Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on November 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces used weather conditions to exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine's drone-based battlefield defenses in the Novopavlivka direction, highlighting Ukraine's need for traditional weapons systems. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian armored vehicles in northeastern Novopavlivka.[i] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached Novopavlivka's northwestern outskirts during the mechanized assault.[ii] Ukrainian volunteer Serhii Sternenko reported on November 15 that Russian forces took advantage of poor weather conditions to enter Novopavlivka several times with equipment and land infantry.[iii] Sternenko stated that Russian forces set up a pontoon bridge between Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and Dachne (east of Yalta) and moved about 10 pieces of equipment across the Vovcha River.[iv] Sternenko stated that Ukrainian forces detected the Russian forces too late but struck two tanks and five infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Russian milbloggers also reported on Russian forces' use of heavy fog during the assault and claimed that Russian forces were able to cross the pontoon bridge twice.[v] One milblogger noted that Russian forces were able to use the second wave of the attack to send in reinforcements to support the troops that dismounted after the first wave.[vi] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) with conducting the mechanized assault.[vii]

Russian forces have recently been exploiting foggy weather to attack throughout the front, particularly in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[viii] The Novopavlivka sector of the front has been relatively quieter in recent weeks, as Russian forces have been concentrating on offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. Elements of the 41st CAA, whose area of responsibility (AoR) covers the Novopavlivka direction, have notably been supporting elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) on the southern flank of Pokrovsk.[ix] The November 14 company-sized mechanized assault into Novopavlivka after a lull in the area demonstrates how Russian forces are trying to find opportunities to exploit a key weakness in Ukrainian defenses — the inability of Ukrainian drones to effectively function in poor weather conditions like fog and rain. Ukraine has thus far in the war based its defense on drones largely out of necessity. Ukraine's "wall of drones" defensive barrier uses a large number of tactical strike drones and loitering munitions to destroy Russian manpower and equipment on the front line.[x] Ukrainian forces adopted this defensive approach in part to offset manpower and equipment shortages while protecting over 1,200 kilometers of front line from Russian advances. Sparsely held Ukrainian defensive positions have facilitated recent Russian infiltration efforts, and shortages of artillery and other traditional systems have limited Ukrainian forces’ ability to operate when bad weather disrupted some drone operations.[xi] Western provisions of traditional systems like artillery are key to Ukraine's ability to build out a layered defense system that is not dependent on any one type of weapon, such that the defenses are vulnerable and exploitable. Russia's exploitation of this vulnerability further highlights the way that traditional weapons systems are not obsolete in modern warfare.

Ukrainian forces appear to be trying to replicate Russia's battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign on a limited scale. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces conducted an airstrike against the M-30 road that runs between Pokrovsk and Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian near rear).[xii] The corps reported that the airstrike impeded Russian forces from using the route to infiltrate Pokrovsk with light equipment. Geolocated footage of the strike published by the 7th Corps shows that Ukrainian forces struck the M-30 between Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka (just southeast of Pokrovsk).[xiii] Russian forces notably recently advanced into Pokrovsk on motorcycles, buggies, and transport trucks along the M-30 under heavy fog.[xiv] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces reported on November 14 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian transport communications facility and a Russian manpower concentration near Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk in the Russian near rear) with a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb.[xv] A Ukrainian source reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces also conducted a strike with a GBU-62 bomb against a road bridge in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast that Russian forces used for logistics.[xvi]

Russian forces have spent months conducting a strike campaign that achieved partial BAI efforts to shape the battlefield and set conditions for Russia's recent advances in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[xvii] The limited Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and force concentrations are a step toward denying Russia the relative sanctuary that Russian forces have enjoyed in near rear areas.[xviii] A dramatically expanded Ukrainian BAI effort could disrupt the operations of the current Russian offensive approach. Russia's BAI campaign notably began months before the recent intensification of offensive operations on the ground, however, and Ukraine should similarly work to incorporate BAI efforts into its longer-term campaign design.

