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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2025

November 13, 2025, 10:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on November 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian forces continue to advance and to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, exploiting the effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and poor weather that hampers Ukrainian drone observation. Russian forces continued their advance toward Hulyaipole and the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway — one of the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Ukrainian forces in the town. Ukrainian and Russian statements indicate that Russian forces have advanced to positions near the villages of Solodke, Yablukove, and Vesele, within a roughly nine-kilometer range northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[1] Russian forces conducted infiltration operations further north toward Danylivka on the T-0401 highway as well.  ISW assesses that the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and elements of the 36th CAA are attempting to isolate and possibly encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through a combination of BAI, infiltration tactics, and advances. Elements of the Russian 35th CAA, deployed to the south and southwest of Hulyaipole, have reportedly redeployed to the 5th CAA sector.[2] The Russian military command thus seems unlikely to launch an effort to encircle Hulyaipole from the south at this time, likely because Ukrainian defenses in the area are strongest in that direction. The prospects for and timeline of this Russian effort remain unclear at this time, but the situation in the Hulyaipole direction is serious.

Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Russian servicemembers raising Russian flags in Danylivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka on the T-0401 highway) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission, likely through Tsehelne and Yehorivka (both just east of Danylivka and southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[3] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Rivnopillya (northeast of Hulyaipole) and that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Danylivka.[4] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Rivnopillya on the evening of November 11, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on November 13 that Russian forces are operating near Solodke (north of Rivnopillya), Yablukove (south of Rivnopillya), and Vesele (southeast of Rivnopillya), indicating that Russian forces continue relatively rapid advances northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[5]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 13 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) reached the Novooleksandrivka-Oleksiivka line (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), gained a foothold east of Yehorivka, and achieved “tactical successes” in the Yehorivka-Danylivka direction within the last two weeks.[6] Mashovets added that Russian forces also crossed the Yanchur River near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) and advanced west to the Solodke-Rivnopillya line, covering a distance of seven kilometers.[7]

Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has concentrated elements of up to nine brigades and regiments, including one tank brigade, and up to six other regiment- and battalion-sized units and detachments, along a 41-kilometer front.[8] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command committed elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade and the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th CAA, EMD) to reinforce the efforts of the Russian 5th CAA and its 127th Motorized Rifle Division, likely east and northeast of Hulyaipole[9] Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command may also redeploy elements of the Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD], operationally subordinated to the Dnepr Grouping of Forces) from western Zaporizhia Oblast and elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 41st CAA (both of the Central Grouping of Forces) to further reinforce efforts in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions[10][11]

ISW continues to assess that the effects of a monthslong Russian BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian GLOCs in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions — including roads, highways, and railway lines — and worsening weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone effectiveness — have facilitated recent Russian advances.[12] A servicemember of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) acknowledged on November 13 that Russian forces take advantage of foggy and rainy weather conditions to conduct assaults.[13] A Russian milblogger published footage on November 13 reportedly showing elements of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) conducting FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velykomykhailivka.[14]

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) by advancing through Rodynske, northeast of Pokrovsk, but the settlement remains contested. Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Rodynske, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in southern Rodynske.[15] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces established a foothold in Rodynske, however.[16]

Pokrovsk itself remains contested as well. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control areas of Pokrovsk south of the railway but that heavy fighting continues in northern Pokrovsk.[17] Geolocated footage published on November 12 and 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in the Pokrovsk City Council building in central Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces still operate in northwestern and north of Pokrovsk.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian positions on the western outskirts of Pokrovsk and near the entrance to Pokrovsk, likely referring to its northwestern entrance.[19] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces also cleared Russian positions in northern Pokrovsk, secured a logistics route into the town, and are operating along the Donetska railway.[20]  A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and will conduct assaults to draw fire from and subsequently attack Ukrainian drone and artillery crew positions.[21] The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces can strike a single Ukrainian position in the area with up to 10 Molniya strike drones, six bomber drones, and artillery and mortar fire within an hour.

