Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2025

November 11, 2025, 10:30pm ET

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on November 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively slow, likely in part because the Russian military command continues to pursue grinding offensive operations throughout the theater. ISW has continued to observe relatively little geolocated footage of Russian advances in and near Pokrovsk in early November 2025 compared to confirmed advances in mid- to late-October 2025. Geolocated footage published on November 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Pokrovsk and marginally advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), respectively.[i] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk; in northern, northeastern, and eastern Pokrovsk; to western Myrnohrad from positions within Pokrovsk; east and northeast of Myrnohrad; and within eastern Myrnohrad.[ii] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk), Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), Kotlyne, and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[iii] Russian milbloggers refuted claims of substantial Russian advances northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne from Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), however.[iv] Russian forces are struggling to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction by advancing on the northern shoulder of the pocket near Rodynske, where they pose the greatest threat of closing the encirclement. Elements of the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have been fighting on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, including near Rodynske, in recent weeks and have been struggling to make advances comparable to the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), which has been fighting and making gains on the western flank.[v]

Russian forces appear to be struggling to conduct successful ground assaults to take and hold additional ground despite having conducted a successful battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign and infiltration missions to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[vi] The urban terrain of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad is not conducive to mechanized, motorized, or mass infantry assaults intended to expand control of terrain, unlike Russian infiltration missions. The Russian military command has dedicated better-trained and better-equipped units to BAI and infiltration missions than they have to ground assaults. Elite dedicated drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are responsible for interdicting Ukrainian logistics and downing Ukrainian drones in the Pokrovsk direction, and Spetsnaz elements are responsible for initial infiltration missions aimed at disorganizing Ukrainian defenses and creating holes for standard Russian infantry to exploit on subsequent infiltration missions.[vii] Russian forces are also struggling to extend logistics that would more easily enable Russian infantry who have already infiltrated into Pokrovsk to consolidate positions and accumulate personnel for further assaults.[viii]

Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will likely take more time and suffer more casualties to do so than if the Russian military command focused more resources from elsewhere on the front in this direction. The Russian military command has chosen to maintain several offensive operations across the theater simultaneously, including northern Kharkiv Oblast in the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions; eastern Kharkiv Oblast in the Kupyansk direction; northeast of the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Siversk direction; near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border junction in the Velykomykhailivka direction; and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian forces have struggled to sustain simultaneous offensive operations on non-mutually supportive axes for much of the war.[ix] Russia's persistent dedication of manpower and resources to various directions and grinding advances, rather than prioritizing resources to the Pokrovsk direction, will prolong the Russian campaign to seize Pokrovsk. The Russian military command has proven willing to tolerate the significant losses and time required for such campaigns.[x] The Russian military command may fear that reducing the Russian force presence or tempo of offensive operations anywhere else in the theater may provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to make gains or redeploy forces elsewhere. The Russian military command also likely seeks to maintain the facade that Russian forces are making substantial advances across the entire theater, contrary to the battlefield reality, and redeploying forces and means away from some areas of the front at the scale necessary to quickly collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction would undermine this Russian narrative.[xi]

Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and other areas of eastern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Okhotnyche (northeast of Hulyaipole).[xii] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Uspenivka and Novomykolaivka and from positions near Okhotnyche, Novouspenivske, and Nove (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[xiii] Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags in Novouspenivske in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xiv] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on November 10 that the contested "gray zone" in the Solodke-Novomykolaivka-Rivnopillya area (northeast of Hulyaipole) has grown significantly recently.[xv] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces seized Novouspenivske.[xvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Solodke and advanced west of Zlahoda, to the eastern outskirts of Yablukove (all north of Hulyaipole), west of Novouspenivske, and east of Vesele (east of Hulyaipole).[xvii] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that supply Hulyaipole from Pokrovske (north of Hulyaipole).[xviii] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces recently intensified artillery strikes in the Hulyaipole direction, firing roughly 2,000 shells in 400 artillery strikes per day ahead of the Ukrainian withdrawals.[xix]

Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of recent foggy weather to use infiltration tactics to advance toward Hulyaipole from the east.[xx] Ukrainian military sources fighting in the Hulyaipole direction told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction are using weather conditions in which Ukrainian drones cannot fly to advance in small groups on foot or on motorcycles.[xxi] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces noted that Russian forces have been exploiting fog that hinders Ukrainian drone surveillance in recent attempts to penetrate the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk on light vehicles, consistent with ISW's recent observations that Russian forces take advantage of poor weather to conduct ground operations in the area.[xxii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of morning and evening fog to intensify offensive operations.[xxiii]

