Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on November 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction and are reportedly extending logistics to southern Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northeastern and to the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk as well as in southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and north of Myrnohrad.[1] Additional geolocated footage published on November 7 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk and immediately north of Myrnohrad).[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the northwestern, northern, and northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Rih (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), advanced southwest of Krasnyi Lyman and Rodynske, and advanced into eastern Rivne (east of Pokrovsk).[4] Some milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing in Rodynske, however.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to drive trucks and motorcycles into southern Pokrovsk to deliver supplies and that these attempts mark the first time that Russian forces have begun operating vehicles in Pokrovsk.[6] Russian forces have been conducting logistics into Pokrovsk primarily with drones.[7] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces confirmed on November 7 that Russian forces are attempting to extend logistics to southern Pokrovsk using motorcycles.[8] The corps reported that Russian forces have reduced their activity and the frequency of their movements within Pokrovsk in order to minimize losses as Russian forces await reinforcements. The corps noted that Russian forces have unsuccessfully attacked Myrnohrad from the east several times and assessed that Russian forces will likely attack the town from a different direction in the near future. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces began attacking Myrnohrad from the west on November 7.[9] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces raised a flag at the Pokrovsk City Council building in central Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and recaptured and cleared the building.[10] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces established an observation post at the city council building before Ukrainian forces recaptured it.

Layoffs at Russia's primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), indicate that Russia may be struggling to balance civilian and defense industrial needs as economic restrictions increasingly degrade Russia's economic performance. Yekaterinburg local news outlet E1 reported on November 6, citing employee-provided documents, that UVZ plans to lay off up to 10 percent of employees by February 2026 and implement a hiring freeze.[11] UVZ employees told E1 that the reduction in staff amounts to up to 50 percent of total employees for most departments. UVZ’s press service stated on November 6 that the manufacturer is “streamlining management and administration expenses“ and denied reports of a hiring freeze.[12] UVZ announced on October 10 that it will shift some employees to a four-day work week starting on December 15, citing declining demand for civilian vehicle production.[13] UVZ is Russia’s sole producer of modern tanks, therefore it is noteworthy that recent civilian shift reductions and planned factory layoffs may be impacting a key defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise and potentially reducing the production of Russian tanks.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have deprioritized tank production to shift to a more drone-centric and dismounted infantry-based force that employs light vehicles such as buggies and motorcycles for mobility rather than armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).[15] Drone innovations throughout the war and the creation of kill zones in which any tanks or other AFVs are prime targets have rendered armored vehicles less effective for Russia's tactics to advance, which rely on mass infantry assaults, infiltration missions, motorcycles and small vehicles, and drone strikes.[16]

Sanctions and restrictions on Russian oil exports may be hindering the Kremlin's attempts to make capital investments in the Russian DIB at the expense of civilian production. Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy on October 23.[17] The Kremlin notably also plans to decrease its defense budget to 38 percent of total expenditures in 2026, down from 41 percent in 2025, as it plans to increase the value-added tax (VAT) likely to fund defense expenditures.[18] The Russian government may be attempting to shield the Russian DIB from the slowdown affecting civilian industry, and the reported UVZ layoffs indicate that Russia's widespread economic problems could affect defense production. The reported UVZ layoffs suggest that the Russian DIB may not be able to drive economic growth and that the Kremlin will need to further redirect resources to the DIB from civilian industry.[19] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely attempting to make investment capital available to the DIB amid a lack of demand for investment capital in civilian industries.[20]

The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues efforts to develop local arms production and export capabilities. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on November 7 that Ukraine will make its DIB self-financing through profits that managed arms exports generate.[21] Kamyshin stated that Ukraine’s DIB has an annual production capacity of $35 billion dollars in 2025 and can reach $60 billion in 2026, over $35 billion of which will be for long-range capabilities.[22] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on November 7 that Ukraine and Sweden finalized an agreement to localize the production of Swedish Gripen fighter jets by 2033.[23]