A Russian milblogger complained that recent footage of Russian forces conducting logistics into Pokrovsk under the cover of fog allowed Ukrainian forces to interdict the effort. Russian milbloggers broadly amplified footage on November 10 and 11 showing Russian motorcycles, buggies, and transport trucks advancing into Pokrovsk under heavy fog, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) social media accounts geolocated the footage to southern Pokrovsk along the M-30 Selydove-Pokrovsk highway by November 11.[22] Russian milbloggers praised the tactic of advancing under fog cover that inhibits Ukrainian drone surveillance.[23] Another milblogger complained on November 12, however, that the "idiot who filmed" the video published it online and "so popular [mil]bloggers" underestimated the threat of Ukrainian artillery in a drone-dominated war, suggesting that the publication of the footage allowed Ukrainian artillery to strike Russian forces involved in the logistics effort.[24]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin remains unwilling to compromise on its long-held maximalist war aims that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera requested an interview from Lavrov, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published the alleged full transcript of the interview on November 13.[25] Lavrov claimed that the war in Ukraine is "not a war for territory" or an effort to bring Ukraine back within Russia's sphere of influence, but is meant to "reliably guarantee Russia's security" and to "thwart NATO and EU plans" to turn Ukraine into a "puppet state" hostile to Russia. Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine must commit to "neutrality" and adhere to the international agreements under which Russia recognized Ukrainian independence — implying that Ukraine has no sovereignty as long as it does not acquiesce to Russia's demands, which would certainly deprive Ukraine of its sovereignty. The Kremlin has consistently reiterated its commitment to its original war demands, which include Ukrainian "neutrality," the removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO’s Open Door Policy.[26] Lavrov's November 13 interview with a prominent Italian newspaper was likely meant to rebroadcast this commitment to a European audience as part of ongoing efforts to convince the West to cease supporting Ukraine as it defends against Russia's war of aggression.  

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 12 and 13 with the second known use of FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces employed FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles and long-range Bars and Lyutyi drones in overnight strikes and published footage showing Ukrainian forces launching Flamingo cruise missiles, but did not specify against which exact targets.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had stated on October 9 that Ukrainian forces employed Flamingo missiles in combat for the first time during the previous week but did not identify their targets.[28] A Ukrainian channel reporting on Mykolaiv Oblast reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces struck Oryol City (roughly 173 kilometers from Ukraine) with an FP-5 Flamingo missile and posted footage of the missile.[29] Geolocated imagery shows damage to boiler and turbine buildings at the Oryol Thermal Power Plant in Oryol City.[30]  Russian authorities issued a missile warning for Oryol Oblast overnight, and Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on November 13 that Russian air defenses destroyed unspecified objects in the air over Oryol Oblast overnight.[31] Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows a fire, likely at a primary oil processing unit, at the Nizhnekamsk Oil Refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan.[32] Refinery officials acknowledged a fire at the plant but did not identify the cause.[33]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows the aftermath of a Russian drone strike against civilians traveling along the P-79 Kupyansk-Borova highway north of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova).[34] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 13 that the strike murdered three civilians and injured a fourth civilian heading southward toward Borova to receive humanitarian aid and pensions.[35] The deliberate murder of civilians is a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[36] Russian forces use tactics to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) that involve indiscriminately striking vehicles and people traveling on roadways, frequently leading to Ukrainian civilian casualties. ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[37]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide monetary aid to Ukraine, including to support military requirements. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union (EU) provided Ukraine with an additional 6 billion euros (roughly $7 billion) in direct budget assistance on November 13.[38] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced on November 13 that Ukraine received the final tranche of funding, worth 4.1 billion euros (roughly $4.8 billion), from the interest on seized Russian assets through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) framework and 1.8 billion euros (roughly $2 billion) of funding through the EU’s Ukraine Facility program.[39] NATO announced on November 13 that several European states will fund a joint $500 million military equipment and munitions package for Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[40] Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden will contribute to the joint package.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian forces continue to advance and to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, exploiting the effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and poor weather that hampers Ukrainian drone observation.
  • Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks.
  • A Russian milblogger complained that recent footage of Russian forces conducting logistics into Pokrovsk under the cover of fog allowed Ukrainian forces to interdict the effort.
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin remains unwilling to compromise on its long-held maximalist war aims that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 12 and 13 with the second known use of FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles.
  • Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
  • Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide monetary aid to Ukraine, including to support military requirements.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports on Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[41]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including southwest of Glushkovo near Novyi Put, north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Varachyne, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on November 12 and 13.[42]

