Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on November 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The situation in the Hulyaipole direction is deteriorating, although Russian forces will probably spend considerable time setting conditions for efforts to seize the settlement. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on November 12 that the situation in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) directions has “significantly worsened” as Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions and have seized three unspecified settlements.[1] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from positions near Novouspenivske and Nove (both northeast of Hulyaipole) and that fighting is ongoing for Rivnopillya, Yablukove, and Solodke (all northeast of Hulyaipole and west to northwest of Nove and Novouspenivka).[2] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on November 12 that mixed-weapon Russian strikes destroyed Ukrainian defensive positions and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the Rivnopillya area on the evening of November 11.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Yablukove (north of Hulyaipole), west of Rybne, south of Solodke, and west of Nove (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[4] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern boundary of Yablukove and that the terrain in the Hulyaipole area favors rapid advances but that Ukrainian mining operations are hindering them.[5]

Russian forces will likely attempt to isolate and encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through infiltration tactics. This new campaign design consists of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that degrades Ukraine's ability to sustain frontline forces such that Ukraine cannot defend against subsequent Russian offensive operations in the area; tactical interdiction efforts targeting local supply lines and Ukrainian drone operators; infiltration missions intended to identify, worsen, and exploit the resulting weak points in Ukrainian defenses such that Ukraine defenses become disorganized; and mass small group assaults to make rapid advances and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from an area.[6] Russian forces have been conducting a monthslong BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, including highways, roads, and railway lines.[7] This campaign is similar to the BAI campaign that Russian forces waged against Pokrovsk starting in Spring-Summer 2025, ahead of intensified operations to seize the town beginning in October 2025.[8] Russian forces intensified infiltration missions and have been making relatively quick advances in the Hulyaipole direction in recent weeks, and Russian milbloggers have identified interdicting and cutting the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway as a goal of these Russian advances.[9]

Elements of three Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) are currently arrayed to either conduct or support offensive operations against Hulyaipole. Elements of the Russian 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are currently responsible for and advancing in the area northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[10] Elements of the 5th CAA will likely push west to cut the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway before pursuing a relatively small encirclement. The Russian military command could choose to pursue a wider encirclement of Hulyaipole, which would threaten a larger portion of Ukrainian forces and land in the pocket at the expense of more time and resources. Elements of the 5th CAA are currently better arrayed to conduct a smaller encirclement of Hulyaipole that would more likely result in more limited advances and inflict fewer losses on Ukrainian forces, but would likely allow Russian forces to make an operationally significant advance in a shorter amount of time at a lower resource cost. Elements of the Russian 29th CAA (EMD) are operating on the northern flank of the 5th CAA in the area southeast to southwest of Velykomykhailivka.[11] Elements of the 29th CAA will likely pursue operations supporting Russian efforts to advance southwest and west of Velykomykhailivka toward Pokrovske, which could reinforce efforts to seize Hulyaipole given the area's proximity to Ukrainian GLOCs supporting Hulyaipole, such as the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway. Elements of the 35th CAA (EMD) are operating southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne, but elements of the 35th CAA have not begun actively pursuing offensive operations in the area south and southwest of Hulyaipole in recent weeks. The Ukrainian defenses in the Hulyaipole direction are best suited to defend against pushes from the south, so it is unlikely that elements of the 35th CAA would activate in this area as long as these defenses pose a significant challenge to Russian forces.[12]

Ukrainian forces will need to defend against Russian operational-level BAI and tactical-level interdiction to counter this new Russian campaign design. Russian operational-level BAI campaigns supporting offensive pushes in the Pokrovsk, Hulyaipole, and Kupyansk directions have lasted for months and preceded intensified Russian infiltrations toward or in the towns.[13] Russian forces begin these BAI campaigns by interdicting major Ukrainian GLOCs at operational depth using artillery, air, and drone strikes conducted by elite drone units. This interdiction campaign aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses sufficiently to allow Russian drone and artillery crews to advance to within tactical range of these GLOCs and local logistics lines to Ukrainian forward positions and thereby to intensify interdiction efforts at the tactical level as well. Russian BAI and tactical interdiction campaigns also intensively target Ukrainian drone operators and artillery crews, which are integral parts of Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian infiltration missions and infiltration assaults. Degrading Ukraine's drone and artillery capabilities creates holes in Ukrainian defenses that Russian forces can exploit for more rapid gains. Russian technological and operational-tactical innovations are the primary factors facilitating Russian advances in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk areas. Ukrainian forces will have to develop technological, operational, and tactical responses to this new Russian approach in order to disrupt it.

