Ukraine Invasion Updates, October 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2025 

US President Donald Trump called for the United States to resume tests of its nuclear weapons, likely in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ostentatious announcements of recent tests of Russian nuclear weapons. Trump stated on October 29 that the United States will start testing its nuclear weapons "on an equal basis" since other countries have been testing their weapons.[i] Trump's decision comes against the backdrop of recent Kremlin announcements about tests of the nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable Burevestnik missile and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, whose ability to deliver nuclear warheads the Kremlin has been highlighting.[ii] Trump did not specify if the United States would test nuclear warheads or the delivery systems. Russian officials, however, largely claimed that the United States would begin testing nuclear warheads, alleging that Russia therefore would have a "free hand" to test its own nuclear warheads.[iii] Russia tested the Burevestnik and Poseidon delivery systems without nuclear warheads, but Kremlin officials have been publicly talking about the devastating effects the Burevestnik and Poseidon warheads would generate, flaunting the systems as powerful "doomsday" weapons that have no equal and that should force the West to "bow down" to Putin.[iv]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a unilateral micro-ceasefire near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk but provided no clarity on the timing of the micro-ceasefire. The Russian MoD stated on October 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an order for a temporary ceasefire to allow journalists to enter and see Ukrainian forces whom Russian forces have allegedly encircled in Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[v] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian military is willing to observe a five-to-six-hour ceasefire to ensure that journalists receive unimpeded entry and exit corridors to these towns, but that the ceasefire is contingent upon security guarantees for the journalists and Russian forces. ISW does not assess that Russian forces have encircled Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, or Myrnohrad at this time. Putin first offered such a micro-ceasefire on October 29, likely in part to claim that Russia is not the impediment to the peace process.[vi] The Kremlin likely intends to use the discussion of this unilateral micro-ceasefire to highlight Russia's claimed gains in the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions and to falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger notably acknowledged that the micro-ceasefire is part of a concerted Kremlin informational effort, commenting that the ceasefire is an "unusual step in the [Russian] information war."[vii]

Ukrainian military sources continued to provide details about the difficult situation in the Pokrovsk pocket. Ukrainian soldiers and commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction continued to indicate that Russian infiltration missions and force accumulations are complicating Ukrainian assault and defense operations and efforts to control Russian movements within the Pokrovsk pocket.[viii] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather to resume infiltration tactics in the Pokrovsk direction to inflate the extent of Russian gains.[ix] A Ukrainian brigade commander reported that heavy autumnal rains are preventing Russian forces from establishing logistics in Pokrovsk, however.[x] Both Ukrainian sources indicated that Russian drone operations are successfully interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to and within Pokrovsk and to Myrnohrad.[xi] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies have established a drone equivalent of "air superiority" in the Pokrovsk direction.[xii] The Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces, including drone operators, continue to dress as civilians – perfidy under international law – to conduct infiltration missions without detection.[xiii] An image from German outlet BILD shows a Russian soldier dressed as a civilian and wearing no military insignia in a high-rise building in Pokrovsk.[xiv] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi visited Ukrainian commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction and reported on October 30 that Russian claims of encircling Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad are false.[xv]

The Russian military command is currently prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction, having reportedly concentrated 11,000 personnel for the Pokrovsk effort.[xvi] The Russian rate of advance in the area, however, remains slow even as Ukrainian forces face increasing challenges in defending the area. Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have struggled with Russian infiltration missions and drone strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs for weeks, but continue to slow the pace of Russian advances, particularly on the eastern flank near Myrnohrad.[xvii] The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction may change if some factor influencing Russia's offensive capabilities or Ukraine's defensive capabilities changes. The changing nature of drone warfare and the increasingly porous nature of the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction make it difficult to assess the degree of control that Russian or Ukrainian forces exert within and around Pokrovsk. ISW is therefore unprepared to offer any assessments or forecasts at this time about the rate at which Russian forces may collapse the Ukrainian pocket near Pokrovsk.

The Kremlin is activating plans to use active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 29 that authorities in Danilovsky Raion, Yaroslavl Oblast are advertising positions for "trained" Russian citizens to work in mobile fire teams that are protecting the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery from drone strikes.[xviii] Regional authorities are offering recruits 3,000 rubles (about $37) per month for serving in the reserve and 40,000 rubles (about $500) per month for participating in training, and the refinery is promising an additional 50,000 rubles (about $625) per month. Mobile fire team participants will undergo 15 days of training before embarking on a 45-day tour of duty. The advertisement notes that Russian authorities will not send the reservists to fight in Ukraine. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Military Commissar Sergei Agafonov stated on October 24 that regional authorities have formed a Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) unit of reservists who have started to train on how to defend local factories from drone strikes.[xix] Agafonov also highlighted that the BARS reservists will only serve in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and will not deploy to Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that authorities in Tambov Oblast are also recruiting reservists to protect local critical infrastructure from drones.[xx] The Russian State Duma recently approved a bill allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia's active reserve to protect critical infrastructure in Russia.[xxi] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the deployment of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure in the Russian rear to set conditions to mobilize active reservists for combat in the future, including in Ukraine, while also bolstering defense of the infrastructure.[xxii]

Karelia Republic Head Artur Parfenchikov stated on October 30 that the republic authorities are working to form "volunteer squads" from conscripts returning from their mandatory military service.[xxiii] Parfenchikov stated that the volunteer squads would work with border guards along Karelia's border with NATO member Finland. The Russian military conscripts men semi-annually, at which point the conscripts undergo training and typically serve for one year.[xxiv] The conscripts become part of the Russian inactive reserve (also known as the "zapas") following their training and service.[xxv] Russian authorities may be looking for ways to use members of the inactive reserve to protect the Russian rear, as they are doing with the mobile fire teams made up of active reservists. Inactive reservists guarding the border of the Karelia Republic would gain valuable knowledge to use in a possible future NATO-Russia war.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes including over 700 projectiles against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 653 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – about 400 of which were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[xxvi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Nizhny Novgorod Oblast; five Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast; eight Kalibr cruise missiles from unspecified areas; two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; and one Kh-31P anti-radiation missile from the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 623 of the 705 air targets, including 592 drones, seven Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-K missile, 21 Kh-101 missiles, and two Kh-59/69 missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 16 missiles and 63 drones struck 20 locations and that downed drone and missile debris fell at 19 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that three missiles were "lost in location," likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck residential infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring five children.[xxvii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy and residential infrastructure in Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Cherkasy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Sumy, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv oblasts.[xxviii] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, reported on October 30 that Russia struck DTEK thermal power plants (TPPs) in unspecified Ukrainian oblasts, seriously damaging TPP equipment during Russia's third massive strike against DTEK TPPs in October 2025.[xxix] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that it scrambled two fighter jets and an early warning aircraft in response to the overnight Russian strikes.[xxx]

Polish fighters intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the second time in three days. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that a pair of Polish MiG-29 fighters intercepted a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea before 0900 on October 30.[xxxi] Polish fighters also intercepted a Russian Il-20 over the Baltic Sea on October 28.[xxxii] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that the Russian aircraft in both instances were operating without registered flight plans or active transponders but did not violate Polish airspace.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump called for the United States to resume tests of its nuclear weapons, likely in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ostentatious announcements of recent tests of Russian nuclear weapons.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a unilateral micro-ceasefire near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk but provided no clarity on the timing of the micro-ceasefire.
• Ukrainian military sources continued to provide details about the difficult situation in the Pokrovsk pocket.
• The Kremlin is activating plans to use active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear.
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes including over 700 projectiles against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30.
• Polish fighters intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the second time in three days.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29, 2025 

A Russian official threatened to supply nuclear missiles to Venezuela and Cuba and called the United States a Russian enemy. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov said on October 29 that Russia can deliver nuclear-capable missiles to “Venezuela or Cuba,” which Zhuravlyov noted are located near Russia’s "main geopolitical adversary” - the United States.[i] Zhuravlyov said that Russia has an “entire range” of missiles at its disposal and will use “what is needed.” Zhuravlyov said that the United States is “not a friend or partner" of Russia but is an “enemy.”[ii] Zhuravlyov’s threats are meant to evoke memories of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as Russian officials have done in the past.[iii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to tout new Russian nuclear missiles to threaten the United States. Putin announced on October 29 that Russia tested the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle on October 28 and touted the vehicle’s alleged speed and power.[iv] Putin also recalled Russia’s recent test of the Burevestnik missile, which is similarly nuclear-powered and has similar characteristics. Putin's announcements of even more newly tested nuclear-powered weapons defy US President Donald Trump's call on October 27 for Putin to focus on ending the war in Ukraine, not testing missiles.[v] Putin is detailing the alleged attributes of the weapons to add weight and urgency to his nuclear threats to enact concessions from the United States on Ukraine. Putin is raising the specter of nuclear war to get Trump and European officials to concede to Russian demands that Russian forces cannot secure on the battlefield. The alleged features of the weapons that Putin touted may be novel, but the systems do not change the underlying framework of deterrence that has prevented nuclear war since 1945. The United States and its French and British NATO allies still retain strong nuclear triads to deter nuclear attack.

Russia continues to use Belarus to threaten Europe with the Oreshnik missile. Belarusian Presidential Press Secretary Natalya Eismont told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 28 that Belarus will put the Oreshnik missile system on combat duty in December 2025.[vi] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 29 that Russia and Belarus do not feel safe given European officials’ “Russophobic statements” and militaristic aspirations and hysteria.[vii] Peskov claimed that statements from the Baltics, Poland, France, and the UK show "how dear" the Oreshnik is to Belarus and Russia. Putin announced in August 2025 that Russian and Belarusian specialists were working to identify future Oreshnik deployment locations by the end of 2025.[viii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is leveraging the Oreshnik system as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at undermining Western resolve to militarily support Ukraine.[ix]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is performatively offering an hours-long micro-ceasefire in Pokrovsk likely in part to claim that Russia is not the impediment to the peace process. Putin continued to claim on October 29 that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk and Pokrovsk and proposed a ceasefire lasting two to six hours to allow journalists into Pokrovsk.[x] ISW does not assess that Russian forces have encircled either town at this time. Putin claimed that Russia is mainly concerned about Ukraine executing a provocation during the proposed ceasefire to blame Russia. Putin is likely trying to use micro-ceasefire proposals to show that Russia is interested in a ceasefire, particularly as Russia has publicly rejected US President Donald Trump's proposed ceasefire on the current frontline. Putin's proposed ceasefire would be a staged media opportunity to portray the situation in a way that benefits Russia. He announced the offer in a staged fashion to call attention to his exaggerated claims about Russian progress in Pokrovsk. Putin likely assesses that Ukraine would not agree to this strange and disingenuous proposal, furthering the long-standing Kremlin narrative that Ukraine is the obstacle to peace.[xi]

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction but remain unlikely to immediately collapse the Ukrainian pocket. Geolocated footage published on October 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Pokrovsk and in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[xii] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces have begun infiltrating into northern Pokrovsk past the railway station in central Pokrovsk, and some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached the northern outskirts of the town.[xiii] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence noted that the frontline remains porous and that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in southern Pokrovsk.[xiv] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Hnativka, entered Rih (both immediately east of Pokrovsk), and advanced west of Pokrovsk.[xv] Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows a Russian flag on the western entrance to Pokrovsk, and Russian sources claimed that there are large contested "gray zones" within Pokrovsk and west of the town.[xvi] Ukrainian Eastern Command Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported on October 28 that Russian forces entered the outskirts of Myrnohrad, but the Ukrainian Eastern Command stated on October 29 that Russian forces are not operating within Myrnohrad and that Shapoval was referring to the Pokrovsk situation instead.[xvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian assault groups conduct infiltration missions into the town and engage Ukrainian drone and mortar crews in firefights to inhibit Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces are struggling to distinguish between civilians and Russian soldiers disguised as civilians – considered perfidy under international law -- making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct defensive operations.[xviii] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting heavy drone and artillery strikes and airstrikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and that Ukrainian forces are relying on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to support logistics to forward positions and conduct some strikes against Russian positions.[xix]

Russian forces will likely expend large amounts of manpower and equipment to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction, as they have during the past 18 months of fighting for Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 29 that Russian forces have concentrated 11,000 personnel for the Pokrovsk effort and deployed a total of 29,000 personnel to the corps' area of responsibility (AoR).[xx] The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps published a map indicating that Russian forces are currently attacking in three different areas: north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske, east of Pokrovsk into Myrnohrad and eastern Pokrovsk, and into Pokrovsk from the south. The corps assessed that Russian forces entering southern Pokrovsk aim to attack into northwestern Pokrovsk and then into Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and eastern Pokrovsk. Russian forces are primarily conducting infiltration missions into Pokrovsk and do not currently exercise the degree of control necessary to push Ukrainian forces entirely from the town and establish enduring positions. Russian forces will likely need to threaten the entire Ukrainian pocket with imminent encirclement in order to seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad without fighting all the way through both settlements. Russian forces have struggled to advance on the eastern and northeastern flanks of the Pokrovsk area to support this larger encirclement effort over the entire pocket, however.[xxi] Russian forces have been fighting to seize Pokrovsk since February 2024 and have expended significant amounts of manpower and materiel in fighting – losses largely due to the Ukrainian drone strikes that have staved off Russian advances in the area for much of the Russian campaign.[xxii]

A recent US intelligence assessment reportedly concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is more determined than ever to gain a battlefield victory in his war in Ukraine, consistent with ongoing statements by senior Russian officials. NBC News reported on October 28, citing two senior US officials, that a US intelligence assessment given to Congress in October 2025 concluded that Putin is more committed than ever to gaining a battlefield victory in Ukraine and is showing no willingness to compromise.[xxiii] The assessment reportedly found that Putin is committed to securing more Ukrainian territory to justify the human and financial losses he has imposed on the Russian people. The recent assessment is in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s continued commitment to his maximalist war aims.[xxiv] Senior Russian officials continue to indicate that Russia is prepared to continue the war indefinitely until Ukraine and its partners capitulate to Russia's demands.[xxv] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 28 rejected US President Donald Trump's proposal for a ceasefire along the current frontline to precede negotiations and indicated that Russia's demands are unchanged.[xxvi] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apti Alaudinov stated on October 29 that Russian forces' task is to seize as much territory as possible to strengthen Russia's position at the negotiating table.[xxvii] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.[xxviii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian State Duma deputies are using imperial Russian and Soviet ideologies to call for Russian society to unite against alleged internal and external threats – likely to set conditions for further repressions and intensified involuntary mobilization for the war against Ukraine or a future war against NATO. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin gave an address to the Russian State Duma on October 29 in which he claimed that a "strong president means a strong Russia" and that "if there is Putin, then there is Russia."[xxix] Volodin called on Russians to "consolidate around Putin, win, and preserve the traditions of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia." Volodin claimed that membership in the Soviet Communist Party was initially an honor and that the party was full of people "who were true moral and ethical beacons," but that the party then relegated these people to the background due to the lack of "threats," causing the party to collapse. Volodin claimed that the Soviet Union also collapsed due to a move toward "sycophants and traitors" such that modern-day Russia must work to "respect people who selflessly serve their country and fight against those who cause [Russia] harm." Volodin claimed that Russian "foreign agents" in the "fifth column" receive money from abroad, have betrayed their country, and are trying to harm the state.[xxx] Volodin claimed that Russia must consolidate society and prevent foreign agents from operating within Russia. Volodin specifically criticized Russians who left Russia to live in Europe. Volodin claimed that Russia must prevent its destruction "from within" and that external challenges "bring everyone together."[xxxi] Volodin called for stricter legislation on "foreign agents" that would be "in the interests of [Russian] citizens."

Putin visited a military hospital on October 29 and spoke with a wounded Russian servicemember about the "continuity of the tradition of service in Russia."[xxxii] The soldier and Putin reminisced about uncovering stories about their ancestors' military service in archives. Putin claimed that the soldier is "fighting just like [his] grandfather" and that "it is in our genes without even knowing." Soldiers at the hospital gifted Putin armor plates upon which they had painted Orthodox saints and which they had worn on the battlefield under fire. Volodin's and Putin's statements allude to a central strongman on whom the state's entire existence rests, deference to the Orthodox Church, and the unity of the Russian people and history, calling back to the 19^th century Russian imperial ideology of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (Narodnost').

The Kremlin is likely trying to convince Russians that Russia is facing threats both externally and internally in order to justify future intensified repressions and the implementation of a permanent wartime footing like the one the Communist Party imposed on the Soviet Union for most of its existence. The Kremlin has long claimed that it is fighting the West and that foreign actors are trying to conduct sabotage within Russia – claims that Kremlin officials repeated today and in recent days.[xxxiii] The Kremlin’s claims are callbacks to the Soviet Union’s rhetorical justifications for enormous military mobilization during the Cold War as the answer to being “surrounded by enemies” as well as to Stalin's justification for his repressions and purges in the 1920s and 1930s as necessary to fight against "anti-Soviet" elements, wreckers, and saboteurs. The Kremlin may be preparing society and setting conditions for intensified crackdowns and repressions. The Kremlin has already intensified its control over the Russian information space and cracked down on Russian society in recent years, particularly after the failed Wagner rebellion in June 2023. These comments suggest that the Kremlin has wider plans and intentions that it fears will invoke domestic backlash even in the current repressive conditions.

The Kremlin may plan to intensify repression ahead of possible involuntary mobilization. A future involuntary mobilization may start with the callup of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure (as the Kremlin is starting to do), but may expand to the use of reservists in fighting in Ukraine.[xxxiv] The Kremlin may aim to use claims that Russia is facing intensified external and internal threats to demand more sacrifices from Russian society and to implement a permanent military and economic mobilization.

European officials continue to report aerial incursions in European airspace. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken reported on October 29 that authorities spotted several unidentified drones operating near the Marche-en-Famenne military base overnight on October 25 to 26.[xxxv] Francken noted that investigations are ongoing and did not attribute responsibility for the drones to any actor at this time. Lithuanian Minister of the Interior Vladislav Kondratovičius reported on October 29 that the Lithuanian government is extending the partial closure of the Medininkai border crossing and full closure of the Salcininkai border crossing with Belarus until November 30.[xxxvi] The closures follow several recent incidents involving Belarusian smuggling balloons violating Lithuania's airspace. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on October 29 that two Polish fighter jets intercepted a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea on October 28.[xxxvii] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that the Russian aircraft was operating without a registered flight plan or an active transponder but did not violate Polish airspace.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian official threatened to supply nuclear missiles to Venezuela and Cuba and called the United States a Russian enemy.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to tout new Russian nuclear missiles to threaten the United States.
• Russia continues to use Belarus to threaten Europe with the Oreshnik missile.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is performatively offering an hours-long micro-ceasefire in Pokrovsk likely in part to claim that Russia is not the impediment to the peace process.
• Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction but remain unlikely to immediately collapse the Ukrainian pocket.
• Russian forces will likely expend large amounts of manpower and equipment to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction, as they have during the past 18 months of fighting for Pokrovsk.
• A recent US intelligence assessment reportedly concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is more determined than ever to gain a battlefield victory in his war in Ukraine, consistent with ongoing statements by senior Russian officials.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian State Duma deputies are using imperial Russian and Soviet ideologies to call for Russian society to unite against alleged internal and external threats – likely to set conditions for further repressions and intensified involuntary mobilization for the war against Ukraine or a future war against NATO.
• European officials continue to report aerial incursions in European airspace.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 28, 2025 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2025 

The Kremlin is intensifying its cognitive warfare effort aimed at coercing the United States to make decisions about the war in Ukraine that are favorable to Russia, including by blaming the United States for Russia's own failure to meaningfully engage in negotiations. Kremlin officials and prominent government voices in the Russian information space are beginning to more directly accuse US President Donald Trump of impeding peace negotiations in Ukraine by refusing to acquiesce to Russia's long-held maximalist demands. The Kremlin voices are aiming to push the Trump administration to engage in economic cooperation with Russia and cease US support for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave a lengthy interview to Hungarian channel Ultrahang, published on October 26, wherein he claimed that the Kremlin was ready to cooperate with the United States to end the war based on previous discussions before the August 2025 bilateral Alaska summit, but blamed the Trump administration for pulling away from negotiations.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is still willing to meet with Trump but that the Kremlin will wait for the United States to initiate further negotiations. Lavrov is attempting to shift blame away from Russia's own unwillingness to compromise by falsely accusing the Trump administration of being the impediment to peace. Lavrov also used the interview to advance several boilerplate Russian informational lines that attempt to sow division between the United States and Europe and to deprive Ukraine of support from its Western partners. Lavrov accused European states of impeding the peace process by pressuring Trump. Lavrov reiterated Russia's demands that Ukraine not join NATO and insinuated that Ukraine is attempting to use peace negotiations to "buy themselves some time" before Russia seizes more territory.

Other Russian officials and information space voices amplified similar narratives, including direct criticisms of Trump, on October 27. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that US-Russian relations are at a "minimum level" and that there are "timid efforts" to improve bilateral relations.[ii] Other Russian officials publicly claimed that Russia remains ready for a leader-level meeting but that there is no progress in scheduling this meeting.[iii] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that pressure from Ukraine is causing the United States to change its position on the war.[iv] Russian state business outlet Kommersant amplified political observer Dmitry Trenin, who claimed that Trump is not interested in a peace deal and that internal US political pressure is influencing Trump.[v] Russian state newspaper Izvestia amplified political commentator Vadim Trukhachev, who falsely accused European states of undermining the possibility of a Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest out of their own self-interest.[vi] The Kremlin has intensified these various rhetorical lines back into both the Russian and international information spaces after US officials recently cancelled the Budapest summit and imposed new sanctions on Russia's energy sector.[vii] The Kremlin likely aims to coerce the United States into bilateral rapprochement and lifting the recent economic restrictions against Russia. The Kremlin likely also aims to justify its refusals to compromise and negotiate an end to the war to the domestic Russian audience.

Kremlin officials continued to reject Trump's proposed ceasefire while reiterating Russia's commitment to its original war aims. Lavrov rejected Trump's recently proposed ceasefire on the current frontline, while agreeing with Trump's statement at the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska that Ukraine and Russia need to not just reach a ceasefire but reach a war termination agreement.[viii] Lavrov claimed that European leaders only support an immediate ceasefire without preconditions in order to allow Ukraine to rearm and attack. Chepa similarly claimed that a ceasefire would give Ukraine the chance ”to catch its breath” and attack Russia in the future.[ix] Chepa claimed that Russia would accept a ceasefire only if the West stops weapons supply to Ukraine and if Ukraine withdraws from Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts - essentially reiterating some of Russia's war termination demands as a precondition for a ceasefire.

Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwavering territorial aims in Ukraine, including claims that extend beyond the four illegally annexed oblasts. Lavrov claimed that Russia recognizes Ukraine’s independence but that Russian control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts is enshrined in the Russian Constitution.[x] Lavrov attempted to use Russia’s sham and illegal referendums in occupied Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 as evidence that most of the population "voted" for Russian annexation. Lavrov claimed that Russian-speakers in the four oblasts have faced persecution from the Ukrainian government and that the people in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts "welcomed Russian soldiers." Lavrov claimed that Russia is seizing territory in Ukraine not out of "imperial spirit" but out of concern for the people "who feel part of Russian culture." Lavrov claimed that the war is not about territory but about the people and the cities they have built and specifically referenced Odesa City at the time of Catherine the Great in the late 18th century. Kremlin statements demanding all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts undermine other Russian offers to cede territory in southern Ukraine for all of Donetsk Oblast.[xi] Continued Kremlin references to Odesa City, which Russian officials have called a "Russian" city, demonstrate Russia's territorial ambitions even beyond the four illegally annexed oblasts.[xii]

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev notably acknowledged on October 24 in an interview with CNN that Ukraine has altered its negotiating position and offered compromises by agreeing to a ceasefire along the current line.[xiii] Dmitriev reiterated on October 26 to Russian audiences, however, that Russia remains committed to its original war aims and desire to seize all of the four oblasts in eastern and southern Ukraine.[xiv] Dmitriev's statements are an implicit acknowledgment that Russia is responsible for the lack of progress toward peace and that Russia wants the United States, Ukraine, and the broader West to capitulate to Russia's demands.

Russia continued nuclear saber-rattling efforts in response to Trump's dismissal of the Russian Burevestnik missile test. Trump stated on October 27 that Putin should end the war in Ukraine instead of testing a nuclear-powered missile and noted that the United States has a nuclear submarine stationed close to Russia that “does [not] have to go 8,000 miles” (in reference to Kremlin claims that the Burevestnik missile flew 14,000 kilometers, or 8,700 miles).[xv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia’s missile test should not strain US-Russia relations, especially as the relations are at ”a minimal level” already.[xvi] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, who frequently represents fringe Kremlin positions and directly communicates the subtext of messages from other Russian officials, congratulated ”Russia’s friends” on the test of the Burevestnik missile on his English-language X account in an attempt to threaten Russia's adversaries.[xvii] Kremlin officials amplified the tests and issued subtle threats to deploy the missiles against the United States, claiming that the missiles could reach ”anywhere" in North America should the United States supply Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.[xviii]  Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that ”it will be too late” by the time European states "understand" the Burevestnik.[xix] Russia's parading of the Burevstnik and veiled nuclear threats are part of wider Kremlin efforts to use a combination of carrots and sticks unrelated to the war in Ukraine to push the United States to give in to concessions about the war.[xx]  The Kremlin similarly paraded the Oreshnik ballistic missile following testing the missile in Ukraine in November 2024 as part of nuclear saber-rattling efforts to convince the West to dial back support for Ukraine, but this effort fizzled out after it failed to achieve the Kremlin's intended effect.[xxi]

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction, underscoring the fluid and interspersed nature of the frontline on this sector of the front. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on Nakhimova Street in western Pokrovsk.[xxii] Additional geolocated footage published on October 27 shows Ukrainian forces assaulting Russian positions in eastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[xxiii] The Ukrainian brigade that published the footage reported that Ukrainian forces control Rodynske and that limited Russian infantry have entered the settlement's outskirts.[xxiv] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all three Russian armored vehicles in a recent platoon-sized mechanized assault near Krasnyi Lyman (just southeast of Rodynske) but that small Russian infantry groups subsequently entered southern Rodynske.[xxv] Mashovets stated that the small Russian groups are attempting to hold positions within the settlement and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 27 that elements of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army (Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are advancing near the railway station within central Pokrovsk and are destroying the allegedly encircled Ukrainian group in Pokrovsk – reiterating Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's October 26 claim that Russian forces had encircled Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[xxvi] Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, continued to label Gerasimov's claim as premature[xxvii] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not physically interdicted the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area but have fire control over several dirt roads.[xxviii]

Ukrainian sources continue to note the porous nature of the frontline and Russia's reliance on infiltration missions within Pokrovsk. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that around 200 Russian troops have accumulated within Pokrovsk, where they are engaging Ukrainian forces in firefights.[xxix] The platoon commander reported that Russian forces penetrated the town in fireteams of two to three personnel and are waiting in shelters and basements for reinforcements. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 27 that Russian forces who have accumulated within Pokrovsk are not entrenched in a defensive position with cover and concealment.[xxx] Mashovets noted that it is difficult to determine the location of Ukrainian and Russian positions within Pokrovsk as Russian forces are conducting small group infiltration missions between Ukrainian lines, often resorting to perfidy to disguise themselves as Ukrainian civilians.[xxxi] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are operating in central Pokrovsk near the railway station and throughout southern Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Sobachovka neighborhood (eastern Pokrovsk), in the city center, and at the railway station. Mashovets assessed that Ukrainian forces assuredly control the area north of the railway station.[xxxii]

The Russian military command is reportedly deprioritizing offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area to focus on Pokrovsk itself. Mashovets reported that the 2nd CAA is Rusia's main "striking force" in the Pokrovsk direction and has been advancing in southern and western Pokrovsk over roughly the past two weeks.[xxxiii] Mashovets stated that the 2nd CAA received significant manpower reinforcements – reportedly between 6,000 and 10,500 troops in several waves - at least two weeks ago.[xxxiv] Mashovets stated that the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) sharply reduced its activity in the Dobropillya salient west of the Kazennyi Torets River in the past week and shifted to focus to the Myrnohrad and Rodynske areas. Mashovets stated that there are unverified reports that naval infantry elements, which the Russian military command recently redeployed to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 8th CAA (SMD) in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, are reinforcing the 51st CAA. Mashovets stated that no more than a brigade's worth of forces and means from the 41st CAA (CMD), which is operating in the Novopavlivka direction, are participating in assaults in the 2nd CAA's AoR south of Pokrovsk. Mashovets noted that elements of the 2nd CAA southwest and south of Pokrovsk are advancing more rapidly than elements of the 51st CAA near Rodynske and Myrnohrad.[xxxv]

Ukrainian strikes on the Belgorod Reservoir dam (southeast of Belgorod City and 11 kilometers from the international border) along the Siverskyi Donets River are reportedly degrading Russian positions in the border areas northeast of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on October 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Belgorod Reservoir dam and that the dam’s water level dropped by one meter.[xxxvi] Magyar reported that the water flooded Russian positions near Grafovka (immediately southwest of the Belgorod Reservoir Dam). Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that the flooding threatens positions of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade, and  136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the area.[xxxvii] Trehubov reported that the flooding reduced some of the Russian forces' combat capabilities, complicated logistics, and flooded areas of advance, and will therefore require Russian forces to change plans and reduce offensive operations in the area. A Ukrainian army corps operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on October 26 that the strike on the dam cut Russian logistics across the Siverskyi Donets River in the area, as Russian forces had previously taken advantage of  shallow water levels following a dry summer.[xxxviii] A local Russian media outlet claimed on October 26 that the water levels ”rapidly” receded from the Belgorod Reservoir dam after Ukrainian forces struck the dam with HIMARS.[xxxix] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on October 27 that the situation at the Belgorod Reservoir dam is stable.[xl]

Balloons flying into Lithuania from Belarusian airspace are impeding operations at the Vilnius Airport. The Vilnius Airport reported that Lithuanian authorities temporarily suspended all air traffic at the airport on the night of October 26 to 27 due to an unspecified number of balloons flying toward the airport.[xli] Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė noted that the balloons flew from the direction of Belarusian airspace and that this was the third consecutive day and fourth total time this past week that balloons from Belarusian airspace have forced the Vilnius Airport to temporarily cease operations.[xlii] The Lithuanian Border Service reported that it closed land border crossings with Belarus as of the evening of October 26 due to the Belarusian balloons, and Lithuanian Interior Minister Vladislav Kondratovich stated that the border with Belarus will remain closed indefinitely.[xliii] The Lithuanian Border Service reported that the border closure will not affect Lithuanian citizens, European Union (EU) citizens, and diplomats.[xliv]  Ruginienė stated on October 27 that Lithuanian forces will take all necessary measures to shoot down these balloons in order to “[send] a signal to Belarus that Lithuania will not tolerate hybrid attacks.”[xlv] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations and non-conventional activity are likely part of ”Phase Zero” — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase – to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xlvi] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, thus, Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[xlvii]  

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is intensifying its cognitive warfare effort aimed at coercing the United States to make decisions about the war in Ukraine that are favorable to Russia, including by blaming the United States for Russia's own failure to meaningfully engage in negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continued to reject Trump's proposed ceasefire while reiterating Russia's commitment to its original war aims.
• Russia continued nuclear saber-rattling efforts in response to Trump's dismissal of the Russian Burevestnik missile test.
• Both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction, underscoring the fluid and interspersed nature of the frontline on this sector of the front.
• Ukrainian sources continue to note the porous nature of the frontline and Russia's reliance on infiltration missions within Pokrovsk.
• The Russian military command is reportedly deprioritizing offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area to focus on Pokrovsk itself.
• Ukrainian strikes on the Belgorod Reservoir dam (southeast of Belgorod City and 11 kilometers from the international border) along the Siverskyi Donets River are reportedly degrading Russian positions in the border areas northeast of Kharkiv City.
• Balloons flying into Lithuania from Belarusian airspace are impeding operations at the Vilnius Airport.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2025 

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continue to make exaggerated claims of battlefield victories while demonstrating that the Kremlin remains committed to seizing the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin held a meeting on October 26 with Gerasimov and the commanders of the Russian groupings of forces.[1] Putin notably wore a military uniform for the meeting, only the third time he has worn a uniform to a public event since the start of the full-scale invasion, and only a few weeks after the second time he did so on September 16.[2] Gerasimov opened his report to Putin by stating that Russian forces continue to carry out tasks to seize Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Gerasimov's statement reiterates Putin's longstanding demand that Ukraine hand over the entirety of the four illegally annexed regions to Russia while undermining recent Russian offers to exchange territory in southern Ukraine for full control over Donetsk Oblast.[3] Gerasimov claimed - very likely falsely - that Russian forces have surrounded up to 5,500 Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk direction and blocked a group of 31 Ukrainian battalions near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). Gerasimov claimed that elements of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are advancing along converging axes and have completed the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the area. Gerasimov claimed that Russia's efforts to isolate the combat zone to disrupt Ukrainian supplies facilitated the alleged encirclement, a reference to Russian efforts in recent months to use adaptations to drone tactics and technology to conduct strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[4] Gerasimov claimed that Russian authorities have tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with destroying the allegedly encircled Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Gerasimov similarly claimed that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces have encircled Kupyansk after assault detachments of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) conducted a flanking maneuver, seized crossings over the Oskil River south of Kupyansk, and worked with elements of the 47th Tank Division and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) to block Ukrainian forces on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River east of Kupyansk.[5] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces have encircled a total of 18 Ukrainian battalions in Kupyansk. Putin similarly falsely claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and later claimed in March 2025 that Russian forces had "isolated" Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it was “impossible” for small groups of Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast.[6] Russian forces did not encircle significant numbers of Ukrainian forces during the Russian operations to retake Kursk Oblast in late 2024 and early 2025, despite Putin’s claims.