A scout of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported on November 13 that Russian forces only carry out logistics on foot, carrying supplies up to five to seven kilometers due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[43]

The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on November 13 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a vehicle distributing bread in Krasnopilska Hromada (southeast of Sumy City), injuring one civilian.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and elements of the Russian 20th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[45]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with seizing Synelnykove.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement after destroying Ukrainian shelters in the area, forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw south and east of Synelnykove.[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk on November 12 and 13.[49]  

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[51]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk toward Hryhorivka on November 12 and 13.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Khatnie.[53]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 strike against Ukrainian positions near Velykyi Burluk.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions are advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Dvorichanske (northeast of Kupyansk) and southeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[55]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichanske and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka and toward Novoosynove on November 12 and 13.[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nechvolodivka (west of Kupyansk), Monachynivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and Osyonovo (south of Kupyansk).[58] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked near Dvorichanske and retook several positions.[59]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 13 that Russian forces are increasing the intensity of assaults and are heavily relying on drones to attack logistics in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR).[60] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly employing fiber-optic drones to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), forcing Ukrainian forces to use field roads and river crossings for logistics and troop rotations. The spokesperson added that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk and bypass the Ukrainian "kill zone" — or area of elevated drone strike risk — by attacking on motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). The battalion commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small assault groups that have little training and that Russian forces north of Kupyansk have almost no equipment, as the only way to get equipment to the area requires crossing the Oskil River.[61] The battalion commander added that Russian forces are using sleeper, Molniya, and fiber-optic drones to undermine Ukrainian logistics but that Ukrainian forces are developing new countermeasures against Ukrainian drones.

Order of Battle: Assault company of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) is reportedly operating in Kupyansk.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[63]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Novomykhailivka and toward Novoserhiivka on November 12 and 13.[64]

A Russian milblogger claimed that recent Russian advances near Oleksandrivka (southwest of Borova) and Korovii Yar (northwest of Lyman) are supporting continued Russian efforts to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs through Rubtsi (southwest of Borova) and cut off Ukrainian forces operating in the Borova direction.[65] The milblogger stated that Russian forces are about 10 kilometers away from the Ukrainian GLOC near Rubtsi and that Russian drone operators are already targeting the GLOC with first-person view (FPV) drones.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of and in eastern Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) and west of Stavky (north of Lyman).[66]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Yarova, and Shandryholove, and toward Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Hlushenkove, Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 12 and 13.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 237th Tank Regiment (both of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[68] Artillery elements of the 27th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Brigade (MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[69]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of and into northeastern Siversk and southwest of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[70]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka on November 12 and 13.[71]

