Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on November 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces may be attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk itself while also encircling Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket from the west, likely because Russian forces have found such an encirclement more feasible than an encirclement from the east. Elements of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attempting to close the encirclement of the pocket from the southwest and northeast of Pokrovsk, respectively, but are each struggling to concentrate forces and make significant advances. The 51st CAA is fighting in two directions that are not mutually supportive because the CAA is simultaneously trying to advance north of Pokrovsk, close the encirclement, and reduce the pocket around Pokrovsk. This split focus is likely hindering the 51st CAA's efforts to close the Ukrainian pocket, consistent with Russian forces’ pattern of pursuing different objectives in an operational direction rather than concentrating efforts on a single decisive objective.[i] SMD elements northeast of Pokrovsk are simultaneously attempting to attack in multiple directions, particularly around Dobropillya. Elements of the 51st CAA are attacking southwestward to seize Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) to close the encirclement. Russian naval infantry elements, likely operationally subordinated to the neighboring Russian 8th CAA (SMD), are attacking southeast of Dobropillya toward Sofiivka and Novopavlivka.[ii] Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking the base of the Dobropillya salient from the west and east, likely to blunt Russian attacks in the area to advance north.[iii] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) counterattacked along the Zapovidne-Ivanivka line (southeast of Dobropillya) and the Mayak-Nove Shakhove line (east of Dobropillya), likely to defend against these Ukrainian counterattacks.[iv]

Russian forces likely initially seized on an opportunity to advance in the Dobropillya direction in part to portray Russian forces as making significant advances ahead of the August 2025 Alaska summit, but the resulting vulnerabilities from failing to make operationally significant advances in the area may be hindering Russian efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk pocket at this time.[v] A Russian milblogger acknowledged at the height of the Dobropillya effort in August 2025 that the base of the Russian penetration was too narrow to develop stable logistics, making the salient vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks.[vi] Elements of the 51st CAA have since deprioritized the Dobropillya effort to focus on collapsing the Pokrovsk pocket, but the 51st CAA must now divide its attention between advancing northeast and north of Pokrovsk while still defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dobropillya direction that now threaten Russia's near rear on the eastern flank of Pokrovsk.[vii]

The 2nd CAA is also struggling to concentrate sufficiently to close the pocket from the southwest. Mashovets reported that elements of the 2nd CAA attacked near Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that the 2nd CAA is dispersing its offensive efforts to both close the Ukrainian pocket from the west as well as to advance within Pokrovsk and north from the town.[viii] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) to prevent Ukraine from conducting an orderly withdrawal that would negate the potential operational impact of the future Russian seizure of Pokrovsk. The 2nd CAA has made speedier advances within Pokrovsk and on the western flank of the pocket than the 51st CAA has made on the eastern flank, but has failed to seize Pokrovsk and collapse the pocket at this time since rapidly infiltrating into the town in late October 2025.[ix] Russian forces fighting in the Pokrovsk direction have taken some of the highest losses on the battlefield in recent months, and elements of the 51st and 2nd CAAs are likely degraded as they attempt to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[x] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.

Russian forces may attempt to use vehicles to transport troops, likely under the cover of fog, in order to speed up the clearing of Pokrovsk itself. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are specifically clearing the T-0504 Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad and O0544 Hrodivka-Myrnohrad roads (both east of Myrnohrad) to allow vehicle-borne Russian soldiers to enter Myrnohrad.[xi] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are using the cover of fog that inhibits Ukrainian drone operations to transport troops into Pokrovsk.[xii] Mashovets stated that the continued Ukrainian presence in northern Pokrovsk is forcing small Russian infantry groups in the area to fight under conditions of a sub-tactical encirclement in the area, while the Ukrainian forces remaining south of the Donetska Railway in Pokrovsk are fighting in similar conditions. The inability of Russian small group infiltration tactics to generate sufficient mass to clear Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk presently will likely force Russian forces to resort to using vehicles during inclement weather conditions to transport large numbers of troops into Pokrovsk. 

