Ukraine Invasion Updates, August 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 31, 2025

The Kremlin is pursuing a multi-pronged informational effort aimed at deterring Western support for Ukraine and undermining European participation in the peace process. The Kremlin has recently been intensifying three rhetorical lines aimed at influencing Western decision-making in the Kremlin's favor: accusing European states of prolonging the war in Ukraine, levying nuclear threats against Western states, and claiming that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Kremlin officials, most notably Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev, implied that European states seek to prolong the war in Ukraine in an effort to reinject this long-held Russian narrative back into the Western information space to undermine US trust in European governments.[1] The Kremlin often leverages Dmitriev to advocate for Russia's interests in the West, particularly involving the peace process in Ukraine and sanctions, on English-language platforms and media outlets.[2] Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev criticized French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on August 31, regarding France's and Germany's involvement in US efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[3] Medvedev claimed that Merz and Macron have "forgotten the lessons" of the Second World War and that "things could end up like they did in 1945 – [Macron and Merz] too may end up being identified by their teeth." Medvedev is evoking the memory of US atomic bombs to threaten France and Germany for supporting Ukraine in the peace process. Medvedev also claimed that Russian advances are "bad news" for Macron and Merz. These various rhetorical lines seek to bolster the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s recently intensified effort to falsely portray Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable.[4] The MoD attempted to use large amounts of qualitative data to make claims about Russian advances – data and claims which ISW assesses are inflated.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD for exaggerating its battlefield successes. Russian milbloggers heavily criticized Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's August 30 claims that Russian forces seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025 and rejected Gerasimov's claim that Russian forces have seized half of Kupyansk.[5] The milbloggers characterized Gerasimov's figures as a "very big exaggeration" and asked which elements of the Russian military command structure are feeding false reports to the Russian high command. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces had gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and seized 130 settlements between March 1 and August 30.[6]

The Kremlin is intensifying these information efforts because its territorial gains remain disproportionately limited and slow relative to the high losses incurred. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Russian forces incurred 210,000 personnel casualties in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts from January to August 2025, an average of 26,250 casualties per month.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered a total of 290,000 personnel casualties throughout the entire theater from January to August 2025, an average of 36,250 casualties per month. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on August 29 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) suggests that at least 93,000 Russian military personnel died in 2024 — almost twice as many as in 2023 (about 50,000), and estimated using a predictive model that at least 56,000 Russian soldiers have died since the start of 2025.[8] Russia's gains have been largely gradual and creeping for many months, and Russia's rate of advance is incredibly slow under the norms of modern mechanized warfare.[9] Any assessment of Russia's battlefield performance and strength must examine both the tempo of advance and the resulting losses to make those gains.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2025

The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces have seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized 210 square kilometers and 13 settlements just in northern Sumy Oblast — likely also since March 2025. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces occupy 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 79 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 76 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 74 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. Gerasimov additionally claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk and seized 10 settlements in the Lyman direction since March 2025: Myrne, Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Lypove, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Serednie.[2] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized five settlements in the Velykomykhailivka direction since March 2025: Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, and Zaporizske.

ISW assesses that Gerasimov is inflating most of his claims. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and seized 130 settlements since March 1. Gerasimov’s claims notably inflate Russian gains by roughly 1,200 square kilometers and 19 settlements. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained 212 square kilometers in northern Sumy Oblast, but only occupy nine settlements in northern Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces occupy roughly 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 76.7 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 73.2 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 73 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces have only seized 6.3 percent of Kupyansk and that Russian forces have not seized all of Myrne, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Kolodyazi, Serednie, Vorone, Sichneve, or Komyshuvakha. Gerasimov is not the first senior Russian military official in recent days to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov similarly claimed on August 29 that Russian forces are currently seizing 600 to 700 square kilometers per month, but ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced only 440 to 500 kilometers per month in June, July, and August 2025.[3] The Kremlin is likely attempting to influence Western policymaking by creating the false impression that Russian advances and victory are inevitable. The Kremlin appears to be trying to use large amounts of quantitative data to create the false impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield. The Kremlin is trying to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals on the battlefield, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine.

The Kremlin's presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia's advances — painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on August 29 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) suggests that at least 93,000 Russian military personnel died in 2024 — almost twice as many as in 2023 (about 50,000).[4] The outlets used a predictive model to estimate that at least 56,000 Russian soldiers had died since the start of 2025. The outlets caveated that the RND data is imperfect for assessing Russian losses as relatives of deceased have at least 180 days to open an inheritance case for dead or presumed-dead Russian soldiers, so the last six months' worth of data (since about February 2025) is significantly incomplete. The outlets stated that the number of inheritance cases rose to 2,000 per week by mid-2025. There was a sharp increase in the second half of 2024 of Russian court cases recognizing missing persons as dead (including but not limited to missing in action [MIA] Russian soldiers whom the court deemed killed in action [KIA]). The outlets found that there was only an increase of cases involving missing persons in the RND since mid-2024 among men — not women — a phenomenon that the outlets stated can only be consistent with an increase in fatality rates in the war.

Russian forces have been suffering from especially high casualties since Winter 2024, and these losses have come at disproportionately small territorial gains.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia's high losses are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.[6] Russia's gains have been largely gradual and creeping for many months, and Russia's rate of advance is incredibly slow under the norms of modern mechanized warfare. Russian forces have been using light motorized vehicles (such as buggies, ATVs, and motorcycles) and infiltration tactics to make gains across the front, but Russia's rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace.[7] Russian forces have also not been able to consolidate and exploit their infiltrations, such as the recent penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[8] Any assessment of Russia's battlefield performance and strength must examine both the tempo of advance and the resulting losses to make those gains. The Kremlin’s presentation of likely inflated territorial gain statistics without critical context for the losses for those gains is likely an attempt to manipulate perceptions about Russia’s military performance and buttress a longstanding Kremlin narrative that Russia’s victory on the battlefield is inevitable. It is not. 

Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai and 37 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast, the Black Sea, and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 537 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatlovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 510 drones; six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; and 32 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 24 drones struck seven locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 21 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck a residential building in Zaporizhzhia City, killing at least one civilian and injuring dozens.[10] Zelensky reported that Russian drones and missiles struck primarily civilian infrastructure in Volyn, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the Russian strike on Kyiv City lasted 10 hours and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure.[11] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspline reported that the strike damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russia used the lead-up to the August 15 Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles and conducted more limited strikes against Ukraine to falsely present itself as a good-faith negotiator to the US administration.[13] Russia will likely escalate its strikes against Ukraine in the coming weeks to leverage its replenished missile and drone stockpiles and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter.[14]

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree on August 29 abolishing the Presidential Administration's Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Department for Cross-Border Cooperation, instead creating the Department for Strategic Cooperation.[15] Kremlin Presidential Administration Deputy Head Dmitry Kozak supervised both these departments prior to their dissolution. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on August 29, citing two sources close to the Presidential Administration and another source in the office of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug, that Kozak is a candidate to become the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug.[16] Two additional sources indicated to Vedomosti that there are discussions within the Kremlin about Kozak's resignation from his Presidential Administration post — effectively pushing Kozak out of the Kremlin and Putin's inner circle. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after he advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia’s security services.[17] Kozak had been one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine and Moldova before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko after February 2022.[18] Reports indicating that the Kremlin is preparing to push an established senior Kremlin official from his position after expressing a desire to end the war in Ukraine are further indicators that the Kremlin has no plans to end the war, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has explicitly stated since the August 15 Alaska summit.[19]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian elements, including from the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Special Operations Forces (SSO), conducted drone strikes against the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast and the Krasnodar Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Syzran Refinery can produce 8.5 million tons of gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, fuel oil, and bitumen per year and that the Krasnodar Refinery can produce three million tons of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel per year. The General Staff reported that there was a fire at the Syzran Refinery and numerous explosions at the Krasnodar Refinery. Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows a fire at Krasnodar Refinery.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows a fire at Syzran Refinery.[22] The Krasnodar Krai Operation Headquarters claimed on August 30 that drone debris damaged a processing unit at Krasnodar Refinery and caused a 300-square meter fire at the enterprise.[23] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[24]

A Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) source reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on August 30 that the GUR destroyed a Russian explosives warehouse in Tula Oblast near the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant, which produces pyroxylin powder for small arms ammunition, artillery systems, and rocket engines.[25]

Russian Investigative Committee Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin will stay in his current position for another year, following reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin was considering moving Bastrykin to a new position. Russian President Vladimir Putin extended on August 30 Bastrykin's term as the chairperson of the Investigative Committee until August 27, 2026.[26] Bastrykin was reportedly a candidate to become the chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, but refused the position during a closed-door meeting with Putin.[27] Bastrykin reportedly asked Putin to remain in his current position for another year.

An unknown assailant shot and killed former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in Lviv City on August 30. The Ukrainian National Police reported on August 30 that an unidentified shooter killed Parubiy in Lviv City.[28] Sources reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the shooter shot Parubiy eight times, was wearing a Glovo delivery service uniform, and fled the scene on an electric bike.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities are investigating the murder.[30]

A Russian servicemember recently murdered an elderly Ukrainian civilian in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian National Guard's 1st Azov Corps reported that a soldier of the Russian 95th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) murdered an unarmed Ukrainian man standing in his yard in southeastern Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and published footage of the murder.[31] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that "intentionally direct attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law.[32] Russian soldiers have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in Ukraine as part of the wider military modus operandi.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable.
• The Kremlin's presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia's advances — painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield.
• Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska.
• The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia
• Russian Investigative Committee Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin will stay in his current position for another year following reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin was considering moving Bastrykin to a new position.
• An unknown assailant shot and killed former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in Lviv City on August 30.
• A Russian servicemember recently murdered an elderly Ukrainian civilian in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2025

Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in order to stall for a planned Fall 2025 offensive, among other things. A German source with insider knowledge told Reuters that Ukrainian officials warned German officials on August 13 that Ukrainian intelligence assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin planned to use the Alaska Summit to "play for time" ahead of a potential Russian offensive in October or November 2025.[i] This report is consistent with recent Ukrainian warnings of Russian efforts to prepare for renewed offensives in the future, though it is not yet clear where Russian forces may focus their main effort in Fall 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that Russia may transfer 15,000 troops to the Zaporizhia direction, 7,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction, and 5,000 troops to the Novopavlivka direction to intensify offensive operations in these areas in the near future.[ii] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview published on August 12 that Russian forces planned to achieve all their objectives near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk — presumably seizing the entirety of these towns — by the end of August or start of September 2025.[iii] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces postponed their initial plan to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by August 1 to December 31, 2025, and that Russian forces increased strikes against Kherson City in accordance with plans to do so. Russian forces notably took advantage of the August 15 Alaska Summit to intensify ongoing offensive operations in certain areas of the theater, such as conducting an infiltration operation near Dobropillya, and to stockpile drones and missiles that Russian forces used to strike Kyiv and inflict heavy civilian casualties overnight on August 27 to 28.[iv] Reports that Russian forces are still planning for a Fall 2025 offensive support ISW's long-term assessment and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's recent statements that the Kremlin's war aims in Ukraine have not changed.[v]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave a major speech at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on August 29. Belousov gave an update on the ten priority directions for the Russian MoD.  Belousov also discussed Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian gains in recent weeks. Belousov claimed on August 29 that Russian forces seized roughly 300 to 400 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory per month at the beginning of 2025 but that Russian forces are currently seizing roughly 600 to 700 square kilometers per month.[vi] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized roughly 426.85 square kilometers of territory in January 2025, 310.67 square kilometers in February 2025, 193.19 square kilometers in March 2024, 173.79 square kilometers in April 2025, 499.28 kilometers in May 2025, 465.80 square kilometers in June 2025, 445.88 square kilometers in July 2025, and about 500 square kilometers thus far in August 2025. Russian advances in August 2025 are far below Belousov’s claims. Belousov’s statement also ignores that Russian forces are making these gains in open fields and areas with minimal fortifications, through failed infiltration operations such as those east and northeast of Dobropillya, and at heavy personnel losses.[vii] Ukrainian General Staff reporting about Russian personnel casualties thus indicates that Russian forces suffered an average of 938 personnel casualties per day thus far in August 2025.[viii] Belousov stated that 97 percent of wounded in action (WIA) servicemembers return to the frontlines “after being wounded,” which is consistent with reports that the Russian military command continues to send injured Russian personnel on attritional, infantry-led assaults.[ix]

Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to produce light vehicles over heavy armored vehicles, reflecting Russian battlefield tactics since winter 2024–2025. Belousov claimed that the Russian MoD procured and delivered 22,725 motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies to the frontlines and plans to deliver an additional 12,186 light vehicles to Russian forces along the frontlines by the end of August 2025.[x] ISW previously observed reports from unspecified Russian military sources that claimed that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in 2024 and intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other light vehicles in 2025.[xi] Russian forces are increasingly fielding light vehicles including motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies in lieu of heavy armored vehicles such as tanks due to their maneuverability and cheap cost relative to armored vehicles, which Ukrainian drone operations threaten.[xii] Russian forces have not implemented adequate protection for armored vehicles and tanks against Ukrainian drone strikes and Russia faces declining tank and armored vehicle stockpiles.[xiii]

Belousov stated that Russia continues to focus on developing its Unmanned Systems Forces and drone production capacity. Belousov stated that Russian forces are focused on integrating elements of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces units into the wider Russian forces and noted that the MoD must still augment logistics and repairs, implement faster training of drone operators, and better staff unmanned systems units.[xiv] The Russian MoD launched a coordinated effort in August 2024 to create a centralized separate service for unmanned systems, likely to centralize the MoD’s control over informal specialized drone detachments and unmanned systems procurement.

Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is expanding its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment likely as part of wider efforts to augment Russia’s administrative capacity to handle conscription and mobilization processes. Belousov noted that the MoD continues implementing a myriad of digital changes to streamline administrative processes for Russian personnel, including onboarding new servicemembers, receiving feedback and appeals from Russian servicemembers, and digitizing the application process and issuance of combat veteran status.[xv] Belousov highlighted that the MoD completed the State System of Unified Military Registration, which is a “unified digital environment” for the MoD.[xvi] Russia has focused on digitizing elements of the conscription and mobilization process since the partial involuntary reserve call-up in September 2022 and has digitalized aspects of this process including issuing digital draft summons for Russian conscripts.[xvii]  Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov introduced a bill in late July 2025 that would facilitate Russia’s ability to process mobilized personnel throughout the year rather than only during the semi-annual reserve call-ups, allowing Russia to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia’s ability to conduct large-scale involuntary call-ups of conscripts and reservists.[xviii]

ISW will cover Belousov’s speech in greater detail in a forthcoming Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations report.

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 29 that GUR forces struck a Russian Buyan-M radar system belonging to an S-400 air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Crimea overnight on August 28 to 29.[xix] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), struck a Russian diesel fuel pumping station near Naytopovychi, Bryansk Oblast.[xx] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the station pumps diesel fuel through Russia’s main oil product pipelines, including for Russian forces, and has a pumping capacity of roughly 10.5 million tons per year. Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on August 28 that unspecified actors, implied to be pro-Ukrainian, planted and remotely detonated explosives under railway fuel tanks at the Tver City railway station located between Moscow and St. Petersburg and that the explosion caused a massive fire.[xxi] The sources stated that the Tver railway junction is a hub that Russia uses to supply its army with fuel and lubricants, ammunition, and personnel. Geolocated footage published on August 28 and Russian opposition outlet Astra clarified that Ukrainian drones struck a crude distillation unit, a liquefied gas rack, a liquified gas pipeline, a gasoline pipeline, a diesel fuel storage tank, and other equipment at the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast during a strike on August 28.[xxii] Astra reported that 28 Ukrainian drones struck the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery and forced the refinery to cease operations.

Ukraine’s ongoing strikes campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia. Sources told Reuters on August 29 that damage from Ukrainian strikes on the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast overnight on August 23 to 24 will force the port’s oil export terminal to operate at about half its usual capacity at around 350,000 barrels per day in September 2025.[xxiii] Attacks against Russian rail-transported fuel shipments also may exacerbate supply problems.  Russian business outlet Kommersant noted on August 21 that rail-transported fuel also causes supply logistics problems as fuel tanks can take two to three months to reach their destination railway station and then stand idle for several weeks before reaching their intended oil depots.[xxiv] Ukraine’s continued strikes are evidently having an impact on Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages and causing price spikes that will likely push over inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[xxv]

US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York City on August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, including at the level of heads of state. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on August 29 that he and Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsia met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff and emphasized Ukraine’s readiness to end the war.[xxvi] Yermak noted that Ukraine welcomes all US-proposed peace initiatives and efforts to end the war and that Ukraine is ready for direct negotiations at the level of heads of state.[xxvii]

The US State Department approved three Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of aviation ammunition, Starlink services, and Patriot air defense system support to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on August 28 that the US State Department approved an FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $825 million that includes up to 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) air-launched missiles and 3,350 navigation systems equipped with modules equipped with anti-spoofing modules, weapons components and spare parts, support equipment, weapons software and support equipment, technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and logistics and transportation support.[xxviii] The DCSA reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and US Foreign Military Funding are funding this FMS to Ukraine. The DSCA announcement confirmed an August 24 report from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that the United States had approved the sale of the 3,350 ERAMs for Ukraine.[xxix] The DCSA announced on August 29 that the US State Department approved another FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $150 million that includes an extension of Starlink terminal support services and a third FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $179 million that includes Patriot air defense system spare parts, maintenance, and related equipment and technical support.[xxx]

Russian forces recently executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 29 that it opened an investigation into Russian forces who brutally tortured and executed seven Ukrainian POWs in a basement near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast in August 2025, and attempted to kill an eighth Ukrainian POW who survived the execution attempt.[xxxi] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne detailed how the surviving Ukrainian POW crawled to safety for five days after the executions and noted that the POW had to write his account of the executions by hand because the injury Russian forces inflicted prevented him from verbally speaking.[xxxii] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders including battlefield commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in order to stall for a planned Fall 2025 offensive, among other things.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave a major speech at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on August 29 and gave an update on the ten priority directions for the Russian MoD. Belousov also discussed Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian gains in recent weeks.
• Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to produce light vehicles over heavy armored vehicles, reflecting Russian battlefield tactics since Winter 2024–2025.
• Belousov stated that Russia continues to focus on developing its Unmanned Systems Forces and drone production capacity.
• Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is expanding its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment, likely as part of wider efforts to augment Russia’s administrative capacity to handle conscription and mobilization processes.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s ongoing strikes campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia
• US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York City on August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, including at the level of heads of state.
• The US State Department approved a $825 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of aviation ammunition and related equipment to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 28, 2025

Russia killed at least 21 civilians, including children, and damaged civilian infrastructure and European diplomatic facilities during the second largest strike of the war thus far and the largest strike since the August 15 Alaska Summit on the night of August 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that overnight on August 27 to 28 Russian forces launched a total of 629 drones and missiles at Ukraine, including 598 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities, Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Hvardivske, Crimea; two Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from over Lipetsk and Voronezh oblasts; nine Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Voronezh oblasts; and 20 Kh-101 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense forces shot down and suppressed 563 Shahed-type and decoy drones; one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile; seven Iskander-M/MN-23 ballistic missiles; and 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles. Drones and missiles impacted in 13 locations throughout Ukraine, and drone and missile debris fell on 26 locations. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russia used jet-powered Geran-3 (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-238 drone) in strikes on Kyiv City.[2]

The August 27 to 28 strikes primarily targeted Kyiv City. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Tymur Tkachenko reported that Russian drones and missiles struck over 20 locations throughout Kyiv City and caused significant damage to residential buildings throughout the city.[3] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko reported that a direct missile strike on a residential building in Darnytskyi Raion, Kyiv City, killed 12 people, including four children.[4] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that as of 20:40 local time on August 28, the death-toll in Kyiv City had risen to 21.[5] Security camera footage shows two Russian missiles consecutively striking Zhylianska Street in Kyiv City, damaging residential buildings, the European Union (EU) diplomatic missile building, and the British Council building.[6] The British Council and the EU delegation to Ukraine both confirmed severe damage to their respective buildings in Kyiv City, and the European Commission and the United Kingdom have both summoned the Russian envoys to Brussels and London.[7] Russian forces hit a US-civilian owned enterprise in Zakarpattia Oblast during its last massive strike series on August 20 to 21, which ISW assessed at the time was likely part of a wider Russian effort to discourage Ukraine's allies from investing in Ukraine. The August 27 to 28 strikes on British and European diplomatic facilities was likely intended to generate a similar impact and discourage Europe's continued support for Ukraine at a time when the United States and Europe are working closely to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine in a future peace settlement.[8] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg condemned Russia's strikes on civilian and diplomatic infrastructure in Kyiv City as a threat to the peace that US President Donald Trump is currently pursuing.[9] Russia also targeted transportation infrastructure in Vinnytsia Oblast on the night of August 27–28. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russia struck train cars of the Intercity+ high-speed train fleet and a railway junction in Kozyatyn, Vinnystia Oblast, causing a massive power outage that impacted railways throughout Ukraine.[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Kozyatyn is "the most important railway junction in Ukraine" and called for Russian forces to strike more Ukrainian transportation nodes.[11]

The August 27 to 28 strike series, which was the largest since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska, supports ISW's assessment that Russia used the lead-up to the Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles, launching fewer and smaller strikes to present itself to the US administration as a good-faith negotiator.[12] Russia is likely to escalate strikes against in Ukraine in the coming weeks to take advantage of the missile and drone stockpile it accrued in the weeks leading up to Alaska, and appears to be resuming its wider campaign to target Ukraine's infrastructure before the fall and winter to undermine Ukraine's will to continue fighting against Russian aggression.[13] Russian strike packages will likely continue to increasingly inflict civilian causalities as Russia scales up the size and type of munitions in its strike packages.

Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign targeting Russia’s oil refineries is contributing to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 28 that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted a drone strike against Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oils, and solvents, and has a processing volume of seven million tons per year. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces, the Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai, just south of Krasnodar City. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Afipsky Oil Refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital role in providing fuel to the Russian military. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on August 28 that the Kuibyshev and Afipsky oil refineries are key to Russia's war machine.[15]

The Russian government announced on August 27 that it will extend its ban on gasoline exports, which was set to expire on August 31, to September 30 for gasoline producers and to October 31 for non-producers in an attempt to stabilize the domestic fuel market.[16] Russia struggled to keep up with domestic demand for gasoline even before recent Ukrainian strikes and has placed intermittent bans on the export of gasoline since 2022, but recent Ukrainian strikes have exacerbated gasoline shortages and caused a spike in gasoline prices across Russia and occupied Ukraine.[17] These gasoline shortages and price spikes will likely result in increased consumer costs, increased business expenses across industries, and drive inflation expectations, thereby pushing overall inflation upwards by increasing both direct and indirect costs throughout the economy and creating further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[18]

The Russian information space responded to the strikes against the Afipsky and Kuibyshev refineries and reiterated concerns about the poor performance of Russia's air defense systems near critical and military infrastructure. A Russian milblogger complained that recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian gasoline refineries are collapsing Russia's oil and gas sector and that Russian citizens are already noticing the effects of Ukrainian strikes in rising gasoline prices as production struggles to keep pace with domestic demand.[19] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger accused "authorized agencies" of failing to protect targets and down Ukrainian drones.[20] Another milblogger lamented that the Russian government has not arrested anyone for failing to protect Russian deep-rear infrastructure from "slow-moving" Ukrainian strike drones.[21] Another milblogger suggested that Russia delegate part of the authority for air defense to those who can use non-standard counter-drone measures and that Russia equip mobile air defense groups and construct air defense at vulnerable facilities.[22] The milblogger recommended that air defense groups arm themselves with small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), interceptor drones, and radars to detect and down targets at low altitudes. The milblogger accused the Russian government of lacking initiative and being incompetent and demanded that Russia increase the use of interceptor drones, small radars, and helicopters to prevent such strikes. The milblogger suggested that Russia take inspiration from BARS (Russian combat army reserve) drone units operating in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts, and called for an increase in the recruitment of volunteers to air defense groups. The Russian information space has blamed Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes throughout Russia's full-scale invasion.[23] Ukrainian long-range drone strikes continue to place pressure on this existing point of neuralgia in the Russian information space.

Russian intelligence services are likely tracking US and European military supply lines in Europe by conducting reconnaissance operations over NATO territory. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 28 that Russia or unspecified Russian proxies are flying surveillance drones over routes that the United States and its allies use to ferry military supplies through eastern Germany, collecting intelligence that Russia could use for its sabotage campaign or to assist Russian troops in Ukraine.[24] NYT reported that US and EU military officials are increasingly concerned about drone flights in Germany and cited a German publication’s report that some of the drones tracking Western military supply routes are Iranian-manufactured drones and are likely originating from ships in the Baltic Sea. NYT reported that US officials confirmed the drone operations, and the officials stated that the origins of the flight are still unknown but that they believe Russian intelligence services are responsible for the flights. NYT reported that Western officials stated that Russian sabotage acts decreased significantly in 2025 after reaching a peak in 2024. The Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) told NYT that it tracked a significant drop-off in sabotage attacks in the first six months of 2025 with only four identified incidents of Russian sabotage or attempted sabotage in Europe. CSIS stated that the drone flights over supply routes are likely Russian espionage attempts to learn what firms are manufacturing weapons for Ukraine and to understand how the West is shipping weapons into Poland and subsequently Ukraine. CSIS noted that the drone flights are likely related to battlefield intelligence attempts meant to give Russia a better idea of what weapons Ukraine has and where Ukraine will deploy them. ISW previously observed reports that Russian intelligence services appeared to be decreasing the frequency sabotage operations but noted that Russia may be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe.[25] Potential drone reconnaissance efforts may constitute a new iteration of Russia's hybrid operations on the European continent. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 28 that the Kremlin is "unaware" of NYT’s reports of Russian reconnaissance flying over US arms supply routes in Germany.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia killed at least 21 civilians, including children, and damaged civilian infrastructure and European diplomatic facilities during the second largest strike of the war thus far and the largest strike since the August 15 Alaska Summit on the night of August 27 to 28.
• Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign targeting Russia’s oil refineries is contributing to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia.
• The Russian information space responded to the Ukrainian strikes against the Afipsky and Kuibyshev refineries and reiterated concerns about the poor performance of Russia's air defense systems near critical and military infrastructure.
• Russian intelligence services are likely tracking US and European military supply lines in Europe by conducting reconnaissance operations over NATO territory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Lyman and Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27, 2025

Limited Russian tactical forces recently infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not established enduring positions in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian advances in Zaporizske (3.75 kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) and Novoheorhiivka (730 meters from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) but that Russian forces are operating within both settlements and have not yet secured positions.[1] The Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 20 and 25 that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizske, respectively.[2] It is premature to characterize these reported advances as a breakthrough into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as the activity is at most a small-scale infiltration. It is also inaccurate to characterize these reported advances as Russia‘s “first“ territorial gains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, especially as Russian forces entered Dnipropetrovsk Oblast long before the Russian MoD claimed the seizures of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. ISW observed geolocated footage in June and July 2025 that indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Dachne and Maliivka (both northeast of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka), and geolocated footage from August 25 further indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Vorone (west of Maliivka).[3] ISW assessed in November 2024 that the Russian military command would likely advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and attempt to envelop these positions.[4] Russian forces may also be trying to advance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to set conditions for further operations in the region.

Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast similar to those they used near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are operating in small groups of five servicemembers, who infiltrate behind Ukrainian lines, wait and accumulate, and then attack in different directions simultaneously.[5] Trehubov specifically noted that Russian tactics in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka are similar to those that Russian forces employed near Dobropillya, and ISW has observed reports that Russian forces have been increasingly adopting these tactics throughout the frontline.[6] Russian forces recently infiltrated east and northeast of Dobropillya but have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions and exploiting the penetration thus far.[7] Such infiltration tactics also appear to be vulnerable to well-organized Ukrainian counterattacks.[8] ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer notably only shows the Russian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) and does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.[9] Russian forces are likely using infiltration tactics that do not automatically result in enduring positions, and Russian actors often leverage maps that attempt to show these movements to exaggerate the presence of meaningful Russian activity on the battlefield.

The Kremlin appears to be resuming its drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of August 26 to 27.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones over northern, southern and eastern Ukraine and that 21 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes caused power outages in Poltava, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts, leaving more than 100,000 households without electricity.[11] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated that Russian strikes damaged a critical electrical substation in Sumy City and gas transportation infrastructure facilities in Poltava Oblast.[12] The Ministry of Energy added that Ukrainian authorities consider the strikes to be a continuation of the Russian campaign to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the eve of the heating season. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also de-energized water utilities in Sumy City and damaged an electrical substation in Novhorod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; a school in Kharkiv Oblast, and an apartment building in Kherson City.[13] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that a Russian strike on August 26 destroyed the DTEK coal enrichment plant in Donetsk Oblast, which prepares coal for heating.[14]

The Kremlin is attempting to undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 27 that the Kremlin does not want to publicly discuss the issue of Western security guarantees for Ukraine and called such public discussions "unhelpful."[15] Peskov also stated that Russia takes a "negative view" of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and that Russia will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO's presence.[16] Peskov's statement was likely in response to the August 26 Financial Times (FT) report that the United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[17] Peskov's rejection of the Western proposals for security guarantees and his efforts to discredit public discussions of these proposals are likely part of the Kremlin's efforts to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to sideline Ukraine's European partners from providing Ukraine robust security guarantees as part of a conflict termination agreement.[18]

The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Peskov reiterated a recurrent Kremlin excuse that any Russia-Ukraine contacts at a high or top level require extensive preparations, but that the heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating groups remain in contact.[19] Peskov added that Russia and Ukraine have not scheduled the next round of talks between their negotiating groups. Peskov attempted to shift blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's unwillingness to organize a Putin-Zelensky bilateral meeting by claiming that the resolution of the war requires "reciprocity from Kyiv."

