March 04, 2025

Ukraine Invasion Updates, February 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.[i] Zelensky observed that Russia has repeatedly violated previous ceasefire agreements, as ISW has reported.[ii] Zelensky said that Ukraine will not accept a ceasefire agreement with Russia without sufficient external security guarantees, as such an agreement will fail to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent war in Europe in the long-term. Zelensky stated that Russian strikes have not "completely destroyed" Ukraine and that Ukraine is "alive" and continuing to defend itself against Russian aggression. Zelensky reiterated that no country wants to end the war more than Ukraine and that any negotiations to end the war will be between Ukraine and Russia with US and European mediation efforts. Trump declined to comment on the possibility of future US security guarantees for Ukraine and US troop deployments to Ukraine. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly told Zelensky to leave the White House following the meeting, and the White House cancelled the afternoon press conference and the signing of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.[iii] ISW continues to assess that supporting Ukraine is a vital American national security interest, as is a strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Ukraine.[iv]

Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met separately with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on February 28 to discuss bilateral security issues and international and regional matters.[v] Shoigu and Xi also underlined the need to continue coordinating efforts at key international platforms including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and diplomatic efforts about "solving the Ukrainian crisis."[vi] Shoigu claimed that the Russia-PRC relationship has reached "unprecedented" heights, and Russian state media highlighted statements from Xi and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian's praise of close bilateral relations.[vii]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and Chairperson of the ruling United Russia party Dmitry Medvedev met with North Korea's Workers' Party (WPK) Central Committee member Ri Hi-yong on February 26 in Moscow to express United Russia's desire "for closer cooperation with the WPK and for expanding contracts and exchanges in all areas."[viii] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Ri on February 27, but the Kremlin's readout did not provide further details about the meeting.[ix] Representatives of the Kursk Oblast Chamber of Commerce signed a cooperation agreement with the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce on February 27 to develop bilateral economic ties and expand municipal production opportunities between Kursk Oblast and North Korean enterprises.[x] The agreement also includes trade and economic ties; cooperation in industry, agriculture, and processing; and joint logistical projects. Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials are increasing cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Serhiy Boyev met with a South Korean delegation led by National Assembly Member Yu Yong-weon in Kyiv on February 28 to discuss Ukraine-South Korea bilateral relations and North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine.[xi] The delegations discussed exchanging defense industrial experience, and Yu expressed interest in organizing a joint seminar between Ukrainian and South Korean defense manufacturers. This meeting follows a recent South Korean report that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025 to support Russia's war effort against Ukraine.[xii] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov highlighted on February 24 that North Korean forces are gaining valuable combat experience and enhancing their weapons systems while fighting in Kursk Oblast and cooperating with Russia.[xiii]

Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot containing thermobaric artillery ammunition near occupied Selydove, Donetsk Oblast overnight on February 27 to 28.[xiv] Geolocated footage published on February 28 shows a facility on fire and secondary explosions in eastern Selydove.[xv] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a forward command post of the Russian 14th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near occupied Ivanivka, Kherson Oblast and a drone control point of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv), Zaporizhia Oblast on February 26.[xvi]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on February 27 to 28.[xvii] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery on February 9 and 17.[xviii]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.[xix] Darchiev headed the Russian delegation to the February 27 US-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul, Turkey, and his recent appointment indicates that he will likely continue to be a key member of any future US-Russian bilateral engagements.[xx]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.
Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States.
Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials are increasing cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.
Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov with establishing a "Kadry" ("Human Resources") national project to integrate Russian veterans into the Russian economy, likely in support of the Kremlin's efforts to prevent the emergence of subversive veteran civil societies.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 27, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Putin stated in his February 27 address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya."[i] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February 27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia.[ii] Putin and other Russian officials have previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian ultranationalists.[iii] Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[iv] Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts.[v] Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial concessions. Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and the Kremlin may use the Russian occupation of limited territory in these oblasts as a false premise to demand that Ukraine surrender even more territory.[vi] ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in good-faith negotiations that require compromises and thinks that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to long-term.[vii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 26 that if Russia is "making maximalist demands that [Russia] know[s] can’t be met," then the United States will know that Putin is not "serious" about engaging in negotiations.[viii] US President Donald Trump reiterated on February 26 that Russia will have to make concessions in peace negotiations and reiterated on February 27 that the United States will "certainly try to get as much [land] as [it] can back [for Ukraine]."[ix]

Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 27 that sources in Russian state media who are close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin has not given "strict" instructions to media about how to cover recent US–Russian contacts.[x] A source who regularly participates in Kremlin meetings with major media editors reportedly stated that the Kremlin told media outlets to emphasize "in every way" that Russia is in contact "not with some abstract Americans, but with Trump's team" and to demonstrate that Trump is "a man who was oppressed in every way both at home and in Europe." Multiple sources reportedly told Verstka that they had received instructions to create an image of Trump as a man who "had the wisdom" to respond to the Kremlin's "outstretched" hand. Putin praised the Trump administration on February 27, claiming that Russia's first contacts with the administration "inspire certain hopes" and that the Trump team is displaying a "reciprocal determination" to restore US–Russian relations.[xi] Putin claimed that "ideological cliches" have started to "destroy the Western community ... from within," as evidenced by alleged problems in Western states' economies and domestic politics. Putin claimed that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Putin's claim that "some Western elites" — but not the Trump administration — are against US–Russian talks is likely an attempt to drive wedges between Trump and other US actors and European leaders. The Kremlin has similarly recently framed European leaders as interested in prolonging the war in Ukraine as part of efforts to falsely portray the US and European positions on negotiations as significantly different and to discredit any possible European role in negotiations.[xii]

US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 27 that the Russian delegation in Istanbul is working to develop the agreements reached during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia.[xiii] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the bilateral meeting would include discussions on the resumption of the work of the US and Russian embassies in each state.[xiv] Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Denis Davydov claimed that Director of the North American Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Alexander Darchiev headed the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[xv] Darchiev served as the Russian Ambassador to Canada from 2014 to 2021.[xvi] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported in November 2024 that three informed sources stated that Darchiev is the most likely candidate to become the new Russian Ambassador to the United States.[xvii] Peskov stated in November 2024 that the Kremlin had chosen a candidate and would announce the appointment "in the foreseeable future."[xviii] The Russian State Duma reportedly held closed consultations in November 2024 with Darchiev about the appointments of Russian diplomats abroad.[xix] Reuters reported on February 27 that a US official stated that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter led the US delegation in Istanbul.[xx]

The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. Bloomberg, citing a source familiar with the topic, reported on February 27 that CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev — who was part of the Russian delegation during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia — convinced Putin to seek negotiations with the United States through business opportunities.[xxi] The Kremlin reportedly viewed US President Donald Trump's interest in a mineral deal with Ukraine as a chance to initiate economic cooperation discussions between the United States and Russia, giving Dmitriev an opportunity to take the lead on such initiatives.

North Korea reportedly recently deployed additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through cooperation with Russia. South Korean news outlet JoongAng reported on February 27, citing multiple sources familiar with the matter, that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025 — in line with a reported recent South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessment that North Korea deployed an unspecified amount of military personnel to Kursk Oblast.[xxii] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 24 that North Korean forces are gaining valuable combat experience and enhancing their weapons systems while fighting in Kursk Oblast and cooperating with Russia.[xxiii] Budanov noted that North Korean Kn-23 ballistic missiles initially missed their targets by over 1.5 kilometers but that Russian specialists worked with North Korean specialists in unspecified "factories" to modernize and improve the missiles' precision. Budanov also emphasized that North Korean forces have learned drone warfare tactics and will likely bring this knowledge back to North Korea to improve North Korean military capabilities. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean Politburo member Ri Hi Yong on February 27 to discuss Russian–North Korean relations.[xxiv] ISW assesses that Russia continues to consolidate a bloc of America's most significant adversaries even as the Kremlin pretends to seek improved ties with the United States.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy.
Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West.
US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations.
The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.
North Korea reportedly recently deployed additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through cooperation with Russia.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces have regained more than 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have occupied since February 24, 2022.[1] ISW has observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have regained 50.03 percent of the territory that Russian forces had seized since February 24, 2022. Russian forces have spent the last year making slow and incremental but steady advances in eastern Ukraine as a result of significant Russian manpower and materiel advantages and Russia's ability to leverage delays in Western aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are using their technological advantages and integrating technological innovations with ground operations in order to slow Russian gains. Ukraine continues to improve and innovate its warfighting capabilities and is working to become self-sufficient in the long-term, but Western and international military support for Ukraine in the short- and medium-term remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian aggression. The defense of Ukraine and the preservation of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign, and democratic country capable of defending itself against Russia is a critical part of deterring broader Russian aggression against the West. The United States, Europe, and other Western allies must demonstrate commitment to Ukraine through timely and reliable military assistance, continue to enable Ukrainian forces to impose significant pressure on Russia, and force Putin to abandon his conquest of Ukraine and his wider ambitions in Europe in order to bring about sustainable peace.

Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicle losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Russian forces have lost over 10,100 tanks, 21,100 armored combat vehicles, and 23,300 artillery systems presumably destroyed and damaged in the three years of Russia's full-scale invasion.[2] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated that Russia had lost about 14,000 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers since February 2022.[3] (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from Syrskyi as IISS data likely only accounts for destroyed vehicles.) Syrskyi stated on February 24 that Russian forces have lost almost 870,000 personnel, including about 250,000 dead.[4] Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona published a joint report on February 24 wherein they used the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) to estimate that at least 160,000 to 165,000 Russian servicemembers have died in the past three years of the war.[5] Syrskyi previously reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 alone, and Meduza and Mediazone estimated in February 2024 that Russia had lost at least 66,000 to 88,000 personnel during the first two years of the war — suggesting that Russian loses significantly increased in 2024.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have suffered vehicle and artillery system losses on the battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and that Russia's force generation apparatus is struggling to recruit enough soldiers to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive operations and loss rates.[7]

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[8] The United States, Russia, Belarus, North Korea, and 14 other countries voted against the Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution, while 93 countries supported it.[9] The People’s Republic of China and Iran abstained. The United States also abstained from a second resolution about the third anniversary of the war that it had proposed after European countries amended the resolution to add language supporting Ukraine's "sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity."[10] The US-backed draft resolution — prior to the European amendments — reportedly did not acknowledge Russia's role as the aggressor and referred to Russia's war against Ukraine as the "Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict."[11]

Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war — casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term. A recent poll conducted by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles between February 5 and 13 showed that 46 percent of respondents do not support the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war goals.[12] The number of respondents who do not support such a Russian withdrawal had consistently decreased between February 2023 (47 percent) and September 2024 (31 percent) but then jumped back to February 2023 levels in February 2025. Fifty-four percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the war had negatively affected their daily lives. Thirty-six percent of respondents stated that their financial situation had worsened — an increase from 27 percent in September 2024. Thirty-six percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the Russian government should prioritize military spending in the budget — a decrease from 43 percent in September 2024. The number of respondents who stated that the most important area for Russian spending is the social sphere increased from 38 percent in September 2024 to 48 percent in February 2025.

Kremlin rhetoric about the relatively faster Russian tempo of advances on the battlefield in recent months and continued official statements about the need for Ukraine to "denazify," "demilitarize," and declare neutrality — Putin's original stated war aims — are likely influencing more Russians to reject a withdrawal in the belief that Russia can achieve these objectives through continued fighting.[13] Russia's protracted war in Ukraine, however, is straining Russia's economy, including by increasing inflation, spending down Russia's sovereign wealth fund, and exacerbating existing labor shortages.[14] Russia will likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in 12 to 18 months if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate — likely increasing the economic burden that the Russian population will feel in the future.[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender. Russian state media largely ignored the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion during programming on February 24 and instead highlighted a meeting in which the Russian Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims Chairman Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin praised Putin for announcing and conducting the war in Ukraine.[16] Putin and other Kremlin officials have not abandoned their original war aims in Ukraine and continue to invoke their goals of "denazifying" and "demilitarizing" Ukraine and banning Ukraine's ability to join any security blocs in the future, despite Russia's failure to defeat Ukraine militarily over the last three years.[17]

Putin does not appear deterred by the idea of protracting the war further despite suffering significant and likely unsustainable personnel and materiel losses over the last three years.[18] ISW recently noted that the Russian military appears to be employing a method of advance in Ukraine based on the assumption that the war will continue indefinitely and that the Russian military does not need to make rapid or significant territorial gains in a single offensive operation.[19] ISW recently assessed that it would take Russian forces over 83 years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine, assuming that they can sustain their current rate of advance and massive personnel losses indefinitely — which is unlikely.[20] Putin has articulated a theory of victory, however, that assumes that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West and continue to advance on the battlefield until Russia defeats Ukraine. Putin's recent statements rejecting the possibility of a peace agreement with Ukraine are indications of his willingness to protract the war.[21] Putin continues to signal to the Russian military and society that he will not end the war until Ukraine capitulates completely and that he has no interest in a negotiated peace agreement that requires Russia to compromise its long-standing war aims, despite Putin's efforts to signal interest in peace negotiations to Western leaders.

Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on February 24 during a press conference in Turkey that Russia will only stop military activity in Ukraine when peace negotiations bring about a "solid, stable result that suits Russia" and account for the "realities" of the battlefield.[22] Lavrov noted that any peace agreement must include provisions banning Ukraine from joining NATO in the future.[23] Russian state media TV channel Channel One (Pervyi Kanal) summarized Lavrov's statements as "[Russia] will only end combat operations" when negotiations end in a way that satisfies Russia.[24] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian state newswire RIA Novosti on February 24 that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire that does not address the "root causes" of the war.[25] Ryabkov stated that a ceasefire that does not address the war's "root causes" is a path to a "quick resumption" of the war and reiterated that Russia considers NATO's post-1991 eastward expansion a root cause of the war. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also claimed on February 24 that it would be "impossible" to resolve the war in Ukraine without understanding and addressing its "root causes."[26] Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians within Ukraine.[27]

Russian officials also continue to frame Russia's demand for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from territory that Ukrainian forces currently control in eastern and southern Ukraine as a "compromise." Ryabkov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and abandon its goal of joining NATO contains "significant compromises" that could serve as the base of a future peace agreement.[28] Ryabkov claimed that Putin's June 2024 demands highlight Russia's desire to find a resolution to the war that "balances" Russia's and Ukraine's interests, despite the fact that Putin called for Ukraine to concede significant areas in exchange for no Russian concessions. ISW has previously noted that Ukrainian authorities rejected the 2022 Istanbul protocol as its terms effectively amounted to a full Ukrainian surrender, and Ukrainian authorities are likely to reject any future ceasefire or peace agreement that amounts to the same.[29]

European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a new military aid package for Ukraine consisting of 25 infantry fighting vehicles, two armored combat vehicles, a landing system for F-16 fighter jets, four F-16 flight simulators, ammunition, drone camera components, and first aid kits.[30] Swedish officials recently announced plans to provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Robotsystem-70 and Tridon Mk2 air defense systems valued at approximately $113 million.[31] Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda announced plans to deliver an unspecified number of RBS-70 short-range air defense systems to Ukraine, and Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced a military aid package consisting of 10,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and 750,000 rations packages.[32] Irish Prime Minister Micheal Martin announced plans to supply Ukraine with an unspecified number of older air defense radar systems.[33] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an EU financial aid package for Ukraine valued at 3.5 billion euros ($3.6 billion) that the EU will distribute in March 2025.[34] British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide Ukraine with 4.5 billion pounds ($5.6 billion) in military aid.[35] Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez pledged that Spain will deliver a new military aid package for Ukraine worth an estimated one billion euros ($1.05 billion) as part of a broader 10-year bilateral security and defense agreement that Ukraine and Spain signed in May 2024.[36] Icelandic Prime Minister Kristrún Mjöll Frostadóttir pledged to increase Iceland's monetary support to Ukraine by roughly 14.4 million euros ($15 million).[37]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.
Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war – casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term.
Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.
Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations.
European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 24, 2025

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.
Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war – casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term.
Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.
Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations.
European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2025

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their ideal framework for future peace negotiations to end Putin's war in Ukraine, as such a framework would force the West to concede to all of Russia's long-standing demands.[2] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft treaties from the March and April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul that indicate that both sides initially agreed that Ukraine would forgo its NATO membership aspirations and be a "permanently neutral state that doesn't participate in military blocs."[3] The draft treaties also reportedly banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons or hosting any foreign military personnel. The WSJ and NYT reported that Russia pushed for the Ukrainian military to be limited to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems. Russia also reportedly demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes. The draft treaties reportedly listed the United States, United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Russia as guarantors of the treaty, and Russia reportedly wanted to include Belarus as a guarantor. The guarantor states were supposed to “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. The draft treaties did not specify if other non-guarantor states would have to terminate their agreements with Ukraine as well, although this is likely considering that the treaty would ban Ukraine from having any foreign-supplied weapons. Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts.

Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals. The Istanbul negotiations effectively conceded to Russia's long-standing demands to "denazify" — overthrow and replace the democratically elected Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian puppet state — and "demilitarize" — constrain and shrink the Ukrainian military beyond the point of being able to defend itself against future Russian aggression — Ukraine.[4] The Istanbul negotiations also conceded to Russia's demands that Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any other security blocs in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walked away from the Istanbul negotiations with the backing of Europe and the United States in 2022 and will almost certainly reject such terms in 2025.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war. Zelensky responded to a hypothetical question during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 about stepping down as president and stated that he is ready to step down in the event of or to facilitate peace or immediate NATO membership for Ukraine.[5] Zelensky noted that he remains committed to holding elections after the war ends and has no interest in being in power "for a decade" and reiterated that Ukraine cannot hold elections until after Russia stops attacking Ukraine and after Ukraine lifts martial law.[6] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[7] Zelensky has repeatedly noted Ukraine's commitment to holding fair and democratic elections in the future.[8]

Zelensky stated during the press conference that several European officials will visit Kyiv for the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2025 and reiterated that European countries should be involved in future peace negotiations about the war in Ukraine.[9] Zelensky noted that NATO membership is one of the best security guarantees that Ukraine could receive and that Ukraine would also consider membership in the European Union (EU), Western financing for an 800,000-person-strong Ukrainian military, and the presence of a Western peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine as acceptable security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire with Russia.[10]

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" forum on February 23 that Ukraine produced 2.2 million first person view (FPV) drones and over 100,000 long-range drones in 2025 and intends to increase its drone production rate in 2025.[11] Zelensky stated that Ukraine produced 154 artillery systems in 2024 and intends to increase production of artillery systems in 2025 and noted that Ukraine is working to develop an analogue to the US-produced Patriot air defense system.[12] Zelensky noted that Ukraine funded 40 percent, European countries funded 30 percent, and the United States funded another 30 percent of Ukraine's domestic defense production in 2024. Zelensky stated that Ukraine intends to fund 50 percent of its domestic defense production in 2025.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated at the forum that Ukraine has become the largest producer of tactical and long-range drones in the world and that 96 percent of the Ukrainian military's drones are purchased or produced in Ukraine.[13] Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Ukraine intends to operationalize technology that will allow a single drone operator to control multiple drones in a "swarm" in 2025.[14] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces conducted 130 long-range operations and struck 377 objects in Russia in 2024.[15] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine has deployed over 1.3 million drones to the frontline and is working to increase its production of fiber-optic drones. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian long-range drones can strike targets up to 1,700 kilometers deep in Russian territory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.[16] Dmitriev was part of the Russian delegation that met with US officials in Saudi Arabia on February 17, and a source close to the Kremlin told Russian opposition outlet Meduza in an article published on February 19 that Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States, likely given his experiences living and studying in the US at Standford University and Harvard University and working for US companies.[17]

Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 23 that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 267 Shahed and other drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[18] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 138 Shahed and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that 119 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that three drones flew toward Belarusian airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that drones damaged infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Poltava, Kyiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts and that a missile damaged civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 23 that Russia launched the largest number of Shahed drones against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23.[20]

Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine. Iran has largely enabled Russia to launch near nightly series of large drone strikes as it has provided Russia with Iranian designed and produced Shahed drones and helped Russia establish its own Shahed drone production facility in Tatarstan Republic.[21] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 23 during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 that half of Russia's ammunition comes from North Korea and that North Korea has started large-scale deliveries of 170mm self-propelled artillery system and 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[22] Budanov added that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 148 ballistic missiles, presumably in 2025.[23]

Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 23 that footage circulating on social media shows a Russian servicemember executing a Ukrainian POW in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast.[24] ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such atrocities.[25]

Key Takeaways:

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war.
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.
Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.
Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
The Russian government continues efforts to increase its defense industrial output.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 22, 2025

ISW is not reporting on the status or prospects of negotiations regarding Ukrainian minerals and US aid for Ukraine today because the discussions and situation appear to be extremely dynamic, and the information space contains too many contradictory and partially outdated rumors to permit drawing firm conclusions.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations. Ryabkov claimed that the United States and Russia are undertaking two "parallel" but "politically interconnected" negotiation tracks that will discuss the war in Ukraine and US-Russian bilateral relations.[i] Ryabkov added that Russia is prioritizing its demand for the United States to return six Russian diplomatic properties, likely referring to properties US authorities previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes.[ii] Ryabkov also stated that the United States and Russian delegations may discuss other international topics such as arms control and the situation in the Middle East.[iii] US and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18.[iv]

Key Takeaways:

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 21, 2025

Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 21 that the Kremlin has ordered Russian state media personalities and other prominent voices in the Russian information space to intensify narratives aimed at creating discord in Ukrainian society and discrediting Ukraine among Western allies.[1] The GUR stated that Russian actors intend to amplify narratives falsely alleging that the West has "betrayed" Ukraine, the United States is not concerned about Europe's and Ukraine's opinions, the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, the Ukrainian military is losing on the frontline, and "corrupt people" are stealing billions of dollars of US aid from Ukraine. The GUR reported that the Kremlin is also preparing to declare "victory" over Ukraine and possibly over NATO on the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion – February 24, 2025.

ISW has recently observed Kremlin officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space amplifying these narratives and other select statements from US officials aimed at sowing discord between Ukraine and its allies.[2] ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory is built on the assumption that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and that Putin is thus attempting to bring about the cessation of Western and particularly US support for Ukraine.[3] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that Russian actors also intend to incite protests in Ukraine via social media posts on February 24, 2025, and will offer to pay protestors if they attend rallies in Ukraine.[4] The SBU asked Ukrainian citizens to be cautious of Russian efforts to manipulate Ukraine's information space ahead of the third anniversary of the war.

US officials continue to reiterate their support for Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 20 that the United States used the recent bilateral meeting with Russian officials in Saudi Arabia to gauge Russia's interest in good faith peace negotiations and to open a communication channel between the two countries.[5] Rubio emphasized on February 18 that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement.[6] Rubio reiterated on February 16 that Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty," and US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations.[7]

Russian forces recently eliminated the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove amid continued reports that the Russian military is redeploying elements of the Russian Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction. Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Russian forces – reportedly elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) – seized Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) and likely closed the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove) from the south.[9] Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Ulakly, and Kostyantynopil on February 20 and 21 as part of ongoing efforts to leverage the seizure of Kurakhove and Dachne (west of Kurakhove) to level the frontline west of the settlements.[10] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces' main objective in the Kurakhove direction was to level the frontline and create more defensible positions west of Kurakhove and that Russian forces would not redeploy forces from the Kurakhove direction until Russian forces achieved their objectives in the area.[11] Russian forces appear close to leveling the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast and are reportedly working to redeploy elements of two formations from this area.

ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions, and Russian servicemen in the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) operating near Toretsk claimed on February 18 that elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 163rd Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) recently redeployed to the area.[12]

The Russian military command likely began redeploying elements of the 8th CAA as Russian forces began closing the Kurakhove pocket and aligning the frontline between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions in Winter 2024-2025 by pushing west from the Yasenove-Andriivka (northwest and west of Kurakhove) line and north from Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove). Russian forces have likely freed up some forces of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division from the Kurakhove direction to redeploy to the Toretsk direction by evening out the frontline west of Kurakhove and are likely prioritizing pressuring Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) - the southernmost point of Ukraine's "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) attacking toward Andriivka from the west and northwest since at least the beginning of January 2025.[13]

The Russian military will likely continue attacking in the Kurakhove direction from the east with elements of the 41st CAA (CMD) and from the southeast with elements of the EMD thereby allowing 8th CAA (SMD) elements to redeploy to other areas of the frontline.

Russian forces are attempting to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to advance further north of the settlement toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. Russian forces recently reintensified offensive operations northeast, north, and west of Velyka Novosilka after temporarily pausing attacks in these areas for several weeks after Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka in late January 2025.[14] Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Russian forces seized Novoocheretuvate (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) after recently crossing the Mokri Yaly River.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD] claimed on February 21 that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) played a crucial role in crossing the Mokri Yaly River and seizing the settlement.[16] Russian forces may have exploited a dry patch of the Mokri Yaly River near Novoocheretuvate to advance into the settlement, as ISW previously assessed that the Mokri Yaly River could pose a significant challenge for Russian forces.[17] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command could either redeploy most of the EMD to another sector of the frontline or opt to retain elements of the EMD in the Velyka Novosilka direction and continue advancing toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[18]

Russian forces have also intensified offensive operations on Velyka Novosilka's northeastern and western flanks. A Russian miblogger published footage on February 21 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 57th Mechanized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) conducting a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka), and Russian forces recently conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove and northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[19] Another Russian milblogger claimed on February 20 that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) recently penetrated Ukrainian defenses north of Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and seized several strongholds in the area.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced west of Velyka Novosilka and east and south of Novosilka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[21] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using armored vehicles and electronic warfare (EW) systems to support Russian infantry attacking near Novosilka, and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are leveraging lowlands with distanced shelters and windbreaks to advance between settlements in the area.[22] Another Russian milblogger claimed on February 20 that Russian forces are attacking Skudne (northwest of Novoocheretuvate) and in the direction of Burlatske and Pryvilne (northwest and west of Velyka Novosilka).[23] The milblogger noted that the Russian military command is attempting to penetrate areas of weakness along Ukraine's defensive line and advance near the border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) through significant expansion in the domestic production of key military equipment. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on February 21 that Ukrainian forces have tripled domestic artillery production, increased armored personnel carrier production fivefold, and doubled the output of anti-tank weapons.[24] Shmyhal noted that Ukraine's ammunition production has grown 2.5 times and drone manufacturing has surged tenfold between January 2024 and January 2025. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine currently produces about one-third of its weapons domestically and is actively working to increase this share and that Ukraine is allocating an additional 7.9 billion hryvnia (about $189 million) to boost drone production in 2025.

Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov also stated on February 21 that 19 Ukrainian companies joined the Ukrainian defense innovation platform Brave1 to support the production of short and medium-range missiles as well as ballistic missiles.[25] Fedorov added that the Brave1 platform will also create a separate grant program to support the development and production of explosives and gunpowder for Ukrainian forces.[26]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on February 20 the launch of the new State Rear Operator (DOT)-Chain System model of efficiently delivering drones to Ukrainian forces on the frontline.[27] The DOT-Chain System expedites drone delivery through forecasting orders and better informs Ukrainian DIB companies of upcoming drone requirements. ISW assesses that such enhancement of Ukraine's DIB – in part through continued Western support – is part of a continued plan to create a sustainable basis for Ukraine to be able to defend itself over the long term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance.[28]

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Sergei Pinchuk to the rank of Admiral and Eastern Group of Forces Commander Andrei Ivanayev to the rank of Colonel General on February 21.[29] Pinchuk's promotion may be reflective of recent Russian efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services. Putin signed a decree on February 5 revoking Russian military districts' "interservice status" and removing naval and Aerospace Forces (VKS) units from subordination to Russian military districts.[30]

Key Takeaways:

Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine.
US officials continue to reiterate their support for Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war.
Russian forces recently eliminated the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove amid continued reports that the Russian military is redeploying elements of the Russian Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.
Russian forces are attempting to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to advance further north of the settlement toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) through significant expansion in the domestic production of key military equipment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Sergei Pinchuk to the rank of Admiral and Eastern Group of Forces Commander Andrei Ivanayev to the rank of Colonel General on February 21.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly falsely designating former penal recruits as having abandoned their units without authorization (SOCH) to avoid paying them amid continued indicators that Russian authorities are concerned about the war's strain on the Russian economy.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2025

The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.[1] The FT investigation provided additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war.[2] FT and experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), but noted that the situation warrants further investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations.[3] FT noted that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders.[4] FT noted that Ukrainian prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.

FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.[5] Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue [Russian] units." Global Rights Compliance President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting, and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.

Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating international law.[6] Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.[7] Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024.[8] FT reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024.[9] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems to incentivize such abuses.[10]

Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told South Korean outlet Chosun Ilbo in an article published on February 17 that roughly 4,000 North Korean forces have been killed or seriously wounded in Kursk Oblast.[11] Budanov noted that North Korean forces are embedded in Russian units and conduct joint operations in small groups with Russian forces and that North Korean forces move as part of larger Russian units to conduct joint operations. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in Kursk Oblast stated on February 20 that North Korean forces have changed their tactics in the area, reducing the size of their infantry assault groups from 50 personnel to 10 to 15 personnel and moving "more cautiously."[12] The commander noted that North Korean assault groups are still larger than Russian assault groups. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated in November 2024 that North Korean forces had been training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units - traditionally more elite forces in the Russian military.[13] Budanov noted that there are more artillery and missile units in Kursk Oblast due to the presence of North Korean troops, but that the GUR has not observed additional North Korean deployments to Russia. GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi also told Chosun Ilbo that 1,000 North Korean troops are training on unspecified new military equipment in an unspecified area in Russia. Skibitskyi reported that North Korean forces have rapidly improved their combat effectiveness by adapting to new combat tactics and operating weapons such as tanks and drones. Budanov also confirmed a Reuters report from December 2024 that Russian missile experts have modified North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, which previously had a 500 to 1,500 meter margin of error, to make them more precise.[14] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in Kursk Oblast reported on February 16 that North Korean assault groups were attacking in more spread out formations as part of efforts to complicate Ukrainian efforts to strike the attacking forces.[15] North Korean forces reportedly recently withdrew from active combat operations in Kursk Oblast after suffering heavy casualties largely due to Ukrainian drone strikes, and reports that North Korean troops have adjusted their tactics on the battlefield to counter Ukrainian drone strikes indicates that North Korean forces may be learning lessons and internalizing valuable combat experience.

