynske.[11]

Russia continues to rely on North Korea for manpower to offset Russia's labor and military personnel shortages. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) on November 14 reported Russian plans for roughly 12,000 North Korean workers to join the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan by the end of 2025 to work at Russia's factory producing Shahed-type drones.[12] The GUR reported that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) met with local government officials and representatives of the North Korean company Jihyang Technology Trade Company in October 2025 to discuss the details. The GUR stated that the Jihyang Company is responsible for the search and selection of North Korean workers to go to Russia, and the company is reportedly a front company for Green Pine, a US sanctioned company that is a hub for North Korea's weapons trade and has aided North Korea's nuclear program.[13] Japanese outlet NHK reported in June 2025 that North Korea was “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the ASEZ, and the reported 12,000 North Koreans going to the drone factory by the end of the year are likely in addition to these 25,000.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 14 that North Korean sappers are demining in Kursk Oblast alongside Russian sappers.[15] The Russian MoD noted that the North Korean sappers previously underwent training at Russian engineering troop training centers. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported in early November 2025 that North Korea deployed roughly 5,000 military engineering troops to Russia, that there were 10,000 North Korean troops near the Russian-Ukrainian border performing "security duties," and that another 1,000 troops were clearing mines.[16] ISW continues to assess that the deployment of North Korean troops to support roles frees up Russian forces to deploy to the battlefield.[17] North Korean workers at the ASEZ will also notably be able to take lessons on large-scale drone production back to North Korea.

Ukrainian forces continue to enhance their air defense system against Russian strikes in ways that offer Europe and the United States valuable lessons. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis Shmyhal announced on November 14 that Ukraine launched serial production in Ukraine of the “Octopus” interceptor drone with three manufacturers beginning immediately and 11 others preparing production lines.[18] Shmyhal noted that the interceptor drones are able to operate at night, in electronic warfare (EW) contested environments, and at low altitudes. Shmyhal reported that the Octopus can intercept Russian Shahed-type drones. Shmyhal’s announcement follows a similar announcement on October 20 about the production of the Octopus drones in the UK.[19] Business Insider reported on November 12 that European defense company Atreyd stated that it shipped its "drone wall" system to Ukraine. The "drone wall" reportedly consists of a collection of first-person view (FPV) drones that launch from designated platforms if radar systems detect a threat, and the drones are arrayed in layers and spaced apart. The FPVs intercept Russian drones by detonating nearby. The system reportedly relies on artificial intelligence (AI) to operate autonomously, and one operator will be able to control 100 drones. Business Insider reported that the "drone wall" system is able to operate in GPS-denied areas as it uses pre-installed 3D maps of the area, augmenting the system’s electronic warfare (EW) resilience. The system’s drones are able to operate at various altitudes and are equipped with identification technology to prevent friendly fire. Business Insider noted that system operators will not require any specialized training nor prior drone pilot training. Atreyd noted that the system will likely be operational in Ukraine within a few weeks and that Ukraine will employ the system to defend its cities and critical infrastructure, but may deploy systems closer to the frontline to intercept Russian glide bombs later. Atreyd’s "drone wall" system is defensive in nature and notably differs from Ukraine’s tactical ”wall of drones” concept, which uses a large number of tactical strike drones and loitering munitions to destroy manpower and equipment on the frontline.[21] Europe can glean important lessons from Ukraine’s air defense measures, including its future employment of Atreyd’s system, to understand how innovations in tactics and technology can counter Russia's evolving aerial threats. ISW continues to assess that the West should support Ukraine's interceptor drone program not only for Ukraine's defense against Russian strikes but also for the defense of Europe.[22]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 13 and 14 that largely targeted Ukrainian civilian areas. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Ryazan Oblast; one Zirkon anti-ship missile from an unspecified location; six Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles from the waters near occupied Crimea and in the Black Sea; and nine Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 430 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including roughly 300 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kinzhal missiles, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, all six Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles, and 405 drones; that one missile and 23 drones struck 13 locations; and that drone debris fell at 44 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces concentrated their strikes on Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes mainly targeted Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts, injuring dozens of civilians and killing at least four.[24] Zelensky highlighted how Ukraine’s air defense systems, including US-made Patriot systems, neutralized 14 Russian missiles.[25] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that the Russian strikes injured 35 civilians and killed six in Kyiv Oblast.[26] A Russian Iskander missile damaged part of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Kyiv City.[27] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in southern Odesa Oblast, killing two and injuring 1orsk.[28] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to leveraging its long-range strikes that target Ukraine’s civilian populace in an effort to sow fear and demoralize the Ukrainian people.[29]

