Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2025

Assessment as of: 10:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on November 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Trump administration continues efforts to negotiate a peace deal to end Russia's war against Ukraine. US President Donald Trump stated on November 25 that Ukraine and the United States "fine-tuned" the initially proposed 28-point peace plan with additional input from Ukraine and Russia and that there are "only a few" remaining points of disagreement.[1] Trump stated that he directed US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll to meet with a Ukrainian delegation at an unspecified location.[2] Trump stated that he looks forward to meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Putin "soon," but only when the peace deal is "final" or "in its final stages."[3] Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Tolbert, Driscoll's spokesperson, stated that Driscoll and his team spoke with a Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi on November 24 and 25.[4] Axios and ABC reported that sources stated that Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov was also in Abu Dhabi, but it is unclear whether Budanov met with the Russian delegation or just the American one.[5]

Ukrainian officials continue to express support for the latest 19-point peace plan and demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to engage in further talks. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak told Axios on November 25 that US and Ukrainian officials have agreed in principle on most aspects of the latest peace proposal and that Zelensky wants to negotiate territorial concessions with Trump directly.[6] Yermak stated that the updated draft text on security guarantees "looks very solid" and that the United States had a "positive reaction" to the prospect of enshrining the security guarantees for Ukraine in a formal treaty. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated that Ukraine is looking to organize a meeting between Zelensky and Trump in Washington in November 2025 to complete the final steps and "make a deal" with Trump.[7] The Financial Times (FT) reported that senior Ukrainian officials stated that Trump and Zelensky would decide on the most sensitive issues in the proposed peace deal, such as territorial issues and US security guarantees for Ukraine, but noted that Ukraine agreed to cap its military at 800,000 personnel.[8] Ukraine has roughly 900,000 active servicemembers.[9]

Russian officials are attempting to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to compromise and its commitment to its maximalist demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on November 25 that the Russian stance towards the peace proposals will "fundamentally" change should the updated peace plan "erase" the "spirit and letter" of alleged agreements from the Alaska summit.[10] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky reiterated Russia's call for any peace settlement to address the war's "root causes"- a deliberately vague term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand for its original war justifications and demands - and claimed that Russia reached an "understanding" with the United States at the Alaska summit.[11] The exact parameters of the US-Russian discussions at the Alaska summit remain unclear, and the parties did not issue official statements about any agreements they reached during the summit.[12] Putin used the press conference at the Alaska summit to reiterate his demands about the "root causes," and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to several Russian and US media outlets directly after the summit to clarify to the West that Russia’s demands to end the war had not changed.[13] High-ranking Russian officials, including Putin, have responded to the various peace plan proposals in recent days by reiterating their commitment to alleged US-Russian agreements from the Alaska summit.[14] The Kremlin has previously pointed to the 2022 Istanbul agreements, which clearly and publicly documented Russia's maximalist demands for Ukraine's capitulation, as their preferred basis of any future agreements.[15] The Kremlin appears to now be exploiting the lack of official, publicly available agreements from the Alaska summit to appear as a good-faith participant in negotiations and is willing to compromise on its original war demands. Kremlin officials' continued public rejections of the US- and Ukraine-proposed peace plans and repeated statements about the "root causes" of the war, however, demonstrate that the Kremlin remains committed to its original war aims from 2021 and 2022. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, a key pro-war constituency for Putin, also continued to reject the peace proposals on November 25 and advocate that Russia continue the war, further demonstrating how the Kremlin has failed to set conditions for the Russian people to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.[16]

 The Washington Post reported on November 25 that a former senior Kremlin official with knowledge of the negotiations acknowledged that the initial 28-point peace plan was a "pro-Russian plan" but stated that some elements of the plan were still unacceptable for Russia.[17] A Russian academic close to senior Russian diplomats told the Washington Post that the 28-point plan was "not good enough" for Russia as it did not address the Kremlin's longstanding demands to remove the current democratically elected Ukrainian government and demilitarize Ukraine by crippling Ukraine's military capacity. The Russian academic claimed that Putin likely does not want Trump to see him as the "main obstacle to peace," but that it is unclear how flexible Putin will be and on what issues he will yield. The source claimed that Putin's position likely hinges on his view of Russia's "reserves of stability" in the face of growing sanctions pressure and that Putin may take a more flexible position if he thinks that "problems are building and next year will be more difficult" for Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely face a series of military and economic issues in the medium-term and that the United States can leverage economic measures coupled with weapons sales to Ukraine to push Putin to come to the negotiating table ready to make compromises to end the war.[18]