US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20. Zelensky stated that he had a "good" conversation with Kellogg during which they discussed the battlefield situation, the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and effective security guarantees for Ukraine.[16] Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's readiness to make a "strong, effective investment and security agreement" with the United States and stated that Ukraine has proposed the "fastest and most constructive" ways to achieve such results.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the G20 Foreign Ministers' summit in South Africa on February 20. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)'s official readout stated that Wang emphasized that the PRC's approach to resolving the war in Ukraine focuses on addressing the war's "root causes."[17] The PRC MFA's official readout of the meeting notably differed and stated that Lavrov stated that Russia, not the PRC, is committed to solving the "root causes" of the war.[18] The Russian MFA's likely purposeful misattribution reflects Russia's attempt to align the PRC's position on the war fully with its own in an effort to bolster its international standing and to shape Russian domestic perceptions of Russia’s relationship with China. Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[19]

Key Takeaways:

The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.
Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.
US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 19 that Putin will appoint a negotiator for talks with the United States after the United States appoints its own negotiator.[1] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on February 19, citing a source close to the Kremlin, that the United States was the first to select its delegation for the February 18 bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia, after which Russia attempted to "select relevant" counterparts for each of the selected US officials.[2] The source claimed that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States. Another source close to the Kremlin told Meduza that Putin may appoint his aide Vladimir Medinsky to the Russian negotiations delegation if Ukrainian representatives join future negotiations because Medinsky took part in the Spring 2022 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul. The source claimed that the Kremlin does not need to include Medinsky in the Russian delegation so long as negotiations remain bilateral between the United States and Russia. The Moscow Times reported on February 19, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the February 18 US-Russia meeting, that the Kremlin seeks to restore access to roughly $6 billion worth of frozen Russian Central Bank reserves in the US.[3] The source claimed that the Russian negotiations delegation in Saudi Arabia pushed for the United States to agree that both countries fully resume the operations of their diplomatic missions in the other country and to return Russian diplomatic property in the United States, which US authorities had previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 18 that the United States and Russia had agreed to restore "the functionality of [their] respective missions in Washington and Moscow."[4] The Kremlin appears to be attempting to push the United States to accept economic and diplomatic terms that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.[5] US acceptance of these economic and diplomatic terms — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged.[6] Rubio, Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff gave an interview to CNN and the Associated Press (AP) on February 18 following bilateral talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in Saudi Arabia. Waltz stated that any future end to the war needs to be "permanent," not "temporary as we have seen in the past." Waltz stated that there is going to have to be "some discussion of territory...and security guarantees" and that future talks will discuss Russia's ability to retain any Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed since February 2022. Rubio answered a question about possible concessions from Russia, stating that these "kinds of things" will happen through "difficult diplomacy in closed rooms." Rubio later noted that there will have to be concessions "made by all sides" in order to bring about an end to the war. Rubio emphasized that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement. Rubio answered a question about his assessment of Russia's desire to achieve peace following the talks in Saudi Arabia, stating that Russia appears willing to "begin to engage in a serious process to determine" the mechanism to end the war, but that an outcome will ultimately depend on the willingness of every side in the war to "agree to certain things."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace. Zelensky emphasized that security guarantees do not necessarily mean deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine.[7] Zelensky stated that it would be sufficient if the United States provided Ukraine with 20 Patriot air defense systems and the license to domestically produce Patriot missiles.[8] Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized Ukraine's need for additional Patriot systems and missiles to defend against Russian missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and his February 19 statements are consistent with previous statements that Ukraine needs a strong military of its own to deter and defend against future Russian aggression.[9]

US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.[10] Kellogg met with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, and Yermak emphasized that Ukraine remains interested in a strategic, long-term, and comprehensive partnership with the United States.[11]

Ukraine's European partners continue to support Ukraine's military and defense industrial base (DIB). The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 19 that a new delivery of trucks, thermal imaging sights, and other military support arrived in Ukraine as part of a package worth 80 million euros (about $83.3 million) that Lithuania prepared during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on February 12.[12] The Lithuanian MoD estimated that Lithuania's military support for Ukraine in 2025 could reach one billion euros (about $1.042 billion) and stated that Lithuania plans to focus its support on Ukraine's air defense, ammunition, drone, and anti-drone needs and financing for Ukrainian domestic weapons production.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Syzran, Samara Oblast on the night of February 18 and 19.[13] Kovalenko noted that the refinery has a processing capacity of 8.9 million tons of oil per year and produces fuel, jet fuel, and bitumen. Kovalenko stated that Russian refineries play an important role in supplying Russian troops. Kovalenko stated that the oil refinery stopped operating after the strike, and Reuters, citing two industry sources, also reported that the refinery suspended oil processing after the drone strike caused a fire at the primary refining unit.[14] The industry sources told Reuters that the Syzran refinery had been operating at only 4.7 million tons of capacity in 2024 at least in part due to previous Ukrainian strikes. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on February 19 of a fire at the refinery, which was later geolocated to within Syzran.[15] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Syzran Oil Refinery but that there was no "major" damage.[16]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace.
US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian federal subjects are reportedly halting their recruitment of foreigners who do not speak Russian for service in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2025

The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya stated during a UN Security Council meeting on February 17 that Ukraine has "irrevocably lost" Crimea, the "Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics" (referring to occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[1] Nebenzya insinuated that peace negotiations should "correct" the situation in these oblasts and that Ukraine should cede the remaining parts of the four oblasts that Ukraine currently controls. Nebenzya is calling for Ukraine to cede the roughly 30 percent of the total area in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia does not currently occupy. (Russian forces currently occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast.) Nebenzya also demanded that Ukraine become a "demilitarized" neutral state in the future and that Ukraine not join any alliances or security blocs.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed on February 17 the possibility of Russia making territorial concessions during future negotiations.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Ukraine should withdraw its forces from and cede any unoccupied territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia, and Nebenzya appears to be resurrecting this demand ahead of bilateral US-Russia negotiations.[4] US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted on February 16 that US President Donald Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty."[5]

Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia. Nebenzya claimed that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) are "incapable" of reaching any agreement with Russia and cannot be party to any future agreements about the war in Ukraine.[6] Nebenzya accused European countries of being "blinded" by Russophobia and unrealistic about peace negotiations. Lavrov questioned why European countries should participate in negotiations and insinuated that European leaders only want to prolong the war in Ukraine in order to defeat Russia and prepare for a future war between Russia and Europe.[7] Russian authorities have previously focused their information operations against NATO, accusing the alliance of conspiring and preparing for a future war with Russia. Russian accusations that European countries and the EU more broadly (implicitly as distinct from the US) are acting aggressively towards Russia is a notable informational inflection and likely indicates a new Kremlin effort to drive a wedge between the US and Europe taking advantage of tensions evident at the recent Munich Security Conference.[8]

The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West — notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia. Nebenzya reiterated Putin's demand that Ukraine must conduct elections before the implementation of any peace agreements, continuing the Kremlin's efforts to falsely portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate.[9] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk have also recently repeated the Kremlin's false claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" and implicitly that Russia thus is not obligated to honor agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government.[10] The Kremlin's apparent unwillingness to make territorial concessions, commit to honoring any future peace agreement with Ukraine, or involve any European leaders in these negotiations calls into question Putin's supposed willingness to engage in good faith negotiations that could bring about long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.

The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.[11] The Russian delegation includes Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the talks will focus on "restoring the entire complex of US-Russian relations" and preparing for possible future discussions about the war in Ukraine between US President Donald Trump and Putin.[12] Peskov added that Lavrov and Ushakov "will be able to send urgent reports" to Putin while in Riyadh — suggesting that the Russian delegation's purpose is to convey messages and inform the Kremlin, rather than to negotiate on Putin's behalf.[13]

Sergei Lavrov has served as the Russian foreign minister since 2004, but has reportedly been left out of previous key Kremlin decisions relating to the Russian invasions of Ukraine.[14] Sources in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told the BBC in August 2023 that the MFA had no previous knowledge of the Kremlin's ultimatums to the US and NATO in late 2021, and the Financial Times (FT) reported in February 2023 that Lavrov learned about the full-scale invasion a few hours before it started.[15] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Kremlin did not notify Lavrov of Putin's June 2024 press conference at the MFA during which Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining territories of four Ukrainian oblasts.[16]

Yuri Ushakov has served as Putin's foreign policy aide since May 2012.[17] Ushakov was Russia's ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 1996 to 1998, served as the Russian Ambassador to the United States from 1999-2008, and became Deputy Head of Government Staff from 2008 to 2012.[18] Ushakov publicly dismissed US and Western intelligence about the impending Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as "hysteria" and "absurdity" in early February 2022.[19] Ushakov reportedly participated in early ceasefire talks with Ukraine shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.[20]

Kirill Dmitriev has been CEO of RDIF, a Russian sovereign wealth fund meant to develop foreign direct investment in Russia, since its creation in 2011 and also holds positions on the supervisory boards of the state-owned Gazprombank, Transneft, and Russian Railways.[21] Dmitriev studied economics at Stanford and Harvard universities in the 1990s and spent his early career working as a consultant at McKinsey & Company and Goldman Sachs and later ran the Ukrainian investment fund Icon Private Equity from 2007 to 2011.[22] Dmitriev enjoys close ties with Putin's family, and Dmitriev's wife, Natalia Popova, is reportedly a close friend and former classmate of Putin's daughter, Katerina Tikhonova.[23] Dmitriev has extensive experience working with Middle Eastern countries, as the RDIF's partners include the sovereign wealth funds of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Bloomberg, citing a person familiar with the exchange, reported on February 14 that Dmitriev recently played a key role in negotiations with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff to free American Marc Fogel from Russia.[24] Dmitriev accompanied Putin on his visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in 2023 and Beijing in May 2024.[25]

A key Putin ally will be notably absent from the meeting. Bloomberg reported on February 14 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin would participate in the Russian delegation going to Saudi Arabia – reports which ended up proving false.[26] Naryshkin is Putin's close ally who reportedly participated in Russia-Ukrainian negotiations shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 and discussions with former CIA director William Burns in Ankara in November 2022.[27] Putin has also stated that he decided to launch Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 after consulting with only the "leaders of [Russia's] special services and the defense ministry."[28] None of the members of the Russian delegation in Saudi Arabia appear to be among the closest inner circle that Putin would likely empower to engage in serious negotiations on his behalf, but Putin may intend to include more trusted individuals in future rounds of talks or may have more confidence in these individuals in these particular talks.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the refinery has an annual refining capacity of about 6.6 million tons and specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil.[29] Kovalenko noted that the oil refinery supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine. Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Kavkazsky Raion, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the station is the largest pumping station in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.[30] The consortium confirmed that seven drones struck the Kropotkinskaya station, leading authorities to take the station out of operation.[31] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SSO) conducted the drone strikes against the Ilsky Oil Refinery and Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station.[32] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that falling drone debris damaged houses in Ilsky and Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 70 drones overnight, including 24 drones over Krasnodar Krai.[34]

Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 17 that footage shows Russian forces executing three surrendering Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified location after a Russian commander orders the soldiers to kill two of the POWs.[35] ISW has long assessed that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[36]

Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[37] NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 17 Iran Update. The sources said that Russia is “close” to a deal that would keep at least some staff and equipment in Syria. One of the sources said that Russia hopes to keep the same air and naval bases that it used prior to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime, likely referring to Hmeimim Airbase and the naval base at Tartus. Russia also previously held several other airbases within central and northern Syria, including a helicopter base in Qamishli, though it is unclear whether the agreement will cover these sites. Russian forces have fully evacuated all their former positions in Syria except for Hmeimim Airbase and the Port of Tartus.[38] Other forces, such as the Syrian interim government or US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have taken many of these bases following Russian forces’ evacuation.[39]

The tone of engagement between Russia and the Syrian interim government has notably become more cooperative in recent weeks, which supports the sources’ claims that Russia may be in agreement with Syria. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara emphasized Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12.[40] Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra recently suggested that Syria could allow Russia to retain air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[41] It is not clear what “benefits“ Russia may be offering Syria in current negotiations. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 in a gesture that likely sought to foster goodwill with the Syrian government.[42] This gesture followed Syrian officials’ demands that Russia pay its debts to the Syrian state and Putin’s offer to Shara to assist with Syria’s economy.[43]

Unspecified sources also told Bloomberg that Russia could help with the Syrian government’s counter-ISIS efforts.[44] It is unclear based on this comment whether the Syrian interim government has discussed Russian forces re-deploying to Syria to fight against ISIS. The Syrian interim government is likely eager to obtain manpower to assist in counter-ISIS operations as the government contends with the political and material realities of forming and training the new Syrian army. Russian participation in the Assad regime campaign against ISIS failed to effectively degrade ISIS in Syria, however. Russian aircraft proved to be far more capable in targeting Syrian opposition groups on behalf of the regime than it was targeting ISIS.[45] The scale of a future Russian deployment to Syria would impact the success of any Russian counter-ISIS operations, and it is unclear if a ”reduced” military presence would be any more effective against ISIS than Russian forces were at the height of Russian deployments to Syria. US Central Command announced in July 2024 that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute in Syria following several years of decreased capability.[46] Russia would by no means provide a suitable replacement for the United States or SDF in counter-ISIS operations in the face of ISIS reconstitution efforts.

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations.
Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia.
The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia.
The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline.
Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.
Russian forces advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the Geneva Convention by conscripting civilians in occupied Ukraine to serve in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2025

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the refinery has an annual refining capacity of about 6.6 million tons and specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil.[29] Kovalenko noted that the oil refinery supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine. Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Kavkazsky Raion, Krasnodar Krai on February 17, and that the station is the largest pumping station in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.[30] The consortium confirmed that seven drones struck the Kropotkinskaya station, leading authorities to take the station out of operation.[31] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SSO) conducted the drone strikes against the Ilsky Oil Refinery and Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station.[32] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that falling drone debris damaged houses in Ilsky and Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 70 drones overnight, including 24 drones over Krasnodar Krai.[34]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations.
Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia.
The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia.
The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline.
Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.
Russian forces advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the Geneva Convention by conscripting civilians in occupied Ukraine to serve in the Russian military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2025

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a telephone call on February 16 to "open a channel of communication" for future talks about the war in Ukraine. US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated that Rubio spoke with Lavrov as a follow up to US President Donald Trump's recent call with Russian President Vladimir Putin and that Rubio reaffirmed Trump's commitment to ending the war in Ukraine.[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov agreed to maintain a channel of communication to resolve issues in the US-Russian relationship; to remove barriers to trade, economic, and investment cooperation; to work together on ending the war in Ukraine and solving issues in the Middle East; and to organize future meetings to improve the work of foreign missions in the United States and Russia.[2] The Russian MFA claimed that Rubio and Lavrov agreed to work to restore "mutually respectful" interstate dialogue and to hold regular contacts, including a Russian-American summit in the future. Rubio stated on CBS on February 16 that his phone call with Lavrov was meant to establish communications for future efforts aimed at reaching a peace agreement in Ukraine.[3] Rubio noted that he discussed issues surrounding the operation of American and Russian embassies because it will be difficult to communicate with Russia if the embassies are not functioning.