Ukrainian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Russian energy and military infrastructure on the night of November 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian ship base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai with drones and Neptune missiles.[30] Ukrainian forces reportedly damaged port infrastructure, the Sheskharis oil terminal, and a launcher and missile storage area of an S-400 air defense system. The Sheskharis terminal is one of the largest oil tanker complexes for the transshipment of oil and petroleum products in southern Russia and supplies Russian forces operating in Ukraine. A source in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Ukrainian strikes damaged oil tankers, pipeline infrastructure, and pumping units as well as an S-300/400 air defense system at the base of the Russian 1537th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (7th Airborne [VDV] Division).[31] Geolocated footage published on November 13 and 14 shows an explosion at the base of the 1537th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Novorossiysk and a large fire near the Novorossiysk oil terminal.[32] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged the oil depot at the Sheskharis transshipment complex and that falling drone debris started a fire.[33] The headquarters claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a civilian vessel in the port of Novorossiysk.[34] Reuters reported on November 14 that industry sources stated that the Novorossiysk port halted exports and Transneft suspended crude supplies to the outlet following the Ukrainian strikes.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast, which supplies the Russian military.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also damaged infrastructure at the Krystal Plant fuel and lubricants storage enterprise in Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast. Ukrainian strikes reportedly caused fires at both enterprises in Saratov Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the fire at the oil refinery likely originated at the fuel storage tank.[37] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a drone strike damaged civilian infrastructure in Saratov City.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk over efforts to close the wider Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area.
• Russia continues to rely on North Korea for manpower to offset Russia's labor and military personnel shortages.
• Ukrainian forces continue to enhance their air defense system against Russian strikes in ways that offer Europe and the United States valuable lessons.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 13 and 14 that largely targeted Ukrainian civilian areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Russian energy and military infrastructure on the night of November 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Borova and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted a sabotage attack against railway infrastructure in Russia on November 13. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR caused an explosion at a section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad near Sosnovka, Khabarovsk Krai on November 13.[39] The GUR reported that the explosion derailed a freight train and damaged the track. The GUR noted that Russia uses the railway to supply weapons and ammunition to the Russian military, particularly those from North Korea.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including southwest of Glushkovo near Novyi Put; north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Varachyne; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on November 13 and 14.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka.[41]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces warned that Russian forces are preparing to open a new offensive in the Sumy direction toward Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City). The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command brought Chechen Akhmat units and a motorized rifle battalion of the 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to the area. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces plan to attack from Kucheriv and Milaevka (both east of Myropillya in Kursk Oblast). The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have been preparing for the attacks over the last few weeks, including by conducting systematic flooding and engineering missions. ISW will continue to monitor the area for new Russian offensive operations.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[43]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk and Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[44]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk on November 13 and 14.[45]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]), and the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Kurchaloyevsky Raion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vovchansk.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[47]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on November 1 A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Khatnie.[49]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Ukrainian positions near Velykyi Burluk.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk)

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Ukrainian forces assaulting Russian positions in central Kupyansk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk) and advanced in eastern Kupyansk, in eastern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk), west of Pishchane, and near Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk).[53]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 13 and 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in and Petropavlivka — areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.