A drone operator from a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on November 13 that Russian forces continue to employ small-group infiltration tactics and attack on motorcycles even when supported with heavy equipment.[72] The drone operator noted that Russian forces rely on motorcycles to reduce casualties as Russian forces experience few losses when Ukrainian drones strike a motorcycle as compared to a mechanized vehicle, which holds more servicemembers.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Slovyansk direction.[73]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Markove (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[74]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of and within central Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka).[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue clearing the Kleban-Byk reservoir area (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) is a contested "gray zone."[77]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Markove; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Shcherbynivka and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 12 and 13.[78]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that recent claimed advances near Kleban-Byk will set conditions for Russian forces to conduct an offensive against Kostyantynivka in Winter 2025-2026, consistent with previous reporting that Russian forces will prioritize completing the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad before conducting a concerted effort to seize Kostyantynivka.[79]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of and into central Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[81]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak, Dorozhnie, and Zapovidne on November 12 and 13.[82]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CCAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Nove and within Nove Shakhove.[83] Elements of the 1st Krasnodar Battery of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Shakhove direction.[84]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the northern and northwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk and north of the town, in northeastern and southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), north of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), and to the southwestern outskirts of Hryshyne (west of Pokrovsk).[85]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Bilytske, Sukhetske, Novoekonomichne Razine, Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novohrodivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 12 and 13.[86] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), Rodynske, Sukhetske, and Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[87]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hryshyne.[88] Drone operators of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly dropping leaflets in Myrnohrad.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Havrylivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) from Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) and are operating in southern and eastern Novopavlivka.[90]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, northwest of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Yalta, and Dachne, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on November 12 and 13.[91]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltrations amid intensified offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

See topline text for Russian infiltrations and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[92] ISW assesses that this change likely did not occur within the last 24 hours.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Orestopil (south of Velykomykhailivka) and southwest of Yehorivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[93]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; south of Velykomykhailivka near Orestopil, Stepove, and Sosnivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Yehorivka, Verbove, and Zlahoda on November 12 and 13.[94]  

Order of Battle: Assault and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the south Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[95]

A Ukrainian drone unit reported on November 11 that Ukrainian FPV drone operators struck Russian supply trucks near the occupied Donetsk City Airport, over 60 kilometers from the frontline.[96]  Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi assessed that Ukrainian forces likely used signal repeaters to extend the FPV’s range.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced north and east of Vesele, Vysoke, and Zelenyi Hai (all east of Hulyaipole).[97]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Yablukove, and Solodke, and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai on November 12 and 13.[98]

Order of Battle: Strela-10M surface-to-air missile (SAM) crews of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely in the Hulyaipole direction.[99]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orkihiv near Stepnohirsk, Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, Stepove, Plavni, and Prymorske on November 12 and 13.[100] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk.[101]

Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[102] Elements of the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk.[103]

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian oil and military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of November 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, and a forward command post of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[104]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi roadway bridge, on November 12 and 13, but did not advance.[105]

Order of Battle: VT-40 and KT first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kherson City.[106] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of artillery elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division operating in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, the first official confirmation that Russian forces redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division from the Chasiv Yar area to the Kherson direction.[107]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and military infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of November 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces struck oil storage tanks at the Morskoy Oil Terminal in occupied Feodosia; a Russian helicopter storage area, drone storage unit, and training areas at the Kirovske Air Base; and an air defense radar station near occupied Yevpatoria.[108] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a base storing and servicing Russian Orion reconnaissance drones, which can also drop munitions, near occupied Kirovske.[109] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces downed 12 Ukrainian drones near occupied Crimea overnight on November 12 to 13.[110]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea; 138 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 90 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[111] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 102 drones and that 36 drones struck 10 locations. The Odesa Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian strikes damaged critical infrastructure, an administrative building, and repair shops in Artsyz, Odesa Oblast.[112] Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim reported that Russian Shahed strikes against Mykolaiv City damaged industrial infrastructure and severely injured three civilians.[113] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian overnight strikes damaged equipment and cut power to at least parts of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts.[114] Ukrenergo added that it will introduce hourly outage and blackout restrictions for most oblasts in Ukraine on November 14.[115]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

 


[1] https://t.me/osirskiy/1314; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32774; https://t.me/yurasumy/25519; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/

[2] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3087; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3088

[3] https://t.me/voin_dv/17667; https://t.me/osintpen/2069; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10513; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1988884158668546204

[4] https://t.me/voin_dv/17667;   https://t.me/voin_dv/17671; https://x.com/voin_dv/status/1988887996062462177; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68793; https://t. me/rybar/75175 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44479; https://t.me/mod_russia/58443; https://t.me/yurasumy/25519; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32774; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/48418; https://t.me/yurasumy/25490