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's continued support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for "invading and occupying" Azerbaijan in 1920 – further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Aliyev stated in an interview with Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya published on August 27 that "the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied the country" in 1920.[20] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had "created [its] own state, but the Bolsheviks took it away." Aliyev also notably characterized Russia's war against Ukraine as an "invasion" and reiterated that Azerbaijan has supported Ukraine's territorial integrity since the start of the full-scale invasion. Aliyev recalled the "recent cooling" of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, stating that Azerbaijan will "never tolerate" any "aggression or disrespect" against Azerbaijan. Aliyev stated that Russia's downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024 and the Kremlin's reaction are "causing great disappointment and discontent" in Azerbaijan. Russian-Azerbaijani relations have been declining since a Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines flight 8243 over the Republic of Chechnya in December 2024, causing the plane to crash in Kazakhstan.[21] Aliyev publicly rejected the Kremlin's attempts to cover up Russia's role in the days following the incident.[22] Russian-Azerbaijani relations continued to decline in June and July 2025 over small-scale incidents that Aliyev seized upon to reiterate his demands that Russia take responsibility for the plane crash.[23] Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against the Ukrainian gas compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani gas overnight on August 5 to 6 and struck the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa City overnight on August 7 to 8.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Limited small Russian tactical forces recently infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, but have not established enduring positions in the area.
• Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast similar to those they used near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025.
• The Kremlin appears to be resuming its drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression.
• The Kremlin is attempting to undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters.
• The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally.
• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's continued support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for "invading and occupying" Azerbaijan in 1920 – further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 26, 2025

The United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of any security guarantee for Ukraine in recent weeks. The Financial Times (FT) reported on August 26 that official Ukrainian and European sources stated that senior US officials told European officials recently that the United Stated would be prepared to contribute "strategic enablers," such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); command and control (C2); and air defense assets, to support a future European-led deployment on the ground in postwar Ukraine as part of security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] European officials reportedly stated that European states can only deploy troops to Ukraine with US support that enables, oversees, and protects the European ground troops. FT reported that officials stated that US postwar support would include US aircraft, logistics, and ground-based radar that would support and enable a European-enforced no-fly zone and air shield for Ukraine. The official sources commented that such US support is contingent on European states' commitment to deploy "tens of thousands" of troops to Ukraine. Three of the officials reportedly stated that Ukrainian troops would defend behind a demilitarized zone that neutral peacekeeping troops would patrol. NATO states would reportedly arm and train these Ukrainian forces. A European-led "deterrence force" would reportedly operate deeper in Ukraine as a "third line of defense," and US assets would operate further in the rear.

High-ranking Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected Western security guarantees for Ukraine and specifically the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of such guarantees, however. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov recently stated in an interview with NBC that Western states, including the United States, should not be allowed to be responsible for Ukraine's post-war security.[2] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly said on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]" "any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries."[3] The Kremlin would likely reject a US and European security guarantee proposal like the one US and European officials are reportedly discussing.

The United States will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil. Reuters reported on August 26 that the US Department of Homeland Security confirmed that the US will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports to the United States starting August 27, increasing total tariffs to 50 percent.[4] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil, and India currently imports roughly 37 percent of its oil from Russia - up from approximately two percent before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[5] Bloomberg reported on August 26 that India’s oil refiners are planning to cut back their purchases of Russian crude oil in response to the increased US tariffs, but have signaled no plans to completely end purchases from Russia.[6] Familiar sources told Bloomberg that both India’s state-run and private processors will likely decrease purchases to between 1.4 to 1.6 million barrels per day, down from a monthly average of 1.8 million barrels per day throughout 2025 thus far. Reductions in Indian refiners' purchases of Russian oil over a sustained period of time will likely place significant restraints on Russia’s ability to fund its war machine. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues that are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[7]

Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil refineries have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia. Reuters reported on August 25 that recent Ukrainian strikes on 10 oil refineries in Russia disrupted at least 17 percent of Russia’s refining capabilities, or roughly 1.1 million barrels per day, and caused A-95 (premium) gasoline shortages in some areas of occupied Ukraine, southern Russia, and Russia's Far East.[8] Reuters reported on August 26 that Russia increased its crude export plan by 200,000 barrels per day in August, as Ukrainian drone strikes disrupted refinery operations and left crude oil available for Russia to export.[9] This revision in crude export plans could increase Russian oil revenue in the short term but is likely adversely affecting the domestic economy. The Wall Street Journal reported on August 25 that several regions of Russia and occupied Crimea have implemented rationing at gas stations as a result of damage from Ukrainian drone strikes to Russian oil refineries.[10] Kurilsky Municipal Okrug Head Konstantin Istomin similarly reported on August 25 that Russian authorities suspended the sale of A-92 gasoline to Russian residents in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Oblast.[11] Russia struggled to keep up with domestic demand for gasoline even before recent Ukrainian strikes and has placed intermittent bans on the export of gasoline since 2022, most recently banning exports at the end of July through August.[12] Recent Ukrainian strikes have exacerbated gasoline shortages and caused a spike in gasoline prices across Russia and occupied Ukraine, which will likely result in increased consumer costs and increased business expenses across industries. This increase would drive inflation expectations and also push overall inflation upwards by increasing both direct and indirect costs throughout the economy. Russia’s Central Bank lowered interest rates on July 25, 2025, likely as a premature response to a temporary decrease in the seasonally adjusted annual rate of inflation in June 2025.[13] Increased gasoline prices and a lowered interest rate, coupled with long-term increased payments to sustain military recruitment and augment the defense industrial base's (DIB) labor force, however, will likely cause inflation to spike, weaken consumer purchasing power, devalue the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[14]

The Russian government proposed that Russian President Vladimir Putin withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers proposed on August 25 that Putin submit a decree to the Russian State Duma to withdraw from the convention.[15] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed the proposal.[16] State Duma Security Committee Deputy Chairperson Andrei Lugovoi claimed that Russia's withdrawal would be a formality since Russia already withdrew from the Council of Europe after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[17] Lugovoi claimed that the European Convention on Human Rights employs double standards against Russia. Russian lawyers and officials justified the proposed withdrawal in Russian outlets by emphasizing that Russian legislation already prohibits torture and that the Convention for the Prevention of Torture is part of a series of Council of Europe human rights treaties from which Russia has withdrawn since February 2022.[18] The proposed withdrawal would be in line with recent Russian measures likely aimed at worsening Russian abuses of Ukrainian prisoners in Russia and occupied Ukraine, including Putin’s July 23 decree authorizing the creation of autonomous Federal Security Service (FSB) pre-trial detention facilities.[19] ISW has observed numerous independent investigations from early 2025 detailing a systematic increase in Russia's torture of Ukrainians held in Russian detention.[20]

Russian residents in border areas are increasingly apathetic toward the war and accepting that Russia will not agree to an end to the war in the near future. Russian opposition outlet Insider reported on August 25 that Russian civilians living in border areas are decreasingly donating toward and volunteering for the war effort.[21] Insider interviewed residents in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts who reported that they do not think that Russia will accept a ceasefire in the near future and anticipate that the war will continue. Interviewees stated that civilians near the border were initially invested in and donated to the war effort but that there is no longer any motivation to help the military. An interviewee from Belgorod Oblast claimed that border residents increasingly view Russian soldiers as threats due to the high risk of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian soldiers and instances in which Russian forces have damaged civilian infrastructure and stolen from local residents. An interviewee from Kursk Oblast stated that people are tired of the war, want to return to a normal life, and do not want to fundraise for the war effort because the war has no apparent end. An interviewee from Bryansk Oblast stated that Moscow's war aims are constantly changing, suggesting that Putin's attempts to target US audiences with claims about his willingness to negotiate are clashing with posturing to Russian audiences that Russia remains committed to achieving its war goals. Putin's attempts to play to both information spaces may be confusing Russian audiences. Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 indicated that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, suggesting that populations in the areas bordering Ukraine who feel the war most firsthand are less supportive of the war effort than those in areas further from the fighting.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of any security guarantee for Ukraine in recent weeks.
• The United States will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil.
• Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil refineries have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia.
• The Russian government proposed that Russian President Vladimir Putin withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
• Russian residents in border areas are increasingly apathetic toward the war and accepting that Russia will not agree to end to the war in the near future.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sumy and Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Sumy.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25, 2025

Ukrainian forces continue to pressure the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces seized Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya and the western bound of the base of the Russian penetration).[1] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed out Russian forces from positions near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway and south of Vesele (northeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces have almost completely cleared Kucheriv Yar (east of Dobropillya). Mashovets' August 25 report follows reports from Ukrainian military officials since August 15 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear settlements at both the northern extent of the Russian penetration and along the base of the penetration.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces had seized Volodymyrivka, (southeast of Dobropillya and the eastern bound of the base of the Russian penetration), and Ukrainian advances along the western and eastern bases of the penetration indicate that Russian forces are failing to expand the width of the penetration to the extent necessary to sustain the depth of the penetration.[3] Mashovets reported on August 25 that these Ukrainian counterattacks threatened to encircle elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army ([CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) operating within the penetration north of the Zapovidne-Mayak-Volodymyrivka line.[4] Mashovets reported that the command of the 51st CAA created an assault group that aimed to break through Ukrainian forces and reach the Russian forces within the penetration. Mashovets added that elements of 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) had regrouped and attempted to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks at the western part of the base near Zapovidne. Mashovets had reported on August 18 that elements of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD) had been attempting to outflank and threaten Ukrainian forces counterattacking at the eastern part of the base near Volodymyrivka.[5] These various recent reports of Ukrainian advances in the area, coupled with the lack of reporting about Russian advances or successful reinforcement missions within the penetration, indicate that the efforts of both the 51st CAA and 8th CAA to defend the base of the penetration may have failed at this time.

The Russian military command has reportedly given up efforts to exploit the penetration toward Dobropillya, after Russia's infiltration tactics appear to have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions within this penetration. Mashovets stated on August 25 that the command of the 51st CAA is now preparing for assaults directly against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), indicating that the 51st CAA has reverted back to its original plan following a brief shift in focus on exploiting the penetration northeast of Dobropillya.[6] Mashovets' report and the recent Ukrainian advances within the penetration indicate that Russian forces likely have not established enduring positions within the salient. Russian milbloggers' reporting about the penetration near Dobropillya has also significantly decreased in recent days and shifted back to focusing on activity north, east, and southwest of Pokrovsk instead - further suggesting that Russian forces have been unsuccessful in consolidating and exploiting the penetration and are shifting their focus back on Pokrovsk directly. Russian milbloggers have warned in the past week that the penetration near Dobropillya was too narrow relative to its depth, creating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks and interdiction.[7] Russian milbloggers also previously warned that Russian forces had to widen the penetration's flanks to sustain the penetration, which Russian forces have failed to do so far.[8] ISW previously assessed that Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the front in the Pokrovsk direction seemed to have allowed Russian forces to temporarily restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya, but Russia's inability to establish logistics to support and reinforce the forward units operating within the penetration have degraded Russia's ability to widen and exploit the penetration.[9]

Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov is likely to become the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, reportedly after Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin's offer to assume this position. The Russian Higher Qualification Collegium of Judges (which oversees the selection of candidates for judicial positions) announced on August 25 that it completed accepting applications for the vacant position of Chairperson of the Supreme Court and that Krasnov was the sole candidate who submitted an application.[10] Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 21 that the Higher Qualification Collegium of Judges cancelled the required qualification examination for the position due to a lack of candidates and reported on August 22 that Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Krasnov the title Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, exempting Krasnov from the qualification examination.[11] A Russian insider source claimed on August 25 that Bastrykin, whom Vedomosti previously reported was a candidate for the Supreme Court vacancy, recently refused the position for unknown reasons during a closed-door meeting with Putin.[12] Bastrykin reportedly asked to remain in his position at the Russian Investigative Committee for another year before moving to become the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the Northwestern Federal Okrug. Putin previously allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past the age of 70 in September 2024, and ISW assessed on August 20 that the Kremlin may have attempted to appoint Bastrykin to serve as Chairperson of the Supreme Court to open the Sledkom chairperson position to a younger official without firing or retiring Bastrykin.[13] The Russian insider source claimed that the current plenipotentiary representative, Alexander Gutsan, will succeed Krasnov as Prosecutor General and that current Minister of Justice Konstantin Chuychenko will replace Bastrykin as Investigative Committee chairperson.[14] Krasnov has held his position as Prosecutor General since 2020 and is notably 49 years old; and Chuychenko is 60 years old — significantly younger than the nearly-72-year-old Bastrykin, reflecting the Kremlin’s introduction of younger officials to senior positions.[15]

Russian authorities recently detained Acting Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Vladimir Bazarov, likely as part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for Russian border security failures. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 25 that Russian law enforcement detained Bazarov as part of a larger criminal case investigating the embezzlement of funds that Russian authorities previously allocated for the construction of defensive fortifications in the Belgorod Oblast border areas during Bazarov’s tenure in the Belgorod Oblast administration.[16] Khinshtein claimed that Bazarov embezzled one billion rubles (roughly $12.4 million) of these funds.[17] Russian authorities previously detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, former Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko, and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin on similar embezzlement charges.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin also notably dismissed Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit on July 7, just prior to Starovoit’s reported suicide on July 7.[19] ISW continues to assess that these arrests and personnel changes are part of a concerted Kremlin effort to use border oblast officials as scapegoats for Russia’s failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[20] The Kremlin is likely also trying to scapegoat local officials for Russia's failure to repel Ukrainian cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast in 2023 and 2024.[21]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons and joint production ventures. German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Finance Lars Klingbeil announced on August 25 that Germany will allocate nine billion euros (roughly $10 billion) to Ukraine annually for the next two years.[22] NATO announced on August 24 that Canada will finance a $500 million aid package to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.[23] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Denys Shmyhal announced on August 24 that Ukraine and Canada signed a joint defense production agreement that will simplify the establishment of Ukrainian defense industrial companies in Canada, facilitate technology exchanges, and help provide Ukrainian forces with modern weapons and military equipment in the long term.[24] Shmyhal and Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasciunas similarly signed a letter of intent on August 25 on the joint production of defense products in both countries, with an emphasis on the joint production of long-range drones.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continue to pressure the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.
• The Russian military command has reportedly given up efforts to exploit the penetration toward Dobropillya, after Russia's infiltration tactics appear to have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions within this penetration.
• Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov is likely to become the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, reportedly after Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin's offer to assume this position.
• Russian authorities recently detained Acting Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Vladimir Bazarov, likely as part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for Russian border security failures.
• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons and joint production ventures.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2025

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used an English-language interview with a US outlet to reiterate the Kremlin's explicit rejection of US-proposed initiatives for peace in Ukraine. Lavrov stated in an interview with NBC that Russian officials have explained Russia's war goals during meetings with Trump and other US officials and have also explained them publicly, signaling that public Russian statements about the war convey the same points that Russian officials aim to convey in private meetings.[1] Lavrov reiterated that Russia views NATO expansion and the alleged "violation of Russian security interests" as one of the "root causes" of the war.[2] Lavrov claimed that Russia will achieve its war aims, which he listed as the removal of security threats to Russia "coming from the Ukrainian territory," the protection of the rights of the "ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking people who believe they belong to the Russian culture and Russian history," and Ukrainian neutrality. Lavrov claimed that Ukraine has the right to exist but only as long as it "lets go" of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers who "decided that they belong to Russian culture."[3] Lavrov claimed that Russia has a "duty" to support and protect those who share the values of the Russian language and the "Russian World" ("Russkiy Mir").[4] Lavrov's statements in the NBC interview reiterate consistent Kremlin claims that the alleged "root causes" of the war are NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's discrimination against Russian speakers.[5] The Kremlin's "root causes" notably extend beyond Ukraine, and agreeing to Russia's demand that any future peace settlement "eliminate" the root causes would require substantial negotiations with NATO as well.[6] Lavrov is also promoting the narrative that Ukraine is part of the Kremlin's "Russkiy Mir" idea - an amorphous ideological and geographic conception that Russia claims includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation. Lavrov's continued insistence that any end to the war must address Russia's "root causes," including multiple times following the August 15 Alaska summit, continues to indicate that Russia's war aims have not changed.[7]

Lavrov continued efforts to mischaracterize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the impediment to an enduring peace in Ukraine, in order to distract from the Kremlin's own unwillingness to compromise or engage in negotiations on US President Donald Trump's proposed timeline. Lavrov claimed that Zelensky "will not resolve the [Kremlin's] issue[s]" with Ukraine and accused Zelensky of publicly stating that "he is not going to discuss any territories," deliberately mischaracterizing Zelensky's recent public statements to the opposite.[8] Zelensky has repeatedly indicated in recent days that he is willing to discuss territorial issues in a bilateral meeting with Putin.[9] Lavrov claimed that Zelensky is going against Trump's wishes regarding NATO membership and is refusing to repeal laws relating to Russia's defined "root causes" of the war. Lavrov asked why Zelensky is "ready to meet" and implied that any Zelensky-Putin meeting would be useless, suggesting that Putin is unwilling to meet with Zelensky unless Ukraine concedes to Russia's original war demands, which amount to Ukraine's military, political, and cultural capitulation.[10]

Lavrov also undermined Zelensky's legitimacy as part of efforts to justify Russia's refusal to engage in the peace process and to sign a peace deal with Ukraine. Lavrov responded to a question about whether he and Putin recognize Zelensky as the "legitimate leader of Ukraine" by stating that "we recognize him as the de facto head" of Ukraine.[11] Lavrov claimed that the Kremlin is willing to meet with Zelensky "in this capacity" but "when it comes to signing legal documents...[Russia] would need a very clear understanding by everyone that the person who is signing is legitimate." Lavrov falsely claimed that "Zelensky is not at the moment" the legitimate leader of Ukraine under the Ukrainian Constitution. Lavrov is continuing months-long Kremlin efforts to exploit Ukraine's legally mandated inability to hold elections during the war and to deliberately mischaracterize the Ukrainian Constitution and law. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections when martial law is in effect, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[12] Lavrov is likely attempting to inject these justifications for not engaging in the peace process into the American information space in an attempt to sway US policy and public opinion in Russia's favor.

Lavrov denied that Russia violated past international treaties prohibiting Russia from invading Ukraine and rejected Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in the future. Lavrov claimed that the 1994 Budapest Memorandum guaranteed Ukraine's security just "as any other non-nuclear state" and that the legal obligation of nuclear states that give guarantees to non-nuclear states is to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.[13] Lavrov claimed that Ukraine - not Russia - violated the 1994 agreement by not respecting human rights after 2014. The Budapest Memorandum does state that Russia, the UK, and the United States are committed to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as Ukraine.[14] Lavrov's claims ignore, however, that the memorandum also states that Russia, the UK, and United States are committed to "respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine."

Lavrov claimed that Western states, which Lavrov alleged prepared a "coup" in Ukraine in 2014 (in reference to Ukraine's democratically organized Revolution of Dignity) and support a "Nazi" government in Kyiv (in reference to Ukraine's democratically elected government), should not be allowed to be responsible for Ukraine's post-war security – a rejection of the US- and European-backed security guarantees for Ukraine currently under discussion.[15] Lavrov claimed that he never stated that Russia must have a veto over security guarantees for Ukraine but that there should be a consensus on such guarantees and take into account Russia's interests. Lavrov repeatedly referenced the security guarantees for Ukraine laid out in the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty during the NBC interview. The 2022 draft treaty stated that Russia would be one of the states guaranteeing Ukraine's security but that the guarantor states all had to come to a consensus before assisting Ukraine in the event of an armed attack against it – essentially granting Russia veto power over the other guarantor states' abilities to help Ukraine in the event of renewed Russian aggression.[16] Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly referenced the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty - which amounted to full Ukrainian capitulation in accordance with Russia's original war demands - as the basis for any future peace settlement.[17] ISW continues to assess that granting Russia veto power over Western security guarantees would enable the Kremlin to weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist another Russian invasion by preventing Ukraine from forming binding security agreements such as those now under discussion, increasing and modernizing its military, and receiving support from Ukraine's partners.[18] Lavrov is likely attempting to obfuscate Russia's 2014 and 2022 violations of the Budapest Memorandum in an interview for American audiences in order to push for a future security guarantee agreement listing Russia as a guarantor state.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Samara oblasts on the night of August 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted a drone strike against the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast.[19] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne stated that the SBU and SOF struck the Novatek gas processing complex, which is the largest producer of liquified natural gas (LNG) in Russia that can process up to 6.9 million tons of raw material per year and is a key Russian logistics hub in the Baltic Sea for energy resource export.[20] Suspilne reported that the strikes damaged the cryogenic gas condensate and gas fractionation unit, which is the “heart” of the complex’s technological processes.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 24 shows a fire at the Ust-Luga port.[22] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on August 24 that drone debris caused a fire at the Novatek terminal.[23]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces, including from Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), also struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of August 23 to 24.[24] The Syzran Oil Refinery can refine up to 8.5 million tons of oil per year, which amounts to about 3.08 percent of the total volume of oil refining in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Syzran Oil Refinery specializes in producing gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation kerosene, and other petroleum products for the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on August 24 shows an explosion and fire near the refinery.[25] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed on August 24 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified "industrial enterprise" in Syzran City.[26] ISW recently observed reports from Russian business outlet Kommersant indicating that Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian oil refineries are among the factors impacting Russia's fuel reserves and threatening oil revenues.[27] The Kremlin relies on oil revenues to fund its war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to threaten Russia’s economic stability.

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Two US officials told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on August 24 that the United States approved the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) air-launched missiles to Ukraine and reported that the systems will arrive in Ukraine in six weeks (about mid-October 2025).[28] The WSJ reported that the ERAMs are part of a mostly European-funded arms package for Ukraine that includes other air defense systems and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS). The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on August 24 that Norway allocated seven billion kroner (around $694 million) to purchase two Patriot air defense systems and other forms of air defense for Ukraine.[29] The Norwegian MoD noted that Germany is also contributing financially to purchase the air defense systems. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that more than C$1 billion (about $722 million) of the C$2 billion (around $1.44 billion) worth of military aid that Canada pledged to Ukraine in June 2025 will go toward the delivery of armored vehicles, drones, and ammunition that will arrive in Ukraine as early as September 2025.[30]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner exchange that included a limited number of Ukrainian journalists and government officials on August 24. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 146 POWs.[31] Russia also released three civilians, two journalists, and former Kherson City Mayor Volodymyr Mykolayenko, and Ukraine also released eight Kursk Oblast residents. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that this exchange is in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used an English-language interview with a US outlet to reiterate the Kremlin's explicit rejection of US-proposed initiatives for peace in Ukraine.
• Lavrov continued efforts to mischaracterize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the impediment to an enduring peace in Ukraine, in order to distract from the Kremlin's own unwillingness to compromise or engage in negotiations on US President Donald Trump's proposed timeline.
• Lavrov denied that Russia violated past international treaties prohibiting Russia from invading Ukraine and rejected Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in the future.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Samara oblasts on the night of August 23 to 24.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner exchange that included a limited number of Ukrainian journalists and government officials on August 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 23, 2025

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to spell out Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on US President Donald Trump's preferred timeline. The Russian MFA rejected on August 22 Western media accusations that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is undermining the peace process with his recent statements, including by rejecting Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[i] The Russian MFA explicitly stated that Lavrov's statements represent the Kremlin's position, which the MFA stated is "distinguished by consistency" and has not changed following the August 15 Alaska Summit. The Russian MFA reiterated Lavrov’s August 20 and 21 statements that any serious discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine that do not "take into account" Russia's own "legitimate concerns" are a “road to nowhere.” The Russian MFA also reiterated Lavrov's August 21 statement that Russia favors collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable” and cited the Russian demands presented to Ukraine during the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations as containing such guarantees. Those demands would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed severe limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without imposing any restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[ii] The Russian MFA stated that Lavrov's August 20 and 21 statements are consistent with Putin’s August 15 demand that any peace agreement address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has repeatedly defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[iii] The Russian MFA emphasized that Lavrov’s "statements confirm the theses" about the war in Ukraine that Putin has "repeatedly voiced." The Russian MFA stated that Putin sets Russian foreign policy and Lavrov, as the foreign minister, implements Russian foreign policy according to Putin's directive, and that Lavrov is therefore not undermining Russian foreign policy objectives.[iv]

The Russian MFA's statement that Lavrov is not undermining the peace process because Lavrov is executing Putin's foreign policy directives is an accurate assertion that Putin himself is the impediment to the peace process. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations and maintains his long-standing war aims that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation.[v]

Putin continues efforts to obtain concessions from the United States in the US-Russian bilateral relationship without meaningfully engaging in the peace process in Ukraine. Putin stated on August 22 that Trump's assuming the presidency in 2025 was a "light at the end of the tunnel" in US-Russian bilateral relations and that his meeting with Trump in Alaska was "very good and meaningful." Putin stated that he hopes this meeting is part of "first steps" for the "full-scale restoration" of US-Russian bilateral relations and that the onus is now on the United States to restore relations because the United States is bound by certain international agreements.[vi] Putin has long sought to restore bilateral US-Russian negotiations to divert attention from the war in Ukraine, obtain concessions from the United States, and continue his war in Ukraine without further sanctions or other penalties.[vii] Putin continues to emphasize the prospects for improving bilateral US-Russia relations even as the Trump administration insists that Putin meet Zelensky to conclude a peace before restoring relations. Putin evidently still hopes that Trump will engage economically with Russia even if he offers no meaningful concessions to make peace. Putin's concern is likely growing under threat of further US sanctions on Russia and its allies that could hinder Russia's war effort.

Trump expressed frustration with the current state of peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Trump stated on August 22 that he is not satisfied with "anything" related to the war in Ukraine and that "we're going to find out" the Russian and Ukrainian positions about peace negotiations "over the next two weeks." Trump stated that he will decide whether or not to impose "massive sanctions, massive tariffs, both" or to "do nothing" during this two-week period, but that for now he will waiTrump added that he told Putin that he is "not happy" about the August 21 Russian strike on the "Flex" US electronics manufacturing company in Mukachevo, Zakarpattia Oblast, which caused a massive fire and injured at least 19 employees.

Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian oil refineries, Western sanctions, and struggling refinery modernization efforts in tandem are impacting Russia's fuel reserves and could threaten. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on August 21 that Russia is on the brink of a gasoline crisis as wholesale gasoline prices have d since early August 2025 as wholesale gasoline production is down nearly 10 percent since January 2025.[ix] Kommersant reported that Russia produced an average of 123,600 tons of gasoline per day in January 2025 but now produces an average of 102,200 tons per da The Moscow Times reported on August 18 that the national index for (roughly equivalent to regular unleaded gasoline) has increased to 71,500 rubles (roughly $890)and AI-95 gasoline (roughly equivalent to premium unleaded gasoline) rose to 80,430 rubles (roughly $1,000) per ton, 1.3 percent and 2.2 percent increases respectively, within a single day.[x] The Moscow Times reported that AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline prices have risen by nearly 38 percent and 49 percent respectively since the start of 2025. The Kremlin extended a temporary ban on August 14 on gasoline exports through for producers and through October 2025 for non-producers in an effort to blunt the price surge.[xi]  

Kommersant noted that Russian experts are blaming unscheduled oil refinery shutdowns, likely alluding to the impacts of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes; lengthy oil refinery repairs; and insufficient gasoline reserves in Spring 2025.[xii] A source in the oil industry told Kommersant that oil refinery repairs take months to complete, that refineries with imported equipment can require particularly lengthy renovation periods, and that authorities have postponed several oil refineries' cheduled maintenance due to sanctions limiting the supply of necessary equipment to Russia.Another source in the fuel industry informed Kommersant that authorities expect to conduct maintenance on up to 10 large oil refineries in Fall 2025, which will exacerbate gasoline shortages. Kommersant noted that a number of regions in Russia and occupied Ukraine are struggling with fuel shortages. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov told Kommersant that occupied Crimea primarily has a shortage of AI-95 gasoline, due to reduced production rates and logistical disruptions as most of the gasoline is transported via roadways that are vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky noted that occupied Zaporizhia Oblast is experiencing a shortage of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes against fuel trains. The Kremlin relies on oil revenue to fund its war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin's inability to effectively navigate critical energy sector issues challenges Russia's ongoing narrative that Russia is capable of withstanding Western economic pressures and financing its war effort for the long-term.[xiii]

The Kremlin is likely escalating its hybrid campaign involving GPS and communications jamming against NATO states bordering Russia. Bloomberg reported on August 23 that European states along Russia's western border and the Baltic Sea, including the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Sweden, have raised concerns to international transport organizations over sharp increases in GPS and signal jamming and spoofing in recent months as well as an increase in Russian electronic warfare (EW) installations in border areas.[xiv] Bloomberg obtained a letter that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland sent to the International Telecommunications Union on June 23 about the worsening radio-navigation interference due to increased Russian jamming. Bloomberg reported that an Estonian regulator stated that 85 percent of flights in the country experience signal disruption and there has been a rapid increase in the "spoofing" of faulty coordinates. Bloomberg reported that Lithuania accused Russia of orchestrating a spike in GPS jamming in late July 2025, causing a 22-fold increase in incidents of GPS jamming in the country since about July 2024. Bloomberg reported that the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, and Poland also expressed concern about Russian EW in a letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization in early July 2025, and the organization expressed "grave concerns" about flight safety as a result of EW jamming. A Lithuanian communications official told Bloomberg that the disruptions from Russian EW jamming are expanding further into these states and that interference is also affecting sea, shipping, and ground communication towers. Pro-Ukrainian investigative outlet Tochnyi reported on August 15 that satellite imagery indicates that Russia is constructing a Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), a military-grade antenna array designed for radio intelligence or communication, just south of Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Oblast and 25 kilometers from the Polish border.[xv] Tochnyi assessed that a CDAA at this location may allow Russia to monitor NATO communications in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea, communicate with submarines operating in the Baltic Sea or northern Atlantic Ocean, and support passive intelligence gathering. ISW previously observed reports that Russian EW interference significantly impacted flights in the Baltics, Poland, and Finland particularly in early 2024 including when Russia likely jammed the satellite signal of a Royal Air Force (RAF) jet transporting then-UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, his staff, and select journalists back to the United Kingdom from Poland in March 2024.[xvi] Iary logistics in NATO members’ territory, and is likely using EW innovations developed in the war in Ukraine against NATO states at this time.[xvii]

A former Russian servicemember confirmed ISW's assessment that echelons of the Russian military command on the battlefield are actively ordering subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Independent Belarusian outlet Vot Tak published an interview with a former servicemember of the Russian Somali Battalion (9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District) who described his experience executing five Ukrainian POWs in occupied Karlivka, Donetsk Oblast in May 2024.[xviii] The soldier reported that his assault platoon commander, callsign "Vedma" ("Witch"), issued an order over radio to execute the POWs, and the soldier described the process of removing the armor of the Ukrainian POWs, finding a concealed area to conduct the execution, and executing the POWs from behind. ISW has observed a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs in violation of international law.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to spell out Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on US President Donald Trump's preferred timeline.
• The Russian MFA's statement that Lavrov is not undermining the peace process because Lavrov is executing Putin's foreign policy directives is an accurate assertion that Putin himself is the impediment to the peace process.
• Putin continues efforts to obtain concessions from the United States in the US-Russian bilateral relationship without meaningfully engaging in the peace process in Ukraine.
• Trump expressed frustration with the current state of peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian oil refineries, Western sanctions, and struggling refinery modernization efforts in tandem are impacting Russia's fuel reserves and could threaten.
• The Kremlin is likely escalating its hybrid campaign involving GPS and communications jamming against NATO states bordering Russia.
• A former Russian servicemember confirmed ISW's assessment that echelons of the Russian military command on the battlefield are actively ordering subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). 
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 22, 2025

The Kremlin continues to signal that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave an interview to NBC on August 22 and reiterated that there is currently no plan for Putin to meet with Zelensky.[1] Lavrov stated that Putin would meet Zelensky "when the agenda is ready for a summit," but noted that "this agenda is not ready at all." Lavrov accused Zelensky of failing to accept Russia’s demanded preconditions for negotiation, such as “discussion of territorial issues,” despite the fact that Zelensky stated on August 18 that he remains willing to meet with Putin unconditionally and directly discuss territorial questions.[2] Putin notably rejected Zelensky's May 2025 invitation for the leaders to hold direct negotiations in Istanbul.[3] The Kremlin has used Lavrov multiple times over the past few days to clarify the Kremlin's position that there will be no Putin-Zelensky meeting on the timeline that US President Donald Trump desires, and Lavrov's interview with a US-based media outlet likely aims to directly clarify this position to Western audiences.[4]