Gerasimov also claimed that Russian forces have advanced in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and seized over 70 percent of the town.[7] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are completing the seizure of Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and have seized Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) and Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka). Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces continue urban combat in Siversk and Kostyantynivka.

Russian milbloggers widely denied Gerasimov's claims. Several milbloggers claimed that Gerasimov was lying and that Russian forces had not encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk and Pokrovsk.[8] One milblogger stated that there is still a multi-kilometer corridor between Russian groups operating west and north of Pokrovsk, and another noted that Russian fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs does not mean that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in the area.[9] Milbloggers pointed to the porous nature of the front, highlighting the way Russian forces are infiltrating into Ukrainian flanks and rear.[10] One milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces often maintain positions in settlements that Russian sources claim that Russian forces have seized and stated that Pokrovsk and Kupyansk are "100 percent chaos."[11] Another milblogger assessed that Gerasimov is "getting ahead of himself again" and expects reality on the ground to "soon catch up with his reports."[12] The milblogger assessed that Gerasimov's report aims to provoke US President Donald Trump to "request mercy" for the encircled Ukrainian forces and to give Trump the impression of serious Ukrainian problems on the front, as the milblogger assessed Putin's claims about encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in March 2025 aimed to do. Gerasimov similarly presented exaggerated territorial claims in late August 2025, including about Kupyansk, that Russian milbloggers heavily criticized.[13]

ISW has not observed evidence to support Gerasimov's claims. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 23 percent of Vovchansk. ISW has only observed footage from October 24 showing limited Russian forces operating in eastern Kostyantynivka after a likely infiltration mission and has not observed evidence of Russian forces operating within Siversk.[14] The Kremlin is also portraying the seizures of small settlements that are not operationally significant as major successes for informational effects. Dronivka is under six square kilometers in size, and Pleshchiivka is under four square kilometers. Both had a pre-war population of about 600 people.

The Kremlin is exploiting Russia's recent reliance on infiltration missions and the absence of contiguous front lines in some tactical areas, as well as the resulting interspersal of forces to make exaggerated battlefield claims. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged on October 26 that the situation near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad remains difficult and noted Russia's use of infiltration missions into Pokrovsk.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces quantitatively outnumber Ukrainian forces in the area and have increased their offensive efforts. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are conducting small group infiltration missions between Ukrainian positions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that about 200 Russian troops are operating within Pokrovsk, but that Ukrainian counter-sabotage missions are preventing Russian forces from advancing deeper into the town and gaining a foothold. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are making gains near and within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad that are tactically significant but likely do not portend the imminent collapse of Ukrainian defenses in the area.[16] Ukrainian and Russian sources have noted how both sides' positions are intermingled, making it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact contours of the frontline.[17] Russian forces have been increasingly leveraging infiltrations between Ukrainian positions to make false claims of advances and consolidated gains.[18] Putin's and Gerasimov's claims of battlefield victories are part of the ongoing Kremlin cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's demands now.[19]

Putin attempted to justify Russia's slow pace of advance because of Russian concern for civilian safety and casualties. Putin falsely claimed that Russian forces will not be working toward any specific deadlines but will put the safety of Russian servicemembers first – setting conditions to justify continued slow Russian advances in the future.[20] Putin asked Russian forces to ensure Ukrainian forces can safely surrender and claimed that Russian forces have "historically always treated defeated enemies with mercy." Putin called for Russian forces to ensure the safety of the civilian population when clearing territories. ISW has observed ample evidence of Russia's blatant disregard for civilian safety and deliberate murders of Ukrainian civilians, including prolific first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against civilians in Kherson Oblast since late 2023 and recent murders of civilians in Pokrovsk and Zvanivka, Bakhmutsky Raion.[21] ISW has also observed repeated reports of Russia executing surrendering Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders are fully complicit in and explicitly order extreme atrocities, including summary executions.[23]

Russia continues to issue explicit nuclear threats as part of a multi-pronged effort seeking to deter continued US pressure on Russia and support for Ukraine. Putin recalled on October 26 the recent annual recurring Russian Grom exercises with all three components of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad.[24] Putin emphasized the “reliability of Russia’s nuclear shield” and claimed that Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces “exceed” the abilities of all other nuclear states. Putin claimed that Russia’s nuclear strategic forces are capable of “fully ensuring” the national security of Russia and the Union State (the political union between Belarus and Russia that a Kremlin-dominated federated government rules as a single polity). Putin and Gerasimov also discussed a test of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, which Putin claimed has an “unlimited” range and which Gerasimov claimed has "guaranteed accuracy against highly protected targets at any distance.” Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev claimed that he relayed information about the Burevestnik tests to US officials.[25] Putin's and Gerasimov's claims are only the latest in Russia's ongoing nuclear saber-rattling campaign, and Dmitriev notably issued oblique nuclear threats during his various interviews with US media outlets on October 24 and 25.[26] Putin and Gerasimov highlighted the missile’s alleged technical capabilities, likely to amplify these nuclear saber-rattling efforts. Russia has been trying to use a combination of carrots and sticks unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral arms control talks, to push the United States to give in to concessions about the war.[27]

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev stated outright that Russia has not deviated from its 2021-2022 original war aims and that Russia continues to seek control of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Dmitriev claimed in Russian on his channels on Telegram and the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX on October 26 that any peace settlement must address the alleged “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have repeatedly defined as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[28] Dmitriev also claimed that the Russian economy is in good condition with low debt and a strong ruble. Dmitriev also directly referenced Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces must “completely withdraw” from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must abandon its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[29] Dmitriev’s reiteration of Putin’s 2024 demands underscores Russia’s unchanged position and unwillingness to compromise on its maximalist demands. Dmitriev's statement also indicates that Russia’s recent offers to cede parts of southern Ukraine in exchange for all of Donetsk Oblast are disingenuous proposals.[30] Dmitriev notably avoided directly discussing Russia’s uncompromising position during his recent statements to US media outlets.[31] Dmitriev’s rhetoric continues to show the marked difference in Kremlin narratives meant for Russian domestic audiences and those meant for American audiences. The Kremlin continues to prime Russian audiences to support a protracted war to achieve all of Russia's original demands.

The Russian economy is showing its first signs of stagnation manufacturing sectors critical to the Russian defense industrial base. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on October 26 that US sanctions are already affecting the Russian economy, as India and many Chinese refineries have stopped purchasing Russian oil.[32] Bessent noted that the Russian economy is in a wartime state with virtually no growth and that Russia has an inflation rate of over 20 percent, in stark contrast to the Russian Central Bank’s official statistics claiming that Russia’s annual inflation rate is 8.2 percent as of October 20.[33] Kremlin officials' continual false portrayal of the Russian inflation rate is part of efforts to claim that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[34] Bessent stated that Russian oil profits are down 20 percent year-on-year and that US sanctions could reduce Russian profits by an additional 20 to 30 percent.[35] Russia’s oil and gas revenues accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia’s total federal revenues in 2024 and are critical to Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine.[36] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov recently acknowledged that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales funding the Russian federal budget to fall roughly by 30 percent in 2026.[37]

Independent Russian outlet The Moscow Times reported on October 25 that Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data indicate that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) showed signs of stalling in September 2025 for the first time since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.[38] Rosstat data shows that fabricated metal production, which surged in 2023 and 2024 and grew 21.2 percent in August 2025, dropped 1.6 percent year on year in September 2025. Transport equipment output growth, which includes tanks and armored vehicles, reportedly slowed to six percent in September 2025, down from 61.2 percent in August 2025.[39] The Moscow Times reported that Russia’s machine building sector, which is heavily dependent on state defense orders, similarly fell by 0.1 percent in September 2025 after surging 15.7 percent in August 2025. The Russian Central Bank notably lowered its key interest rate on October 24, likely to increase capital available for the Russian DIB and reverse recent stagnation.[40] Russian President Vladimir Putin has intentionally designed Russia’s wartime economy to rely on military spending by investing trillions of rubles in Russia’s DIB. The Russian DIB accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production and has largely propped up the Russian industrial sector and broader Russian economy. The Rosstat data, which ISW cannot independently verify, if true, indicates significant signs of deeper economic fracturing amidst ever growing sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending.

Russian regional authorities continue reducing one-time recruitment payments, supporting ISW’s forecast that Russia may begin compulsory recruitment of reservists in the face of mounting economic strain. Russian budgetary constraints appear to be permeating throughout several sectors of Russia’s wartime spending. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on October 26 that regional Russian authorities have been quietly reducing one-time payments to Russians signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over the last several months, including in Nizhny Novgorod and Ulyanovsk oblasts; Tatarstan, Mari El, Bashkortostan, and Chuvashia republics, and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.[41] Sever Realii noted that authorities in some regions cut one-time payments by over two million rubles (roughly $25,000) due to budgetary constraints. ISW has repeatedly assessed that Russia would not be able to sustain increasingly high payments to recruits in the long term, and the decision to substantially decrease one-time regional payments confirms Russia's inability to fund expensive recruitment efforts.[42] Regional governments’ decisions to curtail recruitment incentives are a supporting indicator for ISW’s forecast that Russia may begin compulsory recruitment of reservists.[43] ISW assesses that ongoing Western sanctions against Russian oil and gas exports and unsustainably high payments to soldiers are further destabilizing the Russian economy, regardless of Kremlin claims of economic stability.

Russian forces continue to launch long-range glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian cities. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 25 that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) launched a glide bomb strike against Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Zaporizhzhia City along the right [west] bank of the Dnipro River) from a distance of roughly 150 kilometers.[44] Kryvyi Rih Mayor Oleksandr Vilkul reported on October 26 that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[45] ISW has recently observed reports of Russian forces conducting long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities.[46] Russian forces are likely operating their aircraft farther from the frontline and beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems, exploiting Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems.

European officials have continued to report on Russian hybrid operations in Europe over the past several years. British news outlet Sky News reported on October 24 that a British court sentenced several members of a gang who participated in an arson attack on a British warehouse providing aid to Ukraine.[47] Sky News reported that the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) recruited the arsonists and that the gang planned the attack on industrial units in East London in March 2024. The arson attack reportedly inflicted damage worth around one million pounds (roughly $1.3 million). Several German outlets reported on October 25 that Russia’s Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) installed technical equipment on the wreckage of the Estonia ferry, which sank in the Baltic Sea in 1994, “a few years ago.”[48] The technical equipment reportedly allowed Russian robots and drones to navigate underwater with high precision. The outlets reported that NATO countries have information about the Russian operations and that Western security sources think that Russian military units have repeatedly trained in diving, salvage, and underwater operations in prohibited areas near the wreckage. Russia may have installed sensors to monitor ship and submarine movements or to record propeller noises and other characteristics of NATO warships and submarines. Russia has been setting conditions to confront the West for several years, and Russian sabotage and intelligence activities from years past likely support Russia's effort to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war. ISW assesses that Russia‘s intensified “Phase Zero,” Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war, began in early September 2025.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25, 2025 

The Kremlin is attempting to leverage the visit of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev to the United States to spread Kremlin narratives in the US information space. Dmitriev gave interviews to CNN, Fox News, and US journalist Lara Logan on October 24 and 25 during his visit to the United States.[1] Dmitriev's visit comes against the backdrop of recent US sanctions against Russian oil, the reported US authorization of Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strikes into Russia, and the ongoing debate about the provision of US Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.[2] The Kremlin's deployment of Dmitriev to conduct a press tour within the United States indicates that Russia is concerned about the impact of these US policies. Kremlin officials have in recent weeks attempted to downplay the effects of Western sanctions on the Russian economy and the battlefield effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes — narratives that Dmitriev repeated in his interviews on October 24 and 25.[3]

Dmitriev effectively acknowledged that Ukraine has made compromises in its negotiating position while reaffirming that Russia's maximalist demands from 2021 and 2022 remain unchanged. Dmitriev acknowledged that Ukraine has altered its negotiating position and offered compromises by agreeing to a ceasefire along the current line.[4] Dmitriev said that Russia wants a "final solution" to the war to prevent its resumption — paralleling language that Kremlin officials have used to talk about Russia's demand that any peace settlement address the alleged "root causes" of the war. Dmitriev also said that the United States needs to take Russia’s “national interest” into account when discussing peace in Ukraine; that NATO expansion poses an “existential threat to Russian security;” and that a settlement must take account of Russia’s need to protect Russian-speakers living in eastern Ukraine.[5] Dmitriev's statements paraphrase the Kremlin's so-called "root causes" of the war, which Russian officials have repeatedly defined as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[6] The Kremlin uses this “root causes” narrative to demand the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian puppet government, Ukraine’s commitment to neutrality, and the revocation of NATO’s Open Door Policy.[7] Dmitriev’s and other Kremlin officials' statements are references to long-standing Russian demands of NATO and Ukraine dating back to December 2021 and February 2022.[8]

Dmitriev also implicitly reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of Trump's call for a ceasefire along the current front line. Dmitriev claimed that Ukraine can break a ceasefire and that Ukraine could use it for rearmament and preparation to continue the war — the standard Russian excuse for refusing to accept a ceasefire.[9] Dmitriev claimed that the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska was not about just a ceasefire but about finding a final solution to the war to prevent its resumption. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and other senior Kremlin officials have repeated statements as recently as October 21 about how Russia has not changed its position since the August 2025 Alaska summit and rejects a ceasefire that “leads nowhere” and does not resolve the alleged “root causes” of the war.[10] Dmitriev notably did not directly use the "root causes" phrasing or explicitly list Russia's demands of Ukraine and the West in his interviews with US media outlets. The Kremlin appears to be adapting its informational efforts targeting the United States in the wake of reports that the Trump administration cancelled in-person meetings between US and Russian officials, including the planned summit in Budapest between Trump and Putin, after the Kremlin demonstrated its continued insistence on all of its longstanding demands.[11] Dmitriev’s statements, however, are indeed a reiteration of Russia’s maximalist demands and disinterest in negotiations that amount to anything less than Ukraine’s full capitulation.[12]

Dmitriev attempted to appeal to what he perceives to be Trump administration interests in order to distract from Dmitriev’s statements, which demonstrate Russia's continued unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war. Dmitriev claimed that Russia and the United States are aligned in their respect for "traditional values."[13] Dmitriev claimed that the Biden administration destroyed US-Russian dialogue and that the Trump administration, in contrast, values bilateral dialogue. Dmitriev is attempting to appeal to the Trump administration to distract from Russia’s repeated rejection of Trump's proposal for a ceasefire on the current line and Russia's commitment to its original war demands.

Russian State Duma deputies continue to publicly state that Russia has not changed its maximalist demands — contradicting Dmitriev's attempts to obfuscate his reiteration of unchanged Russia's demands in his interviews with US media outlets. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on October 24 that Russia’s position "remains unchanged" and attempted to blame Ukraine and Europe for stalling the negotiations process.[14] Chepa claimed that Russia is interested in eliminating the "root causes" of the war. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Alexei Zhuravlyov claimed on October 24 that US provisions of weapons to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia have no effect.[15] Such Kremlin statements from Duma deputies that are largely for domestic audiences continue to show that Putin remains committed to ensuring that the Russian population is primed to support his continuation of the war rather than softening Russia's demands.

Dmitriev heavily promoted US-Russian economic cooperation while subtly alluding to Russia's status as a nuclear power. Dmitriev claimed that there is still “potential for economic cooperation” between Russia and the United States, but only if the United States is “respectful” of Russia’s interests.[16] Dmitriev reiterated Russia‘s proposal for the construction of a tunnel connecting Russia and the United States through the Bering Strait using US businessman Elon Musk’s technology.[17] Dmitriev claimed that economic relations can be the 'foundation of a "peaceful relationship” between the United States and Russia.[18] Dmitriev claimed that economic cooperation is possible after the countries overcome their “political difficulties” — that is, US President Donald Trump's refusal to capitulate to Russia’s maximalist demands.[19] Dmitriev is promoting joint economic projects to incentivize the United States to end the war quickly on Russia's terms. Dmitriev's talk of economic cooperation is an effort to posture Russia as cooperative and willing to work with the United States on a peace settlement and beyond, as the Trump administration has recently assessed Russia to be the impediment to peace negotiations.

Dmitriev’s comments about economic projects contained implied threats that Russia will escalate military actions if the U.S. does not concede to Russia’s unchanging demands. Dmitriev repeatedly stated in the interviews that he does not have a military background and that he is merely representing Russia’s economic interests in the United States.[20] Dmitriev claimed that the “security of the whole world” depends on peaceful relations between the United States and Russia, and that the Trump administration is aware of the risks of military escalation and that the “complete annihilation of humanity” is close.[21] Dmitriev’s comments are allusions to Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Dmitriev is attempting to use oblique threats to push Trump to concede to Russia's demands out of fear of escalation.

The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing met on October 24 in the UK to discuss further support for Ukraine and to put pressure on Russia.[22] UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced on October 24 that the Coalition of the Willing agreed on a new five-point plan to support Ukraine, which includes measures to remove Russian oil and gasoline from global markets; unlock billions of euros in frozen Russian assets to financially support Ukraine; increase pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin by providing Ukraine with long range weapons; and continue to work as a coalition on further security guarantees for Ukraine.[23]

Russian forces are making gains near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (directly east of Pokrovsk) that are significant but likely do not portend the imminent collapse of Ukrainian defenses in the area. Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Kozatske and Promin (both east of Pokrovsk) and advanced in eastern and southeastern Myrnohrad.[24] Ukrainian military sources operating near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda in an article published on October 24 that small Russian groups are infiltrating Myrnohrad from the south and that Russian forces seized Krasnyi Lyman (north of Myrnohrad).[25] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not consolidated positions within Myrnohrad and that the large number of Ukrainian drones is complicating Russian attempts to concentrate infantry near Myrnohrad.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Myrnohrad.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that most of Rodynske is a contested "gray zone."[29]

Russian forces reportedly continue to infiltrate Pokrovsk. Sources told Ukrainska Pravda that at least 250 Russian soldiers are in Pokrovsk, where they are engaging in firefights with Ukrainian forces.[30] The sources noted that Russian forces are particularly targeting Ukrainian drone operators — likely as part of efforts to set battlefield conditions for further Russian advances in the area. The sources stated that Russian forces re-entered Pokrovsk in mid-August 2025 following Ukrainian clearing missions in the town in July 2025. Ukrainska Pravda reported that Russian forces have established "staging areas" near the railway within Pokrovsk, between Pokrovsk and Hryshyne (just northwest of Pokrovsk), and along the Dachenske-Novopavlivka-Hnativka line (southeast of Pokrovsk). Ukrainska Pravda reported that Russian fiber optic drones are surveilling all Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. Ukrainska Pravda's sources noted that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south of Pokrovsk. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are "seeping" into Pokrovsk in groups of two to three.[31] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations, such as rain, to evacuate killed and wounded personnel. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are penetrating northern Pokrovsk from the central and western areas.[32]

Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to discuss the interspersal of forces on the front near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Ukrainska Pravda's sources noted that some Ukrainian positions are located "between Russian lines."[33] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that both sides' positions are intermingled in contested "gray zones" such that it is difficult to determine the exact contours of the front line.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 24 that Ukrainian forces recently pushed the limited number of Russian forces in Myrnohrad back from the eastern and northern outskirts of the town and that Russian forces were struggling to hold positions in eastern Rodynske and in Krasnyi Lyman.[35] Mashovets' reporting on October 24 contrasts with Ukrainska Pravda's reporting and Russian milblogger claims on October 25 about Myrnohrad, Rodynske, and Krasnyi Lyman - further highlighting the way that Russian and Ukrainian forces are occupying non-contiguous, intermingled positions in and near Pokrovsk.[36]

Russian forces are employing infiltration tactics in other areas of the front line for informational effects. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on October 25 that Russian forces used infiltration tactics to break into Bolohivka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk) with forces numbering up to 200 personnel operating in small groups.[37] The corps noted that Russian forces recently published footage showing Russian troops holding flags in the settlement but reported that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Bolohivka. Geolocated footage published on October 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[38] Additional geolocated footage published on October 25 shows Russian servicemembers holding a Russian flag in northern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[39] ISW assesses that Russian forces conducted infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka and Kurylivka and that these infiltration missions did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time. Russian infiltration missions into Pokrovsk, where Russian forces are specifically targeting Ukrainian drone operators, appear to have the tactical purpose of setting conditions for further Russian advances. Recent Russian infiltration missions into Bolohivka, Kurylivka, and Kostyantynivka, in contrast, likely aim to further Kremlin informational efforts to exaggerate the Russian rate of advance. Russia has increasingly relied on footage showing Russian flag raisings to claim advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[40] Russian authorities have used these alleged gains to support false Russian narratives of sweeping advances, such as in Kupyansk.[41] These narratives support the wider Kremlin effort to falsely portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's demands now.[42]

Russian forces continue attempts to leverage poor weather conditions to conduct larger mechanized assaults but continue to suffer high vehicle losses disproportionate to their gains. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Druzhkivka direction reported on October 25 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of five armored vehicles attacking toward Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) from Novotoretske (southwest of Volodymyrivka).[43] The brigade reported that Russian forces relied on weather conditions hindering Ukrainian drone operations to conduct the attack but that as many as three vehicles got stuck in swampy terrain, after which Russian infantry disembarked into the water. The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces disabled or destroyed all five of the vehicles. Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian brigade shows three Russian armored personnel carriers (APCs) stuck in the Kazennyi Torets River southwest of Volodymyrivka.[44] The geolocated footage also shows a fourth partially submerged vehicle in the river and a damaged APC within Novotoretske.[45] An open-source analyst on X (formerly Twitter) reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 16 vehicles in the area, suggesting that the reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault was only one wave of a larger attack.[46] ISW will continue to monitor reports with more details about the mechanized assault.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are increasing the frequency of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations.[47] The Ventusky weather radar recorded rainfall near Volodymyrivka on the morning of October 25, and ISW previously noted that the lingering dampness and poor conditions that immediately follow rainfall likely degrade Ukrainian drone capabilities for several hours.[48] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 25 that weather conditions like rain are temporarily complicating Ukrainian drone operations and that Russian forces are trying to exploit this fact to evacuate wounded and killed servicemembers from the battlefield.[49] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction similarly reported on October 25 that Russian forces recently waited for bad weather conditions when Ukrainian forces reduced their drone activity before conducting a mechanized assault in the area.[50]

The October 25 attack near Volodymyrivka is the latest in Russia's renewed efforts in the past weeks to conduct mechanized assaults in the area. Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Pankivka (immediately west of Volodymyrivka) around October 6; a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault south of Shakhove (immediately north of Volodymyrivka) and Volodymyrivka on October 9; a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Shakhove on October 13; and a reduced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Volodymyrivka and Shakhove on October 16.[51] Geolocated evidence indicated that only the October 9 attack resulted in a Russian advance.[52] Russian forces continue to suffer vehicle losses that are disproportionately high compared to the limited gains —if any — that these Russian mechanized assaults are achieving. Russia's current practice of leveraging weather conditions to suppress the effects of Ukrainian drone strikes against mechanized activity appears insufficient, as Ukrainian forces have still been able to largely stop the mechanized attacks and prevent significant Russian advances. Russian mechanized assaults, however, may allow Russian forces to dismount infantry closer to Ukrainian positions to conduct subsequent infiltration missions.