US, Russian, and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly gathering in Saudi Arabia ahead of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the coming weeks. US Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on February 16 that he, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and other unnamed US officials will travel to Saudi Arabia for bilateral negotiations with Russia.[4] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told CBS that he will also travel to Saudi Arabia this week and will take advantage of "any opportunity" to further US President Donald Trump's goal of ending the war in Ukraine.[5] It remains unclear who will represent Russia during the meeting, although a Russian insider source claimed on February 16 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will arrive in Saudi Arabia in February 18.[6]Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that a Ukrainian delegation has also arrived in Saudi Arabia on a working visit.[7] It is unclear if US and Ukrainian officials will meet in Saudi Arabia, as US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg will arrive in Ukraine in the coming days to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[8]

US officials continue to outline their expectations for the peace negotiations. Witkoff noted that his initial meeting with Russian officials is about "trust building" and expressed hope that he will make progress during these initial meetings.[9] Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during the negotiations and that Russia could also promise to not use force against Ukraine in the future or commit to "downsizing" the Russian military.[10] Rubio stated during his interview with CBS that European officials must be involved in the peace negotiations in some capacity, but did not provide additional details.[11] The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Brazil also released a statement on February 16 calling for major world powers to work together to promote peace in Ukraine.[12]

Ukraine's European partners reiterated their support for Ukraine's war effort and domestic defense industry at the Munich Security Conference. Zelensky met with Head of the German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall Armin Papperger on February 15 to discuss the development of joint projects between the Ukrainian and German defense industries, particularly regarding 155mm ammunition production, and broader cooperation in maintenance and repair efforts.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and emphasized strengthening Ukraine's front-line positions, improving air defenses, and bolstering Ukrainian production of long-range drones and missiles.[14] Zelensky met separately with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof and discussed increased defense assistance to Ukraine, direct investments in Ukraine's production of long-range weapons, and strengthening sanctions on Russia's shadow tanker fleet.[15] Zelensky met with Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store to discuss Ukrainian weapons production, including long-range missile and drone production.[16] Zelensky met with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson to discuss increasing sanctions pressure on Russia and strengthening defense cooperation.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak met with former NATO Secretary General (from 2009-2014) Anders Fogh Rasmussen and discussed strengthening Europe's own defense and establishing a task force to develop the concept of a "security guarantee mechanism" for Ukraine, inspired by the International Task Force on Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine.[18] Yermak and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and reiterated their commitment to future peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[19]

Czech President Petr Pavel announced the continuation of the Czech-led Initiative to provide Ukraine with large-caliber ammunition on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference and stated that Czechia secured funding to meet Ukraine's artillery needs until April 2025.[20] Reuters reported that an unnamed Czech government official reported that by the end of 2024 the Czech Initiative had already provided Ukraine with roughly 500,000 155mm artillery rounds and an estimated one million shells over 100mm caliber.

Ukrainian officials also met with US officials to discuss continued support for Ukraine. Yermak met with the US Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell to discuss preparations for upcoming high-level meetings.[21] Grenell emphasized that support for Ukraine is an investment in global stability and security. Zelensky met with a bipartisan delegation of US congressmen to discuss continued US defense assistance to Ukraine and the provision of reliable security guarantees.[22]

The Kremlin officially reiterated its claim that Ukraine has no sovereignty, setting conditions for Moscow to claim that Ukraine has no standing to negotiate with Russia or that any agreements reached with Ukraine in the future are invalid. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 16 that Russia has adjusted its approach to potential talks with Ukraine because Ukraine allegedly has a "deficit" of sovereignty.[23] Peskov claimed that Ukraine's decision to not sign the peace agreement that Russia and Ukraine were discussing in Spring 2022 in Istanbul shows that Russia cannot trust Ukraine's word. Ukraine and Russia had not finalized a peace deal in Istanbul in 2022.[24] Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that the West forced Ukraine to walk away from the Istanbul deal and that Ukraine thus lacks sovereignty. Peskov also continued longstanding Kremlin efforts to place the blame for Russia's full-scale invasion on Ukraine, claiming that Ukraine would "be intact," that the Ukrainian government would not have "abused" Russians in eastern Ukraine, that there would have been no "civil war," and that Russians in eastern Ukraine would have had "no desire...to separate from Ukraine" had Ukraine fulfilled the terms of the Minsk agreements.[25] The Minsk agreements were notably extremely favorable to Russia, placing no obligations on Moscow, yet Russian proxies continually violated the accords with Russian support.[26] Kremlin-controlled state media used a February 15 interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy.[27]

Medvedchuk's interview and Peskov's February 16 statements continue to cast doubt on Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and set informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.[28] US President Donald Trump recently reiterated that Ukraine will be part of any talks with Russia about ending the war.[29] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 16 that Putin expressed his desire to end the war to Trump in their recent phone call but noted that Putin must follow up his statement with action in the coming days and weeks to show if he is serious.[30]

The Kremlin extended an open invitation to US President Donald Trump to attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow as part of efforts to posture Russia's strength and global power status. Peskov stated in response to a question about whether the Kremlin is considering hosting Trump at the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be "happy to welcome" any head of state to the parade.[31] The May 9 parade highlights the Soviet Union's role in defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Putin has often used his May 9 speeches to emphasize the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany while minimizing the contributions of the other Western Allies.[32] Putin has even previously claimed that the Soviet Union acted "alone" in the Second World War.[33] The 2025 Victory Day parade will notably celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and Putin has named 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland."[34] ISW continues to note that Putin is trying to present himself as equal to Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as an heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status.[35]

Western reporting suggested that the United States intends to ease sanctions on Belarus. Russia uses Belarus as a staging ground for its military against Ukraine and NATO and as critical tool in its sanctions evasion schemes. US Deputy Assistance Secretary of State Christopher Smith told CNN on February 12 that he led a US delegation to Minsk and met with "Belarusian counterparts" to secure the release of several political prisoners.[36] Smith stated that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko "didn't get anything for this" release and that the release was a "unilateral gesture" by Belarus. Belarusian journalist Igar Tur claimed on February 13 that Smith and unspecified US officials may have met with Lukashenko during the visit.[37] The New York Times (NYT), citing sources familiar with Smith's trip, reported on February 15 that Smith met with Lukashenko and Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) Head Ivan Tertel in Minsk on February 12.[38] NYT, citing individuals who attended Smith's briefing after the trip, reported that Smith later announced that the US is considering a bilateral agreement in which Lukashenko would release an unspecified number of political prisoners in exchange for the US easing sanctions on Belarusian banks and exports of potash, a key ingredient for fertilizer and major Belarusian export. ISW assesses that any sort of sanctions relief directed toward Belarus would have a positive effect on the Russian economy, as Russia has spent decades integrating Belarus into the Russian economy as part of the Union State project as ISW's George Barros has recently reported in detail.[39] Belarus is a key tool for Russia in its sanctions evasion scheme and the Russian and Belarusian economies are integrated to a degree that Russia's war effort would directly benefit from the easing of US sanctions on Belarus.[40]

The Russian military command reportedly redeployed additional elements of the Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions, further indicating that the Russian military command intends to prioritize putting pressure on Kostyantynivka – the southernmost point of Ukraine's "fortress belt" – in 2025. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 16 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division's 242nd, 255th, and 33rd motorized rifle regiments and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division's 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments and 163rd Tank Regiment from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions.[41] Mashovets stated that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division recently arrived in Toretsk and will attempt to advance along the T-0516 Toretskighway towards Pleshchiivka and Kostyantynivka (both northwest of Toretsk) with the support of the 9th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD). Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division arrived near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk) and will attempt to advance along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway with support from the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA). Mashovets stated that the Russian military command recently reconstituted the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions with new personnel and equipment and estimated that the Russian military command redeployed 7,000 to 8,000 troops from each division to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions. A Ukrainian source recently amplified footage of a Russian servicemember claiming that the Russian military command redeployed the 150th Motorized Rifle Division to the Toretsk direction, and Mashovets' report supports this claim.[42] ISW has not observed additional reports of the 20th or 150th motorized rifle divisions engaged in combat in the Toretsk or eastern Pokrovsk directions as of this report, however.

Mashovets assessed that Russian forces intend to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket around Stara Mykolaivka and along the H-20 Avdiivka-Kostyantynivka highway before advancing on Kostyantynivka from the south and southwest, which is consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka.[43] Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk and northeast of Pokrovsk to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from this pocket under threat of envelopment in the coming months. Mashovets suggested that the Russian military command may redeploy elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) to the Toretsk-Vozdvyzhenka area to reinforce this effort after these elements complete the seizure of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and level the frontline west of Kurakhove.[44] ISW assesses that Russian forces operating east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka are roughly 22 kilometers south of Kostyantynivka at their closest point of advance and that Russian forces operating in Toretsk are roughly 11 kilometers from Kostyantynivka at their closest point of advance as of February 16. Russian forces could possibly reach the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka in May 2025 should Russian forces be able to replicate their recent rate of advance south of Pokrovsk, but this is unlikely given the likely more significant Ukrainian defenses that Russian forces will face on the road to Kostyantynivka and the degradation of the Russian units involved.

The Russian military appears to be committing to a multi-years long effort to seize Ukraine's "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast, further underscoring Russia's Putin's apparent disinterest in a lasting and enduring peace in Ukraine. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command also redeployed the 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) to the 3rd CAA's area of responsibility in the Siversk and Chasiv Yar directions.[45] ISW has not recently observed reports of Russia reinforcing the Siversk or Chasiv Yar directions, but Mashovets' report suggests that the Russian military command may be reprioritizing those efforts. ISW has recently observed an intensification in Russian activity in the Lyman and Chasiv Yar directions and consistent activity in the Siversk direction.[46] Russian forces may intend to leverage advances in these areas to pressure Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from the north and east as Russian forces attempt to advance on Kostyantynivka from the south.

Ukraine's "fortress belt" is a 50-kilometer-long line of four major cities (Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka) that forms the backbone of Ukraine's defenses in Donetsk Oblast, and Russia has long aspired to seize these cities.[47] Russian forces are currently between 25 and 30 kilometers from Slovyansk's eastern outskirts, roughly 20 kilometers from Kramatorsk's eastern outskirts, and nine kilometers from Kostyantynivka's northeastern outskirts at their closest points along the frontline in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces in the Lyman and Siversk directions will have to seize Lyman and Siversk (likely months-long efforts themselves) and advance through numerous fields and small settlements before they can begin to threaten Slovyansk. Russian forces have spent most of the last 10 months slowly grinding through the urban areas of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk but have yet to completely seize these towns. Russian forces may intend to advance southwest of Kostyantynivka and attempt to cut the settlement off from the rest of the fortress belt to the west, but such advances would not collapse the entire fortress belt. Russian advances east and south Kostyantynivka would pressure the fortress belt, but Russian forces are unlikely to completely collapse and seize the fortress belt in 2025 or even 2026.

It is unlikely that the Russian military can sustain a multi-year and multi-axis campaign against Ukraine's fortress belt alongside its other offensive operations in Ukraine. ISW has extensively reported on Russia's mounting personnel and equipment losses in Ukraine and continues to assess that such losses are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given Russia's current force generation and defense industrial capabilities.[48] A multi-year campaign against a series of significant Ukrainian defensive positions will almost certainly require more forces and materiel than previous Russian efforts in less operationally significant frontline areas. Russian forces have yet to face significant and sufficiently built-up Ukrainian defenses since their campaign against Bakhmut in Spring 2023 and Avdiivka in Winter 2023-2024, and Russian forces' current method of advancing using its current manpower advantage to conduct costly infantry assaults is unlikely to achieve the same results in the face of significant Ukrainian defenses.[49] ISW previously noted that the Russian military command has demonstrated its willingness to commit to operations that could take months or even years to conclude as Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to hold a theory of victory that assumes that Russia is able to continue the war until Russia militarily defeats Ukraine.[50] Putin's willingness to begin a likely years-long campaign against Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast further supports this assessment and calls into question Russia's interest and intent in sitting down for bilateral negotiations with the United States.

Key Takeaways:

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a telephone call on February 16 to "open a channel of communication" for future talks about the war in Ukraine.
US, Russian, and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly gathering in Saudi Arabia ahead of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the coming weeks.
Ukraine's European partners reiterated their support for Ukraine's war effort and domestic defense industry at the Munich Security Conference.
The Kremlin officially reiterated its claim that Ukraine has no sovereignty, setting conditions for Moscow to claim that Ukraine has no standing to negotiate with Russia or that any agreements reached with Ukraine in the future are invalid.
Medvedchuk's interview and Peskov's February 16 statements continue to cast doubt on Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and set informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.
The Kremlin extended an open invitation to US President Donald Trump to attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow as part of efforts to posture Russia's strength and global power status.
Western reporting suggested that the United States intends to ease sanctions on Belarus. Russia uses Belarus as a staging ground for its military against Ukraine and NATO and as critical tool in its sanctions evasion schemes.
The Russian military command reportedly redeployed additional elements of the Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions, further indicating that the Russian military command intends to prioritize putting pressure on Kostyantynivka – the southernmost point of Ukraine's "fortress belt" – in 2025.
The Russian military appears to be committing to a multi-years long effort to seize Ukraine's "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast, further underscoring Russia's Putin's apparent disinterest in a lasting and enduring peace in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 15, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations. Zelensky stated during his address at the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Putin intends to cut Ukraine out of negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine and conduct direct bilateral negotiations with the United States.[1] ISW has previously noted that Putin has recently attempted to present himself as equal to Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as an heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status.[2] Zelensky stated that Putin wants to embarrass Trump and have Trump attend the Russian Victory Day Parade — which highlights Russia's role in defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War — on May 9 as a "prop."[3] Zelensky's warning aligns with a report from Russian opposition news outlet Meduza that the Kremlin instructed Russian state media to reduce reporting about Trump and instead portray Putin as a strong and decisive leader, as well as to frame the February 12 Putin-Trump phone call as a victory for Putin.[4] Zelensky also stated that Trump has not discussed the prospect of having other European states participate in negotiations and that Ukraine and the rest of Europe need to present a united front to Putin and Europe needs to participate in decisions about its own future.[5] The Kremlin has routinely attempted to portray the US as the only other relevant actor in Ukraine besides Russia to deny Ukraine's agency in future negotiations and set conditions to convince the US to ignore Ukraine's interests, all likely to demand significant concessions in Russia's favor.[6] Zelensky also reiterated his warning that Russia will field 15 new divisions and use military exercises in Belarus to threaten NATO.[7]