Russia killed at least seven Ukrainian civilians and injured at least 20 in Kyiv City and struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure during combined missile and drone strikes on the night of November 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 22 missiles and 464 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, and that 26 missiles and drones struck 15 locations and falling debris hit 12 locations.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force specified that Russian forces launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles; three Iskander-M ballistic missiles; eight Kalibr and seven Iskander-K cruise missiles; and about 250 Shahed drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kinzhal, three Iskander-M, five Iskander-K, and five Kalibr missiles and 438 drones. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts; and stated that the government will impose rolling blackouts across Ukraine starting on November 26 due to reduced power generation.[20] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the November 24 to 25 strikes left over 102,000 Ukrainian energy consumers without power.[21] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that Russian forces primarily targeted Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast and that Russian strikes against residential buildings and a supermarket warehouse killed seven and injured 20 people in Kyiv City.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged port infrastructure in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast and civilian infrastructure elsewhere in the oblast, injuring six civilians.[23] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Ukrzaliznytsya railway energy infrastructure in Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv Oblast and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Sumy, Cherkasy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[24]

Russian drones violated Romanian and Moldovan airspaces on the night of November 24 to 25 during combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine. The Romanian Ministry of National Defense detected two drones over Romania's Tulcea and Galați counties (both in southeastern Romania) about an hour apart on the morning of November 25 and reported that NATO scrambled two German Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft and two F-16 aircraft to intercept the drones.[25] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense stated that fighter jets tracked the first drone until it reentered Ukrainian airspace and that the second drone was moving towards the Vrancea County, over 100 kilometers away from the Romanian-Ukrainian border.[26] Romanian Defense Minister Ionut Mosteanu stated that the fighter jets nearly shot down the second drone, which repeatedly entered Romania's airspace, but held off due to concerns of debris causing damage on the ground.[27] Mosteanu stated that Romanian authorities later found a Russian drone without an explosive device in Vaslui County (about 250 to 300 kilometers from Ukraine) in what may be the deepest violation of Romanian airspace since February 2022, emphasizing that Romania is facing a "new Russian provocation."[28] Moldova's Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that six Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace overnight, and Moldovan Police reported that a Russian Gerbera drone crashed into a house in Cuhurestii de Jos, northern Moldova.[29] Moldova's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the Russian ambassador over the drone incursions on November 25.[30]

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to leverage their new offensive template to seize Pokrovsk and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). ISW has previously assessed that Russia's new offensive template is comprised of heavy battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration tactics.[31] Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on November 25 that Russian forces control Pokrovsk, south of the Donetska Railway, which is consistent with Russian and Ukrainian reporting of the situation in the area south of the railway in recent days.[32] Ukrainska Pravda reported that the current frontline in Pokrovsk largely runs along the northern outskirts of the town. A senior officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske on October 31 that Russian forces were operating in roughly 60 percent of Pokrovsk as of late October.[33] Ukrainska Pravda reported on November 25 that Ukrainian counterattacks in Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) were initially successful, but that Russian forces later retook the settlement.[34] A Ukrainian deputy battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Ukrainska Pravda that Russian forces have brought tanks and mortars into Pokrovsk since November 19 – indicating that Russian forces have been able to deploy heavy equipment into Pokrovsk despite Ukrainian interdiction efforts.[35]

Russian forces continue efforts to infiltrate Myrnohrad and sever tactical Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk, consistent with the new Russian offensive template that seeks to interdict tactical GLOCs after an operational interdiction campaign. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces assessed on November 25 that Russian forces will attempt to sever the GLOCs between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the near future.[36] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces are reinforcing units within Myrnohrad to defend the southern outskirts of the town, where Russian forces are accumulating. A Ukrainian officer operating in Myrnohrad told Ukrainska Pravda that the Ukrainian GLOCs to Myrnohrad lie entirely within the contested ”gray zone” over which neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces exert firm control.[37] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in Myrnohrad told Hromadske on October 31 that Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators were already within range to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs connecting Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[38] Geolocated footage published on November 25 shows Ukrainian servicemembers taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) along Tsentralna Street in central Myrnohrad, indicating that Russian forces recently managed to infiltrate deep into central Myrnohrad but are not yet comfortably exercising control over this area.[39]

