Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 23, 2025

November 23, 2025, 9:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:45 PM ET on November 23, except for reports about the US-Ukrainian-European meetings in Geneva. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes. US President Donald Trump stated on November 22 that the 28-point peace plan is not his final offer to Ukraine.[i] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated to Fox on November 23 that the peace plan is a "work in progress" and that there are issues that the parties must codify and explain further.[ii] Kellogg stated that there likely needs to be an annex document outlining security guarantees for Ukraine. Kellogg stated that the United States does not want a repeat of the Budapest Memorandum or Minsk Agreements, Russian-preferable agreements that gave Ukraine vague security assurances in exchange for Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament in 1994 and a 2015 failed ceasefire protocol that greatly advantaged Russia and led to the full-scale invasion in 2022, respectively.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that, after the US-Ukrainian-European meetings on November 23 in Geneva, the peace plan is a "living, breathing document" that changes with new input every day.[iii] Rubio added that the parties in Geneva "really moved forward" and that there is no concrete deadline for Ukraine to sign the peace plan, stating that the United States wants to finalize the deal "as soon as possible," even if that is after the initial November 27 deadline.[iv] Rubio stated that the United States recognizes that Ukraine needs security guarantees as part of a peace settlement and that achieving peace will "require for Ukraine to feel as if it is safe" from renewed invasions or attacks.[v] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated, after the Geneva meetings, that "a lot is changing" and that talks will continue later on November 23.[vi] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, who is leading the newly formed Ukrainian negotiating delegation, stated that delegations will continue working on November 23 and in the coming days to create a joint proposal between the United States, Ukraine, and European allies.[vii]

Western reporting also suggests that the United States is open to amending the peace plan, including points about the Ukrainian military and post-war security guarantees. The Washington Post reported on November 22 that US officials stated that the Trump administration recognizes that the security guarantees in the initial 28-point plan are "not strong enough yet."[viii] US officials reportedly stated that US President Donald Trump may raise or remove the 600,000 cap on Ukraine's military or may consider supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk long-range missiles in the event of a peace agreement to bolster postwar deterrence. The Washington Post reported that a US official stated that the United States and US allies would help Ukraine build a security "wall" along the ceasefire line using unspecified advanced technology. A US official stated that Zelensky responded to the US peace proposal by proposing a ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure, but that Russia then responded by labeling such a ceasefire as a "nonstarter."

European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan. Western outlets reported that France, the United Kingdom, and Germany drafted a counterproposal ahead of their talks with Ukrainian and American delegations in Geneva on November 23.[ix] The 24-point counterproposal reportedly includes calls for an immediate ceasefire to precede discussions about territorial issues; for the cap on Ukraine's military to be 800,000 "in peacetime;" for Ukraine to receive a security guarantee from the United States similar to North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5; for the use of frozen Russian assets to fully reconstruct and financially compensate Ukraine; for Ukrainian membership in NATO to depend on consensus from alliance members; and for Ukraine to decide on the presence of foreign troops from guarantor states on Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin has already previously explicitly rejected a number of these proposals, including the deployment of foreign troops to post-war Ukraine.[x]

Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia's longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 22 that Russia cannot deviate from Russian President Vladimir Putin's stated demands at the Alaska summit in August 2025 and reiterated Russia's commitment to addressing the "root causes" of the war.[xi] Ryabkov defined the "root causes" as NATO expansion, weapon deployments to Eastern Europe, and alleged discrimination against Russian people, Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Rybakov's November 22 definition of the alleged root causes aligns with numerous other high ranking Kremlin officials' statements on the matter.[xii] Ryabkov also noted that Russia will continue to act in its national interests regardless of sanctions, signaling that the Kremlin will remain committed to its war effort in Ukraine even in the face of potential future economic pressures against Russia. Putin notably demonstrated at the Alaska summit that he had not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine.[xiii] Ryabkov's reiteration of the importance of eliminating the "root causes" of the war and of Putin's position at the Alaska summit further indicates that the Kremlin has not abandoned its original war aims and justifications, including demanding that NATO remove its Open Door Policy.

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that the US peace plan aims to preserve a "threat on the Russian border," likely referring to Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state and Russia's shared border with longstanding NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic states.[xiv] Zhuravlev claimed that the Kremlin must treat the plan with "extreme caution" and as a "starting point for negotiations" rather than an ultimate peace settlement. Zhuravlev added that the reported European counterproposal conditions are "completely unacceptable for Russia." Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly remarked that possible Western transfers of long-range missiles, such as Tomahawks, to Ukraine under the peace plan would contradict Russia's "demilitarization" objective, which effectively aims to destroy the Ukrainian military such that it cannot protect itself from renewed Russian aggression.[xv] Chepa implied that Russia perceives any security assistance or guarantees for Ukraine as a threat to Russia, and Russian state media framed Chepa's statements as a "warning" explaining why the peace deal is "unacceptable" to Russia.[xvi] Member of the Belarusian National Assembly's House of Representatives Vadim Gigin, who is also a prominent propagandist in the Russian and Belarusian information spaces, stated on Russian state television that Russia cannot agree to the peace plan due to "mutual mistrust" between Russia and the United States and that there is no mechanism for implementing such an agreement.[xvii] These various statements continue to indicate that the Kremlin is disinterested in making any compromises in a peace deal and is setting domestic information conditions to reject the peace plan.