Ukrainian and US officials continue to provide details on upcoming peace negotiations to end the war. Zelensky told Newsmax on February 15 that Russian forces at "minimum" need to withdraw to the pre-full scale invasion frontline and reiterated his commitment to ending the war in 2025.[8] US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that the US aims to engage "all parties in a peace process" within 180 days (by roughly August 2025) and noted that other European states would not "be at the table" in peace negotiations but that the US will consider their points of view.[9]

Ukraine's US and European partners continue to work to jointly develop Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukraine's state-owned defense enterprise Ukroboronprom signed a joint venture agreement with French defense company Thales International SAS on February 15 to create advanced technology and provide operational support in the areas of air defense, radar, electronic warfare (EW), tactical communications, and optoelectronic systems.[10] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov met on February 15 with the heads of European defense companies KNDS France and KNDS Deutschland to discuss maintaining equipment that Ukraine's partners have transferred to Ukraine and the supply of new weapons, including self-propelled artillery systems.[11] The delegations also discussed the possibility of jointly producing 155mm artillery ammunition, repairing and modernizing Ukrainian air defense systems, and developing drone systems and artificial intelligence (AI). Umerov also met on February 15 with a delegation from Boeing Defense, Space, and Security to discuss joint drone, ammunition, and air weapons production.[12]

Kremlin-controlled state media used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy and Russia's longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state. Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Putin whom Putin initially wanted to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following Russia's full-scale invasion — claimed during an interview Kremlin newswire TASS published on February 15 that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader of Ukraine and therefore that Zelensky cannot cancel the 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin.[13] Medvedchuk claimed that the only government body that can cancel the decree in the absence of a legitimate president is the Ukrainian Constitutional Court but that the court currently does not have the necessary quorum to make decisions.[14] Medvedchuk is attempting to exploit the fact that the terms of three judges on the Ukrainian Constitutional Court ended two weeks ago (in January 2025), leaving the court with only 11 of its 18 judges and unable to hold Grand Chamber meetings, which require a quorum of 12 judges.[15] (Ukrainian officials are in the process of interviewing and ranking candidates to make the final selections.[16]) Zelensky, however, remains the legitimate president of Ukraine as he adhered to Ukrainian law and constitution and did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[17] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president, and Medvedchuk's claims about the Constitutional Court are just the latest variation on this theme.[18] The platforming of the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukraine's legal inability to negotiate by a major Kremlin-controlled outlet casts serious doubts on Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.

Medvedchuk reiterated the need to address the "root causes" of the war during future peace negotiations and claimed that the way to eliminate the "root causes" is to remove the legitimate government in Ukraine, disarm the Ukrainian military, and remove Western-supplied weapons and equipment from Ukraine. Medvedchuk claimed that the only way to address these issues and guarantee Russia's security interests is if Russia "controls the territories under [Ukrainian control.]" Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine.[19] Medvedchuk claimed that Russia "has every reason" to return allegedly "historical Russian lands" that have "belonged to [Russia] for centuries" in order to allegedly "save the Ukrainian people."[20] Medvedchuk echoed Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's longstanding claims that Ukraine's neighbors, including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, are hoping to annex territories in Ukraine in order to sow discord among Ukraine's European allies.[21] Medvedchuk also claimed that Russia withdrew from Kyiv during the Spring 2022 peace talks in Istanbul "as a gesture of goodwill," ignoring the fact that poor Russian logistics, heavy losses, and effective Ukrainian counterattacks stymied advances and forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv.[22]

It is notable that Kremlin newswire TASS published Medvedchuk's interview, particularly after the Kremlin recently reportedly issued instructions to Russian government-linked media to portray Putin as a strong leader in contrast to Trump.[23] The Kremlin almost certainly approved the publication of Medvedchuk's interview on February 15 in order to reinject the information operation targeting Zelensky's alleged illegitimacy into the information space and to reiterate Russia's long-term objectives of "denazifying," "demilitarizing," and forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join NATO amid the reported start of limited US-Russia and US-Ukraine talks. These Kremlin informational efforts aim to shape any future negotiations and use different Kremlin-linked actors like Medvedchuk to amplify Russia's longstanding negotiating position.

Russian advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk have slowed over the last two weeks amid indications that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka — the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast — in Spring and Summer 2025. Russian forces made rapid advances aimed at expanding the Russian salient south and southwest of Pokrovsk in December 2024 and January 2025, but Russian advances have slowed southwest of Pokrovsk since early February 2025.[24] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 14 during the Munich Security Conference that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction has improved in recent days, and the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian activity has become less intense near Pokrovsk in recent days.[25] Russian forces have struggled to advance north of Kotlyne and west of Udachne as they appear to have come up against more concerted Ukrainian defenses in these areas.[26] Ukrainian forces have also conducted several counterattacks near Kotlyne and Pishchane (southeast of Kotlyne) aimed at threatening Russian positions in the salient.[27] One Russian milblogger expressed concern on February 15 that slowing Russian advances may allow Ukrainian forces to launch significant counterattacks in the coming weeks and risk giving Ukrainian forces the opportunity to collapse the Russian salient south of Pokrovsk.[28]

Russian advances may be slowing south of Pokrovsk due to degradation among frontline Russian units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations in the area. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 11 that Russian forces suffered roughly 7,000 personnel killed in action (KIA) in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 2 that Russian forces suffered 15,000 total casualties in this direction in January 2025.[29] Russian forces have suffered significant personnel losses throughout the frontline in the past five and a half months and have likely suffered most of these losses in the Pokrovsk direction.[30] Such losses are likely negatively impacting the combat effectiveness of Russian units in the area.

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on February 15 that Ukrainian drone operations are significantly impeding Russian activity in the Pokrovsk direction.[31] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are striking any Russian forces operating more than three kilometers north and west of Selydove (currently 11 kilometers south and 35 kilometers east of the frontline) and that Ukrainian drones are monitoring and restricting access to all roads in this direction. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are making it "impossible" for Russian forces to conduct rotations or resupply frontline units and that Russian activity south and southwest of Pokrovsk is currently very challenging. The milblogger suggested that Ukrainian forces have created a strong layered defense comprised of minefields, conventional artillery systems, and strike and reconnaissance drones and are successfully integrating reconnaissance from drones with ground-based fire systems to improve Ukrainian strike capabilities in the area. The milblogger expressed concern that Russia is far from reaching parity with Ukrainian drone operations and noted that excessive Russian formalization efforts have stalled the development of Russia's drone capabilities.

The Russian military command may also intend to prioritize assaults on Kostyantynivka in 2025 and are thus reportedly not reinforcing the Russian force grouping south of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 15 that the Russian military command has redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk (Kostyantynivka) direction.[32] A Ukrainian source suggested on February 5 that the Russian military command was redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and elements of the 96th regiment (reportedly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit fighting in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Kostyantynivka direction.[33] ISW has not observed further reports of the redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction as of this report. Mashovets and some Russian milbloggers stated that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are still operating in the Kurakhove direction in recent days.[34] The Russian military command may be in the process of redeploying the 8th CAA or may intend to split the 8th CAA between the Kurakhove and Kostyantynivka directions until Russian forces eliminate the small Ukrainian salient remaining west of Kurakhove. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024, and the Russian military command could have redeployed elements of the 8th CAA to reinforce degraded Russian units in the Pokrovsk direction if Russia intended to continue prioritizing this effort in 2025.[35] The redeployment of significant Russian forces to the Kostyantynivka direction indicates that the Russian military command may have identified attacking Kostyantynivka as its priority effort for Spring and Summer 2025.[36]

Russian cargo vessels have continued to evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia negotiates its presence in Syria with the interim government. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 15 Iran Update. OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from February 14 showing the Russian cargo vessel Baltic Leader and potentially the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate about 250 kilometers south of the coast of southwestern Cyprus.[37] Anderson said that the Baltic Leader departed the port of Tartus sometime after February 4, when satellite imagery showed the vessel at the port.[38] It is unclear at this time if the Baltic Leader will bring evacuated Russian cargo to Russia or Libya. Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025.[39] Publicly available marine tracking data showed that two cargo vessels that departed Tartus in late January, the Sparta and Sparta II, were sailing off the coast of the Netherlands on February 15, presumably in transit to Russia.[40] Continued Russian-Syria engagement — including a recent phone call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin — suggests that Syria seeks some relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria.[41] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on February 14 that Russia continues to discuss its military presence in Syria with the new Syrian administration.[42]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations.
Ukraine's US and European partners continue to work to jointly develop Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
Kremlin-controlled state media used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy and Russia's longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state.
Russian advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk have slowed over the last two weeks amid indications that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka — the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast — in Spring and Summer 2025.
Russian advances may be slowing south of Pokrovsk due to degradation among frontline Russian units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations in the area.
The Russian military command may also intend to prioritize assaults on Kostyantynivka in 2025 and are thus reportedly not reinforcing the Russian force grouping south of Pokrovsk.
Russian cargo vessels have continued to evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia negotiates its presence in Syria with the interim government.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
Russian occupation authorities continue to create regional analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions as part of Kremlin efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society and government.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 14. Vance stated during a press conference following the meeting that the United States remains committed to ending the war and achieving a "durable, lasting peace" in Ukraine and not the "kind of peace that's going to have Eastern Europe in conflict just a couple years down the road."[1] Vance noted the importance of dialogue between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, and declined to speculate on possible conditions of a future peace agreement in order to "preserve the optionality" for the delegations. Vance and Zelensky both noted that the conversation was productive and Zelensky thanked the United States for continued military support.[2] Zelensky stated that the United States and Ukraine are preparing a plan to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggression and finish the war in a just and lasting peace that provides tangible security guarantees for Ukraine. US President Donald Trump told reporters on February 14 that Ukraine would have a seat at the table during future peace negotiations with Russia to end the war.[3]

Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak met with US Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg in Munich and discussed ongoing efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.[4] Zelensky also met with a bipartisan delegation of US senators to discuss ongoing US military support for Ukraine, economic cooperation, and the future joint development of critical minerals and rare earth materials in Ukraine.[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, British Deputy Defense Minister Luke Polland, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and other European officials reiterated Europe's support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity amid ongoing discussions about future peace negotiations with Russia.[6]

The Kremlin reportedly ordered Russian government-linked media to reduce reporting about US President Donald Trump and portray Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strong and decisive leader after the February 12 Trump-Putin phone call. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on February 14 that the Kremlin instructed Russian state-run and pro-government media outlets to frame Trump and Putin's February 12 call as Putin's "initiative and victory" and to use Trump's name less frequently in coverage of the call and other events.[7] Meduza reported that the Kremlin is concerned that the Russian public might see Trump as a more "proactive and decisive" leader than Putin and wants Russian media to emphasize that Putin alone is responsible for the outcome of negotiations between him and Trump. An unnamed political strategist in the Russian Presidential Administration told Meduza that the Kremlin does not want the Russian public to perceive Trump as a "strong leader capable of changing the situation" and Putin as a passive or weak leader in comparison. The political strategist added that the Kremlin also instructed the Russian media to manage the public's expectations about negotiations to not create "false, overly optimistic expectations." The Russian information space has previously portrayed Trump as a pragmatic leader with whom Russia could work, but the Kremlin may be attempting to negatively shift the Russian public's perception of Trump in order to emphasize Putin's strength and agency amid reports of possible future peace negotiations and bilateral negotiations.

Russian officials and information space actors have notably not amplified the Russian information operation aimed at portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the illegitimate leader of Ukraine since the February 12 Trump-Putin call. Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified this information operation in January 2024 and most recently questioned Zelensky's legitimacy during a televised interview on January 28, and other Russian officials had amplified this information operation as of February 10.[8] It remains unclear how long Russian officials and information space actors will refrain from amplifying this information operation, however. It would be a significant concession if Putin and other Russian officials recognized Zelensky's legitimacy as Ukraine's president after repeatedly questioning the legitimacy of all Ukrainian leaders since 2014.

A Russian Shahed drone struck the protective structure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on February 14. Geolocated footage published on February 14 shows a drone striking the New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure, built in 2016 to enclose the original temporary shelter structure of Chornobyl's Reactor No. 4, which exploded in April 1986.[9] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that emergency services put out the initial fires from the drone strike and began dismantling parts of the NSC to identify and put out remaining smoldering fires.[10] Images published on February 14 show a surface-level hole in the initial layer of the NSC.[11] Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported that the strike did not pierce the NSC completely and that radiation levels within and outside the NSC remain normal.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described the damage to the NSC as "significant" and asserted that the drone was flying at an altitude of only 85 meters to avoid Ukrainian radar detection.[13] The NSC has a height of roughly 108 meters.[14] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) published images of the site showing the wreckage of a black drone labeled "Geran-2" – a common Russian name for the Iranian Shahed-136 drone – and noted that the drone had a "high-explosive" warhead.[15] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that Russian forces purposefully fly drones over the Chornobyl NPP and constantly experiment with Shahed drone altitudes to fly as low as possible, likely to avoid detection and downing by Ukrainian air defenses.[16]

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko called on the IAEA to intensify international measures to stop Russian strikes on nuclear facilities following the Chornobyl strike.[17] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha had an urgent meeting with IAEA Secretary General Rafael Mariano Grossi to discuss the impacts of the Chornobyl strike.[18] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied that Russian forces conducted the strike, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Ukrainian forces of conducting the strike.[19] The Kremlin has periodically conducted information operations aimed at portraying Ukraine as endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP),

but continued Russian military operations threatening Ukrainian NPPs highlight that Russia is the actual danger to Ukrainian NPPs.[20]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia may be preparing to launch intensified offensive operations into northern Ukraine or attack NATO's eastern flank in 2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned during the Munich Security Conference on February 14 that Russia is preparing upwards of 100,000 to 150,000 thousand troops organized into 15 divisions to "aggravate the situation in the Belarus direction."[21] Zelensky suggested that Russia may intend to attack into Ukraine, Poland, or possibly the Baltic countries. It remains unclear whether Zelensky is referring to active Russian military personnel or Russian efforts to recruit additional forces, as former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced in March 2024 that Russia aimed to form 14 new military divisions in coming years.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 14.
The Kremlin reportedly ordered Russian government-linked media to reduce reporting about US President Donald Trump and portray Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strong and decisive leader after the February 12 Trump-Putin phone call.
Russian officials and information space actors have notably not amplified the Russian information operation aimed at portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the illegitimate leader of Ukraine since the February 12 Trump-Putin call.
A Russian Shahed drone struck the protective structure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on February 14.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia may be preparing to launch intensified offensive operations into northern Ukraine or attack NATO's eastern flank in 2026.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, Kurakhove, and Pokrovsk.
Russia is reportedly intensifying efforts to coerce Russian mobilized and conscripted personnel into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2025

Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting. The United Kingdom (UK) pledged 150 million pounds (about $188 million) in military support, including drones, "dozens" of battle tanks and armored vehicles, and air defense systems, and confirmed plans to provide Ukraine with an additional 4.5 billion pounds (about $5.6 billion) worth of military assistance in 2025.[i] The UK stated that it will provide Ukraine will over 50 armored and protective vehicles, including modernized T-72 tanks, by the end of Spring 2025.[ii] Germany committed to supplying 100 IRIS-T air defense system missiles to Ukraine in the near future, and German defense company Helsing announced the delivery of 6,000 AI-equipped drones to Ukraine.[iii] Norway joined the Ukrainian Drone Coalition and revealed plans to establish and equip Ukraine's "Northern Brigade" as part of a broader Nordic initiative in which the Nordic countries will equip and train one Ukrainian battalion each.[iv] The Netherlands announced the delivery of 25 YPR armored infantry vehicles, Latvia announced the donation of 42 armored personnel carriers, and Estonia also pledged to allocate 0.25 percent of its GDP for military assistance to Ukraine in 2025.[v]

Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024.[vi] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024, and IISS' estimates likely only account for destroyed tanks and armored vehicles.[vii] IISS assessed in February 2024 that Russia would be able to sustain its then-rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 tanks, APCs, and IFVs annually as of 2023) until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[viii] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will remain willing or able to sustain this increased rate of armored vehicle losses in 2025, as Russian forces appear to be adapting their tactics to limit such losses.

IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.[ix] ISW began observing indications in November and December 2024 that Russian forces were using fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast, particularly in areas where Russian forces had previously relied heavily on mechanized assaults to make significant tactical advances.[x] Russian forces have continued to use fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast and throughout the frontline, possibly due to Ukrainian drone operations, equipment constraints, or non-conducive ground conditions brought about by rainy weather. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on February 13 that successful Ukrainian drone strikes have been the main factor — and not poor weather and ground conditions — prompting Russian forces to use fewer armored vehicles along the frontline.[xi] Trehubov noted that Russian forces also have issues supplying shells to some unspecified frontline positions, possibly due to successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots, and have thus decreased the intensity of shelling in such areas.

It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units. IISS assessed that Russia refurbished and built over 1,500 tanks and 2,800 IFVs and APCs in 2024 — suggesting that Russia produced enough vehicles to replace all of its tank losses and three quarters of its armored vehicle losses last year.[xii] IISS assessed that Russia's ongoing effort to expand the Russian military and create new units is exacerbating equipment shortages and noted that Russia may also be suffering from a shortage of spare parts to refurbish tanks and armored vehicles. IISS assessed that it is highly likely that the Soviet-era tanks and armored vehicles remaining in Russia's stores are in a deteriorated condition, which may complicate Russia's ability to offset high equipment losses in 2025 and beyond. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russia is continuing to form new divisions, and former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia aimed to stand up 14 new military divisions in the coming years.[xiii] The Russian military command appears to be balancing allocating refurbished and newly-produced vehicles between new formations and formations that have been fighting on the frontline for several years. Russia may struggle to adequately equip its units with materiel in the long-term if the Russian military continues to burn through Soviet-era vehicle stocks without significantly increasing Russia's ability to produce new tanks and armored vehicles.

Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The EFIS published its annual intelligence report on February 12 which focused on Russian threats to Estonia, other NATO members, and the West.[xiv] The intelligence report noted that the pace of the Russian military's rearmament will depend on the duration and outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine. The EFIS also assessed that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia would allow Russia to permanently station more forces along the borders of NATO member states neighboring Russia than before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – consistent with ISW's longstanding assessments.[xv] The intelligence report highlighted Russia's efforts to increase, improve, and centralize drone operations and production.[xvi] The EFIS reported that Russia will allocate on average one million euros (about $1 million) annually until 2030 to its "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle" National Project, established in December 2023, which aims to establish 48 research and production centers across Russia, standardize drone productions and development, create an electronic database of drone industry experts, and integrate drone-related education into 75 percent of all Russian schools.[xvii] The EFIS assessed that Russia is attempting to use these research and development centers to reduce Russia's reliance on Western and foreign technology and components and that Russia continues to rely on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to procure Western components for drone production. The EFIS noted that up to 80 percent of sanctioned Western components likely reach Russia through the PRC.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on February 13 that Ukrainian drones destroyed two Valdai radar complexes in Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast and noted that Russian forces used the radar complexes to detect and down drones over the airspace near Moscow City.[xviii] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on February 13 that Ukrainian drones targeted the Lipetsk water aeration station in Lipetsk City, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant, which is located near the station and produces about 20 percent of Russia's steel output.[xix] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), reported on February 13 that the SBU struck the Andreapol oil pumping station in Tver Oblast, causing a fire at the boiler equipment warehouse and a closed switchgear.[xx]

The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.[xxi] The Moldovan MFA noted that it summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov following Russian drone violations of Moldovan airspace and notified Vasnetsov of the intended closure of the local branch of the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), a Russian cultural diplomacy agency, in response.[xxii] Moldovan President Maia Sandu reported on February 13 that Russian Shahed drones violated the country's airspace and that two drones exploded on Moldovan territory.[xxiii] Vasnetsov denied reports that Russian drones violated Moldovan territory.[xxiv] Geolocated footage published on February 13 shows the explosion and aftermath of a likely Russian Shahed strike in a field near Ceadir-Lunga, Moldova.[xxv] Azerbaijani outlets also reported on February 6 that Azerbaijani authorities announced the closure of the local Rossotrudnichestvo branch in Baku, Azerbaijan citing national security concerns and a move away from “external interference."[xxvi] Russia currently has over 80 Rossotrudnichestvo branches concentrated in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[xxvii] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use the branches to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting.
Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023.
IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.
It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units.
Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises.
The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.
Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk.
Russian officials continue efforts to increase recruitment for the "BARS-Bryansk" volunteer territorial defense detachment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2025

US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12. Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in Ukraine with Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will "immediately" begin negotiations.[1] Trump added that he planned to "inform [Zelensky] of the conversation" after his call with Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the root causes" of the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement could be achieved through peaceful negotiations."[2] Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[3] Trump confirmed his phone call with Zelensky and stated that they discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference.[4] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve peace, readiness to work together, and Ukraine's technological capabilities — including drones.[5] Zelensky stated that Trump shared the details of his conversation with Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral meetings.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.[6] Medvedev stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian territory, and Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's statements further support ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only comply with a peace agreement that fulfills all of Putin's maximalist demands in Ukraine.[7]

Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The DDIS published a declassified intelligence assessment on February 11 detailing the growing Russian threat to Denmark and NATO members.[8] The intelligence assessment notes that Russia is rebuilding its military to fight NATO on an equal footing, aided by financial and material support from the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran. The intelligence assessment states that Russia's willingness to risk war with NATO may increase if European countries do not simultaneously build up their military capabilities in response to Russian capacity building efforts. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported on February 12 that Europe spent $457 billion on defense in 2024, while Russia by itself spent $462 billion on defense in last year.[9] The DDIS intelligence assessment notes that Russia has not yet decided to launch a full-scale war against NATO but is expanding its military capabilities to maintain that option.[10] Russia is currently avoiding actions that could trigger NATO's Article 5 — the commitment to mutual self-defense — but may take greater risks if it perceives a shift in the balance of power in its favor. The DDIS assessment states that if Russia deems NATO weakened either militarily or politically it could be more willing to attack a European NATO member, particularly if Russia doubts US military support to Europe. The intelligence assessment notably warns that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia will free up significant Russian military resources for their involvement in another future conventional conflict — consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment. The DDIS assessment outlines a timeline for Russia's growing military threat in the event of an end of hostilities in Ukraine: Russia could wage a local war against a neighboring state other than Ukraine within six months; Russia could credibly threaten NATO countries in the Baltic region in two years; and Russia could be prepared for a large-scale war in Europe, assuming NATO does not rearm at the same pace as Russia, in five years. ISW previously assessed that Russia's efforts to restructure the Russian military, revive the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, and create long-term mechanisms to militarize and radicalize Russian society against Western ideals and values indicate that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO.[11]

Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike mainly targeting Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of February 11 and 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[12] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian missiles targeted Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six missiles and 71 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported on February 12 that Russian missiles damaged buildings in the Obolonskyi, Svyatoshynskyi, Darnytskyi, and Holosiivskyi raions of Kyiv City and Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast, and caused five casualties.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 12 that Russian ballistic missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure and killed at least one person in Kyiv City.[14] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 12 that a Russian missile struck central Kryvyi Rih and damaged civilian infrastructure.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat emphasized that Ukraine needs US-provided Patriot air defense missile systems to counter ballistic missile strikes.[16]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[17] The Ukrainian MoD officially launched the program on February 11 and noted that the program offers 18- to 24-year-olds the ability to join the military under a one-year contract and the option to either reenlist after one year or return to civilian life. The Ukrainian MoD will pay volunteers 200,000 UAH ($4,700) upon signing a one-year contract and an additional 800,000 UAH ($19,120) during their service in addition to a monthly salary of 120,000 UAH ($2,870). Volunteers will receive three months of training before deploying to the frontline. The Ukrainian government will subsidize future mortgages, education, and medical care for volunteers and will permit volunteers to travel abroad after their one year of service. The program also exempts volunteers from mobilization for 12 months after their one-year contract ends. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the "Contract 18-24" program is part of Ukraine's ongoing efforts to create a professional military. Ukrainian MoD Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated that the MoD will pay one million UAH (about $23,900) to any Ukrainian servicemembers who were under the age of 25 when they signed a voluntary military service contract.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Putin affirmed Russia's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity and emphasized the need for a dialogue among political and ethno-religious groups within Syria. Putin pledged continued socio-economic aid to, and economic cooperation with Syria, and Putin and al Shara discussed recent negotiations between the interim Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[19] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government on Russian military basing rights at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus, however.[20] Russia likely continues to engage with the interim Syrian government in an effort to secure its presence at these bases.

The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).[21] Several Armenian civic organizations initiated the bill via a petition that garnered enough support (at least 50,000 signatures) for parliamentary consideration.[22] The legislation calls on Armenian authorities to launch EU accession talks in accordance with the will of the Armenian people.[23] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged Armenia’s “sovereign right” to pursue EU membership but urged Armenians to consider whether the EU shares this goal.[24] Peskov also emphasized the "benefits" Armenia gains as a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[25] Russian officials and information space commentators previously claimed that Armenia’s move toward EU membership signaled its withdrawal from the EAEU.[26] Armenia continues to strengthen its ties with the EU and the broader West amid escalating tensions with Russia and concerns that Russia is an unreliable security partner to Armenia.

Key Takeaways:

US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.
Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security. Zelensky stated during an interview with UK outlet The Guardian on February 11 that Europe will not be able to completely meet Ukraine's military needs and provide adequate security guarantees without US involvement.[1] Zelensky called for the West to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air-defense systems and noted that the United States has an irreplaceable role in supplying these systems to Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Ukraine's allies can help rebuild and restore Ukraine alongside Ukrainian companies and that Ukraine is prepared to discuss such plans in detail. Zelensky stated that he will provide US President Donald Trump during their next meeting with a more detailed plan for how the United States can be involved in Ukraine's reconstruction and the joint extraction of natural resources. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has Europe's largest uranium and titanium reserves and suggested that the West should not let these resources fall under Russia's control. Zelensky told Reuters on February 7 that he floated the idea of giving allies the opportunity to invest in critical mineral extraction during closed meetings in Fall 2024.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is offering its partners a "mutually beneficial partnership" to jointly develop Ukrainian resources and is not proposing "giving away" Ukraine's resources. Zelensky stated that the United States will receive prioritized access to this opportunity and that the United States and Ukraine are considering storing US liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Ukraine's underground gas storage sites.

Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.[3] The milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.

The Russian military appears increasingly anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations with Russia.[4] Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian territory.

Russian forces continued to test new strike tactics and packages in a series of missile and drone strikes targeting energy infrastructure in Ukraine on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 19 sea-, air-, and land-based missiles against a gas production facility in Poltava Oblast and 124 Shahed and decoy drones against Ukraine from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 Shahed and other drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts and that 67 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that strikes damaged infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts and facilities at a Naftogaz gas production plant in Poltava Oblast.[6] Russian forces notably launched all the missiles in this strike package against a single target. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes forced Ukrainian energy operators to restrict electricity.[7] Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi stated that that Russian forces first launched Shahed drones, then launched cruise and ballistic missiles - including Kalibr cruise missiles - at a single target in order to complicate Ukrainian air defenses' abilities to intercept all incoming projectiles.[8] Khrapchynskyi stated that Russian forces recently began reducing their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles, which are launched from Tu-22 (Backfire) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic aircraft and are increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles launched from tactical Sukhoi aircraft. The Russians presumably prefer not to risk their strategic bombers in such strikes. Khrapchynskyi also stated that Russian forces are adapting their strike tactics following the provision of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and are prioritizing striking frontline and border areas where Ukrainian forces are less likely to operate F-16s.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and the Ukrainian military struck the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City causing a fire.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Saratov Oil Refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and over 20 types of petroleum products and provides fuel to the Russian military. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated that a drone strike caused a fire at an industrial plant in Saratov Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in November 2024 and January 2025.[11] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied that Ukrainian forces also struck Engels Air Base, and Russian sources published footage purportedly showing Russian air defense operating in the area.[12]

The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11. Russian Duma deputies submitted the proposal to remove Gurulev from the Defense Committee and transfer him to the Regional Policy and Local Government Committee on February 7, and Gurulev expressed support for this move but did not claim responsibility for the initiative.[13] Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported on February 7 that some of its sources stated that Gurulev's removal is due to his controversial statements that reflect badly on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14] Gurulev has made statements that include proposing to introduce a tax on childless Russians and notably leaked the audio message of former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (SMD) Major General Ivan Popov in July 2023 in which Popov claimed that the Russian command dismissed him for expressing grievances over the lack of support for Russian forces, resulting in an ongoing criminal case against Popov.[15]

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false-flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on February 11 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with assistance from unspecified Western countries intend to blow up a foreign vessel in the Baltic Sea to prompt NATO to block Russia's access to the Baltic Sea and start a direct armed conflict between Russia and NATO.[16] The SVR claimed that unspecified European intelligence services and Ukraine's GUR also plan to assassinate Russian opposition figures living abroad and blame Russia for the assassinations to undermine future peace negotiations. Russia's SVR has previously accused Ukraine and other Western states of planning false flag attacks to discredit Ukraine and drive a wedge in Western unity behind Ukraine, particularly at critical moments in Western discussions regarding support for Ukraine and a possible peace plan.[17]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security.
Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory.
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.
The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.
The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.
Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries due to regional budget deficits.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2025

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian positions.[1] Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only the first stage of the Drone Line project.[2] This project likely formalizes and provides additional support to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.

Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the Russian military bureaucracy.[3] The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.[5]

Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City.[6] Kovalenko noted that the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current air defense capabilities are unknown.[7] Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near Krasnodar City.[8] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building.[9] Kondratyev claimed that Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence.[10] Krasnodar City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.[11]

Russian authorities reportedly authorized systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on February 10 that accounts from two former Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) prison guards and a prison medical professional, official documents, interviews with Ukrainian POWs, and a person who has helped the Russian prison officials defect show that Russian authorities have instructed Russian prison authorities to engage in widespread torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons since March 2022.[12] The WSJ stated that Major General Igor Potapenko, the head of the FSIN in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, told elite prison "special forces" in March 2022 to "be cruel" to Ukrainian POWs and that there would be no restrictions on violence against the POWs. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty assessed that these "special forces" were likely the FSIN's special forces — as opposed to the Russian Main Directorate [GRU] Spetsnaz forces.[13]) The WSJ reported that other prison authorities across Russia received similar instructions in the first weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[14] One of the former prison guards stated that they believed they had permission from their leadership to "push their mistreatment of Ukrainians to a new level." Russian forces have increasingly executed Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield, and ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[15] Reports that Russian authorities authorized the torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons as early as March 2022 also demonstrate the degree to which Russian authorities are complicit in these war crimes. Russian authorities notably appointed Potapenko as Vice Governor of St. Petersburg for Security and Migration Policy in 2024.[16] Russian authorities' complicity in these crimes and the promotion of war crime perpetrators to high-level positions within the Russian government further demonstrate the atrocities that Russian occupation inflicts on the Ukrainian people.

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving to Russia to join either the Russian work force or the Russian military. Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora claimed that North Korea and Russia are increasing educational cooperation and that professors from North Korean universities will travel to Moscow, Kazan, Novosibirsk, and Vladivostok cities "for a long period of time" to teach Korean in Russian universities and that Russian universities are preparing three-month internships for North Korean students.[17] Matsegora's statement follows South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) report on February 9 that North Koreans are increasingly entering Russia on student visas to take construction jobs.[18] UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, which Russia voted for in 2017, prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019.[19] Matsegora's statement that North Korean professors are coming to Russia for work would likely violate UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia vetoed in March 2024 an annual UNSC resolution extending a monitoring panel tracking adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea.[20]

A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment. Matsegora claimed that Russia has sent "hundreds" of wounded soldiers who fought against Ukraine to North Korea for rehabilitation and medical care and that North Korea refused Russia's offer of financial compensation for the medical care, food, and other expenses related to the Russians' stay in North Korea.[21] The Russian military command has reportedly been sending wounded personnel back into assault groups without treatment, demonstrating a general disregard for soldiers' health in the Russian military and calling into question official Russian claims to be sending Russian soldiers abroad for treatment, particularly to North Korea.[22] The arrival of combat experienced Russian soldiers, particularly if they include officers or non-commissioned officers, to North Korea may allow the Russian military to work with North Korean forces and disseminate lessons from the war in Ukraine while ostensibly recuperating.

The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated on February 10 that Transnistria rejected 60 million euros (about $61.8 million) in EU aid to support continued gas deliveries to the breakaway republic, refusing to accept the aid's condition that Tiraspol gradually increase tariffs for consumers.[23] Recean outlined the scheme through which Transnistria will receive gas from the European market starting February 13. MET Gas and Energy Marketing, a Hungarian natural gas trader on the European market, signed a contract with Moldovagaz to transport gas for Transnistria to the Moldovan border; Dubai-based JNX General Trading LLC will pay for the gas; Moldovagaz and Tiraspoltransgaz reached an agreement to transit the gas through Moldova to Transnistria; and Transnistria will pay the transit costs in advance. Recean noted that Moldovan authorities have vetted both companies and did not find any violations of international or Moldovan law. Transnistria will reportedly undertake measures to demonstrate its "openness" in return, including releasing political prisoners, continuing to air Moldovan public television, and removing 11 checkpoints that Tiraspol installed in 2022. Recean stated that Tiraspol refused the EU offer of aid under pressure from Moscow, and a senior Moldovan government official told Politico that Russia blocked the EU-proposed solution.[24] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky claimed on February 10 that Russian "credit and functional support" made the Hungarian supply scheme possible and thanked the Russian Ministry of Energy for its assistance.[25] Russia's allocation of funds for Transnistria's purchase of European gas demonstrates that influence over Transnistria remains a priority for the Kremlin, despite Russia's ongoing economic strains at home.[26] Russia's role in financing the gas purchases indicate that Russia will continue to be the sole economic backer of the breakaway republic, despite select Transnistrian authorities' Western leaning political and economic interests.[27]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.
Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.
Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
Russian authorities reportedly authorized systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.
The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving to Russia to join either the Russian work force or the Russian military.
A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment.
The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.
Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2025

Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs.[1] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the highest number since 2019.[2] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.[3]

Russia has been suffering from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[4] The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example.[5] North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December 2024.[6]) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.

The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.[7] The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean security.[8] Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training. German outlet Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on February 8, citing a classified internal German report, that the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating possible espionage connected to six drone sightings near the Schwesing Airbase, where Ukrainian forces have trained to operate Patriot air defense systems, from January 9 to 29, 2025.[9] Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German forces attempted to jam or down the drones, including with HP-47 jammers, RADIS drone detection systems, and Wingman counter-drone systems, but that German forces failed to down the drones or locate the operators in all six instances. Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German authorities described the drones as "specialized objects" with modifications and are likely not commercially available. Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that authorities suspect that the operators launched the drones from ships in the North or Baltic seas and that the operators could be connected to Russia. A Bundeswehr spokesperson reportedly told Süddeutsche Zeitung that the German military has observed an increase in drones flying over German military facilities in an unspecified timeframe.

Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states. Russia has been developing and improving its drone capabilities, including drone resistance to electronic warfare (EW) and Russia's own EW capabilities, in its ongoing war against Ukraine. NATO and its member states have increasingly warned of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members throughout 2024.[10] Reports that a NATO member state is struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine to innovate new technologies.

Key Takeaways:

Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.
The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2025

Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.[i] NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the US and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea, including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause.[ii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[iii] South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops.[iv] ISW assesses that North Korea is using the war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities.[v] Reuters reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through the North Korea-Russia alliance.[vi]

Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military cooperations with North Korea.[vii] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions.[viii] ISW also cannot verify the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war.[ix] Such Russian plans suggest that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader conflict with NATO.[x] Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as a part of a larger confrontation with the West.[xi]

The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment (possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[xii] ISW has not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February 8, however.[xiii] A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.[xiv]

The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU). Western sources reported on February 7 and 8 that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania disconnected from the centralized Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (BRELL) energy network on February 8 as part of a long-planned effort to integrate more closely with the EU and strengthen regional security.[xv] The three countries are temporarily operating independently from the grid and, pending final tests, will synchronize with the EU’s grid on February 9. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas wrote on X (formerly Twitter) on February 7 that this move ensures Russia can no longer use energy as a “tool of blackmail”- something Russia has repeatedly leveraged against countries reliant on Russian energy, including Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine.[xvi] Russia’s Ministry of Energy reported on February 8 that Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, located on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, has also transitioned to autonomous power generation as a result of the Baltic states' decision.[xvii] Kaliningrad Oblast possesses three gas-fueled and one coal-fired power plant and can reportedly generate a total capacity of 1.88 gigawatts, which the Russian Ministry of Energy claimed is more than twice Kaliningrad's peak energy consumption.[xviii] It is unclear if Kaliningrad’s transition to autonomous power generation will impact daily life or Russian military activity in the region.

Key Takeaways:

Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.
Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.
The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2025

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks.[1] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka).[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7.[3] Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement.[4] ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.[5]

Russian sources provided additional information about the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), and drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area.[6] Russian milbloggers widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen drone operators.[7] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[8]

The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the state of the Russian economy.[9] Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer and electronic equipment sectors.

Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52 percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025. Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize, however. (Several studies indicate that Russia’s inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.[10]) Mishustin highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.

Mishustin noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy complex is adapting and finding new markets.

Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has "successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia. Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to finance its war effort over the last three years.[11] The liquidity portion of Russia’s National Welfare fund may run out by Fall 2025.[12]

Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine’s First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated on February 7 that Ukraine outperforms Russia in first-person view (FPV) drone production and that drone development is expanding rapidly in Ukraine.[13] Havrylyuk stated that Ukraine has introduced over 1,300 new weapon models, most of which are drones and drone munitions, since February 2022 and that Ukrainian officials approved more than 250 new drone models for use by Ukrainian forces in 2024 alone. Havrylyuk stated that while drones have become a crucial substitute for long-range missiles, Ukrainian forces require continued innovation to counter Russian defenses and stressed that international military assistance is critical for Ukraine, particularly for weapons where Ukrainian domestic production falls short.

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on February 7 that Ukrainian drone strikes significantly disrupt Russian operations in this direction.[14] The battalion commander noted that Ukrainian drone operators hold some areas of their defense lines in the Pokrovsk direction almost completely independent from infantry support. The commander stated that growing drone supplies have helped sustain Ukraine’s defenses despite Russian forces outnumbering Ukrainians ten-to-one in the Pokrovsk direction. The commander highlighted that Ukrainian forces are reportedly inflicting a seven-to-one casualty ratio on Russian troops in the area but need more personnel to fully stop Russian advances in that direction.

ISW previously noted that Ukrainian drone operations have been key in defending against Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and throughout the frontline, although Ukraine must address its morale, force generation, and training issues to completely stall the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast.[15]

Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[16] NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 7 Iran Update. Qasra is very likely referencing some form of economic relief to help improve Syria’s dire economic situation. The interim Syrian government has lobbied for economic relief from various sources since the fall of the Assad regime.[17] Cooperation with Russia could hinder European Union (EU) plans to lift sanctions on Syria, which are contingent on the new Syrian government pursuing a peaceful political future without extremism or involvement from Russia and Iran.[18] An unspecified Russian source told Bloomberg on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.”[19] Russia has continued to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid ongoing negotiations with the interim Syrian government.[20]\

Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan. Azerbaijani outlet APA News, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported on February 5 that Azerbaijan is preparing to take legal action against Russia in an international court, citing recent clear evidence identifying unspecified Russian actors responsible for the crash and Russia's failure to take responsibility for the crash.[21] Azerbaijan’s intent to sue follows the Azerbaijani Ministry of Digital Development and Transport's February 4 briefing of the initial investigation results attributing the AZAL crash to unspecified "foreign objects."[22]

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev previously accused Russia of attempting to cover up the incident, calling the Kremlin’s response “surprising, regrettable, and infuriating.”[23] Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to Aliyev on December 28 that the crash occurred in Russian airspace but stopped short of admitting Russia’s fault in the crash and taking action against those responsible – demands Aliyev set forth following the crash.[24] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on February 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to make another statement regarding the AZAL plane crash.[25]

Azerbaijani outlet Report.az noted on February 6 that Azerbaijani officials have also formally notified the Kremlin of the closure of the local branch of the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), a Russian cultural diplomacy agency, citing national security concerns and a move away from “external interference.”[26] Russia currently has over 80 Rossotrudnichestvo branches concentrated in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[27] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use the branches to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[28]

Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Moysiuk earlier on February 7 from his previous role as Special Envoy for the Implementation of International Security Assurances and Development of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.[30] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Moysiuk will focus on developing Ukraine's Defense Forces, particularly regarding mobilization processes and military training, and Churkin will lead the charge on defense innovations and technological development for Ukraine's military.[31]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.
The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.
Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.
Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.
Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan
Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.
Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2025

Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka (just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack.[2] Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[3] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim.[4] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims.[5] ISW has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.[6]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye (northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions that complicated Russian drone operations in the area.[8] Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient.[9] Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending in Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024. Putin stated during a meeting with acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 106th VDV Division, 76th VDV Division, and other Russian forces are still operating in Kursk Oblast and will be rewarded for their service in the future.[11] Putin's statement underlines the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned elements of these relatively elite formations in Kursk Oblast for the last six months, depriving Russia of the opportunity to redeploy these forces to higher priority areas of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[12] ISW recently noted that the Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops, including 11,000 North Koreans and elements of most of Russia's elite VDV and naval infantry formations, to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[13] Putin has yet to prioritize expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast over continuing his gradual advances in Donetsk Oblast and continues to drag out the liberation of Kursk's border areas, despite domestic discontent.

Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) commemorated the milestone on February 6 by acknowledging that small SSO units infiltrated Russia's rear in Kursk Oblast as early as June 2024 — two months before the main incursion began in August 2024.[14] The SSO forces advanced behind Russian lines in Kursk Oblast to prepare for the Ukrainian incursion, conducting reconnaissance and targeted strikes to dismantle key elements of Russia's border defenses. The SSO noted that Ukrainian forces systematically destroyed Russian air defense and ammunition depots, limiting Russia's ability to respond to the Ukrainian incursion. The SSO also provided a detailed account of the operation and the technological adaptations the Ukrainian forces employed during the Kursk incursion. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also awarded honors to the Ukrainian personnel involved in the Kursk incursion for the anniversary, offering the first official Ukrainian statement regarding a comprehensive composition of Ukraine's force deployment in Kursk Oblast.[15] Zelensky reiterated that the incursion aimed to prevent a new Russian offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Zelensky noted that the Kursk incursion reinforced his "peace through strength" principle, provided Ukraine with a significant replenishment of POW "exchange funds," and forced Russia to divert elite military units to Kursk Oblast — impairing Russian operations elsewhere along the front. Ukrainian officials have previously noted that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled several Russian plans to attack northern Ukraine and complicated Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations in northern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16]

A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) released results on February 6 of a survey of 1,600 Russians conducted from January 28 to February 2, showing that 67 percent of the people polled support Russia’s war in Ukraine and that 65 percent believe that the war is "going well" for Russia.[17] VCIOM’s Political Research Director Mikhail Mamonov stated that the public demands a swift, favorable conclusion to the war and supports measures that advance these goals while resenting Russian setbacks like the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast incursion, slow territorial gains, and economic hardship. VCIOM’s findings likely reflect Kremlin views and narratives and likely inflate the level of public support for the war, however. These results come amid rising casualties, Russian command controversies, and immense economic strain on the Russian economy during the war.[18] Successful renewed Ukrainian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast may also negatively impact the Russian public’s view of the war in the coming weeks.