[5] https://t.me/osirskiy/1314; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/

[6] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3088

[7] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3088

[8] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3087

[9] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3087; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3088

[11] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3089

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/

[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/58446

[14] https://t.me/voin_dv/17674

[15] https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/1997; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10510; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44452;

[16] https://t.me/rybar/75152

[17] https://t.me/rybar/75152

[18] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/17H3fq1MvE/; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1988842310314885323; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31341

[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31341

[20] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/soldiers-of-the-skelya-regiment-set-up-blockades-to-encircle-russians-in-pokrovsk/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1590203491967348

[21] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/13/vony-ne-stavlyatsya-do-svoyih-bijcziv-yak-do-lyudej-a-yak-do-zasobiv-vorog-hoche-ohopyty-myrnograd-z-dvoh-bokiv/

[22] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1987987902228558123?s=20; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1987982646417240253?s=20; https://t.me/notes_veterans/25845; https://t.me/shershni68/864; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/31892; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10491; https://t.me/milinfolive/160235; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103550; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103574; https://t.me/rybar/75110 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/160228; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14571 ; https://t.me/vrogov/22361; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/48395; https://t.me/wargonzo/30420 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44400

[23] https://t.me/notes_veterans/25845; https://t.me/shershni68/864; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/31892; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10491; https://t.me/milinfolive/160235; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103550; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103574; https://t.me/rybar/75110 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/160228; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14571 ; https://t.me/vrogov/22361; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/48395; https://t.me/wargonzo/30420 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44400

[24] https://t.me/razvedosaa/15480

[25] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2058998/; https://www.corriere dot it/esteri/25_novembre_13/lavrov-intervista-corriere-risposta-direzione-8badb9c7-8a24-4b51-8f82-811920fa8xlk.shtml

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2025/

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31362; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1988936015919321359

[28] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4045334-zelenskij-pidtverdiv-uspisne-zastosuvanna-raket-neptun-i-flamingo-u-pari.html

[29] https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev/37271; https://i-ua dot tv/news/93524-v-rf-obiekty-v-misti-orel-zaznaly-nichnoi-ataky-podrobytsi

[30] https://t.me/supernova_plus/45400

[31] https://t.me/Klychkov_Andrey/5841; https://t.me/Klychkov_Andrey/5844

[32] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1988946554275930611?s=20; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1988932313657602535?s=20

[33] https://www.tatar-inform dot ru/news/na-niznekamskneftexime-likvidiruyut-vozgoranie-6006503; https://t.me/astrapress/97114

[34]*WARNING: GRAPHIC * https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1988958874087682400?s=20; https://youtu.be/gFymKgp-XYk?si=W2rYL2jl6lBUW3-l

[35] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/25705 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1163736-udar-rf-po-ludah-na-trasi-do-borovoi-miscevi-ziteli-ihali-do-selisa-po-pensii-ta-gumanitarnu-dopomogu-prokuratura/

[36] https://casebook.icrc dot org/highlight/targeting-under-international-humanitarian-law

[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025/

[38] https://x.com/vonderleyen/status/1988873789556363357; https://www.eeas.europa dot eu/delegations/ukraine/president-von-der-leyen-%E2%80%9Clasting-peace-relies-strong-and-independent-ukraine%E2%80%9D_en

 

[39] https://suspilne dot media/1163356-es-vidiliv-majze-6-mlrd-evro-dla-ukraini/; https://t.me/svyrydenkoy/924

[40] https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/11/13/nordic-and-baltic-allies-to-fund-joint-500m-purl-package-for-ukraine?selectedLocale=

[41] https://t.me/severnnyi/5720 

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5715 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5717 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/13/tyagnut-na-vizkah-bk-i-generatory-po-5-7-km-rozvidnyk-dshv-pro-novu-pishu-taktyku-rosiyan-na-sumshhyni/

[44] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/39664; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/13/na-sumshhyni-vorozhyj-fpv-dron-vdaryv-po-avtomobilyu-yakyj-rozvozyv-hlib/