Russian aircraft may have violated Japanese airspace on October 24. Reuters reported on October 24 that Japan scrambled jets on October 24 to monitor Russian aircraft, including strategic bombers that flew along the edge of Japanese airspace along its western coast over the Sea of Japan.[53] The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia flew two Tu-95 bombers escorted by two Su-35 fighter jets toward Japan’s Sado Island before turning northwards.[54] Japanese Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi stated on October 24 that Russia conducts daily military operations around Japan.[55] Japanese Prime Minister Sana Takaichi had pledged to accelerate Japan's defense buildup just hours before the incident. The Russian MoD acknowledged on October 24 that unspecified “foreign countries” escorted its jets during a “routine” flight patrol over alleged neutral waters.[56]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced on October 24 that France will provide Ukraine with additional Aster missiles and new Mirage aircraft in the coming days and that the UK will accelerate the delivery of over 5,000 multi-purpose missiles to Ukraine.[57] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 25 that Ukraine expects Sweden to begin delivering its promised 150 Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine in early 2026.[58]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is attempting to leverage the visit of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev to the United States to spread Kremlin narratives in the US information space.
• Dmitriev effectively acknowledged that Ukraine has made compromises in its negotiating position while reaffirming that Russia's maximalist demands from 2021 and 2022 remain unchanged.
• Dmitriev attempted to appeal to what he perceives to be Trump administration interests in order to distract from Dmitriev’s statements, which demonstrate Russia's continued unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war.
• Russian State Duma deputies continue to publicly state that Russia has not changed its maximalist demands — contradicting Dmitriev's attempts to obfuscate his reiteration of unchanged Russia's demands in his interviews with US media outlets.
• Dmitriev heavily promoted US-Russian economic cooperation while subtly alluding to Russia's status as a nuclear power.
• The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing met on October 24 in the UK to discuss further support for Ukraine and to put pressure on Russia.
• Russian forces are making gains near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (directly east of Pokrovsk) that are significant but likely do not portend the imminent collapse of Ukrainian defenses in the area.
• Russian forces are employing infiltration tactics in other areas of the front line for informational effects.
• Russian forces continue attempts to leverage poor weather conditions to conduct larger mechanized assaults but continue to suffer high vehicle losses disproportionate to their gains.
• Russian aircraft may have violated Japanese airspace on October 24.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2025 

Russian forces continue to advance in central and western Pokrovsk, although the exact contour of the front line in and around the town remains unclear. Geolocated footage published on October 23 and 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and western Pokrovsk and seized positions along the Pokrovsk railway line.[1] ISW has observed footage of small Russian infantry groups operating in central and western Pokrovsk over the last week (since roughly October 17) and therefore assesses that Russian forces likely maintain isolated but enduring positions south of the railway line in western Pokrovsk.[2] ISW defines the Assessed Russian Advance layer as verifiable areas in which Russian forces have operated in or conducted attacks against, even if they do not maintain control. Russian forces almost certainly do not maintain control over any positions in Pokrovsk, which is defined as “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.”[3] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged that the situation within Pokrovsk is unclear and that it is impossible to determine where Russian forces may hold enduring positions in the town.[4] Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Pokrovsk, although Russian forces appear to be undertaking significant efforts to consolidate advances and seize Pokrovsk in the coming months. Additional geolocated footage published on October 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southeastern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[5] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Russian forces are also attacking Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), although Ukrainian forces appear to be defending more successfully in Myrnohrad at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 24 that elements of the Russian 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking Myrnohrad from Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka (all northeast of Myrnohrad).[6] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently pushed the limited number of Russian forces in Myrnohrad back from the eastern and northern outskirts of the town. ISW has yet to observe geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces have conducted successful infiltration operations beyond Myrnohrad's eastern outskirts, suggesting that Russian forces are struggling to penetrate Myrnohrad despite recently advancing into Pokrovsk. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are also struggling to hold positions in eastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and in Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad.[8] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have temporarily paused their attacks in Myrnohrad and are advancing within Rodynske.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Promin (east of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Promin.[10]

Ukrainian forces are also reportedly conducting limited infiltration missions into the Russian near rear northeast of Pokrovsk, underscoring the high degree of permeability of positions in the Pokrovsk direction. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently infiltrated into the Russian near rear near Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and ambushed Russian forces.[11] Mashovets stated that Ukraine's ability to also conduct infiltration missions indicates that Russia's forward line of owned troops (FLOT) is similarly porous to Ukraine's and that Russian forces are unable to deny Ukrainian forces access to all territory currently under ISW's Assessed Russian Advances layer. The increasingly porous front line near Pokrovsk and throughout Ukraine reinforces for both sides the importance of being able to seize on an opportune moment or defend against a surprise attack. The fact that Russian and Ukrainian forces occupy non-contiguous intermingled positions in and near Pokrovsk also complicates assessments on the timeline by which Russian forces may seize Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk had a pre-war population twice that of Toretsk, another large urban settlement in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces expended over 14 months to seize after initially establishing positions in Toretsk in June and July 2024.[12] Russian forces may engage in several more months of combat before they fully capture Pokrovsk, assuming Russian forces do not collapse the flanks around Pokrovsk. Russian forces will also have to clear or force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Myrnohrad before Russian forces will be able to fully exploit the seizure of Pokrovsk, as enduring Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad would complicate Russian operations in the area.

The Kremlin continues its multifaceted cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing US decision makers in Russia's favor in response to recent US sanctions. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 24 that Russian President Vladimir Putin "promised a stunning response not only to the Tomahawk missile deliveries...but to [any] attempt to carry out strikes deep into Russian territory."[13] The Kremlin has recently been engaged in a cognitive warfare effort framing the potential US provisioning of long-range Tomahawk missiles or any long-range missile strike against Russia as a red line, including by issuing overt threats regarding Russia's ability and desire to respond militarily to Tomahawk missile provisions.[14] The Kremlin's threat of a military response to Tomahawk missile provisions is the most recent line in its long-standing rhetorical effort to convince the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable due to Russia's supposed military prowess and advantages over Ukraine and the wider West. Russia's ongoing cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian victory as inevitable ignores the reality that Russian forces continue to make only minimal, grinding advances at disproportionately high casualty rates and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives in Ukraine by force in the short- or medium-term.[15] Russia often leverages threats, including nuclear saber-rattling, in order to obfuscate Russia's own military weaknesses and false claims that the West and Ukraine are escalating the war in order to justify Russian escalations. ISW has observed the well-demonstrated pattern that Russia escalates its war in Ukraine as soon as it develops new weapons systems and tactics that Russia assesses will help its war effort. ISW assesses that Russia will continue to escalate the war at any moment of its choosing in the future, regardless of whether the West provides Ukraine with military assistance. The Kremlin notably has not offered any assurances that Russia will refrain from escalating its war in Ukraine even if the United States were to refrain from provisioning Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

Peskov also blamed Ukraine on October 24 for the "protracted pause" in negotiations and claimed that Europe is encouraging Ukraine's unwillingness — a long-running Kremlin narrative designed to dually distract from Russia's continued intransigence and discredit the current Ukrainian government and Europe.[16] Russia has repeatedly attempted to deflect blame for its lack of substantive progress toward peace in Ukraine, despite the fact that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its war aims in exchange for peace.[17] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently acknowledged that the West views Russia's negotiating position as "maximalist" and stated that "Russia has not altered its positions" and that Russia expects that the "root causes" of the war to be addressed.[18] Lavrov has continued to define the root causes of Russia's war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers - similar reasons to those Russian President Vladimir Putin gave on February 24, 2022 when he launched the full-scale invasion.[19] Russian officials have repeatedly stated that Ukraine's neutrality, alteration of NATO's integral open-door policy, and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government are the only conditions by which Ukraine and the West can address the supposed "root causes" of the war.[20] Zelensky, in stark contrast to Russia, has continually demonstrated Ukraine's willingness to engage substantively in the peace initiative, including most recently by articulating his alignment with US President Donald Trump on implementing an immediate ceasefire.[21]

The Kremlin is attempting to weaponize reinvigorated US interest in bilateral cooperation with Russia and involvement in initiatives to return Ukrainian children to pressure the US administration.[22] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on October 24 that Ukraine and its allies are promoting an "anti-Russian smear campaign on the children's issue" and that the US Senate is considering several "anti-Russian bills," including a bill recognizing Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism for the "abduction of Ukrainian children."[23] Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova recently implicated herself in the forced deportation and re-education of a Ukrainian teenager and admitted that she "stole" and re-educated the teenager into a pro-Russian ideology.[24] The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab estimates that Russia has likely deported upwards of 35,000 Ukrainian children, and ISW continues to observe reports that Russia maintains many "re-education" and militarization camps in occupied Ukraine and Russia.[25] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated Russia's desire to extend the New START Treaty despite recent US sanctions and claimed that "the first step toward cooperation could be the re-establishment" of dialogue on the treaty, which is set to expire in February 2026.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains committed to attempts to engage the United States on issues unrelated to Russia's war in Ukraine in an effort to stall or bypass the negotiation progress and extract additional economic and political concessions.[27]

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev announced on October 24 that he is traveling to the United States to meet with Trump Administration officials.[28] CNN, citing sources with knowledge of the visit, reported that Dmitriev will visit with Trump Administration officials to continue discussions about the bilateral relationship.[29] Axios and Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Dmitriev will meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff on October 25.[30]

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the fourth time since June 2025, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability against the backdrop of new US sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending. The Kremlin continues to push the Russian Central Bank to pursue economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. The Russian Central Bank announced on October 24 that it lowered its key interest rate from 17 to 16.5 percent.[31] The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that it recorded significant cooling in sectors oriented toward external demand, likely referring to international trade. The Russian Central Bank assessed that current inflationary pressures will temporarily increase in late 2025 and early 2026 due to a number of external economic factors, in line with ISW's ongoing assessments.[32] The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that there are persistent tensions in Russia’s labor market, but noted that wage inflation is growing more slowly than in 2024. The Central Bank has largely leveraged monetary policy to cope with the economic consequences of Russia’s wartime economy and expanded the Russian money supply through military payouts, social projects, and investment in the DIB.

Ongoing intensified Western sanctions against Russia and Russia’s ongoing labor issues brought on by Russia’s war in Ukraine have significantly contributed to Russia’s economic instability. Russia’s strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits alongside efforts to rapidly expand its DIB since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase government spending to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB’s labor force.[33] Russia has leveraged large federal and regional one-time bonuses (some of which are over ten times Russia's annual average salary) to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other civilian jobs, and competition between Russia’s DIB and civilian enterprises is causing wage inflation for civilian positions and inflating prices in service industries writ large.[34] The Kremlin, however, recently began setting conditions to involuntarily mobilize reservists to fight in the war in Ukraine, which, if activated, would allow the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to reduce payments to soldiers and could potentially lower inflation by reducing one source of large government spending, which also exacerbates structural wage inflation.[35] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russia has begun compulsory mobilization of reservists at this time; however, the Kremlin is setting conditions for the possibility of such.

Russian forces recently launched a series of long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for long-range air defense systems. The Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported on October 24 that Russian Su-34 fighters launched three long-range guided glide bombs against Odesa Oblast.[36] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that the strikes were the first Russian glide bomb strikes against Odesa Oblast.[37] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted strikes with modified long-range glide bombs against Poltava Oblast on October 20, against Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast on October 18, and against Mykolaiv City, Mykolaiv Oblast on October 16.[38] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on October 24 that Russian forces employed UMPB-5R precision guided glide bombs with an extended range of 100 to 180 kilometers and a payload of 100 kilograms — significantly smaller than the 500-to-3,000-kilogram payload of typical Russian glide bombs that Russian forces use against frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and settlements.[39] Beskrestnov noted that the UMPB-5R glide bombs are a cheaper analogue to jet-propelled Shahed-type drones and missiles and are similar to previous Russian developments, such as the Banderol cruise missile and the D30 guided glide bomb. Beskrestnov previously reported that Russia relies on Chinese-produced jet engines to increase the glide bomb's range and that Russian aircraft launch the bombs from an altitude of at least 10 kilometers.[40]

Russian forces likely seek to restore their long-range strike capabilities, allowing Russian aircraft to operate farther from the front line and beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems. ISW observed that Russian forces reduced glide bomb strikes in late 2024 in response to higher rates of Ukrainian air defenses shooting down Russian aircraft.[41] The recent longer-range glide bomb strikes indicate that Russian forces are launching these new glide bombs without the same risk of Ukrainian air defenses, exploiting Ukraine's scarcity of air defense systems that have a long range and are capable of downing aircraft covering the front line. ISW continues to assess that a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an umbrella that uses more Patriot systems, would degrade Russia’s ability to conduct airstrikes, underscoring the critical necessity of timely Western provisions of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine, as the system is the longest-range air defense option in Ukraine’s current arsenal.[42] ISW observed that Russian forces are attempting to use medium-range Lancet loitering munitions to counter Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea at ranges over 50 kilometers, which may be part of Russian efforts to reestablish low- and high-altitude superiority to enable long-range glide bomb strikes against southern Ukraine from airspace over the Black Sea.[43]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly increasing its purchases of domestically produced cruise and ballistic missiles despite Western sanctions that aim to contain Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) production. Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported on October 24 that it received access to leaked Russian military procurement documents about Russian missile procurements from 2024 to 2027, indicating that Russia is scaling up its purchases of missiles.[44] Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered about 303 Iskander-K cruise missiles from Russian manufacturer Novator Design Bureau in 2024-2025 at a cost of between 135 to 142 million rubles ($1.6 to 1.7 million) per missile. Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered 95 modernized 9M729 Iskander-K missiles with a range of over 2,000 kilometers for 146 million rubles ($1.8 million) per missile. Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered 240 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles for delivery in 2022 to 2024 and ordered another 450 for delivery in 2025 to 2026 for a cost of about 168 million rubles ($2.1 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 56 nuclear-capable Kinzhals for delivery in 2024-2026. Militarnyi noted that the cost of Kinzhal missiles may increase from 168 million rubles to between 175 and 190 million rubles ($2.2 to 2.3 million) per missile during the production period. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 525 Kh-101 cruise missiles in 2024 for a cost of 164 million rubles (about $2 million) per missile and ordered 700 Kh-101s for 2025 for a cost of 171 to 194 million rubles ($2.1 to 2.4 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered four different Iskander-M ballistic missile variants totaling 589 missiles in 2024 and 643 in 2025 for a cost of 189 to 238 million rubles ($2.3 to 2.9 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 18 "9M723-2" missiles, which Militarnyi assessed could refer to the "Iskander-1000," a new reported Iskander variant with an intended range of about 1,000 kilometers. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 44 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles in 2024 and 144 missiles in 2025 for a cost of 366 million rubles ($4.6 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly contracted indefinite numbers of Zirkon anti-ship missiles, which Russian forces use to strike ground targets in Ukraine, with planned deliveries of 80 missiles per year for a cost of 420 to 450 million rubles ($5.2 to 5.6 million) per missile. The extent to which these reported leaked documents reflect the Russian DIB's ability to deliver missiles to the Russian MoD on the contracted timelines and the planned deliveries of some of these missiles are unclear. The leaked documents, if authentic, indicate that the Russian MoD believes that Russian missile manufacturers are capable of increasing production of the cruise and ballistic missiles that Russian forces regularly launch at Ukraine despite Western sanctions that aim to curtail the Russian DIB's production capacity. Russian forces likely seek to rebuild their stockpiles of cruise and ballistic missiles and will very likely use increased production lines to launch larger and more devastating strike packages against Ukraine, underscoring Ukraine's critical need for air defenses.

Russian manned aircraft violated NATO airspace for a second time on October 23. The Lithuanian Armed Forces reported that a Russian Su-30 fighter jet and a Russian Il-78 Aerial Tanker illegally entered Lithuanian airspace on October 23, and NATO scrambled two Spanish Eurofighters from a Lithuanian base in response to the aerial incursion.[45] The Eurofighters are part of NATO’s ongoing Baltic Air Policing Mission. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda condemned Russia’s incursion into Lithuanian airspace as a ”gross violation of international law.”[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rejected accusations that Russian aircraft violated Lithuanian airspace, claiming that the Su-30 and Il-78 aircraft were conducting "scheduled training flights over Kaliningrad Oblast.”[47] ISW previously reported that three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonian airspace on September 19.[48]

German media outlet Kieler Nachrichten reported on October 23 that the Russian amphibious Ropucha-class landing ship Aleksandr Shabalin anchored near the entrance to Lübeck Bay off the German coast and blocked a shipping lane.[49] The outlet reported that the Russian ship is obstructing commercial vessels traveling a key shipping route linking the Baltic Sea to the North Sea. The Lübeck Bay is notably roughly 55 km from Kiel, the capital of the northern German state Schleswig-Holstein, where German authorities identified several unknown drones flying overnight on September 25 to 26.[50] German Federal Police stated that the Russian ship is currently operating in international waters and is neither violating international law nor international navigation regulations.[51] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations and non-conventional activity are likely part of ”Phase Zero” — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[52]

Belarusian security officials are supporting Russian cognitive warfare efforts against Poland and Lithuania. Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) First Deputy Chairman Sergei Terebov claimed on October 23 that NATO and Ukrainian military personnel are training a 9,000-15,000-strong “Belarusian Liberation Army” to attack Belarus.[53] Terebov claimed that the supposed "Belarusian Liberation Army" includes Belarusian "radicals," is recruiting additional members from the Baltics, Czechia, Poland, and Ukraine; and is training personnel in Poland and Lithuania. Belarusian officials have historically made absurd claims about alleged NATO efforts to destabilize the Union State – and therefore Russia — and previously amplified the claim of this "Belarusian Liberation Army" threatening the Union State in February 2024.[54] Terebov’s most recent statements come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying Phase Zero cognitive warfare operations and a previous Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) warning from September 30 that Ukraine could conduct a false flag attack against Poland to implicate Russia and Belarus.[55] Russia and Belarus could exploit Terebov's claim to justify future aggression against Poland and Lithuania, including sabotage operations and airspace incursions against NATO members near Belarus.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to advance in central and western Pokrovsk, although the exact contour of the front line in and around the town remains unclear.
• The Kremlin continues its multifaceted cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing US decision makers in Russia's favor in response to recent US sanctions.
• Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev announced on October 24 that he is traveling to the United States to meet with Trump Administration officials.
• The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the fourth time since June 2025, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability against the backdrop of new US sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending.
• Russian forces recently launched a series of long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for long-range air defense systems.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly increasing its purchases of domestically produced cruise and ballistic missiles despite Western sanctions that aim to contain Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) production.
• Russian manned aircraft violated NATO airspace for a second time on October 23.
• Belarusian security officials are supporting Russian cognitive warfare efforts against Poland and Lithuania.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2025 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian oil companies are reportedly significantly reducing direct purchases of Russian oil in the short term, and the European Union (EU) passed its 19th sanctions package against Russia, primarily targeting the Russian energy sector. Reuters reported on October 23, citing multiple trade sources, that major PRC state oil companies -- including PetroChina, SinoPec, CNOOC, and Zhenhua Oil -- suspended purchases of seaborne Russian oil "at least in the short term" following the October 22 US sanctions against Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil.[i] Trade sources told Reuters that Rosneft and Lukoil sell most oil to the PRC indirectly by going through intermediaries, but that intendent PRC refiners are more likely to pause buying to assess the impact of sanctions. The trade sources stated that independent PRC refiners would still likely seek to purchase Russian oil despite the sanctions. Bloomberg and Reuters reported on October 23 citing refineries and industry sources that Indian oil refineries will significantly cut Russian oil imports due to the US sanctions.[ii] An industry source told Reuters that India’s cut of Russian oil imports will be "massive" but not total or immediate as Indian refineries will still import some barrels of Russian crude oil through intermediaries.[iii]

The EU sanctions package bans Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into the EU beginning in January 2027 for long-term contracts and within six months (by April 23, 2026) for short-term contracts.[iv] The package also targets tankers assessed to be part of the Russian shadow fleet, a United Arab Emirates (UAE) entity that serves as a conduit for the Russian shadow fleet by circumventing EU sanctions, and four PRC oil refineries. The EU also sanctioned Russian financial institutions and operators from the UAE and the PRC that supply military and dual-use goods to Russia. The EU imposed additional travel restrictions and authorization requirements for Russian diplomats and sanctioned 11 individuals involved in the illegal deportation, abduction, and militarized education of Ukrainian children.

Senior Kremlin officials publicly characterized the United States and US President Donald Trump as Russia's adversary and "unfriendly" to Russia in response to the October 22 US sanctions against Russia's energy sector. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 23 that Trump imposed these sanctions to pressure Russia and noted that the sanctions are "an unfriendly act toward Russia."[v] Putin claimed that Trump's actions are damaging Russian-US relations and disrupting the global energy market. Putin continued to posture Russian economic resilience regarding Western sanctions, claiming that "[Russia] feel[s] confident [and] stable despite certain losses" but noted that "there is nothing good or pleasant" about the new US sanctions against Russia — an implicit acknowledgement that the sanctions will harm Russia's economy. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts on October 23 that "the United States is [Russia's] adversary" and that the United States is now fully embracing its "warpath against Russia."[vi] Medvedev added that Russia's war in Ukraine is now Trump's war and that the United States recent policy decisions are an "act of war against Russia." The Kremlin typically permits Medvedev to insert hyperbolic statements into the information space that reflect the fringe of the Kremlin's positions and directly communicate the subtext of messages from other Russian officials.[vii] Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have not publicly defined the United States as Russia's adversary during the Trump administration until October 23 and have been careful in their criticisms of the United States under the Trump administration, likely to achieve concessions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, avoid US sanctions, and attempt to conclude bilateral economic deals.[viii] Putin and Medvedev's statements are a significant rhetorical inflection that likely seek to exculpate Russia for refusing to negotiate with Ukraine or agree to ceasefires previously proposed by the United States and Ukraine.  

Other Russian officials continue to posture economic resilience and the necessity of achieving Russia's war aims, likely to prepare Russian domestic audiences for the economic impact of Western sanctions and a prolonged war effort. Russian State Duma Deputy Svetlana Zhurova claimed on October 23 that sanctions against Russia will not impact Russia's policies – likely referring to the war in Ukraine -- and that the Trump administration's pressure against Russia does not address the issues necessary to end the war.[ix] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa responded on October 22 to Trump's criticisms of Putin's willingness to make peace, claiming that Trump's "blunt and sweeping" statements and cancellation of the Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest do not mean that the United States and Russia have stopped preparations for the next summit.[x] Chepa claimed that Trump's proposal for an immediate ceasefire will have no effect as it does not address the "root causes" of Russia's war in Ukraine, justifying to domestic Russian audiences Putin's rejection of Trump's peace efforts.[xi] These statements from senior Kremlin officials and prominent Russian State Duma deputies deflect blame from Russia's long-standing rejection of repeated attempts to progress the peace initiative in Ukraine, the actual reason for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations. Trump, when asked a question about how Putin stated that sanctions will not meaningfully impact Russia, stated, “I'm glad [Putin] feels that way. I'll let you know about it six months from now... Let's see how it all works out.”[xii]

The Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray Russian forces as having established a bridgehead in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast – a new Russian cognitive warfare effort against Ukraine and its partners. Geolocated footage from Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo published on October 22 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag on Karantynnyi Island in 5th Selishche Microraion in southwestern Kherson City.[xiii] Saldo claimed that unspecified Russian reconnaissance and airborne (VDV) units conducted an operation to cross the Dnipro River and seized a bridgehead on Karantynnyi Island. Saldo claimed that the Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks, secured a bridgehead, mined the approaches to the new Russian positions, and are now organizing logistics to Karantynnyi Island. Some Russian milbloggers amplified Saldo's claims and credited drone operators of the 31st VDV Brigade with gaining air superiority for the Russian crossing and artillery elements of the 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) with striking Ukrainian positions on Karantynnyi Island and bridges from mainland Kherson City to the island.[xiv] A milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and assault groups are preparing to search for and eliminate groups of Ukrainian forces in Korabelnyi Microraion (northeastern Karantynnyi Island).[xv]

Available evidence continues to indicate that Russian forces have not established a bridgehead or begun an offensive in west bank Kherson Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade published footage on October 23 that ISW geolocated showing Ukrainian forces freely operating in Kherson City's Ostriv Microraion (on Karantynnyi Island immediately north of 5th Selishche Microraion).[xvi] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Karantynnyi Island and the areas of Antonivka and Sadove (both east of Kherson City on the west bank) are "silent" and that Russian forces are not operating on the west bank of the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger focusing on the Kherson direction recently claimed that Russian forces conducted sabotage and reconnaissance operations near Antonivka and Sadove and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Sadove – claims that are not supported by any available reporting of Russian operations.[xvii] Russia is likely conducting a cognitive warfare effort to portray limited Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a dedicated Russian offensive to cross the Dnipro River and recapture Kherson City and Oblast.[xviii] The Kremlin likely intends to convince the West, European Union (EU), and Ukraine that a Russian victory is inevitable such that Ukraine should submit to Russia's demands to cede territory and that allies should stop supporting Ukraine.[xix] ISW continues to assess that this Russian cognitive warfare effort is incompatible with any claim that Russia is willing to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine.[xx]

Russian forces continue to increase the frequency of mechanized assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine, likely to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations. Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows a Russian roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized and motorized assault toward Siversk from Serebryanka (north of Siversk) and Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[xxi] A Ukrainian drone battalion that repelled the assault reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank, three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), three buggies, and roughly 20 motorcycles in the assault.[xxii] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on October 23 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in Chasiv Yar, destroying two MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and killing roughly 40 Russian servicemembers.[xxiii] Weather monitoring services indicate that the Siversk and Chasiv Yar areas experienced cloudy conditions on October 23, and that it rained in Chasiv Yar on October 23.[xxiv] Russian forces conducted an at least reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) on October 22 as the area experienced cloud cover.[xxv] ISW observed that Russian forces exploited precipitation to conduct a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv) on October 20.[xxvi] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are exploiting poor weather conditions to conduct mechanized assaults as foggy and rainy conditions degrade the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone surveillance and strikes.[xxvii] The season change to autumn is also reportedly making drones more effective by depriving Russian soldiers of some concealment. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that the autumnal lack of foliage is complicating Russian forces' ability to evade Ukrainian drones.[xxviii]

Ukraine's partners continue to support Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo announced on October 23 that Finland will allocate 100 million euros (about $116 million) in its first contribution to the PURL initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Spain is joining the PURL initiative.[xxix]

Russian forces continue to target and kill civilians, first responders, and journalists. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on October 23 that Russian forces executed at least four civilians sheltering in private homes in Zvanivka, Bakhmutsky Raion on October 20, 2025.[xxx] Russian soldiers have committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in occupied Ukraine, and ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders enable and even order atrocities including summary executions.[xxxi] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on October 23 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders in Zelenyi Hai, Kharkiv Oblast, killing one first responder and injuring five others.[xxxii] Russian forces have conducted double-tap strikes targeting first responders in Ukraine to spread fear among Ukrainian civilians and maximize the degree of casualties and damage from Russian strike series in Ukraine. [xxxiii]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on October 23. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on October 23 that Russia released 1,000 bodies that it claimed belonged to deceased Ukrainian servicemembers.[xxxiv] Ukraine’s “I Want to Find” project reported on October 23 that Ukraine released the bodies of 31 KIA Russian servicemembers.[xxxv]

Key Takeaways:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian oil companies are reportedly significantly reducing direct purchases of Russian oil in the short term, and the European Union (EU) passed its 19th sanctions package against Russia, primarily targeting the Russian energy sector.
• Senior Kremlin officials publicly characterized the United States and US President Donald Trump as Russia's adversary and "unfriendly" to Russia in response to the October 22 US sanctions against Russia's energy sector.
• The Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray Russian forces as having established a bridgehead in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast – a new Russian cognitive warfare effort against Ukraine and its partners.
• Available evidence continues to indicate that Russian forces have not established a bridgehead or begun an offensive in west bank Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces continue to increase the frequency of mechanized assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine, likely to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations.
• Ukraine's partners continue to support Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine.
• Russian forces continue to target and kill civilians, first responders, and journalists.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on October 23.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2025 

Russian forces conducted a large combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of October 21 and 22 and struck a Ukrainian kindergarten on the morning of October 22. The Ukrainian Air force reported that Russian forces launched 405 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — roughly 250 of which were Shahed drones — from Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Rostov oblasts and occupied Donetsk Oblast; nine Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and occupied Crimea; four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace above Rostov Oblast; and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 333 drones, eight Iskander-K cruise missiles, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, and two Kh-59/69 missiles; that 12 missiles and 55 drones hit 26 locations; and that drone debris fell on 19 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that 17 drones did not reach their targets as they were "lost in location” (likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare [EW] interference). The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strikes primarily targeted Kyiv Oblast and also affected Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Odesa Oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[2] Kyiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian forces conducted strikes against civilian and energy infrastructure, killing four civilians, including a 12-year-old girl and a six-month-old baby, and injuring 29, including five children.[3] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy announced that it enacted emergency power shutdowns throughout most Ukrainian oblasts and that Ukrainian officials are working to restore power.[4] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that Romanian forces scrambled two F-16 fighter jets to investigate air targets moving toward the Danube Delta area and that two German Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft took off from Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base to carry out Enhanced Air Policing missions during the overnight Russian strikes on Ukraine.[5]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a kindergarten in Kharkiv Oblast on October 22, killing one and injuring seven.[6] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Head Amil Omerov told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on October 22 that Russian forces may have used jet-powered Geran-2 drones in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time to strike densely built-up civilian infrastructure, including the kindergarten.[7] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that Russia used three Shahed (Geran) drones to strike a building in which a kindergarten operated.[8] Terekhov noted that all teachers and children evacuated in time to the basement shelter.

