Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2025

November 21, 2025, 10:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on November 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to indicate that his demands have not fundamentally changed since the August 2025 Alaska summit. Putin held a Security Council meeting on November 21 and explicitly addressed the US-proposed 28-point peace plan to end the war in Ukraine.[1] Putin stated that the Kremlin has received a copy of the proposed deal and that US President Donald Trump had already proposed a peace plan to Russia before the Alaska summit. Putin stated that Russia agrees with the proposals that he and Trump discussed during the Alaska summit. Other Russian officials, including Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, have also responded to the 28-point peace plan by reiterating Russia's commitment to the Alaska summit principles.[2] The exact parameters of discussions at the Alaska summit between Trump and Putin remain unclear, but Putin used the press conference at the summit to reiterate his demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war (Kremlin shorthand for demanding its original war aims about NATO expansion and the removal of the current Ukrainian government).[3] US officials noted after the summit that Putin was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine, and Putin reportedly indicated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) could be a possible guarantor.[4] Russian officials reiterated their demands after the summit that European-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and the deployment of European peacekeeping contingents to Ukraine are unacceptable and made several statements following the summit that Russia's conditions for ending the war had not changed.[5]

Peskov also reiterated on November 21 that the Kremlin would rather negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine and bilateral US-Russia issues separately, contrary to the Trump administration's stated interest and the terms of the 28-point peace proposal.[6] The Kremlin has historically used public statements to clarify Russia's negotiating positions to the West, such as when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to several Russian and US media outlets in August 2025 after the Alaska summit to reiterate that Russia's demands to end the war had not changed.[7] Kremlin officials have offered no variance on their longstanding position to date.

Reported Russian government insiders also indicated that the Kremlin does not support the proposed 28-point peace plan. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on November 21 that diplomatic sources and sources close to the Kremlin stated that the provisions in the 28-point peace plan should be seen more as a basis of a future agreement and not an agreement that Putin would formally sign.[8] One source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that the plan in its current form is "not ready" and that Russia objects to the proposed security guarantees for Ukraine, the cap on the Ukrainian military much greater than that Russia demanded in 2022, the proposed method of sanctions relief for Russia (likely referring to the lack of set conditions under which the United States would lift sanctions), and use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. A high-ranking Russian federal government source working on the peace negotiations reportedly stated that Trump is in a hurry to conclude a deal but that Putin is "not so much." The source reportedly stated that the current document has too many vague points that postpone the resolution of contentious issues between Russia and Ukraine "indefinitely." The source expressed doubt that Russia would ratify an agreement that does not clarify in detail Russia's issues, including borders and deadlines to fulfill the document's conditions. The source noted that Putin's visit to a command post of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces on November 20 in a military uniform "demonstrate[d] his firm position" while the "entire planet is discussing a peace plan."

Russian officials are setting informational conditions to reject the 28-point peace plan, which acquiesces to many — but not all — of Russia's persistent war demands. Putin and other prominent Russian officials continue to reiterate publicly that Russia will achieve its war goals militarily. Putin reiterated on November 21 that Russia is open to achieving peace through diplomatic means but that Russia is "happy" to continue pursuing its war goals militarily.[9] Putin visited a command post of the Russian Western Group of Forces on November 20 and stated that the most important task is to achieve Russia's war goals, which Putin claimed the "Fatherland" and "people of Russia" had set before the Kremlin.[10] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov told Putin at the meeting that Russian forces will continue their mission to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in accordance with the military's existing plans. These statements reinforce to the Russian people that they should expect Russia to occupy the entirety of all four oblasts.

Other Russian officials are signaling more directly to the Russian populace that the 28-point peace deal is unacceptable for Russia. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated that a peace plan is not in Russia's interests, given Russian advances in Ukraine, and claimed that Russia cannot trust the West to uphold the terms of the peace deal, including the point that NATO would not expand.[11] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that the 28-point peace proposal will not lead to a sustainable peace and that no US- or European-proposed agreements will ever lead to such a peace.[12] Zhuravlev claimed that the war can only end with Russia's "unequivocal victory on the front" and with "Ukraine's capitulation."

