Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 22, 2025

November 22, 2025, 7:10 pm ET

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on November 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials and state media continue to set information conditions to reject the US-proposed 28-point peace plan, indicating that the Kremlin is actively conditioning the Russian people to not accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa commented on the peace plan, stating that any plan must adhere to Russia's full demands.[i] Chepa reiterated that Russia's objective is for any peace settlement to address the alleged "root causes" of its war in Ukraine, a deliberately vague term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand for its original war justifications and demands, such as the destruction of Ukrainian sovereignty and the NATO alliance.[ii] Chepa implied that the proposed peace plan offers more concessions to Russia than previous proposals but is still insufficient to address Russia's maximalist demands. Russian state TV channels and milbloggers highlighted similar narratives, including those about how Russia would only participate in a peace plan that eliminates the root causes of the war ­— implying that Russia is not interested in any peace negotiations until it accomplishes its goals on the battlefield.[iii] State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia will not give up any territories in Ukraine that it has illegally annexed, even areas that Russia does not fully occupy such as Zaporizhia Oblast.[iv] Kolesnik's statement indicates that the Kremlin is uninterested in making any territorial compromises. Kolesnik also reiterated the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, such that Ukraine should submit to Russia's full demands now.[v] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky stated that the peace plan is a "good basis" for a settlement but that Russian advances in eastern Ukraine are "equally compelling arguments" — implying that Russia remains committed to continuing its war in Ukraine on the battlefield.[vi] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions.[vii]

Ukrainian, American, and European delegations will meet on November 23 to discuss the US-proposed peace plan to end the war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on November 22 that Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak will lead a new Ukrainian negotiating delegation.[viii] The delegation includes: National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov, Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Head Oleh Ivashchenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsya, First Deputy National Security and Defense Council Secretary Yevheniy Ostryanskyy, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Deputy Head Oleksandr Pokland, and Advisor to the Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Oleksandr Bevz. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian, American, British, French, and German delegations will meet on November 23 in Switzerland to discuss the proposed 28-point peace plan.[ix] Reuters reported that a US official stated that US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll, whom US President Donald Trump reportedly appointed as a special envoy in the peace negotiations, will attend the upcoming talks in Geneva alongside US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.[x]

Ukrainian military officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces are pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk — in contrast to repeated Russian claims of seizing the town. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on November 21 that Russian forces continue to try to infiltrate into Kupyansk, but that the number of Russian soldiers in the northern part of the town has decreased to about 40 personnel.[xi] The Russian military command began to exaggerate Russian successes in Kupyansk in late August 2025 — a narrative that the Kremlin has only intensified in recent weeks.[xii] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev notably claimed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 20 that Russian forces had seized Kupyansk, and Russian milbloggers subsequently denied this claim.[xiii] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction continue to contest the town and are in the process of rolling back a Russian effort to infiltrate the town.[xiv] ISW has not observed sufficient geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized close to all of Kupyansk as of November 22.

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue attempts to seize Pokrovsk itself and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). Russian milbloggers claimed on November 21 and 22 that Russian forces seized Pokrovsk and advanced north of the town.[xv] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad highway in southern Rivne (between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad).[xvi] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have begun attacking into Myrnohrad along the T-0504 from Rivne and advanced in eastern Myrnohrad, likely in an attempt to fix Ukrainian forces within Myrnohrad while also tightening the encirclement around Myrnohrad and blocking Ukrainian egress routes from the town.[xvii] A Ukrainian servicemember acknowledged on November 21 that Ukrainian forces "completely" lost Pokrovsk and noted that Russian forces are attempting to narrow the egress route near Myrnohrad and Rivne.[xviii] The servicemember further stated that Russian forces have cut off all logistics into Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces will likely be unable to withdraw from the remaining, limited opening in the pocket.