Russia's large-scale production of glide bombs and Shahed-type drones will continue to facilitate Russia's BAI campaign on the front. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi told Reuters in an article published on November 14 that Russia plans to produce up to 120,000 glide bombs in 2025, including 500 of the longer-range glide bomb variants that can fly up to 200 kilometers.[xix] Reuters noted that the 120,000 figure includes both new glide bomb production and the modernization of existing unguided bombs into guided versions. Skibitskyi stated that Russia is working to further modify the bombs to fly up to 400 kilometers. Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces have recently been launching 200 to 250 glide bombs daily — a sharp rise from an average of 170 per day in October 2025. Skibitskyi noted that Ukrainian forces can shoot down glide bombs, but that the quantity Russia is currently using is "enormous." Skibitskyi also reported that Russia will make about 70,000 long-range drones in 2025, including 30,000 Shahed-type drones. Skibitskyi's report is largely in line with GUR Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Yusov's statement in early September 2025 that Russia can produce 2,700 Shahed-type drones per month.[xx] ISW observed that Russia began using modified glide bombs with extended ranges of 100 to 180 kilometers against Ukrainian cities in October 2025.[xxi] Glide bombs have been integral to Russia's BAI campaign in the Kursk, Kostyantynivka, Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[xxii] Russian forces have also begun to use Shahed drones to strike targets in the immediate and near rear areas as Russia's Shahed production increased dramatically over Spring-Summer 2025. Russian forces have augmented their tactical drone campaign against Ukrainian ammunition depots and fortified defensive structures with guided glide bombs and Shahed drone strikes as these weapons deliver larger payloads than tactical drones, allowing Russian forces to target fortified structures.

North Korea continues to provide military support to Russia and may be preparing to provide Russia with drones in the future. Skibitskyi told Reuters that Russian forces were able to maintain their rate of fire on the battlefield in 2024 thanks to artillery shell shipments from North Korea, but that North Korean stocks have run low, such that North Korea halved the number of shells it sent to Russia in 2025.[xxiii] Skibitskyi stated that North Korea has sent a total of 6.5 million shells to Russia since 2023. North Korea reportedly did not deliver any ammunition to Russia in September 2025 but resumed shipments in October 2025. Russia reportedly had to ship about half of the delivered shells to plants for improvements since the shells were old. Skibitskyi noted that North Korea has started mass production of short-range first-person view (FPV) drones and medium-range strike drones on North Korean territory. ISW observed reports on November 14 that Russia is planning for roughly 12,000 North Korean workers to join the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan by the end of 2025 to work at Russia’s factory producing Shahed-type drones — likely in addition to the 25,000 workers that North Korea was reportedly considering sending to the ASEZ in June 2025.[xxiv] Thousands of North Koreans learning how to assemble Shaheds will offer North Korea valuable lessons about large-scale production of modern long-range strike drones, and North Korea may be cooperating with Russia to produce various types of drones in North Korea for Russia in the face of dwindling North Korean artillery shell stores.

Russian forces continue their BAI campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to facilitate battlefield gains. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba told The Guardian in an article published on November 15 that Russian forces have increased their strikes against Ukraine’s rail system threefold since July 2025.[xxv] Kuleba noted that Russian forces have struck railway infrastructure 800 times since January 2025, damaging more than 3,000 objects and totaling one billion dollars' worth of damage. Kuleba added that Russia’s strike campaign has three objectives: to destroy Ukrainian logistics in the south to prevent the movement of goods such as Ukrainian grain to seaports; to disrupt rail traffic to cut off frontline oblasts; and to ”destroy everything” in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Head of Ukraine's railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia, Oleksandr Pertsovskyi, added that Russian forces use Shahed-type drones to target individual locomotives. The station head of a rail station in Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces targeted Lozova as it is a major junction that connects to Dnipro City, Slovyansk, Poltava City, and Kharkiv City. ISW previously reported that Russian forces have been using modified Shahed-type drones equipped with a thermal imaging camera and a video stream to pursue moving targets, such as trains, in real time in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.[xxvi] Russia recently intensified its BAI efforts against rail infrastructure to disrupt Ukraine’s use of its intermediate rear area for logistics, particularly along the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway (about 20 to 35 kilometers from the frontline) and T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway (about 14 to 30 kilometers from the front line) — both critical arteries that supply Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[xxvii]

