Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 28, 2025

Assessment as of: 11:59pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on November 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse despite recent Russian gains and Kremlin assertions. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference with Russian state media in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on November 27 that Russia is making significant gains across the frontline such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.[1] Putin implied that some Western officials are attempting to rush the US-proposed peace plan because they fear that Russian forces will collapse sectors of the frontline in Ukraine, destroy Ukraine's most combat-capable elite units, and degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large. Putin claimed that these Western officials are willing to achieve a quick peace even at the expense of Ukrainian concessions. Putin then made a series of exaggerated claims about purported Russian battlefield gains, including that Russian forces have completed the seizure of Kupyansk; captured about 70 percent of Pokrovsk and completely encircled both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad; seized just over 21 percent of all buildings in Siversk; seized most of Vovchansk; and advanced within one to two kilometers of Hulyaipole.[2] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only seized 15.72 percent of Kupyansk, 64.48 percent of Pokrovsk, 10.14 percent of Myrnohrad, 2.16 percent of Siversk, and 35.66 percent of Vovchansk; and that Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of Hulyaipole from the east. Putin also claimed that Russian forces have seized a "significant" amount of territory in "Komsomolsk," even though there is no city in Ukraine with this name.[3] Putin may have been referring to Kostyantynivka, although ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in just 0.07 percent of Kostyantynivka. Though the situation in specific sectors of the frontline is serious, especially in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, most of Putin's assertions are exaggerated and do not correspond to the battlefield reality he claims to represent, nor do they indicate that the frontlines in Ukraine will collapse imminently.

Putin's exaggerated battlefield claims are part of his pursuit to actualize his theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russia's military and economy can outlast the West's will to support Ukraine to continue grinding advances on the frontline.[4] Putin and senior Russian defense officials have made several high-level public engagements in recent weeks to make exaggerated battlefield claims, creating the false impression that Russian forces are making greater gains than they actually are.[5] Senior Russian officials began to exaggerate Russian advances in Kupyansk in August 2025 and have claimed several times since that Russian forces have seized the town – including Putin most recently on November 20 – but even pro-war Russian milbloggers have denied the extent of these official Russian claims.[6] These exaggerated claims aim to convince the West to cease support of Ukraine and push Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands or allow Russian forces to continue their grinding offensive operations unimpeded, which would validate Putin's theory of victory. ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, however.[7]

The rate of Russian advances does not exceed a footpace in all the areas where Putin claimed that Russian forces have made significant advances. Putin praised the claimed seizure of Kupyansk as the model by which Russian forces will make advances elsewhere on the frontline.[8] Russian forces have been using a new campaign design that utilizes battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts to degrade Ukrainian logistics and defenses such that Russian infantry can infiltrate into Ukrainian rear areas, accumulate, and consolidate advances.[9] Russian forces have been most successful at applying this campaign design not in Kupyansk but in the Pokrovsk direction, where Ukrainian forces have managed to stymie the Russian rate of advance in Pokrovsk to a footpace despite Russia's operational prioritization of this effort.[10] Russian forces have not yet seized Pokrovsk, a town of 11.5 square miles (29.78 square kilometers), despite operating within the town for over 120 days.[11] Russian forces have used this campaign design to some degree in the Kupyansk direction but have not yet succeeded in replicating the advances they have made in the Pokrovsk direction, however. Russian forces failed to sufficiently degrade Ukrainian defenses in the Kupyansk direction after first infiltrating into the town in August 2025, allowing Ukrainian forces to largely push back Russian forces.[12] Russian forces continue conducting infiltration operations into Kupyansk, but Ukraine has denied Russia the rapid seizure of the town.[13] Russian forces have made the most rapid advances in recent weeks using this new campaign design in the Hulyaipole direction, but even these advances are constrained to footpace.[14] The Russian military command would likely have to commit equivalent time and resources to other areas of the frontline as it is currently committing in the Pokrovsk direction to replicate the results of the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole efforts elsewhere on the frontline or exploit gaps in Ukrainian defenses.

