Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4, 2025

November 4, 2025, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on November 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Recent Russian advances through Pokrovsk are the culmination of a 21-month campaign to seize the town and a five-month dedicated battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effort to degrade Ukrainian defensive capabilities. Russian gains on the Pokrovsk sector have been in large part enabled by the Russian targeting of Ukrainian drone capabilities. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are sending nearly 100 fireteams consisting of up to three personnel each into Pokrovsk per day.[1] The Ukrainian drone unit stated that these Russian fireteams are overwhelming Ukrainian positions such that Ukrainian drone operators do not have time to launch drones. Ukrainian military sources have recently reported that Russian infiltration groups are deliberately targeting Ukrainian drone crews to engage them in close combat, inhibiting Ukrainian drone operations.[2] Combined Russian ground tactics and the implementation of BAI effects have created an environment in which it is very difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate drones. BAI is the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term; it aims to deny the adversary the use of crucial logistics lines and facilities necessary to sustain battlefield operations.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets indicated that Russian forces created the drone denial environment in Pokrovsk using dedicated tactics that degraded the organization and efficacy of Ukrainian defensive and drone operations ahead of Russian infiltration missions, which also further degraded these Ukrainian operations.[4] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command established a new three-phased process for infiltrations: preparation, execution, and exploitation.[5] Mashovets stated that in the preparation phase, the military command prioritizes identifying Ukrainian tactical and tactical-operational ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supporting forward Ukrainian positions, Ukrainian drone operator positions and drone launch sites, and other exploitable areas.[6] Mashovets stated that Russian forces send in Spetsnaz forces to conduct the initial infiltration missions and subsequent surprise attacks against Ukrainian positions during the preparation phase, after which standard assault forces conduct their own infiltration missions in the execution phase.[7] Mashovets stated that Russian forces send out many small assault groups for further infiltration missions and to consolidate and reinforce positions during the exploitation phase, likely hoping to overwhelm Ukrainian forces while sustaining heavy casualties.[8] Mashovets’ reporting is consistent with ISW’s recent observations of the conduct of Russian infiltration missions.[9]

The current battlespace in the Pokrovsk direction took Russian forces 21 months to achieve. Russian forces took 21 months to advance the 39 kilometers (just over 24 miles) from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk. Russian forces first began the Pokrovsk effort in February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka and began setting conditions to take Pokrovsk through direct frontal assaults in March 2024.[10] This effort failed, however, and Russian forces instead shifted to an envelopment campaign in Fall 2024.[11] Russian forces conducted a short series of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction in Winter 2025 but did not reprioritize the direction again until July 2025.[12] Successful Ukrainian drone operations largely stymied Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction from late 2024 into Summer 2025.[13]

Russian forces began achieving partial BAI effects against Ukrainian GLOCs in the Pokrovsk direction in July 2025, at which point Russian forces effectively denied Ukrainian forces the ability to use Pokrovsk as a logistics hub.[14] Russian technical innovations, such as first person view (FPV) drones with increased ranges, thermobaric warheads, and "sleeper" or "waiter" drones along GLOCs, allowed Russian forces to generate BAI effects and restrict Ukrainian troop movements, evacuations, and logistics.[15] Russia also deployed elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to the Pokrovsk direction and other priority sectors in Donetsk Oblast to focus on interdicting Ukrainian GLOCs and eliminating Ukrainian drone operators.[16] Russian forces began attempts to infiltrate into Pokrovsk in late July 2025 in tandem with their dedicated BAI efforts in the area.[17] Russian forces achieved a limited penetration northeast of Pokrovsk in the Dobropillya tactical direction in August 2025, likely taking advantage of a porous frontline while seeking to secure the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.[18] Mashovets stated on November 4 that Russia created the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to primarily target and strike Ukrainian drone crews and noted that Russian forces prioritize Ukrainian drone crews in tactical, operational, and strategic-level strikes.[19]