Russian ultranationalists, a key pro-war constituency for Putin, similarly argued that Russia should not accept any peace plan and should instead continue its war against Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that a peace plan could deprive Russia of the opportunity to seize more territory in Ukraine and interpreted Putin's November 21 remarks about the US-proposed peace plan as a reiteration of Russia's commitment to fighting while it can still advance.[xviii] The milblogger concluded that Russia's ability to sustain the war effort will determine the war’s outcome, not a diplomatic settlement. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russia's war aims are not limited to the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but encompass all territories "enshrined in the [Russian] constitution," referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in 2022.[xix] The milblogger implied that Russia is willing to continue the war so that it can demand a demilitarized zone that extends all the way to Poland, implying that Russia maintains its maximalist territorial goals in Ukraine. Other Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reiterated that Russia would only agree to a peace plan that encompasses all of Russia's demands.[xx] Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers have been rejecting the US-proposed 28-point peace plan and reiterating Russia's commitment to its original, maximalist war aims since Western media began reporting on the proposal on November 20.[xxi] These statements continue to indicate that Russia is unlikely to accept any proposed peace plan that falls short of Ukrainian capitulation. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions.[xxii]

The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning. The Kremlin has been doubling down on the false narrative that Russian battlefield successes are so widespread that a Russian victory is inevitable.[xxiii] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable and that the "realities on the ground" show that Russia faces many obstacles in its path to seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian rate of advance intensified since the Alaska summit, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day between August 15 and November 20. Russian gains notably have still been confined to a foot pace even during this period of faster advances. Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027 at this rate of advance, assuming Russian forces can maintain the current faster rate of advance, Ukrainian defenses remain strong, and Western weapons provisions to Ukraine remain consistent. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to push Ukraine to hand over this territory to save Russia significant amounts of time, effort, manpower, and resources that it could use elsewhere in Ukraine during renewed aggression.

The actual timeline on which Russian forces could potentially seize all of Donetsk Oblast is likely even longer. Foggy and rainy weather has contributed to Russia's faster tempo in Fall 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian drone operations have not been as effective.[xxiv] These seasonal weather conditions are not permanent, and the rate of Russian advance will likely slow as weather conditions stabilize. Russian advances since August 15 have also not faced heavily fortified, large population centers the size of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt.[xxv] Russia's recent rate of advance of 9.3 square kilometers per day was also notably across the entire theater, and the calculation that Russian forces could seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by August 2027 is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces would commit the same forces, resources, and energy that they have deployed across the frontline since August 15 to fighting in Donetsk Oblast only. The Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire front. Continued European military assistance and European-financed American weapons sales to Ukraine could also strengthen Ukraine's defenses, possibly reversing some Russian gains and slowing this protracted timeline even further.

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket by advancing on the northern shoulder of the encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xxvi] Additional geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xxvii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces are completing clearing operations in Pokrovsk.[xxviii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have created a "kill zone" (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) between Pokrovsk and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad). The milblogger claimed that Russian assault activity is increasing in Myrnohrad and that drone operators are entering the town. The milblogger claimed that it is highly probable that the rest of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is a contested "gray zone."

Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack and maintain a limited presence within and around Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 23 that fighting is ongoing in central Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian forces from accumulating enough forces to push into the northern part of the town.[xxix] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces are suffering heavy losses during their attempts to advance into northern Pokrovsk via the Donetska Railway. A Russian milblogger also acknowledged on November 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain a scattered presence between Kozatske (east of Myrnohrad) and Promin (just south of Kozatske).[xxx] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in northern Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[xxxi]