The Russian military command continues to focus a significant number of forces to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, which is resulting in heavy Russian losses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 22 that Russia has concentrated over 150,000 servicemembers for offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.[xix] Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov told German outlet Die Zeit on November 20 that the Russian military command has amassed a large number of troops to take Pokrovsk and that there are about 400 Russian soldiers within the town.[xx] Hnatov noted that urban areas are easier to defend and more difficult to seize, resulting in high Russian losses. The Ukrainian Eastern Operation Task Force reported on November 22 that Russian forces are maintaining a high intensity of attacks and are primarily concentrating efforts on seizing Pokrovsk itself, despite heavy losses forcing the Russian military command to tap into operational reserves.[xxi] The Russian military command notably redeployed elements of the relatively elite 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to the Pokrovsk direction to support Russian efforts to seize the pocket, likely due to the slowing tempo of Russian advances in the area.[xxii] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after a 21-month campaign, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[xxiii]

Authorities recently reported multiple drone sightings over air bases and airports in the Netherlands. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans reported that authorities observed unidentified drones flying over Volkel Air Base near Eindhoven, a Royal Netherlands Air Force base that hosts a US Air Force squadron as part of NATO, on the evening of November 21.[xxiv] Brekelmans reported that attempts to shoot down the drones were unsuccessful and that authorities never recovered the drones after they flew away. Brekelmans reported that authorities also observed multiple drones at Eindhoven Airport on November 22 and subsequently suspended civilian and military air traffic.[xxv] Dutch authorities have not identified an actor behind the drone overflights as of this writing. These are the latest in a series of drone sightings over European airports and air bases in recent weeks, which come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[xxvi]

Ukrainian forces reportedly recently downed at least 19 Kinzhal ballistic missiles with electronic warfare (EW), likely in response to Ukraine's Patriot air defense interceptor missile shortages and Russian Kinzhal modifications. Servicemembers of the Ukrainian Night Watch EW unit told online outlet 404 in an article published on November 20 that the unit downed 19 Kinzhals over the past two weeks (roughly from November 6 to 20) and later revealed to Forbes that the unit may have downed 21 Kinzhals over an unspecified time period.[xxvii] Night Watch servicemembers stated that they use the Lima EW jamming system, which spoofs the Kinzhals' navigation system by creating a disruption field that prevents the missile from communicating with satellites within the Russian GLONASS system. The Lima EW system causes the missile to become confused about its location and rapidly change direction at a high speed, putting excessive stress on the airframe that causes the missile to ultimately fail to reach its target. A Night Watch servicemember noted that Ukrainian forces began to jam Kinzhals with the Lima system as an adaptation to Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptors and limitations of the air defense systems, likely referring to Russia's new technological innovations that allow Kinzhals to bypass Patriots. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 3 that Russia likely recently modified its Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles to execute unexpected diversionary maneuvers during the terminal flight phase to “confuse” Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missiles.[xxviii] Ukrainian forces have still been able to down Russian ballistic missiles with Patriot systems since the reported Russian modifications.[xxix] Ukrainian forces will continue to need both new EW systems and Patriot systems to repel persistent Russian drone and missile threats, particularly Russian ballistic missiles, despite these successful Ukrainian adaptations, in order to ensure continuous and reliable defenses throughout the country.

