Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 16, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on November 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are attempting to complete their encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces’ recent attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian lines north of Pokrovsk indicate that Russian forces are prioritizing efforts to complete the encirclement, aiming to physically sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) north of Pokrovsk that supply forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). This assessment modifies ISW's previous observation that Russian forces were apparently focusing on seizing the town of Pokrovsk rather than on completing the encirclement.[1] Geolocated footage published on November 16 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly fireteam-sized infiltration mission north of Pokrovsk.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted the infiltration mission northward from Pokrovsk itself.[3] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces killed or wounded the Russian forces involved. It is unclear, therefore, if Russian forces retain positions in this area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 16 that Russian forces have reverted to conducting infiltrations into Pokrovsk in small infantry groups of two to three servicemembers instead of mechanized assaults, likely in reaction to the failure of such assaults.[4] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the neighboring Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area told CNN on November 16 that the size of Russian infiltration groups has recently dropped from five to seven servicemembers to a maximum of three servicemembers.[5] A Ukrainian drone operator in the Pokrovsk direction told CNN that Russian forces’ infiltration tactics are predicated on the assumption that lone survivors of three-member infiltration groups can gain footholds, emphasizing the costly nature of such tactics. The failure of mechanized assaults to rapidly bring large numbers of Russian forces into the town and the costly nature of infiltration-based troop accumulation may constrain Russian forces’ ability to reinforce troops within Pokrovsk, delaying Russian forces’ seizure of the town.

Foggy conditions impede both sides' operations, and both sides have developed approaches to mitigate their effects. A Russian milblogger acknowledged that foggy weather conditions disadvantage Russian as well as Ukrainian forces.[6] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces are able to exit Pokrovsk under the cover of fog and that foggy conditions are impeding Russian drone operations – likely facilitating continued Ukrainian logistics to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. A Ukrainian mechanized brigade operating in the neighboring Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that Ukrainian forces employed unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to detect a Russian mechanized assault toward Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka) that exploited foggy conditions.[7] The brigade reported that the UGVs then transmitted coordinates for first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that repelled the mechanized assault, indicating that Ukrainian forces are developing countermeasures to Russian forces’ exploitation of foggy conditions to launch assaults.[8] Foggy conditions are seasonal and will lift at some point, and it is unclear which side will benefit more from clearer weather.

The logistical situation for Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad remains difficult. The Ukrainian combat medic operating in the Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad area told CNN that Russian drone fire control of Ukrainian GLOCs leading to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad prevents Ukrainian vehicles from moving closer than 10 to 15 kilometers from Pokrovsk, hindering casualty evacuation efforts.[9] The medic noted that Russian forces focused fire on Red Cross-marked UGVs that Ukrainian forces use for casualty evacuation in violation of international law.

The situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains very serious as Russian forces continue to advance and maintain intensified offensive operations. Russian forces are attempting to isolate Hulyaipole from the northeast, likely to support Russian efforts to seize the town from the east. Russian forces continued to advance toward Hulyaipole and the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway, which is one of Ukraine’s main GLOCs supplying Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on November 15 and 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Rivnopillya (northeast of Hulyaipole) and advanced east of Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole) along the O-080618 Hulyaipole-Malynivka highway.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Rivnopillya.[11] Recent Russian advances bring Russian forces within a roughly eight-kilometer range northeast of Hulyaipole and within about four kilometers east of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn acknowledged on November 15 that recent Russian advances threaten to cut off Hulyaipole from GLOCs, including the T-0401 highway.[12] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka, which runs directly along the T-0401 highway. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on November 15 that Russian infiltration operations in the Hulyaipole direction can now penetrate into Ukrainian defenses up to five kilometers past the frontline.[13] Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) appear to be operating near Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole), confirming that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade from positions south of Hulyaipole to reinforce efforts east of Hulyaipole.[14]

Ukrainian forces report that they are successfully pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk. These reports are generally consistent with ISW’s assessments. Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported on November 16 that Ukrainian forces control Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces have cut off Russian forces in northern Kupyansk from logistics.[15] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force noted that Russian forces are attempting to claim successful advances through fabricated flag raisings that Russian soldiers on the ground conduct with flags received in drone drops and supply packages. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 16 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Osynovo (south of Kupyansk) and Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from western Kupyansk and that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are infiltrating the town.[17] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk, and on October 26 that Russian forces encircled 18 Ukrainian battalions in Kupyansk.[18] ISW assessed that both claims were exaggerations of Russian gains in Kupyansk. The Joint Forces Task Force report suggests that Ukrainian forces are in the process of successfully rolling back a Russian effort to seize a settlement at this scale for the first time in recent years.

