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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8, 2025
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on November 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction has temporarily slowed but will likely increase again in the coming days as Russian forces extend logistics and bring reinforcements in the area. Geolocated footage published on November 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced into northern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), a relatively small quantity and area of assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction compared to recent days.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized western Rivne (east of Pokrovsk along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway), seized most of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk), and advanced in eastern and southeastern Myrnohrad.[2] One milblogger claimed that small Russian assault groups are approaching the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in eastern Pokrovsk and are fighting in northern Pokrovsk but are struggling to consolidate positions due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 7 that much of Pokrovsk is a contested "gray zone" but noted that Russian forces have forward positions in northern Pokrovsk while elements of the main Russian force grouping have positions in southern Pokrovsk.[4] Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev stated on November 8 that Russian forces do not aim to establish a foothold within Pokrovsk itself but continue efforts to penetrate through the town to its northern outskirts and are dressing as civilians, a resort to perfidy under international law, to do so.[5] Okishev stated that Ukrainian forces partially restored their logistics north of Pokrovsk and transported ammunition into the town.
Ukrainian military sources have indicated in recent days that Russian forces are somewhat slowing down their offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction while waiting for reinforcements and are attempting to establish defenses and extend logistics into southern Pokrovsk.[6] Mashovets reported that Russian forces quickly established strong defenses near Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are attempting to send reinforcements toward Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Krasnyi Lyman and are sending small and large groups toward Krasnyi Lyman.[7] Russian forces will likely increase the tempo of their offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction in the coming days as Russian forces continue establishing defenses and logistics in the town.
Russia launched over 500 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight on November 7 to 8 as it continues its long-range strike campaign against critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 503 drones and missiles, including 25 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts; 10 Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; seven Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; and three Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea.[8] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 458 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 300 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense downed 406 drones and nine missiles, 26 missiles and 52 drones struck 25 locations, and downed debris fell on four locations. The Kirovohrad Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces struck the Kremenchuk Hydroelectric Power Plant in Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast, with nearly 15 drones and two missiles.[9] The Horishneplavnika City Council reported that Russian forces conducted missile strikes against several energy facilities in Horishni Plavni, Poltava Oblast, causing significant damage and power outages in the city.[10] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces struck an energy infrastructure facility in Odesa Oblast, causing fires.[11] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces conducted a combined Geran-2 drone and Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against energy and gas infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, killing a gas company operator.[12]
Ukrainian State-owned company Tsentrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused fires and stopped electricity output at the Zmievska Thermal Power Plant in Slobozhanske, Kharkiv Oblast, and the Trupilska Thermal Power Plant in Ukrainka, Kyiv Oblast.[13] Russian opposition outlet SOTA noted that these two thermal power plants supplied 14 percent of Ukraine’s electricity.[14] Tsentrenergo reported that Russian forces used an unprecedented number of drones and missiles, amounting to several per minute, against the plants on November 7 to 8 and that the strikes destroyed all restoration progress made at the plants after Russian strikes damaged the plants in 2024. Russia has recently increased strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale ahead of winter 2025-2026, in what ISW continues to assess is a Russian effort to degrade Ukraine’s energy security and industrial capacity and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[15]
Russian forces also struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts. Acting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vladyslav Haivanenko reported that Russian strikes killed three civilians and injured 12 others.[16] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Russian missile and drone strikes injured five civilians and damaged residential infrastructure.[17] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts.[18]
Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian strikes against railway infrastructure in Poltava Oblast resulted in several train delays and disrupted power supply to several stations.[19] Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces struck a key railway depot in Hrebinka, Poltava Oblast, which connects Kyiv and Poltava oblasts.[20] ISW recently assessed that Russia has been intensifying its strike campaign against railway infrastructure as part of its battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts aimed at disrupting Ukraine’s use of its intermediate rear area for logistics.[21]
Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Sanchik as Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics on November 8.[22] Sanchik became SMD commander in November 2024.[23] Sanchik previously served as the commander of the 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) from 2020 to 2023 and deputy commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) from 2017 to 2020, but publicly available information on Sanchik's career remains limited.[24] Sanchik is replacing Colonel General Andrei Bulyga, who served as deputy defense minister for logistics since March 2024.[25] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed hope that the appointment of a Russian commander with a good reputation as the deputy defense minister for logistics may spearhead fundamental changes in Russia’s logistics system.[26] The milblogger claimed that Sanchik's experience in various command positions will help with supplies, even though Sanchik lacks a logistics-focused background.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Yuriy Cherevashenko as the commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Air Defense Systems service on November 7.[27] Zelensky tasked Cherevashenko with scaling up the development of Ukraine's unmanned elements in the Air Force, the introduction of drones, and strengthening air defense with the latest weapon systems. Ukraine announced the creation of the Unmanned Air Defense Systems service, which will deploy units equipped with interceptor drones to combat Russian Shahed drones, on September 26.[28] The command-and-control relationships between these units and tactical ground force units, who also have organic tactical air defenses, remain unclear.
