Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on November 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to try to blame US President Donald Trump for the nuclear arms modernization and buildup program that Russia began years ago. Putin held an award ceremony on November 4 for the developers of the new Burevestnik missile and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, in which he continued to laud the weapons' purported technical capabilities.[1] Putin held a Russian Security Council meeting on November 5 in which Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, and Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov offered their assessments of US President Donald Trump's statements since October 29 that the United States would start testing its nuclear weapons.[2] Belousov advised Putin to begin preparation for "full-scale" nuclear testing immediately, and Putin called for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), special services, and relevant civilian agencies to submit proposals on the possible start of nuclear weapons tests. The Kremlin officials continued to interpret that Trump's recent statements meant that the United States would begin testing nuclear warheads. Trump did not specify if the United States would test nuclear warheads or the delivery systems, however, and US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated on November 2 that Trump is likely referring to tests of delivery systems.[3] Russia has violated the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and likely restarted low-yield nuclear tests in 2019 in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).[4] Russia's latest weapons developments fundamentally do not change the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, even if the technical details that Putin is touting are true — as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently noted.[5]

Russia's grinding advances in the Pokrovsk direction continue to absorb significant Russian losses. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on November 5 that SBU units operating in the Pokrovsk direction killed over 1,500 Russian servicemembers and destroyed 20 tanks, 62 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 532 transport vehicles in October 2025.[6] The SBU's numbers only account for casualties inflicted by SBU forces, and total Russian losses in the area are likely much higher. Geolocated footage published on November 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 4 and 5 that Russian forces advanced within northeastern Pokrovsk, southeast of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), and southwest of Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk).[8] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 5 that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts against Ukrainian forces in southern Pokrovsk and are wearing civilian clothes as part of deception tactics — considered perfidy under international law.[9] ISW has recently observed multiple reports of Russian forces committing acts of perfidy in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces have leveraged infiltration tactics to penetrate the town between Ukrainian positions.[10]

The Russian military command has committed significant portions of the 2nd, 41st, and 51st combined arms armies (CAA) to the Pokrovsk direction, indicating its prioritization of the seizure of the pocket.[11] Elements of the Russian 35th and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in western Pokrovsk; and elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA), the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), and the 1452nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 41st CAA) are reportedly operating in eastern Pokrovsk.[12] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in Rodynske; elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk); elements of the 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk); and elements of the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[13]Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have been taking some of the highest losses on the battlefield in recent months, and the 21-month campaign to seize Pokrovsk has likely degraded these three CAAs.[14] The servicemember noted that Russian forces rarely employ mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction, apart from near Myrnohrad. ISW recently observed reporting of Russian mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[15]

North Korea is reportedly deploying additional troops to support roles in the Russian rear. South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency, citing South Korean parliamentarians who received a briefing from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on November 4 that North Korea deployed roughly 5,000 military engineering troops to Russia, likely to restore infrastructure.[16] South Korean intelligence reportedly assessed that North Korea is training and selecting personnel in preparation for additional troop deployments to Russia. The NIS reportedly stated that there are currently about 10,000 North Korean troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border performing "security duties," and another 1,000 are clearing mines. ISW continues to assess that it is unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy for combat operations to Ukrainian territory, which would mark a significant inflection, but that North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would free up Russian forces to deploy to the battlefield.[17] ISW previously observed reports that North Korean military personnel and “technical advisers” were operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast, and it is unclear if Russia plans to deploy the North Korean troops to restore infrastructure in Russia or occupied Ukraine.[18]

The Kremlin continues to set conditions to deploy active reservists to combat in Ukraine. Russia recently passed a law allowing active reservists to participate in special training sessions to ensure the protection of critical facilities in Russia.[19] Russian officials previously claimed that Russian authorities will only send reservists to protect critical infrastructure within their home region, but the law notably does not include such restrictions.[20] The Kremlin defines the four illegally annexed oblasts in Ukraine as part of Russia, such that the law's lack of territorial restrictions could allow Russia to send active reservists to areas of occupied Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin also passed a law on November 5 extending the monthly payments that Russian contract soldiers receive to any military personnel serving to repel an armed invasion of Russia, during an armed provocation on the state border or in Russian territory, or near areas in which Russia is conducting a "special military operation."[21] Russian officials have long discussed extending benefits to personnel serving in border regions after domestic backlash following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in 2024.[22] The timing of Putin’s decision to pass the law suggests that it may also be related to the recent law on the deployment of active reservists. The Kremlin may be using the clause in the law about those serving near a "special military operation" to set conditions for the deployment — and payment —of active reservists to combat in Ukraine, as ISW continues to assess.[23] The Kremlin is likely framing its recent legal changes regarding active reservists as only part of plans to protect infrastructure in order to conceal longer-term plans to deploy them to Ukraine. A source in one of Russia’s largest oil and gas companies notably told Russian opposition outlet Verstka that the company’s security personnel “do not have high expectations” of the active reservists who will protect critical infrastructure and that only real army air defense systems can offer adequate protection.[24]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor General Andriy Leshchenko reported on November 4that Russian forces have committed over 190,000 war crimes since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and that Russia is conducting a "planned state policy" of crimes against the Ukrainian people.[25] Ukrainian Department of Counteracting Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict Head Yuriy Rud reported that Russian forces have conducted over 5,100 drone strikes against civilians so far in 2025 — twice the total number in all of 2024. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on November 5 that Ukrainian intelligence officers assessed that the November 3 Russian drone strike that killed two Ukrainian civilians in the Borova direction likely occurred as the civilians were evacuating from Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[26] Kupyanksyi Raion Police Department Head Kyrylo Schcherbinsky reported that the civilians were walking from Kruhlyakivka toward occupied Berestove (east of Kruhlyakivka) and that the direction of the drone strike indicated that Russian forces were responsible. The watermark of the footage showing the strike showed the insignia of the Russian 96th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]).[27] ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[28]