Russian forces are continuing to commit war crimes on the battlefield in Ukraine, particularly near Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation on November 22 into a video showing Russian forces executing five captured and unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) on November 19.[xxx] Article 13 of the Geneva Convention prohibits any unlawful act or omission by the detaining power which causes death or seriously endangers the health of a POW while in custody.[xxxi] ISW has observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Pokrovsk direction in recent weeks as Russian forces have approached and infiltrated the town.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials and state media continue to set information conditions to reject the US-proposed 28-point peace plan, indicating that the Kremlin is actively conditioning the Russian people to not accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian, American, and European delegations will meet on November 23 to discuss the US-proposed peace plan to end the war.
• Ukrainian military officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces are pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk — in contrast to repeated Russian claims of seizing the town.
• The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue attempts to seize Pokrovsk itself and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).
• Authorities recently reported multiple drone sightings over air bases and airports in the Netherlands.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly recently downed at least 19 Kinzhal ballistic missiles with electronic warfare (EW), likely in response to Ukraine's Patriot air defense interceptor missile shortages and Russian Kinzhal modifications.
• Russian forces are continuing to commit war crimes on the battlefield in Ukraine, particularly near Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military targets and energy infrastructure across several Russian regions on the night of November 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Special Operations Force (SSO) reported on November 22 that a Ukrainian FP-1 long-range drone downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in flight for the first time near Kuteynikovo, Rostov Oblast, presumably overnight.[xxxiii] Geolocated footage posted on November 22 shows a Ukrainian drone approaching the helicopter roughly 190 kilometers from the frontline.[xxxiv] Local residents told Russian opposition outlet Astra on November 22 that Ukrainian forces targeted the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast overnight and reported explosions near the facility.[xxxv] Footage published on November 22 shows the sound of a drone and an explosion in Syzran.[xxxvi] Samara Oblast Governor Vladislav Fedorishchev acknowledged on November 22 that Ukrainian drones targeted fuel and energy facilities in Samara Oblast.[xxxvii] Local residents told Astra on November 22 that explosions occurred overnight in Saratov City and Saratov Oblast.[xxxviii] Russian authorities closed the Saratov and Samara airports overnight.[xxxix] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein stated on November 22 that Ukrainian drones struck an electric substation in Borovsky Microraion of Rylsk, Kursk Oblast overnight, causing power outages for about 3,000 customers.[xl]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) elements seized some Ukrainian tactical positions on the northern outskirts of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City), respectively, during a large-scale multi-direction ground attack on November 21.[xli] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in Ryzhivka (northeast of Sumy City) and forced Russian forces to withdraw to previously held positions.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, on November 21 and 22.[xlii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[xliii]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian 83rd Separate VDV Brigade suffered heavy casualties and that Ukrainian forces captured three Russian prisoners of war (POWs) during a November 12 Russian attempt to infiltrate into Varachyne via a gas pipeline.[xliv] The milblogger additionally claimed that the Russian military command is deploying elements of the 4th Battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) to Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City).[xlv] The milblogger added that the battalion is subordinated to the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and criticized the Russian military command for employing specialist RVSN personnel as assault infantry — likely in future assaults against Andriivka (southwest of Volodymyrivka and north of Sumy City). The milblogger estimated that high casualties force the Russian military command to replenish the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment with new personnel every two to six months. The milblogger also amplified complaints from families of Russian servicemembers that the Russian military command is committing wounded personnel of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division), including the regiment's 9th Company, to assaults, likely in the Sumy direction.[xlvi]

Order of battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[xlvii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Vovchansk and western Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk on November 21 and 22.[xlix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 45th Spetsnaz Brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Ryasne (northwest of Kharkiv City).[l]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[li]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on November 21 and 22.[lii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[liii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

[Luhansk Oblast map]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain a presence in central and southern Kupyansk.[liv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are clearing Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[lv]

