Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on November 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are struggling to focus on a single decisive objective in the Pokrovsk direction and instead continue simultaneous attempts to close the encirclement of the wider Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket while also attacking within both towns. The Russian military command does not appear to be focusing forces and means on completing the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, which would normally be the fastest and least costly way to seize the entire area, and instead continues to pursue some level of head-on attacks. Geolocated footage published on November 18 and reportedly filmed on November 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northeastern Pokrovsk.[1] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Airborne Assault Forces reported on November 18 that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to infiltrate into Myrnohrad from the side of Krasnyi Lyman (north of Myrnohrad) — indicating that Russian forces operating north of Myrnohrad are not focused on advancing westward to close the encirclement but are attempting to attack southward directly into Myrnohrad.[2] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 18 that Russian forces are attempting to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Myrnohrad from the northwest and west.[3] Russian forces are also conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions throughout the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, likely to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and to destroy buildings and other shelters that Ukrainian forces use as part of their wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in the area.

Russian forces are likely struggling to complete the encirclement in part due to the threat that Ukrainian forces are posing to Russia's northern shoulder of the pocket. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating north of Myrnohrad on the northern shoulder but have been unable to sufficiently push to close the encirclement from the northeast.[4] The 51st CAA's opportunistic penetration in the Dobropillya tactical area (northeast of Pokrovsk) in August 2025 created vulnerabilities for Russian forces that Ukrainian forces have since exploited to threaten the rear of the 51st CAA elements fighting northeast of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command may assess that elements of the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), which are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk, can more effectively complete the encirclement from the western flank instead. The 2nd CAA continues to dedicate forces and means to attacks within Pokrovsk itself and north of the town, however, and does not seem to be prioritizing efforts to close the pocket from the west.

Russian forces are trying to employ their new offensive template in the Siversk and Slovyansk-Lyman directions to set conditions for an advance on Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the northeast and east. Russian forces have been employing a new operational template that relies on a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults.[5] ISW has recently reported on applications of this operational template in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[6] Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 123nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), recently infiltrated into southern and eastern Siversk, although ISW assesses this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that observed Russian infiltrations in southern Siversk suggest that Russian forces will try to covertly concentrate forces in the town in an effort to repeat the "Pokrovsk scenario."[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed on November 18 that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) seized Platonivka (northwest of Siversk) after conducting a feint, attacking under the cover of fog and rain when Ukrainian forces had limited drone support, and conducting first-person view (FPV) drone and artillery strikes.[9] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian seizure of Platonivka allows Russian forces to interdict the T-0513 Lyman-Siversk highway, although ISW has not observed geolocated footage confirming the alleged seizure.[10] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces have prevented Russian forces from reaching the T-0513 road.[11] Ukrainian military sources recently observed that Russian forces were conducting infiltration missions in groups of one to three personnel in order to accumulate forces in the Siversk direction and anticipated that Russian forces would conduct larger mechanized assaults in the winter after the ground freezes.[12] Ukrainian military sources also observed that Russian forces simultaneously saturated Ukraine's forward positions with various drones in an effort to sever Ukrainian logistics.[13]

Russian forces are similarly using infiltration tactics in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction against the backdrop of poor weather conditions and ongoing efforts to disrupt Ukraine's ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. The spokesperson of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps reported on November 18 that Russian forces are trying to infiltrate and establish forward positions in the Lyman direction in an effort to set conditions to conduct further flank attacks and to take Ukrainian forces into semi-encirclements.[14] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces conduct infiltration missions during rainy and foggy conditions that hinder Ukraine's ability to use drones. The spokesperson observed that Russian forces are trying to overwhelm the Ukrainian defensive system — likely referring to Ukraine's tactical “wall of drones” defensive barrier. The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are trying to undermine Ukraine's logistics with tactical drone strikes and infiltration missions that aim to accumulate forces for subsequent larger assaults. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction similarly reported on November 18 that Russian forces are trying to set conditions for assaults in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) by using FPV drones and fiber-optic sleeper drones to undermine Ukrainian logistics.[15] The NCO added that Russian forces are also using drones to coordinate artillery strikes before launching assaults.

