Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on November 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the US-proposed peace plan aims to ensure Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and economic development, during the US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach, Florida on November 30.[1] Rubio stated that the peace plan must not only end the war but also secure Ukraine's future and "long-term prosperity."[2] Rubio stated that the US-Ukrainian meeting was "very productive" and expressed optimism about the peace negotiations' progress but said that there is still "much work to do."[3] Rubio stated that the meeting built upon the results of November 23 US-European-Ukrainian talks in Geneva and confirmed that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will travel to Moscow later this week to discuss the peace deal with the Kremlin.[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will host Witkoff in Moscow before the start of Putin's visit to India on December 4.[5] Witkoff also stated that US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach went "positively" and reportedly confirmed that he will meet with Putin on December 2.[6] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov led the Ukrainian delegation on November 30 and stated that the negotiators achieved "substantial progress in advancing a dignified peace" and uniting the Ukrainian negotiating positions with the United States.[7] Umerov reported that the United States shares Ukraine's key objectives of ensuring Ukraine's security, sovereignty, and a reliable peace, and noted that Ukraine and the United States will continue consultations and work on a joint peace framework.

Russian information space voices continue to argue that the Kremlin will likely reject a ceasefire or any iteration of the US-proposed peace plan because the Kremlin views these efforts as inconsequential and as a hindrance to Russia's goals in Ukraine and globally. A prominent Russian milblogger argued on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin "clearly" outlined that he is prepared to achieve Russia's war aims via military means; therefore, all peace negotiations since the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are "not practical."[8] The milblogger added that Russia's engagement in any peace negotiations "solely" relies on Russian progress on the battlefield, which Russian forces achieve through prolonged and costly warfighting.[9] The milblogger argued that US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a ceasefire on the front line do not benefit Russia, as the ceasefire would force Russia to terminate the September 2022 mobilization decree that allows the Kremlin to retain mobilized servicemen and recruits on the battlefield indefinitely, which will reduce the size of the Russian military and deplete Russia's officer corps.[10] ISW assessed in February 2025 that Putin fears the risks and challenges associated with reintegrating veterans into Russian society and economy and thus remains unlikely to demobilize fully or rapidly — even in the event of a negotiated settlement to its war in Ukraine.[11] The milblogger also argued that a ceasefire will undermine Russia's efforts to seize illegally annexed unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and will create new "military security threats" that Russia will need to address in the near future. The milblogger's observations are in line with Putin's November 27 remarks that intensify efforts to set legal grounds using the false premise of Ukrainian threats to illegally annexed Ukrainian territories to justify a reinvasion of Ukraine at an opportune time.[12]

Former Russian officer and imprisoned prominent ultranationalist, Igor Girkin, published a letter written on November 25 in which he similarly concluded that the Kremlin will not sign any agreements on the basis of the 28-point peace proposal, because the Kremlin views this peace proposal as detrimental to its goals in Ukraine and worldwide, and that the war will continue in Ukraine.[13] Girkin argued that the agreement is unacceptable because it would signify a loss of Russian sovereignty by ceding control over the mechanism for both negotiations and imposing punishments for violating the peace settlement to the United States. Girkin argued that the Kremlin will not commit to any mechanisms that could formally recognize Russia as an aggressor and enable the U.S. to impose punishments against Russia in the event of peace agreement violations. [14] Girkin claimed the peace agreement is disadvantageous to Russia as it would force Russia to formally renunciate its claims over illegally-annexed parts of Ukraine; surrender "strategically vital" offensive positions in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; grant Ukrainian forces time to rest and reconstitute; sharply decrease Russian forces' combat readiness; and lead to a "strategic break" between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). [15]

A columnist for Russian state newswire Rossiya Segodnya stated in an interview published on November 27 that Russia neither takes the US peace proposal seriously nor expects the plan to work in any possible variation, and assessed that the Kremlin is "relaxed" about alterations to the original 28-point peace plan because the Kremlin can discuss any document.[16] The columnist argued that Russia is "pretending" that it is ready to accept the United States as a mediator but ultimately aims to conclude a treaty that provides Russia with a battlefield victory, and that Russia does not seek an immediate peace as the United States does. The columnist emphasized that Russia cannot sign any peace deals with Ukraine or Europe; that Russia's war aims include NATO's withdrawal from all of eastern Europe; and that Russia's demands for a ceasefire also include Ukraine's withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts — not just Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The columnist implied that Russia is unlikely to make any further concessions because the Kremlin believes that it has already won the war in Ukraine. The columnist's statements are consistent with Putin's November 27 interpretation of the US-proposed peace plan as a mere suggestion for discussions and demands that Ukraine cede all illegally annexed oblasts to Russia.[17] Russian officials and ultranationalists have been consistently issuing similar public rejections of the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plan did not concede to all of Russia's absolutist war demands.[18]