Key Takeaways:
- The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction has temporarily slowed but will likely increase again in the coming days as Russian forces extend logistics and bring reinforcements in the area.
- Russia launched over 500 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight on November 7 to 8 as it continues its long-range strike campaign against critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of winter 2025-2026.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Sanchik as Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics on November 8.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Yuriy Cherevashenko as the commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Air Defense Systems service on November 7.
- Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure within Russia on November 7 and 8. Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows explosions in Saratov City, Saratov Oblast, reportedly near the Saratov Oil Refinery, and Russian sources reported Ukrainian drone strikes against Saratov Oblast -- indicating that Ukrainian forces likely struck the refinery.[29] Additional geolocated footage published on November 8 shows an explosion at the Baloshovskaya Electric Substation in Novonikolaevskyi, Volgograd Oblast, which connects the Volga Hydroelectric Power Plant with central Russia.[30] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes left several residential areas of Volgograd Oblast without power.[31] Vologda Oblast Governor Georgy Filimonov reported that Ukrainian forces struck the 750-kilowatt Belozerskaya substation in Vologda Oblast three times but that the strikes did not disrupt power supply.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 8 but did not advance.
Fighting continued in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on November 7 and 8.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[34]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces amplified a Russian servicemember’s claim that Russian forces are suffering heavy losses near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border) due to high desertion rates and a lack of proper training, communication, and radios, while trying to replace encircled elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces).[35] The Russian servicemember claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes are complicating Russian forces’ ability to resupply. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are amassing and consolidating positions on the outskirts of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and are striking Ukrainian fortifications with Molniya fixed-wing drones in preparation for a large assault on Kindrativka.[36] The milblogger criticized the decision to assault Kindrativka, however, as Ukrainian drone strikes have historically hindered Russian assaults in the area.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[37] Drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Stepne (northwest of Sumy City).[38]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 8 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces only retain control of 10 percent of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in 34.7 percent of Vovchansk, however.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on November 7 and 8.[40]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 8.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles near Obukhivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 8 but did not advance.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in the fields west of the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway west of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[42] Ukrainian forces likely did not make this advance recently.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[43] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on November 7 and 8.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk and Osynovo (south of Kupyansk).[45]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment, and elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, reportedly continue to operate in and near Kupyansk.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka on November 7 and 8 but did not advance.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Korovii Yar, Derylove, Yarova, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 7 and 8.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yampil.[49]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) and elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA), including its 237th Tank Regiment and 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Zvanivka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on November 7 and 8.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kostyantynivka near Zaliznyanske and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Illinivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Ivanopillya and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 7 and 8.[52]
The spokesperson of the Ukrainian Proliska humanitarian mission in Donetsk Oblast, Yevhen Tkachev, reported that a Russian fiber-optic drone struck a Proliska car carrying two evacuation workers and two journalists at the entrance to Kostyantynivka on November 8, and that all four passengers survived the strike.[53] Tkachev reported that the car bore the emblem of the humanitarian organization, which evacuates civilians from frontline areas. Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Gorbunov reported on November 7 that two separate Russian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes injured two civilians in a vehicle and on a bicycle, respectively.[54]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[55] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka and Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the Vognetryvnerud Mining Company Quarry No.2 southwest of Toretske and advanced to the southwestern outskirts of Toretske (both east of Dobropillya).[57]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on November 7 and 8.[58]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing their attacks on the Shakhove-Toretske-Sofiivka area.[59] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed back Russian forces to the Hruzke-Kucheriv Yar-Shakhove-Sofiivka line (northeast to southeast of Dobropillya).
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[60]
Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
See topline text for Russian advances and other activity in the Pokrovsk direction.
Russian forces attacked near and in Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka, Krasnyi Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne, Rih, Promin, Myrnohrad, and Hrodivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novohrodivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 7 and 8.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Fedorivka and Rodynske and toward Hryshyne.[62]
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 110th, 114th, and 1st motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near the Zatyshok-Fedorivka-Razine-Krasnyi Lyman area (northeast of Pokrovsk).[63] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Myrnohrad and near Pokrovsk.[64] Tor-M2 air defense system crews of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction, and Molniya-2 fixed-wing drone crews of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk.[65] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.[66] Counter-drone crews of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[67] Drone operators of the Kaira Drone Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on November 7 and 8.[69]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD), seized Vovche (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[70]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 5 shows Ukrainian forces engaging a Russian-occupied building in southern Oleksiivka, indicating that Russian forces previously held positions in northwestern Oleksiivka.[71] ISW is retroactively refining Ukrainian forces positions in northwestern Oleksiivka, as ISW has not observed evidence to indicate a Russian presence in that area of the settlement.
Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; south of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Pryvillya and Yehorivka on November 7 and 8.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff reported fighting toward Ternuvate on November 7 and 8, possibly referring to Ternuvate, Zaporizhia Oblast (southwest of Velykomykhailvika and about 12 kilometers from the current line of contact).[73] ISW has not observed evidence indicating that Russian forces have advanced to such an extent behind the current frontline.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are striking Pysantsi (west of Velykomykhailivka).[74]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Solodke, Nove, and Novouspenivske (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[75]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Uspenivka, Novohryhorivka, Pavlivka, Novovasylivske, and toward Nove, Novouspenivske, and Nove; and east of Hulyaipole near Poltavka on November 8.[76]
Order of Battle: Elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in the seizure of Uspenivka, which ISW assessed Russian forces seized as of November 7.[77]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk on November 7 and 8.[78]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are not operating in the former Kakhovka Reservoir (west of Orikhiv) due to poor terrain.[79] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command recently reported that Russian forces are exploiting dense vegetation in the former reservoir to attack Ukrainian forces near Prymorske.[80] The Kakhovka Reservoir largely dried up following the Russian detonation of the Nova Kakhovka Dam in early June 2023, allowing Russian and Ukrainian forces to traverse difficult terrain that was previously underwater.[81]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on November 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Roadway Bridge, on November 7 and 8.[82]
A Russian milblogger claimed that bad weather and fog are inhibiting Ukrainian drone strikes in Russian-controlled near-rear and operational-rear areas in the Kherson direction.[83]
Order of Battle: Fagot anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) crews of the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the Dnipro River Delta islands.[84]
Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on November 8 that SSO struck an ammunition depot of the 18th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Udachne, Crimea and a S-400 air defense system in occupied Uyutne, Crimea on October 6.[85]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text for Russian drone and missile strikes in Ukraine.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
The Belarusian military is adopting Russian military innovations developed in the war in Ukraine. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage and images on November 4 showing a Belarusian T-72 tank outfitted with an improvised cage armor on the turret and main body, like armor that Russian forces developed in Ukraine to mitigate damage from drone strikes.[86]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1987183397840560473 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/
[2] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68697; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35890; https://t.me/wargonzo/30357
[3] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35890
[4] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02rhH9C2BX5QKocxjiPk2amUNzodNRzXgVUYW6h4hTGkrrUjaf1Q2itTc2KsYfXmtil
[5] https://suspilne dot media/1159324-priznacenna-komanduvaca-bezpilotnih-sistem-ppo-programa-dla-zahistu-prifrontovih-mist-vid-droniv-1354-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1762594734&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/
[7] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02rhH9C2BX5QKocxjiPk2amUNzodNRzXgVUYW6h4hTGkrrUjaf1Q2itTc2KsYfXmtil
[9] https://suspilne dot media/1159324-priznacenna-komanduvaca-bezpilotnih-sistem-ppo-programa-dla-zahistu-prifrontovih-mist-vid-droniv-1354-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1762599482&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://www.facebook.com/pgo.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0FSRsbFnTspsrw4jCcT2cjG8paXAgKukf2PpT5JbFvN6ggC9xLPwEEceWgMDvKzs6l?rdid=YVyfZrQuHuDVpqIj#
[10] https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1159368-u-nic-na-8-listopada-armia-rf-obstrilala-poltavsinu-vnaslidok-raketnih-udariv-znestrumlene-misto-gorisni-plavni/ ; https://www.facebook.com/HorishniPlavniMR/posts/pfbid0UWtpc24MF4qgsPUQm5roQTEdPsLhUdzTbStHXCPdEBPGrPCYEX4k3KcwqSk3dSCEl?rdid=ItLKnFbnXyFKlFoX
[11] https://suspilne dot media/1159324-priznacenna-komanduvaca-bezpilotnih-sistem-ppo-programa-dla-zahistu-prifrontovih-mist-vid-droniv-1354-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1762579357&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/52655
[12] https://suspilne dot media/1159324-priznacenna-komanduvaca-bezpilotnih-sistem-ppo-programa-dla-zahistu-prifrontovih-mist-vid-droniv-1354-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1762590876&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/25657 ; https://t.me/police_kh_region/45591
[13] https://www.facebook.com/PATCentrenergo/posts/pfbid02VobLyRQ2pLEgkazoxaaKnNMn8yimEjbw8p4KTu1HsybNh8GybokXTro9sXCWr6Dvl ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/11/08/stantsii-v-ogne-seychas-generatsii-nol-rabota-tes-kompanii-tsentrenergo-ostanovlena-iz-za-rossiyskogo-udara-po-u ; https://t.me/astrapress/96808 ; https://suspilne dot media/1159716-usi-teploelektrostancii-centrenergo-zupinilisa-pisla-udariv-rf/ ; https://biz.liga dot net/all/tek/novosti/tsentrenergo-polnostyu-ostanovilo-generatsiyu-nochnoi-udar-stal-samym-silnym-s-nachala-voiny
[14] https://t.me/sotaproject/105386
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-updates/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2024
[16] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/25476
[17] https://suspilne dot media/1159324-priznacenna-komanduvaca-bezpilotnih-sistem-ppo-programa-dla-zahistu-prifrontovih-mist-vid-droniv-1354-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1762591755&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/7694
[18] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1987071472255320087 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1987159345969205455 ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/25523 ; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/16806 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/39573
[19] https://suspilne dot media/1159438-cerez-ataku-rf-zatrimuetsa-nizka-poizdiv-ukrzaliznica/ ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7450
[20] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1987132788022317465; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1987124358158958790; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1987120430755553425; https://t.me/truexanewsua/125224
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-updates/
[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/25570297