The United States announced new economic and military levers in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's persistent reticence to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The US Treasury announced on October 22 that its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is imposing further sanctions on Russia as a result of Russia’s lack of serious commitment to the process to end the war in Ukraine.[9] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the United States is sanctioning Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil - Russia’s two largest oil companies - and that the US Treasury is prepared to take further action if necessary to support US President Donald Trump’s effort to end the war. OFAC also blocked all entities of which Rosneft or Lukoil directly or indirectly own 50 percent or more.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 22 that US officials stated that the Trump administration lifted restrictions on Ukraine's use of Storm Shadow missiles, which use US intelligence for targeting, to strike Russian territory.[10] A source reportedly stated that the decision to lift the restrictions occurred before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump on October 17. The WSJ reported that two US officials stated that the Trump administration had not approved any Ukrainian Storm Shadow strikes until recently, when the authority for such strikes moved from US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to US Commander of European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich. US officials reportedly stated that they expect Ukraine to conduct more Storm Shadow strikes against Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that elements of the Ukrainian Air Force, Ground Forces, and Navy struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Bryansk Oblast with Storm Shadow missiles on October 21.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the plant produces gunpowder, explosives, and components for rocket fuel. ISW continues to assess that economic instruments coupled with measures that allow Ukraine to maintain pressure on the battlefield are vital to push Putin to reconsider his theory of victory.[12]

Western reporting indicates that the United States called off the planned meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin after Russia continued to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise on its long-standing war demands in Ukraine. Fox News reported on October 22 that Trump called off a meeting with Putin in Budapest after Russia rejected Trump's push for a ceasefire in Ukraine.[13] Trump stated on October 21 that he does not want to have a "wasted meeting."[14] A White House official stated that there are no plans for a Trump-Putin meeting "in the immediate future."[15] The Wall Street Journal reported that officials stated that the October 20 call between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov showed that the Kremlin was not compromising on its long-held demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to Russia and that Rubio subsequently briefed White House officials after the call, stating that a summit between Trump and Putin was unlikely to yield positive results.[16] Reuters reported that two US officials and a person familiar with the situation stated that Russia sent a non-paper (an informal diplomatic document) to the United States over the weekend of October 18-19 outlining Russian demands.[17] One US official stated that the communique reaffirmed Russia's demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, an implicit rejection of Trump's call for an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline. Reuters reported that Russia also re-emphasized its demand that a future peace agreement not include the deployment of NATO troops to Ukrainian territory. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 22 that Putin has "repeatedly" and "clearly" stated Russia's position and that Russia's stance is "well-known."[18] Peskov's October 22 statement is a continuation of recent Kremlin statements demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to agree to US- and Ukrainian-backed proposals for an immediate ceasefire and Russia's commitment to its maximalist war demands.[19]

The Kremlin is setting conditions to exculpate itself for the likely failure of future peace negotiations due to its own unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 22 that Russia and the United States have not set the date of the Putin-Trump summit and that there are mostly untrue "rumors and gossip” surrounding the summit.[20] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev, on October 21, accused Western media of distorting news about the summit to undermine it.[21] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky claimed on October 22 that Russian officials continue to prepare for the summit, which Slutsky accused the EU of attempting to disrupt.[22] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on October 22 that the meeting will take place, but that the number of days over which the summit will take place is undetermined.[23] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 22 that Russia and the United States did not agree on a meeting between Rubio and Lavrov in Budapest, but that preparations for the Trump-Putin summit continue.[24] Ryabkov accused those who oppose a peace agreement of attempting to present the situation as having changed in the past few weeks. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to deflect blame for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement onto the EU and the West, despite Russia's continued adherence to its maximalist war aims that amount to Ukraine’s total capitulation.[25] The Kremlin has recently publicly and privately underscored its refusal to make concessions on its demands, as seen in Kremlin officials' recent statements and the reported non-paper that Russian officials sent to the US.[26]

The Kremlin is using pre-planned strategic missile tests to further its ongoing rhetorical effort to push the United States to agree to concessions on the war in Ukraine in return for US-Russian arms control talks. Russian President Vladimir Putin directed a strategic nuclear forces exercise involving their land, sea, and air components on October 22.[27] Russian forces launched a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Plesetsk Cosmodrome, a Sineva ballistic missile from the Bryansk nuclear-powered submarine in the Barents Sea, and cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers. These exercises are annual and routine: Russia conducted similar exercises on October 26, 2022; October 25, 2023; and October 29, 2024.[28] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov used the backdrop of the strategic missile tests on October 22 to claim that NATO’s alleged "aggressive policies" forced Russia to adopt ”compensatory military-technical measures” and that Russia will not allow NATO to drag it into a ”very costly arms race.”[29] Ryabkov claimed that there are no opportunities for dialogue between Russia and the United States ”on any issues related to non-proliferation.”[30] Ryabkov demanded that the United States reciprocate Russia's proposal to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and claimed that the United States bears responsibility for Russia's decision to withdraw from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Ryabkov’s invocation of multiple arms control treaties against the backdrop of the strategic missile test is likely part of a concerted and deliberate Kremlin effort. The Kremlin has been using defunct US-Russian arms control treaties to cater to the bilateral Russia-US relationship in the hopes of securing future concessions on Ukraine. Russia has been moving to withdraw from multiple arms control treaties in recent months, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), while offering to extend New START for one year.[31] Russia's use of both carrots and sticks aims to push the United States to turn its attention away from the war and toward US-Russian bilateral relations.

Ukraine and its European allies are reportedly developing a 12-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine that includes multiple points that the Kremlin has already designated as non-starters. Bloomberg and the Telegraph reported on October 21 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Ukrainian and European leaders are developing a peace plan and that a "peace board" that US President Donald Trump would chair would oversee its implementation.[32] The sources stated that the plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of further territorial advances.[33] The proposal calls for Russia to repatriate all deported Ukrainian children and for both sides to exchange prisoners. The sources stated that the proposal also calls for Ukraine to receive security guarantees, funding for reconstruction, and a path towards “rapid” EU accession. Bloomberg stated that unspecified actors would gradually lift sanctions against Russia if Russia agreed to the plan, but did not specify which sanctions. The plan proposes that the West return Russia’s roughly $300 billion in frozen assets only if Russia contributes to Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. Western states would reportedly reinstate sanctions and freeze Russian assets if Russia attacks Ukraine again. The plan calls for Russia and Ukraine to negotiate the governance of occupied territories, but noted that Europe and Ukraine will not legally recognize any occupied territory as Russian. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte met with Trump on October 22, reportedly to present the proposal to Trump.[34]

The reported plan is in line with Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline, to which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has already agreed and which Ukraine’s European allies support.[35] The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly expressed its opposition to a ceasefire and continues to reiterate Russia’s commitment to achieving its original war goals - as evidenced by the non-paper that Russia reportedly sent to the United States, outlining its demands for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and rejecting Trump's proposed freezing of the frontline.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war aims and is refusing to engage in good-faith negotiations - in contrast to Ukraine.[37]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced plans to deploy active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear, in part to obfuscate likely Kremlin efforts to prepare to deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine in the future. Deputy Chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky claimed on October 22 that Russian authorities will use reservists to protect critical infrastructure facilities in the deep Russian rear, such as energy and transportation infrastructure and oil refineries, from Ukrainian drone strikes.[38] Reservists are members of Russia's "human mobilization reserve," an active reserve in which Russian citizens sign a contract with the Russian MoD on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up. Tsimlyansky claimed that mobile fire teams made up of reservists, who were employees of the enterprises and understood the facilities' vulnerabilities and terrain, have successfully repelled drone strikes in the past. Tsimlyansky claimed that the recent MoD-initiated draft law on reservists (which would permit the Russian military to use reservists from Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war) does not mean that Russian authorities will call them up for military service, deploy them to the war in Ukraine, or deploy them outside of Russia.[39] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov notably stated on October 13 that the law will allow the Kremlin to deploy reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[40] Tsimlyansky further claimed that there is "no mention" of mobilization.

The Kremlin is using the deployment of reservists to protect critical infrastructure in the Russian rear to appear as if it is addressing a longstanding sensitive issue, while apparently setting conditions to mobilize reservists for combat in the future. Russian milbloggers have complained throughout the war that Russian authorities have not only failed to protect Russian infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes but have been trying to deflect blame for these failures.[41] Russian mobile fire groups across Russia are unlikely to offer sufficient protection against Ukrainian strikes, and Ukraine notably pairs its effective mobile fire groups with other air defense means to protect against Russian drones — an approach Russia would have to adopt to optimize defense of critical infrastructure. A Russian milblogger responded to Tsimlyansky's announcement, noting how this is not a "game-changing solution" but is "just one cog in the overall security system."[42] The milblogger stated that mobile fire groups without denser radar coverage and more air defense systems will not be effective. Russian authorities are likely trying to downplay the intended effects of the draft law on reservists, which ISW assesses will allow Russia to mobilize members of the active reserve on a rolling basis to sustain combat operations in Ukraine.[43]

Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial enterprises overnight on October 21 and 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a processing unit of the Makhachkala Oil Refinery in the Republic of Dagestan, which has an annual production capacity of one million tons and provides fuel for Russia's Caspian Flotilla naval base.[44] Footage published on October 22 shows an explosion at an industrial area in Makhachkala.[45] Republic of Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov acknowledged on October 22 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified enterprise in the region.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Saransk Mechanical Plant in the Republic of Mordovia, which produces anti-personnel engineering ammunition and mining kits, ammunition detonators, and initiation units.[47] Geolocated footage published on October 22 shows an explosion at the Saransk Mechanical Plant, and Republic of Mordovia Governor Artem Zdunov claimed that an overnight Ukrainian strike damaged an unspecified facility in the region.[48] Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlets on October 21 and 22 that an overnight explosion occurred at a section of the Pskov-St. Petersburg railway line, which the Russian military frequently uses, and stated that the explosion caused significant damage and disrupted logistics.[49]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of October 21 and 22 and struck a Ukrainian kindergarten on the morning of October 22.
• The United States announced new economic and military levers in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's persistent reticence to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Western reporting indicates that the United States called off the planned meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin after Russia continued to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise on its long-standing war demands in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is setting conditions to exculpate itself for the likely failure of future peace negotiations due to its own unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations.
• The Kremlin is using pre-planned strategic missile tests to further its ongoing rhetorical effort to push the United States to agree to concessions on the war in Ukraine in return for US-Russian arms control talks.
• Ukraine and its European allies are reportedly developing a 12-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine that includes multiple points that the Kremlin has already designated as non-starters.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced plans to deploy active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear, in part to obfuscate likely Kremlin efforts to prepare to deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine in the future.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial enterprises overnight on October 21 and 22.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces advanced near Lyman.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2025 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is unwilling to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine that does not result in Ukraine’s complete capitulation. Lavrov stated that Russia has not changed its position since the August 2025 Alaska summit, and that Russia does not need a short-term ceasefire that “leads nowhere,” but a “long-term stable peace.”[1] Lavrov responded to American demands for an immediate end to Russia’s war in Ukraine by claiming that a ceasefire would not resolve the alleged “root causes” of the conflict — which Lavrov has continued to identify as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[2] Lavrov’s statements emphasize the Kremlin’s determination to achieve its original war aims despite American demands for an immediate end to the conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly stated that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire until Ukraine and the West meet Russia's demands of Ukrainian neutrality, the removal of the legitimate government in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO’s Open Door Policy.[3] Lavrov’s statements are a continuation of the Kremlin’s attempts to signal to US President Donald Trump that Trump’s demands for an immediate end to the war are incompatible with Russia’s war aims.[4]

Ukraine and its European allies signaled their support for U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friederich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Portuguese President António Costa, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Støre, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez published a joint statement on October 21 expressing support for Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire and to leverage the current frontline in Ukraine as a "starting point" for peace negotiations.[5] The European leaders noted that Ukraine is the “only party serious about peace” and that Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position “before, during, and after any ceasefire.” The European leaders reiterated their intent to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine and “ramp up the pressure” on Russia’s economy and defense industrial base (DIB). ISW continues to assess that economic pressure alone is an insufficient tool to bring Russia to the negotiating table and that ending the war in Ukraine also relies on continued robust military support to Ukraine.[6]

Recent Russian war crimes in Pokrovsk highlight the humanitarian cost of Russian advances in more populated areas. Ukrainian volunteer Denys Khrystov published on October 19 geolocated footage showing several civilians that Russian forces murdered near the railway line in central Pokrovsk.[7] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on October 21 that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group committed the murders in violation of international humanitarian law.[8] Donetsk Oblast Police Spokesperson Pavlo Diachenko reported on October 21 that Ukrainian authorities are still determining the exact number and nature of civilian casualties from the Russian attack.[9] Diachenko noted that Russian drone strikes prevent humanitarian volunteers from entering Pokrovsk and impede evacuation efforts. The recent murders reflect Russian forces’ policy of deliberately killing Ukrainian civilians, and the death toll will only increase should Russian forces continue to advance into populated urban areas such as Pokrovsk.[10]

Russia's long-range strike campaign continues to target critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 21 that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; four S-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles from Kursk Oblast; and 98 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones - of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea on the night of October 20 to 21.[11] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 58 drones and that all six missiles and 37 drones struck 10 locations and that downed debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts and noted that Russian forces are striking such infrastructure daily ahead of winter.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and energy infrastructure and caused power outages in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Kyiv oblasts.[13]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2025 

US President Donald Trump's October 17 meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly ended with Trump supporting a ceasefire on the current frontlines and not Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk Oblast to Russia. Western reporting, citing sources with knowledge of the Trump-Zelensky meeting, indicates that Trump or a "Trump aide" initially supported Putin's demand that Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia but that Trump later proposed a ceasefire freezing the current frontline by the end of the meeting.[i] Trump told journalists that he did not tell Zelensky that Ukraine must cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia.[ii] Trump has subsequently publicly stated that Ukraine and Russia should freeze the current frontline.[iii] Trump reportedly discussed giving security guarantees to both Ukraine and Russia during the October 17 meeting.[iv] Some Western media outlets reported that Putin offered to exchange unspecified "small areas" or "parts" of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts for the rest of Donetsk Oblast during his October 16 call with Trump.[v] It remains unclear if Putin offered to withdraw from parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy or if Putin offered to abandon part or all of his demand that Ukraine cede unoccupied parts of the regions to Russia. It is also unclear if Putin was proposing preconditions for leader-level negotiations with Ukraine, a ceasefire, or a final peace settlement and if the parties discussed any additional conditions that Putin attached to such negotiations, ceasefire, or peace settlement.

Kremlin voices clarified Russia's position on negotiations following Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to reiterate that Russia remains committed to addressing the alleged "root causes" of the war and is unwilling to agree to a ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Western media reports about Trump's proposal for a ceasefire along the current frontline, stating that Russia has responded to the many repeated statements on this matter and that Russia's position is "well known" and "consistent."[vi] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Russia has discussed the "root causes" of the war in order to ensure that a resolution to the war guarantees peace.[vii] Zakharova reiterated that Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and "the Russian leadership as a whole" have spoken about the need to eliminate the "root causes" and that Russia is oriented around this position. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that there should not be a ceasefire along the current lines and rejected assertions that a ceasefire would allow for diplomatic negotiations to end the war.[viii] Chepa claimed that Russia should conclude an agreement on building the "future world order in Ukraine" before agreeing to halt military actions. Chepa claimed that the upcoming Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest could compel Ukraine to accept the terms of a peace settlement and then Russia can finalize a ceasefire on the frontline.[ix] Chepa claimed that Russia also needs security guarantees at the end of the war from the United States and alluded to Russia's ultimatums to the United States in 2021 about NATO.[x] Chepa claimed that there are "a lot of issues," including demands for Ukrainian neutrality, the cessation of NATO expansion, and the reduction of "certain types of weapons" (possibly referring to Russian demands for significant reductions to the Ukrainian military or the resumption of US-Russian arms control treaties).

The Kremlin has repeatedly referenced the need to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Kremlin officials have defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[xi] The Kremlin uses discussions about these root causes to forward Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian neutrality, the removal of the legitimate government in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO's Open Door Policy. Kremlin officials have also repeatedly rejected Trump's and Zelensky's proposals for a ceasefire on the grounds that negotiations for a final peace settlement must come first.[xii] The Kremlin is likely reemphasizing Russia's commitment to its original war aims against the backdrop of Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to clarify that Trump's position coming out of that meeting is unacceptable for the Kremlin, particularly ahead of the meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The Kremlin is priming the Russian people for a full victory in Ukraine whatever the cost — a domestic effort that is at odds with Putin's reported willingness to make territorial concessions. The Kremlin has consistently reiterated throughout the war that Russia's war demands remain unchanged and has communicated to the Russian people that Russia will achieve all these goals in Ukraine, whether militarily or diplomatically.[xiii] The Kremlin has not prepared Russian society to accept anything less than these demands. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, who served as defense minister throughout much of the war, claimed in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS on October 20 that occupied Ukrainian areas should not be considered "new regions" of Russia but are instead Russia's "old regions" that have "historically" been Russian.[xiv] TASS framed Shoigu's claim as referring to Donbas and "Novorossiya" — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine that the Kremlin has claimed is "integral" to Russia.[xv] The Kremlin has conditioned Russians to expect that Russia's illegal annexation of parts of Ukraine is permanent and that Russia cannot make any territorial concessions to Ukraine. Western media broadly reported around the August 2025 Alaska summit that Putin had offered territorial concessions in exchange for the Ukrainian surrender of the unoccupied portion of Donetsk Oblast, prompting ire from Russian officials and ultranationalist voices in the information space.[xvi] Russian officials and pro-Kremlin voices downplayed or dismissed the prospect of territorial concessions following Western reporting that Putin recently made a similar offer for territorial concessions to Trump.[xvii] Putin's refusal to prepare the Russian people, including the important ultranationalist constituency, to make any concessions in the war in Ukraine is another indicator that he does not intend to diverge from his long-held demands in any future peace talks.

The Kremlin is leaning into its cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as relentlessly advancing and a Russian victory as inevitable. This effort aims to obscure the reality that Russian forces are only making minimal gains at disproportionately high manpower costs and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives by force in the short- or medium-term. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on October 20 that Russia is increasing its federal spending on propaganda in the 2026 budget by 54 percent compared to the 2025 federal budget.[xviii] ISW has also observed reports indicating that the Kremlin is significantly investing in state television outlets and traditional means of propaganda in the 2026 budget.[xix] The Kremlin's increase in state funding for mass media and propaganda notably comes as Russian federal subjects are cutting down on one-time signing bonuses for new military recruits, likely at the Kremlin's direction and in response to struggles to maintain voluntary recruitment and the negative effects these payments are having on the Russian economy as a whole.[xx] The Kremlin is trying to use the information space to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as certain in order to push Ukraine and the West to concede to Russia's demands. The Kremlin is heavily investing in its cognitive warfare capabilities and efforts to try to achieve its unrealistic war goals through diplomatic means. ISW has observed no indications that the Kremlin remains willing to accept anything less than Ukrainian capitulation to all of its original war demands, and the Kremlin remains willing to expend considerable amounts of manpower, materiel, time, and other resources to achieving these demands on the battlefield if needed.

The Kremlin is advancing several informational lines falsely inflating reports of Russian military advances and offensive capabilities in order to push the West and Ukraine into conceding to Russia's territorial demands. Russian forces have been conducting infiltration missions and raising Russian flags in porous areas of the frontline in eastern Ukraine, particularly in Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast and in Donetsk Oblast, as part of a concerted effort to claim that these infiltration missions are actually enduring Russian territorial gains.[xxi] Putin and senior Russian defense officials have artificially inflated the extent of Russian gains in Ukraine in recent weeks, particularly following the August 2025 Alaska summit, using these infiltration missions and exaggerated qualitative data to lend legitimacy to their claims.[xxii] The Kremlin aims for these claims to penetrate the Western information space to falsely portray Russia as capable of making rapid gains on the battlefield and overwhelming Ukrainian forces, even though Russian advances are constrained to slow footpace, dependent upon large numbers of infantry, and incur heavy casualties.

Russian officials are also attempting to falsely portray ongoing limited Russian operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a new major Russian offensive in the province. Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources have begun pushing the narrative that Russian forces have begun efforts to seize Kherson City, claiming without evidence that limited sabotage and reconnaissance activity is actually a significant offensive and that Russia occupies areas of Kherson City.[xxiii] Kherson City's administrative boundaries are limited to the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, and Russian forces have not occupied areas of west bank Kherson Oblast since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in November 2022 that drove Russian forces to withdraw across the Dnipro River to the east (left) bank.[xxiv] ISW has not observed indications that Russian forces are preparing for or have launched a concerted offensive effort to cross the Dnipro River and advance into west bank Kherson Oblast — an operation that would require significant manpower and materiel that Russia has not concentrated in the Kherson direction.[xxv] The Kremlin likely seeks to convince Ukraine and the West that Russia's recapture of Kherson City and all of Kherson Oblast is inevitable such that Ukraine should cede these areas to Russia. The Kremlin may also seek to posture that a Russian "decision" to not seize these areas in exchange for Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast would be a significant Russian concession. The Kremlin is attempting to use all available informational avenues to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine to acquiesce to the Kremlin's demands by convincing them that a Russian victory in Ukraine is certain when it is anything but.

Kremlin officials are attempting to present Ukraine as the obstacle to peace to obfuscate how Putin himself has been impeding the process by insisting that Ukraine cede more territory than Russian forces currently occupy. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev claimed on October 19 that Ukraine and Europe are undermining the US-led peace process.[xxvi] Zelensky has agreed to each of Trump's proposed immediate ceasefires along the current front in recent months, whereas Putin has rejected every one.[xxvii] The Kremlin has been pushing a false narrative that Russia will inevitably seize the territory it is demanding and that Ukraine therefore is responsible for protracting the war by refusing to surrender preemptively. Russian forces in reality, however, have been making creeping, marginal territorial advances at very high casualty rates because Putin has repeatedly rejected American and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and remains determined to fight for more territory than Russia now controls.[xxviii] Russia, not Ukraine, has repeatedly demonstrated that its refusal to compromise or engage in good faith negotiations is the reason for the lack of peace.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump's October 17 meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly ended with Trump supporting a ceasefire on the current frontlines and not Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk Oblast to Russia.
• Kremlin voices clarified Russia's position on negotiations following Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to reiterate that Russia remains committed to addressing the alleged "root causes" of the war and is unwilling to agree to a ceasefire.
• The Kremlin is priming the Russian people for a full victory in Ukraine whatever the cost — a domestic effort that is at odds with Putin's reported willingness to make territorial concessions.
• The Kremlin is leaning into its cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as relentlessly advancing and a Russian victory as inevitable. This effort aims to obscure the reality that Russian forces are only making minimal gains at disproportionately high manpower costs and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives by force in the short- or medium-term.
• Russian officials are also attempting to falsely portray ongoing limited Russian operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a new major Russian offensive in the province.
• The Kremlin is attempting to use all available informational avenues to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine to acquiesce to the Kremlin's demands by convincing them that a Russian victory in Ukraine is certain when it is anything but.
• Kremlin officials are attempting to present Ukraine as the obstacle to peace to obfuscate how Putin himself has been impeding the process by insisting that Ukraine cede more territory than Russian forces currently occupy.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2025 

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to "surrender parts" of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing. Two senior officials told The Washington Post in an article published on October 18 that Putin told US President Trump on October 16 that Ukraine must cede the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia "as a condition for ending the war" and that he "would be willing to surrender parts" of occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange.[1] The exact terms of Putin's reported offer are unclear. It is possible that Putin may have been referring to Ukrainian-controlled parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts that Russia illegally annexed and does not occupy. Putin previously demanded the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in exchange for a ceasefire in August 2025, and ISW has continuously assessed that ceding the remainder of Donetsk Oblast disproportionately favors Russia.[2] Donetsk Oblast contains territory that is strategically vital for Ukraine's defense and defense industrial base (DIB), including the fortress belt – Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014, which  Ukraine has developed into a significant logistical and defense industrial hub.[3] Russian forces currently have no available means of rapidly enveloping or penetrating the fortress belt, which would likely take several years to seize at their current rate of advance. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would allow Russian forces to avoid a long and bloody struggle and continue fighting into deep rear areas of Ukraine from new positions along the Donetsk Oblast border.[4] Russian forces would have advantageous positions from which to launch attacks into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts or southern Kharkiv Oblast – areas that are significantly less fortified than the fortress belt. Such a withdrawal would also set more advantageous conditions for the ongoing Russian offensive to advance across the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast and approach Izyum. Russia would have its choice of multiple, mutually supportive offensive operations to undertake should Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia, especially if there is no guarantee that Russia will not resume offensive operations in Ukraine.

Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City — efforts that are incompatible with Putin's claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed on October 19 that Russian forces control an industrial part of Kherson City in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and several dacha areas on the Dnipro River Delta islands, so "therefore the [seizure] of Kherson [City] itself has already begun."[5] The administrative boundaries of Kherson City are limited to west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, so it is unclear which areas of east bank Kherson Oblast Saldo is referring to. Russian forces withdrew from all of west bank Kherson Oblast as of November 2022 following a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and interdiction campaign.[6] Kremlin newswire TASS framed Saldo's statement to imply that Russian forces have begun a new concerted offensive effort to seize Kherson City itself — a significant undertaking that would require Russian forces to ford the Dnipro River and dedicate more manpower and materiel than is currently operating in the Kherson direction.[7] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russian forces will seize Kherson City as it is a "constituent entity" that "must be returned to Russia," but noted that Russian forces will not do so "anytime soon."[8] ISW has yet to observe any indicators to assess that Russian forces are likely preparing for or have launched a renewed significant offensive operation against west bank Kherson Oblast.

Russian officials also downplayed the seriousness of Putin's reported proposal, likely in an effort to condition Russian society to accept the Kremlin's intent to continue its war effort in Ukraine. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed to Russian state media outlet Lenta on October 19 that occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts "are recognized regions of Russia," following Russia's September 2022 sham referenda, and that any territorial concessions that Russia may have proposed "were expressed in a more relaxed manner."[9] These Russian officials are messaging to domestic Russian audiences that the Kremlin maintains its territorial claims over Kherson City and likely all of west bank Kherson Oblast, and that Putin did not seriously make territorial concessions in Ukraine as Western reporting suggests.

The Kremlin has also failed to prime the Russian information space, particularly Putin's main constituency of ultranationalists, to accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger characterized Putin's reported proposal as "utter nonsense" and noted that there is no reason for Putin to willingly trade a "convenient defensive line" on the Dnipro River and a land corridor to occupied Crimea through southern Ukraine in exchange for the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.[10] Russian officials — including Saldo — similarly opposed making possible territorial concessions to Ukraine around the August 2025 Trump-Putin summit in Alaska.[11] Putin has held firm to his original war aims and territorial claims for over three and a half years of war, and ISW has not observed any indications that he is willing to make meaningful concessions on any of these aims for a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine made bilateral energy proposals to the United States. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 19 that Ukraine made proposals to the United States for gas infrastructure, nuclear power generation, and several other unspecified projects to contribute to Europe's energy independence from Russia.[13]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara and Orenburg oblasts on the night of October 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows large fires and smoke plumes near the refinery's oil storage tanks.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the primary oil processing unit and are still clarifying the damage. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery produces over 20 types of commercial products and processes about 4.9 million tons of oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Orenburg natural gas processing plant in Orenburg Oblast as part of the October 18-19 strikes, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows a fire at the plant.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Orenburg natural gas processing plant is one of Russia’s largest natural gas processing complexes, processing up to 45 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 6.2 million tons of gas condensate and oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes hit one of the gas processing and purification units. Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on October 19 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at and “partially damaged” an unnamed gas plant’s infrastructure in the oblast.[16] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that the Orenburg gas processing plant is the largest gas and chemical complex in the world.[17] The Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy, citing information from Russian state energy operator Gazprom, reported on October 19 that a drone strike caused the Orenburg gas processing plant to temporarily stop receiving gas from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak oil and gas project, which uses the Orenburg facility to process Kazakh-produced raw natural gas.[18] Bloomberg reported on October 19 that Karachaganak is one of Kazakhstan’s top three oil and gas projects and that the Karachaganak oil and gas project cannot cut gas output without reducing crude oil, as the plant co-produces gas and oil.[19]

German officials reported observing unidentified objects resembling drones over Munich Airport on October 18. The Associated Press (AP) reported on October 19 that German authorities temporarily closed Munich Airport twice on the evening of October 18 due to several reports of unidentified drones operating nearby.[20] The AP reported that German authorities were unable to verify either instance and reopened the airport. The drone incidents, if confirmed, would mark the latest incident in an increasing trend of unidentified drone incursions near critical civilian infrastructure and military facilities throughout Europe.[21] ISW assesses that these unattributed drone sightings are likely associated with Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to "surrender” parts of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing.
• Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City – efforts that are incompatible with Putin's claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine made bilateral energy proposals to the United States.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara and Orenburg oblasts on the night of October 18 to 19.
• German officials reported observing unidentified objects resembling drones over Munich Airport on October 18.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Hulyaipole and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2025 

The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia's war demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump's October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded on October 18 on his English and Russian language social media accounts to Trump's October 17 call for both Russia and Ukraine to each “claim victory” in Ukraine.[i] Medvedev claimed that this call is not applicable to Russia and that Russia needs a victory "with the conditions everyone knows."[ii] Medvedev is likely referring to the Kremlin’s consistent pre-war demands to install a pro-Russian puppet government in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality and NATO abandoning its open-door policy, and limiting the size of Ukraine's military as such that Ukraine could not defend itself against future Russian aggression.[iii]

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces broadly reacted to the October 17 meeting between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by cautiously reiterating Kremlin informational lines that aim to divide Ukraine from Western support and justify continuing its war in Ukraine.[iv] Russian officials expressed cautious optimism about Trump's reported decision against provisioning Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles at this time, but Medvedev hedged that US weapon deliveries will continue to Ukraine, however.[v] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky claimed on October 18 that Trump's reported decision against providing Tomahawks to Ukraine was due to his October 16 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which Putin offered to meet with Trump in Hungary, claiming Trump's reported decision as a victory for Putin.[vi] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev reiterated his October 16 and 17 US-Russian bilateral economic proposals following the Trump-Zelensky meeting, continuing efforts to incentivize economic cooperation in exchange for Trump giving up the peace effort and allowing Putin to continue his war in Ukraine without US pressure.[vii]

Ukraine’s October 2025 strikes against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea, appear to have significantly degraded the terminal, and it is unclear when or if Russia will be able to repair it. Planet satellite imagery captured on October 17 and published on October 18 shows significant damage to multiple fuel tanks at the Feodosia oil terminal following Ukrainian strikes against the terminal on October 6, 7, and 13.[viii] Ukraine-based open source intelligence (OSINT) organization Frontelligence Insight assessed that the October 2025 Ukrainian strikes destroyed or severely damaged at least 11 main oil storage tanks and at least six smaller day or additive tanks.[ix] Frontelligence Insight assessed that 19 total main tanks and six smaller day or additive tanks at the Feodosia oil terminal are damaged as of October 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 15 that the Ukrainian strikes damaged at least 16 oil tanks.[x] Frontelligence Insight noted that Russia will likely struggle to repair the Feodosia oil terminal and that Ukraine could strike any repaired facilities.[xi] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative journalist Mark Krutov published Planet satellite imagery from 2022 and October 2024 showing the damage that Ukrainian strikes have inflicted on oil infrastructure in occupied Feodosia since 2022, suggesting that Russia has not yet repaired facilities damaged in prior Ukrainian strikes.[xii] Ukrainian strikes on oil infrastructure in occupied Feodosia diminish the terminal's capacity to supply the Russian military with fuel and lubricant. Ukraine's sustained strike campaign on Russian oil refineries is imposing worsening gasoline shortages on occupied Crimea.[xiii]

Russian state media reported that the majority of Russian drivers expect further increases in gasoline prices as Ukraine continues its long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure. Russian state business outlet Gazeta dot ru reported on October 18 that a poll from online finance platform WEBBANKIR found that 74 percent of Russian drivers have "noticed" gasoline price increases since August 2025 and that 90 percent expect further increases.[xiv] The poll found that 56 percent of Russian drivers consider the price increases significant, and that 18.9 percent have encountered empty gas stations. The poll found that roughly 40 percent of Russian drivers have changed their driving habits due to the price increases, and that 38 percent have begun buying cheaper fuel. Gazeta dot ru noted that gasoline prices have risen 10 percent since January 2025 — the sharpest increase in 15 years.[xv] Russian Union of Auto Services Head Yuriy Valko claimed on October 16 that Russian gas stations are increasingly selling low-quality gasoline, and Chinese automaker Geely Motors blamed a series of recent vehicle breakdowns on the usage of Russian gasoline, which Geely Motors claimed has more byproducts than the gasoline its engines are designed to use.[xvi] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages, and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[xvii] It is noteworthy that Russian state media is openly admitting that gasoline shortages are impacting the majority of drivers, as it suggests that the shortages are becoming increasingly acute.