The Kremlin continues to advance a false narrative that Ukraine’s front line and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily. ISW continues to assess that a Russian battlefield victory is neither imminent nor inevitable and that the Russian war effort has vulnerabilities the West has not exploited. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on a Russian state television program aired on November 30 that Ukraine's battlefield and internal problems worsen every day.[19] Peskov also accused the Ukrainian government of stalling the peace negotiations process, despite the fact that Ukrainian delegations were actively negotiating the terms of the US-proposed peace deal with US counterparts since reports of the proposal emerged in mid-November 2025, including on November 30, and agreed to terms that Russia has not.[20] Peskov's latest statements are likely part of the Kremlin's consolidated cognitive effort to create a false sense of urgency over Russia's claimed inevitable victory — and that Ukraine and the West should therefore immediately concede to Russia’s demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.[21]

Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to contradict the Kremlin's efforts to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable, however. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged that the tactical battlefield situation favors Russia, particularly near Hulyaipole, but stated that Russian state media coverage of Russian progress on the battlefield once again resembles "joyfully idiotic, rosy, self-indulgent nonsense" that does not support the war effort.[22] The milblogger stated that such narratives of an imminent Russian victory create the false perception domestically that the Russian society no longer needs to urgently support the war effort against Ukraine, a competent adversary that uses NATO equipment and intelligence. The milblogger also noted that continuing the war effort in Ukraine will cost Russia further state resources amid growing societal dissatisfaction with the introduction of new fees and rising taxes in 2026.[23] The milblogger added that Russia continues to face manpower shortages and that the ongoing volunteer recruitment campaign is not generating a sufficient number of forces to demobilize Russian personnel that the Kremlin involuntarily called up in September 2022. Girkin similarly assessed in a letter published on November 26 that Russia could develop its possible future seizures of Hulyaipole and Orikhiv into operational successes only if Russia has enough reserves to exploit these tactical advances.[24] Girkin observed that the most recent six-month Russian offensive on Kupyansk did not result in a "big victory" and assessed that Russian efforts to seize the "secondary" objectives of Pokrovsk, Vovchansk, Siversk, and Lyman are only tactical and will not be quick, will not degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large, and will not collapse the front lines. Girkin implied that Russia has enough troops to support tactical advances but lacks the necessary reserves and resources to achieve its strategic goals, such as seizing Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv cities. ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the front line is serious, particularly in Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, the Kremlin's efforts to present Russia's victory in Ukraine as inevitable do not correspond to the battlefield reality.[25] It is notable that the Kremlin’s misrepresentation of the situation on the ground was so far from reality that prominent pro-war milbloggers and ultranationalist figures continue to feel compelled to issue their own corrective statements.[26]

The Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk remains prolonged and costly as Russian forces are optimized for positional warfare and can only achieve a slow rate of advance. Russian forces continue to make slow advances and have failed to seize Pokrovsk entirely despite occupying positions within the town for over 120 days.[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces to the southern outskirts of Rodynske during counterattacks.[28] Mashovets added that costly urban warfare within Pokrovsk has weakened elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), forcing the Russian military command to commit elements of the relatively elite 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) in the neighboring Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area to the 51st CAA’s efforts west of the Kazennyi Torets River (northeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya) and in the Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad direction (east and north of Pokrovsk).[29] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are unable to transport armored vehicles across the Kazennyi Torets River to their foothold west of the river, forcing Russian infantry to operate unsupported in the foothold — further constraining the rate of Russian advance on the northeastern shoulder of the Pokrovsk encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 29 and 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian bridge-laying vehicles and armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) east of Boikivka, south of Pankivka, and west of Novotoretske (all southeast of Dobropillya) as the vehicles attempted to cross the Kazennyi Torets River.[30] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 28 that Russian forces are not fully leveraging their numerical superiority in drones and manpower and that the presence of Russian forces in Pokrovsk is not a reason for Ukrainian forces to retreat from the town.[31] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 30 that Russian forces sent poorly trained, recently recruited personnel into the first wave of assaults, followed by relatively better-trained personnel.[32]

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious, however. Mashovets assessed that Russian presence in the area south of Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk) and between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad will force Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad to conduct a fighting withdrawal to avoid encirclement in Myrnohrad.[33] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces control at least half of Pokrovsk and that the Russian manpower superiority would make it difficult for Ukrainian forces to fully retake the town.[34] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that thick fog continues to degrade Ukrainian drone reconnaissance capabilities and that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV), Molniya, fixed-wing, and sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[35]