The current Russian force composition is not optimized to achieve or exploit a collapse of Ukrainian defenses. The war in Ukraine has become largely positional, and Russian forces writ large are sufficiently degraded such that they cannot currently conduct maneuver warfare at the scale necessary for rapid, operational-level advances that restore maneuver to the battlefield.[15] Russian forces have become optimized to fight positional warfare with low quality personnel, insufficient armor and mechanized equipment stores, and poor command and control.[16] Russian forces are currently conducting positional offensive operations as part of Putin's effort to outlast Western support for Ukraine.[17] Russian forces use three to five people on average for infiltration and assault operations, largely conducted on foot and only occasionally using light motorized civilian vehicles such as motorcycles, buggies, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[18] Ukraine's drone-based defenses, colloquially called the "wall of drones," have some vulnerabilities that Russian forces have managed to exploit to make tactically-significant advances, but overall have denied Russian forces the ability to use armored vehicles and conduct mechanized maneuver, such that it has degraded the overall quality and ability of Russian forces to conduct such operations.[19]

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia does not recognize the US-proposed peace plan as a serious agreement and indicated that Russia is not interested in ending the war on the Trump administration's desired rapid timeline. Putin responded to a journalist's question about the US-proposed peace plan during the November 27 press conference, asserting that the peace plan is not a finalized treaty but a "set of issues" that the United States "proposed" for further discussion and final framing.[20] Putin stated that Russia generally agrees that the 28-point plan could be the basis of some future negotiations but noted that he will not discuss any final agreements because there are no such agreements. Putin also notably did not specify if he believes that the US-proposed peace plan would serve as the basis for Russia's direct negotiations with Ukraine. Putin later responded to a question regarding the possible risks of a "rushed" peace deal, stating that the "issues" in the proposed peace plan require serious consideration. On November 27, Putin continued to exploit the lack of clarity about the August 2025 Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin’s unwillingness to begin the peace negotiations process to end its war in Ukraine. Putin implied that US negotiators created the original 28-point peace plan following negotiations with Putin before the Alaska summit on August 15. High-ranking Russian officials have responded to the various peace plan proposals in recent days by reiterating their commitment to alleged US-Russian agreements from the Alaska summit in place of the documented 2022 Istanbul agreements, which the Kremlin has used to cite as its basis any future negotiations.[21] ISW previously noted that the Kremlin is exploiting the lack of official documents codifying the outcomes of the Alaska summit to add opacity to the negotiations discussion.[22] Putin's discussion of the US peace proposal suggests that the Kremlin views the peace proposal as a suggestion rather than a decisive effort to end the war in Ukraine and is setting information conditions to stall the peace process on this basis.

Putin reiterated that Russia cannot sign any peace or other agreements with the current or future Ukrainian government and reiterated accusations that any Ukrainian government not under the Kremlin's control is illegitimate, another clear rejection of the US peace proposal. Putin stated that it would be "senseless" for Russia to sign any peace agreements with the current Ukrainian government and emphasized that he has made this point repeatedly.[23] Putin reiterated the Kremlin's long-standing false narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is an illegitimate leader and introduced a new claim that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court must first recognize Zelensky's authority before Zelensky can sign any peace agreement with Russia.[24] Putin claimed that the Constitutional Court is "not working," and thus cannot recognize Zelensky's legitimacy. Putin claimed that he wants to secure an agreement with Ukraine but that an agreement now is "legally impossible" due to the falsely claimed illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government. Putin implied that Russia will not be able to conclude any agreements with Ukraine in the long term because Ukraine must end its martial law, conduct elections, execute a referendum, and form a new constitutional court to establish a legitimate government capable of concluding an agreement with Russia. Putin added that there are "plenty of sane people" in Ukraine who want to "build a long-term, historically sound relationship with Russia," implying that Russia is only interested in signing agreements with a pro-Russian government in Ukraine that the Kremlin can manipulate or directly control. Putin is likely deliberately invoking the false narrative that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate in an effort to indirectly reject the US-proposed peace deal by inventing a justification against concluding a peace deal on the Trump administration's proposed rapid timeline, similar to the Kremlin's use of the claimed illegitimacy narrative to justify its lack of serious engagement in prior US-led peace initiatives.[25]

