Ukraine Invasion Updates, April 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2025

The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30. The US Department of the Treasury announced the agreement, which created the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund that aims to accelerate Ukraine's economic recovery.[1] The precise terms of the agreement are unspecified as of this publication. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reiterated that the United States remains committed to peace and prosperity in a free Ukraine and noted that "no state or person who financed or supplied the Russian war machine" will be allowed to benefit from Ukraine's reconstruction.[2] Bessent also stated that the agreement signals to Russia that the Trump administration is “committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.” The BBC Russian Service reported that the agreement includes language that future US military aid to Ukraine could be labeled as US “investment” in Ukraine, though these details remain unconfirmed as of this report.[3]

Russian officials continue to demand full Ukrainian capitulation as the sole basis on which Russia is willing to accept a future peace agreement. Bloomberg reported on April 29, citing three sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's proposal to freeze the war on the current frontlines during their April 17 meeting in Moscow and instead insisted that Russia gain all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of any peace agreement.[4] Bloomberg's report is consistent with Kremlin officials' repeated public demands that any future peace deal must satisfy all of Russia's war goals, including the cession of all of Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia.[5] Kremlin officials have continued to reiterate their refusal to make any territorial concessions even after recent reports of the US seven-point peace plan that offered Russia "de jure" US recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over the rest of occupied Ukraine — the plan that Witkoff reportedly presented to Putin on April 17.[6]

Senior Russian officials continue to demand that any end to Russia's war in Ukraine must also accomplish all of Putin's original war aims. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on April 30 that Putin's main goal remains the achievement of the original goals of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine — Ukrainian demilitarization, neutrality, and regime change with the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet government.[7] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya similarly stated on April 29 that Russia is committed to finding long-term solutions to eliminate the "root causes" of Russia's war in Ukraine."[8] Russian officials have repeatedly defined these "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s Ukraine and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[9] Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian regime change and neutrality as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.[10]

Russian officials continue to set conditions to manipulate any future ceasefires and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing. Peskov claimed that Russia must conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine rather than with the United States, and Nebenzya claimed that Russia is willing to hold direct talks with Ukrainian officials "without preconditions" despite alleged issues with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy.[11] Putin and other Russian officials have similarly claimed that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024 (in accordance with its constitution and law).[12] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to renege on any future agreement it signs with Ukraine on the grounds that the Ukrainian government was not legitimate.[13] Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Constitution. These intransigent Russian demands run contrary to both the US-proposed seven-point peace plan and US President Donald Trump's stated goal of ensuring a lasting peace in Ukraine.[14]

Peskov overinflated Russia's current military strength and battlefield victories thus far in the war in an attempt to justify Russia's continued unwillingness to make territorial concessions. Peskov claimed that the situation on the ground in Ukraine is different from what it was in March 2022 and that it is "impossible" not to recognize this situation "de facto or de jure."[15] Peskov vaguely referenced the March 2022 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul (that resulted in a draft agreement that would have effectively disarmed Ukraine, banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons, and forced Ukraine to commit never to participate in military blocs) and blamed the West and Ukraine for dismantling these 2022 negotiations.[16] Peskov is attempting to create the impression that Russia is in a stronger position today than it was in March 2022. Peskov is also signaling that Russia will not make any territorial concessions, amid reports that a recent US war termination plan proposal included "de jure" US recognition of Russian control over Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[17]

Peskov's assessment that the battlefield situation has changed between March 2022 and now is correct, but because Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since the initial days of the invasion, rather than improved as Peskov falsely suggested. Russian forces were on Kyiv’s outskirts and seized Kherson City in March 2022. Since then, Ukrainian counteroffensives pushed Russian forces away from Kyiv City and other areas in northern Ukraine in March-April 2022; liberated a significant portion of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian forces away from Kharkiv City in September-October 2022; and completely pushed Russian forces from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast and liberated Kherson City in November 2022.[18] Russian forces advanced more than 1,000 square kilometers per day on average in March 2022 — significantly faster and deeper than the Russian rate of advance in Winter 2024, when Russian forces were advancing at a relatively faster tempo than the months of positional warfare that characterized most of 2023 and early 2024.[19] Ukrainian forces have been able to use Western military aid and increased Ukrainian defense industrial production capabilities to limit Russian forces to incremental, gradual advances at the cost of high personnel and equipment losses.[20]