Russian forces are employing their new offensive template in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, setting conditions for a future dedicated effort to seize Kostyantynivka and threaten the Ukrainian Fortress Belt from the south. A Ukrainian drone platoon commander operating in the Kostyantynivka direction told Ukrainska Pravda on November 25 that Russian forces have been entering Kostyantynivka for over a month (since about mid-October 2025) and are regularly engaging Ukrainian forces with small arms.[40] The drone platoon commander reported that the Russian presence in Kostyantynivka is no longer restricted to small sabotage and reconnaissance groups. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 25 that fighting is ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[41] Russian forces have been heavily striking Kostyantynivka and its environs in recent months, likely as part of an operational-level BAI campaign aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics and defensive ability ahead of dedicated ground operations to seize the city and the rest of Ukraine's Fortress Belt.[42] Russian and Ukrainian sources recently indicated that Russian forces had deprioritized the seizure of Kostyantynivka to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk, but that the Russian military command would likely reprioritize the seizure of Kostyantynivka after taking Pokrovsk.[43] The Russian military command likely seeks to continue interdiction efforts and infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka to set conditions for a future dedicated effort to seize the city at a time of its choosing.

Key Takeaways:

• The Trump administration continues efforts to negotiate a peace deal to end Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials continue to express support for the latest 19-point peace plan and demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to engage in further talks.
• Russian officials are attempting to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to compromise and its commitment to its maximalist demands.
• Russia killed at least seven Ukrainian civilians and injured at least 20 in Kyiv City and struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure during combined missile and drone strikes on the night of November 24 to 25.
• Russian drones violated Romanian and Moldovan airspaces on the night of November 24 to 25 during combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.
• The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to leverage their new offensive template to seize Pokrovsk and encircle Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.
• Russian forces are employing their new offensive template in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, setting conditions for a future dedicated effort to seize Kostyantynivka and threaten the Ukrainian Fortress Belt from the south.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 24 to 25. Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources told Ukrainian news agency RBK-Ukraine on November 25 that SBU and other Ukrainian elements struck military and logistics facilities at the Novorossiysk Port in Krasnodar Krai, Russia.[44] The sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck oil terminal infrastructure and an S-300/S-400 air defense system. The sources reported that preliminary data suggests that Ukrainian strikes damaged a Russian Project 1171 large landing ship. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Sheskharis Oil Terminal in Novorossiysk and the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai.[45] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev and Novorossiysk Mayor Andrei Kravchenko acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck Krasnodar Krai.[46] Two sources told Reuters that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) resumed loadings on November 25 after overnight Ukrainian strikes forced a temporary halt in operations at its Black Sea Terminal near Novorossiysk.[47]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian aircraft in Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Beriev Aircraft Repair Plant, likely hitting an A-60 experimental aircraft, in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant repairs and modernizes A-50 early warning and control (AWACS) surveillance aircraft and Tu-95MS strategic bombers. Geolocated footage from Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) shows large explosions over industrial infrastructure in Taganrog.[49] An OSINT source posted satellite imagery taken on November 25 and reported that Ukrainian strikes destroyed an A-60 experimental laser testing aircraft and an A-100 long-range radar detection and control aircraft at the Beriev Plant.[50] The OSINT source noted that the plant suffered ”significant damage,” including to its final assembly shop, and that Ukrainian forces also struck an S-400 air defense system.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy and Kursk directions, including northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka, north of Sumy City near Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne and Yunakivka, on November 24 and 25.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (northeast of Sumy City).[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are not advancing in the Sumy direction and that elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade have been unable to salvage the situation without combined arms support.[53] The milblogger claimed that the Russian command redeployed relatively elite naval infantry and VDV elements away from this area, leaving only motorized rifle regiments to hold the line in Sumy Oblast.