The Kremlin has thus far failed to set conditions for the Russian people to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.[13] Commentary from Russian ultranationalists — Putin's main constituency — indicates that the people upon whom Putin relies for support retain the same expectations for the war that Putin introduced in February 2022, despite the new 28-point proposal. Russian ultranationalist voices criticized the 28-point peace plan for requiring Russia to give up its war goals.[14] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers also criticized the peace proposal as unsustainable and claimed that such a deal would lead to further confrontation in the future.[15] The milbloggers broadly expressed support for continuing the war and claimed that the proposal does not benefit Russia and contains some unacceptable stipulations that must change.[16] A prominent milblogger criticized the deal for not giving Russia all of the Ukrainian oblasts it has illegally annexed, including areas that Russia does not currently occupy in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[17] Official Russian reactions, including from Putin, in response to the 28-point peace plan reinforce, rather than reject, the expectation that Russia will achieve all of its war goals before agreeing to peace.

The Kremlin has similarly rejected US-proposed ceasefires and negotiations in recent months, while Ukraine has consistently shown a willingness to engage and compromise. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated Ukraine's willingness to work with the United States on the proposed peace plan, even though the plan imposes major concessions on Ukraine, few on Russia, and largely amounts to Ukraine's surrender.[18] Putin stated that the 28-point peace proposal "could form the basis" of a permanent peace but requires a substantive discussion.[19] Putin and other Kremlin officials reiterated the Kremlin's commitment to achieving its original war goals through diplomatic means, but have rejected prior US-led proposals.[20] Ukraine has agreed to every ceasefire and prisoner exchange that the Trump administration has proposed to date and demonstrated a willingness to compromise on terms for a permanent peace. The sudden and public imposition of the plan on Ukraine, while also requiring Ukraine to make a rapid decision about the plan with less than a week of consideration time, makes Ukraine appear to be the unwilling party that is blocking progress, even though the Kremlin itself has expressed disapproval of the plan.[21] The Kremlin likely seeks to divide Ukraine from the United States such that Russia can continue its war against Ukraine without US and Western support and backing.

The proposed peace plan would not bring Russia and Ukraine closer to a just and lasting peace but would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine in the future. Axios reported on November 21 that the 28-point plan includes “Article 5-like” security guarantees for Ukraine — referring to NATO’s collective defense clause — but that these guarantees would only last for 10 years and need to be renewed.[22] The time limit on security guarantees for Ukraine would allow Russia to reinvade Ukraine with an experienced, rested, and reconstituted military after the guarantees expire.[23] The battle lines set forth by the proposed peace plan would additionally heavily favor another Russian invasion.[24] Any peace deal that requires Ukraine to withdraw from Donetsk Oblast would force Ukraine to withdraw to lines that would largely be indefensible against renewed Russian aggression and likely allow Russia to launch renewed pushes into southern Kharkiv Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts from the proposed ”frozen” frontline.

Putin and Russian military commanders continue to promote the false narrative that a Russian victory is inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands. Putin notably wore a military uniform for his November 20 meeting at the Western Grouping of Forces command post– the fourth time he has worn a military uniform to a public event since the start of the full-scale invasion and only a few weeks after his second and third times doing so in mid-September and late October 2025.[25] Gerasimov opened his report by claiming that Russian forces are advancing on virtually all fronts on the battlefield. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces have seized over 80 percent of Vovchansk and over 75 percent of Pokrovsk. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized 34 percent of Vovchansk and 46 percent of Pokrovsk, however. Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Medvedev, who recently became the commander after serving as the grouping's chief of staff, claimed that Russian forces have taken control of eastern and southeastern Kostyantynivka and have started to clear the central area. ISW has only observed evidence of Russian infiltration missions into limited areas in southeastern Kostyantynivka, however. Medvedev stated that the Russian military command plans to seize most of Kostyantynivka by mid-December 2025. Putin responded that it is not important to set specific deadlines, but Medvedev's statement is an attempt to paint the Russian military command as confident in its ability to seize rapidly the southern tip of Ukraine's heavily fortified Fortress Belt.

The Russian military command continued to exaggerate claims about successes in Kupyansk – a narrative the Kremlin began to heavily promote in late August 2025.[26] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized all of Kupyansk.[27] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized and maintain control over Kupyansk, but that Russian forces are still destroying small, scattered Ukrainian groups in the town. Kuzovlev claimed that elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division are cooperating with elements of the 47th Tank Division and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) to destroy the Ukrainian forces encircled on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction. Putin claimed during the November 21 Security Council meeting that Kupyansk is a recent example of what Russian forces will "inevitably" repeat in other areas of the front.[28] Kupyansk is notably one area of the front where Ukrainian forces have been successfully pushing back Russian offensive efforts.[29] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction are in the process of successfully rolling back a Russian effort to seize a settlement of this scale for the first time in recent years.[30]

The Russian military command continued to use flag raising across the battlefield to support its allegations of Russian successes. Geolocate footage published on November 21 shows small groups of two to five Russian servicemembers raising flags in Kupyansk, Novoselivka, Stavky, and Yampil — four settlements that the Russian military commanders claimed that Russian forces had seized in the meeting with Putin.[31] ISW assesses that these flag raisings were part of Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). Russia has increasingly relied on footage showing Russian flag raisings to claim advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[32] The Russian military command likely timed the flag raisings with the meeting with Putin in order to garner informational effects and provide alleged evidence to back the commanders' claims.

Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials both refuted many of the Russian commanders' claimed successes. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that there is no evidence of Russian control of the area south of Svativska Street in central Kupyansk or the industrial area east of the railway.[33] The milblogger also noted that Kuzovlev's claim that Russian forces seized Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) is also "uncertain" as there is no evidence or footage of Russian forces raising flags in the settlement, and the situation near the bridgehead in the area remains "tense." A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces stated that Gerasimov's claim about the seizure of Kupyansk is unconfirmed, and another milblogger claimed that it is premature to talk about the seizure of Yampil.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff denied claims that Russian forces seized Kupyansk, stating that Ukrainian efforts to detect and eliminate the Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that infiltrated into the town and its suburbs are ongoing.[35] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported that groups of Russian soldiers numbering about 40 total personnel are scattered in northern Kupyansk.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly denied the claimed seizure of Yampil and percentages of Vovchansk and Pokrovsk that Russian forces control.

Russia’s battlefield successes are not inevitable, and the Kremlin is intensifying efforts to aggrandize recent Russian military activity to advocate that Ukraine surrender terrain in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to actually seize without several years of campaigning. Russian forces seized approximately 908 square kilometers of additional territory (about the area of Berlin) in all of Ukraine since the Alaska summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 15. Some of these territorial gains were enabled by seasonal weather (fog and rain), which degraded Ukraine’s use of drones, and the rate of Russian advance will likely slow as weather conditions stabilize. Continued European military assistance and European-financed American weapons sales to Ukraine will likely enable Ukrainian forces to defend Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast for several years, and possibly even reverse some Russian gains. Russia is facing mounting materiel, manpower, and economic challenges that will continue to compound and constrain Russia’s ability to resource the war as it protracts.[37] Russia is therefore heavily vested in compelling Ukraine to surrender critical terrain that the Russian military is very unlikely to obtain by force on any rapid timeline.

Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in the Pokrovsk direction, where the situation remains serious and dynamic. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in and around Pokrovsk and continue to hold back Russian advances in the area. Geolocated footage published on November 20 and 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway and northeast of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[38] Pokrovsk itself remains contested, underscoring the fluid and interspersed nature of the frontline. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 21 that Ukrainian forces hold defined lines in northern Pokrovsk and maintain positions south of the Donetska Railway line.[39] The 7th Corps reported that Ukrainian forces are also clearing Russian forces from the northern outskirts of Myrnohrad. Russian milbloggers also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within Pokrovsk itself; between Kozatske (east of Myrnohrad) and Promin (just southeast of Kozatske); and between Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and the railway line that runs northeast of Sukhyi Yar.[40]

Russian forces continue to use drones and glide bombs to target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion reported that Russian forces are heavily striking Pokrovsk with guided glide bombs and are relying on the Russian Rubikon Center for Unmanned Technologies — the elements that have been largely responsible for successes in Russia's battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts.[41] The spokesperson added that Rubikon has an unlimited number of drones and highly trained operators in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces have increased their use of fiber optic drones with longer ranges and are focusing on striking Ukrainian drone operators.[42] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are also using "waiter" drones along Ukrainian GLOCs.

