Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on November 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will not publish an assessment tomorrow, November 27, in celebration of Thanksgiving.

Data on Russian forces’ rate of advance indicates that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, and a rapid Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent. A senior US military official reportedly stated that the war will only worsen for Ukraine as Russia can fight indefinitely and that it is better for Ukraine to negotiate a peace settlement now rather than negotiate from a weaker position later.[1] The Kremlin has consistently pushed a narrative claiming that a Russian victory is inevitable — particularly since reports first emerged of the 28-point peace proposal — in order to push Ukraine and the West to acquiesce to Russia's demands. The reality on the battlefield indicates that a Russian victory in Ukraine is far from certain, however. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military commanders have been attempting to portray Russia as capable of rapidly seizing Donetsk Oblast militarily, but hard data on the rate of Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast does not indicate that Russian forces will imminently seize the rest of the oblast.[2] Russian forces have been prioritizing completing the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but have been slow to do so as Ukrainian forces have successfully stymied the rate of Russian advance in Pokrovsk to footpace. Russian forces entered Pokrovsk for the first time by July 31, and Russian forces have advanced an average of 0.12 kilometers per day in Pokrovsk from July 31 to November 26. Russian forces have not seized Pokrovsk — a town of 11.5 square miles — despite operating within the town for over 118 days. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have consolidated advances in 66 percent of Pokrovsk as of November 26, a low percentage given the time and manpower (elements of at least two combined arms armies) Russia has dedicated to pursuing this effort.

The Russian rate of advance across the theater intensified since the Alaska summit on August 15, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day across the entire theater, between August 15 and November 20, but these advances are still constrained to footpace.[3] Russian forces could seize the remainder of Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast by August 2027, assuming a constant Russian rate of advance.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire theater.[5] Russian forces have most rapidly advanced in eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts in recent weeks, inflating the theater-wide rate of advance compared to Russian forces' comparatively slower rate of advance in Donetsk Oblast.[6]

Recent Russian advances elsewhere on the frontline have largely been opportunistic and exploited seasonal weather conditions. Russian forces are pursuing an offensive campaign design that consists of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration missions to degrade the efficacy of Ukrainian defenses.[7] Russian forces leveraged this campaign design and a porous frontline in the area to make relatively rapid advances toward Hulyaipole from the northeast and east, but even these advances are constrained to footpace.[8] Russian infiltration missions elsewhere on the frontline have not resulted in advances similar to the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, however. Russian forces have leveraged infiltration missions and interdiction efforts in the Vovchansk and Kupyansk directions, but have failed to make rapid, sweeping gains this campaign design hopes to enable.[9] These Russian forces are forced to engage Ukrainian forces in attritional urban combat and make only creeping gains, all at disproportionately high manpower losses. The Russian military command would likely have to commit the time and resources to other areas of the frontline as it is currently committing in the Pokrovsk direction to replicate the results of the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole efforts elsewhere on the frontline, particularly areas that Ukrainian forces are better fit to defend.

Ukrainian forces have proven effective at constraining Russian advances and conducting successful counteroffensives, particularly when well-staffed and well-equipped. Ukraine notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast and elsewhere in northern Ukraine in April 2022, liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast in a surprise counteroffensive in September and October 2022, and forced Russian forces to withdraw from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022 following a successful summer-fall interdiction campaign.[10] Ukrainian forces have liberated over 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have seized since 2022 and forced Russia to expend manpower, equipment, time, and energy on attritional offensives that generate losses disproportionately high relative to the amount of gains.[11] Ukrainian forces have thwarted the Russian offensives into northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in Spring 2024 and January 2025, respectively.[12] Ukraine has forced Russia into a positional war that denies Russia the ability to conduct operational maneuver. ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military assistance and weapon sales to Ukraine, in concert with strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, can enable Ukraine to stop Russian battlefield advances cold, especially if Ukrainian forces leverage their well-developed fortifications in Donetsk Oblast.[13]

Kremlin officials continue setting conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist demands. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 26  that "there can be no talk of any concessions or any surrender" of the "key aspects" of Russia's challenges with Ukraine in response to the US peace plan.[14] Ryabkov stated Russia “is prepared to achieve its stated goals” in negotiations – referring to Russia's long-held and oft-repeated demands — and noted that Russia will continue its war in Ukraine if there are “any setbacks” in negotiations.[15] Ryabkov reiterated that Russia’s position has not changed and invoked the alleged “understanding” that the United States and Russia reached at the August 2025 Alaska summit, despite the fact that there are no public-facing agreements resulting from the summit.[16] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to exploit the lack of clarity about the Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to compromise and its commitment to achieving nothing short of a full victory in Ukraine.[17] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 26 that ”it is too early to say” when responding to a question asserting that Ukraine and Russia had never been so close to concluding a peace deal, a further indication that the Kremlin is distancing itself from the peace proposal, likely because Russia intends to reject it.[18]

