Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2025

November 1, 2025, 8:45 pm ET

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on November 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk to seize the town. Geolocated footage published on October 31 and November 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and southeastern Pokrovsk.[i] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in central Pokrovsk beyond what the geolocated footage supports, in northeastern Pokrovsk, and northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[ii] A senior officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske on October 31 that Russian forces are operating in roughly 60 percent of Pokrovsk and have entered Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[iii] Geolocated footage published on October 31 and November 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[iv] The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating to the east in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area (northeast of Pokrovsk) reported on November 1 that Russian forces significantly decreased offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction after a failed mechanized assault on October 27 and suggested that Russian forces may have redeployed forces from this direction to reinforce Russian efforts against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[v] A Ukrainian drone operator operating in Pokrovsk indicated to Hromadske that Russian forces are tactically isolating some Ukrainian positions.[vi] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Hromadske that Ukrainian logistics in the direction are “complicated” but that Russian forces have not cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Ukrainian servicemember operating in Myrnohrad told Hromadske that the Russian forces operating in northern Pokrovsk and northeastern Myrnohrad "feel completely at ease" and that Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators are within range to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs connecting Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. An officer of a Ukrainian unit operating in Myrnohrad told Hromadske that Russian forces have almost complete fire control over the narrow Ukrainian GLOC supplying Myrnohrad. The porous nature of the frontline and ubiquity of drones in this area continue to obscure the tactical picture in Pokrovsk, and ISW will provide an updated assessment as the situation becomes clearer.

Ukrainian forces conducted a heliborne air assault operation west of Pokrovsk on October 31. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 1 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful air assault operation near Pokrovsk.[vii] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on October 31 that elements of the GUR Special Forces conducted the operation, which involved multiple helicopters, and entered areas that the Russian military command previously claimed to have seized.[viii] The GUR sources stated that these areas are critically important for Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on October 31 shows Ukrainian servicemembers disembarking from a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter west of Pokrovsk in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[ix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 1 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian counterattack.[x] A Russian milblogger noted on November 1 that the ability of Ukrainian helicopters to penetrate into airspace saturated with Russian drones without sustaining losses “raises questions,” presumably about the strength of the Russian air defense umbrella in the Pokrovsk direction.[xi]

Close combat, urban terrain, and weather conditions are impacting Ukrainian and Russian drone warfare and Russian infiltration tactics in and around Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian officer told Hromadske on October 31 that Ukrainian infantry operating on the forward edges do not regularly engage Russian forces in close combat, as Russian forces instead engage Ukrainian drone and mortar crews in near rear areas.[xii] ISW has recently observed reports that Russian infiltration groups are deliberately engaging Ukrainian drone and artillery crews in Pokrovsk to inhibit Ukrainian strikes.[xiii] A Ukrainian drone operator told Hromadske that the threat of Russian infiltration groups is forcing Ukrainian drone operators to limit the duration of drone flights because the drone operators also have to engage in small arms combat to repel Russian infiltrations in the near rear.[xiv] The Ukrainian drone operator stated that constant Russian infiltrations into Pokrovsk are forcing Ukrainian forces to pull back the second echelon of drone operators, preventing Ukrainian forces from striking Russian forces on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. A high-ranking Ukrainian officer told Hromadske that about 30 to 40 Russian personnel can infiltrate into Pokrovsk when rainy or foggy weather inhibits Ukrainian drone operations, while no more than 10 Russian soldiers can infiltrate during fair weather when Ukrainian forces can operate drones. ISW has observed reports that Russian forces intensify infiltration efforts during poor weather and that precipitation inhibits both Russian and Ukrainian drone operations.[xv] Another Ukrainian drone pilot indicated to Hromadske that Russian and Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk are fighting for control over high-rise buildings and elevated terrain from which to conduct drone operations, particularly against enemy GLOCs at a distance of 30 kilometers.[xvi]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Moscow Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces struck three lines of the Koltsevoy oil refinery in Ramensky Raion, Moscow Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 31 shows explosions at the pipeline.[xvii] The GUR reported that the Koltsevoy pipeline is 400 kilometers long and transports fuel from the Ryazan, Novgorod, and Moscow oil refineries. The GUR reported that the Koltsevoy pipeline could pump up to 7.4 million tons of fuel annually, including three million tons of aviation fuel, 2.8 million tons of diesel fuel, and 1.6 million tons of gasoline. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 11 drones over Moscow Oblast overnight.[xviii]

