Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on November 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

All available reporting continues to indicate that the stipulations of the reported 28-point Russia-US peace plan amount to Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia's original war demands. Western media outlets and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Honcharenko published on November 20 all 28 points of the reported peace plan.[1] The reported provisions include that:

• Ukraine will withdraw from the remainder of unoccupied Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) and this area will become a "neutral demilitarized buffer zone" internationally-recognized as Russian territory;
• All of Crimea, Donetsk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast will be recognized as de facto Russian territory, including by the United States;
• The conflict will freeze along the current frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts;
• Russia will relinquish the territory it controls outside of occupied Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts;
• Ukraine's military will be capped at a maximum of 600,000 personnel;
• Ukraine must enshrine in its constitution that it will not seek NATO membership, and NATO agrees to include statute provisions that it will not admit Ukraine any time in the future;
• It is “expected” that NATO will not further expand;
• NATO will not deploy troops to Ukraine;
• Ukraine will receive "reliable" security guarantees, including from the United States, for which the United States will receive unspecified compensation;
• The US guarantee holds that a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine would provoke a coordinated military response, reimpose all international sanctions against Russia, and revoke all other benefits to Russia listed in the proposal;
• The US security guarantee will be revoked if Ukraine invades Russia or launches missiles at Moscow or St. Petersburg;
• Ukraine must reject and prohibit "all Nazi ideologies" and hold elections within 100 days of codifying the agreement;
• Ukraine will receive funds and assistance from the United States, proceeds from frozen Russian assets, and the international community for reconstruction and energy infrastructure modernization.

ISW is unable to confirm the exact provisions of the reported peace plan at the time of this writing. A US official told PBS Newshour and Axios that the White House views the plan as a "live" or "working" document that can change based on further discussions.[2] Many of the points from the reported peace plan text cohere with prior Western reporting of the peace plan from November 19 and 20.[3] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed on November 20 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have been working to develop a plan since roughly mid-October 2025 and that they have engaged both Russia and Ukraine "equally."[4] Key Russian officials continue to deny the reported peace plan.[5]

There are no provisions in the reported peace plan in which Russia makes any concessions, and ISW continues to assess that accepting Russian demands would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. Many of the provisions in the full text of the reported plan align with the Kremlin's original 2022 Istanbul demands, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, even though the battlefield situation has changed markedly in the years since and has forced Russia to resort to grinding, foot-pace offensives to make marginal tactical advances.[6] The Kremlin has continuously reiterated that it intends to achieve all of its war goals either diplomatically or militarily, setting informational conditions to justify renewed aggression against Ukraine at a later date.[7] Russian officials have also set informational conditions to justify the aggression for the occupation of Ukraine beyond the five regions it has illegally annexed.[8] This reported plan would capitulate to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory, which is predicated on the assumption that Russia's military and economy can outlast Western support to Ukraine, and would reinforce the Kremlin's belief that the Kremlin can achieve its maximalist objectives against Ukraine and elsewhere with minimal international consequences.[9] Russia would therefore be likely to launch renewed aggression against Ukraine with a blooded, rested, and reconstituted military at a time of its choosing on battle lines in Ukraine that would heavily favor Russia.[10] A Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would force Ukraine to withdraw to lines that would largely be indefensible against renewed Russian aggression from positions in the oblast, and would also provide Russia with easy access to seize Ukraine's Fortress Belt – Ukraine's key defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that is a critical logistics and defense industrial hub – if left undefended in a demilitarized buffer zone.[11] Russian forces would likely be able to launch renewed pushes into southern Kharkiv Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts from the proposed ”frozen” frontline. ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military assistance and weapon sales to Ukraine, in concert with strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, can enable Ukraine to inflict more severe battlefield losses on Russia and therefore challenge Putin’s theory of victory.[12] The reported peace plan, by contrast, cedes all Western and Ukrainian leverage to Russia.