These Russian BAI interdiction efforts have not proven as effective across the entire frontline, however, and will not necessarily be exportable to other parts of the theater. The urban environment in Pokrovsk has provided Russian forces with cover and concealment for infiltration groups and drone crews that are absent in other areas of the frontline, and Russia has dedicated staggering and unsustainable amounts of manpower and materiel to seizing Pokrovsk.[20] Russian forces briefly deprioritized the Pokrovsk effort to focus on the Dobropillya tactical penetration in August 2025.[21] Russian forces failed to exploit this penetration, however, likely in part due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian forces attempting to advance across open terrain. Russian forces then shifted back to prioritizing the Pokrovsk direction by September 2025, and Ukrainian forces have been successfully clearing the Dobropillya salient as Russian forces continue efforts in the Pokrovsk direction as of November 2025.[22] Russian forces have also been attempting to penetrate weak points in Ukrainian defenses and advance near and into Kupyansk, but have not succeeded in destabilizing Ukrainian defenses to the same degree as in Pokrovsk.[23] The differences between the Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk and Pokrovsk are likely in part due to the open terrain surrounding Kupyansk and Russia's inability to dedicate the same degree of manpower and resources to offensive efforts in the Kupyansk direction, especially as the Russian effort to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction is ongoing. Russian forces have also not prioritized generating BAI-type effects in the Kupyansk direction to the same degree as Pokrovsk. Russia would have to commit to potentially years-long, resource-intensive ground operations and BAI implementation to recreate the conditions in Pokrovsk elsewhere in the theater.

Russian forces continue advancing through Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 3 and 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern, northern, and northeastern Pokrovsk.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within, northwest of, and west of Pokrovsk beyond what available geolocated footage indicates.[25] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Russian forces have not yet seized the entirety of Pokrovsk and that fighting continues in the town, particularly in northern and eastern Pokrovsk, and that Russian forces are consolidating positions in central and eastern Pokrovsk.[26] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces "control" northern Pokrovsk, however.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and other milbloggers claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are conducting airstrikes against Rodynske as fighting continues in the settlement.[28] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced close to Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and that fighting is ongoing along the M-30 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway southeast of the settlement.[29] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults to try to enter Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 3 that there are about 260 to 300 Russian soldiers within Pokrovsk and that 30 percent of all fighting in the theater is occurring near Pokrovsk.[31]

Ukrainian forces continue defensive efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 4 that GUR units continue operations in the Pokrovsk direction after having conducted a heliborne assault west of Pokrovsk on October 31.[32] The GUR reported that its forces opened a ground corridor to bring in reinforcements to Pokrovsk and are conducting operations to improve frontline logistics and prevent Russian forces from expanding their fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs.[33] The GUR separately reported on November 4 that it conducted a strike with an FP-2 drone against a headquarters of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies in occupied Avdiivka and killed Rubikon officers and drone operators.[34] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk, Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), Zatyshok, and Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk).[35]  Ukrainian forces also continue counterattacks on the eastern flank of the Russian Pokrovsk effort in the Dobropillya tactical area to relieve pressure on Pokrovsk. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 3 that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest from Vilne (east of Dobropillya) and Nove Shakhove (southeast of Dobropillya, severing the road that connects Nove Shakhove to Shakhove (southeast of Dobropillya) and attempting to split the Dobropillya salient in two.[36] The Russian milblogger noted that footage of a Russian mechanized column stuck in the Kazennyi Torets River near Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) during a failed October 25 mechanized assault indicates that autumn weather conditions are impeding Russian mechanized operations.[37] Senior Ukrainian officers reported to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on November 4 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Shakhove.[38]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two laws on November 4 that likely aim to facilitate the use of Russia's inactive reserve in a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the use of the active reserve in combat in Ukraine. Putin signed a law allowing Russian military conscription administrative processes to occur year-round, as opposed to the current system that only processes conscripts during the semi-annual spring and fall cycles.[39] The law will come into effect on January 1, 2026, at which point military registration and enlistment offices will be able to issue conscription summonses, organize medical examinations, and hold draft board meetings year-round instead of only twice a year. ISW continues to assess that the year-round conscription process aims to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia’s force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups.[40] Changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military and would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently during both a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO.