Russia's long-range drone and missile strike tactics are precisely targeting gas infrastructure in Ukraine during the heating season. Ukrainian state-owned gas enterprise Naftogaz Chief Executive Serhii Koretskyi told the New York Times (NYT) in an article published on November 15 that Russia began to strike Ukrainian gas infrastructure in 2025 after Ukraine halted the transport of Russian gas to Europe on January 1, 2025.[xxviii] Koretskyi reported that Naftogaz spent the summer of 2025 repairing gas infrastructure that Russian forces struck at the end of Winter 2024-2025 when Russia knocked out about 40 percent of Ukraine's gas production capacity. The NYT noted that Russian forces renewed these strikes in October 2025, and a European official source stated that Russian forces struck Naftogaz’s facilities seven times in October 2025, knocking out 60 percent of Ukraine's gas production capacity. Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia knows the location of Ukraine's gas infrastructure as it dates back to Soviet times. Koretskyi noted that Russian missile and drone strikes cannot reach Ukraine's underground gas storage facilities, but that Russia is striking the compressor pumps that pump the gas from underground and the pipelines that distribute gas throughout the country. Russian forces' targeting of specific types of Ukrainian gas infrastructure demonstrates the sophistication of their strike campaigns with the explicit goal of complicating living conditions for Ukrainian civilians in the wintertime.

Russia appears to be setting conditions to deploy involuntarily called up reservists to occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to commit them to combat operations. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported on November 15 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) gathered the first group of involuntarily called up active reservists as part of Russia’s recent initiative to covertly mobilize and deploy reservists to protect critical infrastructure.[xxix] Kharchenko stated that the Russian MoD sent the active reservists to training centers to train for two months. Russia's recent law on active reservists calls for their deployment to areas of Russia, and ISW continues to assess that Russia may attempt to send active reservists to areas of occupied Ukraine as the Kremlin defines the four illegally annexed oblasts in Ukraine as part of Russia.[xxx] Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on November 10 that Russia plans to use reservists in oblasts that border Ukraine to combat Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, evacuate populations, and support “counterterrorism” operations; and may use this legal language to deploy active reservists to areas of occupied Ukraine that border unoccupied oblasts in Ukraine.[xxxi]

Russian forces continue to boast about executing Ukrainian servicemembers. The far-right Russian paramilitary unit Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group acknowledged on its Telegram channel on November 15 that it executed three Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of the front.[xxxii] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that Rusich Group leader Alexei Milchakov — who is a self-proclaimed Nazi — is serving within the 417th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[xxxiii] ISW last observed reports of the battalion operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late October 2025.[xxxiv] Butusov reported that the execution occurred near Pokrovsk, however, but noted that Russian milbloggers have complained that Milchakov and the Rusich Group do not participate in combat operations but engage in propaganda activities in the rear. The Rusich Group's public acknowledgement of its war crimes is in line with ISW's long-held assessment that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[xxxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces used weather conditions to exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine's drone-based battlefield defenses in the Novopavlivka direction, highlighting Ukraine's need for traditional weapons systems.
• Ukrainian forces appear to be trying to replicate Russia's battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign on a limited scale.
• Russia's large-scale production of glide bombs and Shahed-type drones will continue to facilitate Russia's BAI campaign on the front.
• North Korea continues to provide military support to Russia and may be preparing to provide Russia with drones in the future.
• Russian forces continue their BAI campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to facilitate battlefield gains.
• Russia's long-range drone and missile strike tactics are precisely targeting gas infrastructure in Ukraine during the heating season.
• Russia appears to be setting conditions to deploy involuntarily called up reservists to occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to commit them to combat operations.
• Russian forces continue to boast about executing Ukrainian servicemembers.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City overnight.[xxxvi] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the refinery produces A-92/95/98/100 gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, liquefied gases, and other oil refining products, including an average of 840,000 tons of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year. Footage posted on November 15 reportedly shows explosions and fires at the refinery.[xxxvii] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed on November 15 that Russian air defense and electronic warfare downed 25 drones over the oblast overnight and that falling drone debris started a fire at an unspecified business.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck the refinery, however, and criticized Malkov for his allegations about falling debris.[xxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on November 14 and 15.[xl]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 15 that Russian military command partially relieved encircled elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), but that there are still supply issues and Russian command refuses to give orders to withdraw.[xli] The milblogger claimed that the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment continues to send wounded soldiers to attack in Bezsalivka and threatens any servicemembers who refuse the order.[xlii]