Russian forces will likely collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but the significance of seizing these towns will depend on the circumstances and conduct of the Ukrainian withdrawal.  Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk.[14] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced southwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), in eastern Novopidhorodne, and south of Molodetske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[15] Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces either maintain positions or recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk and Zakhidnyi Microraion (central Myrnohrad), areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[16] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 12 that Russian forces launched a large-scale multi-day motorized assault against Pokrovsk employing light equipment on the M-30 Selydove-Pokrovsk highway that runs through eastern Pokrovsk.[17] The corps reported that Russian forces have established firing positions in multiple areas of Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces still maintain logistics to Pokrovsk. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in Myrnohrad reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad continue to receive supplies.[18] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske, but did not retake the settlement.[19] The milblogger added that Russian forces continue to employ glide bomb strikes to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Myrnohrad.

ISW previously assessed that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would achieve an operationally-significant effect of depriving Ukraine of its use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub — an objective that Russia already achieved by July 2025.[20] The further operational significance of the seizure of Pokrovsk remains unclear but depends on several factors, including whether Ukrainian forces conduct an orderly withdrawal or disorderly retreat; whether Ukrainian forces are able to conduct a successful defense after the collapse of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket; and Russian forces’ ability to exploit the collapse of the pocket and conduct a successful pursuit.

Russian milbloggers are mounting a concerted informational campaign prematurely calling the fall of Pokrovsk, likely to influence the information space. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the majority of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) is a contested ”gray zone” and that Russian forces have "firm control" of Pokrovsk, having exploited recent thick fogs – likely referring to recent footage of Russian servicemembers entering Pokrovsk on motorcycles.[21] Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed on November 11 and 12 that Russian forces had nearly seized Pokrovsk.[22] Milbloggers and the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) also amplified artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of alleged Ukrainian mass surrenders in Myrnohrad, whose authenticity the Ukrainian General Staff and many of the milbloggers themselves refuted.[23] One milblogger claimed that Ukraine is distributing the footage in order to discredit and drown out "legitimate" footage showing the conditions of Ukrainian forces in the pocket — still portraying Russian forces as exerting more control in the area than available evidence currently supports.[24] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 46 percent of Pokrovsk and 10 percent of Myrnohrad.

The Russian military command continues efforts to consolidate and integrate drone units into conventional military structures, but the position of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies relative to the new Unmanned Systems Forces remains unclear. Deputy Commander of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Sergei Ishtuganov announced on November 11 that the Russian MoD created an independent Unmanned Systems Forces service that includes drone regiments, battalions, and other units.[25] ISW observed Russian efforts to establish a separate Unmanned Systems Forces service beginning in Summer 2024.[26] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced in December 2024 that the Russian MoD would establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as an independent service by the third quarter of 2025.[27] Ishtuganov stated that Russian forces will assign drone operators, engineers, technicians, and other support personnel to such elements, which coordinate with Russian manufacturers on drone and electronic warfare (EW) development.[28] These efforts are in line with the Russian MoD’s efforts to centralize Russian drone procurement and establish control over informal drone units that organically emerged within Russian military units since 2022.[29] Ishtuganov reiterated Russian intentions to create a dedicated higher military school for drone operators.[30] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree in July 2025 to create a higher military school for drone operators by 2027.[31] Ishtuganov and other Russian sources notably did not clarify the relationship of the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone crews to the newly-formed Russian Unmanned Systems Forces.

The Kremlin is conducting multiple information operations against the Baltic states as it did to justify the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of Phase Zero conditions-setting for a possible attack on the Baltic states at some point in the future. ISW is not currently forecasting an imminent Russian attack on the Baltics. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to Russian media on November 11 in which he brought together several Russian long-running information operations about the Baltic states.[32] Lavrov accused the Baltic states of "Russophobia," "anti-Russian" sentiments, and the mistreatment of Russian speakers and of failing to adhere to agreements with Russia. Lavrov presented the Baltic states as puppets of the United Kingdom, implying that they have lost their sovereignty. Lavrov suggested that they are not really European, implying that they belong properly to Russia and not Europe.[33] Lavrov also described the Baltic states as threatening Russia and claimed that "some figures" in the European Union have been "egging on" the Baltic states by suggesting that Kaliningrad Oblast could be "razed." The Kremlin has used similar informational lines against the Baltic states previously, but Lavrov's presentation of all of them together in a single statement is noteworthy.[34] Lavrov's accusations, both direct and veiled, against the Baltic states closely parallel the accusations the Kremlin has made against Ukraine to justify its illegal occupation of Crimea and parts of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in 2014 and the 2022 full-scale invasion.[35] Lavrov's November 11 statements are the continuation of ongoing Kremlin efforts to set informational conditions for a possible future attack on one or all Baltic states, and are thus part of ongoing Russian Phase Zero operations to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. ISW has observed no direct indicators of Russian preparations to attack NATO states imminently, and Phase Zero conditions-setting efforts can last for years. The Kremlin can also choose not to attack even after setting conditions to do so. ISW's assessments that these and other activities constitute Phase Zero conditions-setting efforts are meant to call attention to the parallels with pre-2022 Russian conditions-setting efforts vis-a-vis Ukraine but are not an imminent attack warning at this time.