Russian forces attacked east of Kupya near Dvorichanske and Krasne Pershe and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Pishchane, and Hlushkivka and toward Novoosynove; and south of Kupyansk toward Kyi on November 13 and 14.[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within and near Kupyansk and near Dvorichanske, Nechvolodivka (west of Kupyansk), and Osyonovo (soupyansk).[56]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on November 14 that the number of Russian troops operating in Kupyansk is about 50 soldiers, significantly less than a week ago (roughly since November 7).[57] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces have halted Russian attempts to replenish forces within the town. Trehubov stated that Russian forces are focusing on the area south and southeast of Kupyansk rather than within the town itself.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 288th Artillery Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Pishchane.[58] Elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including of its 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in Kupyansk.[59]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova).[60]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Tverdokhlibove, Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Olhivka on November 13 and 14.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st GTA (MMD) are striking Ukrainian equipment east of .[62]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Drobysheve, Yarova, Serednie (all northwest of Lyman), Stavky (north of Lyman), and Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[63]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in northern Drobysheve — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Yarova, and Shandryholove and toward Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Hlushenkove, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 13 and 14.[65]

 A Russian milblogger claimed that Yarova is a contested “gray zone” and that other Russian sources claiming Russian advances near and within the settlement are incorrect.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[67] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Rubtsi (northwest of Lyman) direction.[68]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[69]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to eastern Siversk.[70]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and Vasyukivka on November 13 and 14.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Platonivka (northwest of Siversk).

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction are using Lancet loitering munitions to target the Ukrainian near rear.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) and north of the settlement.[74]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka).[75]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in central Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) and along the H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Kostyantynivka, areas in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[76]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske and Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 13 and 14.[77]

A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on November 14 that Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Volodymyrivka.[78] The Ukrainian drone unit reported that it destroyed 11 heavily armored vehicles, including two tanks. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults and attacking on motorcycles equipped with Starlink terminals during foggy weather.[79] The commander noted that Russian forces continue to use infiltration tactics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) reportedly continue to operate near Kostyantynivka.[80] Drone operators of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north of Stupochky.[81] Drone operators of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[82] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka.[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and advanced south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[84]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-occupied building in Shakhove, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[85]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on November 13 and 14.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne, Dorozhnie, and Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya direction.[88]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel, reportedly of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) seized Rih (just east of Pokrovsk).[89] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Pokrovsk.[90]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Bilytske, Sukhetske, Razine, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on November 13 and 14.[91] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske, Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk), and Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[92]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD); of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD); and of the 29th Separate Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Brigade (CMD) are reportedly operating within and near Pokrovsk.[93] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 14 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission along the T-0428 Novopavlivka-Slovyanka highway in eastern Novopavlivka and likely previously infiltrated Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[95] ISW assesses that these infiltrations did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Kotlyarivka; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Dachne, and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai on November 13 and 14.[96]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags throughout Orestopil (just south of Velykomykhailivka) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[97] The Russian infiltration mission into Orestopil also indicates that Russian forces previously infiltrated Oleksiivka (southwest of Orestopil).

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) seized Orestopil.[98] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka), south of Lisne (northeast of Velykomykhailivka), southeast of Orestopil, and south and east of Velykomykhailivka.[99]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and Orestopil; and west of Velykomykhailivka toward Tykhe and Kolomiitsi on November 13 and 14.[100] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces tried to take advantage of foggy weather and used about 20 armored vehicles to support infantry attacks in the Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction on the morning of November 14.[101] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and four armored fighting vehicles and damaged one tank and two armored vehicles.

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces are using fog for small group infiltrations, but that the fog sometimes dissipates before Russian forces complete their missions, exposing them to Ukrainian drones.[102] The commander stated that Russian forces are using civilian vehicles, motorcycles, and electric scooters to transport infantry. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces are using fiber optic drones to wait and then ambush Ukrainian forces along ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that aircraft of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are conducting strikes – likely glide bomb strikes – again Ukrainian shelters in Velykomykhailivka.[104]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole near Yehorivka and Danylivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rivnopillya, Yablukove, Solodke, Pryvilne, Krasnohirske, Zlahoda, and Rybne; and east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke and Zelenyi Hai on November 13 and 14.[105]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction are trying to infiltrate into Ukrainian positions and engage in clashes.[106] Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian forces trying to consolidate in Novouspenivske, Uspenivka, and Okhotnyche (all northeast of Hulyaipole).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Danylivka.[107] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novouspenivske.[108]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[109]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, Stepove, Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Plavni on November 13 and 14.[110]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on November 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 13 and 14.[111]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[112]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/