Russian officials continue to call for the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine as part of efforts to reintensify offensive operations when Ukraine's defense capabilities are weakened. Nebenzya claimed that Europe is issuing "empty declarations and calls for a truce" in Ukraine but that Russia expects the West to give "clear and specific signals" that it "really want[s] to help find a long-term solution" to the war in Ukraine.[21] Nebenzya claimed that one of the main "signals" the West could give is to stop arms supplies to Ukraine. Putin made similar demands about Western military aid when he rejected the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire on March 13, questioning whether Ukrainian forces would be able to continue to receive military aid from their partners and allies during such a ceasefire.[22] Nebenzya's April 30 renewal of Putin's demand is part of the Kremlin's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that are in Russia's favor. The cessation of Western military aid to Ukraine would not only further the longstanding Russian demand for Ukraine's demilitarization, such that Ukraine can no longer defend itself, but would also encourage Russia to continue and even expand offensive operations to take advantage of Ukrainian weaknesses — as Russia has done before. Russia most notably used the months’ long US delay to approve additional security assistance to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024, and subsequent Ukrainian material constraints to intensify offensive operations and expand their goals to attempt operationally significant breakthroughs.[23] Russian forces are still engaged in some of the offensive efforts that gained momentum in late 2023 and early 2024 due to lapses in US security assistance to Ukraine.

Senior Russian officials continue to claim that Russia is open to diplomacy to end the war while rejecting US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that would allow for formal peace negotiations to begin. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on April 29 that the United States wants to see a "complete, full, durable" 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine and not just a "three-day moment" to "celebrate something."[24] US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg similarly stated on April 29 that Trump wants to see a comprehensive 30-day land, sea, and air ceasefire that can be extended and described Russia's May 8-11 proposed ceasefire as "absurd."[25]

Nebenzya and Peskov claimed on April 29 and 30 that Russia prefers "diplomatic" and "peaceful" methods to achieve all of its goals in the war.[26] Peskov, however, reiterated Putin's rejection of recent US- and Ukrainian-proposed ceasefires that would pave the way for diplomatic talks on how to end the war. Peskov claimed that Putin supports a longer-term ceasefire but "questions" the "nuances" that the parties must resolve before Russia can agree to this ceasefire.[27] Peskov claimed that the United States wants a "quick success" in Ukraine but that the process is "too complicated."[28] Peskov referenced Putin's March 13 rejection of the first US- and Ukrainian-proposed full 30-day ceasefire, about which Putin claimed there are questions that "require painstaking research from both sides."[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[30]

Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media appear to be attempting to portray Russia as willing to negotiate. Russian state media broadly reported on April 30 that the state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev stated that Russia is "ready to discuss" a possible US presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which Russian forces currently occupy.[31] Likhachev's statement is in reference to the reported US seven-point peace proposal that stipulates that Ukraine would reacquire the ZNPP and that the plant would function under US operation.[32] A Russian official agreeing to negotiate on this point would represent a major inflection, as Russia has rejected Ukrainian or US operation of the ZNPP previously. Rosatom's press service issued a correction on April 30, however, reporting that Likhachev stated that Rosatom is ready to discuss cooperation with the United States regarding the operation of the ZNPP "on the condition that a political decision is made by the Russian leadership."[33] Rosatom noted that some unspecified Russian news agencies initially incorrectly quoted Likhachev.[34] Many of the Russian state media outlets are still showing the earlier headlines mischaracterizing Likhachev's quote as of this publication, despite Rosatom's clarification.[35] Russia is currently very unlikely to cede the ZNPP to Ukraine, given the Kremlin's continued insistence on achieving all its war goals and continued demonstration of its unwillingness to offer territorial concessions.