Officials reported aerial incursions in French and Lithuanian airspace. French radio station Europe 1 reported on November 12 that French law enforcement observed an unidentified drone made several flights over the Mulhouse rail yard while French Leclerc battle tanks were in transit on the night of November 11 to 12.[36] Europe 1 reported that an unidentified drone flew twice over the ammunition production building of the Bergerac gunpowder factory in France on the night of November 10 to 11, and a source close to the investigation stated that the site’s jamming and identification system malfunctioned and failed to intercept the drone.[37] Lithuanian broadcaster LRT reported on November 11 that Lithuanian border guards intercepted eight balloons smuggling goods from Belarus to Lithuania, one of which border guards seized at the Rūdninkai training ground in the Šalčininkai district.[38] The various incursions into European airspace in recent weeks come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• The situation in the Hulyaipole direction is deteriorating, although Russian forces will probably spend considerable time setting conditions for efforts to seize the settlement.
• Russian forces will likely attempt to isolate and encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through infiltration tactics.

• Elements of three Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) are currently arrayed to either conduct or support offensive operations against Hulyaipole.

• Ukrainian forces will need to defend against Russian operational-level BAI and tactical-level interdiction to counter this new Russian campaign design.
• Russian forces will likely collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but the significance of seizing these towns will depend on the circumstances and conduct of the Ukrainian withdrawal.
• Russian milbloggers are mounting a concerted informational campaign prematurely calling the fall of Pokrovsk, likely to influence the information space.
• The Russian military command continues efforts to consolidate and integrate drone units into conventional military structures, but the position of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies relative to the new Unmanned Systems Forces remains unclear.
• The Kremlin is conducting multiple information operations against the Baltic states as it did to justify the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of Phase Zero conditions-setting for a possible attack on the Baltic states at some point in the future. ISW is not currently forecasting an imminent Russian attack on the Baltics.
• Officials reported aerial incursions in French and Lithuanian airspace.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure on the night of November 11 to 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces struck the Stavrolen petrochemical plant in Budyonnovsk, Stavropol Krai, overnight.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the plant produces polymers for Russian military equipment and drone components. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows fires near the facility.[41] Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed on November 12 that falling drone fragments started a fire at an unspecified industrial zone in Budyonnovsk overnight.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on November 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including southwest of Glushkovo near Novyi Put, north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on November 11 and 12.[43]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are reinforcing the entire frontline in Sumy Oblast to regain the tactical initiative.[44] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a pipeline infiltration operation south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City), but noted that the operation did not achieve the same element of surprise that Russian pipeline infiltration operations achieved in Avdiivka and Sudzha.[45] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces killed or wounded half of the Russian forces that traveled through the pipeline. The milblogger claimed that the new 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) commander Colonel Andrei Voronkov recently transferred 267 servicemembers of the division’s 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment from support elements to assault units.[46]

The Russian MoD posted footage on November 12 reportedly showing a Russian Shahed-type drone strike against a claimed Ukrainian position near Zarichne (northwest of Sumy City).[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Russian forces conducted an infiltration operation in southwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[49] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in southwestern Vovchansk in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Vovchanski Khutory on November 11 and 12.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Starytsia and Hatyshche (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[53]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Hryhorivka on November 11 and 12.[54]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 11 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-type drone strike against a Ukrainian position near Prykolotne (north of Velykyi Burluk).[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, and Hlushkivka, and toward Novoosynove on November 11 and 12.[56]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 12 that Russian forces are intensifying attempts to cross the Oskil River as worsening weather conditions in the direction degrade Ukrainian drone observation capabilities.[57] The brigade commander reported that Russian infantry is attempting to swim across the river after Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed Russian heavy equipment and motorcycles that attempted to cross the river. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the direction reported that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly reduced platoon-sized motorized assault in the direction involving 15 motorcycles, all of which Ukrainian forces destroyed.[58] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces support motorized assaults with intense Molniya drone and Lancet loitering munition strikes.

Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces are stabilizing the situation in Kupyansk.[59] Synehubov noted that roughly 600 residents remain in Kupyansk.