Order of Battle: First-person view drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Nova Sich (north of Sumy City).[xliii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 15 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in western Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xliv] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk on November 14 and 15.[xlv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Vovchansk.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 600 meters toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on November 14 and 15.[xlviii]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces conducted Geran-2 strikes on Ukrainian positions near Mykhailivka (just northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xlix]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Khatnie.[l]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions near the Pivdenna railway southwest of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[li]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[lii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk toward Dvorichanske and Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Kurylivka, and Stepova Novoselivka on November 14 and 15.[liii] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within and near Kupyansk itself and near Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk), Nechvolodivka (west of Kupyansk), and Osynovo (south of Kupyansk).[liv]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces are clearing the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk, eliminating Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and severing the main Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Oskil River on the town's northern outskirts.[lv] The commander stated that it has become difficult for Russian groups to infiltrate Kupyansk, such that the Russian presence in the town has significantly decreased. The commander stated that there was no evidence that Russian forces infiltrated the town on November 14 but acknowledged that adverse weather conditions like fog and rain reduce Ukrainian forces' ability to reconnoiter the area with drones.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions southwest of Stepova Novoselivka.[lvi] Drone operators and other elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Borova itself; north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka, Novoyehorivka, Tverdokhlibove and Olhivka on November 14 and 15.[lviii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the eastern outskirts of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[lix]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, and Shandryholove, and toward Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 14 and 15.[lx]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched an unspecified strike on Slovyansk, resulting in power outages.[lxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[lxii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) and within Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; south of Siversk near Zvanivka and Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and Vasyukivka on November 14 and 15.[lxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating south of Siversk.[lxv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka).[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske and Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylikva, Novomarkove, and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 14 and 15.[lxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne and Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka).[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxix] Elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[lxxi]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on November 14 and 15.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: Kamikaze drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in Shakhove.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the northern outskirts of and in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxiv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske, and toward Serhiivka on November 14 and 15.[lxxv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the outskirts of Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne.[lxxvi]

The Russian MoD claimed that drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies maintain fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket.[lxxvii]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxviii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic s [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[lxxix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances.

Russian forces attacked within Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Dachne, and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on November 14 and 15.[lxxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Velykomykhailivka.[lxxxi]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; southwest of Velykomykhailivka, near Hai, and Novooleksandrivka; and west of Velykomykhailivka toward Kolomiitsi and Tykhe on November 14 and 15.[lxxxii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 15 shows Russian forces raising flags in Yablukove (northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[lxxxiii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Yablukove.[lxxxiv]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on November 15 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Novovasylivske (northeast of Hulyaipole) after Russian forces destroyed all shelters and fortifications in the settlement.[lxxxv] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces continue attempts to penetrate the Ukrainian rear, including in areas near Vesele.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vesele and toward Zelenyi Hai (both east of Hulyaipole).[lxxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka; north of Hulyaipole near Yehorivka, Nechaivka, and Danylivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rivnopillya, Solodke, Pryvilne, Yablukove, Zlahoda, and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai and Vesele on November 14 and 15.[lxxxvii]

A Russian milblogger amplified a Russian platoon commander’s claim that Russian small groups took advantage of poor weather conditions and fog to infiltrate into Danylivka as the fog obscured the movement.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Danylivka.[lxxxix]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Stepove, and Prymorske on November 14 and 15.[xc]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[xci] Sappers of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xcii]

Ukraine’s Energoatom State Enterprise reported on November 14 that the occupied Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost power to its Dniprovska external transmission line, which threatened to cause blackouts at ZNPP.[xciii]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian base in occupied Tokmak (southwest of Orikhiv in the Russian rear).[xciv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge, on November 15 but did not advance.[xcv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Phobos drone group (18th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[xcvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the Tambov Oblast airspace and 135 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 80 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[xcvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles and 91 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that one missile and 41 drones struck 13 locations and that downed debris fell on four locations.

Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported on November 14 that Russian forces launched over 1,500 missiles and 2,000 strike drones against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in four massive strikes in October and early November 2025.[xcviii] Ukrenergo stated that Russian forces are targeting electricity generation facilities, transmission and distribution facilities, and gas infrastructure. Ukrenergo Chairperson Vitaly Zaichenko added that Russian forces are targeting power plants, high-voltage substations, and distribution network facilities. Zaichenko stated that Russian forces are launching an "enormous" number of weapons at each target.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.