Ukraine Invasion Updates, January 2025

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2025

The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January 31 that the UK will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package valued at two billion GBP (about $2.5 billion), primarily for the purchase of air defense systems and funding for the localization of defense production in Ukraine.[i] Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen announced on January 31 that Finland will provide Ukraine with a new tranche of military assistance valued at almost 200 million euros (about $207 million).[ii] Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky stated on January 31 that the Czech government is considering creating a new initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine.[iii]

Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna (Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman) line gradually intensified in September 2024 after a relatively low tempo period in early and mid-2024 during which Russian forces primarily conducted infantry assaults and occasional platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the area.[iv] Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) in late September 2024 – the first large Russian mechanized assault in this direction since Winter 2023-2024.[v] Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations north of Kupyansk, particularly near Dvorichna, as part of this broader intensification in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions. Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk and on the west [right] bank of the Oskil River), advanced in the southern outskirts of Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna), and advanced northward along the west bank of the Oskil River northwest of Novomlynsk (northeast of Dvorichna).[vi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 28 and 31 that Russian forces recently seized Dvorichna, and a Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk.[vii] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Russian forces are also leveraging mechanized assaults to expand their salient north of Kupyansk. Russian forces have conducted five company-sized mechanized assaults and at least one reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction since late October 2024.[viii] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 28 that Ukrainian forces have repelled four mechanized assaults of unspecified echelon since January 22 alone.[ix] The Russian military command has historically allocated armored vehicles to priority frontline areas and intensified mechanized activity could indicate that the Kupyansk direction is becoming a priority sector for Russian forces.[x]

Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), credited elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA) with seizing Dvorichna on January 28.[xi] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 25 that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA), the Russian Volunteer Corps, and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are attacking Dvorichna from the south, advanced to the P-79 Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway, and advanced to Kindrashivka (south of Zapadne and north of Kupyansk) as part of efforts to bypass Zapadne from the south.[xii] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has also redeployed most of the 6th CAA’s artillery to the Dvorichna area, including elements of the 9th Artillery Brigade.[xiii]

The tempo of Russian offensive operations along this sector of the front was generally much lower than elsewhere in eastern Ukraine throughout most of 2024 and Russian units in the area are likely well-rested and prepared to begin a months-long campaign to envelop Kupyansk. The Russian military does not appear to have significant uncommitted reserves to funnel into this effort, but the Russian military command may be willing to redeploy frontline units from another sector of the frontline to exploit any significant tactical gains in the Dvorichna-Kupyansk area.[xiv] Mashovets suggested that the Russian military command may redeploy elements of the 6th CAA, including elements of its 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Motorized Rifle Division, from the Vovchansk area (northeast of Kharkiv City) to Dvorichna if Russian forces begin to make substantial advances north of Kupyansk.[xv] The Russian military command may want to redeploy additional elements of the 6th CAA to the Dvorichna area rather than redeploying forces from another relatively inactive area, as redeploying forces that are relatively nearby and are subordinated to the same formation as the forces already north of Kupyansk could help reduce command and control (C2) and coordination issues between frontline units operating immediately north and northwest of Kupyansk. Russian forces have historically struggled with C2 issues when redeploying units from multiple discrete formations and areas of the frontline to new efforts, a problem that was particularly notable during the Russian defense against Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.[xvi]

Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are also participating in the envelopment of Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil River, and pressure Borova. Mashovets stated recently that elements of the 1st GTA’s 4th and 47th tank divisions were unsuccessfully attacking east of Kupyansk near Kotlyarivka.[xvii] Elements of the 1st GTA, including its 4th and 47th tank divisions, 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, are also reportedly operating along the Kolisnykivka-Kruhlyakivka-Zahryzove salient.[xviii] Russian forces in this salient have advanced to the east (left) bank of the Oskil River but have thus far struggled to cross the river. Russian advances beyond the Oskil River and further Russian advances in the Dvorichna area are a necessary first step in Russian efforts to envelop Kupyansk from the northwest and southwest. The Oskil River will likely continue to constrain further Russian advances westward from the Kruhlyakivka salient, however. Elements of the 1st GTA are also operating near Lozova and Zelenyi Hai (both southeast of the Kruhlyakivka salient) and have been attacking westward to expand the southern flank of the salient, suggesting that Russian forces are also trying to push towards Borova (southwest of the Kolisnykivka-Zelenyi Hai line). It is unclear if elements of the 1st GTA will be able to undertake two simultaneous operational efforts to advance on Borova and cross the Oskil River to support Russian efforts to envelop Kupyansk.

Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating. The Russian Central Grouping of Forces’ seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 was Russia’s first relatively successful envelopment after Russian forces regained the theater-wide initiative in Fall 2023, and Russian forces spent four months closing a gap 12 to 15 kilometers wide and ultimately forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw under threat of tactical encirclement. The seizure of Avdiivka likely served as the Russian military command’s blueprint for future envelopments in other frontline areas. The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces' effort to envelop Vuhledar successfully forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Vuhledar, and Russian forces seized the settlement in October 2024.[xix] Elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces were then able to leverage the seizure of Vuhledar, advance further west, and interdict Ukrainian egress routes to envelop and seize Velyka Novosilka in January 2025.[xx] Russian forces have been successful in closing smaller envelopments around Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka, but ongoing Russian efforts to conduct larger envelopments around Pokrovsk and Kupyansk will test the extent of Russian capabilities.

The Russian military command also appears to be experimenting with involving multiple military districts in a single envelopment. The Russian military command achieved significant tactical successes via envelopments in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions in Fall 2024 and early Winter 2024-2025, possibly due in part to keeping these two operational efforts under a single command – the Eastern Grouping of Forces. Having a unified command over both these directions likely helped minimize coordination issues and ensured a cohesive and unified vision in operational-level planning in the area. The Russian Central Grouping of Forces is currently overseeing the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast and southwest by bringing together tactical advances near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) in an arc around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and closing a gap that is currently 30 kilometers wide.[xxi] The Russian military command appears to be involving elements of both the 6th CAA (LMD) and 1st GTA (MMD) to envelop Kupyansk, which could complicate offensive operations in the area. The Russian military command will likely continue to experiment with envelopments of various depths and involving various force groupings as it works to further refine this method and learn from battlefield successes and failures.

The Russian military's ability to iterate on this method across multiple military districts is notable and indicates that the Russian General Staff may be improving its ability to disseminate lessons learned across multiple sectors of the frontline. Russian forces have previously failed to learn and implement lessons learned across areas of responsibility (AoRs), which has resulted in costly troop and armored vehicle losses throughout the frontline over the last three years.[xxii] Russian forces have historically been more adept at learning and implementing lessons among units within a single grouping of forces/military district, but Russian forces' ability to undertake an envelopment in the Kupyansk direction modeled on Russian activity in Donetsk Oblast indicates that the Russian General Staff is at least attempting to disseminate lessons learned and possibly new doctrine throughout the theater.[xxiii]

The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future. Russian forces have been incrementally working to push Ukrainian forces from the east bank of the Oskil River since Winter 2023-2024, and the Russian military command has previously deprioritized the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman line in favor of other operational efforts in Ukraine.[xxiv] The envelopment of Kupyansk will almost certainly be a months-long effort that requires Russian forces to close a gap 25 to 30 kilometers wide while also fording and maintaining logistics across the Oskil River, seizing small settlements in their path, and repelling Ukrainian counterattacks. Mashovets and a Russian milblogger have suggested that the Russian military command may intend to leverage advances near Dvorichna and Vovchansk to advance on Velykyi Burluk from the northwest and southeast.[xxv] Russian forces are currently 30 and 35 kilometers from Velykyi Burluk from their closest point of advance in the Kupyansk and Vovchansk directions respectively, and Russian forces could spend six months to a year making slow, grinding advances toward Velykyi Burluk before they truly threaten the settlement.

Russian commanders do not seem concerned about the speed or consistency of their advances in Ukraine, likely because they believe that the war will drag on until Russia militarily defeats Ukraine. The Russian military expended four months on the seizure of Avdiivka, spent most of 2024 working to level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast, and has devoted the last three years to seizing the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but does not appear particularly concerned with expediting these advances.[xxvi] Putin has previously articulated a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely and has repeatedly indicated that he has no interest in a resolution of the war on any terms but those he dictates.[xxvii] Putin's commanders are internalizing these statements and likely coming to the logical conclusion that Putin has no interest in ending the war and intends to continue fighting until he accomplishes his objectives in Ukraine, which are the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and the categorical destruction of the Ukrainian military.[xxviii]

This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield. Russian forces' recent envelopments have demonstrated that these efforts require substantial numbers of personnel, armor, and artillery systems to sustain their tempo of advance. The personnel and vehicle losses that Russia is suffering to make these creeping, gradual advances are unsustainable given Russia's current force generation and defense industrial capacities. Reports of Russian tank and armored vehicle losses in 2024 indicate, for example, that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to exhaust its finite Soviet-era stocks.[xxix] Russia's current monthly recruitment rate is also likely either just equal to or below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one, but there are reports that select Russian regions are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.[xxx] Russia's ability to continue slowly enveloping settlements, instead of attempting to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that penetrates Ukraine's defensive lines and quickly achieves operationally significant advances, in the medium to long term is contingent on Russia's ability to supply the high quantities of personnel and materiel needed to sustain these operations.

Russian forces are also intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove. Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields north of Sukhi Yaly (southwest of Kurakhove) during a motorized assault and have likely collapsed the southern part of the Ukrainian pocket along the Zelenivka-Sukhi Yaly-Yantarne line.[xxxi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northeast of Sukhi Yaly, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[xxxii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are prioritizing advances towards Kostyantynopil from the south and Andriivka from the north (both west of Kurakhove) to encircle Ukrainian forces near Dachne and Ulakly (both west of Kurakhove and east of the Kostyantynopil-Andriivka line).[xxxiii] Russian forces recently advanced across fields up to the eastern outskirts of Andriivka, and further advances in and south of Andriivka will likely complicate Ukrainian forces' ability to withdraw from the pocket.[xxxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 31 that Russian forces also advanced to central Andriivka and pushed Ukrainian forces to the outskirts of Kostyantynopil but that Russian forces have not yet entered Kostyantynopil.[xxxv]

Russian forces are also pushing against the pocket from its eastern side. ISW assessed on January 28 that Russian forces likely advanced in fields southeast of Dachne, and Russian milbloggers claimed on January 29 and 30 that Russian forces further advanced towards the settlement.[xxxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 31 that there are reports that Russian forces control half of Dachne and that Russian forces may encircle Ukrainian forces near Dachne if Russian forces cut the H-15 highway near Ulakly.[xxxvii] Footage published on January 31 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a Ukrainian bridge across the Sukhi Yaly River near Kostyantynopil, and a Russian milblogger noted that this is the second bridge that Russian forces have destroyed in the area – likely part of the Russian effort to trap Ukrainian forces in the pocket.[xxxviii] Russian forces likely aim to close or collapse the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove to free up Russian forces operating in the area for offensive operations elsewhere, such as advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border from either the Pokrovsk direction or the Velyka Novosilka direction, as ISW has previously assessed.[xxxix]

Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia’s economic influence over the pro-Russian breakaway republic. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated on January 31 that Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities reached an agreement to accept an EU package totaling 64 million euros (about $66.3 million).[xl] Recean stated that 20 million euros (about $20.7 million) will go towards purchasing gas for Transnistria and that another 10 million euros (about $10.3 million) will go to Moldova for its electricity purchases. The EU will also give Moldova 34 million euros (about $35.2 million) to support its federal budget. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 30 that unspecified sources stated that Transnistria will use its EU-allocated funds to buy gas on the European market from February 1 to 10 through Moldovan state electricity company Energocom, which Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz will then supply to Transnistria.[xli] Kommersant’s sources stated that Transnistria intends to use Russian funding to buy gas from a yet-to-be-determined Hungarian company starting February 11. Transnistria’s acceptance of the EU aid heavily degrades Russia’s economic influence over Transnistria, as free Russian gas supplies to Transnistria’s power plant supported electricity exports that sustained Transnistria's budget.[xlii] Russian and pro-Kremlin Transnistrian authorities will likely attempt to play up Russia’s role in providing Transnistria with limited funding for gas purchases starting in mid-February in order to promote Russia as Transnistria’s benefactor and savior. EU funding for Moldova’s electricity purchases will also likely degrade the efficacy of Russian anti-EU narratives, particularly those about Moldova’s turn to higher-priced European electricity, ahead of the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 31 that elements of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Unmanned Systems Forces, and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery in Volgograd City on the night of January 30 to 31, causing an explosion in the area.[xliii] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on January 31 that the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery is the sixth largest oil refinery in Russia.[xliv] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed on January 31 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil refinery in the oblast.[xlv] A Russian insider source posted footage purportedly showing an explosion near the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery.[xlvi] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery in February and May 2024.[xlvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31.
• Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.
• Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk.
• Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are also participating in the envelopment of Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil River, and pressure Borova.
• Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating.
• The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future.
• This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.
• Russian forces are also intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.
• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia’s economic influence over the pro-Russian breakaway republic.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Western and Ukrainian officials continue to report that North Korean forces have withdrawn from frontline positions in Kursk Oblast.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2025

Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia's favor.[1] Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian government.[2] ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's future negotiating positions.[3] TASS’ decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.

Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.[4] Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations.[5] This position suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called "root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning [of] a number of provisions on which NATO's existence and functioning are based."[6] Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss the possibility of "reducing the level of [NATO's] military presence," presumably along Russia's borders, but noted that this is unlikely to happen.

Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders.[7] Putin issued a series of demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things.[8] The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations.[9] Lukyanov's statements are yet another indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.

Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration. Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more broadly.[10] Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness" and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even including elements of [a] bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.[11]

People's Republic of China (PRC)–based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine. RFE/RL, citing its own Ukrainian bureau's investigative unit Schemes, reported on January 30 that at least two dozen PRC-based firms "untouched" by Western sanctions are directly supplying Russia with gallium, germanium, and antimony — key elements used in Russian drones and missiles.[12] Schemes found that PRC-based firms send these materials to Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies including Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, which supplies nearly 80 percent of the Kremlin's weaponry used in Ukraine. At least a third of these suppliers are reportedly linked to the PRC government, which has repeatedly denied aiding Russia's war. Schemes also noted that the Russian subsidiary of a Japanese company imported antimony from the PRC and supplied silicon wafers to Russian military microelectronics manufacturers. ISW has previously noted that PRC companies are directly and indirectly supplying Russia with drones, machine tools, and microelectronic products that Russia uses to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions used in Ukraine.[13]

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.[14] The resolution called for unwavering European support to Ukraine and noted that sustainable peace negotiations can only be achieved from a position of Ukrainian strength. The resolution stated that negotiations regarding an end to the war in Ukraine can only be conducted with direct Ukrainian involvement and if Russia abandons its “imperial ambitions.” The resolution also condemned Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and commended Ukraine's progress towards European Union (EU) membership. Zelensky has previously highlighted that sustainable and just peace in Ukraine should be achieved through enhanced military support to Ukraine, especially given Russia's reluctance to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued maximalist and imperialist ambitions.[15]

The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine. A US defense official told CNN and three sources with knowledge of the transfer told US outlet Axios on January 28 that the US military transferred roughly 90 decommissioned Patriot missiles from storage facilities in Israel to Poland.[16] The Patriot missiles are expected to be transferred to Ukraine on an unspecified date.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.
• Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.
• Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.
• People's Republic of China (PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.
• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.
• The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty."[i] Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance.[ii] Putin is correct, however, that additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance.[iii] Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer 2022.[iv] Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for the almost three years of war.

Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[v] ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in funding US military assistance to Ukraine.[vi]

Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin. Putin claimed that any peace agreement that Russia and Ukraine conclude before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rescinds his 2022 decree will be invalid.[vii] Putin further claimed that that Zelensky is no longer able to legally rescind the decree because he is no longer the "legitimate" president of Ukraine and that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada could rescind the decree but does not seem interested in doing so. The Ukrainian constitution does not empower the Verkhovna Rada to unilaterally rescind presidential decrees, however, and a decision to do so could itself violate the Ukrainian constitution.[viii] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberately false interpretations of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is the illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to its law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[ix] Putin would likely seize on any unconstitutional act by the Verkhovna Rada — even one he is now calling for — to declare the act and Verkhovna Rada "illegitimate" and stand up another strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in serious negotiations that recognize Ukraine as an independent state. Putin has previously claimed that the Verkhovna Rada is the only "legitimate" government branch in Ukraine and thus the only Ukrainian government entity with which Russia could negotiate.[x] Putin may intend to declare the Verkhovna Rada "illegitimate" in the future in order to justify his demands for complete regime change in Kyiv and his unwillingness to negotiate with Ukrainian authorities.

Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreement with Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly claimed that every Ukrainian government since the 2014 pro-Western Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine has been illegitimate.[xi] Putin has nevertheless engaged in negotiations and reached agreements with Ukrainian officials, including regarding the resolution of armed conflict with the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015.[xii] Putin has also consistently violated these agreements and used similar claims about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government to justify these violations.[xiii] Even if Zelensky or other parts of the Ukrainian government agreed to lift the decree banning negotiations with Putin, Putin would likely violate any peace or other agreement that he reaches with Ukraine under the false justification that such agreements are "invalid" as long as he believes that he can achieve his maximalist war aims through military operations. Putin likely also intends to leverage false claims about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the limitations that the decree places on the possibility of peace negotiations to falsely portray Ukraine — rather than Russia — as the party prolonging the war and unwilling or unable to engage in meaningful negotiations to his domestic and international audiences.

Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiation framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government. Putin's January 28 statements are part of a continued effort to position himself as Trump's equal and reinforce his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.[xiv] Putin's statements also set conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreements with Ukraine that Trump may hope to mediate and are yet another indication that Putin is not interested in compromising on his demands of complete regime change and the crippling of Ukraine's military as conditions for peace.[xv] Putin's efforts to strongarm Trump are also part of a concerted Russian effort to force the West to acknowledge and endorse Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government and an enduring Ukrainian state. ISW previously noted that Western acquiescence to all of Russia's demands in Ukraine would require the West to acknowledge and agree that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and that a Ukrainian identity and state independent from Russia either does not currently exist and/or does not deserve to exist in the future.[xvi]  

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire.[xvii] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17 million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military.[xviii] Geolocated footage posted on January 28 and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery.[xix] Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started a fire in an industrial area.[xx]  Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building and three other buildings.[xxi] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September 2024.[xxii]

The Russian MoD confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces. Sanchik briefed Russian Defense Minister Belousov on Ukrainian activity along the front line in the Southern Grouping of Force's area of responsibility (AoR) and the Russian MoD posted footage showing Sanchik speaking with Belousov.[xxiii] Sanchik previously served as commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD), and ISW first observed claims that Russian authorities appointed Sanchik commander of the Southern Grouping of Forces and Southern Military District [SMD] in November 2024.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression.
• Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin.
• Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreements with Ukraine.
• Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.
• Volunteer recruitment rates in in Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2025

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.[1] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week.[2] Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.[3] Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck."[4] Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation.[5] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.[6]

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.[7] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.[8] Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.[9]

The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.^[10] Ukrainian volunteer drone initiative Victory Drones initially amplified in April 2024 preliminary information that the Russian military command was finalizing the establishment of the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment as part of the Central Military District (CMD).^[11] Victory Drones noted that the regiment had 1,342 servicemembers and that the regiment was staffed at 94 percent as of April 2024. Victory Drones noted that the regiment trained at the base of the Russian 473rd District Training Center (CMD) and consists of command elements, an unmanned systems strike battalion, three unmanned systems reconnaissance and strike battalions, and logistics support units such as signal, medical, and repair elements. Victory Drones reported that the Russian military command planned to form 102 subordinate component units within the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment, of which 41 are strike units and 61 are reconnaissance units. Several Russian volunteer groups began crowdfunding for the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Reconnaissance Strike Regiment starting in July 2024 and implied that the regiment was operating in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.^[12]

Russian milbloggers observed throughout Fall 2024 that the Russian MoD began reorganizing informal drone detachments and other specialists, such as signalmen, medics, and engineers, into "joint technical battalions."[13] The Russian MoD also announced that it formed an unspecified number of unmanned systems detachments by October 2024 via the "Rubikon" Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies and announced the formation of five additional unmanned systems.[14] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov subsequently announced that the Russian MoD would complete the formation of the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military in the third quarter of 2025.[15] Defense Analyst Konrad Muzyka assessed that the recent organizational changes within the Russian military and the formation of drone units suggest that similar regiments may emerge in other Russian military districts in the future.[16] Russian forces will likely gain augmented drone support capabilities should the Russian MoD successfully form these new unmanned systems regiments and centralize its procurement efforts under the Unmanned Systems Forces, although the success of this effort will depend on the Russian military's commitment to executing the necessary reforms and the availability of resources.[17]

A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger.[18] Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian sabotage acts.[19] The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.[20] The Kremlin's sabotage and destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.
• The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.
• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.
• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts to militarize Russian society.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast.[2] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at the end of December 2024.[3]

The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.[4] The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.[5] The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most."[6] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March or early April 2025.[7] Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and compliance of the contract with national and international law.[8] Transnistrian authorities have previously rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid.[9] ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.[11] Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[12] Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at the regional level.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2025

Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.[1] Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement.[2] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area.[3] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[4] A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat of encircling the brigade's elements.[5] ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV) drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area.[6] The brigade stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25 and 26.[7]

The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions.[8] The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure.[9] The Russian MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements.[11] The Russian MoD has not recently been announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January 26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area.[12] Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers, will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.

The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the area in Fall 2024.[13] Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October 2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months.[14] The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka. This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025.[15] The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.

Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.[16] Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations southwest of Toretsk for this purpose.[17] Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024.[18] A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.

Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City.[19] Geolocated footage shows a fire at a tank at the refinery.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.[21] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage.[22] Ukrainian official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks, aircraft, and ships.[23] Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to 24.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.
• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.
• The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military officers.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 25, 2025

Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25. Zelensky stated at a press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return.[1] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs, allowing Transnistria to provide electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent. Transnistrian authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help, instead turning to schemes that involve Moscow directly or indirectly providing enough gas to the breakaway republic to cover only its domestic electricity needs.[2] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted that Russia is trying to leverage its manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[3] Transnistria's possible acceptance of Ukrainian and Moldovan offers of aid and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives. The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani.[4] The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing Russian–Iraqi relations. The channel welcomed Russian businesses, media companies, bloggers, and investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq. Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024, and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a senior foreign official.[5] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence there.[6] The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider the contours of its relations with Iraq.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25.
• The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat veteran status" without submitting a formal application.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 24, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin claimed during a televised interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on January 24 that he is willing to negotiate "on the Ukraine issue," but that a 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree declaring the "impossibility of negotiating" with Putin is a significant impediment to peace negotiations.[i] Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are not interested in peace negotiations and that it is impossible for Russia and Ukraine to discuss "anything serious" with the decree in place. Putin claimed that any peace agreements that result from negotiations between Russia and Ukraine before Ukraine repeals the 2022 decree will be "illegitimate" and claimed that the West must force Zelensky to repeal the 2022 decree. Putin also once again questioned Zelensky's legitimacy as the current president of Ukraine and insinuated that US President Donald Trump should negotiate exclusively with Putin about Ukraine's fate, as the two leaders can "calmly" discuss their interests. Putin has previously called for Ukraine to repeal the 2022 decree, but Putin's intense focus on the decree during his January 24 interview marks yet another attempt to distract from his unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[ii]

Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Ukrainian presidential decree explicitly prohibits Ukraine from conducting negotiations with Putin.[iii] The context within which the decree was signed is important, however. Zelensky signed the decree on the day that Putin illegally annexed four Ukrainian oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), including areas that Russian forces did not then and still do not occupy.[iv] The decree states that the ban on negotiations with Putin is a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and part of Ukraine's efforts to "guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and [the restoration of Ukraine's] territorial integrity."[v] Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree after months of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks in Istanbul in Spring 2022, during which Russia demanded that Ukraine be a permanently neutral state that could not join NATO and that Ukraine submit to limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I. These terms would have restricted Ukraine's Armed Forces to 85,000 soldiers who would be unable to defend Ukraine against a third Russian invasion.[vi]

However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin. Zelensky has outlined clear conditions for potential talks with Russia and emphasized the importance of preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, developing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), and securing security guarantees from Ukraine's Western allies.[vii] Zelensky has repeatedly advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war, proposing that Ukraine should enter any peace negotiations from a "position of strength" – a strategy aimed at compelling Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations and consider just compromises in such negotiations. Zelensky has also invited Russian representatives to attend Ukraine's second Global Peace Summit in the future.[viii]

Kremlin officials have consistently dismissed these overtures, labeling Ukraine's proposed peace formula and platforms "unviable," and Putin even reportedly asked People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to "snub" the first Global Peace Conference in June 2024.[ix] Zelensky has continued to express openness to direct negotiations and has acknowledged the possibility of a diplomatic compromise as part of a broader solution to the war despite Russia's repeated rejections.