Russian officials continue to react to the reported 28-point peace plan by reiterating their commitment to Russia's original war aims and blaming Ukraine for Russia's own unwillingness to compromise.[13] Senior Russian officials reiterated on November 19 and 20 the Kremlin’s demand that an end to the war address its alleged “root causes” of the war, which the Kremlin has long used as shorthand for its original war justifications, and amplified the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is committed to negotiations but deflected blame onto Ukraine and the West for the stall in peace negotiations as a result of Russia's unwillingness to make concessions to end the war.[15] Some Russian officials expressed doubt about or rejected components of the reported peace deal despite the significant benefits it would afford Russia. Some Western media outlets reported that the plan holds that Russia would make lend-lease payments to Ukraine for its occupation of Donbas, a provision that Russian State Duma Committee on Economic Policy Deputy Chairperson Artem Kiryanov explicitly rejected as “completely unacceptable” and “unworthy” of serious discussion.[16] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that discussions on the reported 28-point plan may “take some time" and deflected blame from Russia’s continued intransigence in negotiations to discredit the Ukrainian government and Europe.[17]

The Kremlin continues to use a combination of economic incentives and nuclear saber-rattling to extract concessions from the United States to normalize US-Russian relations without making reciprocal concessions to end the war. The reported peace proposal also stipulates that the United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation treaties including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), that Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy including multi-staged sanction relief and a bilateral US-Russian long-term economic cooperation agreements, and that about 50 percent of the profits from frozen Russian assets will be invested in a joint US-Russian investment vehicle.[18] The Kremlin has repeatedly used economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[19] These concessions would give away leverage that is crucial to US President Donald Trump’s stated objective of achieving an enduring, just, and mutually beneficial peace in Ukraine.

Russian forces operating in the Hulyaipole direction continue to employ their new offensive template that relies on a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults to advance.[20] The situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains serious as Russian forces continue efforts to isolate Hulyaipole from the north and advance on the town from the northeast and east.[21] Geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Russian forces likely recently seized Vesele (east of Hulyaipole).[22] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Vesele.[23] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction (north of Hulyaipole) reported on November 20 that Russian forces exploit foliage, terrain features such as ravines and lowlands, and fog to avoid Ukrainian drone detection.[24] A servicemember of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) acknowledged on November 20 that Russian forces exploited fog during the claimed seizure of Hai (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), which the Russian MoD claimed to have seized as of November 17.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are exploiting the cover of fog that inhibits Ukrainian drone operations to launch attacks.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• All available reporting continues to indicate that the stipulations of the reported 28-point Russia-US peace plan amount to Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia's original war demands.
• There are no provisions in the reported peace plan in which Russia makes any concessions, and ISW continues to assess that accepting Russian demands would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
• Russian officials continue to react to the reported 28-point peace plan by reiterating their commitment to Russia's original war aims and blaming Ukraine for Russia's own unwillingness to compromise.
• The Kremlin continues to use a combination of economic incentives and nuclear saber-rattling to extract concessions from the United States to normalize US-Russian relations without making reciprocal concessions to end the war.
• Russian forces operating in the Hulyaipole direction continue to employ their new offensive template that relies on a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults to advance
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City overnight, causing fires.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the refinery has a refining capacity of 17.1 million tons per year and produces A-92/95/98/100 gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, liquefied gases, and other oil refining products, including 840,000 tons of aviation kerosene per year for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). Footage posted on November 20 shows explosions and fires, reportedly at the refinery.[28] Ukrainian forces most recently struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of November 14 to 15.[29] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that USF also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on November 19-20 and noted that the refinery processes 6 million tons of oil per year and is one of the largest employers in Krasnodar Krai.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on November 20.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Varachyne (all north of Sumy City).[32]

A Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) unit published footage on November 19 and reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Cherny Glaz electronic warfare (EW) system in Kursk Oblast.[33]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are regrouping in Bolshoye Soldatskoye, Kursk Oblast, and that its assault units are at 90 percent strength but are of low quality.[34]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), Prizraka Group, and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment in Sumy Oblast.[35]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), into northwestern Vilcha, and into northern Lyman (both south of Vovchansk).[36]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near and within Vovchansk and near Synelnykove, Lyman, and Vilcha on November 19 and 20.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]), and the Chechen Kurchaloyevsky Raion Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) department are reportedly fighting in Vovchansk.[38] Elements of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating within Synelnykove and between Synelnykove and Vilcha (southeast of Synelnykove).[39] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[40] FPV drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Ambarne, and Khatnie; east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne; and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kamyanka, Dvorichanske, and toward Kolodyazne on November 19 and 20.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Milove-Khatnie area.[43]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction published footage on November 20 of Ukrainian mechanized units clearing Dvorichanske.[44] The brigade reported that Russian forces had entered Dvorichanske under the cover of fog on a previous unspecified date and that Ukrainian forces expelled Russian forces from the settlement. ISW assessed that Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission into Dvorichanske on November 17.[45]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Khatnie.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka and toward Novoosynove on November 19 and 20.[47] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Kutkivka, Holubivka (north of Kupyansk), Blahodativka (west of Kupyansk), and Osynovo (south of Kupyansk).[48]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 20 that Ukrainian forces cut off Russian infiltration routes into Kupyansk from the north and cleared the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk.[49] The commander stated that Russian attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie aim to support Russian forces’ ability to use heavy equipment in attacks on Kupyansk as Russian forces have been unable to transport heavy equipment across the Oskil River. The commander noted that Russian forces are attempting to seize Ukrainian positions on the east (left) bank of Kupyansk and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication onto the east bank with KAB guided glide bomb strikes.

Russian milbloggers complained on November 19 and 20 that the situation on the ground in Kupyansk is very different from how Russian officials and media have portrayed it.[50] The milbloggers stated that there is no footage objectively demonstrating that Russian forces still maintain positions in the settlement and noted that false claims of advance are a persistent problem in the Kupyansk direction. One of the milbloggers claimed that communication from the area of responsibility of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) within Kupyansk is inconsistent, one-sided, and unconfirmed.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on November 20 that Russian forces advanced east of and within eastern Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[53]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and toward Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Novoyehorivka on November 19 and 20.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southeastern Lyman during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Lyman and in central and eastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[56]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Drobysheve, Shandryholove, and Novoselivka and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 19 and 20.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Yampil is a contested ”gray zone.”[58]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 20 that the Russian military command deploys drone operators from line units close to Russian infantry positions only a few hundred meters or sometimes several kilometers from the frontline.[59] The NCO reported that Russian military command provides more expensive and longer-range drones to specialized drone units that the Russian military command views as less expendable, which operate from a greater distance behind the frontline. The NCO noted that Russian forces recently deployed artillery to the right (west) bank of the Chornyi Zherebets River under the cover of poor weather conditions, allowing Russian forces to strike more deeply into the Ukrainian rear. The NCO added that Russian forces have recently intensified artillery strikes in that direction, but do not possess the same quantity of artillery shells as in previous years.

A Ukrainian journalist reported on November 20 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against an evacuation vehicle near Lyman, injuring two civilians.[60]

A Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 19 that its drone operators destroyed a Russian ammunition dump and vehicle park at unspecified locations in the Lyman direction.[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and southeastern Siversk; to the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River north of Platonivka (northwest of Siversk); and near Dronivka (northwest of Siversk), Vyimka, and Ivano-Darivka (both southeast of Siversk).[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have currently seized 20 to 25 percent of Siversk.[63]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and Platonivka and toward Zakitne and Dibrova; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne, Fedorivka, and Zvanivka on November 19 and 20.[64]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on November 20 that Russian forces conducted a three-wave motorcycle assault toward Siversk on November 19 and that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and destroyed ten motorcycles.[65] Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces are attempting to consolidate positions on the northern outskirts of Siversk and demine roads into the settlement in preparation for a potential mechanized assault.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Footage published on November 18 and geolocated on November 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[66]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Footage published on November 16 and geolocated on November 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers in northern Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[67]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[68]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka and Bilokuzmynivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Novomarkove, and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Kleban-Byk, and Toretsk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Volodymyrivka, and Novoolenivka on November 19 and 20.[69]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[70] Loitering munitions operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian equipment, servicemembers, and vehicles near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zatyshok (southeast of Dobropillya).[72]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Pankivka, and Zapovidne on November 19 and 20.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Rivne (east of Pokrovsk) near the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[74] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time, and ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of the Russian infiltration at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk, southwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and on the southeastern outskirts of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[75]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne, Balahan, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk and Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 19 and 20.[76] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[77]

The Ukrainian Navy reported on November 20 that Russian forces conducted a KAB-3000 strike against Myrnohrad.[78] ISW has not observed reports confirming the existence of a KAB-3000, and the Ukrainian Navy may be referring to the Russian FAB-3000 heavy guided glide bomb.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]), 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), and 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[79] FPV drone operators and other elements of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-04-28 Novopavlivka-Dachne highway in northern Novopavlivka and south of the settlement.[81]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on November 19 and 20.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and toward Vidradne; and west of Velykomykhailivka near Tykhe on November 19 and 20.[83] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe, Vidradne, and Hai (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[84]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction reported on November 20 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a roughly reduced company-size Russian motorized assault that involved up to 60 Russian servicemembers in two trucks and two cars.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the south Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[86]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration at an unspecified location in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole) and advanced north of the settlement.[88]

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole near Yehorivka, Yablukove, and Rivnopillya, and toward Zelene, Varvarivka, Radisne, and Nove Zaporizhzhia; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Krasnohirske, Rybne, Pryvilne, and Zlahoda; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya, Zelenyi Hai, and Vysoke on November 19 and 20.[89] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Radisne, Hulyaipole, and Nove Zaporizhzhia.[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Yablukove.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Kamyanske, Novoandriivka, Stepove, and Prymorske on November 19 and 20.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[93]

A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast reported on November 20 that Russian forces are reinforcing their units in this direction and that Russian forces are committing greater numbers of troops to attack and employing winged reconnaissance drones to interdict Ukrainian logistics.[94] The drone battalion commander added that Russian forces are increasingly using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) but cannot operate them at long distances due to communications issues.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and Osa surface-to-air missile (SAM) crews of the 104th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[95]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge on November 20 but did not advance.[96]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 19 that Russian forces conducted a limited infiltration mission near Odradokamyanka (northeast of Kherson City on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River).[97]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Fobos drone group of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in Kherson Oblast.[98]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 135 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 80 were Shahed-type — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 106 drones and that 29 drones struck 16 locations, and downed debris fell on three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, port, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Ternopil Oblasts.[100] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported that Russian forces struck port infrastructure in Izmail, Odesa Oblast, on November 17, damaging three civilian ships, including the Turkish-flagged ”Orinda” gas tanker.[101] Ternopil Oblast Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) stated on November 20 that Ukraine initiated criminal proceedings against Russia for war crimes and premeditated murder due to Russia’s drone and missile strikes against residential infrastructure in Ternopil City on the night of November 18 to 19, which killed 27 people, including three children.[102]

Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russia struck energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts overnight, leaving residents without power.[103] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on November 20 that Ukraine will implement rolling blackouts on November 21 due to damage from Russian strikes against energy infrastructure in most oblasts in Ukraine.[104]

Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on November 20 that Russian strikes have damaged or destroyed 12,500 houses in Kharkiv City since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and that Ukrainian authorities have rebuilt 4,000 houses since then.[105] Terekhov stated that Russian strikes have left 160,000 Kharkiv City residents homeless.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.