Russian military command appears to be redeploying relatively elite forces to the Pokrovsk direction, likely in response to the slowed rate of Russian advances. The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 21 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to the Pokrovsk direction.[43] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed in early September 2025 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the division from the Sumy direction to an unspecified area, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in late September 2025 that the command transferred elements of the 76th VDV Division to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the south Donetsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka directions) and to the AoR of the 35th CAA (EMD) in the Hulyaipole direction.[44] The Russian military command may have planned in September to deploy elements of the division to offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk or Zaporizhia oblasts, but may have deployed the forces to the Pokrovsk direction due to the slowed rate of Russian advances and continued Ukrainian resistance in the area. Russia has used the redeployment of elements of the 76th VDV Division to respond to critical situations on the front in the past, including deployments to Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and to Kursk Oblast during the Ukrainian incursion in 2024.[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to indicate that his demands have not fundamentally changed since the August 2025 Alaska summit.
• Reported Russian government insiders also indicated that the Kremlin does not support the proposed 28-point peace plan.
• Russian officials are setting informational conditions to reject the 28-point peace plan, which acquiesces to many — but not all — of Russia's persistent war demands.
• The Kremlin has thus far failed to set conditions for the Russian people to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin has similarly rejected US-proposed ceasefires and negotiations in recent months, while Ukraine has consistently shown a willingness to engage and compromise.
• The proposed peace plan would not bring Russia and Ukraine closer to a just and lasting peace but would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine in the future.
• Putin and Russian military commanders continue to promote the false narrative that a Russian victory is inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands.
• Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials both refuted many of the Russian commanders' claimed successes.
• Russia’s battlefield successes are not inevitable, and the Kremlin is intensifying efforts to aggrandize recent Russian military activity to advocate that Ukraine surrender terrain in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to actually seize.
• Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in the Pokrovsk direction, where the situation remains serious and dynamic.
• Russian military command appears to be redeploying relatively elite forces to the Pokrovsk direction, likely in response to the slowed rate of Russian advances.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces may have struck Russian infrastructure on the night of November 20 to 21. Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed on November 21 that Ukrainian drones struck a Russian brick factory in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai, overnight, and footage shows explosions and air defenses activating in Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses downed nine Ukrainian drones over Krasnodar Krai overnight.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced from Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City), and near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[48]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, on November 20 and 21.[49]

The milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 83rd Separate VDV Brigade took advantage of fog and rain in the area to launch an intensified offensive operation near Andriivka.[50] ISW has recently observed reports of Russian forces taking advantage of fog and rain, which reduce Ukrainian drone operations, to intensify ground assaults in the theater.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 November 21 situational report (SITREP) reported that Russian forces conducted 10 assaults in the Sumy Oblast border area, an increase from one assault each in its 2200 November 20 and 0800 November 21 SITREPs and consistent with the milblogger's reporting.[52]

The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones struck two Russian ammunitions depots near Troebortnoye, Bryansk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City).[53] The milblogger questioned why Russian command placed two ammunition depots so close to each other with no camouflage.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian forces with Geran-2 strike drones near Sapushyno (55 kilometers northwest of Sumy City).[54] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) reportedly struck Ukrainian bridges in Karpovychyi, Chernihiv Oblast, and Romashkove, Sumy Oblast (both northwest of Sumy City).[55]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[56]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on November 20 and 21.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Black Raven drone detachment (reportedly of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie and southeast of Velyki Burluk toward Kolodyazne on November 20 and 21.[59]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Khatnie.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for Russian infiltrations and claims of advance in Kupyansk.

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Pishchane on November 20 and 21.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk itself, and from Blahodativka (west of Kupyansk) and Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk).[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 20 that Russian forces are attempting to use vehicles and motorcycles to cross the drone "kill zone" (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) in this direction and engage Ukrainian forces in smalls arms battles.[63] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to take advantage of fog and rain, reducing Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and strikes. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have reduced their airstrikes with glide bombs and increased their artillery strikes in the Kupyansk direction and are striking Ukrainian river crossings.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 51st Separate Engineer-Sapper Battalion (reportedly of the 1st GTA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Podoly (southwest of Kupyansk).[64] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velyka Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[65] FPV drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian personnel and equipment near Osadkivka (southwest of Kupyansk).[66] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment with the claimed seizure of Kupyansk and elements of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division) with the claimed seizure of Petropavlivka.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Kopanky and toward Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoeyhorivka on November 20 and 21.[68]

Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News amplified footage purportedly of a Russian servicemember of the Russian 10th Company of the 4th Battalion of the 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) stating that the unit, which is operating in Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova), lacks supplies and that the commander frequently abuses subordinates and extorts soldiers.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for Russian infiltrations in Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Yampil and that Russian forces advanced west, south, and north of the settlement.[70] Another Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces seized Yampil, however.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novoselivka.[72]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Shandryholove, Korovii Yar, Oleksandrivka, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Stavky; and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Stavky on November 20 and 21.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Korovii Yar, Oleksandrivka, and Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[74]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on November 21 that Russian forces no longer directly attack Yampil due to heavy losses and have reverted to attempting to bypass Yampil from the north to move toward Lyman.[75] Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone effectiveness to covertly advance using thermal cloaks.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the commander of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) is incompetent and that elements of the 36th and 37th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division) suffered more losses from friendly fire incidents than from Ukrainian forces during the seizure of Torske (east of Lyman).[76] The milblogger added that while both regiments are quite good, the inter-regimental coordination is nonexistent.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[77] Elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in Novoselivka.[78] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) with seizing Yampil; of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) with seizing Novoselivka; and of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA with seizing Stavky.[79]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 21 that Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian partisans destroyed four Russian servicemembers and equipment in occupied Kalynove, Luhansk Oblast.[80]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on November 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Zvanivka (south of Siversk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[81]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Zvanivka and advanced north and northeast of the settlement.[82]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and Platonivka and toward Zakitne and Dibrova; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne and Zvanivka; and southwest of Siversk toward Sviato-Pokrovske on November 20 and 21.[83]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on November 21 that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed a Russian infiltration group in Siversk and stated that Russian forces currently do not control any part of Siversk.[84] ISW assessed that Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission into Siversk on November 18.[85] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are capitalizing on poor weather and have recently been conducting motorized attacks in the Siversk direction. Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces may be preparing to conduct a mechanized assault on Siversk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Sviato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[86]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 21 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[87] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, SMD) and Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) with seizing Ivanopillya.[88]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Predtechyne and Stupochky (both east of Kostyantynivka) and advanced west of Stupochky.[89]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novomarkove and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky, Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Ivanopillya, and Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Volodymyrivka, and Poltavka on November 20 and 21.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Volodymyrivka.[91]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[92] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian equipment in Kostyantynivka.[93] Artillery elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Chasiv Yar.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[95]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on November 20 and 21.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Dobropillya tactical area.[97]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Ukrainian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[98]

Russian forces attacked within and near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Rivne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 20 and 21.[99] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrnohrad and Hryshyne.[100]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Airborne Assault Forces reported on November 21 that a Russian small infantry group unsuccessfully tried to infiltrate into Hryshyne.[101] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the number of firefights has increased as Russian forces are increasingly attacking with infantry.[102] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are conducting logistics with motorcycles, bicycles, and buggies or on foot due to unpredictable weather.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian vehicles south of Rodynske.[103] Elements of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (also known as the Somalia Battalion) of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Novoekonomichne.[104] Elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[105]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta on November 20 and 21.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka; and west of Velykomykhailivka near Tykhe on November 20 and 21.[107] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe.[108]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kolomiitsi (west of Velykomykhailivka) and reportedly in Velykomykhailivka itself.[109]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 21 shows Russian servicemembers from the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags in northern Radisne (north of Hulyaipole along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[110] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of infiltration of Russian forces in northern Radisne at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces seized Radisne.[111] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole) and advanced east of Pishchane (northwest of Hulyaipole), south of Nechaivka and Ostapivske (both north of Hulyaipole), and north of Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole).[112]

Russian forces attacked toward Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Yablukove, Rivnopillya, Radisne, Vidradne, and Nove Zaporizhzhia; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne, Rybne, and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai, and Zatyshshya on November 20 and 21.[113] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vidradne (north of Hulyaipole) and Nove Zaporizhzhia.[114]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on November 21 that claims that Russian forces seized Vesele (east of Hulyaipole) are untrue and that fighting continues for the settlement.[115] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are unable to enter the settlement.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in Vesele.[116] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Hulyaipole with FAB glide bombs.[117]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[118]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohrisk, Kamyanske, Novoandriivka, Shcherbaky, Prymorske, and Stepove on November 20 and 21.[119]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Prymorske.[120] Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division and 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and personnel in the Zaporizhia direction.[121]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge on November 20 and 21, but did not advance.[122]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction published footage on November 20 and reported that Ukrainian naval drones struck a Russian logistics base on the right (east) bank of the Dnipro River, where Russian forces had been accumulating boats.[123]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian military equipment in occupied Crimea on the night of November 20 to 21. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ka-27 naval helicopter; a Lira-A10 radar system; a 55Zh6U Nebo-U radar system; a Nebo-SV radar; and a P-18 Terek radar in occupied Crimea.[124]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 115 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[125] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 95 drones, that 19 drones struck 12 locations, and that downed debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, residential, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa, oblasts.[126] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also conducted guided glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City overnight, killing five and injuring three others, and damaging multi-story buildings, a commercial market, a supermarket, and vehicles.[127]

Ukrainian State Emergency Services reported on November 21 that the death toll from the Russian missile and drone strike against Ternopil City on the night of November 18 to 19 rose to 31, with 94 people injured and 13 still missing.[128]

The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported on November 21 that Russian missile and drone strikes have damaged all major thermal and hydroelectric power plants in Ukraine, significantly reducing Ukraine’s electricity production capacity.[129]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.