A month-long BAI campaign likely facilitated recent Russian advances in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions. The campaign involved artillery, air, and drone strikes in Ukraine's near rear against targets such as roads, railways, and bridges that support Ukrainian GLOCs, aiming to degrade Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline forces and defend against subsequent Russian offensive operations.[xxiv] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction recently noted that the Russian airstrikes against bridges near Pokrovske (west of Velykomykhailivka) degraded Ukrainian logistics ahead of Russian advances.[xxv] The drone battalion commander added that Russian forces systematically employed fiber-optic sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in that direction. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes near Rivnopillya and Yablukove (both northeast of Hulyaipole) to set conditions for further Russian advances in the area.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved low-altitude air superiority by targeting Ukrainian drone operators and therefore degrading Ukrainian drone operations before recently intensifying offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of November 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast overnight.[xxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported the refinery processes over 20 petroleum products, including gasoline, fuel oil, and diesel fuel. Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows fires near the facility.[xxviii] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed on November 11 that overnight Ukrainian drone strikes damaged unspecified civilian infrastructure facilities.[xxix] This attack marks the fourth Ukrainian drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery within a month.[xxx] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Orsknefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast overnight, damaging an AVT primary oil refining unit.[xxxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility processes over 30 petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation gasoline, and fuel oil. The Ukrainian General Staff added that the facility processes 6.6 million tons of oil annually. Geolocated footage shows smoke from a fire at the facility, and additional footage shows a drone flying in the area ahead of the strike.[xxxii] Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on November 11 that falling drone fragments damaged an unspecified industrial facility overnight.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively slow, likely in part because the Russian military command continues to pursue grinding offensive operations throughout the theater.
• Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will likely take more time and suffer more casualties to do so than if the Russian military command focused more resources from elsewhere on the front in this direction.
• Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and other areas of eastern Ukraine.
• A monthslong battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign likely facilitated recent Russian advances in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of November 10 to 11.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, on November 10 and 11.[xxxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[xxxv]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are bringing ammunition and personnel into Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), possibly in preparation for an attack on Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast).[xxxvi] The milblogger claimed that the new commander of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) is more actively evacuating wounded and killed servicemembers in the area than the previous commander. The milblogger claimed that elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) unsuccessfully attacked on the northern outskirts of Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[xxxvii] The milblogger claimed that eight VKS servicemembers defied the regimental commander's ban on evacuations and evacuated a wounded servicemember from Bezsalivka, where seriously wounded soldiers of the battalion remain.[xxxviii] The milblogger claimed that the new 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th AC, LMD) commander, Colonel Andrei Voronkov, previously served as the acting commander of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD).[xxxix] The milblogger claimed that Voronkov is known for ordering attritional assaults.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[xl] Drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[xli] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian drone launch points, ammunition depots, and positions in border areas of Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.[xlii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within southern Vovchansk and near Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xliii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on November 10 and 11.[xliv]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battery operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on November 11 that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[xlv] The commander reported that Russian forces stopped using Lancet loitering munitions in this direction due to effective Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) jamming and are now using EW-resistant fiber-optic drones.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 11 that the Russian military command is replacing elements of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in the Vovchansk direction.[xlvi] ISW has observed reports that the 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment is a new unit formed as of June 2025 by the expansion of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD) into the 71st Motorized Rifle Division.[xlvii] The milblogger noted that this rotation comes soon after the October 25 Ukrainian strike against the Belgorod Reservoir dam (southeast of Belgorod City) and assessed that Russian forces suffered heavy losses from the flooding.[xlviii] The milblogger complained that the 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment is not fully staffed and almost entirely made up of infantry with insufficient organic support elements. The milblogger noted that the regiment is at only 50 percent of its total end strength and that its artillery elements are only staffed to 20 percent of their end strength.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Vovchansk.[xlix] Drone operators of a drone platoon of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[l]

Derhachivska Hromada Military Administration Head Viacheslav Zadorenko stated on November 11 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian car in Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City), injuring one civilian.[li]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 11 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction reported on November 10 that Russian forces recently crossed the international border into a five-kilometer contested "gray zone" between Odradne and Bolohivka (both east of Velykyi Burluk) in which neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces maintain a permanent presence.[lii] The commander indicated that Russian forces regularly operate in this contested area. ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on November 11.[liii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on November 11 that Russian forces seized "eastern" Kupyansk.[liv] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that reports of Russian advances within eastern Kupyansk, into Sadove, and toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (both south of Kupyansk) are unconfirmed.[lv]

Russian forces continued ground assaults near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka and toward Hlushkivka and Novoosynove on November 10 and 11.[lvi] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southern Kupyansk and near Osynovo (south of Kupyansk).[lvii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on November 11 that Russian forces are attempting to hold positions on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk and noted that both Russian and Ukrainian logistics into Kupyansk are tenuous.[lviii] Trehubov stated that both sides require drone dominance to transport supplies and infiltrate infantry groups into Kupyansk itself. Trehubov stated that Russian forces continue to employ fiber-optic sleeper drones in the Kupyansk direction. A prominent Russian milblogger noted that constant Russian claims that Kupyansk will soon fall are part of an information warfare effort - likely to create a false impression of Russian advances for media audiences both at home and abroad.[lix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in eastern Kupyansk.[lx] Elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) and 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Kupyansk.[lxi] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction with Vedma drones, which can reportedly carry a payload of up to 10 kilograms and have a range of up to 12 kilometers.[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova toward Borivska Andriivka, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove on November 10 and 11.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of and in central Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and west of Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[lxiv]

Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman toward Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 10 and 11.[lxv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction, and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Rubtsi direction (northwest of Lyman).[lxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Siversk.[lxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[lxviii]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka and Pereizne on November 10 and 11.[lxix]

A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 11 that Ukrainian defensive positions are hindering Russian advances east of Siversk.[lxx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Siversk.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Mykolaivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka), northeast of Ivanopillya, west of Pleshchiivka (both southeast of Kostyantynivka), and north of Yablunivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on November 10 and 11.[lxxiii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) and Sofiivka.[lxxiv]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Chasiv Yar, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized as of August 1.[lxxv] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 10 that Ukrainian forces entered Yuzhnyi Microraion in October 2025 and advanced into Levanevskoho Microraion (both in southern Chasiv Yar) during the first week of November.[lxxvi] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces retook roughly 10 percent of Chasiv Yar.

Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov reported on November 10 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian motorcycle in Kostyantynivka, killing one civilian.[lxxvii] Russian sources posted footage on November 9 and 10, reportedly showing Russian forces conducting three FAB guided glide bomb strikes against apartment buildings in Kostyantynivka.[lxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[lxxix] FPV drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications equipment near Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxx] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications equipment near Sofiivka and Rusyn Yar.[lxxxi] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment; 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Nove Shakhove and north of Shakhove (both east of Dobropillya).[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Pankivka on November 10 and 11.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances.

Russian forces attacked within and near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Balahan, Hnativka, Rih, Rivne, Myrnohrad, and Mykhailivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne on November 10 and 11.[lxxxv] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and Hryshyne (west of Pokrovsk).[lxxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that central Rodynske is a contested ”gray zone.”[lxxxvii]

Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov published footage on November 11 showing Russian FAB-3000 and FAB-1500 guided glide bomb strikes against apartment buildings in Myrnohrad.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.[lxxxix] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate within Myrnohrad.[xc] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[xci] Drone operators of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions and vehicles on the outskirts of Pokrovsk.[xcii] Reconnaissance drone operators of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) and Lancet loitering munition operators of the 24th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[xciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[xciv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on November 10 and 11.[xcv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Orestopil (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[xcvi]

Russian forces attacked near Velykomykhailivka itself; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Orestopil, Sosnivka and Novomykolaivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Zlahoda, Vidradne, Danylivka, and Yehorivka on November 10 and 11.[xcvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction reported on November 11 that fighting is intensifying in the direction – Russian forces now send 100 to 200 personnel on ground assaults daily and are increasing the number of assault groups.[xcviii] The spokesperson stated that the contested "gray zone" in the direction is growing. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces continue to operate motorcycles, buggies, and makeshift armored civilian cars rather than heavy armored vehicles. The spokesman noted that faster and more maneuverable vehicles are less vulnerable to Ukrainian drones.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 91st Separate Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD])  reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xcix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances, assessed Russian infiltrations, and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Uspenivka, Yablukove, Novouspenivske, and Rivnopillya and east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke and Zelenyi Hai on November 10 and 11.[c]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on November 11 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian car in Hulyaipole, killing a civilian.[ci]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating within Novouspenivske.[cii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on November 10 and 11.[ciii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk.[civ]

A Russian milblogger claimed that active FPV drone surveillance as far as northern Prymorske enabled recent Russian advances within the settlement.[cv] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery systems near Preobrazhenka (just northeast of Orikhiv).[cvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Road Bridge on November 10 and 11.[cvii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using a new Baba Zina drone in the Kherson direction.[cviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 8th Artillery Regiment (18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating within tube artillery range of Kherson City (roughly 25 kilometers).[cix] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[cx]

Ukrainian forces struck oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of November 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Marine Oil Terminal in occupied Feodosia, a key fuel and lubricants supply hub for occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.[cxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck storage tanks at the oil terminal. The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported, citing local reports, that Russian forces used automatic weapons to fire at drones overnight near the oil terminal and that the Pantsir-S1 air defense system that was previously near the facility is no longer present.[cxii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 119 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – about 80 of which were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[cxiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the strikes primarily targeted frontline areas of Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, as well as Odesa Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 53 drones and that 59 drones struck 18 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Odesa, and Donetsk oblasts.[cxiv] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that the strikes cut power to about 16,000 households in Odesa Oblast.[cxv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against the Orilka railway station (south of Kharkiv City).[cxvi] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on November 10 that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in Orilka overnight on November 9 to 10 for the third time since October 31.[cxvii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.