Putin meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Putin is likely using his interview with Zarubin on Russian state television to signal to Russian society that Russia is unlikely to participate in peace negotiations in the near future and that the war is unlikely to end soon. Putin is also sending this message to a subset of Russian elites who reportedly want the war to end and likely intends for this interview to silence any questions from Russian elites about Putin's timeline for the war and its resolution.[x]

Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that they are willing to negotiate about Ukraine with the United States or other intermediaries but have yet to demonstrate any willingness to negotiate with Ukraine or to compromise on Putin's demands of replacing Zelensky and his government with a pro-Russian puppet regime, destroying the Ukrainian military and rendering Ukraine unable to defend itself from future Russian aggression, and securing a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.[xi]

Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies. Putin is drawing attention to the decree to create friction between Ukraine, the United States, and other Western allies and to refocus the conversation about negotiations on supposed issues with Ukraine's negotiating position – as opposed to Putin's clear efforts to delay and avoid peace negotiations. Putin's theory of victory in Ukraine presupposes that Russia will successfully outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to inflict its demands on a weakened and abandoned Ukraine, and Putin is thus working to bring about these conditions.[xii]

The West must demonstrate its enduring commitment to aiding and arming Ukraine to force Putin to reconsider his theory of victory and his demands. Continued Western military support that enables Ukraine to resist Russian aggression now and in the future is the West's best course of action to bring Putin to the negotiating table and secure Russian concessions essential to bringing about a peace in America’s, Europe’s, and Ukraine’s interests.

Putin also attempted to position himself as Trump’s equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union. Putin emphasized that Russia shares interests with the United States, particularly regarding the global economy, and suggested that he and Trump could engage in "calm, pragmatic" discussions, insinuating that the two leaders could bypass direct negotiations with Ukraine.[xiii] Putin's statements demonstrate his continued belief that Ukraine is only a proxy for the West and further his long-standing narrative that his war in Ukraine is a broader conflict between Russia and the West that can only be settled by great powers.[xiv]

Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak highlighted on January 24 that Putin aims to negotiate "the fate of Europe without Europe" and "Ukraine without Ukraine."[xv] Putin's insistence on minimizing or eliminating Ukraine's role in negotiations about Ukraine's future blatantly disregards Ukraine's sovereignty and attempts to elevate Russia to the role of a global power while marginalizing some Western allies in an attempt to weaken the wider NATO alliance.

Putin demonstrated that he is worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage war in Ukraine. Trump stated on January 23 that oil prices are currently "high enough" that Russia can continue its war effort in Ukraine and called for Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) states to "bring down the cost of oil" in order to decrease Russia's ability to wage war and bring about an "end the war."[xvi] Putin responded to Trump during his interview on January 24, claiming that Russia and the US are both large oil producers and consumers and that "too high prices are bad" for both the US and Russian economies.[xvii] Putin claimed that Russia and the United States rely on energy resources for domestic industries and that "too low prices" would undermine energy companies' investment opportunities. Putin attempted to portray the more modern and diversified US economy as operating similarly to that of Russia, which is a petrostate that heavily relies on revenues from energy exports.

Falling oil prices would decrease Russia's federal budget revenues and risk destabilizing the Russian regime’s stability while also reducing Russia's share of the global oil market and economic influence on the global stage. Putin's emphasis on the need to maintain prices for the sake of energy companies' investments also demonstrates the extent to which Putin feels it necessary to cater to the elite in his inner circle who have personal interests in the energy sector. Putin's focus on his inner circle's interests contrasts with US leaders' larger focus on the general voting population and a broader array of business interests, which benefit from lower energy prices. Putin's attempt to portray lower oil prices as against US interests suggests that Putin is afraid of the harm such policies would cause Russia and is trying to persuade Trump to abandon these proposals without having to concede to Trump’s insistence on meaningful negotiations to end the war.

The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at deterring the United States and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed in an interview with Russian state news outlet TASS on January 24 that the West failed to change the course of the war in Ukraine despite "comprehensive assistance" and a significant financial expense.[xviii] Shoigu's claim is a deliberate and extreme mischaracterization of the realities on the battlefield, however. Western military assistance has consistently provided Ukraine with offensive and defensive capabilities that Ukraine would otherwise not have possessed and that allowed Ukraine to achieve significant battlefield victories. Ukrainian forces used US-provided HIMARS during an interdiction campaign in Summer-Fall 2022 that ultimately forced Russian forces to withdraw from the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast in November 2022.[xix] Ukrainian forces used Western-provided armored vehicles in the Fall 2022 counteroffensive that liberated significant swaths of Kharkiv Oblast.[xx] Western initiatives to provide Ukraine with artillery shells, drones, fighter jets, air defense systems, and other weapons and equipment have allowed Ukraine to maintain its defense against Russian aggression, including denying Russian forces the ability to conduct maneuver warfare and helping Ukraine to defend against Russia's strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[xxi] Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles has partially deprived Russian forces of their sanctuary within Russia to prepare for further offensive operations against northern Ukraine from Russian territory.[xxii] US and other Western military assistance has also bought Ukraine time to develop its own DIB capabilities in support of its defensive efforts against Russia and external aggression in the long term.[xxiii]

Ukraine remains in critical need of US and European military assistance to maintain its defense against Russian aggression and to conduct future negotiations from a position of strength. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on January 23 that NATO allies need to significantly increase their military assistance to Ukraine to allow Ukraine to negotiate with Russia from a position of strength and deter future Russian aggression against NATO.[xxiv] Rutte also acknowledged that Europe should bear a larger financial burden to support Ukraine's defense because European NATO members are geographically closer to Ukraine and that Europe will pay for the United States to continue sending military assistance to Ukraine.[xxv]

The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.[xxvi] Shoigu told TASS on January 24 that the Union State Security Concept that Russia and Belarus signed on April 28, 1999 "has lost its relevance" and that a new Security Concept will guide Russian and Belarusian security policymaking through the framework of the Union State.[xxvii] Shoigu described the new Union State Security Concept as a "completely new...strategic planning document" that draws from the Russian and Belarusian constitutions, the December 1999 Union State Treaty, the Russian National Security Strategy, and the Belarusian National Security Concept. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed an agreement in December 2024 to implement this new Union State Security Concept sometime in 2025.[xxviii]

Shoigu's framing of the new Union State Security Concept suggests that the new concept may be more expansive than the original 1999 document, which would forward Russia's goal of de facto annexing Belarus through the Union State framework. Shoigu notably gave this interview two days before the January 26 Belarusian presidential election, likely to frame Belarus as an undeniable part of the Russian-dominated Union State.[xxix] The Kremlin will likely frame any pro-democratic protests against the upcoming Belarusian elections as part of a Western-backed hybrid war against Russia and Belarus, just as the Kremlin did in 2020.[xxx]

Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 24 that Russian forces downed 121 Ukrainian drones in total on the night of January 23 to 24, including 37 drones over Bryansk Oblast, 20 over Ryazan Oblast, 17 over Kursk Oblast, 17 over Saratov Oblast, seven over Rostov Oblast, six over Moscow Oblast, six over Belgorod Oblast, three over Voronezh Oblast, two over Tula Oblast, two over Oryol Oblast, two over Lipetsk Oblast, one over occupied Crimea, and one over Moscow City.[xxxi]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 24 that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck the production facilities of the Ryazan Oil Refinery and the Ryazan oil pump station in Ryazan City.[xxxii] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of a fire at the oil refinery and noted that the Ryazan oil refinery produces fuel for military equipment, jet fuel, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products for tanks, aircraft, and ships.[xxxiii] BBC's Russian Service reported that its sources in the SBU stated that the Ukrainian strike started fires at three tanks at the refinery and a hydrotreatment workshop for diesel and jet fuel. The sources stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ryazan Thermal Power Plant (TPP).[xxxiv] Geolocated footage shows a fire at the oil refinery.[xxxv] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian forces downed 20 drones over Ryazan Oblast and that drone debris fell on an unspecified enterprise.[xxxvi]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 24 that the SBU, SSO, and other Ukrainian forces also struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which produces microcircuits and components for Russian weapons systems such as the Topol-M and Bulava missile systems, the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and onboard electronics in combat aircraft.[xxxvii] Kovalenko stated that the plant also produces microelectronics for Pantsir air defense systems, Iskander missiles, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones.[xxxviii] The press service of the Kremniy El Group Joint-stock Company (JSC) announced on January 24 that the plant suspended operations after the Ukrainian drone strike.[xxxix] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 24 that Russian forces downed 37 drones over Bryansk Oblast on the night of January 23 to 24.[xl] Geolocated footage shows a fire near the Kremniy El plant.[xli] Ukrainian forces recently struck the Kremniy El plant on the night of January 13 to 14.[xlii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces also struck and damaged the Bryansk Oblast branch of the Russian Investigative Committee.[xliii]

Astra, citing sources in Russia's Ministry of Emergency Situations, reported on January 24 that Ukrainian drones damaged the 711th Aircraft Repair Plant in Borisoglebsk, Voronezh Oblast on the night of January 23 to 24.[xliv] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 24 that Russian forces downed "several" Ukrainian drones over Voronezh Oblast but reported no casualties or damage.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Zelensky signed the decree in September 2022 banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation.
• Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace, however, following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin.
• Putin meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.
• Putin also attempted to position himself as Trump’s equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.
• Putin demonstrated that he is worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage his war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at deterring the US and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2025

Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time.[1] Budanov reported that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however. Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024.[2] Budanov stated that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia 148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."[3]

The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in Ukraine.[4] Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military. The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy.[5] ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.[6]

Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast.[8] Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
• The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability.
• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2025

The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy.[1] Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011.[2] The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however.[3] ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.[4] These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.

Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on January 22 that Russian organizations have allocated a total of 11.4 million rubles (roughly $114,880) for territorial defense training for 100 officers within the "Great Don Army" branch of the All-Russian Cossack Society, including 5.6 million rubles (approximately $56,400) from the Russian Presidential Grant Fund and 5.7 million rubles (approximately $57,400) from the "Great Don Army" organization.[5] The training will include drone piloting training and tactical, medical, and fire training. A separate portion of the training will be devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities in "wartime conditions." The Kremlin's efforts to expand the All-Russian Cossack societies, following the March 2024 law enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's mobilization reserve, are likely an effort to expand the number of well-trained troops in Russia's active reserve pools that the Kremlin can call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.[6]

North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025).[7] The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces.[8] Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia.[9] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and wounded) per month.[10] North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least as of early December 2024.[11] This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025.

These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors.[12] A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement.[13] Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner.[14] ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in Russia's war.[15]

Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that the Russian government, via a Russian military official based in Turkey, recently reached an unspecified agreement with HTS that appears to have included permission for Russian vessels to dock in the port of Tartus.[16] Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website, shows that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships are docked in the port of Tartus as of January 22, and these ships are likely supporting the Russian military's evacuation of military equipment from the port. The milblogger claimed that the Russian and HTS-led governments continue to negotiate about the future of Russia's presence at the Tartus and Khmeimim military bases and noted that it is unclear if any other third-party might be interested in using the port of Tartus in the future.[17] Other Russian milbloggers expressed confusion over the situation in Syria and accused unspecified actors of spreading rumors about Russia's supposed agreement with the HTS-led government.[18] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra stated on January 22 that Russian and Syrian officials have not reached a final solution in the negotiations about future Russian military bases in Syria.[19]

A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region. Russian business outlet Kommersant, citing its own sources, reported on January 22 that Russia may resume gas supplies to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline, using the Cyprus-based company Obzor Enterprises as an intermediary.[20] Kommersant, citing data from the European Union (EU)'s Regional Booking Platform (RBP) for natural gas transmission, reported that Obzor Enterprises booked the TurkStream pipeline on January 20 to transit 3.1 million cubic meters of gas per day to the Strandzha-2 entry point from February 1 to March 1, volumes which Kommersant assessed align with Transnistria's estimated humanitarian needs. Kommersant reported that authorities are discussing extending these supplies through mid-April and that Russia would pay roughly $160 million to purchase the gas. Kommersant's sources noted that Russia is prioritizing efforts to transfer the gas to Transnistria through the Trans-Balkan pipeline, which runs through Bulgaria and Romania before reaching Transnistria. Russian and Transnistrian authorities have recently been exploring the possibility of sourcing Russian-funded European gas to Transnistria through the European spot market, but Moldovan President Maia Sandu has stated that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria and that Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.[21] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted how Russia is trying to leverage the manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
• Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
• North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
• Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
• A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2025

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on the night of January 15 to 16.[1] The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire.[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the second strike started another fire at the facility.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast.[4] Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant.[5] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment.[6] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that falling drone debris caused fires.[7] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile, acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC) (CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic cooperation.[14] Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin readout of the call did not mention these topics.[15] Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.[16]

Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Khinshtein to this post on December 5, 2024, following intense backlash for failing to communicate with or support Kursk Oblast residents displaced by the Ukrainian incursion - scapegoating then-Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to respond.[17] Russian opposition media and local Kursk Oblast news outlets reported that residents of Sudzhansky, Korenevsky, Bolshesoldatsky, and Glushkovsky raions – all on the frontline in Kursk Oblast – protested in front of the Kursk Oblast Administration building on January 18 and 21, demanding to meet with Khinshtein.[18] The protestors recorded an appeal to Khinshtein on January 21 asking him to address insufficient permanent housing for residents, issues with temporary accommodation centers, and his lack of dialogue with Kursk Oblast residents – the latter of which was one of Khinshtein's stated priorities following his appointment.[19] Local Kursk Oblast media reported that Khinshtein's advisor, Viktoria Penkova, met with the protestors, and the Kursk Oblast Administration Press Service stated that authorities informed the protestors of "necessary explanations and consultations" during the meeting.[20] Putin likely appointed Khinshtein to appear dedicated to solving social issues in Kursk Oblast and to quell local protests, and Khinshtein's failure to thus far fulfill this role in his tenure as acting governor undermines this intended effect.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation.
• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military failures.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2025

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.[1] Ukraine's radiation, chemical, and biological intelligence units are monitoring Russia's use of banned chemical agents, which include using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned in warfare under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and CWC. Ukrainian officials have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC, to which Russia is a signatory, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that such violations have been systematic in the Russian military since February 2023.[2]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
• Russian volunteer military detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18.[i] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed seven drones over the region.[ii] Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil depot.[iii] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 18 that units of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and other Ukrainian forces struck the state-owned "March 8" oil depot in Tula Oblast and noted that there were reports of a fire at the facility.[iv] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on January 18 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise in Tula Oblast, causing a fuel tank to catch on fire.[v] Geolocated footage and other footage published by Russian milbloggers showed a fire at an oil depot near Didilovo, Tula Oblast.[vi]

Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Nebo-SVU" long-range radar detection system in occupied Kherson Oblast; a Buk-M3 air defense system in occupied Donetsk Oblast; and a 9C32M radiolocation station of a S-300 air defense system in occupied Donetsk Oblast on January 18.[vii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that they are conducting battle damage assessments (BDA) of the strikes.