The Kremlin is likely concerned that a bilateral Putin-Zelensky meeting could undermine Putin’s domestic justification for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 22, citing interlocutors in the Kremlin, that the Kremlin sees a Putin-Zelensky meeting in the near future as unlikely.[5] A political strategist working in the Kremlin told Verstka that Putin and his advisors fear reputational consequences as a result of meeting with Zelensky. A source who works with the Kremlin's domestic political projects stated that Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov's August 18 statement about "raising the level" of the negotiating delegations is "more like a polite refusal" to the proposed Putin-Zelensky meeting. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin failed to commit to a Putin-Zelensky meeting following the August 18 Trump-Putin call, and Kremlin officials led by Lavrov continue to explicitly reject such a meeting in the immediate future.[6] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is struggling to balance between appeasing a domestic audience that has been conditioned to accept nothing less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine and staving off further US sanctions that could impact Russia's ability to sustain its war effort.[7]

Russian officials continue to deflect blame for the lack of a Putin-Zelensky meeting and Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations by rejecting the legitimacy of Ukraine's democratically elected government. Lavrov also asked on August 22 how Russia can meet with an individual “pretending to be a leader,” falsely implying that Zelensky is an illegitimate leader.[8] Lavrov also questioned on August 21 Ukrainian officials' legitimacy and their eligibility to sign a peace agreement with Russia.[9] Other Russian officials, including State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa, State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Andrei Klimov, and State Duma Defense Committee First Head Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev also rejected Zelensky's legitimacy and questioned the legality of any peace agreement that Zelensky would sign.[10] Russian officials have repeatedly denied and undermined the legitimacy of Zelensky’s presidency in an ongoing effort to justify Russia’s war against Ukraine, portray Zelensky as a false actor in peace negotiations, and deflect from Russia’s ongoing refusal to participate in negotiations.[11] Lavrov and other Russian officials' claims about Zelensky's illegitimacy also set informational conditions for Russia to reject the legality of any peace agreement Russia may sign and justify Russia's reneging on such an agreement in the future.[12]

Ukraine continued its strike campaign against the Russian military and oil infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert "Magyar" Brovdi reported on August 21 that Ukrainian drones struck the Unecha oil pumping station northeast of Vysokoye, Bryansk Oblast, which is part of Russia’s Druzhba pipeline and plays a key role in supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex.[13] Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows a Ukrainian strike on one of the Unecha station's oil pumps and a large fire.[14] Ukrainian forces most recently struck the Unecha facility overnight on August 12 to 13.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 22 that Ukrainian missile, artillery, and aviation launched coordinated strikes on a command post of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and a large ammunition depot in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[16] Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian General Staff published on August 22 shows the Ukrainian strike against the Rubikon command post and ammunition depot east of occupied Novotoretske, Donetsk Oblast (northeast of Pokrovsk).[17] The Ukrainian Navy reported on August 22 that the Ukrainian Navy struck a Russian drone base at the Khersones Airbase west of occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, hitting up to three Iranian Mohajer-6 drones and two Forpost reconnaissance drones that the Russian military uses to monitor the Black Sea.[18]

Ukrainian authorities returned Ukrainian civilians whom Russian authorities deported from occupied areas of Ukraine to a checkpoint on the Russia-Georgia border. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko stated on August 22 that Ukrainian authorities organized the return of 65 Ukrainian civilians, including eight seriously ill, who Russian authorities deported and abandoned without documents, food, or water at the Verkhny Lars border checkpoint on the Russia-Georgia international border.[19] Non-profit organization Volunteers Tbilisi and Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii added that the Ukrainian civilians spent about three months in a basement at the border checkpoint meant to hold only 20 people.[20] Vazhnye Istorii reported that the civilians included residents of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine who refused to cooperate with occupation authorities or accept Russian passports during forced Russification campaigns.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to signal that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
• Russian officials continue to deflect blame for the lack of Putin-Zelensky meeting and Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations by rejecting the legitimacy of Ukraine's democratically elected government.
• Ukraine continued its strike campaign against Russian military and oil infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Ukrainian authorities returned Ukrainian civilians whom Russian authorities deported from occupied areas of Ukraine to a checkpoint on the Russia-Georgia border.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and near Chasiv Yar and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21, 2025

The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated during a joint press conference with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 that Russia will proceed on the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine based on its experience with the 2015 Minsk II agreement and 2022 Istanbul negotiations.[1] Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations were based on the concept of "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine, referencing the Kremlin’s oft-evoked accusation that the "root causes" of the war include NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[2] Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have ensured Ukraine’s security "honestly and collectively" via a group of guarantor countries including United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members, Germany, and Turkey. Lavrov similarly stated on August 20 during a meeting with Jordanian officials that Russia was ready to sign on to an agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations and that those negotiations are a “good example” of a way to negotiate an end to the war.[3]

Lavrov’s recent statements lauding the 2022 Istanbul negotiations suggest that the Kremlin has selected Lavrov to be the predominant amplifier of the longstanding Russian narrative that the Istanbul negotiations are the necessary starting point for negotiations. An agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have crippled Ukraine by permanently banning it from joining NATO, imposing draconian limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and prohibiting Ukraine from receiving any Western military assistance.[4] The draft agreement also demanded that Russia and the UNSC, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC, a key Russian ally), be granted the status of guarantor states and that guarantor states must act in concert in the event of a violation of the agreement, which would allow Russia to veto Western military assistance for Ukraine.[5] The draft Istanbul agreement notably imposes no limitations on Russia’s military capabilities—effectively neutering Ukraine politically and militarily while protecting Russia’s ability to reinvade Ukraine in the future on much more favorable terms even than it faced in 2022. The Kremlin likely understands that the 2022 Istanbul framework is a non-starter for Kyiv and therefore continues to invoke it in an effort to paint Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate while Moscow continues to delay good-faith peacemaking efforts.

The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected US- and European-led efforts to provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees by reiterating on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on August 20 that "[Russia has] explicitly stated: No NATO troops as peacekeepers" and that Russia will not accept such a security guarantee.[6] Medvedev claimed that Ukraine does not need such security guarantees, contrary to the Trump administration's position on Ukraine's need for robust security guarantees.[7] Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 21 that Ukraine should emulate Finland's negotiation model following World War II and become a neutral state and cede part of its territory and that negotiations will be based on battlefield dynamics.[8] State Duma Deputy Dmitry Belik echoed Zhuravlev's sentiments by claiming that Ukraine's attempts to alter its own territorial borders ignores the realities on the ground.[9] Kremlin officials often use the idea of "realities on the ground" to claim that Russia is in a superior position on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands.[10] Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Grigory Karasin claimed on August 21 that stakeholders must understand that Russia is concerned about its strategic security vis a vis Europe and NATO and that this raises questions about the overall viability of the entire negotiation process.[11] Several Kremlin officials claimed that Russia is defending new territories that are enshrined in Russia's Constitution and therefore international recognition of Russia's annexation is unnecessary, obfuscating the fact that Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea and Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts is illegal under international law.[12] Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed that Donbas and Novorossiya – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – are original Russian lands and cannot be part of any territorial concession to Ukraine.[13] Russian reserve Colonel Viktor Baranets claimed on August 20 that Russia may allow European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine ceding all of its southern oblasts, including Odesa, Mykolaiv, and perhaps Kharkiv, to Russia.[14] Russia notably does not occupy any part of Odesa Oblast and occupies slivers of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.

Reuters, citing three sources familiar with top-level Kremlin thinking, reported on August 21 that Putin continues to demand that Ukraine cede all of eastern Donbas, renounce ambitions to join NATO, and establish itself as a neutral state and refuse to host Western troops.[15] The sources added that Putin told US officials that he is willing to freeze Russian offensive operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange as well as return small unspecified parts of Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The sources reported that Putin continues to demand that NATO fundamentally alter one of its core tenets and commit to a legally binding pledge to not expand eastward, a demand that would require the renegotiation and re-ratification of the NATO treaty by all NATO member states. Lavrov recently stated that the Kremlin's objective is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast, further demonstrating that Russia remains unwilling to accept any agreement that falls short of Ukraine's full capitulation.[16] US President Donald Trump and US Vice President JD Vance have recently expressed the United States' willingness to contribute to the safeguarding of measures to prevent Russia from resuming its war in Ukraine.[17]

Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 to discuss Russian-Indian relations and expanding economic investment in energy, including the oil supply, hydrocarbons, and nuclear energy.[18] Russian Deputy Energy Minister Roman Marshavin met with Indian deputy minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Pankaj Jain on August 20 to discuss expanding cooperation in the energy trade.[19] Lavrov held a joint conference with Jaishankar after the meeting and announced that Putin would likely visit India before the end of 2025, and Jaishankar stated that India ”believe[s] that relations between India and Russia have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world after the Second World War.”[20] Putin and other high-ranking Russian officials are spending considerable amounts of time and energy to stabilize and strengthen relationships with India, indicating that Russia views India as a critical source of revenue. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[21] Intensive Russian outreach to India suggests that Moscow is attempting to ensure that New Delhi does not curtail energy purchases from Russia because of these potential secondary sanctions.

Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that overnight Russian forces launched 574 Shahed-type and decoy drones from over Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities, Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; four Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from over Lipetsk and Voronezh oblasts; two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from over Voronezh Oblast; 19 Kh-101 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast; 14 Kalibr cruise missiles from over the Black Sea; and one unidentified missile from over occupied Crimea.[22] Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 546 drones, one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile, 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 12 Kalibr cruise missiles.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that drones and missiles struck 11 locations throughout Ukraine.[24] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles struck infrastructure in Lviv City; Lutsk, Volyn Oblast; Rivne Oblast; and Zakarpattia Oblast, causing civilian injuries and deaths.[25] Russia's August 20-21 strike notably targeted several areas in Ukraine’s far-western oblasts that border Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Russia launched a cruise missile at Mukachevo, Zakarpattia Oblast, striking the "Flex" US electronics manufacturing company and causing a massive fire and injuring at least 19 employees.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that "Flex" was a US-owned civilian enterprise that manufactured household goods such as coffee machines.[27] Russia likely struck the "Flex" enterprise to discourage the United States and Ukraine's European allies from investing in Ukraine or opening businesses within Ukraine.

Russia likely prepared for this strike for several weeks, stockpiling drones and missiles over the backdrop of ongoing US-Russian negotiations and the August 15 Alaska summit.[28] ISW observed that Russia was launching much smaller strike packages in the weeks leading up to the Alaska summit in order to posture itself to the United States as a good-faith negotiator, and assessed that Russia was likely to leverage the smaller-scale strikes to stockpile drones and missiles for renewed massive strikes on Ukraine following the summit.[29] The size and composition of the August 20-21 strike package suggests that Russia successfully stockpiled significant numbers of both drones and missiles in the lead-up to the Alaska summit. Russian forces most recently launched Kalibr cruise missiles on July 21 and Kinzhals on August 4, suggesting that efforts to stockpile these munitions allowed Russian to use them in greater quantities during the August 20-21 strike series.[30]

The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons. US President Donald Trump stated on August 21 that it is impossible for Ukraine to achieve victory against Russia if Ukraine is only able to use defensive weapons and systems and is “not allowed to play offense.”[31] The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 21 that Ukraine has launched mass production of its new FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles which have a range of up to three thousand kilometers and can carry warheads up to 1,150 kilograms.[32] The AP reported that Ukraine currently produces one FP-5 cruise missile per day and aims to increase daily production capacity to produce seven FP-5 cruise missiles per day by October 2025. Ukraine continues to successfully invest in and expand the Ukrainian DIB capacity for producing medium- to long-range weapons systems capable of striking military and DIB facilities within Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in December 2024 that Ukraine would work to scale its production capacity of Palyanytsya, Peklo, Ruta, Neptune, and Sapsan missiles.[33] Ukraine notably succeeded in increasing the range of Neptune anti-ship missiles to allow Ukrainian forces to strike military and DIB facilities located deeper within Russia.[34]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted video footage of Nikiforov briefing Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 21, confirming milblogger claims that Nikiforov replaced Lapin on August 8.[36] The Russian military command’s belated replacement of Lapin reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to dismiss commanders despite displayed command deficiencies, as the Russian military command reappointed Lapin to another high-profile command post despite prominent protest in the Russian information space highlighting Lapin's significant battlefield failures.[37] A Russian milblogger noted that a scandal involving the embezzlement of money allocated for fortifications in Kursk Oblast and the August 2024 Ukrainian incursion into the oblast marred Lapin’s tenure in command of the Northern Group of Forces.[38] Russian milbloggers recently criticized Lapin due to Russia’s failure to establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts.[39] Nikiforov, who began Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as chief of staff of the Eastern Military District (EMD), commanded the Western Group of Forces and Western Military District from December 2022 and was appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in Spring 2024.[40] The Russian MoD sent Nikiforov to assist Lapin and organize efforts to stop the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[41] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 8 that Nikiforov is a relic of the “parquet army” of the 2000s who criticizes subordinates over minor mistakes.[42] ISW assesses that Nikiforov is unlikely to make any major changes, given his presence in the Northern Group of Forces sector for more than a year.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression.
• The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine.
• Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions.
• Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure.
• The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 20, 2025

The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on August 20 that any serious discussions on Western security guarantees for Ukraine without Russian input are a “road to nowhere” and that Russia “cannot agree” that now-proposed "collective security issues" can be resolved without Russia, effectively demanding a Russian veto over Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] Lavrov also threatened that Russia will take “firm and harsh” action to ensure that Russia’s “legitimate interests” are a part of any postwar security arrangement for Ukraine.

The Kremlin is likely trying to inject its demands into the ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian joint effort to create a security structure that will serve as a safeguard against a future Russian re-invasion in the event of a peace settlement.[2] Granting Russia veto power over Western security guarantees would enable the Kremlin to dictate conditions that will weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist another Russian invasion by preventing Ukraine from forming binding bilateral or multilateral security agreements such as are now being discussed, increasing and modernizing its military, and receiving support from Ukraine's partners. Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently said that Russia could not tolerate the presence of troops from NATO member states in Ukraine as part of any security guarantees.[3]

European leaders recently released a joint statement reaffirming that no peace agreement should place limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces or on its cooperation with third countries nor can Russia have veto power over Ukraine’s pathway to joining the European Union (EU) or NATO.[4] European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on August 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be trusted to honor any promises or commitments to permanently cease military activity against Ukraine and that any security guarantees must be robust and credible to deter the Russian military command does not re-group and launch a future invasion of Ukraine.

The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Russia is in favor of collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable” and that a good example of such guarantees was evident in the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations, which would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without any imposing restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[5] The security guarantees proposed in the draft 2022 Istanbul Protocol treated Russia as a neutral security “guarantor state” of Ukraine along with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, failing to identify Russia as a belligerent in the war. The outlined security guarantees would give China and Russia veto power over any action the guarantors could take in response to a renewed Russian attack by granting the UN Security Council the authority to take “measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”[6] Such "security guarantees" would allow the Kremlin and its allies to dictate the means and tools that Ukraine could use to defend itself against Russia and restrict the ability of other guarantor states to come to Ukraine's assistance.

The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Putin confirmed his readiness to continue direct negotiations with Ukraine in the Istanbul format.[7] Russian and Ukrainian delegations have engaged in three rounds of bilateral talks in Istanbul since February 2025, which have resulted in nine prisoners of war (POW) exchanges, but little more.[8] Lavrov claimed that Putin would consider raising the level of the delegation heads after working groups had been established but added that a summit between Putin and Zelensky would need thorough preparations that could take time. Several US officials have stated that Putin promised Trump that he would meet with Zelensky following the multilateral summit between the United Stated, Ukraine, and European leaders on August 18.[9] Trump stated on August 18 that Zelensky and Putin need to meet urgently and that waiting too long before having a leader-level bilateral meeting would result in thousands of deaths.[10] Lavrov may have attempted to portray the Kremlin’s proposal of continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework and working groups as fulfilling Putin's reported promise to Trump to hold a bilateral meeting with Zelensky. Continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework are a far cry from a head of state-level bilateral meeting, however, and Lavrov's statement is likely part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to protract peace negotiations and deflect blame for delays onto Ukraine and the West.

The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs. Reuters reported on August 20 that the Russian government is preparing to increase taxes and reduce its spending as it attempts to maintain its defense expenditure amid economic cooling.[11] Russian Finance Ministry data indicated that the Kremlin ran a budget deficit of 4.9 trillion rubles (roughly $61 billion) from January to August of 2025, exceeding the target for the entire year by a quarter.[12] Russian Federation Council Committee on Budget and Financial Markets Chairperson Antatoly Artamonov claimed in late July 2025 that Russia needed to “urgently start fiscal consolidation” amidst increasingly pessimistic economic indicators and a decline in oil and gas revenues.[13] Reuters reported that Russia spends over 17 trillion rubles (roughly $211 billion) or 41 percent of its federal budget on its defense and national security. A Russian government source stated that Russia's defense spending likely constitutes more than the stated eight percent of Russian GDP and assessed that defense spending if unlikely to decrease in 2026 or in an event of a ceasefire.[14] Reuters reported that the Russian government is increasingly pulling funds away from the healthcare and education sectors, and Russian officials are pushing for Russia to reallocate funds from non-defense budgetary items to the defense sector. Reuters reported that Russia has relatively a low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20 percent; however, this metric is much less consequential as Russia is a rentier state which uses oil and gas revenues and Russia’s sovereign wealth fund to fund its war in Ukraine. The sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned investment fund that Russia pulls money from to avoid incurring debt, but Putin is steadily depleting the fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[15]

Russia is jeopardizing its economic stability and the livelihoods of Russian civilians to increasingly feed its defense industrial base (DIB) and sustain the war effort in Ukraine. Russia faces a growing list of costs from the war, including providing compensation for servicemembers and their families, expanding its DIB, and sponsoring recruitment drives for its war in Ukraine.[16] Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to convince the Russian population that the Russian federal budget prioritizes civilian and social expenditures while continuing to allocate greater sums of the budget to defense spending.[17] The Russian government also must face the future costs of compensating veterans and their families by providing them with financial, medical, and psychological support from the government over the coming decades.

Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary source of wealth. Bloomberg reported on August 20 that India’s state-owned oil refineries purchased an increased amount of Russian oil from August 18 to 19, and Russian deputy trade representative in India Yevgeny Griva told Bloomberg on August 20 that Russia expects India to continue buying Russian oil because of a five percent discount.[18] Bloomberg reported that Russia deepened its discount from one dollar in July 2025 to $2.50 a barrel to Dated Brent, likely to incentivize Indian refineries to purchase Russian oil amidst secondary tariffs.[19] Bloomberg reported that Chinese oil refiners stepped up purchases of Russian flagship oil as some Indian companies pulled back purchases of Russian oil in August amidst US threats of tariffs.[20] Bloomberg reported that China received shipments of 75,000 barrels per day from the Urals, a marked increase from the year-to-date average of 40,000 barrels per day. Secondary tariffs may cost Russia additional foreign funds if Russia is unable to successfully convince tariffed countries to buy more oil from Russia that would compensate the difference between the discount and market price. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[21]

The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to form a new and younger elite. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 20 that the Kremlin is considering Bastrykin for the vacant position of Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court.[22] Unspecified sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration, Supreme Court, and judicial community told Vedomosti that Bastrykin’s replacement presents an opportunity to “introduce new blood” to Sledkom, given that Bastrykin has headed Sledkom since 2011 and is approaching the age of 72. The Kremlin allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past the age of 70 in September 2024.[23] The Kremlin’s replacement of Bastrykin is in line with Putin’s recent practice of reshuffling older members of his inner circle to other roles rather than retiring or firing them, as demonstrated by the appointment of former Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to oversee the Russian shipbuilding industry in May 2025.[24] Putin has been recently promoting younger officials who have significant involvement with the Russian war effort such as former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, who became the youngest ever member of the Russian Security Council in September 2024.[25] The promotion of younger officials connected to the war effort is consistent with Putin’s February 2024 announcement that he is forming a new elite out of veterans and committed supporters of the war effort.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats.
• The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump.
• The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs.
• Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary source of wealth.
• The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to form a new and younger elite.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2025

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin's objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast. Lavrov claimed in a televised interview on August 19 that the Kremlin has "never talked about the need to seize any territories" from Ukraine and that Russia's goal was not to seize Crimea, Donbas, or other areas of Ukraine.[1] The claim seems bizarre in the context of Russia's repeated demands that Ukraine and the West recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory, including territory Russian forces do not control. It reflects the deeper Russian aims in Ukraine, however, quite accurately. Lavrov reiterated that Russia's war objectives concern "protecting" the people in Ukraine from the Ukrainian government, which the Kremlin falsely portrays as illegitimate and oppressive.[2] Lavrov's description of the Kremlin's aim to "protect" Ukrainians from their own government reflects the fact that the Kremlin seeks to remove the democratically elected Ukrainian government and replace it with a pro-Russian government that would allow the Kremlin to control Ukraine without needing to fight for physical control over territory or annex it. Lavrov notably made demands during the interview that reject Ukraine's sovereignty including that Ukraine repeal laws regarding language and religion that are the proper concern only of the government of a sovereign state. Lavrov stated explicitly "there can be no talk of any long-term [peace] agreements" with Ukraine "without respect" for Russia's security and the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as "these are the reasons that must be urgently eliminated in the context of a settlement."[3] The Kremlin's continued insistence on controlling Ukrainian domestic affairs reflects the arguments made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his 2021 essay arguing that Ukraine should not exist independently of Russia.[4]

Lavrov's August 19 statement further emphasizes the Kremlin's broader objective of obtaining full political control over Ukraine before Russia ends its war.[5] Considering Russia's territorial demands separately from demands concealed by its references to "root causes" obscures the reality that the Kremlin views its war demands as indivisible – the Kremlin aims to accomplish all of these goals and has shown no willingness to compromise any of them or sacrifice some for others to facilitate or complete a peace process. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined its war aims as Ukrainian demilitarization, government change in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukrainian commitments barring it from joining NATO and other international alliances.[6] Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout the war and negotiations process that Russia will achieve these war aims either militarily or diplomatically in line with Lavrov's August 19 statements.[7]

Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means. Russia has long attempted to exert control over former Soviet states through continuing cognitive warfare efforts.[8] Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, in which the Ukrainian people protested for a transparent Western-style government, threatened effective Russian control over Ukraine and prompted the Kremlin to launch a series of cognitive warfare efforts in order to stop and reverse the loss of Russian influence in Ukraine.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin accelerated his efforts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution that drove out Ukraine’s Russia-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, and in favor of a democratically elected, pro-Western government.[10] Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in response, accelerated hybrid operations, and backed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.[11] Putin tried to force Ukraine to legitimize the Russia-invented Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) in the 2015 Minsk II accords that established the ceasefire that Russia broke fully in 2022. The Kremlin pressured Ukraine to extend the legal limited autonomy of the regions in December 2019 and to enshrine broader autonomy for Donbas as a constituent part of Ukraine into the Ukrainian Constitution so that the DNR and LNR could serve as conduits for Russian influence in and ultimately control over the government in Kyiv, but Ukraine rejected this effort.[12] The Kremlin ultimately launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 after this failure to bring Ukraine back under Russian control. Putin has long denied Ukrainian sovereignty and alleged that Ukrainians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared "historical and spiritual space."[13] Putin used these claims as part of his justification for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which was the culmination of eight years of failed efforts to regain control of Ukraine through hybrid warfare campaigns.

Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance. Russian officials are setting informational conditions to justify exerting control over former Soviet states, including NATO members Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, by denying the legality of the collapse of the Soviet Union.[14] The Kremlin asserts its right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baltic States by prosecuting officials who remove Soviet-era war monuments and citizens who graffiti them within these states’ sovereign territories in absentia under Russian law that does not apply to those states.[15] Russia notably launched one of the first ever cyberattacks against Estonia in response to the Estonian government's decision to relocate a Soviet "Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn."[16] Russian efforts to exert control over the Baltics has failed. Russia has been much more successful in establishing control over both Belarus and Georgia, however, by launching hybrid operations in both countries and backing pro-Russian governments that are loyal to the Kremlin.[17] The Kremlin now seeks to bring Belarus further into Russian control through the Union State framework and to eliminate the facade of an independent Belarus completely.

Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov stated on August 19 that Russia and Ukraine cannot make any long-term agreements that do not take into account Russia's “security interests,” very likely referring to Russia’s demand for Ukrainian “neutrality.”[18] Russian officials have long insisted on Ukrainian neutrality and non-alignment with NATO as a precondition to negotiations, and Russia is likely setting information space conditions to oppose Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[19] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]... any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries."[20] The Kremlin’s demand ostensibly for Ukraine’s neutrality is in fact meant to isolate Ukraine from its allies and deny Ukraine its sovereign right to form alliances even as Russia insists on de facto control over Ukraine's domestic internal affairs.[21]

Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the penetration. Geolocated footage published on August 18 and 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in an area northwest of Poltavka and northeast of Volodymyrivka (both southeast of Dobropillya).[22] Russian milbloggers also claimed on August 18 and 19 that Russian forces are bypassing Volodymyrivka toward Sofiivka (northeast of Volodymyrivka) and are flanking Ukrainian positions in and near Shakhove (immediately north of Volodymyrivka) from the west in the main penetration and from the east near Volodymyrivka.[23] The Russian advance and pattern of attacks support an August 18 assessment from Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, who stated that elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in the area east of Volodymyrivka to threaten the flank of Ukrainian forces that are attempting to cut off the base of the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[24] The base of the penetration is relatively narrow compared to its depth and runs along the Dorozhnie-Mayak-Volodymyrivka line (all southeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets assessed on August 18 that Russian forces attacking east of Volodymyrivka were advancing more slowly than Ukrainian forces attempting to cut off the base of the penetration, and noted that the forces operating within the main penetration are largely elements of the 51st CAA (SMD). Mashovets reported on August 19 that fighting begun for Mayak – indicating that Russian forces no longer exert firm control over Mayak and other settlements forming the base of the penetration and that Ukrainian forces are now threatening the heart of the penetration.[25] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced toward or into Vesele and that heavy fighting is ongoing near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (both northeast of Dobropillya in the main penetration).[26] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Dobropillya reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Vesele and that Russian forces are attempting to bring forward reserves to reinforce within the penetration.[27]

Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya – at least temporarily. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction, particularly near Dobropillya, and do not have continuous defensive positions but rather intermittent outposts on the frontline.[28] The terrain near Dobropillya consists of wide, open fields and a low density of settlements. These factors all favor rapid, tactical gains even in conditions of positional warfare, allowing Russian forces to attempt a flanking maneuver in support of a tactically significant penetration. Russian forces do not appear to have established a continuous defensive line within their narrow penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya, likely in part due to the infiltration tactics used to achieve the penetration. The tactical penetration is also a reflection of this low manpower density and relatively sparse positions on the frontline, in combination with favorable terrain in the area, can permit a degree of tactical maneuver. Russian forces likely remain unable to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield in the near-term in large part due to the threat Ukrainian drones pose to Russian armored vehicles.

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on August 19 that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers, including the bodies of five soldiers who died in Russian detention.[29] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that Ukraine previously listed the servicemembers on the lists of severely wounded or severely ill prisoners to be exchanged in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.[30] Russian authorities confirmed that Russia returned the bodies of 1,000 KIA Ukrainian soldiers on August 19 and claimed that Russia only received the bodies of 19 KIA servicemembers.[31]

Ukrainian authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 19 that it opened an investigation into a Russian soldier of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) who participated in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) at the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant on June 16 and July 2, 2024.[32] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office noted that the Russian soldier, whom Ukrainian forces captured after the seizure of the plant on September 24, 2024, told Ukrainian investigators that a Russian commander ordered the execution of the Ukrainian POWs.[33] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin's objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast.
• Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means.
• Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance.
• Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for Ukraine.
• Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the penetration.
• Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya —at least temporarily.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19.
• Ukrainian authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 18, 2025

The Kremlin did not publicly commit to a bilateral or trilateral leader-level meeting, contrary to US President Donald Trump's announcement following the August 18 multilateral summit. Trump stated that he called Russian President Vladimir Putin following the August 18 summit and began to arrange a bilateral meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Putin at an unspecified date and undetermined location.[i] Trump stated that he will meet with Zelensky and Putin in a trilateral meeting at an unspecified time after the bilateral meeting. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov spoke to reporters following the August 18 Trump-Putin call and that Putin and Trump “expressed support for the continuation of direct negotiations between the delegations of Russia and Ukraine” and expressed that "it would be necessary to study the possibility of raising the level of representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian sides" — a far cry from agreeing to leader-level bilateral and trilateral meetings.[ii] Zelensky reiterated, following the August 18 summit, that he is ready to meet with Putin unconditionally and that Russia was the first to propose a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian meeting followed by a trilateral meeting with the United States.[iii] Zelensky stated that territorial issues are issues that he will leave "between [himself] and Putin."

Western leaders reaffirmed the importance of strong security guarantees for Ukraine to ensure a just and lasting peace at the August 18 summit. Trump met with Zelensky at the White House before both joined a meeting with European leaders, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian President Giorgia Meloni, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.[iv] The leaders discussed security guarantees for ensuring a lasting peace in Ukraine, plans for future meetings between Ukrainian and Russian leaders, and continued NATO and EU support for Ukraine. Trump stated that the meeting went well and that the US and European diplomatic and security support is paving the way for peace in Ukraine and Russia.[v] Zelensky stated that he and Trump agreed to work together on an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian prisoners, and the return of Ukrainian children whom Russia had kidnapped.[vi]

The Western leaders emphasized the importance of a peace deal and security guarantees that deter further aggression against Ukraine and ensure both Ukrainian and European security.[vii] Von der Leyen, Meloni, and Starmer expressed support for Ukrainian security guarantees styled after NATO's Article 5, which obliges member states to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force," in case of aggression against a single member state.[viii] Trump stated that his intent is that the unspecified security guarantees for Ukraine will deter future aggression against Ukraine.[ix] Trump also verbally stated that the United States will provide some unspecified support for the security guarantees, with European states bearing most of the burden of these guarantees. Trump’s readout of the meeting posted on Truth Social states that “various European countries” would provide the security guarantees and that the United States would provide “coordination” for the guarantees.[x] The US position on American involvement in providing Ukraine security guarantees, therefore, remains unclear. Zelensky stated in a joint press conference with Trump that Ukraine needs security guarantees from its partners as well as resources to keep its military strong, including weapons, training, and intelligence sharing, and that a strong Ukrainian military is itself a security guarantee.[xi] Zelensky noted that Ukraine and European partners now have a program to purchase weapons from the United States and that this is part of the guarantee of a strong Ukrainian military.[xii]

Ukraine reportedly proposed a deal to purchase US weapons and produce Ukrainian drones in exchange for US security guarantees. The Financial Times (FT) reported on August 18 that it obtained a document that Ukraine will promise to purchase $100 billion worth of US weapons with European financing should the United States provide security guarantees, but noted that the document did not specify which weapons Ukraine seeks to purchase.[xiii] The FT reported that Ukraine also proposed a $50 billion deal to produce drones with Ukrainian companies, but that the documents did not indicate how much of the drone deal would be procurement or investment. The FT cited four people familiar with the matter that these proposals were on a Ukrainian list of talking points shared with European leaders ahead of the August 18 summit.