ISW recently assessed that Russian forces have initially made significant advances in and around Pokrovsk after successfully achieving partial battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects that degraded Ukrainian GLOCs and enabled Russian infiltration missions.[16] Russian forces also relied on poor weather conditions to bypass the Ukrainian "wall of drones" and infiltrate weak spots in the Ukrainian defensive lines in the Pokrovsk direction.[17] Russian forces have been attempting to replicate this new campaign design in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions.[18] Russian forces appear to be employing this campaign design in the Siversk and Slovyansk-Lyman directions to put pressure on the Fortress Belt - Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces will likely further conduct infiltrations into Siversk and may attempt to infiltrate into Lyman but will likely need to allocate significant manpower, materiel, and time to recreate their Pokrovsk successes.[19] Russian forces have been faltering in their ability to coherently apply this offensive template in the Pokrovsk direction, highlighting the broader challenges Russian forces will face when operationalizing this campaign design throughout the entire theater.

Russian military commanders continue to order Russian forces to commit war crimes on the battlefield. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on November 18 that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Battalion of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) used two adults and one child as human shields during an assault on the northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk on November 10.[20] The SBU noted that the Russian military command gave the order to the battalion over a radio transceiver. Article 28 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War prohibits the use of civilians as "human shields."[21] The reported incident is in line with ISW’s long-held assessment that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[22] ISW has also observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Pokrovsk direction in recent weeks as Russian forces have approached and infiltrated the town.[23]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS missile strike against military targets within Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 18 that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike using ATACMS missiles against unspecified military targets in Russian territory.[24] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military has previously exploited sanctuary space on the Ukrainian-Russian border to facilitate ground operations in Ukraine and that hundreds of known military objects in Russia are in ATACMS range.[25]

Ukraine continues to collaborate with its European partners on the joint production of interceptor drones. Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom CEO Herman Smetanin announced on November 18 that Ukroboronprom and Czech aviation parts supplier Air Team signed an agreement on the joint development and production of interceptor drones.[26] The Ukrainian-Czech agreement comes against the backdrop of the recent launch of Ukrainian serial production of the ”Octopus” interceptor drone and the announcement of joint efforts between the Ukrainian and French defense industrial bases to produce interceptor drones.[27] Europe can learn important lessons from Ukraine’s air defense to understand how tactical and technological measures can counter Russia’s evolving aerial threats. ISW continues to assess that the West should support Ukraine’s interceptor drone program not only for Ukraine’s defense against Russian strikes, but also for the defense of Europe.[28]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16 that appeared to target the regional headquarters of major Ukrainian broadcasters. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 18 that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and 114 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which 70 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[29] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 101 drones, that four missiles and 13 drones hit 15 locations, and that drone debris hit two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged residential, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts and resulted in civilian deaths.[30] Ukrainian broadcasters Suspilne and Ukraine Radio Dnipro reported on November 18 that Russian forces struck both of their headquarters in Dnipro City.[31] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on November 18 that Russian forces severely damaged Suspilne Dnipro headquarters.[32]