Putin demanded Ukraine's withdrawal from unoccupied parts of illegally annexed Ukrainian regions as a precondition for a ceasefire, not a peace deal. Such a concession would force Ukraine to withdraw to lines that are indefensible against renewed Russian aggression and would consign millions of Ukrainians to life under Russian occupation, therefore failing to guarantee a lasting peace. Putin stated that Russia receives numerous ceasefire requests but will stop active hostilities after Ukrainian forces withdraw from the unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, which Russia annexed along with the occupied portions in 2022.[26] Putin reiterated his commitment to continuing the war if Ukrainian forces do not withdraw, likely in an effort to reinforce the Russian false narrative that Russia can sustain the war effort indefinitely and that Russia's victory is imminent. Putin's statement is not a compromise aimed at advancing the peace deal but is a repetition of his June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede territories that Russia does not occupy and has struggled and failed to seize since 2014 and 2022.[27] Such a concession would force Ukraine to abandon its Fortress Belt, the fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that has served as the backbone of Ukraine's defenses since 2014.[28] Russian forces failed to seize the Fortress Belt during Russia's initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine and since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and it would likely take Russia multiple years to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast alone.[29] This demanded withdrawal would also allow the Kremlin to secure more advantageous positions to renew aggression against southwestern and central Ukraine from the borders of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts by alleviating the need for Russian forces to cross the Dnipro River, a significant effort that Russian forces are currently unlikely to achieve without sacrificing the strategic initiative across the frontline, and conduct long and costly urban battles in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson cities.[30] Kremlin officials have routinely made claims over Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, neither of which Russian forces occupy in any significant part, and have reiterated these claims in recent days.[31] The surrender of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to Russia – in exchange for no guarantees for peace – would set conditions for Russia to pursue further conquests of Ukrainian territory in the future.

Putin also demanded that the international community recognize Russia's territorial conquests in Ukraine, likely to set legal grounds to justify a reinvasion of Ukraine at the opportune time. Putin emphasized that the international community must recognize the illegally annexed Ukrainian territories as de jure part of Russia.[32] Putin stated that Russia does not need Ukraine to recognize illegally annexed territories, however. Putin stated that such international recognition will allow Russia to consider any violations of an agreement with Ukraine as a formal attack on Russia and employ all retaliatory measures or conduct a campaign to "restore rule of law" to Ukrainian-held territories. Putin also stated that he would want to discuss legal issues about Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts with US negotiators, not with Ukraine. Putin is likely demanding the international recognition of occupied and illegally annexed Ukrainian territories because such recognition would grant Russia multiple possible justifications for a reinvasion and may inhibit international support for Ukraine's defense against this Russian aggression. The Kremlin has previously set a precedent of accusing Ukraine of violating the Minsk II accords in the lead up to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a justification for Russia's war.[33]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office announced on November 27 that Russian forces executed five Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in the Hulyaipole direction on the morning of November 27.[34] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces conducted the executions near Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[35] The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 28 that Russian forces executed a Ukrainian POW in Hnativka (immediately southeast of Pokrovsk) on an unspecified date in November 2025.[36] ISW observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions in late October and November 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in these directions and infiltrated into the towns.[37] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[38]