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Russian20General20Officer20Guide20ISW20May2011202022.pdf; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/sanchyk-aleksandr-semenovych.html
[25] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8192254
[27] https://suspilne dot media/1159308-zelenskij-priznaciv-komanduvaca-bezpilotnih-sistem-ppo/ ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-pogodiv-priznachennya-yuriya-cherevashenka-komandu-101237 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16796
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2025/
[29] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1986981239644168395; https://x.com/VyshnyaOstap/status/1986968558278967801; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1987062086447603974 ; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1987080700911091999 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58271 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/347516; https://t.me/tass_agency/347492
[30] https://t.me/supernova_plus/45273 ; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1987094698998014021
[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/347489
[32] https://t.me/filimonov_official/26704
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30357 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82938
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/82938 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5657
[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/5658
[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/5662
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35853
[38] https://t.me/voin_dv/17608; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1987196227448934658
[39] https://t.me/tass_agency/347483
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19725; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35856; https://t.me/severnnyi/5657; https://t.me/dva_majors/82938
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35856
[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103358; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35867
[43] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1986864754174914855; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1986864758755369156; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10467; https://www.instagram.com/reels/DQwpscaDPt4/
[44] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19725; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35867 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174
[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103409 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58283 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103366
[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103358 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103409 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186152 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103411 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58278 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/25452
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19725
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19725 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30357
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35874
[50] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/21349 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82929 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82948
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35874 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30357
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68697; https://t.me/wargonzo/30357
[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1159552-cilespramovana-ataka-vijska-rf-atakuvali-evakuacijnu-avtivku-proliski-v-kostantinivci/
[54] https://www.facebook.com/sergij.gorbunov.197981/posts/pfbid02oY8gnurNMwe1yUdziPMqwN7batXzs9BiTxJ3FdHXwcwYG9mzUdQJp5utyT5gpGyKl; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1159648-rosijski-vijska-atakuvali-fpv-dronom-velosipedista-u-u-kostantinivci-colovik-zaginuv/
[55] https://t.me/sashakots/57486
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/186176; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14543
[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68697
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68697
[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68697
[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14543
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68696 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82938 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30357 ; https://t.me/rybar/75057 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35890
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68697 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68696
[63] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02rhH9C2BX5QKocxjiPk2amUNzodNRzXgVUYW6h4hTGkrrUjaf1Q2itTc2KsYfXmtil
[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/58284 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103360
[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/58264 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58266
[66] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14544
[67] https://t.me/mod_russia/58291
[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/17602
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174
[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68702 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/103388 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58286 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17599 ; https://t.me/rybar/75053
[71] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/17596 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1987055473905049806
[75] https://t.me/yurasumy/25398
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195; https://t.me/rybar/75053; https://t.me/Valentyn_Manko/137; https://t.me/yurasumy/25398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174
[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/17595; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195; https://t.me/dva_majors/82938; https://t.me/wargonzo/30357
[79] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/30318; https://t.me/Dnepro_Rub/10315
[80] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/
[81] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-18/;
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31195; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31176; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/31174
[83] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/30317; https://t.me/AirlinesVDV/1167
[84] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/11547; https://t.me/mod_russia/58269
[85] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2236; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/08/sso-znyshhyly-v-krymu-puskovu-ustanovku-s-400-triumf-ta-sklad-boyeprypasiv/
[86] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/adopting-russian-experience-belarus-shows-off-its-own-tank-shed/ ; https://t.me/modmilby/51755