The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appear to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 18 that the Russian military command have consolidated elements of four brigades - the 2nd CAA's 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 41st CAA's 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades — and three regiments — the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) and the 239th Tank Regiment and the 87th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) — south and southwest of Pokrovsk between Dachenske and Novotroitske.[viii] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva Highway and are attacking between Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade maintain positions on the outskirts of Zvirove (east of Kotlyne) and attacking in the area while elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with support from the 239th Tank Regiment and 87th Rifle Regiment are attacking along the banks of the Solone River toward Solone-Novoserhiivka and Novovasylivka-Uspenivka (south to southwest of Kotlyne). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking towards Dachenske-Chyushchyne and Zelene-Chyushchyne (all south of Pokrovsk) and are making marginal advances. ISW has observed reports that all the brigades and regiments referenced by Mashovets are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk except for elements of the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW has not previously observed involved in combat operations in Ukraine.[ix]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 17 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces to advance west of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town but noted that Russian forces are not advancing immediately south of the town.[x] The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are currently focused on interdicting the railway line between Kotlyne and Udachne. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Sribne and attempting to interdict the E-50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway west of the town.[xi] ISW previously observed indications that the Russian military command defined the 2nd CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) as south and southwest of Pokrovsk and the 41st CAA's AoR as east of Pokrovsk.[xii] The Russian military command's decision to establish a strike group comprised of units of both the 2nd and 41st CAAs south of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces may be reprioritizing tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction to set conditions to exploit more opportunistic avenues of advance closer to Pokrovsk’s immediate flanks. Mashovets noted that elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) and the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA) are currently resting and reconstituting in rear areas of the Pokrovsk direction and that it is unclear which sector of this direction the Russian military command will choose to redeploy these forces.[xiii] The Russian military command may redeploy these units to areas south of Pokrovsk if the Russian command continues to prioritize tactical advances in the direction of Pokrovsk’s southern flanks in the coming weeks and months.  

The Russian military command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 17 and 18 that elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) recently advanced south of Zelene Pole (northeast of Pokrovsk).[xiv] ISW observed reports as recent as January 18 that elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating in the Kurakhove direction, indicating that the Russian military command may have recently redeployed select elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade to the Pokrovsk direction if the milbloggers' claims are accurate.[xv] ISW previously observed claims that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to the Vozdyzhenka area (east of Pokrovsk) from Kurahkove.[xvi] Mashovets reported on January 18 that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 1195th and 1438th motorized rifle regiments (41st CAA) are attacking east of Pokrovsk from Vozdvyzhenka and Novotoretske-Tymofiivka (southwest of Vozdvyzhenka) towards Yelyzavetivka (west of Vozdvyzhenka).[xvii] Mashovets further reported that elements of the Russian 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), supported by elements of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are unsuccessfully attacking in the direction of Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad and Mykolaivka-Promin (all east of Pokrovsk). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are focusing their assaults east of Pokrovsk around Vodyane Druhe (northeast of Vozdvyzhenka), Zelene Pole, and Tarasivka (both north of Vozdvyzhenka), likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to form a wide salient that Russian forces can leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast in the future.[xviii] The Russian military command may be deprioritizing offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction and redeploying forces from Kurakhove to reinforce the Pokrovsk direction now that Russian forces have accomplished their objective of seizing Kurakhove, as elements of the 5th and 110th reportedly participated in the seizure of Kurahkove in late December 2024.[xix] It is unclear whether the Russian command reinforced or sufficiently reconstituted degraded Russian units that recently participated in battles to seize Kurakhove and its environs to the point they may effectively operate on the current frontline in Pokrovsk.

ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command would likely choose to recommit elements of the 5th and 110th brigades to a priority sector of the frontline, and the Russian military command appears to have chosen to redeploy these forces to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk.[xx] The Russian military command appears to be attempting to leverage units of the 41st and 51st CAAs to advance east of Pokrovsk and envelop the town and may intend to redeploy additional units of the 51st CAA to reinforce this effort in the future. Russian forces will likely continue to make gains as part of their intensified effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and southwest, particularly if Russian forces can identify and exploit tactical vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defenses along Pokrovsk's flanks. The rate of such advances will likely remain slow however, as Russian forces have yet to demonstrate the ability to conduct the type of rapid mechanized maneuver necessary to quickly penetrate Ukrainian defensive lines and surround Pokrovsk quickly enough to encircle a significant number of Ukrainian forces.

NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March 2025.[xxi] The Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 18 that the Commander of the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) Colonel David Gagua met with NATO Joint Forces Training Center Commander Major General Bogdan Rycerski and discussed plans for the upcoming NATO-Georgia 2025 exercise. NATO reported on March 7, 2024, that the NATO-Georgia 2025 exercise is scheduled for March 2025 and that previous NATO-Georgia exercises focused on live and simulated training exercises and certification for NATO ally and partner countries’ military units.[xxii] Azerbaijani and Armenian sources reported on January 17 and 18 respectively that Azerbaijan will participate in the exercise and that Armenia will be an observer of the NATO-Georgia 2025 exercise.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18.
• Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18.
• The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town.
• The Russian military command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area.
• NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March 2025.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka directions.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in the Kharkiv direction.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2025

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion.[2] Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery.[3] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products.[4] Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.[5]

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast.[6] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations.[7] North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future.[8] South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast.[9] North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.[10] The agreement outlines the UK's commitment to Ukraine's possible future NATO membership as a means to guarantee Ukraine's security and calls for strengthening bilateral defense and security ties, building consensus on Ukraine's NATO membership prospects, enhancing maritime security, expanding economic and trade cooperation, and boosting collaboration  in the energy, climate, and justice spheres. Starmer highlighted during a press conference on January 16 that the UK intends to provide military aid to Ukraine annually and will provide Ukraine with a loan backed by funds from frozen Russian assets.[11] Starmer highlighted that the UK will also expand its training program for Ukrainian military personnel and provide Ukraine with 150 artillery barrels and a new Danish-funded mobile air defense system.[12]

Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 16 that unspecified sources stated that Russia and Transnistria are discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025.[13] Kommersant stated that Moscow tentatively proposed using Russian budget funds to buy up to three million cubic meters per day of gas that would cover Transnistria's domestic consumption but would not support producing Transnistria's electricity exports to Moldova. Kommersant estimated that this volume of gas would likely cost Russia $164 million from January to April 2025. Natural Gaz DC co-owner Arkady Vikol stated on January 15 that the company had signed a contract with Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz to supply two-to-three million cubic meters of European gas per day to Transnistria.[14] Transnistria President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia would provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery method.[15] Russia is likely seeking alternative routes to supply Transnistria with gas as the Trans-Balkan pipeline transits Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Ukraine stopped transiting Russian gas through its territory on January 1, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on January 15 that Ukraine was in discussions to help Transnistria but that the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is "generally unacceptable."[16] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have recently noted how Russia is trying to use its artificially created gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections, and Russia may cease gas supplies to Transnistria again in April 2025.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
• The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
• Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and other energy infrastructure.[2] Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast.[3] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes.[4] Ukrenergo has since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy consumption following the strikes.[5] Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.[6]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on January 15 that Ukraine received 25 Ukrainians who suffer from serious injuries and illnesses and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[7] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that Ukraine received a civilian previously captured by Russian forces during the exchange.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia received 25 Russian POWs.[9] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced on January 6 that Ukraine and Russia had reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025 and that Ukraine will prioritize returning seriously ill and wounded Ukrainians.[10]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that Russian forces are unable to field tanks and armored vehicles in frontline areas where Ukraine has deployed at least two Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) strike drone companies and two Ukrainian reconnaissance drone companies operate because Ukrainian drone operators strike most or all Russian armored vehicles three to six kilometers from the frontline.[11] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are also unable to field tanks in frontline areas where Ukrainian forces have a sufficient number of shells due to the high accuracy of Ukrainian artillery strikes. The milblogger complained that Russian drones are less effective than the Ukrainian drones and that the Russian military command only supplies Russian FPV operators advanced FPV models operating on non-standard frequences and fiber-optic drones — both of which are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) — to priority sectors of the frontline. The milblogger further claimed that an insufficient amount of Russian artillery coupled with insufficient Russian drone capabilities in select sectors of the frontline allow Ukrainian forces to field tanks more easily for indirect and direct fire. Effective Ukrainian drone and artillery operations in select areas of the frontline may be straining Russia's ability to field tanks amid reports that Russian forces continue to accrue vehicles losses that are likely unstable in the medium term.[12] Ukraine's ability to damage and destroy Russian armored vehicles and tanks with FPV drones and artillery will likely strain Russia's ability to replace such losses as current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that these losses will be prohibitive over the longer term.

Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.[13] Krasnoselsky visited Moscow from January 10 to 14 and negotiated possible gas deliveries to Transnistria with the Russian Energy Ministry.[14] Krasnoselsky added that Russia will provide Transnistria with enough gas for thermal power engineering, industrial enterprises, and civilian use, noting that Russia will not be supplying the rest of Moldova with gas.[15]

Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia. The US State Department reported on January 14 that Armenia and the US launched the US–Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission, signaling a significant step in their bilateral relations.[16] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan formalized the agreement aimed at expanding bilateral cooperation in economic, security, defense, and governance sectors. Blinken emphasized US support for Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov criticized the partnership agreement, accusing the US of destabilizing the South Caucasus.[17] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also expressed dissatisfaction with Armenian government’s January 9 approval of a European Union (EU) accession bill. Overchuk and Lavrov argued that Armenia's potential future EU membership is incompatible with Armenia's membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and framing Armenia’s EU accession bill as a potential withdrawal from the EAEU.[18] Overchuk and Lavrov also claimed that such decisions are Armenia’s sovereign right yet highlighted potential consequences, reinforcing Kremlin’s longstanding pattern of threatening and pressuring neighboring countries through indirect and direct means. The Kremlin reactions to Armenia’s deepening ties with the West demonstrate a broader Russian strategy of undermining the sovereignty of neighboring and previously colonized countries through initial ultimatums and veiled coercion, often escalating to direct action and military violence when Russia’s influence is challenged, as is the case in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drones strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on the night of January 14 to 15.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.
• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.
• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.
• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000 Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2025

The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this idea is "not even up for discussion."[1] Patrushev falsely claimed that sham referendums in occupied Ukraine in September 2022 legitimized Russia's claim to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and insinuated that international recognition of Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of the four oblasts and occupied Crimea is a non-negotiable condition for a future peace agreement.

Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion. Putin identified the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine as the key goals of the full-scale invasion during a speech on February 23, 2022 — and these goals amount to the destruction of Ukraine's ability to defend itself and replacement of the legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government.[2] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated during an interview with Russian outlet Gazeta.Ru on January 14 that the Russian government continues to pursue "denazification" in Ukraine, which Rogozin defined as the "liquidation of those who instill a misanthropic Russophobic spirit" in people.[3] Putin has consistently demanded that the Ukrainian people concede their right to determine their own government, the right to defend themselves against ongoing and future aggression, and the right to choose their own security alliances before and throughout the full-scale invasion.[4] ISW continues to assess that Putin's goals in Ukraine are to break up NATO and seize full control over Ukraine and that Putin remains committed to these goals, and ISW has not observed any indication that Putin is willing to concede on such goals in future negotiations.[5]

Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the Ukrainian state. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred in a press conference on January 14 to "the country that is now called Ukraine" — a clear effort to discredit Ukraine's existence as a sovereign and independent state.[6] Patrushev also emphasized the "fraternal" connection between Russia and Ukraine and rejected any suggestion that Russia and Ukraine have distinct cultural and historical identities.[7] Putin published an essay in July 2021 arguing that ethnic Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians all belong to the same "Russian nation," and Kremlin officials have reiterated these false narratives throughout the war.[8] The Kremlin's ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine. Calls for the West to acquiesce to all of Russia's demands in Ukraine require the West to tacitly acknowledge and agree that a Ukrainian identity and state independent from Russia either does not currently exist or does not deserve to exist in the future.

Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations. Patrushev explicitly stated that Russia and the United States should negotiate on Ukraine "without the participation of other Western countries," specifically excluding the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) and heavily implying that Ukraine also should not participate in these negotiations.[9] Lavrov similarly stated that he does not know what role Italy could play in resolving the war and accused Germany and France of failing in their roles as guarantors to the Minsk agreements — agreements that Russia regularly violated.[10] These statements revive a Kremlin information operation that previously framed the West writ large — rather than just the United States —as the only meaningful negotiating party regarding the war in Ukraine other than Russia itself and rejected Ukraine's right to participate in discussions about its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[11] The Kremlin has periodically revived this information operation in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States, particularly concessions that would undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and further Putin's goal of destroying Ukraine.[12] Patrushev's comments also seek to place Russia on an equal footing with the United States as the Soviet Union was once regarded.

The Kremlin will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational impact. ISW assesses as of January 14 that Russian forces are seven kilometers away from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border at their closest point of advance near Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and up to 7.5 kilometers away from the border near Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka). Russian advances west of Pokrovsk and in the Velyka Novosilka area toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast may be a part of Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces in those areas and seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[13] Russian forces may also be attempting to seize any territory — including territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — regardless of such territory's tactical significance in order to strengthen Russia's negotiating position before potential talks to end the war. Russian authorities may attempt to leverage limited gains in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to claim that Russia has a right to control and annex all of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the future. Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russia does not occupy as a prerequisite for negotiations, and Russian officials have consistently laid claim to the entirety of these four oblasts and occupied Crimea as part of their demands in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces currently occupy limited areas in northern and northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, and the Kremlin may attempt to use these positions to make additional territorial demands in the future. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged Russia’s extensive territorial objectives that expand deep into central Ukraine in March 2024, and Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed on January 14 that "Ukraine may cease to exist" in 2025, indicating that the Kremlin is interested in illegally occupying territory far beyond the current frontline and will leverage potential future advances in an attempt to enhance its negotiation position.[15]

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military facilities between 200 and 1,110 kilometers deep in the Russian rear in Bryansk, Saratov, and Tula oblasts and the Republic of Tatarstan.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Russian state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast, which provides fuel for the strategic bombers at Russia's Engels-2 Air Base, and that the GUR and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery.[17] The Ukrainian Unmanned System Forces' 14th Drone Regiment reported that Ukrainian drones struck tanks with aviation fuel for Tu-160 bomber aircraft at the Kristal oil facility at the Engels-2 Air Base.[18] Sources within the SBU told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck glide bomb and cruise missile warehouses at the Engels-2 Air Base.[19] Geolocated footage published on January 14 shows a fire at the Saratov Oil Refinery.[20] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged unspecified industrial enterprises in Engels and Saratov City.[21] Ukrainian forces notably struck the Kristal oil facility on the night of January 7 to 8, causing a fire that Russian authorities did not put out until January 13 — likely several hours before Ukrainian forces struck the facility again.[22]

The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Force, Special Operations Forces (SSO), SBU, missile troops, and GUR, struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast, which produces components for Kh-59 cruise missiles and ammunition for tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and TOS thermobaric artillery systems and repairs Russian MLRS systems.[23] The Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces used drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems, allowing missiles to strike their targets and that Ukrainian drones hit substations and other infrastructure after the missile strike.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary explosions at the plant and that Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Tor and a Buk air defense system during the strike.[25] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Bryansk Chemical Plant is important for Russian artillery ammunition and missile production and specializes in the production of gunpowder, solid propellant components for rocket fuel, and explosives.[26] Kovalenko also stated that Ukrainian forces struck the "Kremniy  El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which Ukrainian forces previously struck in October 2024 and that produces microelectronics for missile systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and Iskander missiles; radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones.[27] Geolocated footage shows drone strikes and explosions in Seltso.[28] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a large combined missile strike against Bryansk Oblast and that Russian air defense systems destroyed all targets.[29] Bogomaz later claimed on January 14 that a falling missile fragment damaged civilian property in Bryansk Oblast, including in Seltso.[30]  The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Bryansk Oblast with six ATACMS missiles, six Storm Shadow missiles, and 31 drones.[31]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the GUR and SBU struck the Kazanorgsintez Chemical Plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, causing a fire.[32] Kovalenko stated that the strike damaged the plant, which makes materials for military use such as polyamides, synthetic rubber, and chemical compounds for armored vehicles; tires for tanks and armored personnel carriers; plastics for weapons and equipment; and explosives for ammunition.[33] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that geolocated footage indicates that the strike did not hit the Kazanorgsintez plant but rather a Gazprom liquified gas depot two kilometers from the plant and that three fuel tanks are burning.[34] Astra also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Transneft enterprise in Almetyevsk, Republic of Tatarstan.[35] Republic of Tatarstan authorities claimed that a drone strike caused a gas tank to catch fire in the suburbs of Kazan on the morning of January 14.[36]

Sources in the Ukrainian military and SBU told Ukrainian and Russian outlets that Ukrainian forces and the SBU conducted a drone strike that started a fire at the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant in Tula Oblast.[37] Astra stated that Ukrainian drone debris fell on the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant, which produces polymer and composite materials; the Aleksinskaya thermal power plant; and the Tulachermet metallurgical enterprise, which is one of the world's largest producers and suppliers of commercial pig iron and is crucial for Russia's steel industry.[38] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces downed 16 drones over the oblast on January 13 and an additional drone on January 14.[39]

Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 12 that Ukraine is ready to provide Transnistria with coal but that Transnistrian authorities have not responded to the proposal.[40] Transnistria has also reportedly recently refused offers from Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom to help Transnistria obtain gas from European platforms. In December 2024, tests showed that Moldova could receive gas through the Trans-Balkan pipeline that transits Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine.[41] Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on January 14 that Moldova has offered medical care to Transnistrian residents but that Transnistrian authorities have refused.[42] Sandu also acknowledged on January 14 that Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky recently traveled to Moscow and stated that Moldovan authorities helped the Transnistrian delegation travel through the Chisinau airport (likely because Krasnoselsky does not have a Moldovan passport or residence permit).[43] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities' involvement in Krasnoselsky's visit to Russia shows that Chisinau is not preventing any efforts to find a solution to the energy crisis. Zelensky recently stated that Russia is using the gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion ahead of the Summer 2024 Moldovan parliamentary elections. Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihail Popsoi stated on January 14 that Russia is using its artificially created energy crisis to try to destabilize the Moldovan economy in order to influence the upcoming elections.[44]

Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview published on January 14 that Moldovan authorities are to blame for the current energy crisis even though the crisis began on January 1 when Gazprom cut gas supplies to Transnistria while making false allegations about Moldova's debt to Gazprom.[45] Patrushev claimed that Russia's main priority in Moldova is to protect Russia's "compatriots" from "discrimination."[46] Patrushev compared Moldova to Ukraine and alleged that Ukraine's "neo-Nazism and Russophobia" led the country to collapse "long before" Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. Patrushev stated that he "does not rule out" that Moldova's "anti-Russian policy" will "lead to Moldova either becoming part of another state [likely in reference to Romania] or ceasing to exist altogether." Russia has long claimed its need to protect its "compatriots abroad" in Ukraine as a justification for its aggression against Ukraine, and Patrushev's statements suggest that the Kremlin is setting conditions to exploit the artificially created gas crisis in Moldova to justify potential future Russian aggression against Moldova as a necessary response to Moldova's policies that threaten Russian "compatriots" in Moldova.[47]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of its Sovereign Internet on January 14. Russian state media reported widespread internet outages of major Russian internet domains and online services affecting subscribers of all Russian telecommunications companies.[48] Sources in the Russian telecommunications industry attributed this outage to Roskomnadzor's technical means of countering threats (TSPU), which Russian authorities use to restrict Russians from accessing blocked domains and services.[49]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.
• Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion.
• Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the Ukrainian state.
• Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations.
• The Kremlin will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational impact.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova.
• Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of its Sovereign Internet on January 14.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.
• Russia continues efforts to bolster military recruitment efforts by offering financial incentives to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13, 2025

Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and seized positions along the T-0504 highway.[1] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13 that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) recently advanced to and cut the T-0406 highway between Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized a section of both highways.[2] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized the remainder of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) as part of this advance. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are deploying the 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades in a two-echelon formation and that elements of the 74th Brigade conduct the initial attacks and elements of the 55th Brigade follow behind to consolidate positions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating in the Novovasylivka-Uspenivka-Novooleksandriivka area (southwest of Pokrovsk).[3] Mashovets acknowledged that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), further substantiating previous milblogger claims that the 5th Brigade was redeployed to the Vozdvyzhenka area[4] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade may have participated in the interdiction of the T-0505 highway near Myrne, and the Russian military command's decision to redeploy the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that it is prioritizing efforts to advance in this area and envelop Pokrovsk from the east over further advances west of Kurakhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces could also leverage advances east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka and Myrne to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway.[5]

Russian forces also advanced in other areas southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to envelop the town on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces seized Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all 41st CAA, CMD) with the seizure of the settlement.[6] Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 12 and 13.[7]

Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months. The T-0405 and T-0504 highways are two of the three main east-west GLOCs supporting the Ukrainian force grouping in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances east and west of Pokrovsk may complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukraine's ability to resupply and redeploy troops to defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian military command may intend to make further advances north of the T-0504 and T-0406 highways in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to eventually withdraw to the north (rather than to the east or west) to support Russia's envelopment of both settlements and further advances west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The Russian military command likely also hopes to avoid conducting infantry-heavy frontal assaults through the urban areas of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and likely assesses that interdicting these GLOCs increases the likelihood that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from these towns and that Russian forces will be able to avoid conducting costly urban combat operations to take the towns.

Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry. Leningrad-based media outlet 47news, which is affiliated with Russian state censor Roskomnadzor, reported on January 13 that Gazprom's Deputy CEO, Elena Ilyukhina, sent a proposal to the company's CEO, Alexei Miller, on December 23 arguing that Gazprom's central office in St. Petersburg should cut its staff by 40 percent from 4,100 to 2,500.[8] Ilyukhina's proposal to shrink Gazprom's workforce is likely an effort to address economic strains due to the reduction of Russian gas exports to Europe since 2022 and Ukraine's recent refusal to renew a contract to transport Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine.[9] Gazprom official representative Sergei Kupriyanov confirmed the authenticity of the proposal on January 13 during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS but declined to comment further.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently cut the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
• Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.
• Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and wounded.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2025

The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the operation is part of a broader series of Ukrainian strikes targeting command posts of Russian forces operating in the Donetsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 and 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast, and the 3rd Army Corps [AC] (Central Military District) in occupied Svitlodarsk, Donetsk Oblast, respectively.[2] Ukrainian strikes on tactical command posts and positions located near the frontline, such as the strike against Novohrodivka, are likely intended to disrupt Russian tactical activity and directly complicate Russian command and control (C2) on the battlefield. Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear, such as the January 8 strike on the Russian 8th CAA post, are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could have impacts on Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed that the 2nd CAA is currently leading Russian operations south of Pokrovsk, that the 3rd AC is operating near Chasiv Yar, and that the 8th CAA is leading Russian efforts near Kurakhove.[3]

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.[4] The NIS told Agence-France-Presse (AFP) on January 12 that one of the captured North Korean soldiers initially believed that North Korean authorities had sent him to Russia for training but that he realized upon arrival that he would be engaged in combat - in line with recent statements from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[5] One of the captured North Korean soldiers also stated that they suffered food and water shortages for several days before their capture and that North Korean forces have suffered significant losses.[6]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.
• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2025

Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated on January 11 that elements of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) captured a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast on January 9 and that Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces recently captured a second North Korean solider in the area on an unspecified date.[1] The SBU stated that Ukrainian authorities are working with South Korean intelligence to communicate with the POWs as they do not speak English, Russian, or Ukrainian. One of the POWs was carrying a Russian military registration card from the Tuva Republic that Russian authorities reportedly issued him in Fall 2024. The POW told Ukrainian authorities that he had undergone coordination training with Russian forces for only one week before deploying to combat and that he thought he was going to a training exercise in Russia, not to the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that usually Russian or North Korean forces kill wounded North Korean personnel in order to conceal their participation in the war.[2]

North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war. The Washington Post reported on January 11 that North Koreans fighting in Kursk Oblast are attacking in large groups with support from Russian artillery and drones, unlike Russian forces who usually move in smaller groups.[3] North Korean soldiers are also reportedly ignoring Ukrainian drones and continuing to move forward despite drone strikes on personnel. The Washington Post reported that Russian forces are following behind North Korean advances in order to "stabilize the gains," but a Ukrainian solider operating in Kursk Oblast reported that communications issues between Russian and North Korean forces may be slowing Russian efforts to consolidate new positions. The Ukrainian soldier stated that North Korean forces launched an assault consisting of 400 to 500 personnel in December 2024, during which North Korean forces outnumbered Ukrainian forces six-to-one. Ammunition shortages reportedly forced the Ukrainian forces to withdraw after eight hours of fighting — suggesting that North Korean forces are heavily relying on a superior number of personnel to advance despite poor tactics. The solider stated that Ukrainian forces had inflicted significant losses on Russia's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), possibly pushing the Russian military command to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast sooner than planned. Western officials have recently noted that North Korean forces are suffering high casualties, including at least one instance of roughly 1,000 casualties in Kursk Oblast in only one week in late December 2024.[4] Zelensky reported on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast — roughly a third of the reported 12,000 total North Korean personnel in Kursk Oblast — and stated that North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka, Kursk Oblast on January 3 and 4 alone.[5] ISW continues to assess that North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russian forces will likely be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in highly attritional infantry-led assaults in similar or greater sizes than it conducts with most Russian personnel.[6] North Korean forces' inability or refusal to learn to effectively counter drones will also affect the lessons they can learn from the war.

Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains his maximalist pre-war demands to isolate Ukraine and weaken NATO and reportedly aims to enforce these demands in any possible talks with Western leaders about ending the war in Ukraine. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who has discussed this topic with Putin, that Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to withdraw from deployments in Eastern Europe in any such talks by "chang[ing] the rules" of the international system to ensure that there are "no threats to Russia," a callback to his December 2021 ultimatum to the United States ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Putin demanded in 2021 that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; ban any NATO military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; ban deployments of intermediate-range missiles in areas that could reach Russian or NATO state territory; and ban the United States from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[8] Putin notably used and intensified this narrative in 2021 to shape the information space and justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine ahead of his February 2022 full-scale invasion even though the prospect of imminent NATO membership for Ukraine did not drive him to invade Ukraine as he claimed.[9] NATO did not undertake any meaningful actions to expand in Eastern Europe or advance Ukraine's future NATO membership between the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, which promised Ukraine and Georgia eventual NATO membership, and 2022.[10] Putin's December 2021 demands notably extend beyond Ukraine and aim to roll NATO back. The Kremlin likely seeks to resurrect this narrative in an attempt to manipulate Western leaders into acquiescing to Putin's maximalist demands that would weaken NATO under the guise of "compromise" in any future peace negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on January 10 that the Kremlin is ready to hold talks with Trump without any "preconditions," but ISW continues to assess that no negotiations will result in a meaningful or sustainable peace as long as Putin remains committed to his pre-war demands for full Ukrainian capitulation and the weakening of NATO.[11]

Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time. Russian opposition media outlet Astra reported on January 11 that authorities at the Tanevo plant at the Tatarstan Oil Refinery Complex in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan evacuated the facility due to the risk of drone strikes and that locals reported smoke coming from the plant.[12] Russian sources published footage on January 11 purportedly showing a fire near the facility, but one source later claimed that there was no fire and that authorities conducted evacuations as part of exercises.[13] Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov's press service refuted reports of a fire, claiming that footage shows a glow after the facility switched to using an intense flare as part of planned changes to the facility's equipment operations.[14] Russian authorities issued a drone threat warning in the Republic of Tatarstan and stopped operations at the Nizhnekamsk Airport, citing unspecified safety concerns.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast.
• North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains his maximalist pre-war demands to isolate Ukraine and weaken NATO and reportedly aims to enforce these demands in any possible talks with Western leaders about ending the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.
• Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 10, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlets Suspline and ArmyTV that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military warehouse near Chaltyr, Rostov Oblast with drones and Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles.[1] The sources stated that Ukrainian forces used the drones to overwhelm and exhaust Russian air defenses in the area before launching Neptune missiles at the warehouse. The sources stated that Russian forces use reconnaissance drones from this warehouse to correct Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and frontline positions. Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar stated that Russian forces downed 16 Ukrainian drones over the oblast and that the strike caused a fire at an industrial enterprise just north of Chaltyr.[2] Russian opposition outlet Astra assessed that the fire occurred at a plastic coating production plant in the area.[3]

The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 10 to a Trump statement about arranging a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and stated that Putin is open to contact with international leaders and that "no conditions are required for this [contact]."[4] Peskov reiterated, however, that the Kremlin maintains its "repeatedly voiced" position on Ukraine that Putin explicitly defined in June 2024 and repeated in his December 19 Direct Line presentation.[5] Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government under the guise of "denazification," demilitarize, and cede significant swaths of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, including areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy -- all effectively amounting to Ukraine's full capitulation.[6] No negotiations will result in a meaningful or sustainable peace as long as Putin remains committed to these demands -- regardless of the Kremlin's "willingness" to hold talks with Western leaders.[7]

The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10. The US Treasury Department announced on January 10 that the United States imposed sanctions against Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, 183 Russian-connected vessels – many of which are part of Russia's shadow fleet – and dozens of oil traders, oilfield service providers, insurance companies, and Russian energy officials.[8] The United Kingdom announced that it also sanctioned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas on January 10.[9] Japan announced additional sanctions against Russia, including asset freeze measures against 33 organizations and 12 individuals and export bans and other measures against 53 organizations from countries including Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in order to strengthen Japan's response to North Korean support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[10]

The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about $3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced the transfer on January 10 and stated that Ukraine will use the funds for priority expenditures.[11] The G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans initiative will provide a total of $50 billion to Ukraine from the profits of seized Russian assets, including a total of $20 billion from the EU.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10.
• The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged.
• The US, UK, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10.
• The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about $3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• The BBC Russian Service reported on January 10 that a joint investigation conducted with Russian opposition outlet Medizona using open-source data has confirmed that at least 88,055 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.

 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2025

Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for all participants of the group to sign bilateral security agreements with Ukraine in order to strengthen Ukrainian forces and protect Ukraine's energy sector.[i] Zelensky emphasized the importance of providing Ukraine with more air defense systems and stated that Ukraine wants to supply Ukrainian forces with a record number of domestically produced and internationally procured drones in 2025. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group approved eight roadmap documents that outline the Ukrainian forces' objectives through 2027 in key areas for international cooperation, including air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, drones, air force, and maritime security.[ii] Umerov stated that the roadmaps aim to ensure that the Ukrainian military is compatible with NATO and serve as the basis for medium- and long-term support for Ukraine. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told Bloomberg ahead of the January 8 Ramstein meeting that Russia has some advantages in the war but is also facing challenges, as evidenced by Russia's turn to North Korea and Iran for assistance in its war against Ukraine.[iii]

Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9. Austin announced a new US military aid package for Ukraine under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) valued at approximately $500 million.[iv] The package includes AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M air defense missiles; air-to-ground munitions; F-16 support equipment; and small-arms ammunition.[v] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that Germany will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of IRIS-T air defense missiles.[vi] Polish Deputy Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz announced that Poland is also preparing a new aid package for Ukraine.[vii] UK Defense Secretary John Healey and Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds jointly announced that the drone coalition, including the UK, Latvia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, will provide Ukraine with 30,000 drones at an unspecified future time after the coalition signed contracts worth 45 million pounds ($55.4 million).[viii]

Russian elites and high-ranking security officials are reportedly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to wage a full-scale war in Ukraine with half measures and are increasingly concerned with Putin's timeline to end the war. Sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments told Russian opposition media outlet Meduza that Russian elites are increasingly "disappointed" and "tired" of waiting for the war to end and are growing increasingly concerned about the long-term impact of Western sanctions on Russia's economy.[ix] Two sources close to the presidential administration noted that the Russian government currently lacks a clear vision for post-war Russia and that an end to the war could be "critical" for the presidential administration if the administration cannot identify a clear narrative and political framework for Russian society after the war. A source in the Russian presidential administration told Meduza that Russian elites, primarily high-ranking security officials, are increasingly frustrated with not having "enough" manpower and materiel to conduct the war and assess that Putin needs to conduct "mobilization" and completely transition Russian society and the Russian economy to a wartime footing.

High-ranking Russian security officials appear to be assessing that Russia needs to intensify its war in Ukraine rather than seek an exit via negotiations. Meduza's report suggests that Russian security and military officials may recognize that the Russian military is not accomplishing significant territorial gains proportionate to the manpower and materiel losses they are incurring in Ukraine. The Russian military command has, thus far, tolerated taking exorbitant personnel losses in exchange for tactically but not operationally significant advances, and Putin's theory of victory is predicated on accepting such losses so long as Russian forces continue to grind forward in Ukraine.[x] Average daily Russian advances slowed by roughly nine square kilometers in December 2024 after three straight months of increasing territorial gains and personnel losses in September, October, and November 2024, however, and the Russian military command may be less willing than Putin to incur such high casualty rates if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to slow.[xi] Russian security and military officials do not appear prepared to abandon the war as a result of these losses, however, but are reportedly instead advocating for Putin to intensify Russia's war effort by calling for additional partial reserve callups and a formal decision to transition to a wartime footing, likely in hopes of flooding the battlefield with manpower and materiel. ISW continues to assess that Putin is resistant to conducting a partial involuntary reserve callup or further mobilizing the Russian economy, as such decisions would be deeply unpopular among Russians and would further strain Russia's labor shortages and economy.[xii] It remains unclear if this group of Russian security and military officials calling for further manpower and economic mobilization will succeed in convincing Putin to take more dramatic measures to meet the Russian military's needs in Ukraine, although mounting personnel losses and increasing challenges in meeting voluntary recruitment targets may cause Putin to conduct an involuntary partial reserve callup in the near future.

Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance. Russian elites' reported focus on mobilizing more Russian personnel indicates that the Russian elites likely view a lack of manpower as Russia's largest constraint to achieving rapid success on the battlefield rather than the ineffectiveness of frontline Russian forces, poor campaign-planning abilities of Russian commanders, and significant armored vehicle shortages that Russian forces are currently suffering.[xiii] Russian forces have recently demonstrated that they are able to make slow, grinding gains through infantry assaults in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions, but their inability to conduct rapid, mechanized maneuver has prevented Russian forces from converting these tactical gains into deep penetrations into Ukrainian rear areas.[xiv]

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are struggling to restore maneuver to an increasingly transparent battlefield, but the Russian military will also have to address critical shortcomings in its ability to train frontline commanders and plan military operations if Russian forces aspire to conduct the type of rapid, mechanized maneuver that characterized the first few months of the full-scale invasion in early 2022.[xv] Ukrainian military officials recently reported that Russian forces are fielding fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — the two operational directions with the highest intensity of fighting and where Russia has the densest concentrations of its forces — in favor of highly attritional, infantry-led assaults.[xvi] Russian forces have suffered high and unsustainable armored vehicle losses and have struggled to protect these vehicles from Ukrainian drones on the frontline over the last year, forcing Russian forces to increasingly limit and prioritize where and when to field armored vehicles and conduct mechanized assaults.[xvii] Dedicating a significant amount of additional Russian manpower to infantry assaults on critical areas of the frontline would likely allow Russian forces to at least sustain or possibly slightly increase their current pace of advance, but only as fast as Russian infantry can travel on foot — far short of the rapid gains, deep penetrations, and significant battlefield victories that the Russian elites likely desire.