The Kremlin is reportedly concerned that the United States will correctly interpret Russia as unwilling to meaningfully engage in negotiations and accept any peace deal that compromises its ability to achieve its maximalist claims. Bloomberg published on November 25 the transcript of an October 29 call between lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in which Ushakov expressed concerns about Dmitriev’s plan to present a peace proposal based on Russia’s position to the United States.[19] Ushakov stated that Russia needs the "maximum" of its demands and asked, "otherwise, what's the point" of passing on proposals to the United States. Ushakov stated that the United States “might not take [Russia’s proposal] and say that it was agreed with [Russia],“ expressing concern that the United States might not understand and accept all of Russia’s demands. Russia has not engaged in meaningful negotiations since launching the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and continues to reject terms that compromise on any of its maximalist demands.[20] Kremlin officials continue to deflect blame for Russia’s willingness to negotiate through a variety of means, including shifting blame for the lack of meaningful negotiations onto Ukraine and Europe.[21] US Vice President VD Vance stated that Russia is ”asking for too much” to end the war in Ukraine in May 2025.[22]

Recent Ukrainian counterattacks may further delay Russian forces’ seizure of Pokrovsk, though the situation in Pokrovsk remains serious and dynamic at this time. Recent Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Pokrovsk and northwest of the town continue to slow the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured key positions in northwestern and western Pokrovsk during counterattacks, and a Ukrainian journalist reported that Ukrainian forces advanced near the Donetska Railway line in northern Pokrovsk and prevented Russian forces from advancing toward Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[23] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces likely hold positions in northern Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 26 indicates that Russian forces also infiltrated into positions in northeastern Pokrovsk.[24] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the northwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), cohering with Ukrainian reports of advancing in northern Pokrovsk.[25] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces likely hold positions in northern Pokrovsk. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Pokrovsk and that the frontline largely runs along the Donetska Railway line, cohering with recent reports indicating that Russian forces have seized the area south of the Donetska Railway line.[26] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces continue attempts to encircle Myrnohrad and attack the town from the north and south, and Myrnohrad City Military Administration Head Yuriy Tretyak stated that Russian forces are attacking from the west near Rivne and Svitle, all likely in an attempt to fix Ukrainian forces within Myrnohrad while also tightening the encirclement around Myrnohrad.[27]  Ukraine's East Group of Forces reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces are adapting to Russian attempts to cut off Ukrainian logistics into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, including by building protective corridors with nets, covering logistics routes with air defenses, and using heavy drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics.[28] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after a 21-month campaign, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[29]

Russia continues setting conditions to deploy active reservists to combat against Ukraine. A Russian milblogger stated on November 26 that Russian reserve units in Belgorod Oblast, including volunteer self-defense detachments, BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and Orlan anti-drone units, recently received howitzers and other artillery systems, electronic warfare (EW) systems, thermobaric weapons, and all-terrain vehicles.[30] Reserve territorial defense units assigned with protecting rear-area critical infrastructure do not require such heavy equipment suited for offensive operations. This report, therefore, indicates that Russia is setting conditions to deploy Belgorod Oblast active reservists for combat missions, as ISW recently assessed.[31] Russia recently passed a law allowing active reservists to participate in special training sessions to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure facilities in Russia.[32] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin continues to prepare to employ active reservists in combat in Ukraine.[33]