Russian drones appear to be violating Moldovan airspace during large, combined missile and drone strikes. The Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on November 29 that two Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace for one hour and 10 minutes on the night of November 28 to 29, forcing Moldova to temporarily close its airspace.[36] Russia launched a combined missile and drone strike on the night of November 28 to 29 with 632 total air targets, and Russian drones violated Romanian and Moldovan airspaces on the night of November 24 to 25 during a combined missile and drone strike with 488 total air targets against Ukraine.[37]

Ukrainian forces successfully used the Sting interceptor drone to down Russian jet-powered long-range drones for the first time as Ukraine increases technological innovation efforts to combat Russia’s long-range drone and missile campaigns. Ukrainian volunteer Serhiy Sternenko reported on November 30 that the Ukrainian forces successfully used the domestically produced Sting interceptor drone to shoot down several Geran-3 jet-powered long-range strike drones for the first time on the night of November 29 to 30.[38] Geran-3 drones have a shorter flight range than typical Geran drones but can reach higher speeds and can more easily outmaneuver air defense systems.[39] Ukrainian drone manufacturer Wild Hornets, which manufactures the Sting drone, noted in September 2025 that Ukrainian forces have achieved interception rates of about 60 to 90 percent against typical Russian Geran-2 and Gerbera drones.[40] Wild Hornets noted that it was working to increase the speed of the Stinger drone interceptors specifically to counter jet-powered Russian drones, such as the Geran-3. Russia has conducted several strikes with packages reportedly including several Geran-3 drones since late June 2025.[41] Ukrainian industry continues to innovate and produce interceptor drones and new air defense systems as well as adapt and modify allies’ air defense systems.[42]

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the US-proposed peace plan aims to ensure Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and economic development during the US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach, Florida on November 30.
• Russian information space voices continue to argue that the Kremlin will likely reject a ceasefire or any iteration of the US-proposed peace plan because the Kremlin views these efforts as inconsequential and as a hindrance to Russia's goals in Ukraine and globally.
• The Kremlin continues to advance a false narrative that Ukraine’s front line and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily. ISW continues to assess that a Russian battlefield victory is neither imminent nor inevitable and that the Russian war effort has vulnerabilities the West has not exploited.
• The Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk remains prolonged and costly as Russian forces are optimized for positional warfare and can only achieve a slow rate of advance.
• Russian drones appear to be violating Moldovan airspace during large, combined missile and drone strikes.
• Ukrainian forces successfully used the Sting interceptor drone to down Russian jet-powered long-range drones for the first time as Ukraine increases technological innovation efforts to combat Russia’s long-range drone and missile campaigns.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy Oblast near Varachyne and Andriivka, on November 29 and 30.[43] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka.[44]

The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Airborne Division) are experiencing difficulties with casualty evacuations in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City). [45]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and counter-drone elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[46]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 30 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember holding a Russian flag in southeastern Vovchansk in an infiltration event that ISW assesses did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces planted a flag and then left the area, noting that Russian forces likely do not hold positions near the flag.[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, Prylipka, and Lyman on November 29 and 30.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking on the eastern outskirts of Vovchansk.[50]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are employing Geran-2 drones to interdict the O-211328 Zolochiv-Kozacha Lopan road (northwest to north of Kharkiv City).[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Storm Detachment of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on November 29 and 30 but did not advance.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway north of Pishchane and northwest and west of Stepova Novoselivka and southeast of Hlushkivka (all southeast of Kupyansk).[54]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on November 29 and 30.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk.[56]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the outskirts of Kupyansk.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novovodyane, and Tverdokhlibove and toward Stepove and Cherneshchyna on November 29 and 30.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Korovii Yar, Serednie, Novoselivka, and Derylove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 29 and 30.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[60] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of a drone company of the 27th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Lyman.[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Zvanivka; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on November 29 and 30.[62]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 30 that Russian forces aim to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Siversk through Svyato-Pokrovske and Zvanivka.[63] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also attempting to seize higher ground near Svyato-Pokrovske to outflank the Ukrainian forces in Siversk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in northeastern Siversk.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced to the railway depot in southern Kostyantynivka.[65]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on November 29 and 30.[66]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on November 30 that Russian forces continue to suffer heavy losses while employing infiltration tactics.[67] The spokesperson noted that weather conditions, particularly fog, are degrading drone observation, leading to more frequent use of artillery. The spokesperson reported that Russian prisoners of war (POWs) stated that the Russian military command prematurely told them that Russian forces had captured Kostyantynivka to entice them to participate in risky infiltration missions.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 30 that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area are attempting to break through to Druzhkivka from the southwest and to reach Novohryhorivka, Raiske, Torske, and Novomykolaivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka).[68]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka.[69] Lancet loitering munition operators of the Reconnaissance and Strike Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Druzhkivka.[70] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated as the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[71] Drone operators of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) and FPV drone operators of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[72]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), suggesting that Russian forces no longer have a presence in Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya), where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[73]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Toretske, east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak on November 29 and 30.[74]