[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/58451 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/25499 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36071 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6155

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/58442; https://t.me/rybar/75183; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103701; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68792; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/13299; https://t.me/dva_majors/83251; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44468 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83237 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36064

[47] https://t.me/rybar/75183 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103701 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/13299 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83251  

[48] https://t.me/rybar/75183 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103701 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/13299 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83251 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44468  

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19737 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19736 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36064 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5715

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/83233  

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/83237

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19737 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19736

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/83237

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36064

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32771 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44469 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32768

[56] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1988730199438159954; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/61

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19736 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/348301

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/58444

[59] https://t.me/severnnyi/5715

[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5G7xahOrHk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/13/20-ty-kilometrovyj-motok-dozvolyaye-zaletity-poblyzu-kupyanska-znyshhuyut-vorozhi-drony-ta-shturmovykiv-motoczyklistiv/

[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/13/voyuyut-duzhe-prymityvnoyu-i-durnoyu-taktykoyu-na-pivnich-vid-kupyanska-vorozha-pihota-prodovzhuye-doslidzhuvaty-dno-oskolu/

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/58430 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/348239

[63] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32777

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19736 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339

[65] https://t.me/yurasumy/25511

[66] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32780 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19736 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/83232 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83242

[69] https://t.me/epoddubny/25499

[70] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32783 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36088 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36088

[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5G7xahOrHk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/13/czile-viddilennya-dostrokovo-zavershuye-kontrakt-vorozha-tehnika-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-ne-vyyizhdzhaye-z-kilzony/

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/83253  

[74] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1989000927664058403?s=20; https://t.me/brigade56_official/3629

[75] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32789

[76] https://t.me/rybar/75149; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36083

[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339; https://t.me/rybar/75149; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36083; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439

[79] https://t.me/rybar/75149; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2025/;

[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14575 ; https://t.me/sashakots/57622

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/44482

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068

[83] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14572

[84] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14574

[85] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32793; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32796; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68785 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36072; https://t.me/rusich_army/26791; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186800; https://t.me/motopatriot78/44452

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68785; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439; https://t.me/rusich_army/26791; ttps://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36072; https://t.me/epoddubny/25495

[87] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68785; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068; https://t.me/epoddubny/25495;

[88] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68784

[89] https://t.me/mod_russia/58456

[90] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36094

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36094

[92] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3088

[93] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186800; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68793

[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439

[95] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186825

[96] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deep-strike-small-fpv-drones-cover-60-kilometers-hit-russian-supply-trucks/ ; https://t.me/ivanfrankogroup/191

[97] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32774; https://t.me/yurasumy/25519; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/48418

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36068; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439

[99] https://t.me/mod_russia/58419

[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31364 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/83237 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30439

[101] https://t.me/dva_majors/83237 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36079

[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/36071

[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/83231

[104] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31362

[105] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31342 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13382 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31339

[106] https://t.me/mod_russia/58431 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103713 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/22547 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186818; https://t.me/epoddubny/25493

[107] https://t.me/mod_russia/58453 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/

[108] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31362

[109] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1576 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-drones-strike-russian-orion-uav-base-at-kirovske-airfield-in-crimea/

[110] https://t.me/mod_russia/58422 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58454  ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58429

[111] https://t.me/kpszsu/47236

[112] https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/2182 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1163278-rf-atakuvala-kriticnu-infrastrukturu-odesini-aki-naslidki/

[113] https://suspilne.media/mykolaiv/1163360-ataka-sahedom-po-mikolaevu-e-poraneni/; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/16878; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/16880

[114] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4306 ; https://suspilne dot media/1163430-vnaslidok-nicnoi-ataki-rf-poskodzeno-energoobekti-v-troh-oblastah-ukraini-ukrenergo/

[115] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4307 ; https://suspilne dot media/1164050-u-bilsosti-regioniv-14-listopada-budut-diati-grafiki-vidklucen-ukrenergo/

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