Putin also signed a law requiring active reservists to participate in special training to protect critical and other infrastructure in Russia.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) first proposed a version of this law in October 2025 that would have permitted the Russian military to use Russia’s active reserve (“human mobilization reserve”) in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.[42] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated on October 13 that the prior draft of the law would allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[43] The version of the law that Putin signed into law only calls for active reservists to protect Russian infrastructure facilities, but ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the deployment of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure to set conditions to mobilize active reservists for combat in the future, including in Ukraine.[44]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against two civilians carrying a white flag in Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) and walking their dog on November 3.[45] The drone strike killed the two civilians and the dog. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces have been unable to evacuate or identify the bodies.[46] The deliberate execution of civilians is a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[47] The civilians in the footage, aside from being hors de combat due to their clear civilian status, were also holding a white flag--a clear sign of surrender and request for safety. ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[48]

Key Takeaways:

• Recent Russian advances through Pokrovsk are the culmination of a 21-month campaign to seize the town and a five-month dedicated battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effort to degrade Ukrainian defensive capabilities.
• The current battlespace in the Pokrovsk direction took Russian forces 21 months to achieve.
• Russian forces began achieving partial BAI effects against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction in July 2025, at which point Russian forces effectively denied Ukrainian forces the ability to use Pokrovsk as a logistics hub.
• These Russian BAI interdiction efforts have not proven as effective across the entire frontline, however, and will not necessarily be exportable to other parts of the theater.
• Russian forces continue advancing through Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian forces continue defensive efforts in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two laws on November 4 that likely aim to facilitate the use of Russia's inactive reserve in a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the use of the active reserve in combat in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and within and near Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine continued its long-range strike campaign against Russia’s energy sector and defense industrial base on the night of November 3 to 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 4 that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast overnight.[49] Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on November 4 that the strike involved over 50 Bober and FP-1 drones and took place during repairs at the facility following previous Ukrainian strikes.[50] ISW previously observed reports of strikes against the facility on January 29, August 3, and October 16.[51] Geolocated footage published on November 4 shows fires near the refinery.[52] Russian opposition outlet ASTRA reported that the refinery processes 17 million tons of oil a year and is vital for oil supplies to the Moscow region.[53] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed on November 4 that Russian forces downed 20 Ukrainian drones over Kstovsky Raion.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Roskhim Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant in the Republic of Bashkortostan, damaging a workshop.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces aviation kerosene components that Russia uses to manufacture high-octane aviation gasoline. Geolocated footage published on November 4 shows fires at the facility.[56] Sterlitamak Mayor Emil Shaimardanov claimed on November 4 that an explosion partially collapsed the water treatment plant of the facility.[57] Bashkortostan Republic Head Radiy Khabirov claimed on November 4 that two Ukrainian drones attacked the facility and that fragments fell near an auxiliary workshop.[58] Ukrainian forces also struck the Rylsk electrical substation in Kursk Oblast overnight.[59] Geolocated footage published on November 4 shows fires at the substation.[60] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov stated on November 4 that falling Ukrainian drone fragments started a fire overnight at the Frolovskaya electrical substation in Volgograd Oblast.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Lukashivka (southeast of Sumy City).[62]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino, north of Sumy City near Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky on November 3 and 4.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Kindrativka, Novokostyantynivka (all north of Sumy City), Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City), Andriivka, and Varachyne.[64]