Ukraine and Russia agreed to a localized ceasefire in western Zaporizhia Oblast to repair the remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid Russian preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced on October 18 that Ukrainian and Russian forces agreed to a local ceasefire to repair damaged powerlines to the ZNPP after a four-week outage, the longest the ZNPP has ever endured.[xviii] The details of the ceasefire, including its locality and duration, are unclear. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported on October 18 that Ukrainian engineers are restoring power lines to the ZNPP.[xix] The ZNPP occupation administration claimed on October 18 that it began repairs on the Dniprovska power line, the last functioning power line for the ZNPP.[xx] Russia has long been setting conditions to transfer the ZNPP from the Ukrainian power grid to the Russian power grid to bolster Russia's claim over the ZNPP, and Russia likely used the month delay in restoring the Ukrainian power line to the ZNPP to undertake measures in support of connecting the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[xxi] A Russian social media commentator claimed on October 18 that Russian authorities continue to delay preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid and that Russian shelling cuts off power to the ZNPP, which depends on the Dniprovska power line running through Ukrainian-controlled territory.[xxii] The commentator claimed that Russian authorities are currently working to connect the ZNPP to Russia's newly constructed 201-kilometer power line that will complete the full integration of the occupied ZNPP to Russia's power grid, but noted that this will reportedly take several weeks. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s eventual integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid will pose significant risks to nuclear security at the plant and allow Russia to seize Ukrainian energy generation assets for its own benefit.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia's war demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump's October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s October 2025 strikes against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea appear to have significantly degraded the terminal, and it is unclear when or if Russia will be able to repair it.
• Russian state media reported that the majority of Russian drivers expect further increases in gasoline prices as Ukraine continues its long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure.
• Ukraine and Russia agreed to a localized ceasefire in western Zaporizhia Oblast to repair the remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid Russian preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.
• Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17, 2025 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump met at the White House on October 17 and discussed ongoing US support for Ukraine and efforts to the war.[1] Trump expressed confidence in his ability to end the war and assessed that both Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin want to end the war in Ukraine. Zelensky reiterated that he remains open to a bilateral or trilateral meeting with Putin. Zelensky reiterated during the meeting and the following press conference that Ukraine is interested in acquiring US-made Tomahawk missiles to use against Russia in tandem with Ukrainian-made long-range strike drones.[2] Zelensky noted that striking legitimate Russian military targets requires missiles in combination with "thousands of drones" and that Ukraine does not yet have enough missiles. Missiles can carry larger payloads and fly at faster speeds than long-range strike drones, increasing their chances of penetrating Russia’s air defense umbrella and causing more damage to higher-value, better-defended military objects. ISW previously noted that US Tomahawk missiles’ long-range capabilities and sizable payload would enable the Ukrainian military to inflict substantial damage on key Russian military assets located deep within Russian territory, including the Shahed drone factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, and the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast, from which Russia sorties the strategic bombers that fire air-launched cruise missiles at Ukraine.[3] Ukraine can likely significantly degrade Russia's military capabilities by targeting a vulnerable subset of key rear support areas, such as Yelabuga and Engels, that sustain and support Russia's frontline operations and long-range strike campaign against Ukraine.[4]

Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be willing to trade Ukrainian-made drones in exchange for the US provision of Tomahawk missiles, and Trump expressed interest in the exchange.[5] The United States and Ukraine are reportedly negotiating an agreement in which Ukraine would sell millions of battle-tested drones to the United States in exchange for Ukraine purchasing weapons from the United States.[6] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the possible future US provision of Tomahawk missiles but that both leaders agreed to not publicly comment on their discussion.[7] Trump urged Putin and Zelensky to end the war soon and pursue peace in a social media post after the meeting.[8] Two sources briefed on the meeting told Axios on October 17 that Trump told Zelensky that the United States does not intend to provide Tomahawk missiles for now.[9]

Zelensky also met with US Energy Secretary Wright and executives of several US energy companies on October 17 to discuss strengthening cooperation to bolster Ukraine's energy sector amidst Russia's intensified strike campaign targeting Ukraine's power system ahead of Winter 2025-2026.[10] Zelensky also met with representatives from US defense companies Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to discuss strengthening Ukrainian air defenses, including long-range capabilities.[11]

The Kremlin continues to employ a dual-handed rhetorical strategy, leveraging economic proposals and veiled military threats in an effort to simultaneously pursue normalizing US-Russian relations and deterring US support for Ukraine. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev used a series of English-language X (formerly Twitter) posts on October 16 and 17 to promote a possible joint US-Russian economic venture, likely in an attempt to persuade the Trump administration that normalization of US-Russian relations would economically and politically benefit the United States and Russia without engaging in peace talks with Ukraine.[12] Dmitriev functions largely as a persuasive agent that the Kremlin leverages to strengthen relations with the Trump administration, and Dmitriev’s use of the proposal likely aimed to generate media attention and underscore existing Kremlin narratives that bilateral economic cooperation is preferable to a negotiated peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin reiterated on October 17 that Russia would perceive the provision of US-made Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine as a "hostile move" that would threaten global security.[13] Naryshkin repeated consistent Kremlin accusations that European states advocating for the provision of Tomahawks to Ukraine are a "war party" that opposes lasting and just peace.[14] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin mouthpieces have repeatedly portrayed the possible provision of Tomahawk missiles as a significant "escalation" in an effort to deter support for Ukraine.[15] The Kremlin has consistently relied on veiled and explicit threats, including nuclear saber rattling, and began offering economic incentives to deter Western aid to Ukraine.[16] ISW continues to assess that the US provisioning of Tomahawk missiles would not engender a significant escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and instead that the provisioning of long-range Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine would mirror Russia’s own use of commensurate Russian long-range cruise missiles against Ukraine.[17]

The Kremlin is reducing its financial incentives used to recruit volunteer soldiers, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to restructure force generation efforts and centralize control over Russian recruits in an effort to sustain its protracted war in Ukraine. Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation reported on October 17 that Russian federal subjects (regions) are reducing and canceling one-time enlistment bonus payments for new contract military service recruits.[18] Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation reported that the Russian authorities in the Republic of Mari El recently lowered their regional one-time enlistment bonus for new recruits from three million rubles (roughly $31,600) to 800,000 rubles (roughly $9,800); in the Republic of Chuvashia from 2.5 million (roughly $26,300) to 800,000 rubles; and in Samara Oblast from 3.6 million (roughly $37,900) to 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,900). Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation noted that regional governments are also reducing payments in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and the Republic of Bashkortostan and that the St. Petersburg officials retroactively canceled the governor’s one-time payment of 1.6 million rubles (roughly $16,800).[19] St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka reported on October 16 that it obtained information that St. Petersburg canceled already-promised one-time payments for volunteers and that servicemembers in BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) reported issues receiving their enlistment payments.[20] The BARS servicemembers stated that officials told them that the St. Petersburg government issued a decree on August 26, 2025, stating that the regional government would not pay the 1.6 million rubles designated for one-time enlistment bonuses starting August 1 -- retroactively depriving new recruits of bonuses promised when they signed their contracts. One source stated that the regional government retroactively terminated the payments, and regional officials told Fontanka that the decree is classified "for official use only," but that the regional government only canceled one-time payments for volunteer servicemembers (dobrovoltsi). Regional officials stated that servicemembers who sign regular military service contracts (referring to contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will continue to receive one-time payments.

The Kremlin is likely coordinating this cross-regional policy and appears to have realized that its financial incentive system and decentralized force generation campaign, which has been in place since 2022, is unsustainable and ineffective in generating sufficient manpower for its war effort in Ukraine. The Kremlin now appears to be disincentivizing service in BARS, likely in an effort to centralize control over BARS and form a new, MoD-controlled active reserve. The Kremlin originally intended in late 2021 for BARS to function as Russia's active combat reserve by recruiting volunteer reservists for a three-year contract service and maintaining their mobilization readiness while maintaining civilian jobs, similar to US reserves.[21] The Kremlin, however, committed BARS units to the battlefield in Ukraine as irregular formations, often under the supervision of Russian businessmen and officials, at the beginning and throughout the full-scale invasion because it did not initially declare mobilization in Winter 2022.

The recent reductions in financial incentives for Russian volunteers may be part of the Kremlin's recent effort to mobilize members of the Russian active reserve on a rolling basis. ISW recently assessed that Russia may begin to mobilize members of Russia’s active reserve on a rolling basis to sustain its combat operations in Ukraine, but it is unlikely to conduct a large-scale involuntary reserve mobilization to expand the size of the Russian military dramatically at this time.[22] The Kremlin has traditionally relied on financial incentives and sign-on bonuses to attract volunteers to fight in Ukraine and to avoid mass compulsory mobilization, and regional governments' decision to decrease or cancel these financial incentives indicates that the Kremlin may be shifting away from this strategy. Russia's existing “pay-to-play” system for generating recruits is likely hitting diminishing returns, which may compel the Kremlin to adopt an alternative approach using rolling compulsory mobilization of reservists to sustain its manpower in the face of its continuing high casualty rate in Ukraine.

Russia’s short-range and long-range drone strike campaigns continue to disproportionately impact civilians in Ukraine. The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNHCR) released a report on October 10 discussing the impact of Russian strikes on civilians in Ukraine.[23] The UNHRC noted that the total number of civilian casualties from January to September 2025 increased by 31 percent compared to the first nine months of 2024. UNHRC reported that short-range drones, mostly with first-person view (FPV) capabilities, killed 54 civilians and injured 272 and are the leading cause of civilian casualties near the frontline. The UNHRC estimated that FPV drones account for 29 percent of all civilian casualties in Ukraine. The UNHCR reported that 69 percent of deaths and injuries occurred near the frontline, particularly in Donetsk and Kherson oblasts. Russian forces have indiscriminately targeted both civilian and military vehicles traveling in frontline oblasts, and the indiscriminate strikes on vehicles complicate or block medical services and civilian evacuations from the frontlines, in addition to impairing Ukrainian military logistics.[24] Russian forces have long targeted civilians with FPV drones in isolated frontline areas, including in Kherson City, and Russian forces have extended this practice across the entire front line over the last year and a half.[25]

The UNHCR reported that Russia’s long-range strikes also continue to pose a serious threat to civilians, especially those living in large cities such as Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipro.[26] The UNHCR reported that Russia struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure 31 times in September 2025, marking a 15 percent increase in the number of strikes on energy infrastructure in August 2025. Russian forces have recently increased strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale ahead of Winter 2025-2026, and Russian strikes have caused widespread power outages for civilians living in Ukraine. Russian overnight long-range strike packages also purposefully target Ukrainian cities and disproportionately impact civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military aid and support Ukraine's growing defense industry. The Council of the European Union (EU) and members of the European Parliament approved a provisional agreement on defense industrial investment on October 16, which would allocate 300 million euros ($350 million) to fund Ukraine's defense industry.[27] Finland announced on October 17 that it will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package worth roughly 52 million euros ($60.6 million), most of which are new orders for Finnish-made military equipment.[28] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal met with Luxembourg's Defense Minister Yuriko Backes on October 17 and announced that Luxembourg will supply Ukraine with a new military aid package, including tactical vehicles, drones, and night vision devices.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump met at the White House on October 17 and discussed ongoing US support for Ukraine and efforts to the war
• The Kremlin continues to employ a dual-handed rhetorical strategy, leveraging economic proposals and veiled military threats in an effort to simultaneously pursue normalizing US-Russian relations and deterring US support for Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is reducing its financial incentives used to recruit volunteer soldiers, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to restructure force generation efforts and centralize control over Russian recruits in an effort to sustain its protracted war in Ukraine.
• Russia’s short-range and long-range drone strike campaigns continue to disproportionately impact civilians in Ukraine.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military aid and support Ukraine's growing defense industry.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka and in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Siversk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 16, 2025 

US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on the phone on October 16. Trump stated that the two leaders had a "very productive" call and that the two largely discussed potential bilateral economic prospects to pursue after a resolution to the war in Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that the two agreed that there will be a high-level advisor meeting at an unspecified date next week (between October 19 and 25) and an unspecified location with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio leading the US delegation. Trump stated that he and Putin will then meet in Budapest to discuss a resolution to the war. Trump noted that he will discuss the contents of his October 16 phone call with Putin with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during Zelensky’s visit to Washington on October 17. Trump told reporters on October 16 that he will be meeting with Putin in "two weeks or so" and that Rubio will be meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov "pretty soon."[2] Trump suggested that he, Zelensky, and Putin may coordinate "separate but equal" meetings.[3] Trump stated that Putin "really did not like the idea" of the United States sending "a couple thousand Tomahawks" to Ukraine when Trump raised the question.[4]  

Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov attempted to obfuscate Russia's deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in his statement on the October 16 Trump-Putin call. Ushakov claimed that the Trump-Putin call discussed how Ukrainian forces are allegedly using "terrorist methods" to strike civilian and energy infrastructure in Russia since Russia maintains the strategic initiative on the battlefield.[5] Ushakov claimed that the Ukrainian strikes are "forcing" Russia to respond "accordingly." Ukraine’s recent long-range strike campaign is targeting Russia's energy sector in order to degrade Russia’s capacity to fund its war against Ukraine and to fuel its fighting forces[6] Russian forces, in contrast, have been deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure, including by conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes systematically targeting civilians in Kherson Oblast since late 2023, long predating Ukraine’s recent long-range strike campaign against Russian energy[7] Open-source investigative outlet Tochnyi reported on September 28 that Russian drone strikes have resulted in 2,877 Ukrainian civilian casualties in Kherson City alone since 2023.[8]

Ushakov also claimed that US Tomahawk sales to Ukraine would not affect the battlefield situation and would “significantly damage” bilateral US-Russia relations.[9] Ushakov’s claims are a continuation of the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign to deter US sales of Tomahawks to Ukraine.[10] ISW continues to assess that the US deliveries of Tomahawk missiles would not lead to a significant escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, given Russia’s own frequent use of comparable long-range cruise missiles against Ukraine but could make a notable contribution to Ukraine's efforts to defend itself, as ISW has noted.[11]

Russia is intentionally muddying the information space with false flag claims and information operations in an attempt to generate cover for overt and covert attacks against Europe in the past several years, including the recent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikovon on October 16 falsely accused the United Kingdom (UK) of fueling "hysteria" about the threat Russia poses to Europe and claimed that "NATO intelligence services" participated in the recent drone incursions over European countries that Russia actually conducted.[12] Bortnikov accused the UK of trying to establish a naval blockade of Kaliningrad Oblast and the Baltic Sea and attempted to discredit recent UK sanctions against the Russian oil industry and shadow fleet as part of the alleged "blockade" campaign.[13] Bortnikov also accused the UK of planning sabotage operations with Ukrainian special services against the TurkStream pipeline and Russian critical infrastructure.[14] Bortnikov's accusations against the UK follow an October 6 claim by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) that the UK is planning for a group of pro-Ukrainian Russians fighting for Ukraine to conduct an attack on a Ukrainian Navy ship or a foreign civilian vessel in a European port.[15] The SVR has been releasing similar claims more frequently in recent weeks, constituting a new concerted pattern of activity that is likely part of Russia's "Phase Zero" informational and psychological condition setting phase for a higher level of NATO-Russia conflict.[16] The FSB and SVR are likely engaged in a cognitive warfare campaign aimed at sowing confusion among the European population and the international community about the actor responsible for a variety of overt and covert attacks against NATO states, such as sabotage missions, electronic warfare (EW) interference, GPS jamming, drone incursions, and arson. Officials from several European states have identified Russia as responsible for many of these attacks, including many of the drone incursions into European airspace in the past few weeks.[17] The European Parliament also passed a resolution on October 9 identifying Russia as responsible for many of the recent "escalatory actions" and deliberate drone incursions.[18]

Russian forces are reportedly using North Korean forces operating in Russia in ways that will allow North Korean forces to take battlefield lessons learned back to North Korea. The Ukrainian General Staff released footage on October 16 showing North Korean drone operators in Kursk Oblast and reported that North Korean forces are conducting short-range quadcopter reconnaissance drone missions from Kursk Oblast to identify and adjust fires to support Russian forces conducting offensive operations in Sumy Oblast.[19] North Korean involvement in drone operations rather than the highly attritional infantry assaults that characterized North Korea’s operations in Kursk Oblast in 2024-2025 increases the likelihood that North Korean personnel will survive and be able to bring important experience in modern war back to North Korea.[20] The North Korean military command will likely integrate and disseminate the lessons that North Korean forces learn in Russia throughout the North Korean army. The Russian military command's decision to employ North Korean forces as drone operators likely allows Russian forces to avoid overcoming at scale the language barrier that reportedly plagued previous North Korean-Russian joint missions in Kursk Oblast or restructuring Russian forces to integrate North Korean soldiers.[21]

Russian forces are reportedly adapting their long-range drone and missile strike tactics targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale. Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on October 16 that Russia relied on "carpet bombing" in Winter 2022-2023, striking various targets throughout Ukraine with a high quantity of drone and missiles, but is now using "piecemeal" tactics to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure oblast by oblast.[22] Ukrainska Pravda stated that Russian forces are targeting frontline and border areas, conducting localized strikes against Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts while also regularly but less intensely striking Kharkiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Russia is reportedly trying to destroy both local energy generation capabilities and delivery and distribution systems by attacking substations. Ukrainska Pravda reported that Russian forces primarily used drones for these purposes in August and September 2025, launching 10 to 40 drones against one target in a single wave. Russian forces are reportedly now deploying a series of waves with several drones every hour and then subsequently conducting massive missile strikes. Ukrainska Pravda stated that Russia aims to create a blackout in Ukraine by creating a power deficit in eastern Ukraine, where consumption is typically higher and where Russian forces have destroyed almost all local generation capabilities, while gradually stopping the flow of electricity from west to east. One source told Ukrainska Pravda that the number of drones Russia is launching against each target is making defense difficult and that a single precise hit is enough to disable a power plant's power unit. A manager of a Ukrainian energy company reportedly stated that Russia also aims to disrupt Ukraine's gas sector such that Ukraine cannot reliably supply fuel to generate electricity and heat.

Recent Russian drone technological adaptations are likely facilitating Russia's strike campaign against Ukraine's energy sector. Russian sources recently published footage of a Russian strike in Chernihiv Oblast with an MS variant of the Shahed drone, which reportedly includes a thermal imaging camera and video stream and has a range of up to 200 kilometers.[23] Russia is also reportedly using thermobaric warheads on its Shahed drones, allowing Russian strikes to destroy facilities even in hardened shelters like the ones Ukraine is installing to protect energy facilities.[24] Russian strikes targeting power infrastructure in frontline areas, particularly Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts, may aim to achieve some battlefield effects by forcing Ukrainian forces operating in the area to rely on generators, creating vulnerabilities to further Russian strikes. Generators require large and reliable supplies of fuel, and Russia's widespread campaign to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) could inhibit Ukraine's ability to rely on generators at scale near the line of contact.[25]

Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance for Ukraine at the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte stated that 17 NATO member states committed to join the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[26] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that new PURL funding totaled at least $422 million.[27] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's PURL needs in 2026 will range from $12 billion to $20 billion.[28] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine will be able to produce up to 20 million drones in 2026 if Ukraine's partners provide the necessary funding and noted that Ukrainian drone and missile production requires over $4 billion in immediate funding.[29]

Shmyhal stated that several European states contributed funding toward purchases from the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB), including $600 million from Norway for drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and explosives; $106 million from the Netherlands for drones; $8 million from Canada for interceptor drones; and $4 million from Iceland within the "Danish Model" (in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military).[30] Shmyhal also announced several European packages of military aid to Ukraine, including $8 billion from Sweden for security assistance in 2026-2027; $72 million from the Czech Republic; $20 million from Canada for winter equipment and missile components; and $12 million from Portugal to the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU), a British mechanism that uses financial contributions from Ukraine’s partners to purchase military equipment for Ukraine. The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Denmark will provide Ukraine with a new military aid package worth 1.1 billion kroner (roughly $172 million), including maritime equipment and funding for training.[31] Shmyhal announced that Ukraine signed an agreement with Germany to expand bilateral technological and defense industrial cooperation.[32] Germany and Ukraine will develop joint industrial products to produce Lynx infantry fighting vehicles and ammunition, and to repair Gepard anti-aircraft guns and Leopard tanks.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on the phone on October 16.
• Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov attempted to obfuscate Russia's deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in his statement on the October 16 Trump-Putin call.
• Russia is intentionally muddying the information space with false flag claims and information operations in an attempt to generate cover for overt and covert attacks against Europe in the past several years, including the recent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace.
• Russian forces are reportedly using North Korean forces operating in Russia in ways that will allow North Korean forces to take battlefield lessons learned back to North Korea.
• Russian forces are reportedly adapting their long-range drone and missile strike tactics targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance for Ukraine at the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting.
• Russian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2025

The Kremlin remains committed to its rhetorical effort to dissuade the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine amidst critical policy debates. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Russian business outlet Kommersant in an interview published on October 15, entitled "Europe wants to turn the conflict in Ukraine into Trump's War," that a US sale of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine "would be an escalation, and a very serious one at that."[i] Lavrov claimed that such a move would "cause colossal damage" to the normalization of US-Russian relations and undermine the bilateral improvements made since the Biden administration. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is waging a reflexive control campaign to deter the United States from authorizing the sale of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by threatening a deterioration in US-Russian relations.[ii]

ISW assesses that the US provisioning of Tomahawk missiles would not engender a significant escalation in Russia's war against Ukraine, and instead that the provisioning of long-range Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine would mirror Russia’s own use of commensurate Russian long-range cruise missiles against Ukraine. Russia regularly leverages a wide variety of long-range cruise missiles that are comparable to the US Tomahawk missile, such as Kh-series cruise, Kalibr cruise, Kinzhal aeroballistic, and Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles that Russia uses in its regular weekly, sometimes nightly strikes against Ukraine. Russia has leveraged most of these missiles since 2022 to strike Ukraine and began deploying Iskander-K cruise missiles in 2023.[iii] Russia escalated its war in Ukraine by conducting an unprecedented intermediate-range ballistic missile strike against Ukraine with its Oreshnik ballistic missile system with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) in November 2024 and vowing to deploy Oreshnik systems to Belarus by the end of 2025.[iv] US Tomahawk missiles' long-range capabilities and sizable payload would enable the Ukrainian military to inflict substantial damage on key Russian military assets located deep within Russian territory, such as the Shahed drone factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, and the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast, from which Russia sorties the strategic bombers that fire air-launched cruise missiles during Russian strikes on Ukraine.[v]

The Trump administration continues to voice support for additional military support for Ukraine ahead of the October 17 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump stated on October 15 that Zelensky “would like” the United States to sell Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and that he has spoken to Zelensky about the issue.[vi] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on October 15 that the United States “will take steps necessary to impose costs on Russia for its continued aggression” if Russia does not soon agree to negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.[vii] Hegseth urged allies to increase military aid to Ukraine, stating that a ”combat-ready Ukrainian army and strong European-led NATO are critical for deterring Russian aggression” and that the United States “stands ready to do its part“ to aid Europe.

The Kremlin continues to advance its messaging strategy designed to separate the United States from Ukraine and Europe to undermine NATO cohesion and support for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov further claimed during the October 15 interview that Europe seeks to turn the conflict in Ukraine into "[US President Donald] Trump's war" and that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Europe want to lead Trump "astray."[viii] Lavrov also claimed that Europe and Zelensky are giving Trump "ultimatums" and that he is shocked by Europe's attempts to make this "Trump's war." Lavrov appears to be seizing on the Trump Administration's repeated efforts to distance itself from the beginning and causes of the war in Ukraine.[ix] Lavrov's statements cohere with ISW's long-standing assessment that the Kremlin seeks to leverage narratives designed to undercut Ukraine and Europe in an effort to undermine NATO cohesion and support for Ukraine.[x]

Dutch officials recently observed unidentified drones operating near a NATO military exercise in Poland that may have disrupted military-grade communication systems, marking the latest incident in a trend of drone incursions across Europe. Dutch outlet NOS reported on October 14 that the Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Dutch soldiers participating in a NATO military exercise in Poland observed unidentified drones flying overhead and reported communication system disruptions.[xi] It is unclear whether the drones themselves or anti-drone countermeasures disrupted the communications systems. Authorities have yet to publicly identify the source of the drones or the identity of the pilots. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova denied any Russian involvement on October 15 in the recent drone incident and claimed that Denmark has not submitted a formal inquiry to Russia regarding the event.[xii] This incident marks the latest development amid an increasing trend of unidentified drones collecting actionable intelligence near NATO military facilities and civilian infrastructure across Europe.[xiii] ISW continues to assess that the unattributed drone sightings are likely associated with Russia's “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xiv]

Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated at the Ramstein meeting that the U.S. “expects” European NATO member states to “donate [and] purchase even more to provide for Ukraine” through NATO’s new Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.[xv] Finnish Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen announced that Finland will join the PURL initiative.[xvi] Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced that Lithuania will allocate $30 million for the PURL program.[xvii] The Netherlands announced that it will provide Ukraine with 90 million euros (roughly $104.7 million) for the production of reconnaissance and strike drones in Ukraine.[xviii] The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it will allocate 5.9 billion euros (roughly $6.86 billion) of its 2026 national budget for military aid to Ukraine.[xix]

European officials report that UK sanctions and NATO joint military operations are inhibiting Russia’s illicit shadow fleet. UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper announced on October 15 that the UK imposed sanctions on the Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil, as well as 44 tankers involved in the Russian shadow fleet, to “tighten the pressure on Russia’s economy.”[xx] Oil sales by Rosneft and Lukoil support the Russian government's ability to fund the war in Ukraine.[xxi] A NATO military representative reported on October 14 that NATO's Operation “Baltic Sentry” – which enhances NATO’s protection of critical undersea infrastructure – is forcing the RUAF Navy to expend “significant” resources to protect Russian shipping vessels and is degrading the effectiveness of Russia's shadow fleet.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin remains committed to its rhetorical effort to dissuade the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine amidst critical policy debates.
• The Trump administration continues to voice support for additional military support for Ukraine ahead of the October 17 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its messaging strategy designed to separate the United States from Ukraine and Europe to undermine NATO cohesion and support for Ukraine.
• Dutch officials recently observed unidentified drones operating near a NATO military exercise in Poland that may have disrupted military-grade communication systems, marking the latest incident in a trend of drone incursions across Europe.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting.
• European officials report that UK sanctions and NATO joint military operations are inhibiting Russia’s illicit shadow fleet.
• Russian forces advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2025

Russian forces have conducted three company- and battalion-sized mechanized assaults in priority areas of Donetsk Oblast over the last two weeks, marking an inflection in recent Russian armor usage in Ukraine. Russian forces largely stopped conducting reinforced company-sized mechanized assaults in late 2024 and have only conducted a handful of battalion-sized mechanized assaults during 2025. Russian forces, before October 2025, most recently conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast in April 2025.[1] Russian forces have largely favored leveraging small groups of infantry to conduct infiltration missions and make slow advances throughout the frontline over conducting mechanized assaults during the first nine months of 2025.[2] Russian forces are still leveraging infantry to advance but have conducted several comparatively larger mechanized assaults in their priority Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas of Donetsk Oblast in recent weeks.

Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) around October 6, during which Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed four tanks and eight armored vehicles.[3] Russian forces conducted a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault south of Shakhove and Volodymyrivka (both immediately northeast of Pankivka) on October 9.[4] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces used 35 tanks and armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles during the assault and that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed three tanks, 16 armored vehicles, and 41 motorcycles during the assault. Ukraine's 1st Azov Army Corps [AC] reported on October 13 that Russian forces conducted another reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and that Russian forces attacked with 16 tanks and armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles.[5] Ukraine's 1st Azov AC reported that Russian forces were again attempting to seize Shakhove, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 armored vehicles, three tanks, and three motorcycles involved in the attack. Ukraine's 1st Azov AC reported that Russian mechanized assault tactics remain the same and that Russian forces are using motorcycles and armored vehicles to transport infantry to frontline positions. Ukraine's 1st Azov AC reported that Russian forces are using electronic warfare (EW) systems to suppress Ukrainian drones during mechanized assaults and that Russian infantry attack Ukrainian positions after dismounting from the armored vehicles. A Ukrainian officer stated on October 13 that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are participating in mechanized assaults in the area.[6]

Russian forces appear to be conducting larger mechanized assaults during rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations. The Ventusky weather radar recorded moderate to slightly heavy rainfall during the morning of October 9 and light rainfall on the morning of October 13 at the respective locations of the Russian mechanized assaults.[7] Another weather monitoring service indicated that the Dobropillya area had several hours of cloudy conditions and fog on the morning of October 6.[8] Several Ukrainian military sources throughout Fall 2025 have discussed how Russian forces have exploited rainy weather conditions that limit Ukraine’s drone operations.[9] An OSINT analyst on X (formerly known as Twitter) reported that Russian forces have also taken advantage of a period of limited Ukrainian drone activity caused by windy weather to create a “bridge“ through a river in the Lyman direction, indicating that Russian forces are attempting to seize on poor weather conditions to set up logistics as well as make advances in several frontline areas. The analyst noted that Russian forces moved five tanks, one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and self-propelled artillery over the bridge while Ukrainian drones were not able to operate. The lingering dampness and poor conditions that immediately follow rainfall likely degraded Ukrainian drone capabilities for several hours.

Russian forces may also be reverting back to conducting mechanized assaults in areas where Russian infantry are struggling to advance. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on October 13 that the Russian units operating in the Dobropillya salient, particularly elements of the 51st CAA, have recently struggled to seize Shakhove after advancing near the settlement.[10] Elements of the 51st CAA, including the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, conducted many of the mechanized assaults that Russian forces leveraged to advance west of Donetsk City in Summer and Fall 2025.[11] These units may be reverting back to conducting mechanized assaults in the face of more challenging Ukrainian defensive positions near Shakhove, or potentially after Russian forces assess that Ukrainian defenses are attritted following weeks of Russian infantry assaults.

Kremlin officials continue to apply the same narratives that Russia has used to justify its invasions of former Soviet states in the past three decades to the Baltic states. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed on October 14 that Latvian authorities are "persecuting" Russian speakers in Latvia and that Russia must protect its "compatriots" in the Baltic states.[12] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky also claimed that Russians in Latvia are part of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir). The Kremlin's Russian World framework is an intentionally vague ideological idea that Russian President Vladimir Putin has defined as including any former territory of the Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation, as well as any people who feel kinship or belonging with Russia.[13] Russia has long claimed that Russia has a duty to protect its "compatriots abroad" and used this narrative to justify its invasions of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.[14] Kremlin narratives about Russia's "compatriots" in the Baltics and the wider Russian World are part of the Kremlin's years-long efforts to set conditions to justify possible Russian aggression against NATO in the future.[15]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise or engage in good-faith peace negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 14 that Russia is ready for a peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine but is continuing the war due to “lack of alternatives.”[16] Peskov claimed that Russia will ensure its interests in “one way or another” and achieve its war goals. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined its war aims as Ukrainian demilitarization, government change in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukrainian commitments barring Ukraine from joining NATO and other international alliances.[17] Peskov’s statements are in line with boilerplate Kremlin rhetoric throughout the war and negotiations process that Russia will achieve these war aims either militarily or diplomatically.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have conducted three company- and battalion-sized mechanized assaults in priority areas of Donetsk Oblast over the last two weeks, marking an inflection in recent Russian armor usage in Ukraine.
• Russian forces appear to be conducting larger mechanized assaults during rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations.
• Kremlin officials continue to apply the same narratives that Russia has used to justify its invasions of former Soviet states in the past three decades to the Baltic states.
• The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise or engage in good-faith peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13, 2025

The Kremlin removed some restrictions on using Russian reservists in combat, allowing the Kremlin to employ reservists in its war in Ukraine. The Russian government approved on October 13 a draft law that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed stipulating that servicemembers of the Russian mobilization reserve can perform defensive tasks during armed conflicts, counter-terrorist operations, or deployments outside Russian territory.[i] The law proposes that the Russian president can call up reservists for special training lasting up to two months. An explanatory note to the law states that the changes will allow Russia to deploy reservists during peacetime, expanding the current legislation that only allows Russia to deploy reservists during mobilization or wartime. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated on October 13 that the law will allow the Kremlin to deploy reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[ii] ISW will review the significance of this draft law in an upcoming warning order publication.

European officials continue to note how Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. Polish National Security Bureau Chief Sławomir Cenckiewicz told the Financial Times in an article published on October 12 that Russia is using cryptocurrency to pay actors conducting sabotage in Europe in order to prevent European intelligence services from tracking the payments.[iii] Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin increasingly relies on “ad hoc” local agents for sabotage missions and that Poland discovered in 2023 a network of agents whom the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) recruited and whom Russia financed "to a high extent" with cryptocurrency. Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin increasingly relies on “ad hoc” local agents for specific missions to minimize risk to the Kremlin. Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin has also leveraged cryptocurrency to circumvent Western sanctions. Cenkiewicz also stated that Poland is now in a “state of war” in the cyber domain, and FT noted that Poland has accused Russia of orchestrating a recent hacking attempt to cut off the water supplies to Gdansk.[iv]

German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) President Martin Jäger stated on October 13 that the frequency of Russian attacks on Europe is a “new level of confrontation.”[v] Jäger stated that Russia is trying to probe Europe's borders, undermine NATO, destabilize European democracies, divide societies, and intimidate the population. Jäger stated that Europe must prepare for further Russian escalation and cannot assume that Russia will not launch a conventional attack against NATO until 2029. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky compared on October 12 Russia’s recent attacks against Europe to the ways in which Russian President Vladimir Putin used Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 to gauge the West's reaction.[vi] Zelensky warned that Putin is preparing the Russian population for aggression against the Baltic States and Poland. ISW continues to assess that any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for rapid redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many European officials currently expect.[vii]

The Kremlin appears to be changing tactics within its reflexive control campaign to deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, likely due to recent reporting that the United States has been sharing intelligence to help Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure. US President Donald Trump stated on October 12 that he would inform Russian President Vladimir Putin that the United States would provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles if Russia refused to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[viii] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on October 13 that Russia is unable to distinguish between Tomahawk missiles armed with nuclear or conventional payloads while the missiles are in flight and claimed that the United States would control Ukrainian Tomahawk launches.[ix] Medvedev implied that Russia would have to respond to such a scenario and threateningly claimed that US deliveries of Tomahawks to Ukraine would "not be good for anyone." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a request for clarification about Medvedev's statement, claiming that US specialists would have to participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk missile strikes and that any expert is aware of the consequences of such a decision.[x]

The Kremlin has been engaged in a campaign to deter US sales of Tomahawks to Ukraine in recent days, issuing boilerplate claims about US participation in the strikes, the threat such missile deliveries would pose to US-Russian relations, and the missiles' inability to shift the situation on the battlefield.[xi] The Kremlin's October 13 claims about the difficulties in discriminating between nuclear and conventional payloads mark an inflection in this informational campaign. The Kremlin is likely shifting its narratives following the October 12 Financial Times (FT) report about how the United States has been providing Ukraine with intelligence to facilitate Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector, including oil refineries.[xii] Kremlin officials largely did not respond to the FT article, likely because the reporting undermined the narrative that the Kremlin had been repeatedly spreading about how US participation in potential Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes would allegedly risk escalation and a Russian response.

The Kremlin is reportedly preparing to manipulate voters by dismissing unpopular government officials ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 13 that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and a political strategist working with the Kremlin's political bloc stated that the Kremlin is considering replacing select federal subject governors ahead of the 2026 Duma elections.[xiii] The political strategist source noted that dismissing governors is "more effective" closer to elections, so that "people experience a temporary positive emotion" before voting. The sources stated such a Kremlin decision would aim to allay Russian citizens' discontent with and distract from recent unpopular decisions, such as raising the value-added tax (VAT) and tightening tax regimes on small businesses. The political strategist stated that the Kremlin may also dismiss the governors to distract Russians who are "tired of the war [in Ukraine] and tired of waiting for negotiations." Sources stated that local authorities usually cause more discontent than federal ones and that citizens place the blame on the governors for issues that most often irritate them, like issues with transport, utilities, and roads. The source noted that the Kremlin must prepare for dismissals before the 2026 elections now so that the new governors have time to understand how electoral resources work in their regions, which the source emphasized is important to ensure the Kremlin's desired election results.

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of October 12 to 13. Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspline on October 13 that Ukrainian forces struck at least five tanks at the Feodosia Offshore Oil Terminal, a 220kV electrical substation in Feodosia, and a 330kV substation in occupied Simferopol.[xiv] The sources stated that the strikes started a fire at the oil terminal. Geolocated footage and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data confirm that Ukrainian forces struck the three targets in occupied Crimea.[xv] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian strikes damaged 11 fuel tanks at the oil terminal, including eight tanks holding diesel fuel with capacities of 5,000 to 10,000 metric tons, two tanks holding gasoline, and one empty tank.[xvi] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in occupied Feodosia overnight and caused fires.[xvii]

Select Russian industries are showing signs of steep decline that risk lasting damage with potentially deep socio-economic repercussions. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 12 that sanctions, rising costs, and low prices have plunged Russia’s coal industry into its worst crisis in over 30 years.[xviii] FT reported that data from Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) shows that Russia’s coal sector had $2.8 billion in losses in the first seven months of 2025 — doubling the total of all of 2024 and a stark decline from 2023 when Russia’s coal industry generated nearly $4.6 billion in profits. FT reported that the Russian coal industry directly employs more than 140,000 people and remains critical in some oblasts, both as a source of employment and funding for local budgets. FT noted that prices of thermal coal hit multiyear lows globally in 2025 — down 78 percent from 2022 highs — but that the problem has been more severe for Russia as it deals with Western sanctions and logistics bottlenecks. FT reported that the coal sector in occupied Donbas is experiencing significant issues, with Russian investors starting to return mines that the Russian state had given them after they struggled to make the mines profitable. The Russian government has designed its wartime economy to prioritize investment in Russia's domestic industrial base (DIB), which in turn is having negative effects — many of which are potentially long-term — on many civilian sectors and the Russian economy as a whole.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin removed some restrictions on using Russian reservists in combat, allowing the Kremlin to employ reservists in its war in Ukraine.
• European officials continue to note how Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.
• The Kremlin appears to be changing tactics within its reflexive control campaign to deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, likely due to recent reporting that the United States has been sharing intelligence to help Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure.
• The Kremlin is reportedly preparing to manipulate voters by dismissing unpopular government officials ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections.
• Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of October 12 to 13.
• Select Russian industries are showing signs of steep decline that risk lasting damage with potentially deep socio-economic repercussions.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area, near Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2025

Estonian authorities temporarily closed a section of road passing through Russian territory near the Russia-Estonia border on October 10 after Estonian border guards observed a small group of Russian military personnel without insignia in the area. Meelis Saarepuu, the head of the South Prefecture of the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board, reported on October 11 that Estonian authorities closed a nearly kilometer-long section of the road between Varska and Saatse, a portion of which runs through Russian territory, for safety reasons after observing seven armed Russian servicemembers near the Russian section of the road on October 10.[i] Saarepuu stated that the servicemembers' uniforms suggested that they were not Russian border guards. Saarepuu reported that Russian border guards answered Estonian border guards' inquiries by claiming that the Russian activity in the area was routine. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsakhna stated on October 12 that Russian forces are operating “somewhat more assertively and visibly than before” but that reports that the border situation is becoming more tense are exaggerated.[ii] Tsakhna noted that Estonian authorities plan to stop using the road altogether in the future, as there are alternative routes that bypass Russian territory already available or currently under construction. Reports of a small group of Russian servicemembers operating near Estonian territory come against the backdrop of Russian military aircraft violating Estonian airspace on September 7 and 19.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia has recently intensified its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[iv] This event is the first instance of ISW observing "little green men" (a euphemism the Kremlin uses for the Russian military forces in unmarked uniforms) operating near a NATO state in the context of the “Phase Zero” campaign.

American intelligence sharing with Ukraine has reportedly been crucial in increasing the efficacy of Ukraine's long-range drone strike campaign targeting the Russian energy sector in recent months. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 11 that Ukrainian and US officials stated that the United States has been providing Ukraine with intelligence to facilitate Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector, including oil refineries, since at least July 2025.[v] The FT reported that the United States began providing Ukraine with the intelligence following US President Donald Trump's phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in July 2025, as Trump grew increasingly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to move toward peace. The FT reported that officials stated that US intelligence sharing has been crucial in enabling Ukraine to better prepare drone routes to evade Russian air defenses. Three sources familiar with the matter noted that the United States was closely involved in all stages of Ukraine's strike planning. One US official stated that Ukraine selected the long-range strike targets, and the United States then provided intelligence on the sites' vulnerabilities. The FT noted that sources stated that the United States had also determined target priorities for the Ukrainians. The FT noted that Ukraine's improved drone technology and increased drone production have contributed to the success of Ukraine's strike campaign, allowing Ukraine to conduct more frequent strikes. Ukrainian strikes against oil refineries deep in the Russian rear have resulted in gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine, resulting in long lines and increased prices at gasoline stations.[vi] The FT reported that the research group Energy Aspects assesses that Ukraine has struck 16 of Russia's 38 oil refineries.

The Kremlin is attempting to stabilize its domestic gasoline market to offset the consequences of Ukraine's long-strike campaign against refineries. Putin signed a decree on October 12 suspending reductions in the fuel damper payment subsidy to oil refineries from October 1, 2025, to May 1, 2026.[vii] The damper is meant to encourage oil refineries to sell their product domestically by providing government subsidies to compensate for the difference between higher export rates and the domestic market. Putin's decision reflects the efficacy of Ukraine's months-long strike campaign against Russia's oil refineries, which continues to significantly destabilize Russia's gasoline sector. Continued subsidies to the gasoline sector will increase costs on the Russian state.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed possible US sales of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in an October 12 call, as the Kremlin continues its reflexive control campaign to deter the US from sending Ukraine Tomahawks.[viii] Zelensky described the call as “very productive” and noted that Trump and Zelensky also discussed Ukrainian air defense and energy resilience. The October 12 call is the second between Zelensky and Trump in two days. Kremlin officials repeated boilerplate narratives about Russia’s opposition to Ukraine receiving Tomahawks on October 12. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 12 that the potential provision of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is causing Russia “extreme concern” and that the missile is a “serious weapon” but will not change the battlefield situation.[ix] Peskov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also continued on October 12 to blame the European Union (EU) and Ukraine — not Russia — for the lack of progress in peace negotiations.[x] Kremlin rhetoric downplaying the frontline impact of Tomahawk missiles, emphasizing the potential for Tomahawk provisions to damage US-Russia relations, and blaming Ukraine for not hindering peace efforts are part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to prevent the United States from supplying the missiles to Ukraine, just as Russia previously and ultimately unsuccessfully attempted to convince the United States to not send Ukraine F-16 fighter jets, ATACMS missiles, Abrams tanks, and several other systems.[xi]

Russia’s effort to generate increased military recruitment through high financial incentives is reportedly losing momentum, indicating that Russia’s main method for recruiting volunteers for its war may be hitting diminishing returns. Independent Russian-language outlet Idel Realii reported on October 12 that employees in Russian military recruitment offices stated that the number of people signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is not increasing even in regions offering the highest financial incentives.[xii] The sources reportedly assessed that everyone who wanted to "make money from the war" had already signed up. Idel Realii noted that Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug is currently offering the highest one-time signup bonus with 3.2 million rubles (about $39,300) and that regional payouts across Russia increase on average by 500,000 rubles (about $6,100) every three to four months. Idel Realii reported that Sverdlovsk Oblast's March 2025 decision to increase its one-time payout to 3.1 million rubles (about $38,100) did not result in an influx of new recruits. Military recruitment employees in two unspecified Siberian regions reported that only recruits of "extremely advanced age" and with chronic illnesses have been signing up recently. Idel Realii reported that sources in a city in northern Irkutsk Oblast stated that there have been issues with recruitment for several months and that recruits are mostly asking questions about the financial payouts and benefits for servicemembers, such as priority education for their children, loan deferments, and debt forgiveness — demonstrating how those who are signing up are only financially motivated. A source from Irkutsk Oblast stated that the Russian MoD has been trying to recruit people with advertisements — particularly in the lead up to the US-Russia summit in Alaska on August 15 — claiming that a settlement to the war is coming soon, so recruits should "get [their] millions before peace comes." The source also noted that the Russian MoD is deceiving people by advertising how much recruits could make in one year, given the monthly salaries for servicemembers operating in the combat zone, even though Russian authorities are often sending new recruits not to the rear but on assault missions at the front, where the life expectancy is often less than one year.

ISW assessed in February 2025 that ever greater financial incentives for new recruits in the future are unlikely to dramatically increase recruitment, as a large portion of the pool of Russian citizens who are incentivized by money at levels the Russian state could afford to offer at scale have likely already volunteered to join the military.[xiii] The growing financial incentives for new recruits and social benefits for servicemembers suggest that sign up rates have been declining and that Russia has had to find new incentives to drive recruitment.[xiv] ISW continues to assess that decreases in Russian recruitment, such that Russia cannot replace its high casualty rates, could in part force Russian President Vladimir Putin to choose between conducting an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Putin has shown great reluctance to order, or coming to the negotiating table to end the war.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Estonian authorities temporarily closed a section of road passing through Russian territory near the Russia-Estonia border on October 10 after Estonian border guards observed a small group of Russian military personnel without insignia in the area.
• American intelligence sharing with Ukraine has reportedly been crucial in increasing the efficacy of Ukraine's long-range drone strike campaign targeting the Russian energy sector in recent months.
• The Kremlin is attempting to stabilize its domestic gasoline market to offset the consequences of Ukraine's long-strike campaign against refineries.
• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed possible US sales of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in an October 12 call, as the Kremlin continues its reflexive control campaign to deter the US from sending Ukraine Tomahawks.
• Russia’s effort to generate increased military recruitment though high financial incentives is reportedly losing momentum, indicating that Russia’s main method for recruiting volunteers for its war may be hitting diminishing returns.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk and Siversk. Russian forces advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 11, 2025

The Russian defense industry is implementing long-term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long term military threat to NATO. Ukraine-based open source intelligence (OSINT) organization Frontelligence Insight published internal documents from Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), on October 11 that reveal that UVZ aims to increase T-90 production by 80 percent by 2028, compared to 2024 levels, and launch production of the new T-90M2 (Project 188MS) variant, also referred to as Ryvok-1 (Dash-1).[1] The documents, which ISW reviewed but cannot independently verify, indicate that UVZ aims to surge tank production beginning in 2027. The documents indicate that UVZ estimates a projected 2026 output of 10 T-90M2 tanks and intends to produce a peak of 428 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks in 2028. The documents indicate that UVZ intends to produce a total of 1,118 new and modernized T-90M and T-90M2 tanks between 2027 and 2029. Ukrainian officials previously assessed that UVZ can only produce roughly 60 to 70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions, and UVZ is likely producing between three and six T-90 tanks per month.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that UVZ produced 540 to 630 T-90M tanks since February 24, 2022 (an estimated average of 13 to 15 tanks per month).[3]

The Russian defense industry may have to increase its production capacity for tank production by integrating more automation and high-precision machine tools to achieve the planned T-90 production increase, as Russia continues to face labor shortages and mounting casualties in Ukraine.[4] UVZ notably launched a program to train computer numerical control (CNC) machine operators in March 2025, likely to expand UVZ’s production capacity.[5] Russia has consistently relied on its allies to obtain high precision machine tools through sanctions evasion; the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 1 that UVZ continues to produce tank engines with European-manufactured CNC machines that Russia obtains through sanctions evasion schemes.[6]

While the T-90 production targets as described in the leaked documents are aspirational figures that Russian industry may not meet, the plans nevertheless indicate that Russia seeks to rearm and is setting conditions to pose a significant long term military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) far beyond the end of the current war in Ukraine. Frontelligence assessed that UVZ's goals to modernize the Russian armored fleet with over 2,000 T-90M, T-90M2, and T-72B3M tanks between 2026 and 2036, in addition to the tanks and armored vehicles that Russia produced in 2024 and 2025, is sufficient to fully replenish Russia’s tank fleet for another large scale war.[7] Open-source tracking indicates that Russian tank losses have decreased through 2025, and a senior Finnish military official stated on April 27 that Russia is sending “almost none” of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for “later use.”[8] The planned production increase indicates that Russia plans for military contingencies beyond the current war in Ukraine on the backdrop of its current “Phase Zero” operations against Europe and that Moscow seeks to project power against NATO.[9]

Recent open-source data indicates that Russia is also increasing its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, possibly for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term or to reestablish its tank reserve to threaten NATO in the medium term.   A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery reported on October 8 that Russia's total tank reserve has dropped from 3,106 to 2,478 in the last three to four months (since June or July 2025) and that Russia's T-72A reserve specifically has dropped from 900 to 461.[10] The source noted that the Russian military appears to be drawing T-72A tanks from previously untouched storage bases in order to refurbish the tanks and that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) appears to be cannibalizing remaining T-64 tanks. The source suggested that Russia is likely in a refurbishment phase and will likely be able to utilize these refurbished tanks in Ukraine. The source estimated that Russia has roughly 141 T-54/55, 885 T-62, 611 T-64, 492 T-72A, 287 T-72B, 44 T-80B, 82 T-80U, and zero T-90 tanks left in its reserve.[11]

ISW continues to observe a notably reduced use of Russian tanks on the battlefield compared to Russia's intensified use of armored vehicles in late 2023 and 2024, suggesting that Russia may be stockpiling tanks and is likely aiming to build out and modernize its tank reserves for both short-term use in Ukraine and for the medium- to long-term in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO.[12] The Russian military may remain reticent to increase their use of armored vehicles on the battlefield again given that Ukrainian drones have been quite successful in damaging and destroying Russian armored vehicles and that the Russian DIB appears to be pivoting to a lengthier refurbishment phase.

 Russian forces are still using tanks to advance on the battlefield during infrequent mechanized assaults when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, indicating that the tank remains and will remain a relevant weapon on the battlefield under proper tactical conditions. Russian forces recently conducted a company-sized and reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Dobropillya areas in Donetsk Oblast after largely refraining from conducting larger mechanized assaults.[13] Russian forces appear to be conducting these assaults during rainy weather conditions, as rain and high winds impede Ukrainian drone operations.[14] Russian forces will likely continue to seize on bad weather as an opportunity to advance when Ukrainian forces cannot effectively fly drones. This dynamic underscores that Ukraine’s drone defenses depend on certain weather conditions and that drones alone are insufficient to defend against ground and armored forces. Russia's reported efforts to refurbish T-72A tanks indicate that Russia will likely have sufficient armored stocks to re-equip frontline units in priority areas and continue opportunistic mechanized assaults in the short term, although Russia may also stockpile newly refurbished or produced tanks for future use in Ukraine or against a NATO member state.

Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO on a timeline much sooner than 2036 and without necessarily reconstituting its tank fleet. Russia's ongoing sabotage and drone reconnaissance activities against military bases and critical infrastructure in Europe indicate that Russia has already entered “Phase Zero,” the informational and psychological condition setting phase, of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[15] Russia's long range strike capabilities and enhanced drone production capabilities represent an immediate threat to NATO.[16] Russia's force generation efforts and reported efforts to generate a strategic manpower reserve–which Russia could choose to employ in Ukraine or in a future land war against NATO–suggest that Russia can sustain and reconstitute its manpower despite continuously heavy losses from its ongoing war in Ukraine.[17] Russia will likely have significant combat power made available within months following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, which Russia likely can rapidly deploy to NATO’s eastern flank. Russia is developing concepts of operation and warfighting tactics that allow Russia to pursue large scale combat operations without using masses of tanks or armor, while effectively denying an adversary from using tanks or armor at scale. Russia is also learning how to achieve the effects of battlefield air interdiction in an adversary’s rear without establishing air superiority or air supremacy.[18] ISW has observed no indication that the Russian military command would need to wait until the Russian military reconstitutes to its full end strength before intensifying its attacks against NATO member states, and in fact, Russia may attack before that moment if NATO fails to establish deterrence. Russia is currently gaining significant experience in modern warfare within an ever changing theater characterized by an extremely short innovation cycle while tolerating a highly attritional, infantry-led war in Ukraine–the likes of which Europe has not engaged in since the 1940s. NATO and its allies must prepare to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats that Russia will likely pose immediately following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, but also into the future.

 European authorities continue to report increased unidentified drone sightings in European airspace near military facilities. Czech General Staff Spokesperson Zdeňka Košvancová reported on October 10 that the Czech military has detected an increasing number of incidents involving unidentified drones operating near Czech infrastructure, particularly military facilities, in recent weeks.[19] German outlet Der Spiegel reported on October 9 that the German military detected an unidentified drone that entered the security perimeter of a NATO air base in Geilenkirchen on the evening of October 8.[20] Der Spiegel, citing an internal memo, reported that the drone overflew the air base's runway at low altitude. Der Spiegel noted that the NATO air base houses airborne early warning and control (AWACS) surveillance aircraft that fulfill a critical role in monitoring NATO's eastern flank. Der Spiegel reported that German authorities have not yet attributed the incident to any specific actor. ISW assesses, however, that Russia has been increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered Phase Zero of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[21] The ongoing unattributed drone incursions across Europe are part of a recently intensified pattern and therefore are likely part of Russia's broader condition setting effort.

Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal met with Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans on October 10 and provided additional details on the recent Ukrainian-Dutch memorandum of understanding (MOU).[22] The agreement includes the launch of joint production of deep strike drones, a 110 million euro ($128 million) investment in the Build with Ukraine initiative, and 200 million euros ($232 million) for Ukrainian air defense systems. Shmyhal reported on October 11 that Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) signed an agreement on joint production of artillery and letters of intent to strengthen the LYRA program, a battlefield technology partnership between the UK and Ukraine.[23] The LYRA program aims to improve Ukraine and the UK’s defense capabilities by combining defense-industrial and scientific potential.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian defense industry is implementing long-term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long term military threat to NATO.
• Recent open-source data indicates that Russia is also increasing its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, possibly for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term or to reestablish its tank reserve to threaten NATO in the medium term.
• Russian forces are still using tanks to advance on the battlefield during infrequent mechanized assaults when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, indicating that tanks remain and will remain a relevant weapon on the battlefield under proper tactical conditions.
• Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO on a timeline much sooner than 2036 and without necessarily reconstituting its tank fleet.
• European authorities continue to report increased unidentified drone sightings in European airspace near military facilities.
• Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10, 2025

Russian forces launched a large, combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of October 9 to 10, primarily targeting energy infrastructure and civilian targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Lipetsk Oblast; 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles from Rostov and Bryansk oblasts and occupied Crimea; four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles; and 465 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 200 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo and Shakhty, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 405 drones; one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile; four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; nine Iskander-K cruise missiles; and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and that four missiles were “lost” or suppressed, likely by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 13 missiles and 60 drones struck 19 locations, and downed debris fell on seven locations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 9, 2025

EU and NATO states continue to take steps to increase European defenses against covert and overt Russian attacks. The European Parliament overwhelmingly voted on October 9 in favor of a resolution condemning Russia's recent "escalatory actions" in violating Polish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Romanian airspace.[i] The resolution passed the parliament with 469 votes in favor, 97 against, and 38 abstentions. The parliament noted that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for the actions in Polish, Estonian, and Romanian airspace. The European Parliament denounced Russia's deliberate drone incursions aimed at critical infrastructure in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The resolution did not mention the recent drone flights over the Munich Airport, but German officials recently attributed the incursions to Russia.[ii] The resolution encouraged initiatives enabling EU states to take action against airspace violations, including by shooting down the threats, and welcomed the EU's "drone wall" and Eastern Flank Watch initiatives.[iii] The resolution called for the EU to "substantively" increase its defense and industrial cooperation with Ukraine, especially in the fields of drone technology and countermeasures. European parliament members advocated for sanctions against entities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) supplying dual-use goods and military items that are essential for Russia's production of drones and missiles, and called for punitive measures against all states enabling Russian actions, such as Belarus, North Korea, and Iran. The European Parliament stated that the range of Russia's sabotage and "hybrid" activities against the EU amounts to state-sponsored terrorism, "even if they fall below the threshold of an armed attack." ISW assesses, however, that Russia has been increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase 0” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[iv]

The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 9 that four NATO officials stated that NATO states are discussing more forceful responses to Russia's increasingly provocative actions.[v] Proposals reportedly include arming reconnaissance drones that collect intelligence on Russian military activity, reducing limits on pilots' ability to shoot down Russian threats, and conducting NATO exercises at more remote and unguarded areas near the Russian border. Two NATO official sources told the FT that the talks aim to streamline rules of engagement among NATO states, as some require pilots to visually confirm threats before engaging, while others allow pilots to open fire based on radar data or perceived danger, given the direction or speed of the object. The officials stated that the talks aim to raise the costs for Russia and to clearly define countermeasures.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky added more details about Russia's use of its shadow fleet to conduct recent drone incursions into European airspace. Zelensky stated on October 9 that intelligence indicates that the Russian shadow fleet consists of more than 500 tankers and that Russian special services were on board the Russian Borocay tanker that French authorities stopped off the coast of France on September 30 and seized on October 1.[vi] Maritime-focused news outlet Maritime Executive reported on September 23 that the Boracay was one of three Russian-linked vessels near the coordinated drone incursion that shut down the Copenhagen Airport on September 22.