Polish officials attributed the recent sabotage attacks against a Polish railway to Russian security services. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on November 18 that Russian secret services recruited two Ukrainian citizens who used explosives to damage two segments of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Mika and Lublin on November 16.[33] Polish Special Services Spokesperson Jacek Dobrzynski stated that “everything" indicates that Russian special services commissioned the sabotage attacks.[34] Tusk stated that the suspected saboteurs entered Poland from Belarus in Fall 2025 and returned to Belarus following the attacks.[35] Polish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz stated on November 18 that the sabotage attacks are part of Russia’s broader effort to “destroy community, destroy alliances, and sow uncertainty.”[36] Chief of the Polish General Staff Wiesław Kukula similarly stated on November 17 that Poland is in a ”pre-war situation” in which Russia is creating favorable conditions for “potential aggression on Polish territory.”[37] These official Polish statements cohere with ISW’s continued assessment that Russia is intensifying its ”Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are struggling to focus on a single decisive objective in the Pokrovsk direction and instead continue simultaneous attempts to close the encirclement of the wider Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket while also attacking within both towns.
• Russian forces are trying to employ their new offensive template in the Siversk and Slovyansk-Lyman directions to set conditions for an advance on Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the northeast and east.
• Russian military commanders continue to order Russian forces to commit war crimes on the battlefield.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS missile strike against military targets within Russia.
• Ukraine continues to collaborate with its European partners on the joint production of interceptor drones.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16 that appeared to target the regional headquarters of major Ukrainian broadcasters.
• Polish officials attributed the recent sabotage attacks against a Polish railway to Russian security services.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Pokrovsk and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline for reports about Ukrainian operations in the Russian Federation.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continue limited ground attacks in northern Sumy Oblast on November 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on November 17 and 18.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka.[40]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command transferred remnants of the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment's 2nd Battalion after 3rd Battalion elements suffered heavy losses in Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City).[41] The milblogger claimed that the command transferred the 3rd Battalion's officer corps to occupied Luhansk Oblast to recruit new personnel. The milblogger claimed that the 2nd Battalion subsequently relieved the 3rd Battalion in Oleksiivka.[42] The milblogger also claimed that the commander of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) is addressing issues with frontline evacuations, but that there are at least 331 personnel from the regiment's 1st Battalion alone that Russian forces were unable to evacuate from the battlefield near Tetkino, Ryzhivka, and Popovo-Lezhachi (all northeast of Sumy City) in the past six months.[43] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 51st and 119th airborne (VDV) regiments (both 106th VDV Division) are unsuccessfully attacking southern Yunakivka and that the Russian military command is gradually withdrawing elements of the 2nd battalion of the 119th VDV Regiment to recuperate after fighting in the area since August 2025.[44]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements and first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 106th VDV Division; elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 83rd Separate VDV Brigade; and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[45][46]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on November 18 that elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Tsehelne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in southern and central Vovchansk, south of Tykhe to the north (right) bank of the Vovcha River, and near Synelnykove (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on November 17 and 18.[49]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 244th Artillery Brigade (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[50] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Okhrimivka and Vovchanski Khutory (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske on November 17 and 18.[52]

Ukraine’s 16th Army Corps (AC) reported on November 18 that Russian forces are using new forces to attack near Dvorichanske and are incurring substantial losses.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) seized Dvorichanske from the south - likely referring to what ISW assessed on November 17 was a Russian infiltration mission.[54] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted Geran-2 drone strikes against Ukrainian positions near Velykyi Burluk.[55]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Khatnie.[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 18 but did not advance.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) and advanced northeast of the settlement, though likely did not make these advances recently.[57]

Russian forces attacked within and near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, and Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on November 17 and 18.[58] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Velyka Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and Blahodativka (west of Kupyansk).[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Pishchane.[60] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk, and elements of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate within Kupyansk.[61]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Borova direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows Ukrainian forces operating south of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[62]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Kruhlyakivka on November 18.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Nova Kruhlyakivka.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Yarova, and Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 17 and 18.[65]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 18 that Russian forces are committing poorly trained manpower to the Lyman direction.[66] The NCO stated that Russian forces sometimes transfer artillery systems across the Chornyi Zherebets River but are unable to transfer heavy military equipment including armored vehicles. The NCO reported that Russian forces may attempt to establish some river crossings across the Chornyi Zherebets River in the winter after the river and the ground freeze.

A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces were recently able to stabilize the frontlines near Lyman and that Russian forces shifted their focus to conducting small group attacks in the direction of Dibrova (southeast of Lyman) and Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman).[67] The source claimed that Russian forces are establishing positions east of Yampil and conducting infiltration missions into the settlement.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 18 that Russian forces conducted a Molniya-2 drone strike against a Ukrainian deployment point in the Lyman direction.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Rubtsi (northwest of Lyman) direction.[69] Elements of the 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[70]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently infiltrated into southern and eastern Siversk.