Authorities reported unidentified drone incursions near the Brussels and Liege airports in Belgium on the evening of November 4. Belgian authorities closed the Brussels Airport due to an unidentified drone.[29] Authorities reopened the Brussels Airport approximately two hours later but closed the airport again after subsequent drone sightings. Belgian authorities also closed the Liege Airport due to unidentified drone sightings.[30] Belgian officials reported that there were three unidentified drones flying over the Kleine Brogel Air Base from October 31 to November 2.[31] Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken stated that the repeated drone overflights are “in line with the hybrid techniques seen in other countries” and that the actors organized them "in a very structured way.”[32] Belgian authorities have not officially attributed these latest drone sightings to a specific actor as of this writing. The repeated unidentified drone incursions near Belgian critical infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political and psychological conditions for a potential Russian war against NATO.[33]

Key Takeaways:

•       Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to try to blame US President Donald Trump for the nuclear arms modernization and buildup program that Russia began years ago.
•       Russia's grinding advances in the Pokrovsk direction continue to absorb significant Russian losses.
•       North Korea is reportedly deploying additional troops to support roles in the Russian rear.
•       The Kremlin continues to set conditions to deploy active reservists to combat in Ukraine.
•       Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
•       Authorities reported unidentified drone incursions near the Brussels and Liege airports in Belgium on the evening of November 4.
•       Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Vovchansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka. Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

•       Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
•       Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
•       Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
•       Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
•       Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
•       Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
•       Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
•       Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
•       Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 4 to 5. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on November 5 that Ukrainian drones struck the Vladimirskaya power substation near Vladimir City and that geolocated footage shows explosions overnight near the Oryol Thermal Power Plant in Oryol Oblast.[34] Vladimir Oblast Governor Alexander Avdeev claimed that a Ukrainian drone struck energy infrastructure in a suburb of Vladimir City.[35] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed that Russian forces downed two Ukrainian jet-propelled drones over Oryol City overnight and that drone debris damaged private homes.[36] Yaroslav Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev also claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes caused minor damage to oil pumping stations in two okrugs.[37]

Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that SSO elements, in cooperation with the Russian Chernaya Iskra insurgency group, struck a transport-loading vehicle for an Iskander missile launcher near Ovsyannikovo, Kursk Oblast on the night of October 3 to 4.[38] SSO and Chernaya Iskra elements also reportedly destroyed a 1L122 Garmon radar station near Nizhny Reutets, Kursk Oblast.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: A Ukrainian drone battalion reported on November 4 that Russian forces still occupy Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[39]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian naval infantry elements marginally advanced by 100 meters near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[40]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Varachyne, on November 5.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Andriivka, Kindrativka, and Varachyne (all north of Sumy City).[42]

The Sumy Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian vehicle in Seredino-Budska Hromada on November 5, killing one civilian and wounding three.[43] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian drone operations are slowing Russian advances in the Sumy direction.[44]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that a soldier from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) likely killed two Russian servicemembers in the Troitske-Kostyantynivka area (north of Sumy City) and that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are searching for the soldier.[45]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[46] FPV drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly struck Ukrainian equipment in Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City).[47]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the T-2104 Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[48]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced near the T-2104 highway in central Vovchansk, an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[49]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Tykhe and near Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk on November 4 and 5.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) continue to operate in southern Vovchansk.[52] Drone operators and other elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian equipment in the Kharkiv direction.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Odradne (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[54]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Bolohivka on November 5.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk), within Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and between Kupyansk and Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk).[56]

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on November 4 and 5.[57] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk and near Monachynivka (northwest of Kupyansk), Blahodativka (southwest of Kupyansk), and Osynovo (southwest of Kupyansk).[58]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions and that Ukrainian forces have cleared the west (right) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk and the town's northwestern outskirts of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[59] The commander stated that Russian forces are increasing their use of lightly armored equipment to bring manpower closer to the front line during foggy weather that inhibits Ukrainian drone operations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Kupyansk.[60] Drone operators of the 153rd Neptune Reconnaissance Company of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Pishchane.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 5 but did not advance.