European authorities continue to report unidentified drone incursions into NATO airspace. The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration (LFV) reported that there were reports of at least one unidentified drone flying over the Gothenburg Landvetter Airport on the evening of November 6, forcing authorities to divert or cancel over a dozen flights.[24] A Swedish police spokesperson told Reuters that authorities are investigating suspected aviation sabotage.[25] Belgian authorities temporarily closed the Brussels Airport on the evening of November 6 after Skeyes air traffic controller observed an unidentified drone, marking the airport's third closure in a week.[26] Belgian police confirmed on November 6 that unidentified drones flew near the Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK CEN) in Mol, Belgium as well as the European Quarter, which houses several European Union (EU) buildings.[27] The Flemish Public Broadcasting Company (VRT) reported on November 6, citing unspecified sources, that German troops arrived in Belgium to assist the Belgian military in implementing unspecified drone detection and defense measures.[28] The repeated unidentified drone incursions near European airports and critical infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO. [29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction and are reportedly extending logistics to southern Pokrovsk.
• Layoffs at Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), indicate that Russia may be struggling to balance civilian and defense industrial needs as economic restrictions increasingly degrade Russia's economic performance.
• The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues efforts to develop local arms production and export capabilities.
• European authorities continue to report unidentified drone incursions into NATO airspace.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Lyman, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine continued its strike campaign against Russia's energy sector and defense industrial base on November 6 and 7. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range drone strike against the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant, which produces components necessary for high-octane aviation gasoline, in the Republic of Bashkortostan on November 6.[30] Ukrainian forces last struck the plant overnight on November 4 to 5.[31] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein stated on November 7 that Ukrainian drones struck unspecified energy infrastructure that caused power outages in Rylsk and its environs for roughly 17,000 consumers in Rylsk, Glushkovo, and Korenevsky raions.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces appear to have either maintained positions or recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence or recently advanced in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[33]

Fighting continued in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on November 6 and 7.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[35]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces have encircled elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).[36] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently took heavy casualties when attempting to reinforce the Russian troops in the encirclement and complained that these Russian soldiers are demoralized and fatigued and that the Russian military command has not ordered a rotation. The Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian servicemember recounted several friendly fire incidents between Russian and North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast, including near Pogrebki (northeast of Sumy City and southeast of Korenevo). The Russian milblogger noted that the Russian military command had not provided passphrases to Russian soldiers in an area that North Korean forces were guarding near Pogrebki, resulting in Russian casualties.[37]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) fiber optic drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and vehicles near Pysarivka (north of Sumy City).[38] Elements of the 51st and 119th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of 106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[39] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[40] Drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and FPV reconnaissance drone operators of the Prizrak Group are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[41]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Borysivka, Synelnykove, and Vovchansk on November 6 and 7.[43]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 7 that about 600 Russian personnel accumulated near Vovchansk in the past day.[44] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on November 7 that Russian forces first accumulate manpower on Russian territory and then conduct attacks in several directions within and near Vovchansk.[45] The officer reported that Russian forces are using Molniya fixed-wing drones as mothership drones to drop two first-person view (FPV) drones and strike two targets in rear areas.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 7 that elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) operating in the Kharkiv direction are suffering supply shortages due to Ukrainian drone operations whereas elements of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) received reinforcements, possibly of recruits from African countries.[46]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 7.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Obukhivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Kupyansk, and near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), Sobolivka, and Myrove (both west of Kupyansk).[48] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dvorichanske (northeast of Kupyansk).[49]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk toward Dvorichanske and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on November 6 and 7.[50] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk and Pishchane.[51]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and Pishchane are contested “gray zones.”[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi (east of Kupyansk).[53] Elements of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of mobilized personnel, reportedly of the 6th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Kupyansk.[54]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Borova direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced south of Nadiya (east of Borova), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[55]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Boriivska Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Druzhelyubivka on November 6 and 7.[56]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Nadiya.[57] 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and restored control over the main road near the northeastern part of the settlement.[59] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Stavky (northwest of Lyman).[60]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Yarova, Korovii Yar, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Karpivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 6 and 7.[61]

A Russian milblogger claimed that northeastern Yampil remains a contested “gray zone” and that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Yampil.[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[63]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka and Fedorivka on November 6 and 7.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kleban-Byk (southeast of Kostyantynivka), on a section of the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Donetsk highway northwest of Yablunivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and marginally advanced in southern Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Predtechyne, southwest of Oleksandro-Shultyne (both east of Kostyantynivka), and east of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[66]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 6 and 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in southern Ivanopillya and west of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka), areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[67]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka; north of Kostyantynivka toward Minkivka and Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, Kleban-Byk, Nelipivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on November 6 and 7.[68]

A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on November 6 that Russian forces slightly decreased the intensity of their attacks against Kostyantynivka and have reverted to small group tactics with infantry or motorcycles after failed mechanized assaults.[69]  