The Kremlin used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate Russia’s objective of absorbing all of Ukraine into Russia – possibly under the control of Medvedchuk himself. Medvedchuk’s statements are consistent with ISW’s assessments that Russia aims to absorb all of Ukraine and with US President Donald Trump’s statements that Putin “wants all of it.”[19] Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Putin, whom Putin initially wanted to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following Russia’s full-scale invasion, claimed in an interview that Kremlin newswire TASS published on November 15 that he believes that Ukraine will not “survive as a state” in the future.[20] Medvedchuk stated that he considers the reunification of Ukraine with Russia a strategic goal and called the preservation of an independent Ukraine a threat to Russia, claiming that an independent Ukraine will inevitably become a springboard for the “collective West.” Medvedchuk’s statements imply that Medvedchuk does not see himself as the future president of an independent Ukraine, but merely as the leader of his Other Ukraine organization – a Russian organization conducting the explicit Russification of Ukraine. Medvedchuk’s statements indicate that the Kremlin seeks to absorb all of Ukraine into Russia, not just the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly promoted Russia’s far-reaching territorial objectives involving the absorption of nearly all of Ukraine into Russia.[21]

Medvedchuk and other Russian officials are attempting to position him and his organization, Other Ukraine, as responsible for the absorption of Ukraine into Russia and the complete destruction of an independent Ukrainian political and cultural identity. Medvedchuk boasted about the success of forced integration efforts and continued to advance the false Russian narrative that Ukrainians want to be Russified.[22] Medvedchuk continued to promote the Other Ukraine organization that he created in January 2023 as a mechanism for Russification efforts through the claim that the organization has created six centers to ”assist“ former Ukrainian citizens in Russia.[23] Medvedchuk stated that he has repeatedly met with Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin to advance cooperation between the Other Ukraine organization and State Duma committees.[24] Medvedchuk stated that Volodin issued an order to include representatives of Other Ukraine in working committees and commissions of state duma committees. Medvedchuk's claims, not yet substantiated by other Russian officials, are an attempt to elevate Medvedchuk and his Other Ukraine project to the status of leaders of the Kremlin's project to Russify Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to encourage war crimes against Ukrainian servicemembers and civilians on the battlefield. Far-right Russian paramilitary unit Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group leader Alexei Milchakov amplified photos of the November 15 execution of three Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) and claimed that he would offer cash prizes to the first three people who submit a photo with “clearly executed prisoners in the background.”[25] Milchakov operates as both the leader of a Russian paramilitary unit and a prominent voice in the Russian milblogger information space, and his calls to commit war crimes against Ukrainian servicemembers reflect Russian forces’ widely accepted cultural and systemic practice of committing war crimes on the battlefield.

The Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 16 that it opened an investigation into Russian forces’ November 14 execution of three Ukrainian POWs in the Hulyaipole direction.[26] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence posted footage on November 15 showing Russian forces murdering two surrendering Ukrainian POWs on the outskirts of Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole).[27] A returned Ukrainian civilian whom Russian occupation authorities detained in occupied Donetsk Oblast in 2020 told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Russian occupation authorities brutally tortured him.[28] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are attempting to complete their encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
• The situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains very serious as Russian forces continue to advance and maintain intensified offensive operations.
• Ukrainian forces report that they are successfully pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk. These reports are generally consistent with ISW’s assessments.
• The Kremlin used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate Russia’s objective of absorbing all of Ukraine into Russia – possibly under the control of Medvedchuk himself. Medvedchuk’s statements are consistent with ISW’s assessments that Russia aims to absorb all of Ukraine and with US President Donald Trump’s statements that Putin “wants all of it.”
• Russian forces continue to encourage war crimes against Ukrainian servicemembers and civilians on the battlefield.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the refinery has an annual processing capacity of 8.8 million tons and produces more than 20 types of commercial products, including the highest grade of jet fuels for the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on November 15 shows explosions at the refinery.[31] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Russian air defenses repelled a Ukrainian drone strike overnight.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on November 15 and 16.[33]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 16 that Russian forces partially extricated encircled elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) from Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).[34]

Order of Battle: Molniya drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[35] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on November 15 and 16.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Synelnykove.[38] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka on November 16.[40]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the new regimental command of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), which Russian sources recently claimed is operating near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), is demanding 8,400 rubles (about $104) from each sub-unit to pay for the construction of a new command center.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Sadove (south of Kupyansk) and within northeastern Kupyansk.[42]