[3] https://t.me/fenix_3_79/669; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10525; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989299345561096340; https://t.me/fenix_3_79/669; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989034568339566801 ; https://t.me/shershni68/868  ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989049991818879281; https://x.com/425Skala/status/1989050266490974350 

[4] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989294650881151336 ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/26702; https://t.me/mir_perezagruzka/10764; https://t.me/osintpen/2074

[5] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989304806742093867; https://t.me/mir_perezagruzka/10765 

[6] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989049991818879281; https://x.com/425Skala/status/1989050266490974350  ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989304806742093867; https://t.me/mir_perezagruzka/10765

[7] https://t.me/dva_majors/83306 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186889 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68806

[8] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1582; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1989407183868703017?s=20

[9] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1169541041264020 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1164400-sili-specialnih-operacij-znisili-misce-zoseredzenna-osobovogo-skladu-51-oi-armii-rf-na-doneccini/ ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/sof-drones-destroy-gathering-point-of-russia-s-51st-army-near-myrnohrad/ ;  https://x.com/SOF_UKR/status/1989240036634816848

[10] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/11/14/aviacziya-zsu-vdaryla-po-obyektu-transportnoyi-komunikacziyi-rosiyan-na-donechchyni/ ; https://t.me/EastAFU/45

[11] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68806 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83306

[12] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7294

[13] https://kyivindependent dpt com/russia-plans-to-import-12-000-north-koreans-to-work-in-its-massive-shahed-drone-plant/; https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1718/materials/summaries/entity/green-pine-associated-corporation

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-26-2025/

[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/58471

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/

[18] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/11968

[19] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretary-john-healey-mp-mansion-house-defence-and-security-lecture-2025

[20] https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-gets-drone-wall-to-fight-russian-threats-arms-maker-2025-11 ; https://archive.ph/7bYFP

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025/

[23] https://t.me/kpszsu/47392

[24] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16871

[25] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16882

[26] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2017

[27] https://t.me/bbcrussian/87880

[28] https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1164282-udarni-droni-atakuvali-pivden-odesini-poskodzeno-energoobekt-e-postrazdalij/ ; https://www.facebook.com/oda.odesa/posts/pfbid0roBSp4xKMZfgctkGoEq2KagWLqFn2jLqiwEBNAfDhSV1mcTzXfk4v2o219Cm8hzFl ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/12316 ; https://t.me/OdessaDumskayaNet/103880 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/11/14/udar-rf-po-chornomorsku-zagynuly-2-lyudyny-10-poraneno-sered-nyh-dytyna/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/53041 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/87872 ; https://t.me/astrapress/97178 ; https://t.me/OdessaDumskayaNet/103907 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1164464-rf-atakuvala-dronami-rinok-na-odesini-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/

[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2025/

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31395

[31] https://suspilne dot media/1164690-sbu-i-sili-bezpeki-ta-oboroni-urazili-naftovij-terminal-u-portu-novorosijsk-dzerela/

[32] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12294; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1989110048996614446; https://t.co/uACJYzBp9r; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1989133285168128343 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1989116701166985228; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1989137979680727494?s=20

[33] https://t.me/opershtab23/14429; https://t.me/opershtab23/14435

[34] https://t.me/opershtab23/14434

[35] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-black-sea-port-novorossiysk-suspends-oil-exports-after-ukrainian-drone-2025-11-14/; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-drones-damage-ship-dwellings-oil-depot-russias-novorossiysk-2025-11-14/

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31395

[37] https://t.me/astrapress/97215

[38] https://t.me/busargin_r/10079

[39] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vybukh-na-transsybi-operatsiia-voiennoi-rozvidky-zablokuvala-kliuchovu-lohistychnu-arteriiu-kremlia.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/7296 ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4058801-gur-zablokuvalo-ruh-vantaziv-po-transsibirskij-magistrali.html

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83306 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5723 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5729

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/30456

[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/5725

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/58464

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36100

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19738 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30456 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5723

[46] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6156

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36100

[48] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19739 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393

[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36100

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36100

[51] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1989141476379623749?s=20; https://t.me/vpolezrenia1/10290 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1989170834448253369?s=20; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/63;

[52] https://instagram.com/reel/DRCnSEQDMRg/

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/83306 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36100 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44508