Polish fighter jets intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the third time in three days, and German officials reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Berlin Brandenburg Airport. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on October 31 that two Polish MiG-29 fighter jets intercepted a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace over the Baltic Sea on October 31.[xix] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that the Russian aircraft was operating without a registered flight plan or an active transponder but did not violate Polish airspace. Polish fighter jets also intercepted Russian reconnaissance aircraft on October 29 and 30.[xx] German authorities at the Berlin Brandenburg Airport confirmed on November 1 that German police spotted an unidentified drone flying near the airport on the evening of October 31, forcing the airport to suspend flights for two hours and divert 11 aircraft.[xxi]

Russian authorities continue cracking down on Russian social media sources who share insider information about the Kremlin and Russian security services. Russian insider channel VChK-OGPU-Info reported on October 31 that Telegram administrators blocked the main VChK-OGPU channel at the behest of Russian authorities for alleged “doxxing and extortion.”[xxii] VChK-OGPU-Info claimed that Telegram removed other channels considered "irritants" to Russian law enforcement and intelligence agencies and that only Telegram management could have removed the account from Telegram. The channel also claimed that Russian forces detained one of the channel's authors in St. Petersburg on October 30. VChK-OGPU claims to have sources affiliated with Russian law enforcement and has offered purported insights into Kremlin factional dynamics, internal assessments of Russian government policies, significant changes in the Russian MoD, and leaks of information regarding the MoD and Russian military.[xxiii]

The Kremlin likely targeted VChK-OGPU as part of a wider effort to cleanse the Russian information space of sources that publish information that the Kremlin deems threatening to the regime's stability. Telegram first deleted the VChK-OGPU channel and several other channels in April 2025, reportedly at the behest of Russian authorities, forcing VChK-OGPU to rely on a backup.[xxiv] Russian law enforcement also detained three employees of the state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru in June 2025 for allegedly receiving funding from an organization designated as a foreign agent and bribing Russian law enforcement to obtain sensitive internal reports.[xxv] Russian authorities raided in late July 2025 the offices of Baza, a Russian outlet affiliated with Russian law enforcement, as part of an abuse of power investigation against Russian police officers who allegedly disclosed sensitive information to Baza.[xxvi] Both publications notably maintained relations within Russia’s internal government systems and previously published information that the Russian government seemingly hoped to withhold from domestic and foreign audiences.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk to seize the town.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a heliborne air assault operation west of Pokrovsk on October 31.
• Close combat, urban terrain, and weather conditions are impacting Ukrainian and Russian drone warfare and Russian infiltration tactics in and around Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Moscow Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1.
• Polish fighter jets intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the third time in three days, and German officials reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Berlin Brandenburg Airport.
• Russian authorities continue cracking down on Russian social media sources who share insider information about the Kremlin and Russian security services.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced to the western outskirts of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[xxvii]

Fighting continued in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindrativka, on October 31 and November 1.[xxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepne (northwest of Sumy City) and Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[xxix]

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported on November 1 that Russian forces used a Molniya mothership unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with two first-person view (FPV) drones to strike a minibus in Mykolaivka (west of Sumy City) about 36 kilometers from the frontline.[xxx] Beskrestnov noted that Russian forces control the Molniya mothership drones via local mobile internet networks and fly these motherships through areas with stable mobile coverage before dropping the FPVs roughly five to 10 kilometers from the target.[xxxi]

The Russian milblogger, reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed that the Russian military command deliberately continues to refuse to rotate servicemembers of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[xxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Prizrak Group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxiii] FPV drone operators of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xxxiv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on October 31 and November 1.[xxxv]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces published footage purportedly provided by and showing servicemembers of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), operating in Vovchansk, filtering rainwater from puddles due to Russian logistics failures.[xxxvi] The milblogger claimed the Russian military command fails to evacuate the bodies of Russian servicemembers killed in action (KIA).