Ukrainian Presidential Office Head and prominent negotiator Andriy Yermak resigned from his position on November 28. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Yermak's resignation on November 28 and stated that Ukraine's negotiating team will consist of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), National Security and Defense Council, and Ukrainian intelligence.[39] Zelensky stated that he will begin consultations on November 29 to pick Yermak's successor and noted that he is "resetting" the Ukrainian Presidential Office. Yermak became head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office in February 2020 and has led several Ukrainian negotiating delegations over the last several months.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• The frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse despite recent Russian gains and Kremlin assertions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia does not recognize the US-proposed peace plan as a serious agreement and indicated that Russia is not interested in ending the war on the Trump administration's desired rapid timeline.
• Putin reiterated that Russia cannot sign any peace or other agreements with the current or future Ukrainian government and reiterated accusations that any Ukrainian government not under the Kremlin's control is illegitimate, another clear rejection of the US peace proposal.
• Putin demanded Ukraine's withdrawal from unoccupied parts of illegally annexed Ukrainian regions as a precondition for a ceasefire, not a peace deal. Such a concession would force Ukraine to withdraw to lines that are indefensible against renewed Russian aggression and would consign millions of Ukrainians to life under Russian occupation, therefore failing to guarantee a lasting peace.
• Putin also demanded that the international community recognize Russia's territorial conquests in Ukraine, likely to set legal grounds to justify a reinvasion of Ukraine at the opportune time.
• Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions.
• Ukrainian Presidential Office Head and prominent negotiator Andriy Yermak resigned from his position on November 28.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Slovyansk-Lyman direction, the Kostyantynivka tactical area, and the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and military infrastructure on the nights between November 26 to 28. Geolocated footage published on November 27 shows smoke and explosions at a Russian Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) military base in Grozny, Chechnya, and a 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) base in Borzoi, Chechnya, likely due to a Ukrainian drone strike.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery, Saratov Oblast, on the night of November 27 to 28, causing explosions and fires.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery supplies the Russian military and refines 20 types of petroleum products. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of November 26 to 27.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[44]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Varachyne, Kindrativka, and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on November 26, 27, and 28.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City), Kindrativka, and Andriivka (both north of Sumy City).[46]

The Russian milblogger, reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed on November 27 that Ukrainian forces have encircled elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[47] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have finished reinforcing the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with technical specialists and wounded servicemembers for future offensive efforts near Oleksiivka.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Kindrativka.[49] Elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[50] Drone operators and other elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment, the Krechet unit of the 83rd VDV Brigade, and the 20th Separate Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[51]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced and Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into western Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City).[53]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions along the T-2104 Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway in central Vovchansk, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, Lyman, and Vilcha on November 26, 27, and 28.[55]

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on November 27 that Ukrainian forces hold Vovchansk, refuting Russian claims that Russian forces seized Vovchansk.[56] The commander noted that Russian forces are committing more manpower and trying to seize Vovchansk with highly attritional infantry-led assaults. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on November 27 that Russian forces are attempting small group infiltration missions and noted that Russian forces are improving their camouflage during these infiltration events.[57] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have tried to take advantage of poor weather conditions to establish river crossings in the Vovchansk direction in recent weeks.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying the 2nd Battalion of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) to Vovchansk.[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, reportedly continue to operate in Vovchansk.[59] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 27 and 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske on November 26, 27, and 28.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Storm Detachment of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) and the 1st Battalion of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Milove-Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) area.[62]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 26 and 27 shows Ukrainian forces operating in central Kupyansk and eastern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[63] ISW assesses that changes in eastern Kurylivka did not occur within the past 24 hours.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kupyansk near Mala Shapkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on November 26, 27, and 28.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in western Kupyansk and near Monachynivka (northwest of Kupyansk), Radkivka (north of Kupyansk), and Tamarhanivka (southwest of Kupyansk).[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Kurylivka.[66] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are striking Ukrainian equipment near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles on the outskirts of and within Kupyansk.[67] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kupyansk.[68] Kub loitering munition operators of the 288th Artillery Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 27 and 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Novoplatonivka and Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky and Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novovodyane, Novoyehorivka, Druzhelyubivka, Olhivka, and Tverdokhlibove on November 26, 27, and 28.[70]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 28 indicates that Russian forces seized Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and advanced south of the settlement, indicating that Russian forces seized the settlement on a prior date.[71]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward the eastern outskirts of Lyman, south and southeast of Korovii Yar (northwest of Lyman), north of Ozerne, and on the northeastern outskirts of Dibrova (both southeast of Lyman).[72]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Oleksandrivka, Karpivka, Novoselivka, Yarova, Korovii Yar, Shandryholove, Drobysheve, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Stavky, Ridkodub, and Hlushchenkove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Maslyakivka, Ozerne, and Yampil on November 26, 27, and 28.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dibrova and Ozerne.[74]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 28 that Russian forces have been attacking toward Lyman with high quantities of drones and personnel since the end of May 2025.[75] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using infiltration tactics to penetrate and accumulate in the Ukrainian rear for further attacks. The spokesperson also noted that Russian forces in this direction include a significant number of mercenaries from various African countries. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are mostly active in the windbreaks near Lyman and that the Russian military command in the Lyman direction continues to order attritional assaults.[76] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Lyman from the south and the north.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Sydorove (west of Lyman).[77] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[78]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 27 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions north of Platonivka (northwest of Siversk), an area that ISW previously assessed as a Russian advance.[79]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 27 that Russian forces seized Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[80] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the claimed seizure of Vasyukivka.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Svyato-Pokrovske (south of Siversk) and northeast and east of Zakitne (northwest of Siversk).[82]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and Platonivka and toward Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Fedorivka; and southwest of Siversk near Sakko i Vantsetti and Vasyukivka on November 26 to 28.[83]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on November 27 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in the Siversk direction and are attempting to use ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) to reach southern Siversk.[84] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on November 28 that Russian forces are attacking in small fireteams of two to five servicemembers and utilizing many drones to support ground attacks.[85] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are mining roads with fiber optic sleeper drones.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian Chechen Shrama Group of the 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions east of Dronivka.[86]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in eastern Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[87] ISW assesses that this change likely did not occur in the last 48 hours.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[88]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 25 and 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in southern Kostyantynivka along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway and southeast of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[89]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to central Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[90]