A Russian source claimed on November 12 that Russian forces are operating in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[60] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces are operating in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on November 11.[61]

A Russian unit commander of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in the Kupyansk direction claimed on November 11 that Russian forces used new Zanoza first-person view (FPV) heavy bomber drones to destroy four long-distance Ukrainian crossings near Kupyansk in an effort to undermine Ukrainian logistics.[62] Russian newswire TASS reported that Zanoza drones have fiber optic cable controls, which make these drones resistant to electronic warfare (EW).[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in western Kupyansk.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Nadiia; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Novoserhiivka on November 11 and 12.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chernyi Voron Drone Detachment (245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Pisky-Radkivski (south of Borova).[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, and Shandryholove and toward Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub, Karpivka, Novyi Myr, and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 11 and 12.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoselivka.[68]

A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 12 that Ukrainian drone operations are hindering Russian advances near Yampil.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Hyperion Unmanned Systems Battalion of the 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Yampil, Zakitne (south of Yampil), and Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[70] Drone operators of the 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division) and of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[71]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Siversk.[72]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka on November 11 and 12.[73]

A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 12 that Ukrainian drone operations are complicating Russian attacks in the outskirts of Dronivka.[74]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the eastern outskirts of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[75]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway south of Kostyantynivka.[76] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), apart from the southern part of the settlement, is a contested "gray zone."[77]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 9 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced west of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[78]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne, Bila Hora, and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 11 and 12.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Volodymyrivka.[80]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on November 12 that Russian forces recently attempted to exploit fog to conduct a massed infantry assault in the Kostyantynivka direction, but the fog hindered Russian forces' ability to differentiate friendly from enemy forces.[81] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are increasingly using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for supply deliveries due to Ukrainian drones with increased ranges impeding Russian logistics.[82]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted Shahed-type drone strikes against civilian and energy infrastructure in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk overnight on November 11 to 12.[83]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone and Molniya loitering munition operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Pleshchiivka.[84] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly using Molniya-2 loitering munitions to strike Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[85] Drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly coordinating drone strikes against Ukrainian equipment near Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak, Dorozhnie, and Zapovidne on November 11 and 12.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne, Dorozhnie, Nove Shakhove, and Shakhove on November 11 and 12.[88]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 11 that Russian forces incurred heavy vehicle losses in a series of recent mechanized assaults toward the eastern outskirts of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[89]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 11 that Ukrainian drone saturation in the Dobropillya tactical area in tandem with reduced foliage, is complicating Russian advances and that Russian forces leverage fog to advance.[90]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances, unconfirmed claims of Russian advances, and recessions of Russian claims.

Russian forces attacked near and in Pokrovsk itself; west of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Rih, Hnativka, Rivne, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka, Sukhyi Yar, and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 11 and 12.[91] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk, Zatyshok, Rodynske, Rivne, and Hryshyne.[92]

Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on November 1 that 1,253 civilians remain in Pokrovsk and 1,350 civilians in Myrnohrad.[93]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.[94] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Rodynske.[95] Elements of the Russian Tiger Battalion of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[96] Drone operators of the Kaira Drone Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novopavlivka.[98]

Russian forces attacked towards Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on November 11 and 12.[99]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 11 and 12 that Russian forces advanced north of Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka) and north of Yehorivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[101]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Stepove, and Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Zlahoda and Verbove on November 11 and 12.[102]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Novyi Svit, Donetsk Oblast.[103] Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking the occupied Starobesheve thermal power plant near Novyi Svit.[104]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced amid intensified offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction.

See topline text for Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole near Rivnopillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne and Rybne; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai on November 11 and 12.[105]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Prymorske and Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[106]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on November 11 and 12.[107]

A Russian milblogger published footage on November 12 reportedly showing elements of the Russian Burevestnik Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment and 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps) employing rocket launcher-equipped Malvina unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to strike Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[108]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Stepnohirsk.[109] Drone operators of the 74th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Military Base, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Zaporizhia direction.[110]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge, on November 12, but did not advance.[111]

Recent footage confirms damage from recent Ukrainian strikes against oil terminals in occupied Crimea. A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) unit published footage on November 12 showing the damage to oil terminals in occupied Feodosia following Ukrainian strikes on November 10 to 11; October 12 to 13; October 6; and September 29.[112]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 121 drones, including roughly 70 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[113] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 90 drones and that 31 drones struck 19 unspecified locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones damaged civilian and residential infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[114] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, four glide bombs, and 23 Shahed-type drones, two first-person view (FPV) drones, and two unspecified drones against Kharkiv City and Oblast on November 11, injuring five civilians and damaging railway infrastructure in Barvinkove, Iziumskyi Raion.[115] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian strikes damaged residential infrastructure and caused a fire in Pereskipskyi Raion, Odesa City, overnight.[116] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian Border Guard unit operating in Chernihiv Oblast reported on November 12 that Russian forces struck unspecified locations in Snovska and Seminivska hromadas with FPV and fiber-optic FPV drones on November 11.[117]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian electronic warfare, interceptor drones, helicopters, and mobile fire groups have downed over 150 Russian drones since the beginning of October 2025.[118]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.