North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities. Reuters, citing two Ukrainian military-affiliated sources, reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have shown significantly improved accuracy.[19] These North Korean missiles, previously accurate within 1 to 3 kilometers, can now strike within 50 to 100 meters of their intended targets. One Ukrainian source noted that Russia has launched over 20 North Korean missiles in recent weeks, all demonstrating enhanced precision. Reuters’ sources speculated that North Korea may have upgraded the navigation systems of its missiles, incorporated new steering mechanisms, or received improved targeting data and guidance components from Russia, although the exact modifications remain unclear. The North Korean missiles not only serve to bolster Russia’s arsenal but also likely allow North Korea to refine its capabilities for possible future military operations elsewhere. Other Russian allies, such as Iran, likely can improve their strike systems’ performance by leveraging Russia’s lessons learned from operations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base, causing an explosion and resulting in a fire at the facility.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base to store, prepare, and launch Shahed drones against Ukraine and to conduct maintenance for aircraft operating over occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of the explosion at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base.[21]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on February 6 that France transferred an unspecified number of French Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets to Ukraine — the first batch of Mirage jets Ukraine has received.[22] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6, 2024 that France would provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train several pilots to operate the jets.[23] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on February 6 that the Netherlands recently delivered an unspecified number of US-made F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.[24]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.[25] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 6 that Bakanov's appointment is part of a regular personnel rotation.[26] Several Russian milbloggers characterized the reshuffling, however, as a result of Kremlin officials' dissatisfaction with Roscosmos's underperformance under Borisov's leadership, including Borisov's inability to accelerate the development of a full-fledged portable satellite communications system for the Russian military by 2026.[27] A Russian insider source noted that Borisov served as Deputy Minister of Defense under former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu from 2018-2022 and was one of the last remaining nodes of Shoigu's patronal network that controlled the Russian Ministry of Defense prior to widespread arrests of Ministry of Defense officials in Summer 2024.[28] Bakanov previously served as the head of Russia's Gonets communication satellite program from 2011-2019.[29] Gonets is a possible civilian analogue to Western Starlink terminals.[30]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.
Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion.
A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.
North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.
Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
Russian authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory.[1] Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations. Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.[2]

Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[4] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[5]

Prominent Kremlin-linked figures continue to clearly articulate Russia's disinterest in negotiations while Putin propagates the information operation accusing Ukraine of being the unwilling party. Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk, a close personal ally of Putin and father of Putin's goddaughter, reinforced the Kremlin's efforts to delegitimize Ukrainian statehood in a February 4 article, arguing that Russia must reclaim its so-called "historical lands."[6] Medvedchuk published an accompanying map depicting all Ukrainian territory east of Lviv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts as part of "historical Russia." Medvedchuk claimed that Western support for Ukraine aims solely to collapse Russia from within and labeled Ukrainians as "modern barbarians" whom Russia must save through integration into the Russian state. Medvedchuk denied Ukraine's historical legitimacy, insisting that modern Ukraine is inherently Russian - a narrative consistently promoted by Kremlin officials and the Russian information space to justify Russia's war and occupation of Ukraine. Medvedchuk's rhetoric as a member of the Russian elite with extensive ties to Putin are representative of the Kremlin's systemic refusal to act in good faith regarding negotiations with Ukraine and the West and the Kremlin's core unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine - a state and government it considers illegitimate.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Zelensky added that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were KIA.[8] Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[9] Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to 70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Albashneft LLC oil depot in Novominskaya, Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire at the facility.[10] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of fire at the Albashneft oil depot and noted that the depot supplies straight-run gasoline (crude oil distillate), diesel fuel, and fuel oil to the Russian military.[11] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows a fire at the Albashneft oil depot.[12] Krasnodar Krai Governor Venyamin Kondratyev claimed on February 5 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil tank near Novominskaya.[13]

The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 5 revoking Russian military district's "interservice status" and removing naval and Aerospace Forces (VKS) units from subordination to Russian military districts.[14] The decree replaces the "joint strategic command" of each military district with a "directorate" that presumably will exclusively oversee ground forces and appears to disaggregate naval and VKS assets back to the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy and VKS command, respectively. The decree states that military districts will also be involved in helping Russian citizens enter the "mobilization manpower reserve" of the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed reorganizing military districts to optimize the army's command structure in June 2024.[15]

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to re-establish military districts primarily as headquarters for Russian ground forces and disaggregate the peacetime administrative headquarters for Russia’s Navy and Air Force. Joint Russian operational groups will likely continue to be led by a combined-arms operational military command in wartime.[16] Disaggregating administrative control for Russian naval and air forces from the headquarters responsible for administrative control for ground forces would likely free up bureaucratic bottlenecks during peacetime and allow military district commanders to focus on training and preparing Russian ground forces for combat operations. Russia's efforts to refocus military districts on purely overseeing ground force assets could also help simplify and expedite Russia's activation of its ground forces during a future conflict. Russian forces will very likely continue to form and operate in interoperable joint force groupings under unified operational commanders during wartime, including during ongoing combat operations in Ukraine. It is unclear how or if this administrative restructuring will impact Russia's campaign in Ukraine in the long-term. Such a change is unlikely to affect the near-term battlefield situation since many Russian forces operating in Ukraine are currently organized under interservice groupings of forces. This restructuring may help Russian forces reconstitute multiple services more quickly than they otherwise could, as Russian ground, naval, and the air forces may not need to compete over the administrative resources of a single military district.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) announced on February 4 that it will enact a new migration regime that imposes severe restrictions on migrants residing in Russia starting on February 5.[17] The law requires migrants who have committed a criminal offense or are undocumented to register with Russian authorities, regularly share geolocated photos to the MVD, and obtain MVD approval for basic activities including buying property, driving a car, accessing banking services, and traveling outside their region. The law gives the MVD the right to deport migrants who violate these restrictions without a court hearing and penalizes those who provide undocumented migrants with services. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin reported that migrant-related crimes remain a "serious concern" for Russian authorities and the public and claimed that there was an 18 percent increase in court cases against migrants in 2024.[18] Bastrykin's statements reinforce Russian ultra-nationalist narratives that migrants pose a security threat by supposedly violating laws, moving "uncontrollably" within Russia, and committing crimes. The new MVD migration regime and Bastrykin's rhetoric demonstrate that Russian authorities are increasingly prioritizing efforts to appease particularly pro-war, xenophobic Russian ultranationalists and mitigate potential domestic security risks linked to rising anti-migrant sentiment rather than offsetting Russia's labor shortages and ongoing economic struggles, in part, with migrant labor.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on February 5. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on February 5 that Ukraine repatriated 150 Ukrainian POWs and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[19] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that the returned Ukrainian POWs suffer from serious injuries and illnesses.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia also received 150 Russian POWs.[21]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run.
Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.
The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.
Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2025

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.[1] Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident.[2] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with power.[3] Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024.[4] Grossi reported that the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves.[5] Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment, including auto transformers.[6] Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.[7]

Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage."[8] Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse" because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the frontline.[9] Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting new personnel.[10] These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial involuntary reserve call up.

The Russian military may be struggling to recruit enough new military personnel, however. ISW observed reports in late 2024 and January 2025 that the Russian military's monthly recruitment rate is likely equal to or below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one.[11] ISW also observed reports that select Russian federal subjects are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed a draft amendment on February 3 to reclassify some illnesses, diseases, and disorders for conscripts and those signing military service contracts. The Russian MoD proposed reclassifying syphilis, hypertension, central nervous system atrophy disorders, skin diseases, schizophrenia, psychotic disorders, affective disorders, and other health problems as more minor ailments that do not disqualify someone from service.[13] Radio Svoboda, citing the Russian Movement of Conscientious Objectors, reported that the Russian MoD's proposal would make it more difficult for conscripts to obtain military service exemptions for health reasons and would complicate dismissal procedures for mobilized personnel and servicemembers who signed a military service contract.[14]

Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claim that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in an interview with Russian state news wire RIA Novosti published on February 4 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia.[15] Ganchev claimed that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts from Ukrainian shelling. Ganchev called on Russian forces to drive Ukrainian forces "as far west as possible." Ganchev claimed that occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast had a plan in August 2022 to hold a "referendum" on Russia's annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but that the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in early September 2022 prevented the referendum. Ganchev claimed that if it were not for the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Kharkiv Oblast would have become the "fifth oblast to join Russia on September 30." Russian forces currently occupy parts of northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, but Russia has not attempted to illegally annex Kharkiv Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably did not include Kharkiv Oblast in his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even territories that Russian forces do not occupy in these regions.[16]

A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[17] Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[18] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[19] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[20] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[21] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus.[22] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet."[23]

Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria. The Ukrainian Resistance Center posted video evidence showing that it had gained access to the "Mosaik" system, an internal system that Russia reportedly uses to track Russian ship routes and cargo.[24] Data from the "Mosaik" system shows that the Sparta IV traveled between Tartus, Syria, and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in April 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Oboronlogistika logistics company owns the Sparta, Sparta II, and Sparta IV cargo ships.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian vessels stopped traveling between Russia and Syria via the Black Sea in Spring 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian naval drone strikes in the Black Sea.[26] Russian ships instead reportedly started traveling from Russian ports in the Baltic Sea to Syria via the Atlantic Ocean despite the fact that this route is several times longer than the Black Sea route. The appearance of Russian vessels in the Mediterranean Sea on February 4 is consistent with reports that Russian ships are now traveling between Syria and Russia via the Atlantic.

Russia has also reportedly used vessels belonging to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that it gained access to correspondence between an unspecified branch of the Russian Administration of Sea Ports and the Sparta's captain in which Russian authorities asked the Sparta and Sparta II to monitor Latvian patrol ships in the Baltic Sea off the western coast of Latvia in April 2023.[27] NATO notably conducted its Aurora 23 exercise near Sweden in April and May 2024.[28]

Key Takeaways:

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities
Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties.
Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.
A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.
Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.
Russia has also reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2025

Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared to previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February 3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[1] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1 square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670 casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024. The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025, coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024.[2] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024 through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.[3]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd City and the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant near Astrakhan City.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike damaged the primary processing units at the Volgograd refinery and that a fire started at the Astrakhan plant. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Volgograd Oil Refinery is one of the top ten refineries in Russia and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes gas condensate and produces gas and diesel fuel.[5] A source in the SBU told Radio Liberty that the Volgograd Oil Refinery processes almost six percent of all Russian oil and that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant processes 12 billion cubic meters of gas condensate per year.[6] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that an employee at the Astrakhan plant stated that the strike damaged a gas condensate processing plant.[7] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Russian forces repelled a massive Ukrainian drone strike against the oblast overnight and intercepted and neutralized "most" of the drones.[8] Bocharov claimed that falling drone debris caused a fire at an oil refinery and short-term power outages. Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct a drone strike against fuel and energy facilities and that a fire started after a drone fell.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 25 drones over Volgograd Oblast and seven over Astrakhan Oblast.[10] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Lukoil refinery in Volgograd City on the night of January 30 to 31.[11]

Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi stated in an interview with Radio Liberty published on February 3 that Ukrainian forces are working on developing new technologies but are not disclosing them for as long as possible in order to maintain the technological initiative and prevent Russian forces from making their own analogues.[12] Sukharevskyi reported that the Unmanned Systems Forces conducted over 220 strikes against Russian territory in 2024 using over 3,500 weapons. Sukharevskyi noted that Ukrainian forces have struck over 15 "Buk-M3" and "Tor" air defense systems in December 2024 and January 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces stuck a "Buk-M3" 57 kilometers from the frontline in mid-January 2025. Sukharevskyi reported that Ukrainian forces' use of first-person view (FPV) drones to hunt Russian reconnaissance drones has led to a tenfold decrease in Russian reconnaissance drone usage. Sukharevskyi highlighted Ukraine's production of first-person view (FPV) and other drones made entirely of Ukrainian-made components and stated that Ukraine is working to develop a way to counter Russian forces' fiber optic cable FPV drones and to produce its own fiber optic cable drones. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that the Ukrainian military continues to increase the number of unmanned systems in formations and units of the Ground Forces, Airborne Assault Forces, Naval Infantry Corps, and Unmanned Systems Forces.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race to adapt and innovate their strike and anti-drone capabilities and that Ukraine's ability to field technological adaptations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's quantitative materiel advantages.[14]

The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The UN HRMMU reported that it has observed Russian forces execute 79 Ukrainian POWs in 24 separate incidents since late August 2024 and that Russian forces perform many of the executions as Ukrainian soldiers surrender to Russian forces.[15] UN HRRMU Head Danielle Belle reported that the Russian executions "did not arise out of nowhere" as Russian officials have "openly called for the ill treatment and even execution" of Ukrainian POWs, and the UN HRRMU recorded at least three incidents of Russian officials making such calls. The UN HRRMU reported that statements to "give no quarter" are violations of humanitarian law and a war crime, and Belle emphasized that military commanders and political leaders "must issue clear and unambiguous orders to ensure the protection and humane treatment" of all POWs and individuals no longer participating in combat. ISW has previously assessed that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[16] Ukrainian Commissioner for Missing Persons in Special Circumstances Artur Dobroserdov stated on February 3 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating images purportedly showing a beheaded Ukrainian serviceman.[17]

Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."[18] Using corps structures is not entirely new for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been using corps since 2023. Ukraine formed the 9th and 10th army corps and restructured its Reserve Corps to the 11th Army Corps in 2023, and Ukraine is currently forming the 4th Army Corps.[19] Further restructuring to systematically form an echelon between Ukraine’s numerous separate brigades and Ukraine’s various operational groups of forces, and the creation of appropriate command staff headquarters at this new intermediary echelon, would likely improve command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations.

Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014. Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" (Armenian Battalion) Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade) that is currently operating in Kursk Oblast, died on February 3 after an explosive attack at his apartment building in Moscow City.[20] Sargsyan founded the Arbat Battalion, reportedly on instructions from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), in September 2022, and the battalion signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in July 2023.[21] Sargsyan is wanted in Ukraine for organizing violence against protestors in the 2014 pro-Western Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that Sargsyan was a member of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's inner circle.[22] The SBU used explosives to assassinate Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow in December 2024.[23] Ukrainian officials have not commented on Sargsyan's death, and ISW cannot independently confirm the responsible actor.

The far-right Russian paramilitary unit "Rusich" Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group reacted to Sargsyan's assassination, claiming that "the Motherland will lose nothing from one dead bandit" and that Sargsyan and his "ethnic mafia" only caused problems for Russia.[24] "Rusich" Group leader Alexei Milchakov — who is a self-declared Nazi - and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apty Alaudinov notably met in January 2025 following Rusich's repeated criticisms of Akhmat forces.[25] Alaudinov and Milchakov expressed their support for each other and promote a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony. Rusich's response to Sargsyan's death, however, highlights the group's continued xenophobic and ultranationalist sentiments and calls into question the sincerity of Milchakov's reconciliation with Alaudinov.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared to previous months in late 2024.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.
Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects.
The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."
Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the Dnipro direction.
The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2025

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a former boarding school dormitory holding 84 local Russian civilians preparing to evacuate and four Ukrainian police officers.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike wounded four people and killed four.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force warned that Russian sources are attempting to blame Ukraine for the strike.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and senior Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike from Sumy Oblast against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha.[4] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike.[5] Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo reported that Russian state-run TV stations Channel One (Perviy Kanal) and NTV claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha but also reported Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast.[6] ISW is unable to independently verify the details of the strike at this time.

Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Children's Issues Daria Herasymchuk reported on February 2 that Russia has illegally deported at least 20,000 Ukrainian children since 2022 and that Ukraine has repatriated 1,189 children with support from humanitarian organizations and Qatar, South Africa, and the Vatican.[7] Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have killed Ukrainian parents, kidnapped their children, and transported the children to "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea. Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have also separated children from their families in illegal filtration camps. Ukraine's Regional Human Rights Center identified 13 such "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea alone. Russian authorities reportedly use the camps in occupied Crimea to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children before further deporting them to Russia for adoption. Herasymchuk warned that Russian authorities are increasingly attempting to mobilize Ukrainian teenage boys into the Russian military - a violation of the Geneva Convention.[8] ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[9] The United Nation's Genocide Convention Article 2 defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.[10]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine.
Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft; eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems suitable for intercepting such missiles.[2] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[3] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were staying in Odesa City.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia's overnight strikes targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).[5]

A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on February 1 that Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the Black Sea.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones.[7] Another Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces' naval drone capabilities as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea.[8] Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.[9]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.
A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

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March 04, 2025

Ukraine Invasion Updates, February 2025

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