Ukrainian State Border Guard Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on November 4 that Russian forces have recently intensified artillery strikes against Chernihiv Oblast but are not accumulating equipment or small infantry groups in the area.[65] Demchenko noted that Russian forces have recently significantly decreased infantry attacks in northern Sumy Oblast. ISW observed reporting on September 25 that Russian forces have deprioritized their efforts in Sumy Oblast and redeployed forces from Sumy Oblast to eastern Ukraine.[66]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 4 that Russian forces are conducting scheduled troop rotations and accumulating forces for future attacks near Oleksiivka.[67] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command recently deployed unidentified Spetsnaz (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) elements to the area. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command forces Russian servicemembers to transport supplies and ammunition on foot despite available unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).[68] The milblogger noted that such missions leave Russian servicemembers vulnerable to Ukrainian drone operators and recently led to unnecessary casualties near Yunakivka. The milblogger blamed such tactics on Russian Northern Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov’s disregard for Russian casualties. The milblogger claimed that the North Korean artillery shells that Russian forces use are often defective and tend to explode within the barrels of artillery pieces.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions and vehicles in Sumy and Chernihiv oblast border areas.[70] Drone operators of the 2nd Battalion of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[71]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[72]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on November 3 and 4.[73]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the contested “gray zone” within and near Vovchansk is expanding and that Russian forces are thus facing difficulties consolidating and accumulating forces for future attacks.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Milove and Khatnie (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[75]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on November 3 and 4.[76]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Ukrainian positions in Prykolotne (north of Velykyi Burluk).[77]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within northern Kupyansk and west of Sadove (south of Kupyansk).[78]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove and Kurylivka on November 3 and 4.[79] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Radkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), Sobolivka, Myrove (both west of Kupyansk), and Osynovo (south of Kupyansk).[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Sobolivka, Myrove, and Radkivka are contested ”gray zones.”[81]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 3 that up to 60 Russian servicemembers remain within Kupyansk.[82] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction published footage on November 4 showing Ukrainian forces repelling an at least platoon-sized Russian motorized assault, destroying 15 motorcycles and killing at least 16 Russian servicemembers.[83]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 3 that Russian forces are experiencing unspecified logistical difficulties in the Kupyansk direction.[84] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against Dvorichanske.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 4 that the command of the Russian 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), operating in the Zapadne sector (north of Kupyansk), recently decided to deny servicemembers leave for an indefinite period.[85] The milblogger claimed that a commission arrived to investigate heavy casualties and assign blame to elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD). ISW has recently observed reports of the 47th Tank Division operating in the Kupyansk direction.[86]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including the 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[87]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on November 3 and 4.

See topline text for information about a recent Russian war crime in the Borova direction.

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in southeastern Lyman, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[88]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[89] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces regained control of Tsentralna Street in northeastern Yampil, and that areas on the northern and northeastern outskirts of Yampil are becoming a contested “gray zone.”[90]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Korovii Yar, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 3 and 4.[91]

Zelensky reported on November 3 that Ukrainian forces continue to stabilize the situation in the Lyman direction.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements, including drone operators, of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[93] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[94]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[95]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on November 3 and 4.[96]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk (west of Siversk) direction reported on November 4 that Russian infantry are attacking in small fireteams of one to five personnel daily, regardless of the weather or time of day, and employ thermal-shielding cloaks at night.[97] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces attempt to penetrate gaps in Ukrainian defenses and wait for reinforcements.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 31 and November 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) and south of Oleksandro-Shultyne (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[98]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced southeast of Kostyantynivka, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[99]

Russian forces attacked east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 3 and 4.[100]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka) direction reported that Russian forces may conduct more mechanized assaults in wintertime when the ground freezes, but that damp soil is currently complicating Russian mechanized operations, given the swampy terrain of the direction.[101] The commander stated that Russian forces are using thermal-shielding cloaks.

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are conducting glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka.[102]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1st Prizrak Territorial Defense Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces southeast of Kostyantynivka.[103] FPV drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Sofiivka.[104] FPV drone operators of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[105] Reconnaissance drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade are reportedly coordinating artillery strikes with multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA) against Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on November 3 and 4.[107] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove and Zapovidne.[108]

See topline text for reports of Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dobropillya tactical area.