Meduza's report indicates that Russia's security elite — like Putin himself — is uninterested in a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the war in the near future. Several sources told Meduza that Russian elites were concerned about Putin's ability to extract his territorial demands — the formal recognition of Russian control over the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, including the parts Russia currently does not occupy — in possible future negotiations and are focused on creating an "image of victory" in post-war Russia.[xviii] This focus on Russian victory in tandem with the elites' reported desire to intensify the war further indicates that Russian elites support Putin's desire to negotiate only on terms dictated by Russia and to achieve a significant victory to justify the war to Russian society. Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly indicated that Russia is unwilling to engage in good-faith negotiations or participate in a meaningful peace negotiation except on terms that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, and the Russian elite will most likely continue to support Putin's demands over engaging in meaningful negotiations.[xix]

A Russian opposition investigative outlet reported that Russian authorities have turned a pretrial detention center (SIZO) in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast into a torture center for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and imprisoned Ukrainian civilians.[xx] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that Russian authorities have been torturing Ukrainian POWs and civilians at the SIZO-2 in Taganrog and reported several accounts from Ukrainian POWs detailing the extent and high frequency of the physical and sexual abuse that the Russian guards inflict on the Ukrainian prisoners. The Ukrainian POWs reported that the Russian guards torture Ukrainian POWs, particularly defenders of Mariupol, to coerce them into pleading guilty to extremism charges in sham trials intended to falsely portray Russia as the liberator of Ukraine and justify its occupation of Ukrainian territories. Ukrainian POWs also told Mediazona that Russian authorities use the SIZO-2 facility's reputation for torture to threaten Ukrainian prisoners at other facilities and that these Ukrainians are often willing to do "anything" to avoid being transferred to SIZO-2. Mediazona also cited various human rights experts' and lawyers' statements that Russian authorities frequently detain Ukrainian civilians and journalists in occupied Ukraine for even slight suspicion of assisting the Ukrainian military or opposing the Russian war and refuse to release them, provide access to lawyers, or provide medical care. Mediazona noted that it is unclear who runs the Taganrog facility, as lawyers for the detained Ukrainians assume that employees of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service run the facility. The Russian Memorial Center for Human Rights — the successor of the Memorial Human Rights Center that focused on human rights abuses in the Soviet era — reported in October 2024 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had assumed control over the SIZO-2 facility.[xxi] The UN has consistently reported on Russian forces' "widespread and systematic torture" of Ukrainian forces as nearly all interviewed Ukrainian POWs describe consistent experiences of torture while in Russian detention.[xxii]

The UN condemned the recent surge in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs. UN Deputy Human Rights Chief Nada Al-Nashif called on Russian authorities on January 8 to halt the summary executions of Ukrainian POWs and prosecute those who engage in these executions following a recent surge in credible reports of more executions.[xxiii] Al-Nashif noted that the UN has verified 68 cases of Russian forces conducting summary executions of Ukrainian POWs since the start of the war. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.[xxiv]

The Armenian government approved a draft law on January 9, beginning Armenia's accession process into the EU.[xxv] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on January 9 that the Armenian government does not object to the law's adoption and noted that the Armenian population must approve the decision on Armenia's possible future EU membership through a referendum.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9.
• Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9.
• Russian elites and high-ranking security officials are reportedly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to wage a full-scale war in Ukraine with half measures and are increasingly concerned with Putin's timeline to end the war.
• High-ranking Russian security officials appear to be assessing that Russia needs to intensify its war in Ukraine rather than seek an exit via negotiations.
• Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance.
• Meduza's report indicates that Russia's security elite — like Putin himself — is uninterested in a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the war in the near future.
• A Russian opposition investigative outlet reported that Russian authorities have turned a pretrial detention center (SIZO) in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast into a torture center for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and imprisoned Ukrainian civilians.
• The UN condemned the recent surge in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
• The Armenian government approved a draft law on January 9, beginning Armenia's accession process into the EU.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sudzha.
• Russian officials continue to indicate that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and Russian society in the long term.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Unmanned Systems Forces struck the oil storage facility and caused a large fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility provides fuel for the Russian military's Engels-2 Air Base and noted that strike will create logistical issues for Russia's strategic aircraft based at the airfield. Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows a large fire at the storage facility, and Russian sources noted that the fire continued to burn into the morning of January 8.[2] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that debris from a falling drone struck an unspecified industrial facility near Engels but later acknowledged that the strike caused a fire in the area.[3]

Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 8th CAA used this command post to coordinate operations in Kurakhove.[5] Russian sources amplified reports on January 8 that a Ukrainian purported Storm Shadow strike against Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 killed at least one serviceman in the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and three servicemen in the 76th VDV Division.[6]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8.
• Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast, in Toretsk, and near Kurakhove.
• Russian forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber optic cables in Ukraine.

 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2025

Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kvitkova Street and reached the northwestern administrative boundary of Toretsk.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Pyrohova Street in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly 90 percent of Toretsk, but ISW has only observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces occupy approximately 71 percent of the settlement as of January 7.[3] Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024, likely to reduce the Ukrainian salient in the area and deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas in the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions, both of which were Russian main efforts at the time.[4] Russian forces originally committed limited combat power, including elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), Territorial Troops, and some elements of the Central Military District [CMD], to intensified operations near Toretsk in June 2024.[5] Russian forces have made creeping and grinding gains within Toretsk and the nearby settlements since June 2024 but have intensified offensive operations in recent weeks and made tactical gains within northern and northwestern Toretsk.[6]

Russian forces appear to be shifting assault tactics in Toretsk in order to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and facilitate tactical gains within the settlement. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in fireteams of roughly five personnel.[7] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that Russian forces had made recent gains in Toretsk by attacking in multiple areas at once instead of focusing attacks in one location.[8] Russian forces are likely leveraging their superior manpower quantities to intensify offensive operations and advance within Toretsk.

Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces may intend to consolidate their positions in northwestern Toretsk and central Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) to advance along the T-05-16 highway towards Kostyantynivka through Nelipivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillia and the fields around these settlements in an effort to threaten the southern tip of Ukraine's Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk fortress belt, which forms the backbone of Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast defense. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage further advances northwest of Toretsk and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in this area and level the frontline west and southwest of Kostyantynivka. Such advances would complicate Ukraine's ability to counterattack into Russia's near rear southeast of Chasiv Yar, including towards Klishchiivka, and would allow Russian forces to deploy additional artillery systems within range of Kostyantynivka and operate first-person-view (FPV) drones within range of the town. Russian forces may also attempt to advance west and northwest of Niu York and Leonidivka towards the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway to pressure Kostyantynivka further from the south and create a more stable southern flank for a push on Kostyantynivka. Russian forces will likely be able to accomplish more rapid advances in the fields and small settlements north and west of Toretsk than they have been able to make in their grinding advances in urban Toretsk. Russian units in this area may attempt to replicate the short, tactically significant mechanized assaults that Russian forces conducted in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 if they have adequate armored vehicle reserves for this sector.[9]

Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk. Russian forces may attempt to leverage gains within Toretsk and in the Toretsk-Shcherbynivka-Niu York area with recent Russian gains east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket between Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Toretsk. Russian advances east of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk may be part of an ongoing effort to make opportunistic gains that seize any territory, regardless of that territory’s relative insignificance.

Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months. Russian forces achieved their most rapid rates of advance while operating in the fields and small settlements in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 but have struggled to make rapid advances in urban areas including Toretsk.[10] Russian forces have spent the last six months advancing roughly 12 kilometers through Toretsk and have been fighting through Chasiv Yar since April 2024.[11] Russian forces have, in contrast, advanced roughly 18 kilometers west of Selydove since Russian forces seized the settlement in late October 2024 and roughly 20 kilometers north and northwest of Vuhledar since Russian forces seized the settlement in early October 2024.[12] Russian positions in northwestern Toretsk are currently 12 kilometers from the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, and Russian forces would likely attempt to advance directly along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Russian forces could possibly be able to threaten significant Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka within the coming two or three months but only if they are able to achieve a rate of advance in the open areas northwest of Toretsk similar to the rate at which they have advanced in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions. The Russian force grouping in Toretsk is likely smaller than the groupings in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions, however, likely does not have prioritized access to Russian reserves, and may not be capable of committing enough troops and materiel to the frontline to accomplish these rates of advance.

Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), including its 132nd and 9th motorized rifle brigades and 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, have been the main forces conducting offensive operations in Toretsk.[13] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in mid-December 2024 that elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are also operating in Toretsk, but ISW has not observed Russian reporting of this brigade operating in the area.[14] The Russian military command may decide to continue offensive operations in the Toretsk direction with the 51st CAA forces that are currently deployed in the area, which would likely result in slower, gradual advances as these limited forces are likely degraded after six months of urban combat.

The Russian military command could choose to redeploy forces from other sectors of the front to the Toretsk direction. The Russian military command could redeploy forces from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions to the Toretsk direction in the future. The Russian military command has been prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions recently and would likely not redeploy forces from these areas to the Toretsk direction until Russian forces had achieved their objectives in these areas. Russian forces' priority objective in the Pokrovsk direction remains unclear at this time, however, as Russian forces appear to be advancing east and southwest of Pokrovsk in order to envelop the town while also advancing westward from the area south of Pokrovsk towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[15] Russian forces in the Kurakhove direction are currently focused on eliminating the Ukrainian pocket near the Sukhi Yaly River but may also prioritize continued advances westward towards the border area in the future.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that the Russian military command recently withdrew elements of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) from combat operations near Kurakhove in order to rest and reconstitute and will redeploy these forces to an unspecified frontline area at a future date.[17] The Russian military command will likely choose to recommit the 5th and 110th brigades to a priority sector of the front, which could be Toretsk if the command chooses to make that a priority.

The Russian military command may continue to prioritize the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction but deprioritize offensive operations in another sector of the front, such as the Kupyansk or Borova directions, in order to redeploy forces to the Toretsk direction. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations at varying intensities along the entire front as part of efforts to pin down Ukrainian forces and maintain the strategic initiative.[18] The Russian military command may prefer to maintain this continuous pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline over redeploying forces to the Toretsk direction, although the Russian offensive operations towards Kostyantynivka from the Toretsk area may offer Russian forces the opportunity to make the most operationally significant advances along the frontline. ISW is not prepared to offer a forecast of how the Russians will weigh the effort near Toretsk at this time.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff did not report if the strike killed or wounded Russian personnel. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a strike, reportedly with HIMARS, against a different 810th Naval Infantry Brigade command post near Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 25, killing the brigade’s deputy commander and other staff officers.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area.
• Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.
• Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months.
• Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas.
• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.

 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2025

Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 and 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Berdin, central Russkoye Porechnoye, and central Novosotnitsky (all northeast of Sudzha).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian roughly reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Berdin and that Russian forces, including elements of Rosgvardia's "Talib" Group, repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novosotnitsky.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and Akhmat Spetsnaz units cleared areas near Berdin and Novosotnitsky.[3] One Russian milblogger characterized recent Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast as enhanced reconnaissance in force operations that could be a diversionary effort for unspecified future operations.[4] Increased Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast may be the beginning stages of a concerted Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere in the theater, though ISW is unprepared to offer any specific forecast.

Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[5] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), seized Leonidovo (northwest of Sudzha) and that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Russkoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha).[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (both southeast of Sudzha).[7] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), attacked toward Malaya Loknya and near Novoivanovka, Viktorovka, and Nikolskiy (all northwest of Sudzha).[8] The Russian MoD claimed that "Caspian naval infantry" drone units, likely referring to drone units of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), are operating in Kursk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command likely redeployed elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast.[9]

Ukrainian forces may be continuing to conduct long-range strikes against Russian rear areas in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to use integrated strike capabilities to support ground operations. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that there were audible explosions near the Russian 3754th Central Aviation Technical Base (military unit 13830) in Kursk City.[10] ISW cannot independently confirm if Ukrainian forces successfully struck the base. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 6 that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian forward and rear positions in Kursk Oblast with missiles several times.[11] The Russian Kursk Oblast Operational Headquarters claimed on January 6 that Russian forces destroyed two Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast.[12] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range precision strike capabilities and electronic warfare (EW) systems activity to support ground operations.[13]

Russian forces reportedly executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on January 3. A geolocated image published on January 6 shows the aftermath of a reported Russian execution of three bound Ukrainian POWs near Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on January 3, and Ukrainian officials announced an investigation into the reported executions.[14] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published a purported audio interception on January 6 reportedly of a unit commander of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) issuing an order to execute a Ukrainian POW.[15] ISW continues to assess that Russian commanders are either complacent or enabling their subordinates to execute POWs in clear violation of international law.[16]

Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine and Russia have reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025. Lyubinets indicated on January 6 that the exchanges will include both military POWs and civilian prisoners and stated that Ukraine will prioritize returning prisoners who are seriously ill or wounded.[17] Lyubinets did not provide further details about the preliminary agreement but noted that it remains to be seen "whether the Russian side will keep its word." Ukraine and Russia conducted one of the largest POW exchanges in 2024 on December 30. Russia had consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to engage in POW exchanges before the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, during which Ukrainian forces took many Russians prisoners.[18]

The leaders of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces and the far-right paramilitary unit "Rusich" Russian Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group met on January 6 and promoted a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apty Alaudinov published a video of his meeting with Rusich Group deputy commander (call sign "Medved") and the self-declared Nazi and the leader of the Rusich Group Alexei Milchakov on January 6.[19] Alaudinov stated that he has no issue with Russian nationalists who love their "nation" (natsiya) and want it to be better, as long as they do not claim that their "nation" is superior to all others. Alaudinov stated that he realized that Milchakov loves his country and that there is a lot of work ahead to make Russia "great, powerful, and united." Alaudinov stated that he and Milchakov agreed that they have a "common enemy" and "common goals" and that they need to prevent anyone from "stirring up interethnic and interfaith" tensions, presumably among Russian citizens. Milchakov stated that the meeting was "friendly" and that they discussed possible "interaction" in the war in Ukraine and the development of their "personal relationships."[20] The administration of the Rusich Telegram channel responded to criticisms of the meeting, claiming that Alaudinov invited Milchakov to the meeting, has "never fought against Russia and the Russians," and never spoke against Milchakov's views.[21] The Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group previously criticized Wagner Group commander Alexander Kuznetsov (call sign "Ratibor") for joining the Akhmat Spetsnaz in April 2024, and Russian milbloggers, including those in Russia's ultranationalist community, have previously criticized Chechen "Akhmat" forces for not contributing to Russian military operations.[22] Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly attempted to portray Russia as an ethnically and religiously harmonious and inclusive society as he balances against xenophobic demands from Russia's pro-war ultranationalist community.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.
• Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.
• Ukrainian forces may be continuing to conduct long-range strikes against Russian rear areas in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to use integrated strike capabilities to support ground operations.
• Russian forces reportedly executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on January 3.
• Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine and Russia have reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025.
• The leaders of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces and the far-right paramilitary unit "Rusich" Russian Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group met on January 6 and promoted a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony.
• Russian forces advanced in the Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2025

Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas.[5] Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka "some time ago, however.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13] The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia's ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.

Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast. The tempo of Russian offensive operations has remained low east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, along the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) line, and further east near Novooleksandrivka and Arkhanhelske since September 2024 when Russian military command reprioritized offensive operations aimed at seizing Selydove (southwest of Pokrovsk), Kurakhove, and Vuhledar over efforts to seize Pokrovsk.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 29 that Russian forces began intensifying offensive operations east of Pokrovsk, and geolocated footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[20] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces have likely also seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (both east of Pokrovsk) in recent days and advanced into southeastern Yelyzavetivka (south of Pokrovsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units consolidated positions north of Tymofiivka and along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and that Russian forces advanced north of Vozdvyzhenka toward Baranivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Zelene Pole.[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 5 that Russian forces recently resumed attacks in the Mykolaivka-Promin and Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad areas (both east of Pokrovsk) and reinforced the Russian grouping in this area with elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the 137 Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 41st CAA, CMD).[23]

The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces intensified offensive operations east of Pokrovsk over the last week (since December 29), and ISW started observing reports of renewed Russian activity in the area on December 27.[24] Recent Russian advances near Vozdvyzhenka and Yelyzavetivka and claims that Russian forces are advancing further north towards Vodyane Druhe and Baranivka indicate that Russian forces may be forming a salient that they intend to leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Elements of the Russian 41st CAA have reportedly been regrouping and reconstituting in this area for several months, and Mashovets assessed in late December 2024 that the Russian military command was preparing to activate elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will have to make significant and rapid advances toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest in the near future.[26] The Russian military command may assess that advancing through the fields and small settlements along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line will be an easier path of advance than attempting to fight through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.

Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance. ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[27] Russian advances east of Pokrovsk may be opportunistic, aimed at seizing additional territory regardless of its tactical significance, and the beginning of a concerted Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Russian advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary may also be part of an opportunistic exploitation of weaker Ukrainian positions south of Pokrovsk, while also contributing to Russia's long-term objective of advancing to the administrative boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[28] The Russian military command likely intends to exploit opportunities to advance east and south of Pokrovsk so long as such advances remain expedient and Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks immediately near and into Pokrovsk itself.

Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced to southeastern Yelyazavetivka and seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (all east of Pokrovsk).[29] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also reportedly participated in the seizure of Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[30] The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly also participated in the seizure of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and is conducting clearing operations within the settlement, indicting that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between at least two sectors of the frontline.[31] ISW has not observed reports of other elements of the Russian 51st CAA operating east of Pokrovsk in the 41st CAA's AoR within the past month. The Russian military's decision to split the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade along two prioritized sectors of the frontline and reports of their participation in the seizure of several settlements indicates that the Russian military may be using elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade as a tactical penetration force.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.
• Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.
• Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.
• Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.
• The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.
• Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.
• Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.

 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 4, 2025

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[1] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[2]

Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[4] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[5] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[6] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[7] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[8] The New York Times reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses.[9] Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.[10]

Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4. Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows damage to the Novatek gas terminal in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike.[11] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that its sources stated that Russian forces shot down most of the drones over the port terminal of Novatek subsidiary Novatrans LLC, causing minor damage to a building at the port.[12] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces downed three drones near Luga Bay but that there was no damage.[13] Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces destroyed a total of four drones over Leningrad Oblast.[14] The Ust-Luga sea trade port is the second largest in Russia after Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against the Novatek gas terminal at the port in January 2024.[15]

Astra reported that its sources in the Russian emergency services stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City with at least five drones on the night of January 3 to 4 and that Russian forces shot down all the drones.[16] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed at least five drones over Voronezh City overnight and that several drones fell on residential buildings.[17] Astra also reported on January 4 that its sources in the Kursk Oblast emergency services stated that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast on January 2 killed seven Russian servicemembers.[18] Ukrainian and Russian sources previously stated that the strike targeted a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]).[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.
• Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle.
• Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna and likely maintain positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel.

 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace." Zelensky stated on January 2 that achieving a "just peace" in future negotiations – a concept Zelensky highlighted in his December 31 New Year’s address – requires a strong Ukrainian military, security guarantees from Western allies, and Ukraine's future membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) in order to deter Russia from renewed aggression against Ukraine.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine cannot achieve a just peace with a small military, such as "40,000 or 50,000 soldiers" – a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial demand during the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Spring 2022 that Ukraine demilitarize and only maintain a force of roughly 50,000 personnel.[2] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded conditions for ending the war that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation, including the removal of the legitimate Ukrainian government and Ukraine's demilitarization.[3] These demands have not changed since 2021.

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal. Zelensky stated on December 31 that Ukrainian missiles and drones are Ukraine's "arguments for a just peace."[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to produce about 3,000 cruise missiles and "drone-missiles" and at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.[5] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) will also increase production capacity to about $30 billion worth of goods and attract $1 billion in foreign investment in 2025. The Telegraph reported on January 2 that Ukraine is working to mass produce the "Trembita" cruise missile, which has a 90-mile range, a 40-pound payload, and costs $10,000 per missile to produce.[6]

Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.[7] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities will be able to consider lifting martial law when the "hot phase" of the war comes to an end and when Ukraine is in a "strong position" with a "strong army, a strong package of weapons, [and] security guarantees." Ukraine's law, "On the legal regime of martial law," originally passed in 2000, states that Ukrainian authorities can end martial law "provided that the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity has been eliminated."[8] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly used deliberate misreadings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president of Ukraine after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[9] The Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya. The GUR reported on January 3 that the Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship, the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, and the Sparta cargo ship are scheduled to arrive at Tartus on January 5 while the Sparta II cargo ship and the Ivan Skobelev tanker are scheduled to arrive on January 8 to transfer Russian military assets to an unspecified location in Libya.[10] The GUR previously reported in mid-December 2024 that Russia had deployed the Ivan Gren, Alexander Otrakovsky, Sparta, and Sparta II from northern Russia to Syria.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace."
• Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal.
• Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems.

 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2025

Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary. Russian and Ukrainian authorities confirmed that Russian gas ceased flowing through Ukrainian territory as of the morning of January 1, and Russian officials and media largely projected confidence that the cessation of gas supplies through Ukraine will harm Europe but not Russia.[1] The loss of gas revenue will likely negatively affect Russian state energy operator Gazprom, which has been struggling with decreasing gas revenue from Europe since 2022.[2] Bloomberg estimated on January 2 that Gazprom will likely lose $6 billion in gas revenues per year due to the cessation of gas transports through Ukraine.[3] The BBC Russian Service noted on January 1 that Gazprom's main source of income in 2021 came from Russia's 45 percent share of the European gas market at the time but that Russia now has only one remaining route to export gas to Europe — the TurkStream pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the Black Sea to Turkey — and that Russian gas currently only accounts for five percent of the European market.[4] The BBC noted that Slovakia and Austria — the final destinations of the blocked Russian gas through Ukraine — have both fully met their energy needs through alternative sources. The Kremlin's efforts to project confidence about the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine mirrors its efforts to coerce Europe into authorizing Russian gas transit to Europe through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Winter 2021–2022, and the Kremlin's renewed posturing in Winter 2024–2025 likely aim to extract economic or diplomatic concessions from Europe, undermine unity within the European Union (EU), and drive a wedge between the US and EU.[5]

Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova. Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Transnistria via Ukraine on January 1, claiming that Moldova failed to pay a debt worth $709 million.[6] An audit by British and Norwegian audit firms, however, found in 2022 that Moldova owed Gazprom only $8.6 million.[7] Moldova recently held talks with Gazprom about transporting gas to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey, but Gazprom refused and did not make the arrangements to do so by the deadline on December 16.[8] Free Gazprom gas has long powered Transnistria's Cuciurgan power station, which exported a significant amount of electricity to Moldova and used the profits from these sales to support Transnistria's budget.[9] The Cuciurgan power station switched to coal reserves on January 1, which reportedly can last about 50 days.[10] Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz stopped gas supplies to most consumers in Transnistria and shut off most of the hot water and heat on January 1.[11] Moldova increased its electricity imports from Romania to make up for lost supplies from Transnistria.[12] Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom offered on January 1 to provide Tiraspoltransgaz technical and commercial assistance to obtain gas from European markets after successful tests on December 31, 2024 to supply Moldova with gas through Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.[13]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations. Zelensky stated in his New Years Eve address on December 31, 2024, that Ukraine seeks to accomplish a "just peace" in the war and announced that Ukraine is once again building its own missiles and produced over one million drones in 2024.[14] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is producing large quantities of "Palyanytsya," "Peklo," "Ruta," "Neptune," and "Sapsan" missiles, some of which Ukrainian forces have yet to use. Zelensky emphasized that the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) produced 30 percent of all military equipment that Ukrainian forces used on the frontlines in 2024. Zelensky described Ukrainian missiles and drones as Ukrainian "arguments for a just peace" and noted that Ukraine can only accomplish such a peace if it is strong.

Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies. ZNPP occupation director Yuriy Chernichuk announced on January 1 that Russian occupation officials intend to obtain licenses from Moscow to operate all six of the ZNPP's nuclear reactors by 2028, obtaining a license for the operation of the first reactor by the end of 2025.[15] Ukrainian licenses for the first ZNPP reactor will expire in December 2025, and the Kremlin claimed in 2022 that all licenses would be valid until their expiration or until the ZNPP received Russian licenses.[16] Chernichuk also announced on January 2 that occupation officials plan to replace the ZNPP's foreign-sourced equipment with Russian-made equipment, that Russia will use the ZNPP reactors to supply energy to all of occupied Ukraine, and that Russia will also use the ZNPP to generate power for Russian regions west of the Ural mountains.[17] Chernichuk's stated goal of acquiring licenses for Russia to operate ZNPP's nuclear reactors signals Moscow's long-term territorial intentions and aligns with Russia's broader efforts to de facto legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and further steal Ukraine's critical energy supply.

Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post. Geolocated footage published on January 2 showed a damaged building and Russian military vehicles after a Ukrainian missile strike against Ivanovskoye, Kursk Oblast.[18] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike, possibly with HIMARS, against the command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the settlement, while Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that the strike damaged the House of Culture in the area.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was holding an award ceremony at the House of Culture.[20]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea. The GUR reported on January 2 that a Ukrainian Magura V5 naval drone used missiles to destroy two Russian Mi-8 helicopters and damage one in the Black Sea on December 31.[21] The GUR previously reported that the naval drone strike only destroyed one helicopter and damaged another.[22] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk doubted Russian reports that there were eight crewmembers aboard the helicopters but noted that the loss of highly trained helicopter crews is significant.[23] Pletenchuk also noted that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea have deprived Russian forces of sustainable logistics in the area, including by damaging the railway on the Kerch Strait Bridge and ferries that transported railway cars and fuel tankers.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military vessels are trying to hide from Ukrainian naval strikes in bays and ports and that Russian forces will only be able to repel Ukrainian naval drones equipped with missiles with jet and fighter aircraft.[25] ISW assesses that increased Ukrainian offensive capabilities in the Black Sea will most likely threaten Russian control over occupied Crimea.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary.
• Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations.
• Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to inadequately supply Russian military personnel with basic equipment and ammunition, forcing soldiers to provide their own materiel.