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xxxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced between Odradne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and Bolohivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xxxviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Dvorichanske on October 31 and November 1.[xxxix]

The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces published footage on November 1 reportedly showing Russian forces conducting TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces near Novouzhvynivka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xl]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and toward the Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi railway station (south of Kupyansk).[xli]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on October 31 and November 1.[xlii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yuvileynyi Microraion and other areas within Kupyansk itself, near Osynovo (south of Kupyansk) and Velyka Shapkivka, and toward Myrove (both northwest of Kupyansk) and Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[xliii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[xliv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova toward Novoplatonivka on October 31 and November 1 but did not advance.[xlv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[xlvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Yampil and Lyman.[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Korovii Yar, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Stavky; and east of Lyman near Maslyakivka and Torske on October 31 and November 1.[xlviii]

A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 1 that Russian forces are attacking on foot and using fewer vehicles in the Lyman direction.[xlix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Hyperion Unmanned Systems Battalion (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in northeastern Yampil.[l] Multiple rocket launch system (MLRS) elements of the 1st) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment in the Lyman direction.[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne and Fedorivka on October 31 and November 1.[lii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on October 31 that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized the St. Matrona Moskovska mine (southeast of Kostyantynivka and northwest of Toretsk).[liii] Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces seized the mine on June 8, that Ukrainian forces retook the mine on July 18, and that Russian forces seized the mine on October 29.[liv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Nelipivka, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Pleshchiivka, and Toretsk; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka.[lv]

The senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces operating near Kostyantynivka have reverted to small group infiltration tactics after sustaining heavy losses during a failed October 27 battalion-sized mechanized assault.[lvi] The NCO added that Ukrainian forces captured three prisoners of war (POWs) from the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near Kostyantynivka.

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on October 31 that Russian forces are unable to fully consolidate recently seized positions in the Kostyantynivka direction due to Ukrainian interdiction of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[lvii]

Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov reported on November 1 that Russian forces conducted an FAB-250 glide bomb strike against Kostyantynivka, injuring one civilian and damaging residential infrastructure.[lviii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lix] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Kramatorsk.[lx] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka) with Lancet loitering munitions.[lxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 31 and November 1, but did not advance.[lxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating fiber optic drones in the Dobropillya direction.[lxiii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for information on assessed Russian and Ukrainian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Mykolaivka, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Udachne, and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Novopavlivka, and Molodetske on October 31 and November 1.[lxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hryshyne, Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk), and Rodynske.[lxv]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion and the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian military vehicles near Rodynske and Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxvi] FPV drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and unspecified drone operators of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[lxvii] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in northern, eastern, and southeastern Myrnohrad.[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 31 and November 1, but did not advance.[lxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Vorone, and Ternove; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka, Danylivka, Vyshneve, and Verbove on October 31 and November 1.[lxx]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Hulyaipole near Krasnohirske and toward Rybne; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pavlivka and Novomykolaivka and toward Nove; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai on October 31 and November 1.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, Shcherbaky, and Novoandriivka on October 31 and November 1.[lxxii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces continue to employ small group infiltration tactics in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR).[lxxiii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Shaman detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[lxxiv] Drone operators of the 74th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Svoboda (northeast of Orikhiv) with Lancet loitering munitions.[lxxv]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Roadway Bridge, on October 31 and November 1, but did not advance.[lxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 31 to November 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 223 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other types of strike drones — including about 140 Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 206 drones and that 17 Russian drones struck seven locations. The Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration reported on November 1 that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv City, likely with an Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, killing one civilian and injuring 15 others, and damaging energy infrastructure.[lxxviii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Poltava oblasts.[lxxix] Chernihiv Oblast officials reported that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Koryukivka and Koryukivska Hromada, damaging an agricultural enterprise and unspecified critical infrastructure, and targeted the central square in Novohrad-Siverskyi (both northeast of Chernihiv City).[lxxx] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces struck a natural gas production facility in Poltava Oblast.[lxxxi] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported on October 31 that it will restrict energy consumption to unspecified Ukrainian oblasts on November 1 due to ongoing Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[lxxxii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.