Russian officials largely rejected Europe's proposed security guarantees for Ukraine in a potential peace agreement. Trump stated on August 18 during his meeting with Zelensky and European leaders that Putin stated on August 15 at the Alaska summit that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a peace agreement.[xiv] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]" "any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries," however.[xv] Zakharova's rejection covers both a formal NATO contingent to a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine as well as contingents from any NATO member state in Ukraine, even if those contingents are not part of a NATO mission. Zakharova's statement is consistent with previous Kremlin statements rejecting the possibility of any NATO member state deploying a military contingent to Ukraine and threatening that Russia would deem any such deployment of forces to Ukraine as legitimate military targets.[xvi] Trump and other EU officials reiterated that any deployment of peacekeeping forces to Ukraine would not be a formal NATO military contingent.[xvii]

Western leaders expressed support for a ceasefire that may follow a possible future trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin. Trump stated that all the leaders in attendance at the August 18 multilateral summit “would obviously prefer an immediate ceasefire while we work on a lasting peace," but that "as of this moment, it's not happening."[xviii] Trump stated that he supports a ceasefire because it could stop the casualties "immediately." Merz and Macron also expressed support for Ukraine and Russia to implement a ceasefire either ahead of or following a trilateral Trump-Zelensky Putin meeting.[xix] Both Trump stated that both Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin "can talk a little bit more" about a potential ceasefire, presumably in a potential future bilateral or meeting.[xx]

Russian forces conducted long-range strikes against Ukrainian rear areas that resulted in civilian casualties ahead of the August 18 White House meetings. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Taganrog and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, and Kursk City; and 140 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea overnight on August 17 to 18.[xxi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 88 Shahed drones and decoys over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that missiles and drones struck 25 locations in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.[xxii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 18 that Russian missile strikes killed three and injured 20 in Zaporizhzhia City.[xxiii] Zelensky also reported that Russian forces struck an Azerbaijani energy facility in Odesa City. Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that Russian missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and killed seven civilians and injured 18.[xxiv] Russian forces conducted combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night before and after the Alaska summit on August 15, also inflicting civilian casualties and damaging civilian infrastructure.[xxv] Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that result in high civilian casualties even as Trump has repeatedly called on Russia to stop strike series that disproportionately affect civilian areas.

Russian budgetary constraints are forcing Russia to employ alternative mechanisms to fund enlistment bonus payments and recruit soldiers for its war in Ukraine. Russian opposition media outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on August 18 that data from Russian federal budget expenditures indicate that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) contract recruitment rate fell to a two-year low in the second quarter of 2025.[xxvi] Vazhnye Istorii reported that the Russian MoD made payments to 37,900 people for signing a contract in the second quarter of 2025, but that the Russian MoD made payments to 92,800 people in 2024, a significant decrease. ISW previously observed reports that the Kremlin exceeded its 30-billion-ruble ($381.5 million) 2025 federal budget allocation for contract payments by Summer 2025 and increased its budget allocation to 35.8 billion rubles ($455.3 million).[xxvii] Russia’s recruitment rate likely has not slowed despite the federal recruitment budget’s depletion, however. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on July 2 that the Russian MoD signed over 210,000 contract soldiers, which Vazhnye Istorii noted is 1.6 times higher than what the budget expenditure data reflects.[xxviii] Vazhnye Istorii reported that other research assessed that the MoD secured about 191,000 new contracts using regional budgetary data, suggesting that the Kremlin is using other budgets to finance recruitment.[xxix] Russian officials are increasingly attempting to circumvent budgetary shortcomings by informally recruiting conscripts, offering additional payments to foreigners, and shifting the financial burden by tapping the budgets of Russian federal subjects (regions) rather than the direct budget of the federal government.[xxx] Russia’s attempt to place the onus of funding enlistment bonuses on federal subjects represents a cosmetic attempt to obscure the fact that Russia’s finite national wealth is unable to sustain long-term recruitment efforts indefinitely without cutting into other government programs. Increased financial challenges will likely degrade Russia’s overall force generation apparatus. Additional Western sanctions targeting Russian oil revenues will likely exacerbate greater economic challenges that can degrade Russia’s long-term ability to continue its war in Ukraine.[xxxi]

Russian forces are struggling to exploit the infiltration in the Dobropillya direction in the face of continued Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 18 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Zapovidne (formerly Nykanorivka) and Dorozhnie — both southwest of Dobropillya — at the very base of the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[xxxii] Geolocated footage published on August 14 and geolocated on August 18 shows Ukrainian servicemembers detaining Russian soldiers along a windbreak southwest of Petrivka (northeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Russian forces advanced to the area prior to August 14 during the initial infiltration operation.[xxxiii] Additional geolocated footage published on August 17 and geolocated on August 18 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Russian forces had advanced to the settlement before August 17 and that Ukrainian forces were then able to liberate the area.[xxxiv] ISW had previously not coded these settlements as Russian advances on ISW’s maps due to the lack of geolocated evidence of Russian presence in either Petrivka or Zolotyi Kolodyaz.

ISW has observed indications that Russian forces are struggling to translate the initial tactical infiltration around Dobropillya into a wider operational-level breakthrough. Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 18 that Ukrainian forces collapsed the Russian salient in the Dobropillya direction by cutting off Russian infiltration elements from main forces, presumably by denying Russian forces the ability to supply and reinforce the infiltration groups at the scale necessary to exploit the infiltration.[xxxv] Mashovets stated elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attempting to bypass Volodymyrivka (southwest of Dobropillya) from the east in an attempt to threaten the flank of the Ukrainian forces currently threatening elements of the 51st CAA, which are holding a narrow penetration toward Dobropillya between Zapovidne and Novotoretske (southwest of Dobropillya).[xxxvi] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advancing on the western side of the penetration are advancing faster than elements of the 8th CAA are advancing east of Volodymyrivka, however. Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th, 110th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (all 51st CAA) operating within the penetration are therefore "fracturing" in their efforts to support the base of penetration and can only hold a 2.5 kilometer width of territory within the penetration as a result.[xxxvii] A Russian milblogger recently warned that the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya was too narrow relative to its depth and therefore vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks and interdiction.[xxxviii] Russian milbloggers are also notably increasingly discussing the Rodynske direction (north of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya) as opposed to Dobropillya, indicating that failures to reinforce the initial infiltration are now being reflected in the Russian information space's reporting of the Pokrovsk direction.

A Russian servicemember recently murdered a Ukrainian woman in the Pokrovsk direction in clear violation of international law. The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on August 18 that it opened an investigation into a Russian servicemember murdering a Ukrainian woman as she walked on a street near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xxxix] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that "intentionally direct attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law.[xl] Russian soldiers have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in Ukraine as part of the wider military modus operandi.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin did not publicly commit to a bilateral or trilateral leader-level meeting, contrary to US President Donald Trump's announcement following the August 18 multilateral summit.
• Western leaders reaffirmed the importance of strong security guarantees for Ukraine to ensure a just and lasting peace at the August 18 summit.
• Russian officials largely rejected Europe's proposed security guarantees for Ukraine in a potential peace agreement.
• Western leaders expressed support for a ceasefire that may follow a possible future trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.
• Russian forces conducted long-range strikes against Ukrainian rear areas that resulted in civilian casualties ahead of the August 18 White House meetings.
• Russian budgetary constraints are forcing Russia to employ alternative mechanisms to fund enlistment bonus payments and recruit soldiers for its war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces are struggling to exploit the infiltration in the Dobropillya direction in the face of continued Ukrainian counterattacks.
• A Russian servicemember recently murdered a Ukrainian woman in the Pokrovsk direction in clear violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Dobropillya. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2025

US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Face the Nation on August 17 that both Russia and Ukraine need to make concessions in order to achieve a peace agreement.[1] Rubio noted that any agreement in which only one side makes concessions would be a surrender, not a peace agreement. Rubio stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered "a couple" of unspecified concessions at the August 15 Alaska summit but did not offer enough concessions to reach a just peace agreement immediately. Rubio reiterated Trump's August 13 statement that the United States is not in a position to accept or reject a deal on behalf of Ukraine and that Ukraine must decide for itself what conditions it will accept for a peace deal.[2] Rubio stated that the Trump administration wants a deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its country and to "be assured" a Russian invasion "never happens again." Rubio stated that harsher US sanctions against Russia would end the peace talks and continue the war for at least another year to year and a half. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any peace talks with Ukraine.[3]

Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Axios reported on August 16, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's August 16 call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin told him that Russia could seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Putin so desired.[4] Putin's claim that Russian forces will inevitably seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. The Russian campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia's first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 17 that Russia has tried and failed to seize all of Donetsk Oblast in the past 12 years of fighting in eastern Ukraine.[5] Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult campaigns.

Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force.[6] Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since.[7] Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024.[8] Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk.[9]

The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar on July 31, 2025, although ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian forces have seized the entirety of the settlement.[11] It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.

Russian forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast in February 2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or encirclement – all of which have thus far yet to be successful after more than 18 months.[12]

Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russian forces took open areas without any significantly fortified settlements during their recent penetration northeast of Pokrovsk near Dobropillya.[13] Russian forces still have not demonstrated any capability to rapidly seize large, fortified positions, however, as the campaigns for Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have shown.[14] Russian forces are struggling to supply and reinforce their tactical penetration near Dobropillya and defend against Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks —suggesting that Russian forces may not be able to consolidate their positions and exploit this penetration. The Russian effort for Dobropillya is just one part of Russia's broader 18-month effort to seize Pokrovsk, moreover. Russia's efforts near Dobropillya result from the failure of Russia's initial effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and northeast, causing the Russian command to try a deeper envelopment further northeast and north. ­_­

None of these many-months-long efforts to take Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have been at the scale needed to seize all of Ukraine's fortress belt – Ukraine's highly fortified, main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of cities that are significantly larger in terms of size and population.[15] Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by force would take several years given the number of fortified urban areas Russian forces must overcome to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries.

Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. The New York Times (NYT), Reuters, and BBC, citing anonymous European officials, reported on August 17 that Putin asked Trump on August 15 for guarantees that Russian would become an official language again in parts or all of Ukraine and that Ukraine would end its "persecution" of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[16] The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization, but rather is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church's (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[17] The ROC is notably an element of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit, particularly in the Kremlin's efforts to promote Kremlin narratives and Russian nationalist ideology to sustain and expand Russia's influence in former Soviet states.[18] The ROC has also advocated for the codification of a Russian state ideology premised on the idea that Ukraine should not exist.[19] Putin's demands regarding the Russian language and the protection of the ROC's activities in Ukraine via the UOC MP deny Ukraine the right to establish its own domestic laws as a sovereign and independent state.

Putin's demands that Ukraine make Russian an official language again and allow the UOC MP to operate in Ukraine are similar to Russian demands to exert control over Ukraine's domestic affairs in the 2015 Minsk accords. The Minsk II agreement required Ukraine to amend its constitution to give more autonomy to the Russia-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and LNR) and expand their role in Ukraine’s politics.[20]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires given the complexity of the "root causes." Putin reiterated his ongoing demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war during the joint press conference at the Alaska summit on August 15.[21] Putin stated on August 1 that the "main thing" in the peace process is the eradication of the war's "root causes," which Putin described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) – the ROC's arm in Ukraine.[22] Putin's demands to formalize Russian an official language in Ukraine and protect the ROC in Ukraine come from Russia's demands of Ukraine the Kremlin made in the Spring 2022 Istanbul negotiations. Russia demanded in Spring 2022 during the Istanbul negotiations that Ukraine "prevent restrictions and discrimination" against the UOC MP and restore all of the church's rights.[23] Russia also demanded in Spring 2022 that Ukraine guarantee the Russian language as an official language.[24] Marco Rubio responded to a question regarding Putin's demands at the Alaska summit during an interview with Face the Nation on August 17, stating that Putin's demands to address the alleged "root causes" allude to long historical complaints that the Kremlin has repeatedly invoked.[25] Rubio stated that the United States is not going to focus on the "root causes" but rather on halting the fighting.

Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO. Russian officials have defined one of the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.[26] Russia issued a broad set of ultimatums to the United States in December 2021 demanding that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian territory.[27] The 2021 ultimatums also demanded that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement and refrain from deploying weapons in Europe. Putin's demand that any peace agreement eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine would require a lengthy, complicated negotiation process not only with Ukraine but also with NATO and the United States. Russia's demands about the "root causes" are demands for massive NATO concessions that would jeopardize NATO's integrity and European and US security more broadly.

Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments to not invade and as Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on August 17 that Putin agreed during the Alaska summit that Russia would "legislatively enshrine" promises that Russia would not invade any other territory in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe – likely referring to the creation of new Russian legislation or amendments to the Russian Constitution.[28] Putin has extensively disregarded and amended the Russian Constitution to support his political objectives, as evidenced by the Kremlin's manipulating of the 2020 vote for a constitutional amendment to allow Putin to run for president again in 2024 and potentially remain in power until 2036.[29] Putin's two invasions of Ukraine also broke Russia's obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine within Ukraine's borders at the time.[30] Russia has continually violated international agreements prohibiting aggression against Ukraine, including the Minsk agreements.[31] Putin’s promise to codify Russian promises against future aggression into Russian legislation or the Russian Constitution is neither credible nor a concession, and there is no evidence to suggest that Putin would abide by any such law forbidding a renewed invasion of invade Ukraine after concluding a peace agreement.

The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees. Axios stated on August 16 that sources briefed on Trump's call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders after the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska stated that Putin said he was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine and mentioned the People's Republic of China (PRC) as one of the possible guarantors.[32] Witkoff stated on August 17 that Trump and Putin came to an agreement that the United States and Europe could "effectively offer Article 5-like language" as a security guarantee for Ukraine against future renewed Russian aggression – referring to NATO's collective defense clause.[33] Putin's reported suggestion that the PRC could be a security guarantor mirrors Russia's proposed peace settlement in Istanbul in April 2022. The April 2022 proposed treaty listed the PRC, several Western states, and Russia, as the security guarantors for Ukraine.[34] Russia demanded in the proposal that guarantor states provide Ukraine with aid in the event of a future attack only after all guarantor states had agreed to such a decision. The PRC is a close Russian ally that has significantly helped the Russian war effort and defense industrial base (DIB), and the PRC would not be a neutral guarantor.[35] Russia's involvement in the guarantee would make it meaningless. The parameters of the security guarantees for Ukraine that Putin is reportedly willing to accept are unclear. Any future peace settlement that includes stipulations similar to the demands that Russia made in April 2022 requiring unity among guarantor states would enable the PRC (or Russia, if Russia is one of them) to veto any decisions to help Ukraine in the event of another Russian invasion.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Brussels on August 17 to meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and to participate in a Coalition of the Willing teleconference.[36] The teleconference aimed to coordinate Ukraine's and Europe's positions before Zelensky's visit to the White House on August 18. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian President Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, and Von der Leyen announced that they will accompany Zelensky during his meeting with Trump.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement.
• Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast.
• Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances.
• Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas.
• Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires given the complexity of the "root causes."
• Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO.
• Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments to not invade and as Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires.
• The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16, 2025

Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin's own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims. US President Donald Trump stated on August 16 that his meeting with Putin and subsequent call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European and NATO leaders were productive.[1] Trump stated following that "all" determined that the best way to end Russia's war in Ukraine is to begin direct negotiations for a peace agreement, rather than a ceasefire agreement. Trump announced that he will meet with Zelensky at the White House on August 18 and that he and Zelensky may schedule a subsequent meeting with Putin if the August 18 meeting goes well. Trump did not specify whether the subsequent meeting with Putin will be bilateral or trilateral, though Trump told Fox News following the Alaska summit on August 15 that both Putin and Zelensky want Trump to attend a leader-level meeting.[2] Axios correspondent Barak Ravid reported on August 16, citing an unspecified source who was on Trump's call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin expressed interest in a comprehensive settlement to end the war rather than a ceasefire and stated that "a quick peace agreement is better than a ceasefire."[3] Bloomberg reported, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Trump stated on this call that Putin wants Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but noted that it is up to Ukraine to decide what to do with its territory.[4] The sources told Bloomberg that Putin proposed to effectively freeze the front line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The sources reported that Trump expressed the United States' readiness to contribute to security guarantees for Ukraine so long as the guarantees do not involve NATO, and that Trump suggested that Putin would accept this. Axios reported, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's phone call, that Trump informed Zelensky and the European leaders that Putin claimed that Russian forces were making significant battlefield progress and that Putin could seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[5] The source told Axios that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff briefed Zelensky and NATO leaders during the call on how Putin views territorial issues and what Putin is willing to give in return. The source reported that Witkoff informed the leaders that Putin is willing to end the war and commit to abstaining from seizing more Ukrainian territory and not to attack Ukraine or other countries in a new war.

It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated on August 16, after the Alaska Summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the subject of a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky has not been discussed.[6] Ravid reported that a source briefed on Trump's talks with Putin stated that Putin proposed to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine's withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast and that the US delegation perceived that Putin is open to negotiations regarding Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[7] Ravid reported that Putin requested that the United States recognize "these four oblasts" (presumably Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, although the reporting is not clear) and occupied Crimea as Russian. The Financial Times (FT) reported, citing four sources with direct knowledge of the talks, that Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a precondition for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.[8] Three of the sources told FT that Putin offered to freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and not to launch new attacks to seize additional territory (it is not clear if he meant in those two oblasts or elsewhere), in exchange for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Senior Russian officials and most sources speaking to Western media did not indicate that Putin mentioned Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, which is notable because Russian forces are also conducting offensive operations in these regions. Newsmax White House correspondent Mike Carter reported on August 15, citing unspecified sources, that Putin dropped his objections to teaching the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and NATO states providing security guarantees to Ukraine that would enable NATO states to defend Ukraine if Russia violates any agreement.[9] Carter reported that the unspecified sources stated that Russia and Ukraine still need to work out the definition and implementation of a ceasefire.

Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit. Putin may have also offered a limited ceasefire in southern Ukraine in exchange for Donetsk Oblast, but other details of Putin's offer to Trump remain unclear. Putin has established territorial demands over the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, which are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, as preconditions for any possible future ceasefire in Ukraine. A former senior Kremlin official suggested to FT that Putin is prepared to compromise on other issues, including territory, if Putin is satisfied that an agreement addresses the “root causes” of the war.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers and has repeatedly invoked this phrase as shorthand for Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and the resumption of Russian control over Ukraine.[11] Putin's demand that any agreement address these "root causes" is not a compromise from his original war aims, and reports that Putin "compromised" on issues such as Ukraine's ability to teach its own language in its own country are designed to obfuscate Putin's actual unwillingness to compromise.

Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however. A Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast – which ISW continues to assess would be a major strategic military and political concession – without a full ceasefire that extends to long-range strikes and all frontline activity would pose major risks to both withdrawing Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian forces in rear areas in Kharkiv Oblast. Putin notably has not offered a ceasefire under which Ukrainian forces would be able to safely withdraw across the Donetsk Oblast border and defend rear areas against renewed Russian aggression on the flanks. The Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary is far from Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast known as the "fortress belt," and even if Putin implemented a ceasefire long enough for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Donetsk Oblast, renewed Russian ground assaults and fires both from advancing forces in Donetsk Oblast and forces on the flank in Kharkiv Oblast would threaten Ukrainian forces along the frontline and in rear areas.[12] A Ukrainian withdrawal would likely result in large force concentrations along major Ukrainian thoroughfares and defensive structures that Russian aviation, drones, and artillery would likely target upon the expiration of a ceasefire. These strikes would degrade Ukrainian forces' combat capabilities, including Ukraine's ability to defend against renewed Russian efforts to advance into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk Oblast or along the right flank in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces operating in Donetsk Oblast would also likely pursue withdrawing Ukrainian forces along routes of egress, threatening to rout the withdrawing Ukrainian forces and degrade their ability to establish new defensive positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast would likely also receive fire support from Russian forces already operating in neighboring Kharkiv Oblast, which would further threaten the rear of the withdrawing Ukrainian forces. These Russian strikes would also make it untenable for Ukrainian forces to maintain their positions on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River and set conditions for Russian forces to push further into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A partial ceasefire that does not extend to Russian military activity in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts would therefore be insufficient for assuring the safe withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.

ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression. ISW continues to assess that surrendering currently unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast to Russia would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their aggression against Ukraine on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for this territory and given Russia the opportunity to build up manpower and weapons stocks.[13] ISW previously noted that allowing Russia to occupy the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would concede Ukraine’s fortress belt to Russian forces, and this fortress belt also includes significant DIB infrastructure. Russian forces have notably been unable to advance to or envelop the fortress belt since Fall 2022. The Russian military command would almost certainly work to rapidly establish lasting positions throughout the fortress belt and utilize the fortress belt's DIB for military production if Ukrainian forces withdraw from their positions in Donetsk Oblast. ISW also previously noted that the Donetsk Oblast border area is naturally poorly suited to act as a robust defensive line due to its few settlements, open fields, and natural obstacles such as the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers.[14] A Ukrainian withdrawal across the Donetsk Oblast border would therefore also require the deployment of a robust international peacekeeping force and large-scale investment in infrastructure compatible with a large-scale, long-term ceasefire monitoring mission to prevent future Russian aggression. The absence of a full ceasefire on the frontline and regarding long-range strikes would likely preclude the deployment of this international force, however.

Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace. Putin has remained committed to slow, grinding advances on the battlefield through attritional infantry assaults – constraining the maximum possible rate of Russian advance to footpace.[15] Ukrainian drone strikes have significantly complicated the Russian military command's ability to tactically employ heavy equipment, as Russia has not figured out how to adequately protect armored vehicles and tanks from Ukrainian drones.[16] Russian forces have therefore been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield to create and exploit breakthroughs and achieve operationally-significant advances.[17] The Russian military command has implemented an operational pattern that leverages creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements before beginning street-by-street frontal assaults to force Ukrainian withdrawals. Russian forces have proven unable to make significant advances in Ukraine by conducting frontal assaults.[18] The Russian military command has failed to operationalize its envelopment tactic against a significant Ukrainian defensive line and will likely be unable to leverage this tactic to seize the fortress belt cities that form the backbone of the Ukrainian forces' defense rapidly — such an operation three and a half years into the war would likely be a multi-year effort with significant Russian personnel and material losses.[19] Russian forces have also recently leaned on infiltration tactics to make tactically-significant advances, but have thus far struggled to exploit these infiltrations and consolidate positions in their paths of advance at scale.[20] Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping, penetrating, or otherwise seizing Ukraine’s fortress belt or the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, which Putin has demanded as a precondition for a ceasefire with no comparable Russian concessions.

Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed. Medvedev stated on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels on August 16 that the Trump-Putin meeting "demonstrated that negotiations are possible without preconditions" while Russia continues its war in Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin appears to have successfully narrowed discussions of the war in Ukraine to the fate of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — the four oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022.[22] Russian forces continue offensive efforts to advance into northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, however. Putin's reported demands largely do not address the fate of these oblasts or the Russian military efforts within them. Russian forces would presumably continue their offensive efforts in these areas while negotiations are ongoing. Putin is attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to commit to a comprehensive ceasefire by repackaging one of his war aims as a prerequisite to negotiations for a permanent peace. Putin likely aims to both stave off further US sanctions that could hinder Russia's ability to finance its war effort and to extract further US, Ukrainian, and European concessions through the ongoing negotiation process.

The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on August 16 that the Kremlin disseminated an instruction manual to pro-government and state-run media outlets in Russia after the summit to report that "no deal [on Ukraine] was reached at the summit — and that no deal could have been reached."[23] Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to claim that Trump and Putin did not discuss "Ukrainian and European demands for an unconditional ceasefire," that Trump urged Zelensky to make a deal with Putin, and that Trump greeted Putin on the tarmac as a gesture of goodwill. Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to describe the meeting as "historic" because "Putin restored Russia's status as a great superpower" and to describe Trump and Putin as "equals." Meduza quoted the manual as claiming that "the revival of Russia’s power and authority is the result of recent years," likely referring to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, long-term military reorganization efforts, and strengthened ties with states including Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) since February 2022.[24] Meduza reported that the Kremlin issued a separate instruction manual before the summit stating that media outlets should emphasize that Putin spoke with Trump about "Kyiv's unwillingness to negotiate," that Russia is ready for any scenario in the talks, and that it is Putin — rather than Trump —who sets the agenda for US-Russian relations.[25] Meduza reported that the pre-summit manual instructed reporters to emphasize that the United States and Russia have many avenues for "mutual understanding" and that bilateral cooperation would not be limited to the "Ukrainian issue." A media strategist working with the Russian Presidential Administration’s political team told Meduza that the Russian government aimed to prepare the Russian public for the possibility that the summit would fail to pause fighting and emphasize that Putin is setting the terms — cohering with ISW's long-held assessment that the Kremlin is not setting informational conditions for Russians to accept an end to the war that does not amount to a Russian victory on Putin's terms.

Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with Russian outlet News dot ru on August 16 that Trump and Putin communicated as political equals and that the summit was a major event in global diplomacy.[26] Zhuravlev also claimed that the United States understands the ”root causes” of the war in Ukraine — a term Russian officials use as shorthand to reiterate Putin's pre-war demands of Ukrainian neutrality and regime change.[27] Zhuravlev claimed in another interview to Russian outlet Gazeta dot ru that the war in Ukraine can only end if the United States "confirm[s] Russia's security guarantees" and added that Ukraine and the EU should not be involved in the peace process.[28] Russian officials have frequently claimed that Ukrainian and European leadership are prolonging the war in Ukraine and are not interested in peace negotiations in an effort to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty, deny Kyiv a role in the peace process, and divide Ukraine from its allies.[29] Russian Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Chairperson Andrei Klishas claimed that the meeting between Trump and Putin confirmed Russia's desire for a long-term and just peace and that Russia will achieve this goal either through military or diplomatic means.[30] Klishas also reiterated a long-standing Russian claim that there can be no unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.[31] This rhetoric reinforces to a domestic Russian audience that it must not expect Putin to compromise on his long-held, public demands to achieve his full objectives in Ukraine.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was part of the Russian delegation in Alaska, arrived in Anchorage on August 15 wearing a USSR sweatshirt in a staged media stunt.[32] Lavrov likely sought to present Russia as the inheritor of the Soviet Union and simultaneously equate Russia and the United States as comparable superpowers, in line with the reported Kremlin command to Russian media to report that Putin restored Russia to its great power status, a status that Putin and other Russian officials have long complained was lost when the Soviet Union collapsed.[33] Russian officials have claimed that the Soviet Union never legally dissolved and that the Soviet Union therefore still exists, with Russia as the legal inheritor of its power, territory, and treaties — setting informational conditions to exert control over former Soviet Union states.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia very likely maintains territorial ambitions beyond occupied Crimea and the other four Ukrainian oblasts it has illegally annexed.[35] Lavrov also likely sought to present the war in Ukraine as a matter that falls within Russia's sphere of influence in which other states should not interfere, similar to Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov's claim in May 2025 that the Soviet Union still legally exists and that the war in Ukraine is therefore an "internal process."[36] Putin also stated during the joint press conference with Trump on August 15 that Russia and Ukraine share the "same roots" and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a "brotherly" nation, a long-standing Kremlin narrative with roots in Putin's July 2021 essay on the "Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" that also seeks to present the war in Ukraine as an internal affair.[37]

Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian positions and taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) northeast of Dobropillya within Vesele and Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed the 1st Azov Army Corps (AC) August 15 report that Ukrainian forces cleared six settlements northeast of Dobropillya, including Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz in operations from August 12 to 15.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff and 1st Azov AC stated that Ukrainian forces killed 271 Russian personnel, wounded 101, and took 13 POWs, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian tank, two armored vehicles, and 37 motorcycles and other vehicles in these operations. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only advanced in unfortified areas northeast of Dobropilllya and that Russian forces are strengthening their positions in the northern section of the penetration.[40] One Russian milblogger denied Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian forces advanced in the salient but conceded that Ukrainian forces entered Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[41] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are holding their positions near Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[42] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian penetration is not sustainable because it is too narrow and vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction efforts and assaults that threaten Russian forces' ability to sustain the penetration.[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to cut the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway because the base of the penetration is too narrow for its depth, and that Russian forces need to widen the penetration’s flanks before fighting toward the highway. The footage of Ukrainian forces recapturing settlements northeast of Dobropillya and the lack of reporting suggesting that Russian forces are reinforcing and resupplying the penetration enough to exploit the penetration indicates that Ukrainian forces have likely retaken these settlements, as multiple Ukrainian sources have now reported.[44] This footage and these reports also suggest that Russian forces very likely do not have stable and enduring positions within the penetration and likely do not control the area between Russian positions east and northeast of Dobropillya and the base of the penetration southeast of Dobropillya.

Key Takeaways:

• Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin's own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims.
• It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.
• Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit.
• Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however
• ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression.
• Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace.
• Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed.
• The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine.
• Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Siversk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15, 2025

US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. Trump and Putin initially planned to meet one-on-one, but the talks expanded to a three-on-three format including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, for unspecified reasons.[i] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the talks went "remarkably well" following the three-on-three discussions.[ii] Trump and Putin then held a joint press conference. Putin addressed the crowd first and spoke in Russian, reiterating several long-standing Kremlin information operations about the war in Ukraine, Russian history, and the US-Russia relationship.[iii] Putin invoked the geographical closeness of Alaska and the Russian Federation and called back to US-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War in order to artificially highlight bilateral US-Russia relations. Putin emphasized the importance of solving the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[iv] Putin also accused European states of attempting to undermine the negotiation process. These statements are two standard narrative lines that the Kremlin employs in order to justify its illegal invasion of Ukraine and to drive a wedge between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[v] Trump then spoke for a shorter time than Putin and emphasized that the meeting had been "productive," but that the US and Russian delegations reached "no deal." Putin concluded by addressing Trump in English and inviting him to Moscow.[vi] Trump and Putin left the press conference stage without taking any audience questions, and a luncheon planned for after the meeting was reportedly cancelled.[vii]

Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Putin again demonstrated that he has not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine. Putin used the joint press conference following the August 15 Alaska summit to evoke the Kremlin's long-standing narrative that Russia and Ukraine share the "same roots" and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a "brotherly" nation.[viii] Putin published an essay on the "Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" in July 2021, in which he similarly ideologized that Ukrainians and Belarusians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared "historical and spiritual space."[ix] ISW previously assessed that the essay, which Putin published less than a month after meeting with then-US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021, was an ultimatum to Kyiv as it openly questioned Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Putin stated in the essay that Ukraine was a ”product of the Soviet era shaped on the lands of historical Russia,” and reiterated these arguments in his February 2022 declaration of war against Ukraine as a justification for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[x] The continuity between Putin's statements at the August 15 press conference with Trump and his previous statements demonstrates that he remains committed to the view that Ukraine's existence as a state and territorial integrity depend on Ukraine's alignment with Russia.

Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine. Trump reported that he and Putin "made great progress" and agreed on "many points" but did not agree on other points.[xi] Trump did not elaborate on the specifics of what the US and Russian delegations discussed, upon what points the delegations agreed, and which points remain in contention. Trump stated that "there's no deal until there's a deal" and stated that he will inform Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO states about the conversation and that an agreement on Ukraine is "ultimately up to them."[xii] Trump reiterated his timeline that any bilateral economic agreements with Russia will come after the war is "over with."

Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts and 97 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast on the night of August 14 to August 15.[xiii] Russian forces used drones to target frontline areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts, and the missiles to target Kharkiv and Chernihiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 63 Shahed-type and decoy drones over northern and eastern Ukraine.[xiv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the two Iskander-Ms and 34 drones struck 13 locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that the ballistic missiles hit cars in Dniprovskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and an agricultural enterprise in Koryukivka Hromada, Chernihiv Oblast, killing and wounding civilians.[xv] Russian drones hit an ambulance and a civilian car in Velykapyskarivka Hromada, Sumy Oblast, on the morning of August 15, killing one civilian.[xvi] Ukrainian officials and media sources reported on the evening of August 15 that a Russian drone hit the Sumy City Central Market, damaging retail outlets, an educational institution, and other buildings.[xvii] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts "on the eve of the [Alaska] meeting."[xviii] US President Donald Trump responded to the August 15 Russian strikes while en route to Alaska, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is "trying to set a stage" ahead of the summit.[xix] Trump stated that the Russian strikes will "hurt" Putin's ability to make a deal with Trump. Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that result in high civilian casualties even as Trump has repeatedly called on Russia to stop strike series that disproportionately affect civilian areas.[xx] The United Nations (UN) reported on August 13 that Russian air and drone strikes in July 2025 contributed to the highest total monthly casualty toll since May 2022.[xxi]

Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have stabilized Russian penetration near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya.[xxii] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces continue to destroy the Russian assault groups in the area and that Russian forces have not been able to redeploy additional troops to the area. A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Pokrovsk of Russian groups and individual soldiers who had previously infiltrated the settlement.[xxiii] A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya).[xxiv] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have in part stabilized the situation along the Vesele-Zolotyi Kolodyaz-Kucheriv Yar line (northeast of Dobropillya).[xxv] ISW has not observed broader reporting about Ukrainian forces clearing settlements in the Russian penetration near Dobropillya at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 15 that elements of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) initially advanced several hundred meters east of Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) but that Ukrainian counterattacks from Volodymyrivka and Shakhove (both north of Pankivka) pushed back the Russian advance.[xxvi] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) have been attempting to hold Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and to repel Ukrainian counterattacks in the Ivanivka-Zapovidne direction (north to east of Dorozhnie) since August 13.[xxvii] A Russian milblogger also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[xxviii] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces had tactical successes near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[xxix] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[xxx] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances, however.

The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful. Mashovets stated that small infantry groups of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) conducted the initial penetration, but that the total number of Russian forces that conducted the tactical breakthrough did not exceed 300 to 350 personnel.[xxxi] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command tried to consolidate the penetration by redeploying elements of the 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne.[xxxii] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command asked senior commanders in the area to provide additional forces and means by redeploying up to two battalions with armored vehicles from the 8th CAA (SMD), which is largely operating in the Toretsk direction, to support the other elements of the 51st CAA that conducted the tactical breakthrough.

Ukrainian officials continue to conduct evacuations of settlements near the Russian penetration area, however, likely reflecting the increased Russian drone threat due to the Russian advance near Dobropillya. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 14 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from Druzhkivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and villages in Andriivka Hromada, northeast, north, and northwest of Zolotyi Kolodyaz, noting that roughly 1,800 children live in these settlements.[xxxiii] ISW continues to assess that Russia's use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear is severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area.[xxxiv]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian elements conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, causing explosions and fires.[xxxv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Syrzan Oil Refinery is one of Rosneft’s largest refineries and produces a wide range of fuel products, including aviation kerosene for the Russian military. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, posted images on August 15 showing smoke over the Syzran Oil Refinery.[xxxvi] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in February 2025.[xxxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that the Ukrainian SSO and other Ukrainian forces also struck the Russian Olya Seaport in Astrakhan Oblast, including the Port Olya 4 vessel, which was carrying Shahed-type drone components and ammunition from Iran.[xxxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian military uses the Olya Seaport as a logistics supply point for military goods from Iran. The Ukrainian SSO Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Port Olya-4.[xxxix] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Russian air defenses downed Ukrainian drones targeting the Olya Seaport and that drone debris damaged a ship.[xl]

Russian opposition outlet Baza reported on August 15 that there was an explosion at the Elastik Gunpowder Factory in Ryazan Oblast.[xli] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov confirmed that there was an "emergency situation" at a plant in the area that killed five and injured 100 others and declared a state of emergency in the municipality.[xlii] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened an investigation into the violation of safety procedures following the explosion.[xliii] Kovalenko posted footage on August 15 showing an explosion at a gunpowder plant in Ryazan Oblast, noted that there were roughly 50 workers at the plant, and stated that "something strange" occurred at the plant.[xliv] Ukrainian sources have not yet claimed responsibility for the strike, however, and ISW cannot confirm its causes at this time.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15.
• Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine.
• Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine.
• Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.
• Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).
• The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful.
• Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2025

Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump will meet around 11:30 am local time at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska.[1] Ushakov stated that the meeting will occur face-to-face with interpreters present, after which Putin and Trump will hold a joint press conference. The Russian delegation will include Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, and leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev.[2] White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt confirmed the location of the meeting on August 14 and noted that Trump will meet one-on-one with Putin, then attend a bilateral lunch meeting with the US and Russian delegations, and conclude with a press conference.[3] Trump stated during an interview with Fox News that he will either hold a joint press conference alongside Putin or hold the press conference alone, depending on the outcome of his one-on-one meeting with Putin.[4]

The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement. The Kremlin's inclusion of Russian Finance Minister Siluanov and RDIF CEO Dmitriev in the Alaska delegation suggests that Russia will likely attempt to shift the focus of the summit away from its war in Ukraine and towards potential bilateral economic deals. Neither Siluanov nor Dmitriev attended the previous Russia-Ukraine negotiations in Istanbul in May or June 2025.[5] Dmitriev was present during the February 2025 US-Russia talks in Istanbul, however.[6] The Kremlin has frequently leveraged Dmitriev in order to frame Russia as an attractive economic partner to the United States and used his business experience to advocate on behalf of Russia's economic interests, as ISW has previously noted.[7] Dmitriev has notably been instrumental to the Russian narrative, claiming that Alaska is a historical part of Russia ahead of the summit and leveraging the summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States, however, undermining Dmitriev's apparent position as a neutral, economic-focused arbiter.[8] The Kremlin relies on Siluanov to downplay the detrimental effects of Western sanctions on the Russian economy in an attempt to convince the West to drop sanctions against Russia due to their falsely claimed ineffectiveness.[9] Dmitriev and Siluanov's presence at the Alaska summit is likely intended to frame the summit as a potential business deal.

Other Russian officials have also indicated that the Kremlin will attempt to use the Alaska summit to engage in economic negotiations with the United States. Ushakov stated on August 14 that, in addition to discussing Ukraine, Trump and Putin will also speak about bilateral cooperation "in the trade and economic sphere," where there is "enormous" and "untapped" potential.[10] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 14 that Putin and Trump "may" discuss sanctions and other economic issues.[11] Russian First Deputy Chair of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs Svetlana Zhurova claimed that "Russia and the United States will conclude an economic deal in any case" following the Alaska summit.[12] These statements are likely part of a concerted Russian effort to exploit the Alaska summit to secure much-needed economic relief from the United States. ISW continues to assess that any American acceptance of Russian-offered economic deals in the absence of reciprocal Russian concessions on Ukraine in return will degrade important economic leverage that the United States currently holds over Russia.[13]

The Kremlin is coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration significant leverage during the summit. Bloomberg reported on August 13 that Western sanctions and Russia’s wartime economy are seriously harming the Russian economy, while Putin’s attempts at stabilizing the economy are failing as Russian oil revenue continues to fall.[14] Falling oil prices, coupled with heavy Western sanctions and declining energy revenue, have put a serious strain on Russia’s already strained federal budget, which is now facing its highest budget deficit in 30 years, according to Bloomberg.[15] Unnamed officials told Bloomberg that Putin has repeatedly requested sanctions relief as part of any deal to be discussed in Alaska, which ISW assesses likely indicates that Putin is concerned about the state of the Russian economy and is seeking economic reprieve from the West.[16] Putin signed a law on February 25, 2022 that forced Russian lenders to issue preferential loans to war-related contracts at a government-set interest rate below the market rate.[17] The Kremlin designed this law to flood the Russian defense industrial complex with cash, which effectively subordinated Russian banks to the government and its wartime goals. ISW previously reported that Russian bankers had growing concerns over the growing number of non-performing loans and are seeking a state-funded bailout, undercutting Putin’s long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[18] The Russian economy's fiscal strain is eroding the Kremlin’s ability to sustain its war effort in the long term, depleting reserves, and exposes underlying economic fragility. Trump previously threatened secondary sanctions and tariffs on countries that continue to import Russian oil, which ISW continues to assess would likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting revenues essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[19] Russia is likely setting conditions to attempt to use the Alaska summit to secure economic relief, but the Trump administration indicated that it may leverage Russia’s economic fragility to push Putin for concessions.[20]

US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump stated in an interview with Fox News Radio on August 14 that Putin is entering the Alaska summit in a good headspace and is looking to "make a deal" in Alaska, but that it is unlikely that Alaska will result in a quick ceasefire.[21] Trump stated that there is a "25 percent chance" that a "second meeting" in Alaska (likely between Zelensky and Putin) will fail. Trump acknowledged that economic sanctions are "incredibly powerful" and that Putin likely agreed to meet in Alaska because of the impact of secondary sanctions against India and the threat of further US sanctions. White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated to Fox News on August 14 that Trump has other sanctions and measures that he can levy against Russia if the need arises, but that diplomatic negotiations are his top priority.[22] Trump previously stated on August 13 that there will be "very severe consequences" if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit.[23]

The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit. Putin held a meeting on August 14 with high-ranking Kremlin officials to prepare for the Alaska summit, wherein he claimed that the US-Russian talks would create conditions to ensure "peace...in the world as a whole" should the talks lead to agreements about strategic offensive weapons agreements.[24] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump may "touch upon" the broader tasks of ensuring peace and security.[25] ISW has assessed in recent weeks that the Kremlin was dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks in front of the United States to secure Russia's desired demands in Ukraine and deflect from the subject of Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations.[26] Russia announced on August 4 that it was permanently withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, for example.[27] Kremlin officials began to set conditions to justify Russia's withdrawal from the treaty in June 2025.[28] Russia and Belarus publicly promoted Russia's deployment of Oreshnik ballistic missiles (which the INF Treaty banned) to Belarus even before Russia's withdrawal from the INF on August 4, 2025.[29] Reuters reported on August 13 that the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and the Center for Naval Analysis both assessed that satellite imagery shows activity at the Pankovo test site in Arkhangelsk Oblast since July 2025 that is similar to activity preceding previous Russian tests of its 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile.[30] Reuters reported that a Western security source confirmed that Russia is preparing a Burevestnik test. Russia has been deliberately flaunting its missile capabilities in recent weeks in order to create the facade of an escalating situation and to pressure the Trump administration into pursuing arms talks at the Alaska summit. Russia has long violated the INF Treaty, including by launching Oreshnik missiles at Ukraine before withdrawing from the INF, and has largely failed to successfully test its Burevestnik missile; as such, the situation has not escalated in reality.[31] Russia has essentially been trying to manufacture an escalation in advance of the Alaska summit in order to coerce the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks, with the ultimate goal of extracting concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine and distracting from the Kremlin's disinterest in engaging in serious peace talks with Ukraine.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 2025 civilian casualties from Russia's war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022. The UN OHCHR reported on August 13 that there were at least 1,674 civilian casualties in Ukraine in July 2025 – a record high since May 2022 and a 22.5 percent increase from July 2024.[32] The UN OHCHR reported that Russian glide bombs accounted for the largest increase in civilian casualties in July 2025 (276) as compared to June 2025 (114). The UN OHCHR stated that almost 40 percent of the civilian casualties in July 2025 were due to Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes, but that the number of casualties from these strikes decreased by about 20 percent in July 2025 as compared to June 2025. The UN OHCHR reported that short-range drones accounted for 24 percent of the casualties in July 2025 - the second largest cause. Russian forces notably started targeting civilian and military vehicles with short-to-medium range tactical drones along Ukrainian highways in an effort to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Spring and Summer 2025.[33] Russia dramatically increased the size of its missile and drone strike packages throughout Summer 2025 due to increased production and stockpiling, and these larger-scale strikes have caused significant civilian casualties and damage.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia's relatively smaller-scale strikes in recent weeks are allowing Russia to stockpile missiles and drones, and that Russia may resume larger-scale strike packages in the near future, likely following the Alaska summit.[35]

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev and Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on August 14 that newly-arrived Ukrainian reserves stabilized the situation in the Dobropillya direction and are holding the front line.[36] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian reserves are counterattacking in the Dobropillya direction, have started to stabilize the situation, and pushed Russian forces back slightly in unspecified areas of the penetration.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vesele, north of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (both northeast of Dobropillya), and to eastern Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[38] Other Russian milbloggers, however, continued to urge caution to their Russian audience about unconfirmed claims of Russian advances and emphasized that it remains unclear if Russian forces have been able to consolidate positions.[39] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor also highlighted that Russian forces will have difficulties supplying and exploiting their narrow yet deep penetration, especially in the face of Ukrainian drone operations and flank attacks, and that Russian forces have been unable to introduce a large number of troops into the area quickly enough for consolidation and exploitation.[40]

ISW continues to assess that offensive Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions. ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time. ISW largely uses its Assessed Russian Advances layer to depict areas within the Russian FLOT, where ISW has observed evidence of a Russian presence, but this layer does not necessarily denote areas where Russian forces have established an enduring presence. ISW evaluates its Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory map layer using the doctrinal definition of "control" — a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. ISW deliberately distinguishes between the Russian FLOT and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control. ISW does not assess that Russian forces exercise control over the areas in their tactical penetration near Dobropillya as of August 14 and will reassess Russian advances when ISW has observed confirmed, reliable reporting that Ukrainian forces have retaken the territory.

The United Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment to providing Ukraine with long-term, post-war security guarantees. The Times reported on August 14 that following the August 13 virtual meeting between Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and various EU leaders, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the UK and other European nations have developed "realistic" plans to deploy a "reassurance force" to Ukraine upon the conclusion of a potential ceasefire.[41] The reassurance force reportedly includes "air reassurance" over western Ukraine, training for Ukrainian military personnel, and mine clearance operations in the Black Sea. Starmer also noted that the UK is ready to increase economic pressure on Russia in order to force Putin into making concessions on the war in Ukraine. ISW has long assessed that Western security guarantees and continued support for Ukraine's military and economy following a potential ceasefire are critical to the development of a stable, post-war European security architecture, which will crucially bolster Ukraine's and Europe's ability to forcefully deter future Russian aggression.[42]

Ukraine's European partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Germany announced on August 13 that it will fund the purchase of $500 million worth of US equipment and munitions for Ukraine through NATO's Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which allows NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine.[43] The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway previously contributed a total of one billion dollars to Ukraine through the PURL initiative.[44] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala stated on August 13 that the Czech-led ammunition initiative has delivered one million rounds of large-caliber ammunition to Ukraine so far in 2025.[45] A US official reported to Axios on August 13 that US President Donald Trump will continue to sell weapons to NATO states that they can transfer to Ukraine even if diplomatic efforts to resolve the war fail.[46]

Ukraine and Russia conducted their 67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 84 civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs) on August 14.[47] Zelensky noted that the prisoners returned to Ukraine include servicemembers who defended Mariupol in early 2022 and civilians who Russian forces illegally detained, some of whom had been imprisoned since 2014.[48] Zelensky added that almost all of the returned prisoners require significant medical care. Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported that one of the civilian prisoners returned in the exchange was 17 years old when Russian forces detained him in 2016 in occupied Yasynuvata, Donetsk Oblast, and sentenced him to ten years in a penal colony on false charges of espionage.[49]

Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 14 that elements of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd City and caused several fires at the facility.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the refinery is the largest producer of fuel and lubricants in Russia’s Southern Federal Okrug and produces over 15 million tons of oil annually, or 5.6 percent of Russia’s total oil refining, in addition to diesel, gasoline, and aviation fuel, which Russian forces require for military purposes. Geolocated footage published on August 14 shows fires and smoke at the facility.[51] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over Volgograd Oblast and that falling debris caused an oil spill and set fire to petroleum products at the refinery.[52] Russian authorities temporarily grounded flights from Volgograd Airport.[53]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit.
• The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement.
• The Kremlin is coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration significant leverage during the summit.
• US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit.
• The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 2025 civilian casualties from Russia's war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022.
• Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted their 67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14.
• Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2025

Russian officials reiterated that Russia's objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Ministry's Deputy Director of Information and Press Department Alexei Fadeev stated on August 13 that Russia’s position on resolving its war against Ukraine remained “unchanged” since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14, 2024 speech.[1] Fadeev added that the goals for Russia’s delegation to the Alaska summit on August 15 are defined “exclusively by national interests” and implied that Russia will not consider any territorial concessions.[2] Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine's capitulation as a prerequisite for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine on June 14, 2024. The demands included that Ukraine must withdraw from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy; demilitarization; and denazification of the Ukrainian government and society, including the removal of Ukraine’s current democratically elected government; and future Ukrainian alliance neutrality, likely referring to NATO membership. Fadeev’s statements indicate that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing objectives in the war against Ukraine that amount to Ukraine’s full military and political capitulation to Russia and has not adjusted its position ahead of the Alaska summit.

The Trump administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine's formal involvement in peace negotiations. US President Donald Trump held a virtual summit on August 13 with select European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in preparation for Trump's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the August 15 Alaska summit.[3] German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that Trump reaffirmed that Trump would not negotiate territorial issues with Putin.[4] French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Trump clearly demonstrated that the United States seeks to convince Putin to commit to a ceasefire during the Alaska summit.[5] Macron added that Trump agreed that no one but Zelensky should negotiate issues concerning territory and that Trump will not be engaging in any "schemes for territory swaps" during the summit.[6] Macron stated that Trump accepted that the United States and Europe will need to jointly give Ukraine security guarantees but made it clear that these security guarantees would not involve NATO.[7] Two unnamed meeting participants told the Wall Street Journal that Trump pledged to ask Putin for an immediate ceasefire but expressed doubts that Putin would agree to this condition.[8]

US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on August 12 that the Alaska summit is ”not a negotiation” and affirmed that Trump remains committed to informing Zelensky and European leaders about his meeting with Putin.[9] White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated on August 12 that Trump wants to use the Alaska summit to develop a better understanding of how to end the war in Ukraine and that the summit will be a "listening exercise" for Trump.[10] Leavitt added that the Alaska summit is a bilateral meeting but that any peace negotiations would require a trilateral meeting between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.[11] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview on August 12 that Trump's primary objective for the Alaska summit is to have an in-person meeting to "feel out" Putin in order to enable Trump to make further decisions on how to end Russia's war in Ukraine.[12] Rubio noted that Russian forces suffered 60,000 casualties in July 2025 alone and that such high casualty rates indicate Russia's commitment to its war effort in Ukraine.

Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and warned that Russia would face "very severe consequences" if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit. Trump stated after his virtual summit with European leaders and Zelensky on August 13 that he hopes to organize a trilateral meeting with Putin and Zelensky in the event of a successful Alaska summit.[13] Trump warned that there will be "very severe consequences" if Putin does not agree to stop his war against Ukraine after the Alaska summit but did not specify those consequences.[14] US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent told Bloomberg on August 13 that the United States could increase or loosen sanctions against Russia depending on the outcome of the Alaska summit.[15] Bessent urged European leaders to prepare to join the United States in introducing harsher sanctions against Russia and tariffs against the People’s Republic of China and other consumers of Russian energy. One US official told Axios on August 13 that the Trump administration believes that it can "bring down the Russian economy" and that Trump will continue to sell weapons to NATO countries for Ukraine even if diplomatic efforts to resolve the war fail.[16]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders formulated common principles for potential peace negotiations with Russia ahead of the Alaska summit, many of which are in line with the Trump administration's August 12 and 13 statements. Zelensky, following a series of virtual meetings with European leaders and Trump and US Vice President JD Vance, announced on August 13 that Ukraine and its European allies agreed upon and conveyed to Trump the following common principles regarding the Alaska summit and a potential peace agreement: everything that concerns Ukraine should be discussed with Ukraine; parties should arrange a trilateral meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and Putin; parties should agree to a ceasefire prior to a broader peace agreement; the West should provide reliable security guarantees for Ukraine; Russia cannot be allowed a veto over Ukraine's potential accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO; and stakeholders should strengthen sanctions against Russia if Putin refuses a ceasefire following the Alaska summit.[17] These stated principles cohere with the Trump administration's articulated timeline for a ceasefire prior to peace negotiations, preference that negotiations occur between Putin and Zelensky directly, security guarantees for Ukraine, and resolve to impose sanctions against Russia in the event of Putin’s continued intransigence after the Alaska summit and continuation of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[18]

The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US President Donald Trump. Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev alluded on August 13 to the 1945 Yalta Conference between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, claiming that the Yalta conference "won World War II" and that Putin and Trump will similarly "prevent World War III."[19] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa amplified comparisons between the upcoming summit and the Yalta Conference and claims that the United States and Russia should "talk to each other as friends."[20] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Trump should visit occupied Crimea in order to agree to a "new Yalta peace."[21] Multiple Russian outlets similarly compared the Alaska summit to Yalta and claimed that "people who have a real influence on global processes" will be at the table in Alaska.[22]

Russian comparisons of the August 15 US-Russia summit with the 1945 Yalta Conference attempt to conceal the power disparity between the United States and Russia and are efforts to present Russia as having much stronger diplomatic, military, and economic positions than it does. Russia is already trying to present the very fact that Trump and Putin are meeting as a Russian victory in order to foster perceptions that Russia is an equal of the United States. Comparisons between the two meetings are also inaccurate because the 1945 Yalta Conference resulted in an agreement about post-war Europe, while Trump and other US officials have reiterated that the August 15 summit will not result in any US-Russia agreements about the end of the war in Ukraine.

Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in priority sectors of the front line and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that Russia may transfer 15,000 troops to the Zaporizhia direction, 7,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction, and 5,000 troops to the Novopavlivka direction to intensify offensive operations in these areas in the near future.[23] Zelensky noted that the Russian military command may redeploy these troops from the Sumy direction. The Russian force grouping operating in northern Sumy Oblast largely consists of Russian airborne (VDV) and naval infantry elements, and the Russian military command may intend to redeploy these relatively more "elite" elements to eastern and southern Ukraine in the near future.[24]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne published on August 12 that the GUR received confirmed information that the Russian military command plans to achieve its "preliminary results" in Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Chasiv Yar – likely referring to Russian plans to seize these settlements – by the end of August 2025 or early September 2025.[25] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces recently have changed their tactics and are currently focusing on destroying any defensible positions with persistent strikes and forcing civilian evacuations before infiltrating a settlement in small sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Skibitskyi noted that Russian forces then consolidate and accumulate forces for larger attacks.

Skibitskyi noted that Russia has recently started shelling Kherson City intensively in order to force locals to evacuate – suggesting that Russian forces may be preparing for limited infiltration operations against Kherson City and west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian forces have implemented drone tactics and adaptations in recent months to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and to facilitate Russian advances on key Ukrainian settlements as ISW has reported.[26] Russian forces have notably conducted drone and missile strikes against Kherson Oblast that appear to be generating some BAI effects, suggesting that Russian forces may be applying new tactics that have proven successful in other parts of the front line for preparations to resume larger-scale offensive operations in the Kherson direction.[27] Russian forces may also use infiltration tactics like those seen in the recent Russian penetration in the Dobropillya direction to attack in the Kherson direction following strike preparations. The likelihood of imminent renewed, large-scale Russian offensive operations against Kherson City and west bank Kherson Oblast remains low at the moment, however, as the Russian military command would likely need to redeploy a significant number of forces to the area to cross the Dnipro River and establish and hold a bridgehead.

Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties. Skibitskyi stated that Russia's production of drones, Iskander ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles is enabling Russia to conduct combined strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, logistics, and civilian facilities.[28] Skibitskyi noted that Russia plans to manufacture over 79,000 Shahed-type strike drones in 2025, including 40,000 Geran-2 drones, 5,700 Garpiya-A1 drones, and 34,000 Gerber and other decoy drones. Skibitskyi stated that Russia is able to increase its drone and missile production after establishing new production lines in Izhevsk (referring to the Russian defense manufacturer Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol that produces Garpiya-A1 drones) and Yelabuga (referring to Russia's Shahed-type drone factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone [SEZ] near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan). Skibitskyi reported that Russia is also working to decrease its dependence on foreign-made components and has already domestically produced internal combustion engines, navigation system components, and antennas.

Russia has been able to dramatically increase the size of its missile and drone strike packages in recent weeks due to increased production and stockpiling, and these larger-scale strikes have caused significant civilian casualties and damage.[29] Russia's overnight strike packages in August 2025 have contained between 45 and 163 drones and missiles - a relatively small number compared to strike packages in recent months that contained hundreds of drones and missiles per night.[30] Russia is likely not conducting massive strikes against Ukraine at this time to set conditions for the upcoming Alaska summit and will likely refrain from such strikes until the summit is over. The smaller-scale strikes, however, allow Russia to stockpile missiles and drones, particularly as the quantity of drones used in many of Russia's drone strikes in recent weeks has been below Russia's reported June 2025 daily production rate of 170 Shahed and decoy drones.[31] Russia's daily drone production rate is likely even higher now. Russia may resume its large-scale strike packages following the bilateral summit.

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[32] Russian milbloggers continued to urge caution to their Russian audience about unconfirmed claims of Russian advance. [33] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev stated on August 12 that three groups of Russian forces conducted the recent penetration and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two of the groups and some of the third group.[34] Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces still need to clear Vesele, Rubizhne, Kucheriv Yar (all three northeast of Dobropillya), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya), but that Russian forces do not control these settlements. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya), while other milbloggers denied these claims.[35] One milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized the settlement.[36] ISW observed reports that elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade were operating near Toretsk throughout June 2025, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in late July 2025 that elements of the brigade were attacking in the Dobropillya direction.[37] The recent redeployment of elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that the Russian military command is currently prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over those in the Toretsk area, possibly as part of efforts to bypass the southern tip of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka from the southwest after Russian forces have failed to make significant advances north of Toretsk.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW's Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions. ISW’s definition of the Assessed Russian Advances layer is any area in which ISW assesses Russian forces have operated or launched attacks against but do not control. ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time. ISW largely uses its Assessed Russian Advances layer to depict areas within the Russian FLOT but over which Russian forces have not yet established control. ISW's Assessed Russian Advances layer illustrates areas where ISW has observed evidence of a Russian presence but does not necessarily denote areas where Russian forces have established an enduring presence. ISW evaluates its Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory map layer using the doctrinal definition of "control" - a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. ISW deliberately distinguishes between the Russian FLOT and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control. ISW does not assess that Russian forces exercise control over the areas in their tactical penetration near Dobropillya as of August 13.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town. Ukrainian battalion commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 12 and 13 that Russian forces are using small sabotage and reconnaissance groups to try to enter Pokrovsk.[38] One commander reported that Russian forces resumed intensive artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and air strikes against Pokrovsk in recent days, suggesting that the presence of Russian forces in the town is minimal.[39] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi's comments about Russian tactics focusing on striking settlements to destroy any defensible positions and force civilian evacuations before entering a settlement in small sabotage and reconnaissance groups - are consistent with reporting that Russian forces are intensely striking Pokrovsk and conducting infiltration missions.[40]

Russia's use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear are severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a strike against a Ukrainian drone operation point near Novomykolaivka (northeast of Dobropillya) using five Geran-2 drones.[41] Russian forces have been leveraging recent adaptations in drone technology and tactics to more heavily target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[42] Pokrovsk City Military Administration Head Serhiy Dobryak stated on August 12 that over 1,300 Ukrainian civilians remain in Pokrovsk but that Russian forces are striking "everything that moves" along roads going into the town, forcing civilians to walk to evacuation vehicles.[43] Donetsk Oblast Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 13 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from settlements due north, northwest, and west of Dobropillya, noting that roughly 1,150 children are present in these settlements.[44] Yevhen Tkachev, head of the Proliska humanitarian mission in Donetsk Oblast, reported on August 13 that Russian forces are conducting fiber optic drone strikes against civilian vehicles that are trying to evacuate Ukrainians from areas in Kostyantynivka.[45]

The Kremlin is likely using the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling campaign ahead of the Alaska summit. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced on August 13 that Belarusian and Russian forces will jointly rehearse planning for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik ballistic missiles during the Zapad-2025 exercises on September 12 through 16.[46] Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling and demonstrative military exercises as part of their reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that disproportionately benefit Russia.[47] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko recently participated in a likely staged press event with Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 1, during which both amplified the Kremlin's nuclear saber-rattling narratives.[48] Khrenin's mention of tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik planning exercises are likely part of the Kremlin's broader effort to posture military strength ahead of the Alaska summit. Russian officials have also used Russia's recent withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which Russia had violated for years, to threaten the United States.[49] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin dangles the prospect of bilateral arms control talks to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[50] Russia may intend the announcement that Zapad-2025 will focus on the employment of Oreshnik missiles (missiles that are banned under the INF Treaty and that Russia has publicly flaunted and employed against Ukraine) and nuclear weapons to pressure Trump to engage in arms control talks, distracting from talks about the war.