The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Emergency Service reported on November 4 that a Russian glide bomb struck an apartment building in Dobropillya, injuring one civilian.[109]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Aleppo Detachment of the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[110] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly directing VKS FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in the northern part of the Dobropillya salient.[111]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces attacked near and in Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Rivne, Zatyshok, Krasnyi Lyman, Fedorivka, and Razine; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Novoekonomichne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Molodetske, and Kotlyne on November 3 and 4.[112]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]); 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA); and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Pokrovsk.[113] Assault elements of the Rykar Regiment, reportedly subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces, are reportedly operating in Pokrovsk.[114] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad.[115] Elements of the 9th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Rodynske.[116] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone control points in Myrnohrad.[117] Drone operators of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA), 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC), and 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[118] Drone operators of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[119] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating Russian FAB glide bomb strikes near Sukhetske.[120]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Novoukrainka and Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Yalta on November 3 and 4.[121]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Novopavlivka direction published footage on November 4 of Ukrainian drone operators repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault across the Vovcha River near Yalta and destroying all vehicles involved – two T-72B3 tanks and three armored personnel carriers (APCs).[122] A Russian milblogger claimed that the footage indicates that Russian forces are struggling to conduct mechanized operations in muddy fall weather conditions, as all Russian vehicles became immobilized in mud.[123]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Verbove, Yehorivka, Tsehelne, Danylivka, and Oleksiivka on November 3 and 4.[124]

The senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian fire support company operating in the Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction stated that Russian forces are poorly equipped and often drown trying to cross water obstacles.[125] The NCO stated that Russian forces are struggling to hide from Ukrainian drone strikes with less fall foliage and to use equipment after rainy weather due to soggy soil. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Pokrovske (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[126]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[127]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Krasnohirske, Novohryhorivka, Pavlivka, Novovasylivske, Uspenivka, Novomykolaivka, and Okhotnyche on November 3 and 4.[128] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Uspenivka.[129]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 35th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Rivnepillya (north of Hulyaipole) and Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[130] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Vremivka (Hulyaipole) direction.[131]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and in central Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[132]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Stepove; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on November 3 and 4.[133]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 4 that GUR elements raised a Ukrainian flag during a sabotage and reconnaissance mission into the contested "gray zone" on the islands of the Velyki Kuchuhury reserve in the northeastern part of the Kakhovka Reservoir.[134] Geolocation of the GUR footage confirms the Ukrainian flag raising on the island.[135] A Russian milblogger claimed that fog is thickening in the area, facilitating Russian movements as it hinders Ukrainian drone operations, but also making it difficult for Russian forces to distinguish between Russian and Ukrainian positions.[136] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone operations along the Stepnohirsk-Prymorske line and near Orikhiv are complicating Russian advances and logistics.[137]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Prymorske.[138] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[139]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Roadway Bridge, on November 3 and 4.[140]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 3 that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted a Kh-39 helicopter-launched air-to-surface missile strike against Ukrainian forces in Ponyativka (east of Kherson City).[141]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricant warehouse in occupied Kherson Oblast on the night of November 2 to 3, destroying 900 cubic meters of fuel and lubricants and two pumping stations.[142]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea with Lancet loitering munitions.[143] Molniya-2 loitering munition operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and positions in the Kakhovka direction (northeast of Kherson City).[144]

One of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) four anti-submarine corvettes is reportedly on fire in occupied Crimea. The Crimean-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on November 4 that one of the BSF's Project 1124M Albatross-M Grisha-class anti-submarine corvettes is on fire at the pier in Sukharna Bay in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[145] Crimean Wind reported that the BSF only has four Project 1124M corvettes, two of which the BSF evacuated to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai in 2024, and two of which remained in occupied Sevastopol.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and six S-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles from Kursk Oblast.[146] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 130 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, including about 80 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 92 drones and that one missile and 31 drones struck 14 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, residential, port, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts.[147]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 4 that Russian forces dropped 5,328 guided glide bombs on Ukrainian positions and frontline settlements in October 2025, the highest number of glide bomb strikes in a single month in 2025.[148] The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces have launched about 40,000 guided glide bombs in the first ten months of 2025 – as many glide bombs as Russia launched in all of 2024.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 4 that the Belarusian military command staff met to discuss training that integrates experiences from “modern warfare,” likely referring to the war in Ukraine.[149] The Belarusian MoD stated that the training will emphasize counter-drone operations, the usage of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for casualty evacuation and demining, and small group operations in cooperation with motorized vehicles in forested terrain.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.