The Kremlin continued its reflexive control campaign aimed at deterring the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, including by threatening to deploy Russian missiles to Cuba. Kremlin officials repeated on October 9 recent Kremlin narratives claiming that the United States would have to directly participate in future Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes.[vii] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev also referenced Russia's recent military cooperation agreement with Cuba and implied that Russia can deploy missiles to Cuba close to the United States.[viii] Zhuravlev's statements come against the backdrop of similar Russian claims on October 8 about Russia potentially supplying Iskander and Oreshnik ballistic missiles to Cuba in response to US provisions of Tomahawks to Ukraine.[ix] The Kremlin is trying to invoke memories of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to threaten the United States. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is pursuing various multi-pronged information efforts to deter the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.[x]

Kremlin officials continue to indicate that US-Russian relations are deteriorating to levels similar to those during the Biden administration. Zhuravlev claimed on October 9 that the West is unlikely to change its behavior and "embrace reconciliation" with Russia.[xi] Zhuravlev claimed that Russia's relations with the Trump administration have returned to the level of those under former US President Joseph Biden. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 9 that Russian-US dialogue is experiencing a "serious pause."[xii] Peskov claimed that Russia has yet to receive a response from the United States to Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) for one year past its expiration in February 2026.[xiii] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 9 that US-Russian dialogue paused after Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in New York City on September 25.[xiv]

Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK Valerii Zaluzhnyi highlighted a Russian cognitive warfare effort to spread false information about future Ukrainian elections. Zaluzhnyi denied claims on October 8 that he supports holding elections in Ukraine during wartime or is preparing to run for president.[xv] Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian propaganda is spreading false narratives and targeting the Ukrainian information space. Russia's informational efforts targeting Ukrainian media likely aim to split Ukrainian society.

Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly admitted that Russian air defenders shot two missiles at an Azerbaijan Airlines civilian plane in December 2024. Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on October 9 and apologized that the plane crash "occurred in [Russian] skies" — continuing his refusal to take responsibility for downing the plane.[xvi] Putin claimed that the "first cause" of the plane crash was a Ukrainian drone. Putin claimed that the "second reason" for the crash was a Russian air defense system technical failure. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces launched two missiles and said that they did not hit the plane directly. Putin stated that the missiles exploded, "perhaps" self-detonating, near the aircraft. Putin claimed that the plane's pilot received instructions from Russian air traffic controllers to land in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan, but decided to return to Baku and then flew to Kazakhstan. Putin correctly described air defense missile proximity fuses, which detonate upon reaching a certain distance from the target — implicitly acknowledging that Russian air defense missiles were the cause of the crash. Putin is trying to leverage technical jargon to cover the facts about what happened. Leaked transcripts of the conversation between the pilot and Russian air traffic controllers revealed that Russian authorities did not allow the plane to land in Russia even after the crew requested an emergency landing — refuting Putin's claim that Russian authorities offered Makhachkala as a landing site but that the pilot himself refused.[xvii]

Russian elites are reportedly expressing concerns over the Kremlin’s years long efforts to nationalize assets. Reuters reported on October 8, citing unnamed sources, that the Russian Central Bank ruled that Russia violated the rights of minority shareholders by seizing some assets related to its war in Ukraine, including seizing assets from foreign companies and domestic Russian enterprises.[xviii] Three sources close to the Central Bank and Moscow Stock Exchange (MOEX) told Reuters that MOEX lodged an official complaint with the Central Bank over the Russian state's legal violations in the seizure of a majority stake in gold mining company Uzhuralzoloto Group of Companies (UGC). Sources told Reuters that there are signs of backlash within parts of the Russian elite, especially among market-friendly technocrats credited with saving the Russian economy from collapse amid ongoing Western sanctions. Reuters reported that Russian authorities have seized roughly $50 billion in assets, roughly two percent of Russia’s GDP, since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Sources told Reuters that some business executives and Central Bank and Russian Ministry of Finance officials are privately questioning what they see as a move toward a “Soviet-style command structure” with the state increasingly mobilizing resources in order to achieve a military victory in Ukraine. Western sanctions have severely limited the financial and material resources available for Russia to fund its war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has increasingly relied on nationalizing assets to secure resources for the war since 2022, while also consolidating state control over the business sector. The recent MOEX complaint and Central Bank ruling indicate that Russia’s elite is growing resentful of the fiscal problems that such nationalization efforts are having on Russia’s economy.

Russia is increasingly conducting Shahed-type drone strikes against frontline areas, but will likely continue to conduct less precise guided glide bomb strikes as well due to their larger payloads. Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on October 8 that Ukrainian soldiers and experts noted that Russia is increasingly relying on Shahed-type drones to strike Ukrainian frontline positions.[xix] Ukrainian soldiers reported that Russian forces actively conducted Geran-type drone strikes (a Russian variant of Iranian Shahed drones) against frontline areas near Kostyantynivka in September 2025 and have recently increased their Geran-type drone strikes closer to the front in northern Sumy Oblast, particularly targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and concentration areas 10 to 15 kilometers from the front. Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi stated that Russia is increasingly employing Shahed-type drones near the frontline instead of KAB guided glide bombs, but stressed that Russia is not suffering from a KAB shortage. Khrapchynskyi noted that Shahed-type drones only have a 90-kilogram warhead — significantly smaller than the smallest KAB warhead at 250 kilograms — but that Shahed-type drone strikes are more precise. Khrapchynskyi also noted that Russia can produce a Shahed-type drone for about $20,000 to $50,000, whereas KAB costs about $25,000. Khrapchynskyi assessed that Russia is anticipating that Ukraine will be able to more effectively counter KAB strikes, which Russian forces launch from aircraft, particularly with the arrival of additional F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine.

Russia's use of Shahed-type drones to strike frontline areas is likely enabling Russia to conduct precision strikes against targets for which KABs are not optimized. Russia is unlikely to cease its use of KABs despite their increased production costs due to the larger payload that allows Russia to destroy hardened targets that Shahed-type drones cannot. Russia's increased Shahed-type drone production is likely allowing Russia to increasingly strike frontline areas while also expanding its long-range strike campaign. Russia's frontline Shahed-type strikes, particularly those against Ukrainian GLOCs, are likely contributing to Russia's ability to generate some battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects and enabling Russian advances as ISW has previously assessed.[xx]

Russia continues to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on October 9 that it identified the commander of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), Andrey Syrotyuk, who ordered Russian forces to shoot three Ukrainian civilians at close range as they were evacuating Kupyansk on October 2.[xxi] The SBU reported that the Russian soldiers disguised themselves in civilian clothing — an act of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory. The execution of civilians very likely constitutes a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[xxii] The SBU report coheres with ISW's longstanding assessment that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• EU and NATO states continue to take steps to increase European defenses against covert and overt Russian attacks.
• The Kremlin continued its reflexive control campaign aimed at deterring the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, including by threatening to deploy Russian missiles to Cuba.
• Kremlin officials continue to indicate that US-Russian relations are deteriorating to levels similar to those during the Biden administration.
• Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK Valerii Zaluzhnyi highlighted a Russian cognitive warfare effort to spread false information about future Ukrainian elections.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly admitted that Russian air defenders shot two missiles at an Azerbaijan Airlines civilian plane in December 2024.
• Russian elites are reportedly expressing concerns over the Kremlin’s years long efforts to nationalize assets.
• Russia is increasingly conducting Shahed-type drone strikes against frontline areas, but will likely continue to conduct less precise guided glide bomb strikes as well due to their larger payloads.
• Russia continues to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in the Kherson direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 7, 2025

The Kremlin continues its reflective control campaign aimed at preventing the US from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 7 that the US sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine would be a “serious escalation” that would not change the situation on the frontline in Ukraine and noted that Tomahawk missiles can carry a nuclear warhead.[i] Peskov stated that Putin made his position “unequivocally” clear on how Russia would respond to such action, referring to Putin's October 2 and 5 threats against the US provision of Tomahawk missiles. Putin threateningly warned the United States against selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine on October 2, claiming that American military personnel would have to directly participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes.[ii] Putin later threatened on October 5 that US provisions of Tomahawk missiles would “lead to the destruction” of the “emerging positive trend” in US-Russian relations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to portray potential US Tomahawk deliveries to Ukraine as a dangerous escalation to deter the United States from sending such weapons to Ukraine.

Other Russian officials are echoing Putin's threats. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev absurdly claimed on October 7 that Ukraine would use US-made Tomahawk missiles to strike Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw and that US President Donald Trump ”should understand that."[iii] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky claimed that Trump would greatly increase the risk of starting a third world war if the US sold Tomahawks to Ukraine and that Russia would not be responsible for such increased risk.[iv] Russian State Duma Deputy Maksim Ivanov and Russian Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov similarly claimed that Russia would be forced to launch a “preemptive” strike against Ukraine and that “not only Ukraine will suffer” if the US sends Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.[v] The Kremlin has previously conducted similar influence operations when the United States was discussing sending Ukraine Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), F-16 fighter jets, and Abrams tanks, and has routinely successfully delayed the provision of Western weapons to Ukraine.[vi] Previous Western weapons provisions and Ukrainian strikes using US-provided long-range weapons systems, however, did not trigger an escalatory Russian reaction, and the West and Ukraine have repeatedly violated Russia’s alleged “red lines” in the past with no resulting escalation.[vii] These recent Russian threats about Tomahawk missile provisions are part of Russia’s wider reflexive control campaign that aims to coerce Russia’s opponents to make policy decisions that actually benefit Russia.[viii] 

Leaked Russian estimates of Russian killed in action (KIA) to wounded in action (WIA) rates in Ukraine underscore the impact of increased tactical drone usage in Ukraine and the extent to which drones complicate ground advances and casualty evacuation. Ukraine's "I Want to Live" initiative published leaked Russian data on October 6 detailing Russian military casualties from January to August 2025.[ix] The data indicates that Russian forces suffered a total of 281,550 casualties of which: 86,744 were killed in action (KIA), including 1,583 officers and 8,633 penal recruits; 33,996 are missing in action (MIA), including 11,427 penal recruits; 158,529 were wounded in action (WIA), including 6,356 officers and 16,489 penal recruits; and 2,311 were captured. Ukraine's "I Want to Live" initiative's data on total Russian military casualties from January to August 2025 is similar to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi's report that Russian forces had suffered 299,210 casualties since January 2025 as of September 9.[x] Ukraine's "I Want to Live" initiative reported that Russia's casualty ratio is one KIA for every 1.3 WIA, likely due to insufficient tactical medicine training and the Russian military command's frequent failure to sufficiently rehabilitate WIA. The standard KIA to WIA ratio is one-to-three, which demonstrates that the Russian forces currently appear to have an abnormally high KIA to WIA ratio (1:1.3) likely due to the efficacy of pervasive tactical-level drone strikes that have created kill zones (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) throughout the theater, complicating both sides ability to evacuate casualties and triage WIA.[xi] ISW has previously observed reports that the Russian military command is struggling to and frequently refusing to recover WIA, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes that are significantly complicating movement on the battlefield.[xii]

The leaked estimates indicate that Russian forces suffered their highest casualties in the Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, and Lyman directions between January and August 2025, reflecting command prioritization of these sectors of the front. The “I Want to Live” documents indicate that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, responsible for the Pokrovsk direction, suffered the heaviest casualties during this period, with 43,709 killed, missing, and captured and 52,865 wounded.[xiii] These figures reflect the Russian military command’s prioritization of the Pokrovsk direction throughout 2025, as Russian forces suffered roughly 34 percent of their casualties in this direction during the first eight months of 2025. The Central Grouping of Forces' 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Central Military District [CMD]) suffered 15,310 killed, missing, and captured and 16,260 wounded, and the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) suffered 13,000 killed, missing, and captured and 14,201 wounded — the heaviest casualties out of Russia’s CAAs. The 2nd CAA has been involved in fighting mainly south and east of Pokrovsk since October 2023 and the 51st CAA redeployed to the frontline east of Pokrovsk in early 2025 and is currently responsible for Russia’s penetration toward Dobropillya.[xiv] The Central Grouping of Forces' 41st CAA, active in the Novopavlivka and Pokrovsk directions, suffered 7,544 killed, missing, and captured and 13,335 wounded. Russian forces have failed to seize Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Novopavlivka, or Druzhkivka after months of fighting despite sustaining significant casualties.

The documents reveal that Russia’s Northern Grouping of Forces, which eliminated much of Ukraine’s penetration into Kursk Oblast in early 2025 and is responsible for Russia’s ongoing efforts to create buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, suffered 53,572 casualties, second only to the Central Grouping of Forces. Russian forces may have sustained a significant portion of these casualties during the intensified Russian effort to retake Kursk Oblast in February and March 2025. The Western Grouping of Forces, responsible for the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Borova directions, suffered 47,410 casualties. The 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), primarily active in the Lyman and Kupyansk directions, suffered casualties of 9,987 killed, missing, and captured and 11,411 wounded — the third highest figure among Russia's CAAs fighting in Ukraine — underscoring the intensity of fighting in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions in recent months. The Western Grouping of Forces’ 20th CAA (MMD), active in the Borova and Lyman directions, suffered casualties of 6,410 killed, missing, and captured and 5,712 wounded. The Western Grouping of Forces has failed to seize any of the major settlements in its area of responsibility (AoR) — Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman — in 2025.

Russian forces also sustained significant casualties in lower priority frontline areas in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Southern Grouping of Forces, active in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and the Siversk direction, suffered 32,740 casualties, with the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) around Siversk suffering 13,055 casualties, the highest in the grouping of forces. The Southern Grouping of Forces has made minimal progress since seizing Toretsk in June 2025. The Eastern Grouping of Forces, responsible for eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and the Velykomykhailivka direction, suffered 38,011 casualties, with the 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]), responsible for Russia’s grinding advance toward and into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, suffering 16,980 casualties, the highest in the grouping of forces. The documents indicate that fighting in the Dnepr Grouping of Forces' AoR, which includes the Kherson direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast, remains relatively desultory amid ongoing Russian efforts to reactivate the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast with the Dnieper Grouping of Forces suffering 13,243 casualties.

Russian forces appear able and willing to sustain these casualty rates despite achieving limited tactical advances. A Russian insider source that has consistently provided accurate reports about changes in the Russian military command previously reported that the Russian MoD recruited 292,000 people between January 1 and September 15, 2025 — an average of 31,600 recruits per month.[xv] The leaked documents indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 281,550 casualties between January and August 2025 — an average of 35,193 casualties per month.[xvi] Russian casualty rates thus far in 2025 appear slightly higher than current monthly Russian recruiting rates, but Russian casualty rates have been decreasing over the last four months. The Russian General Staff may assume that casualty rates will continue to decrease in Ukraine if Russian forces can improve their ability to counter the kill zone, and this reasoning may explain why Russia is reportedly beginning to form a strategic reserve for future deployment.[xvii] ISW previously assessed that Russian casualty rates marginally decreased and gains became less costly during Summer 2025 compared to Fall 2024 and Spring 2025, likely due in part to Russia’s renewed emphasis on using UAVs to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in rear areas.[xviii] Russia has proven its ability to recruit enough people to sustain losses in Ukraine over the last three years while possibly beginning to generate a strategic reserve, and the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon or decrease the pace of operations in Ukraine so long as Russia can continue to more than sustain such losses.

European states continue to provide humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine and conclude joint agreements with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). Slovakian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák and Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on October 6 that Slovakia will provide five Božena demining vehicles, engineering vehicles, and medical stretchers as part of Slovakia’s 14th aid package to Ukraine.[xix] This is the first Slovakian aid package to Ukraine since Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico's election on October 1, 2023.[xx] The Estonian company Milrem Robotics announced on October 7 that it will deliver over 150 THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to Ukraine and that the Netherlands is funding the UGV purchase.[xxi]

Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin announced on October 7 that Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom concluded cooperation agreements for "float and fly" drone concepts with US-based drone manufacturer LeVanta Tech at the Third International Defense Industry Forum (DFNC3) in Kyiv.[xxii] Smetanin also announced that Ukroboronprom signed agreements with Spanish defense firm Escribano Mechanical & Engineering related to air defense and armored vehicles.[xxiii] Shmyhal announced on October 6 that Ukraine and Denmark signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that will enable Ukrainian companies to launch new joint production projects in Denmark, create joint capacities and exchange technologies with Denmark, and attract European Union (EU) funding for joint projects.[xxiv]

The Russian military command reportedly appointed Former Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel as the deputy commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces. A Russian insider source, who has accurately reported on Russian military command changes in the past, reported on October 6 that Kisel became the deputy commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces under the recently appointed Northern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[xxv] The Northern Grouping of Forces currently oversees operations in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. The insider source reported that Kisel was serving in Syria and organizing the evacuation of Syria's military-political leadership and military personnel after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, before returning to the Ukrainian theater. Kisel commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Russian authorities reportedly suspended Kisel in Spring 2022 for his failure to seize Kharkiv City and sent Kisel to serve in Syria.[xxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed in late 2024 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) removed Kisel as the commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria for unspecified reasons.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues its reflective control campaign aimed at preventing the US from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.
• Leaked Russian estimates of Russian killed in action (KIA) to wounded in action (WIA) rates in Ukraine underscore the impact of increased tactical drone usage in Ukraine and the extent to which drones complicate ground advances and casualty evacuation.
• The leaked estimates indicate that Russian forces suffered their highest casualties in the Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, and Lyman directions between January and August 2025, reflecting command prioritization of these sectors of the front.
• Russian forces appear able and willing to sustain these casualty rates despite achieving limited tactical advances.
• European states continue to provide humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine and conclude joint agreements with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Russian military command reportedly appointed Former Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel as the deputy commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas and near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6, 2025

Russia appears to be accelerating the informational and psychological condition setting phase — "Phase 0" — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on October 6 that the United Kingdom (UK) is planning for a group of pro-Ukrainian Russians fighting for Ukraine to conduct an attack on a Ukrainian Navy ship or a foreign civilian vessel in a European port.[1] The SVR claimed that the saboteurs will claim they were acting on orders from Moscow and that the UK plans to equip the group with Chinese-made underwater equipment in order to blame the People's Republic of China (PRC) for supporting Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The SVR's October 6 claim follows similar SVR false flag claims targeting European states, such as Poland, Moldova, and Serbia, and the SVR has been issuing such statements more frequently in recent weeks that constitute a new concerted pattern of activity.[2]

Russia appears to be conducting concerted preparations as part of the physical and psychological condition-setting phase for war contingencies. Russia has been engaged in a variety of overt and covert attacks against NATO states, such as sabotage missions, electronic warfare (EW) interference, GPS jamming, and arson, in recent years.[3] Russia has dramatically increased these attacks on NATO states in recent weeks since Fall 2025 — most notably with the drone incursions into NATO airspace.[4] This pattern of organized activity suggests that Russia has entered the first phase of preparations — "Phase 0” — to move to a higher level of war than the one Russia is currently engaged in, such as a future NATO-Russia war. ISW is not assessing at this time whether the Kremlin has decided to engage in such a higher level of war or on what timeline the Kremlin may expect to do so. Russia has been undertaking longer-term plans that ISW assesses may be part of preparation for a NATO-Russia war in the future, such as the restructuring of Russia's military districts on its western border and the buildup of military bases on the border with Finland.[5] ISW has not observed indicators that Russia is actively preparing for an imminent conflict with NATO at this time.

Russia's overt and covert attacks and false flag claims serve multiple purposes for Moscow both internationally and at home. Russia aims to create fear throughout the European population and fragment NATO’s resolve. The wide range in the type and location of the attacks and false flag claims aims to foster a sense that the threat of violence is pervasive throughout all of Europe. Russia aims to use fear in Europe to gain concessions in its war against Ukraine and a possible future NATO-Russia war. Russia is trying to push Europeans to decrease their support of Ukraine out of fear that continued support will increase Russia's overt or covert attacks. Russia is also trying to push Europe to decrease or cease its ongoing efforts to shore up its defenses out of fear that these efforts will provoke Russian attacks. These efforts are part of Russia's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push Russia's opponents to make policy decisions that actually benefit Russia. The Kremlin's use of the SVR’s repeated false flag claims aims to affect the Russian population's views of the West, framing Western actors — not Russia — as responsible for attacks or threat of attacks. The Kremlin is setting conditions to justify and rally public support for any possible future Russian aggression against NATO.

European officials continue to report drone sightings in European airspace. Norwegian officials reported a possible sighting of unidentified drones over the Gardermoen International Airport in Oslo, Norway, on the night of October 5 to 6.[6] The Norwegian Eastern Police District reported that a pilot and other unspecified actors spotted between three and five drones.[7] Airport authorities delayed several plane landings and temporarily closed the airport after the sightings.[8] Norwegian law enforcement has not yet confirmed the possible sighting and has not attributed the event to any specific actor.[9]

German officials attributed recent drone flights over the Munich Airport to Russia. German Chancellor Friederich Merz stated on October 5 that he "assumes" that Russia was behind "most" of the drone flights that forced German authorities to close the Munich Airport on the nights of October 2 to 3 and October 3 to 4.[10] Merz stated that the likely Russian drone incursions were conducting espionage and reconnaissance and aimed to spread fear among the German population.[11] Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder stated that Russia meant for the drones over the Munich Airport to make Germans nervous or to scare the population.[12] Neither Merz nor Söder have attributed the drone sighting over Frankfurt Airport on October 2 to Russia so far.

The Kremlin continues to deny responsibility for recent drone incursions into NATO airspace. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used his English-language Telegram account on October 6 to deflect blame away from Russia for recent drone incursions in European airspace, including by claiming that the drones could have been a Ukrainian provocation.[13] Medvedev claimed that the reason for the incursions "is not the point." Medvedev threateningly claimed, rather, that the point is for Europeans to “get a taste of what the danger of war really means” and to feel their “imminent and excruciating end closing in.” Medvedev claimed that French President Emmanuel Macron and Merz are “scoring political points on blood” and that Europeans might "rip the heads off" of Macron and Merz if Europeans were to “understand what war means.”[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 6 that statements from European Union (EU) leaders about Russian involvement in the recent drone overflights are “sweeping and unfounded” and called on European leaders to “broaden their horizons” rather than attributing all drone sightings to Russia.[15] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko implied on October 6 that Europeans are behind the latest drone incursions, claiming that drones in EU airspace aim to increase European “military psychosis" and force European parliaments to increase military spending.[16] Medvedev's, Peskov's, and Grushko's claims are part of the Kremlin's wider effort to deny and downplay the threat that Russia poses to Europe in order to dissuade European states from continuing their efforts to bolster their own defenses. ISW continues to assess that Russia is pursuing a multipronged informational effort to deter the West from defending against hostile Russian actions and to set conditions for a potential future conflict with NATO.[17]

Russian forces conducted a fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone strike for the first time against Kramatorsk on October 5 — furthering Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics within and near the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast. Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko reported on October 5 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk with a fiber-optic FPV drone for the first time, damaging a car.[18] Geolocated footage of the strike indicates that the location of the strike was about 20 to 22 kilometers from Russia's closest frontline positions on the Chasiv Yar-Zaliznyanske line (southeast of Kramatorsk) and a few blocks from the H20 Slovyansk-Kostyantynivka highway that runs through the entirety of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[19] Russian forces are now able to conduct FPV strikes against all the cities of the fortress belt — Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka.[20] Russian strikes against logistics hubs and major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the fortress belt are part of Russia's efforts to adapt its drone technologies and tactics to generate effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[21] Russian forces are expanding their employment of fiber optic drones, including by equipping relatively cheap Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones with fiber optic cables to make the Molniyas immune to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).[22] Russia is also reportedly producing over 50,000 fiber optic drones per month.[23] Successful Russian efforts to scale up their fiber optic FPV strikes against fortress belt cities and nearby GLOCs would significantly hamper Ukrainian logistics in Donetsk Oblast. The recent strike against Kramatorsk indicates that Russian forces are attempting to disrupt Ukrainian logistics not only on the southern flank of the fortress belt near Kostyantynivka, where Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations, but also from the north.[24]

Ukraine continues to conduct long-range drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod on the night of October 5 to 6.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Sverdlov Plant is one of Russia's largest explosives manufacturers and produces ammunition for aviation and artillery shells, aerial bombs, anti-tank guided missiles warheads, ammunition for Russian engineering forces, and warheads for air defense missiles.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported and geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Naval Oil Terminal in occupied Fedosia, Crimea, which transports oil and oil products from railway cars to sea vessels and road transport vehicles, and supplies Russian forces in Ukraine.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike caused a fire at the facility. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Major Robert Brovdi reported that USF elements conducted the drone strike against the oil terminal and that the facility is the largest transshipment for oil products in occupied Crimea with a tank capacity of 250,000 cubic meters.[27] Brovdi noted that Russian forces use the terminal to supply fuel to Russian forces in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts by rail. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ayvazivska railway station in Feodosia.[28] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight, causing a fire in a security room and injuring two.[29] Footage published on October 5 reportedly shows explosions near the Tuapse refinery.[30] Krasnodar Krai authorities claimed that downed drone debris fell on the Tuapse Oil Refinery.[31]

Reuters reported on October 6 that Ukraine's October 3 to 4 overnight strike against the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, shut down its CDU-6 oil refining unit, which has a capacity of 160,000 barrels per day and accounts for 40 percent of the plant's total refining capacity.[32] Sources told Reuters that repairs will last one month and that the refinery will operate at 70 percent capacity during repairs. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian refineries is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages, and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[33]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 5 to 6, striking a maternity hospital. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 116 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[34] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense downed 83 drones and that 30 drones struck seven locations. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that Russian drones targeted a maternity hospital in Sumy Oblast with 11 children, 35 patients, and 120 employees inside, causing a fire.[35] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted energy and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia is prioritizing strikes against civilians and energy infrastructure to continue its long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2025–2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[37]

The Ukrainian military continues to transition to a corps structure. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on October 6 that it is disbanding the Dnipro Group of Forces (GoF), which was responsible for operations from Kharkiv Oblast through Zaporizhzhia City, as part of its transition to the corps structure.[38] Ukrainian forces formally began implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian military into a corps structure in February 2025.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Dnipro GoF was a temporary structure and that the corps structure eliminates the need for operational-strategic groups. Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on October 6 that Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, who headed the Dnipro GoF, will retain his post as the commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces Command and move to the northeastern direction of the frontline, reducing his area of responsibility (AoR) by roughly half.[40] Ukraine's efforts to form an echelon between brigades and operational groups of forces and to strengthen the army corps staff structure will likely improve Ukrainian command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations, assuming Ukraine can effectively develop the corps-level professional staff.[41]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia appears to be accelerating the informational and psychological condition setting phase — "Phase 0" — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.
• European officials continue to report drone sightings in European airspace.
• German officials attributed recent drone flights over the Munich Airport to Russia.
• The Kremlin continues to deny responsibility for recent drone incursions into NATO airspace.
• Russian forces conducted a fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone strike for the first time against Kramatorsk on October 5 — furthering Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics within and near the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.
• Ukraine continues to conduct long-range drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 5 to 6, striking a maternity hospital.
• The Ukrainian military continues to transition to a corps structure.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 5, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to deter the US from sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by linking improvements in the US-Russian bilateral relationship to concessions from the United States on the war in Ukraine. Putin claimed in an interview published on October 5 that US provisions of Tomahawk missiles would "lead to the destruction" of the "emerging positive trend" in US-Russian relations - linking the prospect of improved US-Russian relations with limits on US support for Ukraine.[i] Putin is continuing to dangle the prospect of incentives that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Putin has been trying to facilitate US-Russian rapprochement, including by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks, to secure Russia's desired demands in Ukraine.[ii]

Putin has been promoting various rhetorical lines to try to deter the Trump administration from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. Putin threateningly warned the United States against selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine on October 2, claiming that American military personnel would have to directly participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes.[iii] Putin also claimed that such strikes would mark a "new stage of escalation" but would not change the battlefield situation. Putin made similar arguments when the United States was considering sending Ukraine ATACMS missiles, F-16 jets, and Abrams tanks. Putin appears to be trying different approaches – from threatening worsening bilateral relations to downplaying the missiles' usefulness – to influence US decision-making.