Skibitskyi recently stated that Russia and Belarus are actively preparing for Zapad-2025 but that the exercises do not pose a significant threat to Ukraine.[51] Skibitskyi noted that Lukashenko does not want to be directly involved in Russia's war against Ukraine. ISW similarly assessed that Belarusian forces are will not enter the war on behalf of Russia, but Belarus nonetheless plays an important role in Russia's war effort by forcing Ukrainian forces to defend the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, pinning forces that Ukraine could deploy along the frontline.[52]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials reiterated that Russia's objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations.
• The Trump administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine's formal involvement in peace negotiations.
• Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and warned that Russia would face "very severe consequences" if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit.
• The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US President Donald Trump.
• Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in Kherson Oblast.
• Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties.
• Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
• ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW's Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.
• Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town.
• The Kremlin is likely using the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling campaign ahead of the Alaska summit.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 12, 2025

Russian forces continued to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) using limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups on August 12. Russian forces have yet to be able to deploy reinforcements to hold and exploit this tactical penetration and will likely face obstacles in trying to do so. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 12 that Russian sabotage groups infiltrated Vesele, Rubizhne, Kucheriv Yar (all three northeast of Dobropillya), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya) and that Ukrainian forces had already destroyed some of these groups.[i] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that several small Russian groups bypassed Ukrainian positions and tried to advance toward Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian military command allocated additional forces and means to the area. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that the situation is most complicated near Dobropillya and that Russian forces operating without mechanized equipment advanced about 10 kilometers deep.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff's report indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Dobropillya to Nove Shakhove and Stepy. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized Nove Shakhove, Rubizhne, Ivanivka (both east of Dobropillya), and Dorozhie (southeast of Dobropillya) and advanced near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Shakhove, Toretske (both east of Dobropillya), and Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya) and in eastern Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[iii]

Ukrainian and Russian sources characterized the Russian forces operating east and northeast of Dobropillya as limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups that are hiding in basements, windbreaks, and forests in the area.[iv] Russian forces have been using tactics that rely on small fireteams that infiltrate the Ukrainian near rear by finding weak points in Ukrainian defenses, at which point the fireteams wait for more forces to accumulate and then attack to try to gain a foothold and consolidate.[v] The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces recently reported that Russian forces are constantly changing tactics and methods of deploying troops in the Pokrovsk direction and are leveraging numerical manpower superiority to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses with small infantry groups despite sustaining high casualties in these assaults.[vi] The Dnipro Grouping of Forces clarified that small group infiltrations are not an indicator of Russian forces establishing control over a given area and noted that such inaccurate conclusions lead to a misunderstanding of the situation in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces will likely attempt to employ this infiltration and accumulation tactic east and northeast of Dobropillya as well. The Russian penetration near Dobropillya is notably a deeper and faster tactical push than those that Russian forces have recently achieved, but Russia's ability to mature these tactical advances into an operational-level breakthrough in the near future is not certain. Ukrainian drone operations had been largely successful at holding back significant Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction since late 2024 and will likely continue to be an obstacle to Russia's deployment of reinforcements and ability to hold its positions. Russian forces will also have to contend with newly arrived Ukrainian reinforcements in the area.[vii]

Russian milbloggers, who often overinflate Russian advances, questioned Russia's ability to exploit the tactical penetration. Several Russian milbloggers urged caution on August 12, noting that Russian forces have yet to consolidate their positions and that the penetration is not a full-scale breakthrough yet.[viii] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Russian forces infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in a "splayed" manner and that the depth of the penetration threatens Russia's ability to secure its flanks.[ix] The milblogger expressed concern about Russia's ability to close the pocket in the area, given Russia's high losses. The milblogger complained that Russian forces had not adequately integrated strike drone units and assault groups and that the Russian groups infiltrated gaps in Ukrainian defenses, mostly using Russia's "usual" highly attritional, infantry-led assaults. Another milblogger claimed that the penetration has significantly stretched the frontline and that Russian forces will only be able to turn the penetration into a "success" if Russian forces have enough manpower to introduce operational reserves and advance "correctly and in time."[x] A Russian source claimed that infiltration missions have serious risks, as the infantry far from the front can only receive supplies via drones, and the main forces cannot support isolated infiltration groups.[xi] The source claimed that Russian forces will likely soon try to launch a subsequent attack with a larger group of forces to prevent Ukrainian forces from gaining the tactical initiative. A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed several Russian groups that had infiltrated the area and are gradually pushing back Russian forces that were trying to gain a foothold.[xii]

The Russian tactical penetration in the Dobropillya direction was not immediate but came rather after months of Russian preparation and condition setting using new drone innovations and tactics at scale. ISW recently assessed that Russia's integration of combined drone strike tactics and adaptations in recent months has facilitated Russian advances on key Ukrainian towns.[xiii] Russian strike and reconnaissance drone adaptations are likely achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) - the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 12 that Russian forces in the Dobropillya area have "systematically" knocked out Ukrainian drone crews and had taken Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) northwest of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) under fire control with drones.[xiv] The milblogger claimed that these Russian efforts isolated the combat zone. Another milblogger claimed on August 12 that Russian infantry infiltrated the Ukrainian near rear along previously reconnoitered routes.[xv]

Russia's persistent drone strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs have likely impacted Ukraine's defensive operations, enabling the recent Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group penetration. Russian forces have increased their use of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against the T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway, and Russian drones have also been targeting Ukrainian vehicles along the T-0515 highway in Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xvi] Russia's drone adaptations in recent months, including the use of repeater drones that extend the range of tactical drones, sleeper drones with modifications to operate on the ground in a low-power standby mode, and fiber optic drones that are resistant to electronic warfare (EW), have enabled Russian forces to threaten Ukrainian GLOCs deeper in the rear than before. Russia's partners, particularly the People's Republic of China (PRC), have provided drone components and production capabilities that have enabled many of these Russian drone adaptations. Russia tested many of its recent drone innovations during offensive operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast and began scaling up its production and deployment of modified drones in early 2025. Russia's use of sabotage and reconnaissance groups to conduct a tactical penetration is not intrinsically noteworthy, but Russia's drone innovations enabling strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs to achieve the effects of BAI will require a Ukrainian and Western response.

Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction are also only the most recent result of over 17 months’ worth of protracted campaigning. Russia’s recent tactical penetration should be viewed within the context of Russian forces’ significant resource expenditures to attrit Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction over the past year and a half. Russian forces have been fighting since February 2024 to advance west of Avdiivka. Russian forces, with their recent penetration near Zolotyi Kolodyaz have advanced 55 kilometers in depth over the past 17 months. Russian forces have lost well over five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in the Summer 2024.[xvii]

Russian officials are attempting to exploit the tactical penetration near Dobropillya to influence the upcoming US-Russia summit in Alaska, but the Kremin's overall strategic objective is to break the will of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe in order to achieve Russia's longstanding demand for full Ukrainian capitulation. Russian State Duma deputies Alexei Zhuravlev and Nikolai Buduev claimed on August 12 that negotiations must account for “realities on the ground” (a reference to the frontline that Kremlin officials often use to claim that Russia is in a superior position on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine must concede to Russia's demands).[xviii] Zhuravlev also claimed that eastern Ukraine is a "treasure trove of minerals" and that it is strategically important that Russia maintain a land corridor to occupied Crimea via southern Ukraine. Buduev further claimed that a freeze of the current frontline would be a temporary solution as it would leave the ”root causes” of the war unresolved, and State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed that any peace settlement must address the “causes” of the war in order to prevent the future resumption of Russian military activity.[xix] Kremlin-affiliated Russian academic Dmitry Suslov published an op-ed in Russian business outlet Kommersant claiming that any possible ceasefire and peace settlement that emerges from the August 15 US-Russia summit will be based "primarily on the Russian approach" but that Russia will "continue to win" on the battlefield even if the summit does not result in any agreements about the war.[xx] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky claimed on August 12 that additional Western military aid to Ukraine will not change the battlefield situation and that time is not on Ukraine’s and the West's side.[xxi]

Russian officials' statements continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains committed to achieving its original war aims. Russian officials' continued references to the war's ”root cause” (which Kremlin officials have defined as Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and NATO expansion) are reiterations of Russia's original war demands from 2021 and 2022 for changes to NATO's Open Door Policy and the removal of the current Ukrainian government.[xxii] Zhuralev's claims about mineral deposits and the land bridge are setting informational conditions to claim that Russia cannot withdraw from eastern or southern Ukraine due to strategic Russian security interests. Zhuralev's claim demonstrates Russia's unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations that require compromises - as ISW has repeatedly assessed. Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to frame Russia's seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as inevitable to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.[xxiii] Russia has frequently employed informational campaigns that frame large-scale Russian advances and battlefield victories as inevitable, even when there are no negotiations on the horizon.[xxiv] Russian efforts to influence the US-Russia summit in Alaska are unlikely to be successful, as US President Donald Trump previously stated that the United States would not pursue a US-Russian agreement to end Russia's war against Ukraine during the summit.[xxv]  Trump recently noted that Putin aims to conquer all of Ukraine – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment.[xxvi] Russia is trying to break the will of the United States and Europe to continue supporting Ukraine and to break Ukraine's will to continue defending against Russian aggression in order to pave the way for Russia to achieve full Ukrainian capitulation.

Ukrainian intelligence indicated that North Korea recently deployed 11,000 soldiers to Russia to facilitate Russia's war effort in Ukraine, further demonstrating Russia's commitment to leaning on its anti-Western partners to protract the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on August 12 that there are roughly 11,000 North Korean troops at Russian training grounds located largely in western Russia, including in Kursk Oblast. Skibitskyi noted that the Russian military command appears to have defined North Korean forces' areas of responsibility as Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. Skibitskyi reported that North Korea has agreed to send additional troops to Russia to support reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast, which coheres with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's announcement in June 2025.[xxvii] Skibitskyi noted that GUR is expecting the arrival of the first contingent of North Korean soldiers to Kursk Oblast to consist of approximately 1,200 soldiers. South Korean intelligence assessed in June 2025 that the Russian military command likely intended to leverage the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia in July or August 2025, and Skibitskyi's report coheres with these reports.[xxviii] The Russian military command likely aims to leverage the influx of North Korean troops to pin Ukrainian forces to the Russian-Ukrainian border area as part of efforts to establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and to prevent the Ukrainian military command from redeploying manpower to reinforce Ukrainian defensive positions in other priority areas of the front.[xxix] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa previously assessed that Russia likely seeks to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025, and the Russian military command is likely aiming to exploit North Korean troops in pursuit of this objective.[xxx] It remains unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy to Ukrainian territory or remain in Russian border areas. North Korean troops deploying to Ukrainian territory would indicate a serious escalation in North Korea's commitment to support Russia's war effort, as North Korean troops have previously only fought on Russian territory. North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would still free up Russian forces for deployment to the battlefield in Ukraine, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continued to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) using limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups on August 12. Russian forces have yet to be able to deploy reinforcements to hold and exploit this tactical penetration and will likely face obstacles in trying to do so.
• Russian milbloggers, who often overinflate Russian advances, questioned Russia's ability to exploit the tactical penetration.
• The Russian tactical penetration in the Dobropillya direction was not immediate but came rather after months of Russian preparation and condition setting using new drone innovations and tactics at scale.
• Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction are also only the most recent result of over 17 months’ worth of protracted campaigning.
• Russian officials are attempting to exploit the tactical penetration near Dobropillya to influence the upcoming US-Russia summit in Alaska, but the Kremlin's overall strategic objective is to break the will of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe to achieve Russia's longstanding demand for full Ukrainian capitulation.
• Ukrainian intelligence indicated that North Korea recently deployed 11,000 soldiers to Russia to facilitate Russia's war effort in Ukraine, further demonstrating Russia's commitment to leaning on its anti-Western partners to protract the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Borova, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 11, 2025

US President Donald Trump expressed the United States' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Trump commented on August 11 about the upcoming August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska and stated that "it is not up to [Trump]" to make a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin about the end of Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that "a deal should be made for both [Russia and Ukraine]," suggesting that the United States will not pursue a US-Russian brokered agreement that would exclude Ukraine during the Alaska meeting. Trump added that he would notify Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders about his upcoming meeting with Putin. Trump stated that a meeting between Zelensky and Putin or with Zelensky, Putin, and Trump will follow the Alaska summit – suggesting that the United States is interested in facilitating substantive peace talks that include Ukraine in negotiations with Russia.

Trump signaled that the United States would aim to return some of Ukraine's economically and strategically significant territories during the peace negotiations process. Trump noted that Russian forces currently occupy "some very prime territory" in Ukraine and that the United States is going to "try and get some of that territory back for Ukraine."[2] Trump did not clarify what he considers to be "prime" territory, only vaguely noting that Russia has taken "largely ocean in real estate" and that Ukraine only maintains control over the coastline in Odesa Oblast. Trump's references to "prime" territory are likely about Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, given his discussions about territory on the ocean or a river and his mention of Odesa Oblast. Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts host an abundance of economically and strategically significant land and offer much broader access to the Black Sea and the Dnipro River. Ukraine's access to the Black Sea is critical for Ukraine's sizeable export market, particularly of agricultural products and minerals.[3] Ukraine is also rich in critical raw materials, and Russia's direct access to the Black Sea may enable Russia to capture significant revenue streams associated with Ukraine's raw material export. Ukraine's access to the Dnipro River and a buffer around that river is operationally significant because the river acts as a naturally defensible barrier. Allowing Russia to maintain control over east (left) bank Kherson Oblast would put Russia in a much more advantageous position to conduct offensive operations against west (right) bank Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, given how the current Ukrainian positions along the Dnipro River, if frozen, would lack the necessary operational depth to prevent a repeat Russian invasion. Persistent Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes are currently preventing Russian forces from accumulating engineering and bridging equipment to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, but a future ceasefire would prevent such strikes. Zaporizhia Oblast also hosts Europe's largest nuclear power station – the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) - which supplied roughly one-fifth of Ukraine's electricity before Russia's full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have occupied the facility since March 2022.[4] The Trump administration had previously attempted to negotiate an agreement to secure joint Ukrainian and US control over the ZNPP, which Russia explicitly rejected in spring 2025.[5]

Trump indicated that Putin's fear of the impact of US sanctions against Russia and Russia's economic partners drove Putin to propose a bilateral summit. Trump stated that the Russian economy is "not doing well right now."[6] Trump stated that his announcement imposing 50 percent tariffs on India for importing Russian oil is also not helping the Russian economy and "was a big blow" to countries that purchase Russian oil. Trump stated that he was "all set" to implement much more significant economic restrictions, but that Trump "got a call that [Russian officials] would like to meet." Trump correctly indicated that the Russian economy is a liability that the United States, Europe, and Ukraine can leverage to degrade Russia's ability to continue its war in Ukraine. Putin has long sustained a theory of victory that relies upon the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West, including by relying on Russia's partners to sustain the Russian economy and war machine.[7] ISW continues to assess that strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, in concert with timely and sufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine, can enable Ukraine to inflict more severe battlefield losses on Russia and thereby challenge Putin's theory of victory.[8]

Putin's decision to reach out immediately before Trump imposed further economic restrictions against Russia or its trading partners undermines the Kremlin's ongoing narrative that sanctions have not and will not affect the Russian economy. Kremlin officials have routinely claimed that Russia's economy is strong and impervious to further US or other Western sanctions, both in order to portray stability to the domestic Russian audience and to convince Western states not to impose further sanctions against Russia and its trading partners.[9] Putin's decision to reach out to Trump immediately before the United States imposed additional economic restrictions demonstrates the Kremlin's recognition that this narrative is false. The Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project, and Russia has implemented monetary and economic policies to disguise Russia's economic issues, but that will likely exacerbate Russia's instability instead.[10]

Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine. State Duma Committee on International Affairs First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 11 that the primary issue of the Putin-Trump meeting will be discussions about solutions to the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine (a common Kremlin reference to Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] expansion) to ensure that these causes "cannot be repeated."[11] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya published an opinion piece on August 11 by Vice-Rector of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) Diplomatic Academy Oleg Karpovich claiming that Russia has yet to achieve its objective of protecting the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and reiterating that Russia considers Ukrainian membership in NATO "impossible."[12] Karpovich claimed that Ukraine's "denazification" is a "matter of time." Putin and other Russian officials have continued to demand Ukraine’s demilitarization (a demand for the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself against future Russian aggression), denazification (a demand for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a Russian puppet government), and alliance neutrality.[13] Putin most recently reaffirmed his uncompromising demands on August 1 when he claimed that his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede all of the four illegally annexed oblasts before he would agree to a ceasefire are still in place. Putin’s recent demand is notably only about the conditions that Ukraine must meet before Putin will agree to a ceasefire, not war termination. Putin's demands before he agrees to a war termination agreement will likely be even more extensive.

Putin is reportedly demoting officials within his inner circle who have voiced disagreement with Putin's determination to continue the war. The New York Times reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after Kozak advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia's security services.[14] Kozak was previously one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko.[15] Kozak’s recent opposition to Russia's war and the subsequent reduction in his influence in the Kremlin demonstrate Putin's determination to continue his war to achieve his maximalist demands.

Russian officials and media are also setting informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement to end the war. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 9 that US President Donald Trump is a "temporary person" due to US presidential term limits and that US presidents often renege on agreements that their predecessors reached.[16] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad, which often works to condition the Russian nationalist community to support Russia's war effort, published an opinion piece on August 11 claiming that any peace deal that Russia agrees to with Trump is a deal only with his administration, not the United States or the broader West.[17] The article further claimed that the next US administration will not adhere to any agreement that Trump concludes with Putin and that peace in Ukraine is "just a truce" and the war will resume. Russian State Duma Deputy Leonid Ivlev stated on August 10 that Ukraine's Constitution is meaningless and is simply a result of Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs bargaining.[18] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely to allow Russia to renege on a peace settlement that Russia signs with Ukraine in the future at a time of Russia's choosing.[19]

Putin may try to use the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to gain concessions from Trump about the war in Ukraine in the August 15 meeting in Alaska. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on August 10 that Russia continued research and development of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles while the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was in effect and that Russia has a "fairly solid arsenal" of such missiles.[20] Rybakov claimed on August 11 that Russia's "reliable" sources confirmed that Russia's recent withdrawal from the INF Treaty achieved its "desired result" and a "sobering effect" in the United States.[21] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin was dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[22] Putin may offer to negotiate arms control treaties with Trump during the August 15 bilateral summit in Alaska. The June 2021 summit between Putin and former US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021 notably focused on arms control and largely ignored Ukraine despite the buildup of Russian forces on Ukraine's border at the time.[23] Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use and production of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty, including the Oreshnik ballistic missile and possibly the Iskander missile.[24] The renewal of the INF Treaty or the establishment of a similar treaty would likely not result in any significant change in Russia's deployment and use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are reportedly infiltrating areas near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces likely recently advanced southeast of the settlement. A Ukrainian source stated on August 11 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Dobropillya.[25] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) shows heat anomalies west of Nove Shakhove and in Novyi Donbas (both east of Dobropillya), Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya), suggesting fire missions in the area.[26] ISW therefore assesses that Russian forces likely recently seized Razine, Sukhetske, Fedorivka, Zatyshok, Boikivka, Novotoretske, Zapovidne (all southeast of Dobropillya), Mayak, and Pankivka (both east of Dobropillya). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 11 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that forward Russian assault units and "infiltration" groups are operating near Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), Nove Shakhove, and Bilytske.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and advanced north of Zapovidne, south of Bilytske, south of Dorozhnie, west of Shakhove, southeast of Vilne (both east of Dobropillya), to Nove Shakhove, south of Kucheriv Yar, and to the outskirts of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly half of Volodymyrivka (south of Shakhove) and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Pankivka.[30] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have interdicted a roughly 2.5 kilometer wide section of the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Kucheriv Yar and Zolotyi Kolodyaz are contested "gray zones" and that Russian forces are likely conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions in these areas.[31] It is premature to call the Russian advances in the Dobropillya area an operational-level breakthrough, though Russian forces very likely seek to mature their tactical advances into an operational-level breakthrough in the coming days. Russian forces used a similar tactical penetration in mid-April 2024 to facilitate the seizure of operationally significant territory northwest of Avdiivka.[32] The next several days in the Pokrovsk area of operations will likely be critical for Ukraine’s ability to prevent accelerated Russian gains north and northwest of Pokrovsk.

Russia is likely focusing on advances toward Dobropillya to set informational conditions ahead of the August 15 US-Russian summit. ISW continues to assess that Putin is attempting to frame Russia's seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as inevitable to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.[33] Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles, particularly in likely multi-year endeavors in Donetsk Oblast. Putin likely seeks to leverage intensified tactical pushes in Avdiivka to set conditions to seek US concessions on Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russian forces have been using drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the near rear in recent weeks to set conditions for more rapid advances in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW recently assessed that Russian drone adaptations are likely achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[34] Russian forces have increased their use of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against the T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway after having significantly improved their tactical drone capabilities to threaten Ukrainian GLOCs deeper in the rear than before. Russian drones have also been targeting Ukrainian vehicles along the T-0515 highway in Rodynske. Russia's persistent drone strikes at longer ranges are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to take alternative roads and further stretch GLOCs, which is likely impacting Ukraine's defensive operations that rely on the consistent flow of equipment, supplies, and manpower.

Russian forces continue to implement and field technological drone innovations designed to strike Ukrainian forces' rear and near rear. Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed on August 11 that Russian forces have adapted their indigenous Geran drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-136) to carry anti-tank mines that enable operators to remotely mine Ukrainian forces' rear and near rear.[35] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on August 11 from a Russian milblogger showing an unspecified Russian drone remotely mining an unspecified logistics route in Ukraine and noted that Russian Shahed-type drones are now capable of carrying two mines.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are achieving partial effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and are advancing on the battlefield by leveraging technological innovations and combined drone strike tactics.[37] Russian forces are now fielding fiber optic controlled sleeper drones to locations such as rooftops, hilltops, and roads for up to several weeks in support of missions targeting Ukrainian positions and logistics; the drones are capable of remaining electronically silent and physically inactive.[38] Russia's war in Ukraine continues to be defined by its dramatically shortened innovation cycle, underscoring the critical importance of continued Western support for Ukraine's development of kinetic drone countermeasures and drone interceptors that are capable of interdicting Russian Shahed-type and tactical drones.[39]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on August 10 to 11. Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range drone strike against the Arzamas Instrument-Making Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, which produces components for Kh-32 and Kh-101 missiles. A geolocated photograph shows damage to a building at the plant and footage shows a fire at the building.[40] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted unspecified enterprises in two industrial zones in the oblast on the night of August 10 to 11 and that a drone strike killed one enterprise employee and injured two in Arzamassky Okrug.[41]

Ukrainian official sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone strike against Komi Republic on the night of August 9 to 10. Suspilne reported on August 11 that sources in the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that GUR conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic, which supplied fuel and lubricants to Russian forces.[42] The GUR sources reported that the strike damaged a tank with petroleum products and a gas and gas condensate processing plant. Ukhta City Civil Defense and Emergencies Department Head Andrey Dudnikov claimed on August 11 that two drones fell on the oil refinery on August 10, damaging a water tank and smokestack.[43] ISW continues to assess that a possible long-range strikes moratorium will hinder Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign against the Russian defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia's defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[44] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine's civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump expressed the United States' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Trump signaled that the United States would aim to return some of Ukraine's economically and strategically significant territories during the peace negotiations process.
• Trump indicated that Putin's fear of the impact of US sanctions against Russia and Russia's economic partners drove Putin to propose a bilateral summit.
• Putin's decision to reach out immediately before Trump imposed further economic restrictions against Russia or its trading partners undermines the Kremlin's ongoing narrative that sanctions have not and will not affect the Russian economy.
• Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine.
• Russian officials and media are also setting informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement to end the war.
• Putin may try to use the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to gain concessions from Trump about the war in Ukraine in the August 15 meeting in Alaska.
• Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are reportedly infiltrating areas near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces likely recently advanced southeast of the settlement.
• Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on August 10 to 11.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2025

The United States and Ukraine's European allies agree that Europe, not the United States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance gave an interview to Fox News on August 10 and reiterated the Trump Administration's consistent position that the United States will no longer directly fund the Ukrainian military effort, but that Europe can continue to buy weapons from US manufacturers for Ukraine and Europe's own defensive needs.[i] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in an interview with Face the Nation published on August 10 that the "floodgate" of lethal aid packages to Ukraine opened after US President Donald Trump met with Rutte on July 14 and that Canada and European NATO allies will continue to fund weapons for Ukraine.[ii] Rutte stated that these deliveries are in addition to Europe's investments in European and Ukrainian defense industrial facilities and that there will be additional European aid package announcements in the coming weeks. Western outlets reported on August 7 that NATO allies, the European Parliament, and several international banks — including US JP Morgan Chase, German Commerzbank, and Canadian RBC Capital Markets — are backing the new Bank for Defense, Security, and Resilience (DSRB), an international bank that will specialize in lending to NATO and allied countries for defense procurement.[iii] Western media reported that the DSRB will help NATO states reach their goal of committing five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense spending and that more than 40 unspecified countries are expected to become shareholders. UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves and UK Defense Secretary John Healy endorsed the DSRB.[iv] The DSRB announcement signals NATO allies' commitment to increasing defense spending, and European NATO members will likely leverage the bank to sustain investments in Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), to launch further joint production initiatives with Ukraine, and to fund defense production intended for Ukraine and NATO allies' own stocks.

US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the August 15 summit in Alaska. Reuters reported on August 9, citing sources in the White House, that Trump is open to holding a trilateral summit in Alaska with Zelensky and Putin but that the White House is currently preparing for a bilateral meeting between Trump and Putin.[v] CNN and NBC reported on August 10, citing senior US officials and sources familiar with the matter, that the White House has not ruled out the possibility of inviting Zelensky to Alaska.[vi] One of the sources noted that any meeting with Zelensky would likely occur after the Trump-Putin meeting. Vance told Fox News on August 10 that the United States is trying to schedule a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky in order to negotiate an end to the war.[vii] Vance stated that Putin's refusal to meet with Zelensky has been one of the most significant impediments to the peace process.

The Kremlin is attempting to use the upcoming Alaska summit to divide the United States from Europe rather than engage in meaningful peace efforts. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 10 on both his English and Russian language Telegram accounts that Europe is trying to prevent the United States from helping to stop the war in Ukraine.[viii] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky claimed on August 9 that European countries are pursuing an anti-Russian policy and trying to prevent a quick peace settlement in Ukraine.[ix] Russian political scientist Sergei Markov told the Washington Post on August 10 that Russia's main interest in the Alaska summit is to portray Ukraine and Europe rather than Russia as the obstacles to peace in Ukraine.[x] Markov stated that Russia refuses to take any steps backward and that the only compromise that Russia is willing to consider is halting military efforts to seize Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts and Kherson and Zaporizhzhia cities. Markov expressed hope that Trump will realize that Zelensky is the main reason for Russia's war in Ukraine and that European leaders are the second reason for the war, rather than Russia.

European and Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, have consistently demonstrated their willingness to promote and engage in good faith negotiations and impose substantive ceasefire agreements to progress the peace initiative, which Russia has consistently rejected in pursuit of incremental battlefield gains and additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[xi] The Kremlin has long attempted to weaken cohesion between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine as part of a wider campaign to deter further Western support to Ukraine and distract from Russia's intransigence regarding the peace process and unwillingness to compromise on Putin's original war demands.[xii] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its long-standing war aims of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, regime change in Ukraine in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukraine's demilitarization - all of which would ensure Ukraine's full capitulation - and that Russia will very likely violate and weaponize any future ceasefire agreements in Ukraine while blaming Ukraine for the violations as it repeatedly did in Spring 2025.[xiii]

Ukraine's European allies continue to signal their support for Ukraine and US-led peace efforts ahead of the Alaska summit. French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen published a joint statement on August 9 expressing support for US-led peace efforts and calling for Ukrainian and European involvement in future peace negotiations.[xiv] The European leaders called for a ceasefire or reduction of hostilities before negotiations begin and stated that the current frontline should be the starting point for negotiations. The leaders also called for robust and credible security guarantees that protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The leaders expressed their commitment to the principle that international borders cannot be changed by force and reiterated that Russia's invasion of Ukraine violates the UN Charter, the Helsinki Act, and the Budapest Memorandum, among other Russian international agreements.

Russian tank losses appear to be declining as Russian forces continue to deprioritize mechanized assaults across the frontline, indicating that the Russian command recognizes that it cannot protect vehicles from Ukrainian drone strike capabilities on the frontline and near rear. An intelligence focused open source that tracks Russian vehicle losses in Ukraine reported on August 10 that the rate of Russian tank losses continues to decline and reached its lowest levels of the war in June and July 2025.[xv] The source stated that it has visually confirmed 22 Russian tank losses in June 2025 and 19 Russian tank losses in July 2025, down from 116 confirmed tank losses in June 2024 and 97 confirmed tank losses in July 2024.[xvi] The source indicated that Russian tank loss rates began to decrease in December 2024, which is consistent with the Russian military command's theater-wide shift from costly mechanized assaults toward gradual, creeping infantry assaults.[xvii] The source stated that Russian T-62 and T-90 loss rates remain consistent, T-72 loss rates have declined in proportion to the overall decline of Russian tank losses, and T-80 tank loss rates have significantly declined.[xviii] Russia has likely exhausted much or all of its stockpiles of T-80 tanks and is likely conserving existing stores and stockpiling newer tank models while depleting stores of other tanks and armored vehicles, including the older T-62. Russian forces have conducted relatively few but costly mechanized assaults in Ukraine thus far in 2025 due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone strikes against armored vehicles, instead prioritizing infantry-led assaults and assaults on expendable motorcycles and other light vehicles.[xix] Russian forces have been using armored vehicles to transport infantry to forward positions for infantry assaults, constraining Russian advances to foot pace and preventing Russia from using mechanized maneuver warfare to exploit breakthroughs and achieve operationally significant advances.[xx] It remains unclear why Russia continues to invest significantly in tank and armored vehicle development and production while Russian forces are largely unable to field these vehicles for their intended purposes, as Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to inflict high frontline and near-rear armored vehicle losses with drone reconnaissance and strikes.[xxi] Russia may be preparing for the eventuality that Russian forces will become able to counter Ukrainian drone operations well enough to be able to field armored vehicles and restore at least some maneuver to the battlefield, but ISW has observed no indications of Russian technological advances in this direction.