Mashovets reported on November 30 that Russian forces are attempting to accumulate assault infantry near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and to bypass the settlement from the east near Volodymyrivka (southeast of Dobropillya and southwest of Druzhkivka).[75] Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces largely prevented Russian forces from crossing the Kazennyi Torets River (east to southeast of Dobropillya) and halted Russian advances on the Nove Shakhove-Shakhove line. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are unable to break through to the northeast of Shakhove despite the Russian military command’s constant deployment of reinforcements to the area.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Ukrainian advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad highway in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) during what ISW assesses to have been a Russian infiltration mission.[76] Mashovets reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces struck infiltrating Russian servicemembers on the railroad west of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[77] ISW assesses that these events did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad Highway south of the settlement, and in eastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[78]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 29 and 30.[79] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Zatyshok and near Hryshyne.[80]

Order of battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles on the outskirts of Myrnohrad.[81] FPV drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rodynske.[82] Artillery elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 30 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on November 29 that its soldiers captured personnel of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) during a clearing operation, and a source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence asserted that the Ukrainian brigade liberated Ivanivka (south of Novopavlivka).[84] A Russian milblogger stated that there are conflicting reports about the status of Ivanivka.[85] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces lack firm control over the area north of Ivanivka with only a small number of two-person fireteams operating south of Ivanivka.[86] The milblogger acknowledged that the thinly held nature of Russian lines near Ivanivka indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced in the area. Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized western Ivanivka, however.[87]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Ivanivka, and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste on November 29 and 30.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River and advanced west of Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[89]

Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Vorone, and Voskresenka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Zlahoda, Pryvillya, Verbove, and Yehorivka on November 29 and 30.[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Eastern Military District [EMD] and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Malynivka (northwest of Velykomykhailivka).[91]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 30 shows Russian forces operating east of Varvarivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses was likely an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[92]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Prylyuky (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Varvarivka and west of Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Danylivka (north of Hulyaipole).[93] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Hulyaipole and northeast of Zelene (north of Hulyaipole), and that Russian forces control 70 percent of Dobropillya.[94] ISW has not observed evidence confirming that Russian forces have advanced into Dobropillya.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Krasnohirske, Pryvilne, and Solodke; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya and Zelenyi Hai on November 29 and 30.[95]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in an alleged pocket near Zelenyi Hai and Vesele (east of Hulyaipole) and assessed that Russian forces will take multiple weeks to seize Hulyaipole.[96]

Geolocated footage published on November 28 shows elements of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces striking a Russian Buk-M1 air defense system south of Foroys, Zaporizhia Oblast (about 38 kilometers southeast of Hulyaipole).[97]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones north of Zatyshshya.[98] Elements of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[99] Drone and artillery elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly coordinating strikes near Hulyaipole.[100]

Ukrainian partisans recently blew up Russian military fuel vehicles near occupied Berdyansk. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 30 that a Ukrainian partisan attack damaged two Russian military vehicles and injured Chechen Akhmat personnel on a highway near occupied Berdyansk on November 29.[101]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[102]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[103]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirske, Shcherbaky, Prymorske, Kamyanske, and Stepove on November 29 and 30.[104]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 29 and 30.[105]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 30 that Russian forces are temporarily pausing ground operations in the Kherson direction due to dense fog, which constrains drone operations.[106] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are relying on artillery to strike west (right) bank Kherson Oblast until weather conditions improve, as Russian forces can strike static targets with artillery. 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[107]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 122 Shahed-type, Geran-type, and other drones, of which about 75 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[108] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 104 long-range drones and that 18 drones struck 13 locations in Ukraine, with debris of intercepted missiles and drones impacting two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck an enterprise in Chernihiv Oblast, that the two Iskander-M ballistic missiles impacted Odesa Oblast, and that Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo enacted energy restrictions and rolling blackouts as a result of the strikes.[109]

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 30 that Russian forces struck Vyshhorod, Kyiv Oblast on the night of November 29 to 30, killing one civilian and wounding 19.[110] Zelensky reported that Russian strikes additionally injured civilians in Dnipro and Kharkiv oblasts and that Russian forces also struck Odesa, Sumy, and Kherson oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Russian strikes in Vyshhorod, Kyiv Oblast targeted an apartment building, causing a fire.[111] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on November 30 that all three Shahed drones that Russian forces used to strike Vyshhorod carried cluster warheads.[112] Beskrestnov reported that the drones launched the cluster warheads at residential infrastructure, and then the drones themselves impacted the buildings.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.