The Kremlin is trying to prevent the United States from providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in order to retain the sanctuary that Russia enjoys in its rear. Ukrainian forces are able to conduct long-range drone strikes against a significant portion of Russia's rear, but the payloads on these drones are limited and not suitable to destroy specialized objects. Ukraine's ability to launch missile strikes deep into Russia's rear with larger payloads would allow Ukraine to significantly damage - if not destroy - key military assets in Russia, such as the Shahed drone factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, or the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast from which Russia sorties strategic bombers that fire air-launch cruise missiles at Ukraine. Russia has been able to significantly scale up its Shahed drone production by expanding the factory in Yelabuga, allowing Russia to launch increasingly large and more frequent long-range drone strikes against Ukraine. Russia's nightly strike packages in September 2025 featured an average of 187 long-range drones (many of which are Shahed-type drones) per night, whereas similar strike packages in January 2025 only featured an average of 83 drones, for example. Russia notably started launching overnight strike packages that included over 500 drones more frequently in September 2025. ISW assesses that there are at least 1,945 Russian military objects within range of the 2,500-kilometer variant Tomahawk and at least 1,655 within range of the 1,600-kilometer variant. Ukraine likely can significantly degrade Russia’s frontline battlefield performance by targeting a vulnerable subset of rear support areas that sustain and support Russia’s frontline operations.[iv] Ukraine has reportedly launched mass production of its new, domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile with a 3,000-kilometer range and 1,150-kilogram warhead, but the system remains unproven, and Ukraine will need time to scale up production.[v]

Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of October 4 to 5 with 163 combined projectiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 53 missiles, including two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast; 42 Iskander-K/Kh-101 cruise missiles from Samara, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; and nine Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.[vi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 496 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Kacha, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 439 drones, one Kinzhal missile, 32 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and six Kalibr missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that eight missiles and 57 drones struck 20 locations and that debris fell on six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that six missiles did not reach their targets either because they were "lost in location" (likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare [EW] interference) or because Ukrainian authorities were still specifying their impact location as of 1400 local time. Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maksym Kozytskyi reported that Russian forces launched 140 Shahed-type drones and 23 cruise missiles against Lviv Oblast, killing four civilians, injuring eight, and damaging civilian and energy infrastructure.[vii] Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi reported that Russian strikes disrupted power supplies in the city and damaged the Sparrow civilian industrial park.[viii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also killed one civilian and injured 10 others in Zaporizhzhia City and disrupted power supplies in Zaporizhzhia City and Zaporizhia, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts.[ix]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz Board Chairman Serhiy Koretskyi noted on October 5 that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure are a deliberate attempt to deprive Ukrainian civilians of heating ahead of Winter 2025-2026.[x] Russia's October 4 to 5 strikes targeting Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure are the latest in Russia's long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2025-2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace. ISW recently assessed that Russia had likely been stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large-scale drone and missile strikes on select intermittent days.[xi]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 5 that Russia has modified its ballistic missiles to fly on quasi-ballistic trajectories and approach targets from multiple directions, decreasing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems.[xii] Ihnat's October 5 statement confirms recent reporting from the Financial Times.[xiii]

The pro-Russian Georgian Dream party secured widespread majorities in municipal elections in Georgia on October 4, sparking mass protests that Georgian Dream officials tried to blame on Ukraine. Georgian security forces clashed with protesters in Tbilisi following local elections in which the Georgian Dream party won majorities in every municipality.[xiv] Kremlin officials, Georgian Dream officials, and Russian milbloggers baselessly accused foreign intelligence services of organizing the protests to launch a coup and destabilize the country.[xv] Georgia's State Security Service claimed that it confiscated weapons and explosives that protestors planned to use for sabotage missions on election day and that a Georgian representative of an unspecified Ukrainian military unit supplied the weapons.[xvi] ISW will continue to monitor the ongoing protests as the situation continues to develop.

Russia is likely leveraging its close relations with Serbia and Republika Srpska to threaten to destabilize the Balkans and undermine European cohesion. Former President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik claimed on October 5 that the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany are planning to stage a "color revolution" in Serbia to destabilize and dismember the country and to weaken Serbia and the entire Balkan region.[xvii] Dodik claimed that European officials are misrepresenting the recent spate of unidentified drone incursions into European airspace to discredit Russia and promote confrontation.[xviii] Dodik claimed that the West is forcing Republika Srpska to hold illegitimate snap elections in order to undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords (which ended the 1992–1995 Bosnian War).[xix] Serbian President Alexsandar Vucic claimed on October 5 that NATO's decision to require each member state to allocate five percent of their GDP to defense spending is an indicator that the world is preparing for war and stated that Serbia would like to avoid such confrontation.[xx] Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) recently claimed that European officials were preparing to stage a "color revolution" in Serbia, mirroring Russia's rhetorical attempts to justify its invasions of Ukraine and aggression towards NATO members.[xxi] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to undermine the Dayton Accords to destabilize the Balkan region and undermine European cohesion.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to deter the US from sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by linking improvements in the US-Russian bilateral relationship to concessions from the United States on the war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is trying to prevent the United States from providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in order to retain the sanctuary that Russia enjoys in its rear.
• Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of October 4 to 5 with 163 combined projectiles.
• The pro-Russian Georgian Dream party secured widespread majorities in municipal elections in Georgia on October 4, sparking mass protests that Georgian Dream officials tried to blame on Ukraine.
• Russia is likely leveraging its close relations with Serbia and Republika Srpska to threaten to destabilize the Balkans and undermine European cohesion.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2025

German officials reported more unidentified drone sightings near airports and military facilities. The Munich Airport reported on October 4 that authorities closed the airport on the night of October 3 to 4 due to unidentified drones operating near the airport — the second time in less than 24 hours that the airport closed due to drones.[1] German outlet Bild reported on October 4, citing unnamed security sources, that authorities determined that the unidentified drones operating near the Munich Airport were military reconnaissance drones and that German authorities also detected an unidentified small aircraft flying near an ammunition depot near Jever on October 3.[2] Bild reported that German authorities arrested a Croatian man piloting a drone roughly 700 meters from the Frankfurt Airport on October 3 and that three unidentified drones flew over the Federal Police Aviation Squadron Headquarters in Gifhorn on October 2. These unidentified aerial incursions near critical German infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia's ongoing attempts to destabilize Europe and undermine NATO’s cohesion.[3]

Russia continues to challenge and probe NATO states' capabilities, possibly as part of preparations for a potential future Russia-NATO war. UK Space Command Head Major General Paul Tedman told the BBC in an article published on October 2 that Russia has been trying to jam British military satellites with ground-based systems weekly.[4] Tedman stated that Russia is "flying relatively close" to the UK satellites and is trying to collect information. Tedman noted that this Russian activity is deliberate and has increased since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Tedman noted that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have tested anti-satellite weapons and that Russia is developing the capability to put nuclear weapons in space. Tedman assessed that the PRC has more sophisticated capabilities, but that Russia has a greater will to use its counter-space systems. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius reported on September 25 that Russia had used two Olymp-K satellites to track German military Intelsat satellites.[5] Pistorius stated that Russia and the PRC can jam, blind, manipulate, or kinetically disrupt satellites.

Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine that resulted in civilian casualties and damaged critical energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and 109 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of October 3 and 4.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 73 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine, that three missiles and 36 drones hit 21 locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a civilian train in Shostka, Sumy Oblast, during the day on October 4 with Shahed-type drones, killing one civilian and injuring at least 30 others.[7] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on October 4 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-type drone strike against agricultural enterprises in Sumy Oblast, damaging two warehouses storing 700 tons and 1,000 tons of grain, respectively.[8] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes disrupted power supplies in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts and injured civilians and damaged residential infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[9] Russia is likely prioritizing strikes against civilians and energy infrastructure to continue its long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine's energy security ahead of Winter 2025-2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[10]

 
Ukraine continues to conduct long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries, exacerbating ongoing gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff and Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces, with support from the Russian insurgency group Chernaya Iskra, conducted a strike against the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, on the night of October 3 to 4.[11] The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces, in coordination with Chernaya Iskra, struck the oil refinery's installation that produces linear alkylbenzenes and linear alkylaromatic sulphonates, and the installation that filters impurities from the oil. The SSO reported that this is the third Ukrainian strike against the facility in 2025 and that the oil refinery has an annual processing capacity of roughly 20.1 million tons. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on October 4 that the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery is one of Russia's five largest refineries.[12] Geolocated footage published on October 4 shows fires near the oil refinery in Kirishi, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) shows heat anomalies in the area. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on October 4 that Russian forces downed seven drones over Kirishi and that a fire started in the industrial zone.[13]

A Russian insider source claimed on October 3 that the Khabarovsk Krai Prosecutor's Office is intervening to assess the actions, particularly those related to pricing, of government agencies and selling fuel that are affecting the worsening gasoline shortages in the region.[14] The insider source claimed that Khabarovsk Krai Governor Dmitry Demeshin claimed that private gas stations were unable to purchase enough gasoline, which has exacerbated shortages and price increases. The insider source claimed that private gasoline stations are closing in order to avoid profit losses. The insider source claimed that Russia's Far East, eastern Siberia, northern Caucasus region, and occupied Crimea are at an increased risk of gasoline shortages and that ongoing Ukrainian strikes against oil refineries west of the Ural Mountains coincided with scheduled maintenance, leading to a 10 to 11 percent reduction in anticipated gasoline and diesel fuel production in September 2025. The insider source claimed that 16 of Russia's 38 oil refineries, many of which Ukrainian forces have struck repeatedly in recent months, are in regions that are experiencing rising gasoline costs. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 4 that residents in Biysk, Altai Krai, are reporting acute AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline shortages that are resulting in long lines and local complaints about rising gas prices. Astra reported that residents noted that roughly half of the gasoline stations in Biysk have closed.

Key Takeaways:

• German officials reported more unidentified drone sightings near airports and military facilities.
• Russia continues to challenge and probe NATO states' capabilities, possibly as part of preparations for a potential future Russia-NATO war.
• Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine that resulted in civilian casualties and damaged critical energy infrastructure.
• Ukraine continues to conduct long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries, exacerbating ongoing gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; 21 Iskander-K cruise missiles; seven Kh-59/69 cruise missiles; and 381 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 303 drones, 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles, and five Kh-59/69 guided air missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 18 missiles and 78 drones struck 15 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell in six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian drones and missiles primarily targeted critical energy infrastructure in Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts and struck Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz reported that Russian drones and missiles intentionally targeted critical energy infrastructure during the October 2-3 strike, including gas transportation infrastructure that has no military purpose, to deprive Ukrainian civilians of the ability to heat their homes leading into the winter of 2025 to 2026.[2] Naftogaz Board Chairman Serhiy Koertskyi reported that the October 2-3 strike significantly damaged unspecified Ukrainian energy facilities.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in August 2025 that Russia was increasingly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure to undermine Ukraine’s preparations for the winter heating season.[4]

Russian forces likely stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large scale drone and missile strikes on select days. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on October 2 that Russian forces launched 6,900 drones against Ukraine in September 2025, including more than 3,600 Shahed-type drones.[5] Russian forces do not regularly launch missiles in nightly strike packages against Ukraine and often go several days without using missiles in these packages. Russian forces appear to be stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles most days and then launching large numbers of missiles in conjunction with large numbers of drones, likely to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems. Russian forces notably only conducted four overnight strikes containing over 10 missiles in September 2025 and have conducted one overnight strike containing over 40 missiles roughly every two weeks since late August 2025, underscoring Russia's recent pattern of intermittently conducting a few large, combined strikes between Russia's most consistent, smaller drone strikes.[6] Russian forces are continuing to use more cruise missiles and fewer ballistic missiles in combined strikes and are likely continuing to rely on ballistic missiles to conduct pinpoint strikes on specific targets while using drones and cruise missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems remain Ukraine’s only air defense systems capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles, and Russian forces may be specifically targeting cities and energy infrastructure not actively defended by Ukraine's Patriot systems to increase the chances that Russia successfully strikes its intended target.

Russian forces are likely leveraging recent upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles to improve their ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 3 that Russia likely recently modified its Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles to execute unexpected diversionary maneuvers during the terminal flight phase to “confuse” Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missiles.[7] FT reported that a Western official familiar with Ukraine’s Patriot systems’ interception rates attributed the recent “marked” decrease in Ukraine’s Patriot interception rates to this new “pattern” in Russian missiles’ terminal phase maneuvers. The FT noted that Ukraine’s air defenses may also be degraded due to ongoing Russian strikes targeting Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems. A US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report published in August 2025 stated that modifications that enable Russian ballistic missiles to change trajectories and perform maneuvers atypical of a traditional ballistic trajectory have impeded Ukraine’s ability to leverage Patriot air defense systems against Russian ballistic missiles.[8]

Russia continues to escalate its destabilization efforts against Europe as European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating in their airspace. Reuters reported on October 3 that Danish intelligence indicates that Russian warships have repeatedly sailed on collision courses with Danish vessels and pointed weapons at Danish military helicopters and naval vessels during passage through the Danish straits.[9] Reuters reported that Danish Defense Intelligence Service Director Thomas Ahrenkiel stated that Danish intelligence indicates that Russian warships equipped with sonar and jamming equipment have sailed through the Danish straits and that it was “highly probable” that the ships have jammed signals and caused significant GPS interference in Denmark at least once. Belgian outlet VRT reported on October 3 that a Belgian aircraft observed 15 unattributed drones above the Elsenborn military base in East Cantons, Belgium, and that the drones then flew into German airspace on the night of October 2 to 3.[10] VRT reported that the Belgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating the matter to identify the actors behind the most recent aerial incursion, and Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken assessed that the drone incursion is characteristic of Russia's broader ongoing hybrid warfare campaign to destabilize Europe. The New York Times (NYT) reported on October 2 that German authorities closed the Munich Airport overnight due to several unattributed drone sightings, forcing authorities to ground and divert several flights.[11] It remains unclear if the German and Belgian aerial incursion incidents are connected. Danish intelligence on Russia's naval provocations and the recent aerial incursions cohere with ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia is conducting a pervasive hybrid warfare campaign against Europe designed to destabilize the continent and undermine cohesion.[12]

The Kremlin continues efforts to undermine Western-brokered peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik, on October 2, following Putin's speech at the Valdai Club, an international discussion forum that the Kremlin has used in its decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia’s favor.[13] Dodik told Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) that he asked Putin not to leave Republika Srpska “at the mercy” of the European Union (EU), which is “strangling” the country.[14] Putin and Dodik have now met eight times since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and last met on April 1, 2025.[15] The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords, likely in an effort to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[16] Putin’s meeting with Dodik, amidst ongoing unidentified drone incursion over North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airspace, is likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to sow divisions in Europe and prevent a coordinated NATO response if Russia invades a NATO country.

Norway and Ukraine's European partners opened the largest training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland on October 1. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 2 that NATO and Ukrainian officials participated in an opening ceremony of Camp Jomsborg, the largest training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland.[17] The Ukrainian MoD reported that the facility can accommodate up to 1,200 military personnel and is designed to augment the exchange of combat experience between Ukraine and NATO. Ukrainian broadcaster Armyinform reported that military personnel from Estonia and other NATO member states may join the 250 Norwegian military instructors already stationed at the Polish training ground.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages.
• Russian forces likely stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large scale drone and missile strikes on select days.
• Russian forces are likely leveraging recent upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles to improve their ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems.
• Russia continues to escalate its destabilization efforts against Europe as European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating in their airspace.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to undermine Western-brokered peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe.
• Norway and Ukraine's European partners opened the largest training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland on October 1.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to threaten Europe as part of a multi-pronged informational effort to deter the West from responding to hostile Russian actions. Putin claimed on October 2 that Russia is closely monitoring the "militarization" of Europe and explicitly stated that Russia is "listening closely" to Germany regarding remarks that the German military should be the "most powerful in Europe."[1] Putin claimed that "no one doubts" that Russia's response to Europe's "militarization" will not be "long in coming" and that Russia is evaluating whether Europe's efforts are "just talk" or if Russia must take "countermeasures" that "will be very convincing." Putin absurdly claimed that Russia has "never initiated a military confrontation" but suggested that competing with Russia militarily would "ultimately end badly for the provocateur." Putin simultaneously downplayed the threat that Russia poses to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), claiming that European warnings of Russian aggression are "nonsense" and efforts to "whip up hysteria" within Europe. Putin called on European states to "calm down" about Russia and instead focus on domestic issues. Putin is attempting to dissuade European members of NATO from bolstering their own defensive efforts and providing military support for Ukraine, which both oppose Russia's own strategic objectives, by posturing that Russia is only a threat to Europe as long as Europe resists Putin's objectives.

Putin's rhetoric follows the recent Russian and unidentified drone incursions into or within European airspace; Russian aerial overflights in or near European airspace and assets in violation of international safety norms; and Russian hybrid and sabotage operations against NATO military facilities and logistics.[2] Russia also aims to sow discord and fear within Europe through hybrid operations, including within Poland, Germany, and Lithuania.[3] Putin made these remarks during his annual speech at the Valdai Club, an international discussion forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues. The Valdai Club has served as a useful tool in the Kremlin’s decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia’s favor.[4] Putin likely aimed to use his Valdai Club address as the venue for these remarks to ensure that his various informational efforts, including those targeting Europe, reach a broader audience and cumulatively achieve his desired effect: persuade the West against supporting Ukraine or protecting itself from Russia.

Putin attempted to discourage the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by downplaying their effectiveness and indirectly threatening the United States. Putin warned the United States against selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, calling the missiles "powerful" and "threatening."[5] Putin noted Ukraine cannot operate Tomahawk missiles without the "direct participation of American military personnel" and that Ukraine's use would mark a "new stage of escalation." Putin also downplayed the Tomahawk missiles as "not entirely modern" and noted that the provision of these missiles to Ukraine "will not change the balance of power on the battlefield."[6]  ISW continues to assess that Ukraine has an operational requirement to strike important military infrastructure protected in Russia's rear.[7]

Putin is attempting to exaggerate Russian advances in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Putin claimed on October 2 that Russian forces have seized two-thirds of Kupyansk.[8] ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized only 14 percent of Kupyansk as of October 2, and that Putin is exaggerating Russian gains in Kupyansk. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk, which ISW also assessed was an exaggeration of Russian gains in Kupyansk.[9] The Kremlin has been attempting to use large amounts of quantitative data to create the false impression that Russian forces are rapidly advancing on the battlefield.[10] Putin's October 2 statements are a continuation of the ongoing Kremlin effort to hyperfocus on and exaggerate tactical Russian gains to falsely portray Russia as making rapid advances on the battlefield and to provide Russia with an informational victory in the war.[11] Putin is trying to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals militarily, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US President Donald Trump approved intelligence sharing with Ukraine for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets within Russia. WSJ reported on October 1, citing unnamed US officials, that Trump recently approved US intelligence agencies and the Pentagon to share intelligence with Ukraine for long-range strikes against energy infrastructure within Russia, and that the US is asking NATO allies to provide similar intelligence support.[12] It is currently unclear if this approval also extends to military targets within Russia. The US officials stated that the US is considering providing Tomahawk missiles, Barracuda missiles, or other ground- and air-launched missiles with ranges of roughly 500 miles, cohering with prior reports that the Trump administration was considering selling Tomahawks to Ukraine.[13]

To mitigate domestic panic over Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries, Russian officials attempted to downplay the reported US decision to increase intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 2 that US intelligence sharing with Ukraine is “not an innovation.”[14] Peskov also claimed that no weapon will be a "magic pill" for Ukraine.[15] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik also claimed that the US has already been providing Ukraine with intelligence for long-range strikes.[16] Russian officials are likely attempting to avoid inflaming panic within Russian society, given that Ukraine’s strikes against oil refineries have spurred recent gasoline shortages.[17]

Russian military intelligence is likely conducting hybrid operations in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania to sow fear and discord within NATO states, following indications of a possible future Russian false-flag operation within Poland. Polish media, citing sources associated with the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) and Polish General Prosecutor's Office, reported on October 2 that the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) may have orchestrated planned drone strikes within Poland, Germany, and Lithuania.[18] The ABW detained an alleged courier whom the GRU reportedly recruited on Telegram for transporting explosives in cans for food products, drone parts, and SIM cards between Lithuania, Poland, and Germany. Lithuanian authorities also discovered a cache of explosive-filled cans in a cemetery in Kaunas, and the GRU reportedly intended for actors to use the drones to drop the explosive-filled cans for the strikes. The ABW stated that it is still investigating the people and events. ISW previously assessed that Russia and Belarus may conduct special forces sabotage operations against critical infrastructure in Poland and launch additional drone incursions and blame Ukraine.[19]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on October 2 that Ukraine received 185 Ukrainian POWs and 20 Ukrainian civilians and that Russia received 185 POWs and 20 Russian civilians.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to threaten Europe as part of a multi-pronged informational effort to deter the West from responding to hostile Russian actions.
• Putin attempted to discourage the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by downplaying their effectiveness and indirectly threatening the United States.
• Putin is attempting to exaggerate Russian advances in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.
• The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US President Donald Trump approved intelligence sharing with Ukraine for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets within Russia.
• To mitigate domestic panic over Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries, Russian officials attempted to downplay the reported US decision to increase intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
• Russian military intelligence is likely conducting hybrid operations in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania to sow fear and discord within NATO states, following indications of a possible future Russian false-flag operation within Poland.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka, and in northern Kharkiv Oblast, eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1, 2025

The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 1 that the third round of US-Russian discussions to address "irritants" will "definitely take place before the end of autumn [2025]" but that Russia and the United States have not yet agreed on a specific date.[i] Ryabkov claimed that Russia is waiting for US President Donald Trump's response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent proposal to extend Russia's adherence to the New START Treaty, a bilateral nuclear arms limitations treaty that entered into force in 2011, for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[ii] Ryabkov further claimed that the United States must either "pursue stabilization" with Russia or engage in "a new arms race, which [Russia] opposes, even though [Russia is] guaranteed to ensure [its] own security."[iii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 1 that Russia cannot plan high-level contacts between Russia and Ukraine because Ukraine has stopped the negotiation process.[iv] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to normalizing bilateral relations with the United States for economic and political gain while protracting its war in Ukraine to make additional gains on the battlefield as the Kremlin obstructs peace efforts.[v] Russia is also attempting to discredit Ukraine by baselessly accusing the Ukrainian government of halting the negotiation process to distract from Russia's uncompromising demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation.[vi]

Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace. Norwegian public broadcaster NRK reported on October 1 that Norwegian authorities spotted an unidentified drone on September 30 near an airport in Bronnesund, prompting authorities to divert one scheduled flight and cancel remaining flights.[vii] NRK also reported that Norwegian police detained eight People's Republic of China (PRC) citizens following reports of an unidentified drone flight near the Svolvaer Airport, arrested one of the tourists, and seized drone equipment. The Norwegian police stated that there is no current apparent connection between a state actor and the Svolvaer Airport or other drone incidents. [viii] French authorities stopped the Russian Borocay shadow-fleet-linked tanker off the coast of the Saint-Nazaire port in western France on September 30 and seized the tanker and detained the captain and first mate on October 1.[ix] French President Emanuel Macron stated that the Borocay's crew committed ”very serious offenses.”[x] Maritime-focused news outlet Maritime Executive reported on September 23 that the Boracay was one of three Russian-linked vessels near the coordinated drone incursion that shut down the Copenhagen Airport on September 22.[xi] The Maritime Executive reported that European authorities are investigating three Russia-linked vessels that were sailing near the Copenhagen Airport when unidentified drone flights recently forced the airport to close.[xii] Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet reported that the Russian Ropucha-class landing ship Alexander Shabalin had been off the Danish coast for days during heavy drone flights at Danish airports and that Danish authorities are investigating the ship's role in the drone operations.[xiii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk similarly reported on September 28 and 29 that intelligence indicates that Russia is likely launching drones into NATO airspace from Russian shadow fleet tankers and is leveraging such vessels to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions in international waters.[xiv]

The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction. The commander of Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kherson direction reported on October 1 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division from near Chasiv Yar to the Kherson direction to replace elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) that redeployed from the Kherson direction to Donetsk Oblast at an unspecified date.[xv] Geolocated footage from a Russian source shows Russian forces, purportedly elements of the 98th VDV Division, striking a house in Prydniprovske, Kherson Oblast.[xvi] These are the first reports that ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating outside of the Chasiv Yar direction, where the division has operated nearly exclusively since April 2023.[xvii] ISW has observed reports that some elements of the 98th VDV Division remain active near Chasiv Yar as recently as October 1, 2025, indicating that this reported Russian redeployment is likely occurring slowly and that the division may be splitting its elements across various sectors of the front.[xviii] It is currently unclear whether the Russian military command would redeploy some or all of the 98th VDV Division from the Chasiv Yar area to the Kherson direction or other areas of the frontline.

The reason for the redeployment of the 98th VDV Division is unclear. The Russian military command may be redeploying the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction to allow it to rest and reconstitute away from active frontline ground operations. ISW has observed Russian redeployments from the Kherson and Sumy directions to the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast, including elements of its relatively elite VDV and naval infantry units, indicating that the primary Russian effort in Fall 2025 is more likely in Donetsk Oblast than in Kherson Oblast.[xix] The 98th VDV Division has been in active combat since April 2023, when it participated in the final seizure of Bakhmut and the Russian efforts to advance from Bakhmut toward and through Chasiv Yar, and this redeployment may indicate that elements of the 98th VDV Division are degraded or have limited combat capability after sustaining two and a half years of offensive operations. The redeployment of elements of the 98th VDV Division may alternatively indicate that the Russian military command intends to reprioritize offensive operations in the Kherson direction, however. This would be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces would have to ford and cross the Dnipro River into unoccupied Kherson Oblast under intense Ukrainian fires — an operation Russian forces have not attempted since Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022. Forces that have been in combat with as little rest as the 98th VDV Division would be ill-equipped for such an undertaking without significant rest. It is possible that the Russian military command intends to redeploy elements of the division slowly to prepare for a future offensive in the Kherson direction after the division has rested and reconstituted, allowing other Russian forces to fight in Russia's current priority efforts in Donetsk Oblast. ISW will continue to monitor for indications that the Russian command is redeploying elements of the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction or any other areas of the front.

Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian energy-focused outlet Seala told Russian state outlet RBK on September 30 that Russian oil refineries are temporarily facing a 38 percent decrease (roughly 338,000 tons per day) in their primary oil refining capacity as of September 28 due to Ukrainian drone strikes, which have struck more than two dozen major oil refineries in Russia since early August 2025.[xx] Seala estimated that Russia's total available capacity for gasoline and diesel fuel production fell by 6 percent in August 2025 and by another 18 percent in September 2025, reaching historic lows. Seala estimated that Ukrainian drone strikes caused approximately 70 percent of downtime in gasoline production as the strikes disabled approximately a quarter of Russia’s oil refining capacity (roughly 236,000 tons per day) by the end of September 2025, and that four more Russian refineries, including two of the top five largest Russian oil refineries, halted production after drone strikes. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the fuel crisis has impacted the Far East and occupied Crimea the hardest, where Russian authorities have banned sales of more than 30 liters of gasoline per customer since the beginning of the week (roughly September 28).[xxi] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on October 1 a limit of 20 liters of gasoline per customer in an effort to mitigate the gasoline shortage.[xxii] Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev noted that Russian oil companies have to wait months for repairs to damaged refineries, as Western sanctions have blocked the sale of equipment and replacement parts on which Russia relies and cannot easily replace with Chinese equivalents. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak outlined to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on September 24 several possible means of alleviating Russia’s desperation for gas, including a zero-rate five percent import customs duty on gasoline imported from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), South Korea, and Singapore through certain checkpoints in the Far East.[xxiii] Novak also reportedly proposed a rule that Russia will only authorize certain companies to supply fuel, which would allow Russia to export approximately 150,000 tons of gasoline from Siberian refineries westward per month to maintain supply balances in central Russia. Novak also reportedly proposed increasing gasoline imports from Belarus from 45,000 tons to 300,000 tons per month. RBK reported that Belarus began exporting gasoline to Russia in September 2025 after a pause that began in Fall 2024.[xxiv]

Russia’s problems with oil refinery capabilities will likely persist amidst more damage to Russian oil refineries. Russian authorities and sources reported on October 1 that there was a large fire at the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, located 700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[xxv] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev claimed on October 1 that the incident is unrelated to a drone attack, and neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources have attributed responsibility for the fire.[xxvi] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike overnight caused a fire at an industrial facility in Verkhnedonsky Raion, Rostov Oblast, and NASA FIRMS data indicates that there was a fire at the Sukhodolnaya Oil Pumping Station in Rostov Oblast.[xxvii]

The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid. Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported on September 30 that the ZNPP has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid since September 23 and is relying on backup diesel generators to maintain its reactor cooling systems.[xxviii] The Ukrainian officials stated that Russian shelling damaged the final operational Ukrainian power line to the ZNPP, and the IAEA stated that the damage occurred about 1.5 kilometers from the ZNPP itself. Damage to the ZNPP's power lines has disconnected the ZNPP from the Ukrainian power grid nine other times since the full-scale invasion prior to September 23, and the current power outage is the longest the ZNPP has ever endured.[xxix] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor in exile Dmytro Orlov stated that one of the diesel generators supporting the ZNPP has failed, as the diesel generators are not designed to operate for such a long period of time.[xxx] Orlov stated that continued Russian shelling of the area prevents Ukrainian authorities from repairing the power line.[xxxi] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that there is no immediate danger to the ZNPP, but that running on the diesel generators is not sustainable.[xxxii] Grossi stated that Ukraine has been ready to repair another power line to the ZNPP that has been disconnected since May 2025, but that the "military situation" has not allowed Ukraine to repair this power line. Russian officials denied the reports of Russian shelling and accused Ukrainian strikes of damaging the power line to the ZNPP.[xxxiii] Greenpeace Ukraine analyzed satellite imagery of damage to the power line since September 23 and assessed that there was no shelling of the power line, suggesting that Russian forces conducted sabotage operations against the power line.[xxxiv]

Russia has been setting conditions to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid for months. Russia has been constructing power lines into occupied southern Ukraine that could connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid, and Russian officials have announced their intention to bring the ZNPP to its full operational capacity under Russian control.[xxxv] Transferring the ZNPP to the Russian power grid requires that the ZNPP remain disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid. The ZNPP's six nuclear reactors have remained in a cold shutdown mode since April 2024 to mitigate the risk of nuclear disaster in wartime conditions, and restarting the ZNPP under conditions of occupation and war would very likely introduce significant risks.[xxxvi] Russia's occupation of the ZNPP has significantly degraded the security of the plant, and Russia's integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid will exacerbate security risks, degrade Ukraine's future power generation capacity, and serve as a tool that Russia can use to legitimize its occupation of Ukraine.[xxxvii]

The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets. The EC announced on October 1 that its Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan program issued Ukraine its ninth tranche of funds worth four billion euros (roughly $4.7 billion) secured by proceeds from frozen Russian revenues.[xxxviii] The EC noted that its overall support to Ukraine is now approaching 178 billion euros (roughly $209 billion). EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 30 that two billion euros (roughly $2.3 billion) of the earmarked funds are for drone production.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.
• Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace.
• The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction.
• Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
• The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid.
• The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast

Previous Updates

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