[62]northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Borivska Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on November 4 and 5.[63]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted a Kh-39 helicopter-launched air-to-surface missile strike against a Ukrainian drone launch point in Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova.[64]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Hrekivka.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Lyman; in Maslyakivka (east of Lyman); Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman), and Yampil (southeast of Lyman); and near Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[66]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Korovii Yar, Shandryholove, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 4 and 5.[67]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 5 that Russian forces are infiltrating between Ukrainian positions with limited ammunition and without provisions and then accumulating before subsequent attacks.[68] The spokesperson stated that these tactics are occasionally successful but result in high casualties. A Russian milblogger claimed that the northern and northeastern parts of Yampil are a contested “gray zone.”[69][70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment reportedly continue to in the Lyman direction.[71]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) and Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[72]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka and Pereizne on November 4 and 5.[73]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Slovyansk (Siversk) direction.[74]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 5 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Katerynivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[75]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Pleshchiivka, and Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Shcherbynivka, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on November 4 and 5.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Pleshchiivka.[77] Drone operators of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kramatorsk (Kostyantynivka) direction.[78] Elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pryiut (southwest of Druzhkivka).[79]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast and southeast of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[80]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced east of Shakhove, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[81]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak and Zapovidne on November 4 and 5.[82]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are striking Ukrainian positions northeast, southeast, and east of Shakhove.[83]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for information about assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka, Zatyshok, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Hnativka, Rih, Myrnohrad, Novoekonomichne, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 4 and 5.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[85]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 5 that Russian forces rarely employ mechanized vehicles in the direction, apart from near Myrnohrad.[86] ISW recently observed reporting of Russian mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in Pokrovsk.[88] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[89] Elements of the Somali Battalion (9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are reportedly operating in northern Pokrovsk.[90] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Myrnohrad.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on November 5 that Russian forces advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), southwest of Horikhove, and north of Dachne (both southeast of Novopavlivka).[92]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on November 4 and 5.[93]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[94]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Oleksiivka.[95] ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the last 24 hours and that Russian forces no longer hold positions in southern Oleksiivka. ISW defines the Assessed Russian Advance layer as areas which Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against, even if they do not maintain control.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Verbove, Zlahoda, Oleksiivka, and Yehorivka on November 4 and 5.[96]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction reported that Russian forces are using motorcycles, buggies, and modified cars to transport supplies and troops.[97] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces take advantage of dry weather to conduct rapid attacks, and that Russian forces are striking bridges from Pokrovske toward the frontline to interdict Ukrainian logistics. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces exploit dry weather to conduct rapid attacks. Russian forces’ attempts to exploit dry weather to conduct maneuver attacks in some areas of the front could indicate local vulnerabilities in Ukrainian drone defenses, as Russian forces in sectors of the front well-covered by Ukrainian drones seek to use wet weather to advance because such weather denies the usage of drones. A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction reported that Russian airstrikes destroyed bridges near Kolomiitsi, Pokrovske, and Dobropasove (all west of Velykomykhailivka) during a systematic two- to three-week campaign and degraded Ukrainian logistics in the area to set conditions for recent attacks in the Velykomykhailivka direction.[98] Satellite imagery collected on October 23 indicates that a Russian airstrike heavily damaged a bridge on the T-04-01 road crossing the Yanchur River northwest of Danylivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[99] The drone battalion commander added that Russian forces are systematically using fiber-optic sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[100]

The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on November 4 that a Russian glide bomb strike in an unspecified village of Pokrovska Hromada, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast killed two civilians and wounded four others.[101]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Pryvilne, Novoivanivka, Uspenivka, and Novomykolaivka; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai on November 4 and 5.[102]

A Russian milblogger published footage on November 5 reportedly showing elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) conducting a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Rivnopillya (north of Hulyaipole).[103]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 338th Rocket Artillery Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[104]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Prymorske, Novoandriivka, and Stepnohirske on November 4 and 5.[105]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on November 5 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a minibus traveling on a highway in Zaporizskyi Raion, injuring four civilians.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near Antonivskyi Roadway Bridge on November 4 and 5.[107]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly continue to operate in Kherson Oblast.[108]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 80 Shahed-type and Gerbera-type drones, including roughly 50 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[109] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones and that 18 drones struck seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, residential, water, and energy infrastructure in Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[110] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported on November 4 that it will restrict energy consumption to all Ukrainian oblasts on November 5 due to ongoing Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Sumy, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts.[111]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Kremlin is continuing its long-term efforts to integrate the Belarusian and Russian economies. Belarusian state news agency Belta reported on November 5 that Belarusian parliamentarians ratified an agreement between Belarus and Russia to form a unified electricity market.[112] A Belarusian National Assembly deputy stated that Russia and Belarus are planning to establish a unified gas market and that they currently have a unified energy market. Belarusian Minister of Energy Denis Moroz stated on November 5 that Belarus and Russia are in the final stage of negotiating a common price for natural gas for Belarus and Russian customers.[113] ISW assessed in January 2025 that the creation or absence of functional common markets for gas, electricity, oil, and petroleum products by 2027 will be a key indicator for the progress of the Kremlin’s effort to integrate Russia and Belarus’ economies.[114]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.