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted an Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against a Ukrainian manpower concentration near Varvarivka (west of Druzhkivka).[70]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka.[71] Howitzer crews of the 1st battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are coordinating with reconnaissance drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) to strike Ukrainian positions east of Ivanopillya and west of Pleschiivka.[72] Drone operators of the Gorynych Anti-Terrorist Unit (Federal Security Service [FSB] Presidential Regiment) are striking Ukrainian positions in southeastern Kostyantynivka and southern Ivanopillya.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Dorozhnie and advanced east and north of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and in southern Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[74]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Zapovidne on November 6 and 7.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dorozhnie.[76]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in northeastern Shakhove.[77] Drone operators of the Aleppo Detachment of the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya tactical area.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 7.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Fedorivka, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Hrodivka, Rivne, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Novohrodivka, and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske and Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Pishchane, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 6 and 7.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne (west of Pokrovsk), Rodynske, and along the Rodynske-Fedorivka line.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hryshyne.[81] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.[82] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate within Myrnohrad.[83] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Pokrovsk.[84]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka on November 7.

Assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on November 6 indicates that both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[85]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Novopavlivka, northwest of Filiya (northeast of Novopavlivka), and near Ivanivka.[86]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on November 6 and 7.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Khoroshe (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and west of Privillya (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[88]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka toward Orestopil; southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove, Zlahoda, and Yehorivka and toward Vovche and Ternyvate; and west of Velykomykhailivka toward Vovche, Tykhe, and Kolomitsi on November 6 and 7.[89] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Danylivka and Vyshhneve (both southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[90]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 7 indicates that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), recently seized Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) and likely seized Pavlivka (just north of Upsenivka) on a prior date.[91]  

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole near Rybne and toward Solodke and northeast of Hulyaipole near Novomykolaivka and toward Nove and Novouspenivske on November 6 and 7.[92] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rybne.[93]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[94] Elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) reportedly crossed the Yanchur River and are operating near Rybne.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnorhisk, Shcherbaky, and Prymorske on November 7.[96]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate into Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and near Kamyanske, Plavni, and Prymorske (all west of Orikhiv).[97] Voloshyn noted that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are attempting to advance along the Kakhovka Reservoir and leverage the high reeds to bypass Ukrainian positions and advance into Ukraine's near-rear area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to establish logistics to forward positions in Mala Tokmachka.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Viking Drone Detachment are reportedly coordinating with elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division to attack Stepnohirsk, and infantry and drone operators of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Prymorske-Stepnohirsk area.[99] Drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on November 7 that Ukraine and Russia have implemented a localized ceasefire to repair the Ferrosplavna-1 power line to the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) beginning on November 8.[101]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi roadway bridge, on November 6 and 7.[102]

The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on November 7 that Russian drone operators dropped explosives onto a civilian minibus in Beryslavskyi Raion, Kherson City, killing one civilian and injuring two others.[103]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian energy facilities in occupied Crimea. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on November 7 that Ukrainian forces struck the Hvardiiska oil depot near occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea on the night of November 5 to 6, destroying a full RVS-400 oil storage tank and damaging two trains transporting full oil tanks.[104] The SSO reported that Ukrainian drone operators also struck several oil depots and fuel and lubricant warehouses in occupied Simferopol and surrounding areas, destroying tank park facilities and causing several fires. Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows SSO drones striking oil storage tanks and depots in occupied Hvardiivske and Komsomolske.[105]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 6 that Russian forces launched 128 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including roughly 80 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda Crimea.[106] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 94 drones and that 31 drones struck 11 unspecified locations. The Ukrainian National Police reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, injuring six civilians and damaging a residential building.[107] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper and the Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on November 7 that Russian drones struck energy infrastructure, a warehouse, and an administration building in Odesa Oblast.[108] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on November 7 that Russian forces struck residential buildings and a school in Zaporizhzhia City.[109]

Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian rail infrastructure in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on November 6 and 7. Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces drone strikes against Kharkiv Oblast used 27 Geran-2 drones, one Molniya loitering ammunition, and 31 other strike drones and damaged railway infrastructure near Nove, Lozova Raion.[110] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian materiel depot in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast and used Garpiya drones to strike railway infrastructure in Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[111] Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported on November 7 that Russian strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure in Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts delayed several trains for up to five hours.[112]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.