Russian forces attacked within and near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on November 21 and 22.[lvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within and near Kupyansk.[lvii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction continue to use small groups to bypass and infiltrate into Ukrainian positions.[lviii] Trehubov stated that the "kill zone" (an area immediately near the front line where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) is 20 kilometers wide, such that stealth is important on the battlefield. Trehubov noted that Russian forces are exploiting terrain and foggy weather conditions to try to attack unnoticed.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and vehicles on the western approaches to Kupyansk.[lix] Drone operators of the 1st GTA are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[lx] Drone operators and other elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[lxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 22 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in southeastern Bohuslavka (north of Borova) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxii]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Bohuslavka, east of Borova near Kopanky and toward Shyikivka, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on November 21 and 22.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position along the T-0513 Lyman-Siversk highway south of Yampil (southeast of Lyman) after what ISW was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the FEBA.[lxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west, southeast, and south of Yampil, in northern Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman), southeast and southwest of Stavky (north of Lyman), in southeastern Lyman, and along the T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway south of Lyman.[lxv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Shandryholove, Korovii Yar, and Drobysheve and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novomykhailivka, Novyi Myr, and Stavky; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 21 and 22.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Maslyakivka (just southeast of Lyman).[lxvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces continue to use small group tactics and strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) - in line with ISW's assessment of Russia's new campaign design that relies on a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign and small group infiltration missions and assaults.[lxviii] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using sleeper FPV drones to ambush Ukrainian vehicles along GLOCs and operating tanks as artillery from closed positions to hide from Ukrainian drones. The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command has massed a large number of forces in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR), including both well-trained and poorly trained soldiers. A Ukrainian servicemember assessed that Russian forces are trying to advance toward the Siverskyi Donets River and bypass Lyman from the south.[lxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces previously withdrew from Yampil, that Russian forces only control about 70 percent of the settlement, and that Ukrainian forces currently maintain positions in its southern area.[lxx] The milblogger claimed that it is unclear if Russian forces have consolidated positions in the settlement.[lxxi] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered southern Yampil and are clearing the settlement.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian equipment in the Lyman direction.[lxxiii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in the southeastern outskirts of Siversk, indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced along the Donetska Railroad in southern Siversk on a prior date – an area where Russian forces recently conducted infiltrations.[lxxiv]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Russian forces raising a Russian flag in the northeastern outskirts of Zvanivka (south of Siversk), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[lxxv]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in northeastern Platonivka (northwest of Siversk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[lxxvi] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of infiltration of Russian forces to Platonivka at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 22 that Russian forces seized Zvanivka.[lxxvii] Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the claimed seizure of Zvanivka.[lxxviii] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Siversk.[lxxix]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Siversk – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxxx]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Dronivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Zvanivka and toward Sviato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk toward Pazeno on November 21 and 22.[lxxxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade [3rd CAA] are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the southwestern outskirts of Siversk.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 18 and 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into western Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[lxxxiii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka); along the H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway south of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka); and into eastern Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxxiv] Another Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces continue to clear Ukrainian forces in northern Ivanopillya.[lxxxv]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 18 and 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in western Oleksandro-Shultyne – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxxxvi]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Kleban-Byk, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on November 21 and 22.[lxxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) and Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating south of Kostyantynivka.[lxxxix] Elements of the 1st Prizrak Territorial Defense Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the BARS-13 Pisarev Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are striking Ukrainian forces in and near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[xc] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating south of Stepanivka.[xci] Reconnaissance elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly coordinating Lancet loitering munition strikes with elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) against Ukrainian vehicles near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xcii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Kostyantynivka.[xciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 22 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on November 22 that Russian forces seized Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and advanced west of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[xciv]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Zapovidne on November 21 and 22.[xcv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shakhove.[xcvi]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on November 21 that Ukrainian forces liberated over 430 square kilometers during counterattacks in the Dobropillya direction and inflicted over 13,000 casualties on Russian forces.[xcvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for additional unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[xcviii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on November 21 and 22.[xcix] A Russian milblogger and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne, Rodynske, Udachne, and Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk).[c]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Maksim Krivonos Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps); the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (also known as the Somalia Battalion) of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD); and of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in and around Pokrovsk.[ci] FPV drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[cii] FPV drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[ciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and central Novopavlivka.[civ]

Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai on November 21 and 22.[cv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) reportedly continue to operate in and around Novopavlivka.[cvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and Berezove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on November 21 and 22.[cvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Velykomykhailivka.[cviii]

Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on November 22, citing local Telegram channels, that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on November 21 to 22, causing power outages in occupied Makiivka, Horlivka, Yenakiieve, Khartsyzk, Yasynuvata and other settlements.[cix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Nove Zaporizhzhia (north of Hulyaipole) and Vysoke (east of Hulyaipole).[cx] The Russian MoD credited elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of Nove Zaporizhzhia.[cxi]

Russian forces attacked toward Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Yablukove, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Rivnopillya and toward Varvarivka and Pryluky; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne, Zlahoda, and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya, Vysoke, Malynivka, and Zelenyi Hai on November 21 and 22.[cxii]

Hulyaipole Military Administration Head Serhiy Yarmak reported on November 22 that Russian forces conducted 15 KAB glide bomb strikes against Hulyaipole on November 21.[cxiii] ISW assesses that these strikes are likely part of Russian forces’ battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks on Hulyaipole itself.[cxiv]

Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov told German outlet Die Zeit on November 20 that the situation remains tense in the Hulyaipole direction and acknowledged that Russian forces have advanced but noted that Ukrainian forces have also launched successful counterattacks in other directions of the front.[cxv] Anonymous sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspline on November 21 that Russian forces have semi-encircled some Ukrainian units in the Hulyaipole direction, completely cutting off logistics to these units.[cxvi] Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces refuted such reports earlier on November 21, however, and stated that such reports aim to discredit the Ukrainian military command.[cxvii] Ukraine‘s Southern Defense Forces noted that the situation remains difficult, but that Ukrainian forces maintain communication with frontline units and are still able to facilitate logistics and evacuate personnel.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Nove Zaporizhzhia, Danylivka, and Nechaivka (both north of Hulyaipole).[cxviii] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting FAB guided glide bomb strikes on Hulyaipole.[cxix] Elements of the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Radisne (north of Hulyaipole).[cxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on November 21 and 22.[cxxi]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported that Russian forces conducted an at least reduced company-sized mechanized assault on November 21 near Mala Tokmachka.[cxxii] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed eight vehicles, including a tank and an MT-LB armored fighting vehicle (AFV). Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian brigade published on November 21 shows Russian vehicles attacking south of Mala Tokmachka.[cxxiii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) are contested "gray zones."[cxxiv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a KAB glide bomb strike against Zaporizhzhia City on November 20.[cxxv]

Order of Battle: Fiber optic drone operators of the Russian 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are striking Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) equipment southwest of Mahdalynivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[cxxvi] Drone operators of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups and positions in Zaporizhia Oblast, and sappers of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly using Kuryer unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to clear mines in the Orikhiv direction.[cxxvii] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 74th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast, including north of Orikhiv.[cxxviii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in Zaporizhia Oblast.[cxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 21 and 22.[cxxx]

Russian state newspaper Izvestia reported on November 21 that sources within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russian VDV elements operating in the Kherson direction will receive naval drones to strike coastal infrastructure and watercraft and to supply Russian troops over waterways.[cxxxi] Chairperson of the Russian Paratroopers Union Colonel Valery Yuryev claimed that the VDV units will use the naval drones on the Dnipro River and near its islands, particularly in the event of a future operation to cross the Dnipro River. Yuryev claimed that Russian forces will use the drones to destroy Ukrainian boats, cover Russian landing forces, conduct reconnaissance, and deliver supplies. Yuryev noted that the naval drones are equipped with machine guns and anti-tank guided rockets, can serve as aerial drone launch platforms, and can carry rocket artillery components. Military expert Alexei Leonkov told Izvestia that weather conditions impede aerial drone operations, particularly in the autumn and winter, but that Russian forces will be able to use the naval drones to reconnoiter coastal areas regardless of weather. Leonkov stated that the naval drones will also serve as floating loitering munitions to strike pontoon bridges or permanent bridges with warheads weighing 400 to 500 kilograms — significantly larger than the standard 20-to-50-kilogram payloads of most aerial drones on the frontline.

A Russian milblogger posted footage on November 22 showing the aftermath of a Russian drone strike against a Ukrainian medical vehicle in Kherson City, claiming that Russian forces will consider Red Cross-marked vehicles legitimate military targets — in violation of international law.[cxxxii]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces striking an electrical substation in occupied Yani Kapu, Crimea, on the night of November 21 and 22.[cxxxiii] The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the substation.[cxxxiv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 104 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 65 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[cxxxv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 drones, that the missile and 13 drones hit seven locations, and that the strikes were ongoing as of 0900 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and transport infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts, including the ferry crossing at the checkpoint on the Romanian-Ukrainian border in Orlivka, Odesa Oblast.[cxxxvi]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on November 21 that Russian forces have launched over 112,000 Shahed-type drones since the start of the full-scale invasion.[cxxxvii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus pardoned and returned 31 Ukrainian citizens to Ukraine. Belarusian Presidential Press Secretary Natalya Eismont stated on November 22 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko pardoned 31 Ukrainian citizens in accordance with US-Belarusian agreements and that Belarusian authorities returned the civilians to Ukraine.[cxxxviii] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on November 22 that Belarusian authorities had sentenced the Ukrainians to two to 11 years in prison, and that the youngest detainee was 18 years old.[cxxxix]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.