The Ukrainian National Police reported on November 28 that Russian forces conducted a KAB-250 guided glide bomb strike against Druzhkivka.[91]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and toward Bondarne; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Stupochky, and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 26, 27, and 28.[92]

A Ukrainian journalist reported that over 4,000 residents remain in Kostyantynivka.[93]

A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly showing Russian forces employing Kuryer unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) equipped with AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers and 12.7 mm NSVT machine guns in the Kostyantynivka direction.[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) and Gorynych Anti-Terrorist Unit (Federal Security Service [FSB] Presidential Regiment) are striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Oleksandro-Shultyne.[95] Drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[96] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications equipment near Sofiivka, intercepting Ukrainian drones over Novohryhorivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), and striking Ukrainian vehicles near Komyshuvakha (west of Druzhkivka).[97] FPV drone operators of the Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[98] Elements of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) and the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating southeast of Predtechyne.[99] Elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are operating east of Novotoretske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[100] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated as the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 27 and 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Vilne and Toretske and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on November 26, 27, and 28.[102] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shakhove.[103]

The Ukrainian National Police reported on November 28 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against a home in Dobropillya.[104]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones over Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya).[105] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and the 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[106]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[107]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of and within southeastern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and marginally on the western outskirts of and within western Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[108] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence north of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[109] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that areas west of Myrnohrad remain a contested ”gray zone.”[110]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, Zatyshok, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad, Rivne, and Svitle; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske, on November 26, 27, and 28.[111] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne and Zatyshok.[112]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on November 27 that Ukrainian forces have cleared 11.5 square kilometers within Pokrovsk of Russian forces.[113] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that fighting continues along the Donetska Railway within Pokrovsk and within central Pokrovsk.[114] The corps added that Russian forces are attempting to advance within northern Pokrovsk and are trying to accumulate reinforcements and set conditions for further assaults by setting up satellite communications within Pokrovsk. 7th Rapid Reaction Corps Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on November 27 that the intensity of small arms engagements within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has increased.[115] Okishev reported that the first wave of Russian assaults consists of poorly trained infantry tasked with hiding to wait for reinforcements, while the second wave includes relatively well-trained assault elements assigned specific objectives. Okishev noted that Russian forces continue attempts to cut Ukrainian GLOCs from Pokrovsk to Myrnohrad and gain a foothold in Hryshyne. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 28 that Russian forces are reducing the intensity of their attacks.[116] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces kill or wound 15 to 20 percent of the Russian servicemembers that they detect daily and noted that Russian forces often fail to evacuate wounded servicemembers.