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 9 to 10, including the first drone strike against a target in the Komi Republic. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 10 that Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) conducted a drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City, causing a fire.[xxii] The General Staff reported that the facility produces up to seven million tons of gasoline and diesel fuels per year and over 20 types of petroleum products and supplies the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows a large smoke plume over the Saratov Oil Refinery, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area that are consistent with reports of fires in the area.[xxiii] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a drone damaged an industrial enterprise in Saratov Oblast.[xxiv] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in February 2025, January 2025, and November 2024.[xxv] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic with at least one drone, and geolocated footage published on August 10 shows damage to a tank at the refinery.[xxvi] Ukhta is more than 2,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[xxvii] Russian authorities have not yet acknowledged a Ukrainian drone strike against the Komi Republic, but did temporarily stop flights from the Utkha Airport, consistent with reactions to Ukrainian drone strikes elsewhere in Russia.[xxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of an unspecified Russian battalion near occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, killing 25 Russian personnel, including the battalion commander.[xxix] ISW has recently observed elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division), and 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) operating near Oleshky.[xxx]

Ukrainian drone manufacturers have developed a new drone capable of intercepting higher-speed Russian drones. Representatives of the Ukrainian drone manufacturer Besomar told Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi on August 10 that Besomar developed a reusable interceptor drone that is capable of downing Russian drones at speeds up to 200 kilometers per hour, including Geran-type long-range strike drones.[xxxi] The interceptor drone is equipped with a shotgun and an automated firing system that can hold between two and four shots. The interceptor drone is also equipped with a digital communications system with a frequency response that allows the drone to approach its target unnoticed by the Russian drone's evasion systems. The drone can fire manually or automatically due to a sensor in the nose of the drone that the drone operator can activate to initiate a shot when a target enters the drone's range.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine's European allies agree that Europe, not the United States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine.
• US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the August 15 summit in Alaska.
• The Kremlin is attempting to use the upcoming Alaska summit to divide the United States from Europe rather than engage in meaningful peace efforts.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to signal their support for Ukraine and US-led peace efforts ahead of the Alaska summit.
• Russian tank losses appear to be declining as Russian forces continue to deprioritize mechanized assaults across the frontline, indicating that the Russian command recognizes that it cannot protect vehicles from Ukrainian drone strike capabilities on the frontline and near-rear.
• Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 9 to 10, including the first drone strike against a target in the Komi Republic.
• Ukrainian drone manufacturers have developed a new drone capable of intercepting higher-speed Russian drones.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 9, 2025

The Trump Administration has described Russian President Vladimir Putin's reported demands for a ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since August 6. The exact details of Putin's position remain unclear. German outlet BILD reported on August 9 that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff misunderstood Putin's demand for Ukraine to withdraw from the remainder of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, in addition to the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, as an offer for Russia to withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts during the August 6 Putin-Witkoff meeting.[1] BILD reported that Witkoff also misunderstood Putin's proposal for an energy infrastructure and long-range strikes ceasefire, and that Witkoff interpreted Putin's offer as a general ceasefire that would curtail frontline military activity. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that European officials familiar with the conversation and call stated that US President Donald Trump, presumably after being briefed by Witkoff, told Ukrainian and European officials on August 6 that Putin would withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine ceding unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[2] The officials told WSJ that Witkoff walked back Trump's statement during a call with European officials on August 7 and stated that Russia would "both withdraw and freeze" the frontline, presumably referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. European officials reportedly asked Witkoff to further clarify Putin's demand during a call on August 8, and Witkoff stated that the "only offer" on the table was for Ukraine to unilaterally withdraw from Donetsk Oblast in exchange for a ceasefire. Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported that a source in Ukraine's Presidential Office briefed on the Putin-Witkoff meeting, presumably by Witkoff himself, stated that Putin also offered to withdraw from northeastern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts as a "sign of goodwill" in exchange for Ukraine ceding the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.[3] The source stated that Putin reportedly told Witkoff that Putin would be willing to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Bloomberg reported on August 8 that unnamed sources stated that Putin demanded that Ukraine withdraw from the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and concede occupied Crimea to Russia in exchange for freezing the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and beginning negotiations on a ceasefire agreement.[4] It remains unclear, based on Western reporting, if Putin ever truly offered to withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected Putin's demand.[5]

The only element of Putin's reported position common to all reports is Putin's continued demand for Ukraine to withdraw from unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast — a major Ukrainian concession. Conceding to such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its "fortress belt," the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting will not resume.[6] Ukraine's fortress belt stymied Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast in 2014 and 2022 and is still impeding Russia's efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in 2025, as ISW has recently described. The fortress belt is a significant obstacle to Russia's current path of advance westward in Ukraine, and surrendering the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their attacks on more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for the ground.[7]

Ukrainian and European officials reportedly presented a counterproposal to US officials on August 9 as European officials continue to issue statements of support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. WSJ reported on August 9 that Ukraine and European leaders proposed a counteroffer to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands for Ukrainian territorial concessions as a precondition to ceasefire during a meeting with US Vice President JD Vance in the United Kingdom (UK) on August 9.[8] WSJ reported that the counteroffer stipulates that a full ceasefire in Ukraine must be implemented prior to territorial negotiations, in accordance with US President Donald Trump’s previously articulated preferred timeline for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine.[9] WSJ reported that the counteroffer also states that territorial exchanges should be conducted in a reciprocal manner and that Ukraine must receive robust security guarantees in exchange for any Ukrainian territorial concessions to prevent future Russian aggression against Ukraine. WSJ reported that Finnish President Alexander Stubb presented the Ukrainian-European counterproposal to Trump during a phone call on August 9. European leaders, including UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys, Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze, and Romanian Foreign Minister Toiu Oana, expressed support for Ukraine’s efforts to achieve a just and lasting resolution to Russia’s war on August 9.[10]

Russian officials welcomed the announcement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Alaska on August 15 and referenced Russian narratives about Russia's historical claims to Alaska. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Alaska is a logical meeting place due to the fact that the United States and Russia are close neighbors across the Bering Strait and share economic interests in Alaska and the Arctic region.[11] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who attended the August 6 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, described Alaska on August 9 as "a Russian-born American" and claimed that Alaska reflects the ties between the United States and Russia.[12] Dmitriev also noted Alaska's historic ties to the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia's past military and economic presence in Alaska.[13] Russian officials and state media have previously claimed that the United States should return Alaska to Russia. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed in January 2024 that Russia has been waiting for the United States to return Alaska "any day" in response to a US Department of State statement to the contrary.[14] Russian TV hosts and propagandists Vladimir Solovyov and Olga Skabeyeva repeatedly claimed in 2024 that the United States should return Alaska to Russia.[15] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed in July 2022 that Russia would claim Alaska as its own if the United States froze foreign-based Russian assets.[16] Russian state media outlet RT claimed in October 2018 that Russia should demand Alaska back from the United States after the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.[17]

Ukraine continues its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on August 9 that it conducted a drone strike against a Russian Shahed drone warehouse in Kzyl Yul, Republic of Tatarstan and that the drone strike started a fire at the warehouse.[18] The SBU stated that Russia stored Shahed drones and related foreign-sourced components at the facility. Kzyl Yul is located roughly 43 kilometers from the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia has based a large-scale Shahed drone production facility.[19] Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Militarnyi reported that sources within Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that GUR conducted a sabotage operation in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai on August 8, causing two explosions near a checkpoint on the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade's (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) base.[20]

Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 8 that the Russian military command appointed Nikiforov as the new commander of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, replacing Lapin, who has held the position since Fall 2024.[21] Russian milbloggers have been highly critical of Lapin for Russia’s failure to establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[22] Nikiforov has reportedly been overseeing Russia's response to the August 2025 Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and subsequent Russian offensive into northern Sumy Oblast alongside Lapin since mid-August 2024.[23] A Kremlin insider source claimed that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is a close ally of Nikiforov and likely had a role in Nikiforov’s appointment.[24] Neither Russian state media nor the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has yet confirmed Nikiforov's appointment, and Lapin's next assignment remains unclear.

Key Takeaways:

• The Trump Administration has described Russian President Vladimir Putin's reported demands for a ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since August 6. The exact details of Putin's position remain unclear.
• The only element of Putin's reported position common to all reports is Putin's continued demand for Ukraine to withdraw from unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast - a major Ukrainian concession.
• Ukrainian and European officials reportedly presented a counterproposal to US officials on August 9 as European officials continue to issue statements of support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Russian officials welcomed the announcement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Alaska on August 15 and referenced Russian narratives about Russia's historical claims to Alaska.
• Ukraine continues its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2025

US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain. A White House official told ABC News, Bloomberg, and the New York Post on August 7 that the United States and Russia have not yet set a location for the meeting, and a White House source told CNN on August 6 that the meeting could occur within the next two weeks (by about August 21).[i] The White House official told Western news outlets that Trump set the condition that Putin must agree to meet bilaterally with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before Trump would meet with Putin. Putin stated on August 7 that he is not against meeting with Zelensky "in general" but that "certain conditions must be created" before such a meeting.[ii] Trump later clarified, however, that Putin does not have to meet with Zelensky before Trump will meet with Putin.[iii]

Putin proposed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a possible location to meet with Trump.[iv] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on August 7 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff proposed a trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin during Witkoff's August 6 visit to Moscow but that Russia did not comment on this "option" during the visit.[v] Ushakov stated that Russia wants to first focus on a bilateral Trump-Putin meeting and claimed that the United States and Russia have set a location or this meeting. The Kremlin has attempted to set the pace and sequence of negotiations about temporary ceasefires and a permanent peace in Ukraine since the start of the US effort to hold negotiations to end the war in February 2025.[vi] Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to US peace proposals and meaningful negotiations while refusing to meet with Zelensky in the near-term are attempts to obfuscate the reality that Putin remains uninterested in ending his war and is attempting to extract bilateral concessions from the United States without meaningfully engaging in a peace process.

Zelensky reiterated his willingness on August 7 to meet with Trump and Putin and commit to a ceasefire.[vii] Zelensky listed Ukraine's top priorities as ceasing casualties and reaching a ceasefire agreement with Russia; a meeting between the heads-of-state to achieve a lasting peace; and ensuring long-term security with assistance from the United States and Ukraine's European partners.

Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy. Bloomberg reported on August 5, citing people familiar with the situation, that Russia considered accepting a moratorium on long-range strikes in order to mitigate the threat of secondary US sanctions.[viii] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who often reiterates Kremlin rhetorical lines to support the Kremlin's objectives, claimed on August 1 that he recently told US representatives that Russia is interested in another long-range strikes moratorium.[ix] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on August 6 that Putin gave Witkoff a ceasefire proposal but did not specify the contents of the proposal.[x] Rubio stated that a ceasefire is an important part of the negotiation process because it is difficult to negotiate a permanent peace deal while under fire — reiterating Trump's preferred timeline of establishing a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting formal peace negotiations to end the war.[xi]

Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russia can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.[xii] Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025 that indicated that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia sustain its current pace of missile strikes against Ukraine.[xiii] Russia continues to heavily invest in its long-range drone and missile production capabilities, including by leaning on partners and allies like Belarus, Iran, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea for weapons provisions, joint production efforts, and sanctions evasion schemes.[xiv] Russia will only continue to invest in its drone and missile production capabilities and lean on its allies as it prepares for a prolonged war effort in Ukraine and potential future conflict against NATO. The size of Russia's strike packages against Ukraine will therefore likely only continue to increase, as will the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties.[xv] Russia in 2025 has already conducted over 10 of the largest-ever drone and missile strikes in the war thus far and reportedly seeks to increase the size of its strike packages to contain up to 2,000 drones.[xvi] A temporary strikes moratorium would also degrade Ukraine's long-range strike campaign targeting Russia's defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia's defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[xvii] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine's civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands. Kremlin sources recently implied to Reuters that Putin remains committed to his demand that Russia occupy all four oblasts before he would be willing to establish a ceasefire — a reiteration of Putin's June 2024 demand that he and other Kremlin officials have since publicly repeated.[xviii] A Kremlin source also told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the frontline in Ukraine will likely "crumble" in two to three months. ISW assessed that the Kremlin is likely leaking this information to try to project confidence in Russia's military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale.

Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors. ISW assesses that Russia has yet to seize roughly 6,500 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast, or about 25 percent of the region. Russian advances aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk have accelerated in recent weeks, but Russian forces have spent the last 18 months trying to seize an area of about 30 square kilometers.[xix] Russian forces have been fighting to seize Chasiv Yar (pre-war population of 12,000) since April 2024, and it took Russian forces 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from western Bakhmut to western Chasiv Yar.[xx] Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions are increasingly threatening the southern tip of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast at Kostyantynivka.[xxi] Kostyantynivka is roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk, the northern tip of the fortress belt, and the cities in the fortress belt (Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk) collectively had a pre-war population of roughly 373,000. Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since mid-2022, and ISW continues to assess that the seizure of the fortress belt will be a difficult, multiyear effort.[xxii]

Future Russian operations to seize the entirety of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will require significant river crossing operations that Russian forces have historically struggled to complete since 2022. Russian forces still have to seize roughly 7,200 square kilometers of Zaporizhia Oblast (about 26 percent of the region) and roughly 7,000 square kilometers in Kherson Oblast (about 26 percent of the region). Russian gains in the Zaporizhia direction in the past two years have mostly consisted of advances in areas that Ukrainian forces liberated during their Summer 2023 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have yet to seize Orikhiv (roughly 35 kilometers southeast of Zaporizhzhia City). Russian forces appear to be trying to advance along the Kamyanske-Stepnohirsk line (west of Orikhiv on the bank of the Dnipro River) northward toward Zaporizhzhia City but are roughly 20 kilometers from the southern outskirts of the city. Zaporizhzhia City had a pre-war population of 706,000 people, and the seizure of the city and the rest of the oblast will require Russian forces to cross the Dnipro River, which runs through the city and separates northwestern Zaporizhia Oblast from the rest of the region. Zaporizhzhia City is a heavily fortified city like those of the Donetsk Oblast fortress belt, and the Russian military command would have to commit a significant contingent of Russian personnel and equipment to the seizure of these cities. The seizure of Kherson Oblast would also require operations to cross the Dnipro River, establish a lodgment on the west (right) bank of the river, and seize Kherson City (pre-war population of 275,000). Russian forces would also have to contend with significant defenses that Ukrainian forces have established on west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area in 2022. Russian forces have not conducted a successful cross-river operation at scale across the Dnipro River since Russian forces withdrew to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and this river crossing occurred as Russian forces attempted to rapidly retreat from oncoming Ukrainian forces. Russia would likely struggle to pursue simultaneous efforts in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, particularly considering the impacts of three years of war on Russian combat capabilities.

Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims. Statements from Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly indicated that Russia has more expansive territorial aims in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts.[xxiii] Putin recently claimed that "all of Ukraine" is Russia's, Russian officials have called for Russia to seize Sumy City, and Kremlin officials routinely label Odesa and Kharkiv cities as "Russian" cities, for example.[xxiv] Russia is also committing significant forces and means to offensive operations beyond the four oblasts, further casting doubt on claims that Russia only seeks to occupy these four regions. Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian military command has committed elements of its relatively more "elite" airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces to fighting in northern Sumy Oblast and has been intensifying efforts to seize Kupyansk in recent months.[xxv] The deployment of VDV and naval infantry forces to these sectors suggest some level of prioritization within the Russian General Staff — prioritization that is incongruent with the claim that Russia is only concerned with the seizure of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.

Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory. Kremlin statements continue to indicate that Putin remains committed to replacing the democratically elected Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, reducing Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself from future aggression, abolishing NATO's long-held Open Door Policy, and changing the Ukrainian constitution to commit Ukraine to neutrality.[xxvi] Putin remains committed to destroying the Ukrainian state, identity, and culture and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[xxvii] Russian efforts to conquer all of Ukraine through battlefield gains would take decades should the current rate of advance continue, but Putin's theory of victory is contingent on the hypothesis that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must.[xxviii] Putin continues to believe that time is on Russia's side and that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. Economic measures coupled with Western military aid that enables Ukraine to inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remain critical to changing Putin's calculus and bringing him to the negotiating table willing to make compromises to end the war.

The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin's desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed on August 7 that "under no circumstances" should one expect talks between Putin and Trump to end Russia's war against Ukraine.[xxix] Sobolev claimed that Russia will not be able to accomplish its war goals with a ceasefire or truce. Sobolev reiterated claims that any peace settlement must eliminate the "initial causes" of the war — a variation on the phrase that Kremlin officials often invoke to refer to NATO expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[xxx] Sobolev repeated Putin's original war goals to "demilitarize" and "denazify" Ukraine — that is, to significantly constrain the Ukrainian military and replace the Ukrainian government. Sobolev claimed that Russia seeks control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russian forces will create "buffer zones" in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Russian forces currently only occupy minuscule parts of Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts, and Sobolev appears to be demanding that Russia seize additional territory. Russian forces are also notably not operating in Chernihiv and Odesa oblasts, indicating that Sobolev is calling for Russia to launch completely new offensive operations. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 7 that Russia will "obviously" not be satisfied with freezing the frontline and that Trump must understand that Russia "cannot be defeated."[xxxi] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 7 that Russia has always been ready for peace talks but noted that Russia's position has not changed since Russia's pre-war ultimatums in 2021 (when Russia demanded that NATO and the United States cease NATO expansion and limit military activity in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia).[xxxii] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad published an op-ed on August 7 claiming that the war in Ukraine is an "internal affair" for Russia.[xxxiii] The article claimed that Russia does not want peace with Ukraine, "but peace without Ukraine," as "there should be no Ukraine." Russian state media also amplified narratives from Russian officials on August 7 about Ukrainian authorities' alleged disregard for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians.[xxxiv]

Russian deputies' statements are largely intended for domestic consumption, and Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch, Orthodox nationalist, and Tsargrad founder Konstantin Malofeev often works to condition the Russian nationalist community to support Russia's war effort.[xxxv] These statements from Russian officials and Russian media are part of the Kremlin's efforts to prepare Russian society for negotiations to fail and for the war to continue. The Kremlin is setting conditions to accuse Ukraine of not caring about its own population in the event of Ukrainian disagreements with Russian demands in future negotiations. The Kremlin will likely try to use this narrative to shift the blame for failed negotiations onto Ukraine — not Russia — and to justify a prolonged war to the Russian people.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are likely operating west of Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces may not yet maintain enduring positions on the settlement's western outskirts in Sobolivka. ISW reported on August 6 that geolocated footage showing two Russian servicemembers moving on foot in fields and windbreaks in Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) indicated that Russian forces recently advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and seized Sobolivka.[xxxvi] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 7 that Russian forces have not seized Sobolivka.[xxxvii] The milblogger claimed that the footage may show a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group and referenced another milblogger’s claim from late July 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Kupyansk.[xxxviii] Russian forces are increasingly using sabotage and reconnaissance groups to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions into settlements as part of larger envelopment efforts.[xxxix] ISW assessments of Russian advances based on geolocated footage reflect the observed presence of Russian forces within a given area. ISW’s "Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine" map layer is distinct from the "Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory" layer, for which ISW uses the doctrinal definition of control that imposes a high bar to confirm the exclusion of enemy forces from an area.[xl] ISW will continue to monitor the situation for further reporting about Russian activity near Sobolivka.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain.
• Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy.
• Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine.
• Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.
• Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors.
• Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims.
• Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory.
• The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin's desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes.
• Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk direction and likely completed the seizure of Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that the Witkoff-Putin meeting was "useful and constructive" and that Putin and Ushakov exchanged "signals" about Ukraine.[1] Ushakov stated that the Kremlin will refrain from issuing further statements about the negotiations until Witkoff has briefed US President Donald Trump about the results. Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev also attended the meeting with Putin and Witkoff and called the negotiations "successful."[2] Trump characterized the negotiations as "highly productive" and stated that Witkoff and Putin made "great progress," and emphasized the importance of ending Russia's war in Ukraine.[3] Neither the Kremlin nor the White House has issued formal read-outs as of the time of this writing.

Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks. White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated following the Putin-Witkoff meeting that Trump intends to meet with both Putin and Zelensky, and two people familiar with the matter told the New York Times (NYT) that Trump could hold a bilateral meeting with Putin followed by a trilateral meeting with Zelensky as soon as next week.[4]

Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine. Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets amplified commentary from Russian State Duma deputies, largely framing Witkoff as a rational actor in US-Russia negotiations while portraying Trump as irrational. Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin stated on August 4 that he hoped that the results of Witkoff's meeting with Putin would be "specific, not emotional, like Trump's latest statements," and Russian media amplified Karasin's comment in reporting about the Witkoff-Trump meeting on August 6.[5] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 6 that Trump sent Witkoff to "smooth over tensions" following Trump's recently issued "ultimatums" that Russia end the war or face US sanctions, and claimed that this smoothing over could negatively affect the image of the Trump administration.[6] Alexander "Sasha" Kots, a Russian milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin's Human Rights Council, accused Trump of "handing out" daily ultimatums and suggested that Witkoff will bring Trump a proposal that Trump "will perceive as a small victory."[7] The Kremlin has frequently attempted to sow divisions between Ukraine and its allies, as well as between the United States and Europe, as part of wider efforts to deter support for Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin appears to be employing similar informational tactics against the Trump administration to undermine ongoing US efforts to compel Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war. The Kremlin also likely aims to coerce unilateral concessions from the United States regarding the war, including fostering US-Russian economic deals in Russia's favor without Trump's stated preconditions of a ceasefire and negotiations for an enduring peace.

Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions. Bloomberg reported on August 5 that Russia's oil revenue fell by approximately a third from July 2024 to July 2025 due to the global decline in crude oil prices and the appreciation of the ruble.[9] Bloomberg reported that the oil industries continue to account for roughly a third of Russia's budget and that the drop in oil revenues therefore increases pressure on Russia's already-strained federal budget. Russian State Duma deputies downplayed the impact of the fall in oil revenue on August 6, however. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with the Russian outlet NEWS.ru that Russia would not stop the war in Ukraine even if it were "twice as expensive to fill oil tanks" and that the Russian government structured a reserve into its budget forecasts for 2025 such that even a $10 decrease in the price per barrel of oil would not impact the state budget.[10] State Duma Energy Committee First Deputy Chairperson Valery Selezne stated in an interview to Russian outlet OSN that Russia should take advantage of gas shortages in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to increase Russian exports to Central Asia to protect the Russian domestic economy from the financial burden of potential tariffs against Russia — somewhat in opposition to Zhuravlev's claim that Russia's economy is impervious to changes in oil revenues.[11] State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption member Adalbi Shkhagoshev stated in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS that further US sanctions against Russia will not affect the course of the war in Ukraine and that new sanctions would amount to economic war against Russia and its BRICS allies.[12]

Economic indicators suggest that the Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project. The Russian Central Bank reported to TASS on August 6 that the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.4 percent in the first quarter of 2025, below the originally forecasted growth projection of two percent, and by 1.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025, close to the forecasted growth projection of 1.9 percent.[13] The Russian Central Bank claimed that there was a "slowdown in the growth rate of household and government consumption" in April 2025, which the bank did not forecast. UK outlet Express reported on August 6 that Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade data showed that the passenger car market fell by 24 percent from July 2024 to July 2025.[14] Consumer spending is a major driver of domestic economies, and a decline in purchases of a common item such as passenger vehicles suggests that consumers either face or fear economic instability that would inhibit such purchases. The Russian Central Bank is likely attempting to use reports of GDP growth as a sign of economic stability to project confidence to the domestic Russian populace who may be worried about the impact of the war and further Western sanctions on everyday life. Russian officials and the Central Bank are also likely attempting to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia or secondary sanctions against Russia's trading partners. Increased sanctions, especially against Russian oil exports, will further hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine. The sanctions remain critical — in tandem with continued Western defense assistance to Ukraine — to constraining Russian aggression.[15]

US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the Unted States due to India’s ongoing economic cooperation with Russia. Trump signed an executive order on August 6 that will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports to the United States, starting on August 31, given India’s continued purchases of Russian oil.[16] The executive order includes a modification provision in the event that India ceases purchases of oil from Russia or in the case of retaliation against the United States for this order. The executive order describes Russia as “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security and foreign policy. India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil and has continued to purchase Russian military equipment since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[17] ISW previously assessed that European and US sanctions appeared to be degrading Russia's revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil and that sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil will further hinder Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine.[18]

Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town. Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) and likely seized Sobolivka and Myrne (immediately north of Sobolivka).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are close to interdicting the H-26 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway (running east-west from Kupyansk and roughly one kilometer south of Sobolivka), the main Ukrainian GLOC supplying Kupyansk.[20] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely leverage advances northwest of Kupyansk to support efforts to envelop Kupyansk and complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions in the town and defend areas to the west.[21] Russian forces have at least three possible courses of action (COAs) following the potential future seizure of Kupyansk. Russian forces may continue to push west of Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove or northwest of Kupyansk toward Velykyi Burluk in order to support Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance toward Kharkiv City.[22] The Russian military command may instead reprioritize the seizure of the remainder of the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions to support efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk Oblast or set conditions for a future offensive on Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the northeast, respectively. The Russian military command may alternatively redeploy manpower from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority areas such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions to facilitate Russia's long-standing objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian advances in Sobolivka and Myrne appear to be consistent with Russia's recently demonstrated operational pattern of partially enveloping a settlement as opposed to trying to seize it using frontal assaults.[23] Russian forces are likely to use advances in these areas to support the envelopment of Kupyansk and pursue further advances west and northwest of Kupyansk.

The US State Department approved a $104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on August 5 that the US State Department approved and notified US Congress of an FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $104 million for equipment, maintenance services, and long-term sustainment support for M777 howitzers.[24] The DSCA reported that UK defense manufacturer BAE Systems will be the principal contractor for this FMS.

A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on August 6 that it opened a case against a Russian servicemember who intentionally killed a Ukrainian man attempting to evacuate from Udachne, Donetsk Oblast, which Russian forces currently partially occupy.[25] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General published footage of the execution and reported that this is the third recorded incident of Russian forces executing civilians in occupied Donetsk Oblast thus far in 2025.[26] Russian soldiers and occupation authorities have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in occupied Ukraine in Russia's pursuit to eradicate an independent Ukrainian language, culture, and identity.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear.
• Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks.
• Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine.
• Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions.
• US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the Unted States due to India’s ongoing economic cooperation with Russia.
• Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town.
• The US State Department approved a $104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine.
• A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv and western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 5, 2025

Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement. Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations. Reuters reported on August 5 that three Kremlin sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin's belief that Russia is winning and his doubts that US sanctions will have a significant impact on Russia are driving Putin's decision to continue his war against Ukraine.[1] Two of the sources claimed that Putin's war aims take precedence over his efforts to improve relations with the United States and US President Donald Trump. One source claimed that the recent Ukrainian-Russian peace talks in Istanbul were a Russian attempt to convince Trump that Putin was open to peace but noted that the talks were devoid of any real substance. One source claimed that "Putin cannot afford to end the war just because Trump wants it." A source described Trump's reported March 2025 offer — in which Trump purportedly proposed to lift all US sanctions against Russia, to "de jure" recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and to "de facto" recognize Russian control over the other parts of Ukraine that Russian forces occupied at the time — as a "fantastic chance," but stated that stopping a war is more difficult than starting one. Putin rejected that offer.

 The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims. One of Reuters' sources stated that Putin does not see the logic in stopping Russian offensive operations, as Russian forces are making relatively more rapid advances on the battlefield.[2] The Kremlin sources implied that Putin would be willing to establish a ceasefire if Russia first occupied (or was given) the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Recent Kremlin statements, including from Putin himself, have repeatedly indicated that Putin remains committed to achieving his maximalist objectives that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation, however.[3] Putin claimed as recently as June 20 that "all of Ukraine is [Russia's]."[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Anatoly Wasserman said in an interview with Azerbaijani news outlet Minval published on August 3 that the stated goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine are "incompatible with the continued existence of Ukraine" as a sovereign state and that Russia alone will determine the end date for its war.[5] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published two op-eds on July 30 entitled "There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine" and "Noted: Ukraine will end very soon."[6] Kremlin insiders are likely speaking to Western media outlets in order to socialize Putin's demands to Western policymakers and audiences, frame Russia's demand for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as reasonable, and insinuate that there is a possibility for a full ceasefire and lasting peace should Ukraine and the West acquiesce to Putin's demands.

The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale. One Kremlin source told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the front line in Ukraine will likely "crumble" in two to three months.[7] This source is likely providing an accurate reflection of the situation in the Kremlin and the Russian General Staff, as the Russian General Staff is almost certainly giving Putin a positive assessment of Russia's military campaign in Ukraine. The Russian military has a pervasive culture of lying and submitting overly positive reports to superiors, and this culture is likely also an issue at the upper echelon of the Russian military.[8] Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin repeatedly claimed that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu lied to Putin about issues in Russia's war effort.[9] The Russian General Staff significantly downplayed Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast to Putin, and Putin repeatedly falsely claimed that Russian forces encircled several groups of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast — likely after being misinformed by the Russian General Staff.[10] Putin even appeared to scold  Gerasimov and current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 1, claiming that he recently pressed Belousov and Gerasimov to tell him "honestly" about the frontline in Ukraine.[11] Russian forces are continuing to advance in Ukraine only at a footpace, if more rapidly than previously, and the Kremlin sources' statement reflects the Russian General Staff's and Putin's confidence in continued gains rather than an objective assessment of prospects on the battlefield.

The Kremlin source likely leaked this information in order to project confidence in Russia's military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale. The Kremlin routinely shifts its rhetorical efforts based on what Kremlin officials assess will be most impactful during particular geopolitical moments, such as the Kremlin's recent shift from feigning interest in good-faith peace negotiations in early 2025 to reiterating its commitment to Putin's long-standing war aims.[12] The Kremlin has been engaged in a significant effort since January 2025 to convince Trump that Putin was willing to conclude a peace agreement in the short term, but is now attempting to justify prolonging the war in hopes that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine. The Kremlin likely assesses that projecting confidence in Russia's ability to militarily defeat Ukraine in Western media outlets will generate fear and distrust in Ukrainian and Western society, further degrading Ukraine's morale to continue defending against Russian aggression.

Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people. One Kremlin source told Reuters that Putin does not feel that now is the time to end the war because Russian society and the Russian military would not understand such a decision.[13] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted multi-year effort to justify Putin’s maximalist war objectives as necessary for the existence of the Russian state and to garner societal support for a protracted war until Russia achieves such goals.[14] Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 suggested that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is likely seizing on these sentiments, which it has actively fostered, to justify Putin's decision to continue the war.[15] Putin is also increasing Russian society's reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), which now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.[16] ISW continues to assess that any sharp decrease in Russia’s defensive spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, furthering Putin’s incentive to continue a protracted war in Ukraine and instigate future military conflicts despite high Russian losses on the battlefield and critical constraints on its economy.[17] Putin has intentionally cultivated Russian society's commitment to his war aims and has not set conditions to take any off-ramps to accept a peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims.

Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on August 4 that the conditions for Russia's "unilateral moratorium" on the deployment of weapons banned under the INF Treaty are "disappearing" such that Russia "no longer considers itself bound" by the INF Treaty's restrictions.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian leadership will decide on response measures after analyzing the deployment of Western land-based intermediate-range missiles. The Russian MFA claimed that Russia has "proactively made efforts to maintain restraint" following the US suspension of the INF treaty in 2019. The Russian MFA claimed that Western states have built up "destabilizing" missiles in areas near Russia, creating a "strategic" threat to Russian security. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the MFA's announcement, stating that Russia is no longer "limited" in any way and that Russia has the right to take "appropriate measures."[19] Peskov claimed that the West should not expect any announcements about the deployment of Russian shorter- and intermediate-range missiles as this information is "sensitive."[20] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 4 on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that the Russian MFA's statement is the result of NATO states' "anti-Russian policy" and that "this is a new reality all [Russia's] opponents will have to reckon with."[21] Medvedev vaguely threatened that the West should "expect further steps" from Russia. Medvedev's August 4 threat on his English-language account is the latest in a string of recent nuclear threats against the West that are part of the Kremlin's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[22]

Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty. The United States suspended participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles. Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019, but had not formally withdrawn from the treaty.[23] Russia conducted a strike against Ukraine using an Oreshnik ballistic missile (reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile, which has a range of 2,000 to 5,800 kilometers) in November 2024, and Putin publicly claimed on August 1 that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik complex and missiles and that the missile system entered into service.[24] Russia has also routinely launched Iskander missiles, with a reported range of 400 to 500 kilometers, against Ukraine and permanently deployed Iskanders to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[25] High-ranking Russian officials began to set conditions in the information space for Russia to permanently withdraw from the INF Treaty in June 2025, suggesting that the Kremlin had made the decision to withdraw previously.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to posture its withdrawal from the treaty as a response to Trump's August 1 announcement, however.