See topline text for reports on recent assessed Russian infiltration missions into Siversk.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Siversk, east and west of Platonivka (northwest of Siversk), and east of Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[71]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 18 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions east of Siversk - an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[72]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Zvanivka on November 17 and 18.[73]

Order of battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are fighting with elements of the 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) along the Siverskyi Donets River towards Zakitne (northwest of Siversk).[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on November 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Bondarne; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Kostyantynivka near Sofiivka on November 17 and 18.[75]

The spokesperson of the Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on November 18 that Russian forces struck a civilian vehicle with a first-person view (FPV) drone in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (immediately southeast of Druzhkivka), injuring one civilian.[76]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[77]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak on November 17 and 18.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Vilne (east of Dobropillya).[79]

Russian forces recently advanced in Pokrovsk.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), in northern Myrnohrad, and northwest of Rivne (both east of Pokrovsk).[80]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 17 and 18.[81] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[82]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 18 that the overall quality of Russian forces has significantly declined due to heavy losses.[83] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the fog of war is increasingly obscuring the situation in Rodynske.[84]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA CMD) are reportedly operating in Dinas Microraion of northeastern Pokrovsk and in Rih (east of Pokrovsk).[85] Drone operators and other elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[86] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast and south of Novopavlivka.[88] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces regained positions in northern Novopavlivka following the November 14 Russian mechanized assault into the settlement from the south.[89] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces only hold northern Novopavlivka and that Russian forces are clearing the rest of the town.[90]

Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne, and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove on November 17 and 18.[91]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces in the Novopavlivka direction have fire control over an unspecified sector of the T-0428 Mezhova-Novopavlivka highway.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Novopavlivka.[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Tykhe (west of Velykomykhailivka).[94]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Berezove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on November 17 and 18.[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 18 that Russian forces seized Nechaivka (north of Hulyaipole along the T-0401 Hulyaipole-Pokrovske highway).[96] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing on the settlement's northern outskirts and noted that there is no footage confirming the alleged seizure.[97] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vesele (east of Hulyaipole) and advanced west of Rivnopillya, southwest of Yablukove (both north of Hulyaipole), and west of Vesele.[98]

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole toward Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rivnopillya, Yablukove, Pryvilne, Pavlivka, Krasnohirske, and Zlahoda; and east of Hulyaipole near Vesele, Vysoke, Zatyshshya, and Zelenyi Hai on November 17 and 18.[99] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vidradne (north of Hulyaipole) and Solodke.[100]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Rivnopillya.[101] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Yablukove.[102]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central and eastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[103]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on November 17 and 18.[104]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on November 18 that Russian forces are attacking in small fireteams of one to two people at night.[105] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly striking civilian vehicles and homes in frontline settlements.

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division have seized 15 percent of Prymorske.[106]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on November 18 that Ukrainian forces are striking power grids in occupied Kamyanka-Dniprovska (west of Enerhodar) with artillery and drones.[107]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th VDV regiments (both 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Prymorske.[108] Elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[109] Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Mala Tokmachka.[110] Elements of the 104th VDV Division, including its 328th VDV Regiment; the 7th VDV Division; the 11th Separate VDV Brigade; the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division); and BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to VDV Forces) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[111]

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on November 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on November 17 and 18.[112]

Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on November 18 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian car at the entrance to Novovorontsovka (northeast of Kherson City) on November 18, killing one person and injuring another.[113]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 18 that elements of the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces undermined the effectiveness of the Ukrainian mobile anti-drone groups on Kherson City's eastern flank in 2025 with artillery strikes, and that Ukrainian forces began to build anti-drone nets along Ukrainian logistical routes.[114]

Order of Battle: Verba man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) crews of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City).[115]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for additional reports of Russia’s air, missile, and drone campaign.

Russian strikes continue to impact Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on November 18 that Ukraine implemented rolling blackouts across the country after Russian forces struck energy facilities in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kherson, and Donetsk oblasts on the night of November 17 to 18.[116] Ukraine’s railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported on November 18 that it is imposing temporary restrictions on civilian trains and rerouting some trains after Russian strikes damaged the railway network in Kharkiv Oblast.[117] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces struck several railway stations in Kharkiv Oblast, including stations in Berestyn.[118] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Berestyn with four Iskander-M ballistic missiles.[119]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi reported on November 17 that Russian strikes against electrical substations have forced the Khmelnitskyi and Rivne nuclear power plants (NPPs) to operate at reduced capacity since November 7.[120]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.