Russian milbloggers published footage on November 27, reportedly showing Russian forces conducting RBK-500 UMPK guided cluster bomb strikes against northern and central Hryshyne.[117]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles with fiber optic loitering munitions near Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[118]

Russian forces recently advanced and Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and southwest of the settlement.[119]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 27 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian tank in western Ivanivka, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[120]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka, Tovste, and Zelenyi Hai on November 26, 27, and 28.[121]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Ivanivka.[122]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 27 and 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka, Vyshneve, Zlahoda, Yehorivka, and Verbove on November 26, 27, and 28.[123]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction reported on November 27 that Russian forces are attacking daily with small groups and light vehicles, including cars, buggies, and motorcycles.[124] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces modify regular cars by installing rubber protection to make them less vulnerable to drone strikes. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are advancing under foggy weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction reported on November 28 that Ukrainian forces stabilized the situation in the Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction but that Russian forces continue small group infiltration attempts, moving at night and in the fog to conceal movement.[125]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly conducted FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velykomykhailivka.[126] Elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 5th Tank Brigade (both 36th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast direction.[127]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 28 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel concentrations and fuel and lubricant depots in unspecified locations of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[128]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Dobropillya and east of Dobropillya, east of Varvarivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), and north and marginally east of Hulyaipole.[129]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Andriivka, Ostapivske, and Pryluky; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, Krasnohirske, and Pryvilne; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya, Zelenyi Hai, Vesele, and Vysoke on November 26, 27, and 28.[130] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole and Dobropillya.[131]

A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian intelligence reported on November 27 that Russian forces have significantly decreased the intensity of their assaults toward Hulyaipole.[132]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Hulyaipole.[133] Drone operators of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Hulyaipole direction.[134] Elements of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating on the Zaporizhia front.[135]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 26, 27, and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and central Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[136] 

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Kamyanske, Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Novoandriivka on November 26, 27, and 28.[137]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 28 that drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to the Airborne Forces) are using remote detonation devices on their drones to down Ukrainian high-altitude reconnaissance drones on the outskirts of Orikhiv.[138]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including the 247th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, and in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[139] Elements of the 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[140]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on November 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 28.[141]

Russian forces continue to strike civilian vehicles and infrastructure in Kherson City. The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on November 27 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian vehicle in Blahovishchenske (west of Kherson City).[142] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against civilian vehicles near Kherson City and traveling along the M-14 Kherson City-Mykolaiv City highway.[143] The milblogger claimed that Russian fiberoptic drones were able to reach central Kherson City and that Russian forces will soon use this capability to increase the tempo of strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and other targets on the right (west) bank of  Kherson Oblast.[144]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th and 217th VDV regiments (both 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[145] Elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Salyut Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) operators of the 104th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[146]   

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military equipment in occupied Crimea on the night of November 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage facility in occupied Saky, Crimea, destroying Russian Orion and Forpost drones, Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2 air defense systems, and other military equipment.[147] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat signatures at the site of the facility, confirming the strike.[148]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 142 Shahed-type, Geran-type, and other drones, of which about 90 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[149] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 92 long-range drones in northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 42 drones struck 18 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck unspecified infrastructure and residential areas in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; residential areas in Staryi Saltiv and Motuzivka, Kharkiv Oblast; and civilian infrastructure, a gas station, and residential areas in Odesa Oblast.[150]

Russian forces conducted combined missile and long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 72 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, of which about 50 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[151] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed about 63 drones and that the Iskander-M missile and nine drones struck five locations. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian forces struck a power substation in Sumy Oblast, injuring one civilian.[152]

Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages and rolling blackouts throughout Ukraine on November 27 and 28.[153] Ukrenergo Head Vitaliy Zaychenko stated on November 26 that Ukrainian recovery efforts have reduced the duration of power outages and rolling blackouts but noted that the duration of these outages depends on the Russian strike campaign.[154]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.