Russia is reportedly continuing to struggle to replace its battlefield losses with new recruits. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 17 that Russian federal budget expenditure data shows that 262,700 people signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and received one-time sign-up bonuses between January and September 2025 — an average of roughly 29,189 new recruits per month.[xiii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered about 28,400 to 48,000 losses per month between January and September 2025.[xiv] The data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces suffered an average of roughly 35,400 losses per month — more than the reported average monthly recruitment rate. Russia's main method for generating manpower through high financial incentives and price surging has reportedly been losing momentum and hitting diminishing returns in recent months.[xv] ISW continues to assess that Russia's recent law on the deployment of active reservists within Russia and occupied Ukraine is part of wider efforts to set conditions to deploy involuntarily called up active reservists to combat operations in Ukraine in an effort to offset these decreasing recruitment rates.[xvi]

Saboteurs recently damaged at least two segments of a Polish railway on a route to Ukraine. Polish police reported that a train conductor observed damage to a portion of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Życzyn, Poland on the morning of November 16.[xvii] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on November 17 that an explosion from an act of sabotage destroyed portions of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Mika and Lublin.[xviii] Polish authorities have not attributed the explosions to a specific actor as of this writing. Investigative journalist Christo Grozev published images of a damaged rail track near Warsaw and an electrical cable laid across the track on the route to Rzeszów.[xix] Grozev assessed that the cable was 300 meters long and led to a nearby parking lot, allowing a saboteur to remotely detonate an explosive device. It is unclear whether this incident on the Warsaw–Rzeszów railway line is connected to the incidents on the Warsaw-Lublin line. The Lublin-Warsaw and Warsaw–Rzeszów railway lines support Western military assistance deliveries to Ukraine.[xx] The rail line explosions come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[xxi]

France agreed to sell Ukraine weapons systems, such as fighter jets and air defense systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a declaration of intent on November 17, allowing Ukraine to purchase military equipment from France.[xxii] Zelensky reported that the document will allow Ukraine to purchase 100 Rafale F4 fighter aircraft by 2035, radars for air defense systems, air-to-air missiles, aerial bombs, and eight SAMP/T air defense systems with six launchers each. The document calls for technology transfers and joint production of Rafale aircraft in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian and French defense industrial bases (DIBs) will begin joint production of interceptor drones and work to develop components for Ukrainian drones in 2025.[xxiii] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told CNN on September 3 that only US-made Patriot systems and French- and Italian-made SAMP/T air defense systems can intercept Russian ballistic missiles.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces may be attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk itself while also encircling Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket from the west, likely because Russian forces have found such an encirclement more feasible than an encirclement from the east.
• Russian forces may attempt to use vehicles to transport troops, likely under the cover of fog, in order to speed up the clearing of Pokrovsk itself.
• Russia is reportedly continuing to struggle to replace its battlefield losses with new recruits.
• Saboteurs recently damaged at least two segments of a Polish railway on a route to Ukraine.
• France agreed to sell Ukraine weapons systems, such as fighter jets and air defense systems.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine’s long-range strikes campaign against Russian energy infrastructure is increasingly damaging the Russian power grid. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on November 17 that Ukrainian strikes are the cause of every tenth power outage in Russia, and that Ukrainian strikes and low funding for repairs of old energy infrastructure have degraded Russia’s power grid by 80 percent.[xxv] A former officer in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Novaya Gazeta Europe that Ukrainian forces are targeting substations supplying power to major defense industrial base (DIB) facilities.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on November 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on November 17.[xxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Kindrativka and Andriivka (all north of Sumy City).[xxvii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces provided additional information on Russian forces’ November 12 pipeline operation south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[xxviii] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces anticipated the Russian operation and fired on Russian forces exiting from the pipeline. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces may bring North Korean forces into Sumy Oblast through the pipeline. The milblogger also stated that Russian forces’ pipeline operations have lost the element of surprise and discouraged further such operations.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces employed a Kuryer unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) armed with an RPO-S Shmel thermobaric weapon in combat for the first time in the Sumy direction.[xxix]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City within and near Vovchansk and near Synelnykove on November 16 and 17.[xxx]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian vehicles and positions in the Kharkiv direction.[xxxi] TOS-1A thermobaric artillery elements of the 20th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[xxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) raising a flag in central Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xxxiii] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of infiltration of Russian forces to Dvorichanske.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment seized Dvorichanske.[xxxiv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Milove, east of Velykyi Burluk and Obukhivka, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on November 16 and 17.[xxxv]

Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevych stated that Russian forces conducted Geran-2 drone strikes against a residential area of Velykyi Burluk and Buryakivka (just north of Velykyi Burluk) on the evening of November 16, killing one civilian and wounding another.[xxxvi]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Khatnie.[xxxvii]  

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 17 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[xxxviii] The Russian milblogger refuted Russian claims that Russian forces seized Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk), acknowledging that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from the settlement daily.[xxxix]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Kupyansk — an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[xl]

Russian forces attacked within and near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, and Kurylivka on November 16 and 17.[xli] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupyansk and near Velyka Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), Radkivka (north of Kupyansk), Myrove, Podoly (both west of Kupyansk), Osynovo (south of Kupyansk), Hlushkivka, Sadove, and Blahodativka (all southwest of Kupyansk).[xlii]

Ukraine's 10th Army Corps (AC) reported on November 17 that Russian claims that Russian forces seized east (left) bank Kupyansk and encircled Ukrainian forces in Podoly are untrue as Russian forces do not maintain a presence in these areas.[xliii] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are raising flags within Kupyansk in order to falsely claim Russian advances.[xliv] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are eliminating Russian forces in northern Kupyansk.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating within Kupyansk.[xlv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Korovii Yar, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Terny; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Maslyakivka; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 16 and 17.[xlvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that both well-trained Russian forces, who typically operate in sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and poorly trained forces are trying to infiltrate Ukrainian positions and then accumulate for further attacks.[xlviii] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are trying to exploit foggy weather to attack in larger groups at the same time.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Yampil.[xlix] Drone operators of the Hyperion Unmanned Systems Battalion (reportedly of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles near Starodubivka (south of Lyman).[l] Elements of the 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 17 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southern Siversk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[lii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces seized Platonivka (northwest of Siversk).[liii] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing the settlement.[liv] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that there is no footage confirming the claimed seizure, however.[lv]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Zvanivka on November 16 and 17.[lvi]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske and Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on November 16 and 17.[lvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported that Russian forces have changed frontline tactics and are now deploying aircraft and using glide bombs to strike Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure in the near rear.[lviii] The commander stated that Russian forces continue attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian positions under the cover of fog. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that it is too early to discuss a full-scale assault on Kostyantynivka.[lix]

A Russian milblogger complained on November 17 that elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are fighting within Ivanopillya but have not seized any Ukrainian fortifications.[lx] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) elsewhere in the area seized some Ukrainian defensive positions on the western flank of a defending Ukrainian unit.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) and of the 7th Military Base (49th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Kostyantynivka.[lxi] FPV drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly struck a Ukrainian command post and generator near Chasiv Yar.[lxii] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment; 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxiii]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Dobropillya direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 17 that Russian forces infiltrated Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya) in small infantry groups.[lxiv]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Shakhove, and Nove Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Mayak on November 16 and 17.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shakhove.[lxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications devices in Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxviii] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces south of Kucheriv Yar.[lxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage posted on November 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in northern Pokrovsk.[lxx] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of infiltration of Russian forces in northern Pokrovsk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 17 that Russian infiltration groups reached the T-0515 highway southwest of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk) and entered Rivne (east of Pokrovsk).[lxxi] ISW assesses that none of these infiltration events changed the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA) at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of and in northeastern Pokrovsk.[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Krasnyi Lyman, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on November 16 and 17.[lxxiii] Russian milbloggers and the Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne, Rivne, Myrnohrad, and Svitle (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), including drone operators, reportedly continue to operate in Myrnohrad.[lxxv] Elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Pokrovsk.[lxxvi] FPV drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles and equipment near Pokrovsk.[lxxvii] FPV drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hryshyne.[lxxviii] Elements of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and the Storm Special Purpose Detachment of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Pokrovsk.[lxxix]