[54] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1989170834448253369?s=20; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/63 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989357629865652597; https://instagram.com/reel/DRCnSEQDMRg/;

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19739 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19738 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44508; https://t.me/gvZapad/17129 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58467 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83306

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36100 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58476 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44508; https://t.me/gvZapad/17129 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44503 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103749 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36127 

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/11/14/poperedni-anonsy-yakos-ne-zrostayutsya-kilkist-rosijskyh-dyversantiv-v-kupyansku-rizko-zmenshylasya/

[58] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1989141476379623749?s=20; https://t.me/vpolezrenia1/10290

[59] https://t.me/tass_agency/348402; https://t.me/mod_russia/58467 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/25507 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103749

[60] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1989129114452914557?s=20; https://t.me/vpolezrenia1/10290

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19739 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19738

[62] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1989129114452914557?s=20; https://t.me/vpolezrenia1/10290

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36129 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83306 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30456

[64] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1989079371026690072; https://youtube.com/watch?v=Xm0Cr-B3VSE ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10516 

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19739 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19738 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44494; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/18935 ;

[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/44498; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/18938

[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/83310

[68] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/11404 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17677

[69] https://t.me/shock3OA/3356; https://t [dot] me/creamy_caprice/10522 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989267163698606396; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989267163698606396?s=20; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989270664201847140?s=20; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989273095639888170?s=20 

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36129

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30456

[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36129

[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36129

[74] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1989114408841465864?s=20; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/3329

[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/44492 

[76] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10517; https://t/me/motopatriot78/44401; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1989112853388042668?s=20; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44401

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83306 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30456 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36121

[78] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/11/14/minus-11-odynycz-tehniky-ta-60-okupantiv-feniks-vidbyv-vorozhyj-shturm-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/ ; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/1324

[79] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/11/14/vsya-tehnika-shho-doyizhdzhala-rozbyralasya-fpv-na-kostyantynivskomu-napryamku-vorog-vyprobovuye-usi-mozhlyvi-varianty-atak/

[80] https://t.me/epoddubny/25516

[81] https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/3329

[82] https://t.me/sashakots/57678

[83] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14576

[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36121 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/25533

[85] https://x.com/OSINTUkriane/status/1989224969189093501?s=20; https://x.com/OSINTUkriane/status/1989225215319240821?s=20; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/26691 

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36121

[87] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68806

[88] https://t.me/dva_majors/83295

[89] https://t.me/mod_russia/58472 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58478

[90] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103797

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68803 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36144

[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/83306 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30456 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58477; https://t.me/mod_russia/58481 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68806

[93] https://t.me/wargonzo/30467 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44511 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58456 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/160498

[94] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/48424

[95] https://t.me/kyianyn204/4059; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10528 

[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373

[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/17680; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10520; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989247042892492976?s=20; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989250147881308313?s=20; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1989252318844584433?s=20; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/

[98] https://t.me/mod_russia/58472; https://t.me/mod_russia/58477; https://t.me/mod_russia/58480

[99] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68812; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32799 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103792; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68812

[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373; ttps://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13384; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68803; https://t.me/wargonzo/30456

[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31394

[102] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1164688-rosijski-vijskovi-vikoristovuut-tumani-dla-prosuvanna-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku-5-osbr/

[103] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/14/prohodyat-marshrut-mavik-detalno-proglyadaye-shlyah-oboronczi-testuyut-taktyku-protydiyi-dronam-na-optovolokni/

[104] https://t.me/voin_dv/17679

[105] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373; ttps://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13384; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68803; https://t.me/rybar/75203; https://t.me/voin_dv/17682

[106] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1164716-armia-rf-prodovzue-sturmuvati-vtim-prosuvanna-nini-nemae-volosin-pro-situaciu-na-gulajpilskomu-napramku/

[107] https://t.me/voin_dv/17683

[108] https://t.me/mod_russia/58470

[109] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1989089828961677562; https://t.me/stavvoin/42 

[110] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31393; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13384; https://t.me/dva_majors/83306; https://t.me/wargonzo/30456

[111] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31375; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31373 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13384

[112] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36107