Ukrainian forces are also conducting tactical-level air interdiction lines of effort against Russian logistics that support the Pokrovsk effort. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on November 23 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian forces participating in offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.[xxxii] The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position on a dominant height at an industrial facility in Pokrovsk that Russian snipers used to exert fire control over the surrounding area. The SSO reported that Russian forces were also accumulating personnel in the area. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration in Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk and east of Dobropillya) of elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) that were trying to close the encirclement around Pokrovsk from the north. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration point and drone ammunition depot of elements of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and in occupied Sontsivka (in the Russian tactical rear 27 kilometers south of Pokrovsk). The SSO reported a strike against another ammunition depot in occupied Dokuchayevsk (in the Russian operational rear 71 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk) from where Russian forces stored, distributed, and shipped equipment to forces attacking in the Pokrovsk direction.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[xxxiii] Russia will likely try to exploit the eventual seizure of Pokrovsk for informational effect to forward the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Russian victory on the battlefield is not inevitable, however, and it notably took Russian forces 21 months to advance roughly 40 kilometers and begin to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket.[xxxiv] A campaign to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, including Ukraine's much larger and more populous Fortress Belt, would take several years of arduous battles, and Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities the size of those in the Fortress Belt since 2022.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes.
• European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan.
• Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia's longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance.
• The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning.
• The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks.
• Ukrainian forces are also conducting tactical-level air interdiction lines of effort against Russian logistics that support the Pokrovsk effort.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Pokrovsk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely struck energy infrastructure in Moscow Oblast on the night of November 22 to 23. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that drones struck the Shatura State Raion Power Plant in Shatura, Moscow Oblast, likely causing the power plant’s power distribution unit to catch fire.[xxxv] Geolocated footage and imagery published on November 23 show large plumes of smoke and fires at the Shatura State Raion Power Plant.[xxxvi] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov acknowledged that drones struck the plant and that a fire broke out at the facility but claimed that the strikes did not disrupt the power supply.[xxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on November 22 and 23.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to seize the initiative in the Sumy direction and launched several unsuccessful counterattacks toward Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City) on November 22.[xxxix]

The milblogger, reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed that Russian forces ceased offensive operations in the forested areas near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City), as Russian forces lack the necessary manpower to continue attacks in this direction.[xl] The milblogger added that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) previously attacked in the Sadky direction for several months but likely struggled to advance due to Ukraine's dense fortifications in the forested areas and use of drones. ISW last observed Russian forces conducting assaults in the Sadky direction in early November 2025.[xli] The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military command is committing elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) to the Oleksiivka area shortly after deploying these forces to Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City), and that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are continuing to operate in the settlement.[xlii] The milblogger noted that Russian forces operating in the Oleksiivka direction are struggling to evacuate wounded personnel or troop rotations due to Ukrainian drone strikes. The milblogger complained that the Russian military command failed to rotate personnel of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 3rd Battalion, and that these elements have not left positions in Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City) since May 2025.[xliii] The milblogger continued to amplify appeals from relatives of Russian servicemen, who complained that medical elements of the 44th AC (LMD) are clearing wounded servicemen for deployment to combat missions.[xliv]

Order of battle: Artillery elements of the 106th VDV Division and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xlv] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xlvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on November 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Lyman and toward Vilcha on November 22 and 23.[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[xlviii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Alisivka (north of Kharkiv City).[xlix] Reconnaissance elements of the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[l]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie on November 23.[li]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting Geran-2 strikes on Ukrainian positions near Obukhivka (east of Velykyi Burluk, roughly 6 kilometers from the frontline) and Hnylytsya Persha (west of Velykyi Burluk, roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[lii] A different Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are launching FAB-500 glide bombs at Kolodyazne (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[liii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on November 22 and 23.[liv]

Ukrainian broadcaster Armyinform refuted Russian claims on November 23 that Russian forces surrounded Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) and reported that Ukrainian forces still fully control the settlement.[lv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian milbloggers are “puzzled” by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s November 20 claims that Russian forces seized Kupyansk, as there is no concrete evidence indicating that Russian forces seized the town.[lvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[lvii] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[lviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova) and advanced east of the settlement.[lix] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[lx]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on November 22 and 23.[lxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove.[lxii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) recently advanced in central Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[lxiii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of and in southern Lyman and south of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[lxiv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Serednie and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Dibrova, Yampil, and Zakitne on November 22 and 23.[lxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyman.[lxvi]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces control roughly 70 percent of Yampil.[lxvii] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 18 percent of Yampil and conducted an assessed infiltration operation into the northeastern tip of the settlement on November 21 and 22.[lxviii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are accumulating on the outskirts of Lyman, likely to prepare for future assaults on the town.[lxix]

Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on November 23 that Russian forces conducted three KAB glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk, injuring four people and damaging civilian infrastructure.[lxx] ISW assesses that these strikes are likely part of Russian forces’ battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks on Slovyansk itself.[lxxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Platonivka (northwest of Siversk) during what ISW asses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxii]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 23 that Russian forces seized Pazeno (southwest of Siversk).[lxxiii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Siversk, northwest of Kuzmynivka (south of Siversk), northwest of Zakitne, east of Platonivka (both northwest of Siversk), and from Fedorivka (south of Siversk) toward Nykyforivka (west of Fedorivka).[lxxiv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Sakko i Vansetti, Pazeno, Vasyukivka, and Sviato-Pokrovske on November 22 and 23.[lxxv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are amassing infantry on the outskirts of Siversk, likely to prepare for a future assault on the town.[lxxvi]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on November 23 that Russian forces are the most active in the Slovyansk direction and are attacking more specifically toward Siversk.[lxxvii] Zaporozhets stated that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian three-wave motorized assault on Siversk aimed at clearing roads to facilitate the movement of armored vehicles. Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces recently took advantage of poor weather to infiltrate. ISW assessed that Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission into Siversk on November 18.[lxxviii] Zaporozhets estimated that Russian forces aim to consolidate positions on the outskirts of Siversk to support a battle for the town by December 2025.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 23 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the western outskirts of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxix]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka and toward Mykolaypillya on November 22 and 23.[lxxx]

The Kramatorsk City Council reported on November 23 that Russian forces conducted two Smerch multiple launch rocket system strikes against a residential sector, killing three and damaging residential infrastructure.[lxxxi] The Kramatorsk City Council reported that Russian forces later used two Geran-2 drones to strike storage facilities in Kramatorsk.

A Russian milblogger claimed that some settlements near Kostyantynivka, including Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) and Predtechyne, are largely “gray zones” as the situation on the ground is fluid and constantly shifting.[lxxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka.[lxxxiii] Geolocated footage posted on November 18, but likely from a significantly earlier date, indicates that drone operators of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) were operating near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya at an unidentified previous date.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 23 indicates that likely elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) recently advanced in southern Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[lxxxv]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on November 22 and 23.[lxxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in northern Shakhove.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shakhove.[lxxxviii] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[lxxxix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for additional reports of assessed Russian advances and infiltrations and Ukrainian counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[xc]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk, in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and into northwestern Myrnohrad.[xci]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on November 22 and 23.[xcii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-3000 strike on Myrnohrad.[xciii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators and other elements of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[xciv] Drone operators and other elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating FAB strikes on Ukrainian positions near Hryshyne.[xcv] Artillery elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and TOS-3 thermobaric artillery elements of the 29th Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Brigade (CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[xcvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and within Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on November 22 and 23 but did not advance.[xcvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 23 shows a singular Russian servicemember raising flags throughout Tykhe in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xcviii] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of the Russian infiltration at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Tykhe (west of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced north of the settlement.[xcix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka) and south of Kolomistii (west of Velykomykhailivka).[c]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and Berezove; southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove, Vovche, and Oleksiivka; and west of Velykomykhailivka near Kolomitsii and toward Dobropasove and Oleksandrivka on November 22 and 23.[ci] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dobropasove and Oleksandrivka.[cii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Vidradne (north of Hulyaipole).[ciii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Nove Zaporizhzhia (northwest of Hulyaipole) and west of Vidradne.[civ]

Russian forces attacked toward Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka, Pryluky, and Andriivka; north of Hulyaipole near Yablukove and Yehorivka and toward Ostrepivske; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne, Zlahoda, and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya, Vysoke, Malynivka, and Zelenyi Hai on November 22 and 23.[cv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Varvarivka.[cvi] Elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[cvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) in a recent mechanized assault in the area.[cviii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on November 23 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks, two armored personnel carriers (APCs), and one motorcycle during the Russian mechanized assault.[cix] Another Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Russian forces conducted at least a reduced company-sized mechanized assault on November 21 near Mala Tokmachka (just east of Novodanylivka).[cx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Shcherbaky; north of Mali Shcherbaky; and northwest and northeast of and in central Stepnohirsk (all west of Orikhiv).[cxi]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on November 22 and 23.[cxii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka.[cxiii]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators and other elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Prymorske.[cxiv] Mechanized elements of the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the southern part of Novodanylivka.[cxv] Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) are reported attacking from Mala Tokmachka toward the eastern outskirts of Orikhiv.[cxvi] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly continuing offensive operations on the outskirts of Orikhiv.[cxvii] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[cxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces cleared part of Odradokamyanka (east of Kherson City on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River).[cxix]

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 22 and 23.[cxx]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 98 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which about 60 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[cxxi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 69 drones, that 27 drones hit 12 locations, and that the strikes were ongoing as of 0830 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, and industrial infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts.[cxxii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 23 that Russian forces launched over 1,050 drones, almost 1,000 guided glide bombs, and over 60 missiles during the week (roughly November 17 to 23).[cxxiii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on November 23 that Russian-Belarusian relations can serve as a "model" for interstate cooperation and that bilateral interactions within the Union State can serve as a "benchmark" for other integration associations in Eurasia.[cxxiv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades-long strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus through the Union State framework and seeks to replicate this approach with other former Soviet states.[cxxv]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.