Ukrainian forces recently recaptured positions in Novopavlivka.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows Ukrainian forces capturing Russian soldiers in eastern Novopavlivka where ISW observed Russian forces operating within the town as of November 14, indicating that Ukrainian forces have recaptured these areas.[lxxx] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces eliminated most of the Russian forces within Novopavlivka and localized the Russian advance.[lxxxi] The spokesperson of the brigade noted that Ukrainian forces cleared Novopavlivka.[lxxxii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Dachne, and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on November 16 and 17.[lxxxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Pegas artillery crew of the Russian 400th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the east (left) bank of the Vovcha River on the eastern outskirts of Velykokmykhailivka and northwest of Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka) and also advanced north of Vovche (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove on November 16 and 17.[lxxxvi]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 17 that Russian forces lost a record number of forces — including 317 personnel and several vehicles — in an assault near Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka) on November 16.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxxviii]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military targets and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 17 that GUR drones struck a Russian Tor-M1 air defense system, 55K6 command post for an S-400 air defense system, and a 9S18M1-3 radar station for a Buk-M3 air defense system in occupied Donetsk Oblast in the past two weeks (since about November 3).[lxxxix] Geolocated footage published on November 17 indicates that GUR drones struck a Tor-M1 in occupied Mariupol.[xc] Russian sources and occupation officials accused Ukrainian forces of striking the Chaikyne electrical substation on November 16, reportedly leaving up to 500,000 subscribers without power in areas including occupied Donetsk City, Horlivka, Makiivka, and Yasynuvata.[xci]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows Russian forces in central Hai (northeast of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[xcii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of Hai.[xciii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Danylivka and east of Nechaivka, Radisne, and Nove Zaporizhzhia (all north of Hulyaipole along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway).[xciv] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to advance north and west from Hai, likely to interdict the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway.[xcv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole near Ternuvate and Dobropillya; north of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rivnopillya, Solodke, Pavlivka, Pryvilne, Krasnohirske, and Zlahoda; east of Hulyaipole near Vesele, Vysoke, and toward Zatyshshya on November 16 and 17.[xcvi]

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction recently began striking Ukrainian military equipment and other infrastructure targets 10 to 12 kilometers from the frontline, forcing Ukrainian forces to move their equipment further into the rear.[xcvii] Beskrestnov indicated that Russian forces are conducting heavy first-person view (FPV) drone and glide bomb strikes against the Pokrovske-Ternuvate-Zaliznychne (north to southwest of Hulyaipole) line. Beskrestnov reported that it is difficult for Ukrainian forces to move in this area and that Ukrainian forces can use equipment to detect Russian FPV drones but not fiber optic drones, which have a range of 20 kilometers.

Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Ukrainian forces struck a bridge along the Hulyaipole-Uspenivka road (northeast of Hulyaipole) in the Russian near rear with a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb.[xcviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly clearing windbreaks west and north of Rivnopillya.[xcix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southeastern outskirts of Orikhiv.[c]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirske and Prymorske on November 16 and 17.[ci]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 17 that Russian forces have not seized Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and that Russian sources discussing the seizure of Mala Tokmachka are spreading false claims.[cii] Voloshyn reported that there have not been any assaults over the past day or two days.

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division with the seizure of Mala Tokmachka.[ciii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Mala Tokmachka on November 16.[civ] Elements of the 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly continuing to operate in Stepnohirsk.[cv] Drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Preobrazhenka (immediately north of Orikhiv).[cvi] Maintenance elements of the 104th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Orikhiv direction.[cvii]

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on November 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge and in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on November 16 and 17.[cviii]

The Kherson City Military Administration and Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 17 that Russian forces conducted a “double tap” strike against an ambulance in Dniprovskyi Raion, Kherson City, injuring two ambulance workers and damaging two ambulances.[cix]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system near Ulyanivka (northeast of Kherson City) and an Osa SAM system near Novokyivka (southeast of Kherson City).[cx]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to strike areas of Kherson City unprotected by anti-drone nets.[cxi] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are stationed on the outskirts of Kherson in the “island zone” but that there are no large-scale operations to seize the city.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th Airborne Division are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Antonivka (east of Kherson City).[cxii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and 128 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones — of which about 80 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[cxiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that as of 0900 local time Ukrainian forces had downed 91 drones but that the strikes were ongoing. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 32 drones struck 15 locations and that the two ballistic missiles struck two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, port, and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Donetsk oblasts.[cxiv] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes cut power to consumers in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts.[cxv] The Romanian Emergency Management Agency reported that Romanian authorities evacuated civilians after a Turkish-flagged liquefied natural gas tanker caught fire after a Russian drone strike near Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[cxvi]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar in Minsk on November 17 and discussed cooperation in the energy and industrial sectors, including aircraft manufacturing.[cxvii]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.