Russia’s long-range strike campaign is increasingly killing and injuring civilians. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported on November 25 that Russian forces significantly increased long-range strikes in 2025, killing 548 civilians and injuring 3,592 civilians from January to October.[34] The HRMMU reported that this was a 26 percent increase in civilian deaths from January to October 2024, in which long-range strikes killed 434 civilians and injured 2,045 civilians. Russian forces have conducted at least 15 combined strikes against Ukraine with strike packages of over 500 long-range weapons each, with a record high strike of 823 total drones and missiles on September 7, 2025.[35] The HRMMU reported that Russian strikes inflicted four times more total casualties in Kyiv City from January to October 2025 than in all of 2024 and that long-range strikes inflicted significant increases in civilian casualties in Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia cities as well.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to leveraging its long-range strikes that target Ukraine’s civilian populace in an effort to sow fear and demoralize the Ukrainian people and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Data on Russian forces’ rate of advance indicates that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, and a rapid Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent.
• Recent Russian advances elsewhere on the frontline have largely been opportunistic and exploited seasonal weather conditions.
• Ukrainian forces have proven effective at constraining Russian advances and conducting successful counteroffensives, particularly when well-staffed and well-equipped.
• Kremlin officials continue setting conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist demands.
• The Kremlin is reportedly concerned that the United States will correctly interpret Russia as unwilling to meaningfully engage in negotiations and accept any peace deal that compromises its ability to achieve its maximalist claims.
• Recent Ukrainian counterattacks may further delay Russian forces’ seizure of Pokrovsk, though the situation in Pokrovsk remains serious and dynamic at this time.
• Russia continues setting conditions to deploy active reservists to combat against Ukraine.
• Russia’s long-range strike campaign is increasingly killing and injuring civilians.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial enterprise in Russia on the night of November 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck and started a fire at the Russian Joint Stock Company VNIIR-Progress Plant in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic, which produces navigation equipment and components for cruise and ballistic missiles.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces GNSS receivers and antennas for GLONASS, GPS, and Galileo satellite systems, such as Comet-type modules that Russian forces use in Shahed-type drones, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Kalibr cruise missiles, and navigation kits for glide bombs. Geolocated footage published on November 26 shows a drone strike and fires near the VNIIR plant.[39] Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a "massive" drone strike against Cheboksary, damaging two residential buildings.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on November 25 and 26.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), Yunakivka, and Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City).[42]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting Geran-2 strikes against bridges and other crossings in Sumy Oblast to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.[43] ISW assesses that these strikes are likely part of Russian forces’ battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaigns aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks in northern Sumy Oblast.[44]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) are preparing to deploy and conduct assaults, likely in the Tetkino to Ryzhivka area (northwest of Sumy City).[45] The milblogger criticized the Russian military command's decision to deploy the 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the area as it is outside the unit’s doctrinal role, but noted that the Russian command redeployed the units to support struggling elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in the area. The milblogger also claimed that the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) is on the defensive near Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City), Andriivka, and Kindrativka after its 3rd Battalion conducted a failed counterattack.[46] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are also conducting failed assaults in the area. The milblogger claimed on November 23 that the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 83rd Separate VDV Brigade had taken advantage of fog and rain in the area to launch an intensified offensive operation near Andriivka, but recent reports suggest that it was a limited push.[47]

Order of Battle: Drone and loitering munitions operators of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[48] Drone operators and other elements of the 1st Battalion of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade, and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[49]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Footage published on November 24 and geolocated on November 25 shows Ukrainian servicemembers striking Russian positions in a forested area along the T-21-04 Vovchansk-Chuhuiv highway southeast of Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City), during what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[50] ISW assesses that this change likely did not occur in the last 24 hours.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on November 25.[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Lyman, Vilcha, Zybne, and Synelnykove on November 25 and 26.[52]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on November 26 that Russian forces are not conducting mechanized assaults in the southern Slobozhansk (Kharkiv) direction and that Russian forces have been using infantry elements, mainly constituted by former convicts, to advance in the area for almost a year.[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conducted mechanized assaults during Winter 2024 to 2025 and transitioned to attacking on foot and using light vehicles in Spring 2025. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using drones to guide infantry groups.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Hryhorivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kamyanka and Kolodyazne on November 25 and 26.[54]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted air and Geran-2 strikes against Ukrainian positions near Ustynivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk  roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline) and Ploske (immediately west of Velykyi Burluk roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline).[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 26 that Russian forces advanced and consolidated positions within central Kupyansk.[56]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces infiltrated to central Myrove and to the northern outskirts of Sobolivka (both west of Kupyansk).[57] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 25 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in eastern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[58]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on November 25 and 26.[59]

Mashovets reported on November 26 that Russian forces’ failure to rapidly seize Kupyansk and make significant gains within the town within the last two weeks places Russian forces within Kupyansk at risk of encirclement from Ukrainian counterattacks, as Russian logistics to Kupyansk are dependent on an at most 4.3-kilometer-wide corridor that Russian forces control near Zapadne, Holubivka, Radkivka, and Kindrashivka (all north of Kupyansk).[60] Mashovets added that elements of the Russian 347th and 272nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) have recently intensified attacks in the Orlyanka-Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and Stepova Novoselivka-Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) directions to fix Ukrainian forces and prevent Ukrainian forces from massing counterattacks against Russian forces north of Kupyansk.[61] Mashovets noted that such attacks enabled Russian forces to advance only 1.5 kilometers west of Stepova Novoselivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) have also conducted probing attacks west of the N-26 Kupyansk-Svatove road in the Tabaivka-Hlushkivka direction (southeast of Kupyansk).