Russian forces attacked within and near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Dvorichanske; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane; and south of Kupyansk near Sadove on November 15 and 16.[43] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Osynovo (south of Kupyansk) and Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating within Kupyansk.[45] Artillery elements of the 275th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Borova itself; northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and toward Novoplatonivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Druzhelyubivka and toward Cherneshchyna on November 15 and 16 but did not advance.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Serednie, Korovii Yar, Drobysheve, and Derylove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Terny, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 15 and 16.[48]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are increasingly using sleeper drones to ambush vehicles on roads.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne and Zvanivka on November 15 and 16.[51]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have fire control over the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Siversk.[52]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on November 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the C050702 Shakhove-Koptieve highway north of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on November 15 and 16.[54]

A Ukrainian Border Guards inspector reported on November 16 that Russian forces near Kostyantynivka are trying to bypass Ukrainian positions by wearing civilian clothing – an act of perfidy under the Geneva Convention.[55] The inspector stated that Russian forces attack more often at night when they wear anti-thermal imaging cloaks. The inspector noted that Russian forces are taking advantage of worsening weather conditions when Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance and first-person view (FPV) drones are not as effective - in line with recent reporting on Russian tactics during poor weather conditions in other sectors of the front in eastern Ukraine.[56]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles south of Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[57] Reconnaissance drone and Lancet loitering munition operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery systems near Druzhkivka.[58] Strike drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[60]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, and Dorozhnie on November 15 and 16.[61]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Dorozhnie, Nove Shakhove, and the area from Boykivka (southeast of Dobropillya) to Zatyshok (southwest of Boykivka) and to Zapovidne (northwest of Boykivka) are contested "gray zones."[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for reports on recent Russian infiltration operations in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[63]

Russian forces attacked within and near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Rivne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on November 15 and 16.[64] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Kaira Drone Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]); of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, SMD); and of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[66] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad.[67] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zatyshok.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Filiya, and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on November 15 and 16.[69]

The Ukrainian 9th AC reported on November 16 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear Russian forces from Novopavlivka following a Russian company-sized mechanized assault into the settlement on November 14.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Orestopil and Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on November 15 and 16.[71]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies elements in the Russian rear on the night of November 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted an unspecified type of strike against a Rubikon drone storage depot and a fuel and lubricants pumping station at an unspecified location in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[72]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

See topline text for reports about assessed Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vesele and to the eastern outskirts of Zatyshshya (both east of Hulyaipole).[73]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Vysheve; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rivnopillya, Pavlivka, Pryvilne, Yablukove, Zlahoda, and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai, Zatyshshya, Vysoke, and Vesele on November 15 and 16.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]); of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate); and of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 16 that Russian forces seized Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[76]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, Prymorske, and Stepove on November 15 and 16.[77]

A servicemember of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast stated on November 15 that Russian forces recently intensified their offensive operations and are attempting to infiltrate in small groups of two to three personnel.[78] The servicemember stated that Russian forces are trying to move along the former Kakhovka Reservoir, which largely dried up following the Russian detonation of the Nova Kakhovka Dam in early June 2023. The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported that Russian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes in an attempt to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their advantageous positions. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), buggies, and civilian cars with anti-drone nets and electronic warfare (EW) systems to attack and are moving along windbreaks to avoid detection from Ukrainian reconnaissance drones.[79] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces may increase their use of heavy mechanized vehicles in the winter as motorized vehicles do not have the same cross-country abilities. The spokesperson noted that Russian fiber optic drones can break when flying long distances, can get caught on tree branches, and are not as fast as regular first-person view (FPV) drones, such that they are easier to shoot down.[80]

Order of Battle: FPV drone crews of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian firing points and drone control posts near Orikhiv.[81] Elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Prymorske.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 15 and 16.[83]

The Ukrainian Kherson City Military Administration reported that Russian forces struck a civilian car in Dniprovskyi Raion with a drone on the afternoon of November 16, injuring three civilians.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th VDV Division and an unspecified drone battalion of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[85] Drone operators of the Phobos drone group (reportedly of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[86] FPV drone crews of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[87]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 176 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which about 100 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that as of 0900 local time Ukrainian forces downed 139 drones; that 37 drones hit 14 locations; and that debris fell in two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck industrial, civilian, energy, and transport infrastructure in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts.[89] One of Ukraine's largest pharmaceutical distributors, Optima-Pharm, reported that Russian strikes completely destroyed the company's Dnipro City warehouse – the third strike against Optima-Pharm warehouse since late August 2025.[90]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 16 that Russian forces launched about 1,000 strike drones, almost 980 guided glide bombs, and 36 missiles against Ukraine in the past week (since roughly November 9).[91]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.