Novhorod-Siverskyi Raion Military Administration Head Oleksandr Seliverstov reported on November 24 that Russian forces conducted two first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against minibuses in Semenivka, Chernihiv Oblast (northwest of Sumy City).[54]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[55] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[56]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on November 24 and 25.[57]

Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on November 25 that a servicemember of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) claimed that his commanding officers strapped him to a tree for four hours while Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones flew nearby as punishment for refusing to fight in Vovchansk.[58] The Russian servicemember claimed that the Russian military command sent a fellow servicemember to battle with a TM-62 anti-tank mine strapped to his chest.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in Vovchansk.[59] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and elements of the Kurchaloyevsky Raion Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) department and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly continuing to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on November 24 and 25.[61]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces complained that the commander of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division) continues to order costly attritional assaults near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), in line with his predecessors’ practices.[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction reported that intense fighting continues in the area between Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and Kamyanka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk and northeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces continue to intensify drone and artillery strikes against Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[63] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are taking advantage of worsening weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations to intensify offensive operations near Dvorichanske. The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces used two tanks to repel a large-scale Russian assault on Dvorichanske, as weather conditions hindered Ukrainian drone operations.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted Geran-2 drone strikes against Ukrainian forces near Siryi Yar (west of Velykyi Burluk) and Mytrofanivka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk and north of Kupyansk).[64]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Khatnie.[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[66]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on November 24 and 25.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[68] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Borova near Nadiya and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on November 24 and 25 but did not advance.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Lyman, toward the T-0513 Lyman-Siversk highway southeast of Lyman, and in southwestern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Stavky (north of Lyman) remains a contested "gray zone" following a Russian infiltration mission to raise flags in the settlement.[72] The Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in western Stavky (north of Lyman), contrary to Russian claims of having seized the whole settlement.[73]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Ozerne on November 24 and 25.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking near Stavky.[75]

Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on November 25 that Russian forces have entered Lyman several times but that Ukrainian forces repelled the Russian forces each time and prevented them from establishing an enduring presence in the settlement.[76] A servicemember of a Ukrainian drone unit told Ukrainska Pravda that Russian forces gained fire control of the E-40 Slovyansk-Izyum highway after seizing key heights in the Lyman direction. Ukrainska Pravda reported that the loss of the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman) in late September 2025 brought the frontline up to the Lyman-Yampil railway line, allowing Russian forces to advance to the outskirts of Lyman and creating a large contested "gray zone" near Yampil. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Lyman direction stated on November 25 that Russian forces conduct assaults with drone-supported infantry and occasionally with motorcycles.[77] The Ukrainian servicemember stated that Russian forces primarily attack in the morning and evening and sometimes during the day to take advantage of thick fog, which complicates Ukrainian drone operations. The Ukrainian servicemember stated that Russian forces aim to hinder Ukrainian logistics with constant drone strikes, including with first-person view (FPV), fiber-optic, and sleeper drones.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Rubtsi (northwest of Lyman) direction.[78]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached the northeastern outskirts of Siversk and advanced in southern and northern Siversk.[79] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces cut the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway west of Zakitne (west of Siversk), and another milblogger assessed that Russian advances toward Ozerne (just west of Zakitne and just south of the T-0513) will allow Russian forces to cross the Siverskyi Donets River to reach the rear of Ukrainian forces in Siversk.[80]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and toward Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Zvanivka; and southwest of Siversk near Pazeno on November 24 and 25.[81]

Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on November 25 that Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces out of Siversk several times after Russian forces entered the town.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in southern Nelipivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka), where ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had advanced, indicating that Russian forces are likely conducting infiltration missions in the area.[83]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (southeast of Kostyantynivka) and advanced north and west of the settlement, as well as along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Donetsk highway north of Oleksandro-Kalynove (south of Kostyantynivka).[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced north of Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) toward Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[85]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kostyantynivka itself; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Kleban-Byk, Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Mykolaipillya; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on November 24 and 25.[86]

A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on November 25 that its drone operators recently destroyed two Russian Cherny Glaz electronic warfare (EW) systems in the Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka) direction.[87]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 25 that Russian forces seized Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka), which ISW assessed that Russian forces had seized as of November 21.[88] The Russian MoD credited elements of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, SMD), Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) with seizing Ivanopillya.[89]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly coordinating loitering munition strikes against Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[90] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 8th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated as the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Vilne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on November 24 and 25.[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances and infiltrations in the Pokrovsk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are present north of Pokrovsk – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[93]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Pokrovsk; southwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk); and in northern, northeastern, and western Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[94]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, Krasnyi (Chervonyi) Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad, Rivne, and Svitle; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Zvirove, and Molodetske on November 24 and 25.[95] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), in Rodynske, and toward Myrnohrad.[96]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Myrnohrad.[97]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the southwestern outskirts of Novopavlivka.[98]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on November 24 and 25.[99]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Novopavlivka.[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the east (left) bank of the Vovcha River in southeastern Kolomiitsi (west of Velykomykhailivka).[101]