A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 25 that Russian forces continue attacks toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk), in attempts to push Ukrainian forces from areas east of the Oskil River and seize Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, Kivsharivka, and Novoosynove (both southeast of Kupyansk).[62] The company commander reported that Russian forces exploit foggy or rainy weather that degrades Ukrainian drone detection to conduct assaults.

Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on November 26 that about 3,000 civilians remain in the Kupyansk direction, including 560 civilians in Kupyansk itself.[63]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted three FAB-500 UMPK glided guide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Podoly (east of Kupyansk).[64]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 47th Tank Division, including its Kontora Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion, reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[65] Kub loitering munition operators of the 288th Artillery Brigade (1st GTA) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[66]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Borova direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions of advance in central Bohuslavka (north of Borova) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[67]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and toward Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Novovodyane on November 25 and 26.[68]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on November 26 that about 1,000 residents remain in the Borivska Hromada (within the Borova direction).[69]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Bohuslavka.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 26 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on November 26 that Russian forces advanced in northern Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and to the Siverskyi Donets River south of Yampil.[71] Mashovets attributed Russian advances near Yampil to Russian numerical superiority in both personnel and equipment, and Russian exploitation of concealment that the forested and swampy terrain north and east of Yampil provides. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command has concentrated all of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), including its 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades, 11th Tank Brigade, and two to three motorized rifle regiments of the Russian Territorial Forces and Mobilization Reserve in an 18-to-20 kilometer zone near Yampil. Mashovets assessed that recent Russian advances will allow Russian forces to attack Lyman from Yampil and Ozerne (southeast of Lyman).[72]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions along the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway southwest of Yampil, indicating that Russian forces are likely conducting infiltration missions in the area.[73] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Korovii Yar, Novoselivka, Drobysheve, and Serednie and toward Yarova; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Stavky, and Karpivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and toward Ozerne on November 25 and 26.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Drobysheve.[75]

Mashovets reported on November 26 that elements of the Russian 20th CAA (MMD), including its 144th Motorized Rifle Division and attached elements of the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (2nd Motorized Rifle Division), have failed to advance more than several hundred meters near Serednie in recent weeks during attacks attempting to reach the Novoselivka-Drobysheve-Pryshyb-Yarova area (northwest to west of Lyman).[76]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 26 that Russian forces are intensifying drone-supported infantry attacks, likely as Russian forces are attempting to meet deadlines for the seizure of territory.[77] The spokesperson added that Russian forces in the Lyman direction include poorly trained ex-convicts, who often attack without body armor, and that properly equipped Russian infantry are almost always Spetsnaz elements.

Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Vadym Filashkin reported on November 26 that Russia has intensified KAB guided glide bomb and Molniya loitering munition strikes against Slovyansk in the last week (presumably between November 19 and November 26).[78] Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that Russian forces struck Slovyansk with two KAB-250 guided glide bombs on November 25, injuring seven civilians.[79] ISW assesses that these intensified strikes are likely part of Russian forces’ battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaigns aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks in the Slovyansk direction.[80]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to actively use drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics despite worsening weather conditions.[81]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction published footage on November 26 showing a Ukrainian FPV drone strike against a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system in the Lyman direction.[82]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Korovii Yar and Stavky and toward Yarova.[83]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Siversk and that fighting has begun in central Siversk.[84]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and toward Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Sakko i Vantsetti on November 25 and 26.[85]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are regularly conducting artillery, drone, and air strikes to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Slovyansk through Rai-Oleksandrivka (southwest of Siversk, approximately 15 kilometers from the frontline) toward Siversk.[86] ISW assesses that these strikes are likely part of Russian forces’ battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaigns aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks in the Siversk direction.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Mykolaipillya; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka and toward Novopavlivka on November 25 and 26.[88]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to coordinate loitering munition strikes against Ukrainian positions near Novopavlivka.[89] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 8th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated as the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[90] FPV drone operators of the anti-tank artillery battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Raiske (west of Druzhkivka).[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Zapovidne on November 25 and 26.[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for reports on recent Russian infiltrations and Ukrainian counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[93]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, Krasnyi (Chervonyi) Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Zvirove, and Molodetske on November 25 and 26.[94]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in the Pokrovsk direction.[95]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad.[96] FPV drone operators of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Rodynske.[97] FPV drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Rodynske and Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[98] Drone operators and other elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[99]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and southeast of Novopavlivka, north of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka), and north of Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[100]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Yalta, and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on November 25 and 26.[101]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on November 26 that Russian forces are attempting to expand the ”kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) to Slovyanka (roughly 27 kilometers north of Novopavlivka) and to the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway.[102]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly attacking toward Novopavlivka.[103]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 25 and 26, but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka and Verbove on November 25 and 26.[104]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction reported on November 26 that Russian forces are concentrating efforts on attacking toward Pokrovske (west of Velykomykhailivka).[105] The commander stated that Russian forces are employing missile and bomb strikes, air strikes, and drone and loitering munition interdiction efforts against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and that there are elements of several Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Ukrainian forces struck several Russian military objects in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of November 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M1 air defense system in occupied Mariupol and brigade-level ammunition depots in occupied Ocheretyne (north of Donetsk City, roughly 24 kilometers from the frontline) and Kamyanka (north of Donetsk City, roughly 37 kilometers from the frontline).[106]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Ukrainian military source reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces advanced to the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway west of Danylivka (north of Hulyaipole).[107]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 25 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian vehicle in eastern Hulyaipole, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[108]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Hulyaipole, southeast of Zarichne (northwest of Hulyaipole), east of Dobropillya, and east of Varvarivka (both north of Hulyaipole).[109]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Zarichne; north of Hulyaipole near Yablukove, Dobropillya, and Rivnopillya and toward Zelene and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Krasnohriske, Pryvilne; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya, Zelenyi Hai, Vesele, and Vysoke on November 25 and 26.[110] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Solodke to Rivnopillya and near Vidradne (north of Hulyaipole).[111]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces withdrew to more advantageous positions near Vysoke but that Russian forces have not seized the village as of November 26. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces cannot bring reinforcements into the village despite the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces.[112] Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces reported on November 26 that Russian forces are exaggerating claims of advance for informational effects, although the situation remains tense in the Hulyaipole direction.[113] Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces reported that Ukrainian forces are inflicting 250-300 casualties on Russian forces per day. Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces reported that Russian forces have not encircled Ukrainian forces and that Ukrainian forces are still able to conduct logistics and evacuations.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting FAB-500 guided glide bomb and TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes near Hulyaipole.[114]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Andriivka (north of Hulyaipole) and Hulyaipole.[115] Elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole.[116] Elements of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[117]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske on November 25 and 26.[118]

A Russian milblogger claimed that an unspecified battalion operating in the Zaporizhia direction is "practically wiped out" with only company and platoon commanders and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) remaining.[119] The milblogger claimed that reinforcements are arriving to the battalion from training grounds and are attacking Stepnohirsk, but that only three to five newly arrived soldiers survive out of 10 to 12. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is transferring combat vehicle gunners to infantry assaults, leaving many vehicles without crews.  

Ukrainian columnist Vadym Kushnikov reported on November 26 that Russian forces conducted a strike with a Molniya drone with a night vision camera against Zaporizhzhia City on the evening of November 22 for the first time.[120] Kushnikov stated that Russian forces have been using such drones since Summer 2024 and modernized the drones in June 2025. Kushnikov stated that Russian forces are using the Molniya, which can fly up to 40 kilometers and carry up to 10 kilograms of explosives, as a mothership drone to carry first-person view (FPV) drones.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a command post of an unspecified element of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Vasylivka (southwest of Orikhiv in the Russian near rear, roughly 12 kilometers from the frontline).[121]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Novodanylivka.[122] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[123]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on November 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 25 and 26.[124]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[125]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 25 and 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and 90 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 55 were Shahed-type drones – from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[126] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 72 drones and that the missiles and 10 drones hit 10 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, civilian, residential, and rail infrastructure in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[127]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 26 and reiterated Belarus’ alliance with Russia on November 26. Lukashenko met with Putin at the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.[128] Lukashenko reiterated Belarus’ alliance with Russia as a justification for its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and claimed that Belarus is willing to host Ukraine-Russia talks in Minsk.[129] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades-long strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus through the Union State framework and seeks to replicate this approach with other former Soviet states.[130]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on November 25 that the Belarusian armed forces received an additional delivery of Tor-M2 air defense systems from Russia.[131]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.