European and NATO allies announced that they will purchase over one billion euros worth of US weapons for Ukraine through a new NATO funding mechanism. Ukraine’s Minister of Defense (MoD), Denis Shmyhal, announced on August 4 that the United States and NATO launched the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which is a new mechanism that will allow NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine through voluntary contributions.[27] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on August 4 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly $570 million) to purchase American weapons systems, including Patriot components and missiles, through the PURL initiative.[28] NATO announced on August 5 that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden will finance a combined $500 million military aid package to purchase air defense systems, Patriot munitions, anti-tank systems, ammunition, and spare parts from the United States through the PURL initiative.[29]

A Ukrainian company recently launched a new reusable interceptor drone designed to down Russian Shahed-variant drones. Ukrainian Technary design bureau CEO Hennadii Suldin told Ukrainian defense technology outlet Defender Media on July 30 that Technary has developed a reusable Mongoose interceptor drone, designed to intercept Russian Shahed-variant drones.[30] Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone has a jet engine and an automatic homing system, which allows the drone to approach an enemy drone, fire a projectile into a drone’s engine or propeller, and then continue its mission or return for refueling. Suldin stated that the drone can lock onto a target from 800 meters and that the drone's auto-guidance system activates when the target is within a range of 150-200 meters. Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone can reach speeds of up to 300 to 310 kilometers per hour with a maximum flight altitude of 5,000 meters and a combat radius of 12 kilometers. Suldin estimated that a Mongoose interceptor drone could likely destroy 10 to 12 Shahed drones over its lifecycle and noted that the drone’s reusability can help overcome Ukraine’s currently constrained interceptor drone production capabilities. Suldin stated that Ukrainian forces will begin integrating prototypes of the Mongoose interceptor drone in the near future. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that the Mongoose interceptor drone is designed to combat high-speed aerial threats such as the Shahed-136.[31] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told RBC-Ukraine on July 31 that Russian forces are launching new, jet-powered Shahed drones that fly at speeds of 500 kilometers or more.[32] ISW previously observed reporting that Geran-3 drones can reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement.
• Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations.
• The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims.
• The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale.
• Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people.
• Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2025

Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia. The Kremlin did not immediately employ a coordinated response on August 2 and 3 following Trump's initial announcement, but more Kremlin officials began to coalesce around similar rhetorical lines on August 4.[1] Kremlin officials utilized three main framings to respond to Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines — posing Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines as "emotional," discounting the threat that this decision poses to Russia, and posturing Russia as a more responsible international actor than the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 4 that discussions of nuclear escalation are premature and a "very emotional" perception of the situation.[2] Peskov claimed that Russia is "very careful" about any statements related to nuclear issues and that Russia takes a "responsible position" in regard to nuclear rhetoric.[3] Russian Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairperson Grigory Karasin responded to Trump by claiming that it is always better to be less emotional and more rational in foreign policy.[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev also characterized Trump as "emotional" in response to Trump's August 1 statement.[5] Russian State Duma Deputy Viktor Volodatsky claimed that Trump is attempting to intimidate Russia, but that the redeployment of US nuclear submarines near Russia is not a real threat to Russia, and Russian Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov similarly claimed that Trump is mistaken if he assesses that this redeployment will scare Russia.[6] Dzhabarov claimed that Russia is not threatening anyone.

These official Russian responses ignore the Kremlin's history of frequently leveraging nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia. Trump explicitly acknowledged on August 1 that he redeployed the submarines in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats.[7] Medvedev alluded on July 31 to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter."[8] The Kremlin regularly uses Medvedev to introduce nuclear threats into the Russian and international information spaces, but more senior Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, also often make similar vague allusions to Russia's nuclear weapons capabilities.[9] Putin has routinely invoked Russia's Oreshnik ballistic missile system to allude to the possibility that Russia could conduct a nuclear strike against the West, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed during a media engagement with Putin on August 1 that Trump cannot dictate rules to a nuclear power like Russia.[10]

The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev's role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information efforts targeting the West. Peskov claimed on August 4 that Russian officials, including Medvedev, have different assessments on current events but that Russian President Vladimir Putin alone determines Russia's foreign policy.[11] Peskov claimed that Putin's position is the "main thing" of import. Peskov's attempt to separate Medvedev's views from Putin's ignores the way that Putin and other high-level officials in Putin's inner circle have themselves frequently used similar nuclear saber-rattling to threaten the West.[12] Medvedev himself does not drive Russian foreign policy decisions, but ISW continues to assess that his statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy.[13] Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements if he chose to do so, especially considering the Kremlin's demonstrated ability to coordinate official statements and overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev's aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, however, as they push the West to see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and create space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats. Peskov's August 4 claims are trying to conceal the way that the Kremlin is likely approving and encouraging Medvedev's use of his platforms to make statements against the West.

Russian authorities continue to intensify the use of bribery charges, including to to scapegoat regional government officials responsible for Russia's border defense and target defense industry officials and critical information space actors. Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain), citing Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) data, reported on August 4 that the number of bribery cases in Russia increased by roughly 52 percent in bribe-taking cases and 84 percent in bribe-giving cases since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. [14] The MVD data showed a 33 percent increase in bribe-taking cases and 11 percent in bribe-giving cases in the first half of 2025 alone. Russian anti-corruption expert Ilya Shumanov told Mozhem Obyasnit that Russian authorities have created new offenses with fixed fines of up to 10 million rubles (roughly $125,300) as part of efforts to crack down on corruption and are actively investigating several large-scale bribery cases in the defense industry. Mozhem Obyasnit noted that Russian authorities have detained former Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Yegorov; Gleb Trifonov, the editor-in-chief of Baza, a Russian outlet reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement; the editor-in-chief of state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru; and former Rosgvardia Deputy Head Viktor Stigunov in July 2025 alone.

The Kremlin has been particularly targeting high-ranking officials in border oblasts with corruption charges in order to punish them for their inability to repel Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed on August 4 that Russian authorities may soon decide to liquidate the state-owned Kursk Oblast Development Corporation (KODC) following a series of embezzlement charges against the organization.[15] Russian authorities previously detained and charged KODC executives and high-ranking regional officials in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts with embezzling funds earmarked for the construction of defensive fortifications in Russia's border areas.[16] ISW continues to assess that the arrests of officials in border areas are part of a concerted Kremlin effort to scapegoat regional officials for failing to repel Ukraine's incursion, and the decision to liquidate the KODC is likely part of these scapegoat efforts.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia.
• The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev's role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information efforts targeting the West.
• Russian authorities continue to intensify the use of bribery charges, including to scapegoat regional government officials responsible for Russia's border defense and target defense industry officials and critical information space actors.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on August 3.[1] Geolocated imagery shows a fire at the Rosneft Kubannefteprodukt Oil Depot in Adler, Krasnodar Krai.[2] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone strike caused the fire and that the fire engulfed several fuel tanks at the depot.[3] A Ukrainian Telegram channel also published a photo on August 3 purportedly showing an oil refinery on fire in Kstovo, Nizhnyi Novgorod.[4] Nizhnyi Novgorod Oblast Governor claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of August 2 to 3.[5]

Russia is reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukraine. A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported on August 2 that satellite imagery of the airport in northern occupied Donetsk City from July 2025 shows that Russian authorities have partially cleared the fortifications on the runway and started construction work at the parking lots, possibly in preparation for the installation of fuel tanks.[6] Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno reported that the satellite imagery suggests that Russian occupation authorities are building closed storage areas near the destroyed airport terminal and are preparing manual drone control points, warhead unloading areas, air surveillance posts, and a runway.[7] CyberBoroshno assessed that Russian occupation authorities are developing infrastructure at the airport to launch Shahed-type strike drones, Gerbera-type decoy drones, and possibly Geran (Shahed) jet-powered drones. Long-range drone launch sites closer to the frontline will reduce the reaction time for Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces have been launching long-range strike drones from occupied Ukraine, and Russia's continued use of occupied Ukraine for such strikes will increasingly threaten Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states if Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory.

Russia appears to be trying to better protect its air bases after multiple years of Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear. Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev claimed in an interview with the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) official newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on August 1 that Russia is creating a new generation of the Voronezh early-warning radars, which Maksimtsev claimed will not have any blind spots, will guarantee full coverage for all unspecified important assets, and will be able to track ballistic missiles regardless of their flight trajectories.[8] Maksimtsev further claimed that Russian forces are planning to provide all Russian air bases with shelters to protect aircraft.[9] Maksimtsev claimed that Russia has been constructing such shelters at its main air bases for the last two years and is working to expand these shelters to all air bases. The UK MoD published geolocated imagery on July 29 indicating that Russia has launched a program to construct hardened aircraft shelters at air bases close to the Russia-Ukraine border and in occupied Ukraine, including at Millerovo Air Base in Rostov Oblast, Khalino Air Base in Kursk Oblast, and Hvardiiske Air Base in occupied Crimea.[10] ISW reported in mid-July 2025 that recent satellite imagery indicated that Russian forces were constructing hangar-style aircraft shelters at Khalino Air Base and Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea.[11] An open source account on X (formerly Twitter) posted additional satellite imagery from early June 2025 that indicated that Russian forces had started construction of aircraft shelters at 14 military sites, including Millerovo Air Base, Khalino Air Base, and Hvardiiske Air Base, and had likely expanded construction following Ukraine's June 1 Operation Spiderweb deep strikes.[12] Russian milbloggers have repeatedly complained throughout the war about the Russian military's failure to adapt to repeated successful Ukrainian strikes and refusal to construct protective shelters at air bases.[13]

Russian intelligence services appear to be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe. The Economist and Bloomberg, citing an upcoming report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), recently reported that instances of suspected Russian sabotage attacks and hybrid warfare incidents in Europe sharply escalated to 30 attacks in 2024; IISS also counted 11 suspected Russian-backed hybrid attacks in Europe between January and May 2025.[14] The Economist reported that IISS analysts assessed that the decreasing trend in the number of suspected sabotage attacks in 2025 could be due to the increased NATO presence in the Black Sea, Russia's attempts to posture itself as a good-faith negotiator during peace negotiation with the United States about the war in Ukraine, or concerns that the scale of Russian hybrid attacks in Europe may provoke NATO escalation.[15] US and European officials told Bloomberg that the decreasing trend could be due to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to avoid antagonizing US President Donald Trump at the start of Trump's second term and early peace efforts in Ukraine, the reallocation of Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) resources to Ukraine, high-profile trials of saboteurs that are deterring future attacks, or the Moscow's attempts to tighten its control over and restrain the local proxies that Russia is using to conduct the attacks.[16] The official sources cautioned that the decreasing trend does not indicate that Russia has stopped its hybrid attacks or will not escalate them in the future, noting that Russian sabotage plots are more frequent in eastern European states than those in western Europe. IISS similarly warned that Russian intelligence services may be refining their tactics and reassessing the criminal networks in Europe with whom they partner, and that Russia may renew its hybrid campaign against Europe in the near future.[17]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kryvonozhko as the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force on August 3.[18] Kryvonozhko served as the acting head of the Ukrainian Air Force from August 2024 until he was appointed commander.[19] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian Air Force is implementing a 20-year development plan to improve Ukrainian aviation.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on August 3.
• Russia is reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukraine.
• Russia appears to be trying to better protect its air bases after multiple years of Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear.
• Russian intelligence services appear to be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kryvonozhko as the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force on August 3.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2025

Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on August 2 that it conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City, one of the four largest refineries in Russia.[1] The USF reported that the drone strike started a large-scale fire at the refinery and caused significant damage to its production facilities. The USF reported that the facility produces about 840,000 tons of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year — about 8.4 percent of Russia's total TS-1 production — and produces up to 17 million tons of oil per year, or 6.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed on August 2 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed drones over the oblast and that drone debris fell on an unspecified enterprise.[2] The USF stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Annanefteproduct oil depot in Anna, Voronezh Oblast, which can receive petroleum products from up to 50 railway tanks and handle up to 160,000 tons of light petroleum products per year.[3] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris started a fire at an unspecified building in the oblast.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck Rosneft's Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a drone strike and subsequent explosion at the Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery.[6] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that falling drone debris killed one person in Kuybyshevsky Raion.[7] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 2 that Ukrainian drones struck the Likhaya-Zamchalovo traction power substation at a Russian rear supply base near Uglerodovsky, Rostov Oblast.[8] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[9] Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that an unspecified enterprise caught fire in Uglerodovsky.[10]

Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Post reported that its sources within Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that an explosion disabled a section of Gazprom's Central Asia-Center pipeline in Volgograd Oblast that transports natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Russia.[11] The GUR sources did not specify the cause of the explosion. The pipeline reportedly supplies several Russian defense industrial enterprises.

Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated on August 2 that it conducted a drone strike against the Elektropribor plant in Penza City, which manufactures equipment for digital networks in Russian military control systems and devices for aviation, armored vehicles, ships, and spacecraft.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that Elektropribor specializes in producing secure telecommunications systems, cryptographic communications equipment, and printed circuit boards for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU), Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Russian space program.[13] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows an explosion at the Elektropribor plant.[14] Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the Radiozavod enterprise in Penza City, which produces communications systems for the Russian military, including kits for armored vehicles, command and staff vehicles, and air defense systems.[15] Penza Oblast Governor Oleg Melnichenko claimed on August 2 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified enterprise in Penza City and that Russian authorities limited mobile internet in the oblast as a result of the strike.[16] The SBU stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, hitting Shahed-type drone storage and launch sites.[17] FIRMS data shows heat anomalies at the air base, and an open source account on X (formerly Twitter) noted that a significant number of Russia's best air defense equipment surrounds the air base.[18] Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Russian 3rd Radio Regiment's "Periscope-VM" radar system near occupied Feodosia, Crimea, and FIRMS data shows heat anomalies near the radar's location.[19] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a fire at a Russian radar base near Feodosia.[20]

The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump’s August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia. The Kremlin, Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) did not directly respond to Trump's August 1 announcement, and ISW continued to only observe limited, dissonant responses from Russian state media and select Russian officials and milbloggers on August 2. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev attempted to discredit the credibility of Trump's announcement.[21] Kremlin newswire TASS published footage on August 2 showing the Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine arriving at the Russian Northern Fleet’s main submarine base in Severnomorsk, Murmansk Oblast.[22] The Knyaz Pozharsky submarine entered service on July 24, 2025.[23] A Russian milblogger used the arrival of the submarine at Severnomorsk to claim that the Knyaz Pozharsky is far superior to American analogues and that the Russian Navy will put the Knyaz Pozharsky on combat duty in response to Trump’s deployment of nuclear submarines.[24] TASS amplified a claim from a senior research fellow of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Latin America that Russia could deploy Oreshnik ballistic missile systems to other states, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean, to ensure Russia’s global military presence and the sovereignty of Russia’s allies.[25] The research fellow's August 2 claim parallels a Russian milblogger's August 1 call for Russian ships and submarines equipped with nuclear weapons to visit Cuba.[26] Both responses attempt to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made during a press event on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding commitment to its longstanding demands. Lavrov claimed on August 1 that Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine are making progress and blamed Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.[27] Lavrov claimed that Russia is waiting to receive a concrete response from Ukraine regarding Russia's proposal to establish online working groups. Lavrov also claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is repeatedly shifting his demands for negotiations and a ceasefire. Lavrov signaled Russia's commitment to its long-standing war aims in Ukraine and Russia's demand that any peace settlement eliminate the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov's statements included many of the same phrases and nuances as Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements and occurred on the same day as the Putin-Lukashenko press event, indicating that these narratives are part of top-down Kremlin instructions to Russian officials about how to frame the negotiations process.[28] Putin's, Lukashenko's, and Lavrov's statements represent Putin's official position about negotiations and his war aims. ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in compromising on its long-standing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's capitulation and continues to promote inflammatory rhetoric designed to undermine US-European cohesion.[29]

Indian oil refineries reportedly continue to import Russian crude oil despite US President Donald Trump’s imposition of 25 percent tariffs on India’s exports to the United States. Reuters reported on August 2 that sources in the Indian government stated that India will keep purchasing Russian oil. Reuters reported that Indian government sources stated that there are long-term oil contracts that prevent an immediate halt in Russian oil imports and that India's continued import of Russian oil has helped stave off a global surge in oil prices. Indian outlet ANI reported on August 2 that Indian oil refineries continue to source oil from Russian suppliers due to “price, grade of crude, inventories, logistics, and other economic factors.”[30] Indian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated that Russia and India have a "steady and time-tested partnership" and that India sources its energy needs based on "what is available in the markets and... prevailing global circumstances."[31] ISW previously assessed that European and US sanctions appeared to be degrading Russia's revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil and that sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil would further hinder Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine.[32] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil, and continued third-state purchases of Russian oil in the face of Western sanctions will significantly limit the effectiveness of these economic measures to affect Russia's war effort.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2.
• Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of August 1 to 2.
• The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump’s August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made during a press event on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding commitment to its longstanding demands.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2025

US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines presumably closer to Russia in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States. Trump stated on August 1 that he ordered American military authorities to position two US nuclear submarines "in the appropriate regions" following Medvedev's "highly provocative statements."[i] Trump stated that he gave the order "just in case [the] foolish and inflammatory statements [from Medvedev] are more than just that." Trump previously stated on July 31 that Medvedev should "watch his words" and is "entering very dangerous territory."[ii] Medvedev responded to Trump on July 31 on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts and threatened that Russia is "doing everything right" and will continue along its own path.[iii] Medvedev also alluded to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter," in response to Trump. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio answered a journalist's question on July 31 about Medvedev's nuclear threat, stating that one cannot ignore Medvedev's statement.[iv] Rubio stated that Medvedev is not a "relevant decision maker," but he still has a role in the Russian government, so "his words are going to have impact" as a "provocateur."

The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States prior to the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-ratting campaign. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke to journalists on August 1 in a likely staged event to publicly promote the Kremlin's narratives and stances about its war in Ukraine.[v] Lukashenko criticized Trump's recent efforts to bring Russia to the negotiating table and find a way to end the war. Lukashenko claimed that Trump must act "carefully" and that it is not possible for Trump to "dictate the rules" during the ongoing military clash, "especially to a nuclear power" like Russia.[vi] Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling as part of their reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[vii] The Kremlin had also repeatedly used staged interactions with Lukashenko to deliver indirect nuclear threats.[viii] Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats are also part of these reflexive control efforts, as Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine.[ix] ISW continues to assess that Medvedev's provocative and threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy.[x] Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering that the Kremlin coordinates official statements and controls the Russian information space, internet, and media.

Limited Russian milblogger responses to Trump's August 1 announcement criticized Trump, attempted to downplay the threat, or called on Russia to respond in kind. Russian milbloggers noted that Trump did not specify exactly where the US submarines were deploying, implying that Trump's statement could be a feint.[xi] One milblogger claimed that Trump's announcement is not leading to Trump's desired peace.[xii] Russian political scientist Sergei Markov claimed that Trump is "losing his sanity" and that Trump's announcement endorses Medvedev's allegation that Trump was moving closer to nuclear war.[xiii] Another milblogger called for Russian ships and submarines equipped with nuclear weapons to "pay a friendly visit to Cuba again."[xiv] Russian naval vessels, including a reportedly nuclear weapons-capable ship, made a port call in Cuba in June 2024, likely in order to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive control campaign to instill fear in the West and push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[xv]

Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024 – further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war against Ukraine. Putin stated during the press event with Lukashenko that the conditions that he laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) "certainly" remain the same.[xvi] Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[xvii] Putin also reiterated on August 1 that the "main thing" in the peace process is the eradication of the war's causes, which Putin described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[xviii] Putin's claims about the alleged causes of the war mirror repeated calls from Kremlin officials in the past months about the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war.[xix] Rubio stated on July 31 that the United States has not seen any progress or "sincere interest" from the Kremlin to end the war.[xx] Rubio stated that Trump must decide how much he wants to continue his efforts toward securing a ceasefire "if one of the two sides is not interested."

Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations. Putin claimed on August 1 that he assesses that peace negotiations with Ukraine are developing "positively overall" and that recent prisoner of war (POW) and killed in action (KIA) exchanges between Russia and Ukraine are evidence of this positive trajectory.[xxi] Putin claimed that Russia is willing to delay negotiations if Ukraine wants to do so in response to a recent statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Russia's war demands will not change until there is regime change in Russia.[xxii] Putin claimed that any disappointment regarding the speed or outcome of negotiations is a result of "excessive expectations." Putin stated that negotiations must happen in detailed conversations behind the scenes and not in public. Putin claimed that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to conduct negotiations "off-camera" in three working groups but that these groups have not started operating yet. Putin likely intends to leverage claims that Russia and Ukraine are meeting in private working groups to refute any future Western complaints that Russia is not participating in peace negotiations. Russia has sent several low-level delegations to prior rounds of negotiations in Istanbul, and these rounds have yet to result in any developments toward peace other than POW and KIA exchanges.[xxiii] Future working group meetings with a similarly low-level Russian delegation are unlikely to result in any significant developments since Putin almost certainly singularly dictates the parameters of Russia's negotiating position.

Putin reiterated on August 1 his long-standing claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and claimed that Zelensky's government has "clearly violated" Ukraine's constitution.[xxiv] Putin has long claimed that every pro-Western Ukrainian government since Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity are illegitimate, and Russian officials intensified claims in Spring 2024 that Zelensky's government specifically is illegitimate under the false pretense that the current Ukrainian government is violating the Ukrainian Constitution by delaying presidential elections until the end of martial law.[xxv] The Ukrainian Constitution prohibits the government from holding elections during martial law and times of external aggression, such as Russia's full-scale invasion.[xxvi] ISW has previously noted that Putin's false claims that the current Ukrainian government is unconstitutional and illegitimate are laying the groundwork for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing in the future.[xxvii] ISW continues to assess that Putin is feigning interest in peace negotiations while Ukrainian officials, in contrast, continue to demonstrate genuine interest in peace – as evidenced by Zelensky's August 1 statement that he remains willing to meet with Putin and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha's July 31 statement that Ukraine wants to end the war in 2025.[xxviii]

Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of Ukraine through slow and costly advances.[xxix] Putin claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline in eastern and southern Ukraine and that Russian forces are advancing "somewhere more, somewhere less."[xxx] Lukashenko claimed that Russian forces are on the offensive everywhere and that Russian forces are "not [advancing] quickly, but slowly." Lukashenko claimed that Putin told him that Russian forces are advancing slowly because Putin "feel[s] sorry for the [Ukrainian] people" -ignoring the degradation of Russian forces after three years of war and significant Ukrainian defensive operations. Putin's and Lukashenko's statements suggest that Putin continues to be content with the slow rate of advance that characterizes Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that frontline Russian commanders appear content with Russian forces making advances at roughly a footpace, and Putin appears personally content with a slower rate of advance as well - likely due to his continued belief that Russia will be able to militarily defeat Ukraine in the long-term.[xxxi] Lukashenko also downplayed Russian casualties in Ukraine by claiming that Russia is not losing as many people as the Soviet Union did during the Second World War. The Soviet Union, which consisted of territories and peoples far beyond the modern-day Russian Federation, lost between nine and 11 million casualties during the Second World War.[xxxii]

Putin continues to posture himself as a well-informed, caring wartime leader. Putin claimed that he recently asked Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to "honestly" tell him about the frontline situation in Ukraine.[xxxiii] Putin's reported demand for honesty from Belousov and Gerasimov may be a nod to Russian milbloggers' long-standing complaints that the Russian military command misinforms Putin about the frontline situation and that frontline Russian commanders submit falsely positive reports to their superiors.[xxxiv] Putin has historically attempted to respond to milblogger grievances and has routinely postured himself as a hyper-involved wartime leader to the Russian public.[xxxv]

Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt – which ISW continues to assess will constitute a multi-year long effort. Putin claimed that Russian forces recently seized Chasiv Yar, although Putin acknowledged that Russian forces are still clearing the town and that Ukrainian forces may counterattack into Chasiv Yar in the future.[xxxvi] Putin claimed that Chasiv Yar is "quite a large settlement," although 2022 census data states that Chasiv Yar had a pre-war population of 12,500 people.[xxxvii] Russian state media and milbloggers are attempting to oversell the seizure of Chasiv Yar as a significant development along the frontline, and Putin appears to be leaning into this effort.[xxxviii] Lukashenko further claimed that Chasiv Yar is "the road" to Kramatorsk, which Lukashenko called the center of Ukraine's defense (referring to Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast).[xxxix] Lukashenko claimed that Russian forces will "slowly gnaw" at, seize, and advance beyond Ukraine's fortress belt. Putin responded that Russian forces will "return" the fortress belt, which Putin claimed belongs to Russia. Lukashenko claimed that Ukraine should quickly ask Russia to negotiate an end to the war before Russia seizes the fortress belt. ISW has long assessed that Russian forces aspire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, and Putin's statement marks the most recent high-level Russian confirmation of this intention.[xl]

Putin's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt indicates that he is willing to continue military operations in Ukraine long beyond Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace in Ukraine and is ready to undertake complex, years-long operations. ISW previously noted that a Russian operation to seize Ukraine's fortress belt will be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces will have to seize Siversk and Lyman, advance through the Svyati Hori national park, and contend with the Siverskyi Donets River and Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal before Russian forces can even begin to threaten Slovyansk (the northern tip of the fortress belt).[xli] Russian forces are currently expanding their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka (the southern tip of the fortress belt) in order to support a future attack on or envelopment of Kostyantynivka and the wider fortress belt from the southwest, but seizing Kostyantynivka alone will likely be a months-long effort. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger recently noted that it took Russian forces 14 months to seize Chasiv Yar and that Kostyantynivka is roughly three times larger than Chasiv Yar - underscoring how long a frontal Russian assault into Kostyantynivka could last.[xlii] Russian forces attempted to encircle Ukraine's fortress belt in Spring 2022 but culminated while trying to conduct the over 55-kilometer-wide encirclement.[xliii] Russian forces have conducted several successful, smaller partial envelopments since seizing Avdiivka in February 2024, but Russian forces have yet to conduct a successful operational-level envelopment of a significant Ukrainian defensive line.[xliv] ISW previously noted that it is unlikely that the Russian military can sustain a multi-year and multi-axis operation against Ukraine's fortress belt alongside its other offensive operations in Ukraine, particularly after three and a half years of degrading combat operations.[xlv] Putin appears confident in the Russian military's and economy's strength and longevity, however, given his August 1 endorsement of seizing the fortress belt and Russia's current rate of advance in Ukraine.

Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his efforts to resolve the war. Putin claimed that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik ballistic missile complex and missiles, and that the Oreshnik system entered into service.[xlvi] Putin claimed that Russian and Belarusian specialists are working to identify future Oreshnik deployment locations by the end of 2025, and Lukashenko stated that Russia will station Oreshnik systems in Belarus in 2026. ISW assessed at the time of Russia's first Oreshnik launch in November 2024 that Russia is leveraging the Oreshnik system as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at undermining Western resolve to militarily support Ukraine.[xlvii] Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements about Oreshniks are similarly trying to posture military strength to convince Trump not to follow through with his threat of economic repercussions.

Lukashenko claimed on August 1 that Russia and Belarus have undertaken significant measures in recent years to offset the impact of Western sanctions and that the two countries will survive additional future sanctions.[xlviii] Lukashenko claimed that Russia is a "treasure trove" of minerals and technology and that Russia and Belarus will prove their capabilities to doubters (presumably referring to the West). Lukashenko claimed that "we [Russia and Belarus] have always been and will be" and that Russians and Belarusians should not worry about Western sanctions. Lukashenko's statements are the latest in the Kremlin's ongoing effort to posture economic stability to its foreign and domestic audiences and to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia by claiming that sanctions have no impact on the Russian economy.[xlix]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO. Putin signed amendments on July 31 that introduce fines for “intentional” searches of “extremist” content on virtual private networks (VPNs) and ”violating the procedure” for using VPN services.[l] Putin also signed a law that expands the offenses for which Russian authorities can revoke acquired citizenship, including the “justification or propaganda of terrorism,” cooperation with a foreign state against the security of Russia, “unlawful influence” on Russia’s information space, and the implementation of decisions of “international organizations in which Russia does not participate.”[li] The Kremlin has vaguely defined "extremism," and the law about citizenship revocation similarly contains vaguely defined language. The Kremlin has and will exploit this vagueness to censor any information that it considers a threat, including anti-war and anti-regime sentiment.

The Russian government has been slowly consolidating control over the Russian population’s access to independent information throughout Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin will likely ban WhatsApp and replace it with the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX in the near future, and Kremlin officials will likely attempt to replace other independent communication platforms, such as Telegram, with state-controlled communication platforms.[lii] The Kremlin has also targeted media outlets that publish anti-war sentiment and counter the Kremlin's preferred narrative in the information space.[liii]

The Russian government is also slowly adapting its legal regime to increase the state's ability to repress and coerce Russians into conceding to state narratives and ideas, like the Soviet Union’s attempts at controlling the population. The Russian State Duma adopted in recent months legal definitions that allow Russia to criminally prosecute Kremlin opponents by classifying domestic opposition as a threat to Russian national security.[liv] The Russian government may be pursuing these informational and legal constraints in preparation for possible future societal backlash, as Putin appears willing to continue the war for years to come. The Kremlin's measures to cut Russian society off from the outside world are also part of efforts to indoctrinate Russians into an informal state ideology that, at its foundation, is anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian and to militarize Russian society ahead of a longer war in Ukraine and a possible future war with NATO.[lv]

Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine. Business Insider reported on August 1 that Ukrainian mobile fire groups and domestically produced interceptor drones may be unable to effectively counter Russia's new high-speed Geran-3 drone (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-238).[lvi] Ukrainian columnist Vadym Kushnikov reported on July 31 that the Geran-3 is equipped with a high-power jet engine that enables the drone to reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour and to function like a cruise missile in its ability to evade air defense systems.[lvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 30 that Russian forces launched eight jet-powered drones, possibly referring to Geran-3 drones, on the night of July 29 to 30, marking one of the first official Ukrainian reports noting Russia's use of jet-powered drones.[lviii] The Ukrainian Air Force did not specify whether Ukrainian forces downed any of the eight jet-powered drones, however. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely used a Geran-3 drone variant to strike Kyiv City on June 11 and that Russia may have first incorporated the Geran-3 drones into strike packages on January 8.[lix] Russia will likely increasingly rely on modified long-range drones, such as the Geran-3 drone, to continue innovating its long-range strike tactics designed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and strike densely populated cities in Ukraine's rear as part of efforts to inflict greater civilian casualties.

Russia's latest drone innovations underscore the critical importance of timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine. Russian drone adaptations are attempting to reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine's air defense tactics and innovations, including the use of mobile fire groups and interceptor drones. Western-supplied air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets, which Ukraine has largely been using to intercept Russian long-range missile and drone strikes, will become even more important in the face of these Russian drone adaptations. [lx] Kushnikov reported that Russia is unable currently to mass produce the Geran-3 drones, given Russia's reliance on Iran and the People's Republic of China (PRC) for turbojet engine supplies.[lxi] Iran helped Russia scale its domestic production of the Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, and the PRC has been increasingly supplying components for Russia's Geran-type drones, suggesting that Russia will be able to procure the needed Iranian and PRC engines to scale up its production of the Geran-3 in the future and pose a greater threat to Ukraine.[lxii]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced that it will sell Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to Ukraine. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 31 that it awarded a contract worth $3.5billion to Raytheon to produce AMRAAM missiles, AMRAAM Telemetry Systems, initial and field spares, and other production engineering support activities.[lxiii] The DoD announced that the contract includes military sales to Ukraine and other US partners.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines presumably closer to Russia in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States.
• The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States before the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-ratting campaign.
• Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024 – further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war against Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.
• Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of Ukraine through slow and costly advances.
• Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, which ISW continues to assess as a multi-year effort.
• Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his efforts to resolve the war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO.
• Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Borova and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.