Russian forces attacked west of Velykomykhailivka near Tykhe; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Orestopil and Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove on November 24 and 25.[102] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Orestopil and west of Hai (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[103]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 25 that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Velykomykhailivka, Orly (northwest of Velykomykhailivka), and Havrylivka (north of Velykomykhailivka) on November 24.[104]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Hulyaipole and along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway north of and into Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole).[105] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger refuted on November 25 other milbloggers’ claims that Russian forces are assaulting Hulyaipole itself as of November 24.[106] The milblogger added that Russian forces have yet to clear Ukrainian forces from tactically significant heights near the outskirts of Zelenyi Hai and Vysoke (both east of Hulyaipole).[107]

Russian forces attacked toward Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia, Yehorivka, and Rivnopillya and toward Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Pryluky; northeast of Hulyaipole near Krasnohirske, Pryvilne, Pavlivka, and Solodke; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya, Vesele, Vysoke, and Zelenyi Hai on November 24 and 25.[108] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Dobropillya and near Rivnopillya, Solodke, and Radisne (north of Hulyaipole).[109]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue air and drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) leading to Hulyaipole to set conditions for efforts against the town itself.[110] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 25 that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Hulyaipole, Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), Vozdvyzhivka, Kosivtseve, and Rizdvyanka (all northwest of Hulyaipole) on November 24.[111] A Russian milblogger posted footage showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian vehicles with fiber optic drones reportedly on the outskirts of Hulyaipole.[112]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces exploited windbreaks and foggy weather conditions during the claimed seizure of Nove Zaporizhzhia, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized as of November 22.[113] The milblogger claimed that the seizures of Nove Zaporizhzhia, Zatyshshya, and Yablukove (northeast of Hulyaipole) deprived Ukrainian forces of key fortifications in the Hulyaipole direction.

Order of Battle: Assault and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD), likely including drone operators, are reportedly continuing to operate toward Hulyaipole and strike Ukrainian vehicles within Hulyaipole.[114] Assault elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate near Zatyshshya, and assault elements of the 218th Tank Regiment and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[115] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly continuing to operate near Nove Zaporizhzhia.[116] TOS-1A thermobaric artillery elements of the 35th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Regiment (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[117] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[118] Artillery elements and Lancet and KVN drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) and elements of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely in the Hulyaipole direction.[119]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 24 shows Russian forces in western Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) conducting what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[120]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[121]

Russian forces continued ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on November 24 and 25.[122]

Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition and KVN fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 291st Artillery Brigade (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces north of Orikhiv.[123] Drone operators of the Shaman detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the approaches to Orikhiv.[124] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly continuing to operate in Prymorske and Stepnohirsk.[125] Drone operators of the Russian 417th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, engineer and assault elements of the 7th VDV Division, and elements of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[126]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge on November 24 and 25 but did not advance.[127]

A Russian milblogger who frequently reports on Russian drone and artillery strikes in the Kherson direction warned on November 24 that Ukrainian drone strikes are successfully interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the 15-kilometer zone from the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson Oblast.[128] The milblogger warned that Ukrainian interdiction efforts threaten Russian positions along the eastern shore of the Dnipro River and in the Dnipro River Delta island zone.[129] The milblogger claimed that Russian remote mining and artillery strikes have failed to constrain Ukrainian movement in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast or Ukrainian interdiction efforts, and called for Russian forces to counter the Ukrainian interdiction campaign.

Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian airfield in occupied Crimea. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on November 25 that two Ukrainian drones struck an inoperative A-60 experimental aircraft at a Russian airfield in occupied Crimea.[130] A Crimea-focused Telegram channel reported that Ukrainian forces targeted an airfield in occupied Hvardiiske, and that there were explosions in occupied Dzhankoy and Kerch.[131] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also launched Neptune missiles at the Saky Thermal Power Plant.[132] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces intercepted 131 drones over the Black Sea and 26 drones over occupied Crimea overnight.[133]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for Russian combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 24 to 25.

The Sumy Oblast Emergency Service reported on November 24 that Russian forces conducted a "double tap" strike against a fire truck in Sumy City after Ukrainian firefighters responded to put out a fire from an earlier Russian drone strike.[134]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.