Russian officials continue to falsely portray European efforts to increase their own defense capabilities — in line with US President Donald Trump's objective to have Europe shoulder more of the burden for collective security — as a threat to Russian national security, likely to support Russian efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO. Russian authorities organized the third Anti-Fascist Conference on April 30, which included military representatives from Belarus, North Korea, and Vietnam.[36] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Viktor Goremykin claimed that Western states have supported the Ukrainian government in implementing Ukraine's alleged "Russophobic" policies, claiming that these policies are direct threats to Russia's security. Goremykin also claimed that the European Union's (EU) five-year rearmament defense plan is unacceptable to Russia, and that Russia will take "all necessary" measures to protect its security. Belarusian Defense Minister General Viktor Khrenin also warned that European rearmament efforts threaten global peace and claimed that some European countries, particularly the Baltic States, promote Russophobia in their state policies.[37] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently intensified their threats against Europe — particularly the Baltic States — due to Europe's alleged "Russophobia" and aggressive military buildup.[38]

North Korea and Russia continue to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in the military and labor spheres. Reuters reported on April 30, citing South Korean intelligence, that roughly 600 North Korean troops have died in Russia out of a total deployment of 15,000 since November 2024 and that North Korean forces have suffered approximately 4,700 casualties in Russia's war against Ukraine to date.[39] Reuters also noted that North Korean battlefield experience in Russia's Kursk Oblast over the past six months has improved North Koreans' combat capabilities, particularly in drone usage, and that Russia has provided North Korea with technical assistance on spy satellites, drones, and anti-air missiles in return for its military support. Reuters also reported that South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea has sent approximately 15,000 workers to Russia, in violation of United Nations (UN) sanctions that prohibit the export of North Korean labor to third countries. US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on April 29 that North Korea is derailing efforts to achieve peace between Russia and Ukraine and that Russia's military assistance and training of North Korean troops directly violates the UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2270, all of which broadly prohibit North Korea from receiving or providing military training or assistance to other countries.[40] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on April 30 that Russia and North Korea are constructing a bridge to enhance bilateral relations.[41] Russian opposition outlet Meduza added that Russia and North Korea will complete its construction in 1.5 years (approximately in late 2026) and that the bridge will support vehicle traffic between the two countries.[42] Russia and North Korea will likely use the bridge for materiel transportation as the two states strengthen their cooperation.

Ukrainian sources continue to report on cases of Russian commanders ordering their subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on April 30 that the deputy commander of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and company commander of the "Storm" Detachment in the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) ordered their subordinates to execute a Ukrainian POW and then desecrate his body near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) in June 2024.[43] ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such atrocities.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.
• Russian officials continue to demand full Ukrainian capitulation as the sole basis on which Russia is willing to accept a future peace agreement.
• Peskov overinflated Russia's current military strength and battlefield victories thus far in the war in an attempt to justify Russia's continued unwillingness to make territorial concessions.
• Russian officials continue to call for the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine as part of efforts to reintensify offensive operations when Ukraine's defense capabilities are weakened.
• Senior Russian officials continue claim that Russia is open to diplomacy to end the war while rejecting US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that would allow for formal peace negotiations to begin.
• Russian officials continue to falsely portray European efforts to increase their own defense capabilities – in line with US President Donald Trump's objective to have Europe shoulder more of the burden for collective security - as a threat to Russian national security, likely to support Russian efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO.
• North Korea and Russia continue to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in the military and labor spheres.
• Ukrainian sources continue to report on cases of Russian commanders ordering their subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29, 2025

Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government.[1] Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 29 that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea region, must "determine their own future."[2] Patrushev specifically noted that Odesa City spent over two centuries as the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's outpost in the Black Sea and claimed that Odesa City residents have "nothing in common" with the current Ukrainian government. These statements are a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2023 claim that Ukrainians living in the Black Sea region have nothing "to do with Ukraine" and that Odesa is a "Russian city" and follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's April 14, 2025 claim that the Ukrainian government "does not represent" residents of Odesa City and other Ukrainian territories.[3] Patrushev claimed that Russia "respects the will of the [Ukrainian] people" and attempted to justify Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Crimea, Donbas, and "Novorossiya" — an invented region in Ukraine which the Kremlin has claimed includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia.[4] Medvedev also claimed that the current Ukrainian government does not speak for the Ukrainian people.[5] Medvedev's and Patrushev’s statements reference the longstanding Kremlin demand for regime change in Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government that could struggle to oppose or even support the Kremlin's goal to occupy more territory in Ukraine at a later time of the Kremlin's choosing.[6]

Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the "illegitimacy" of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency would create legal difficulties in direct peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but that Russia is more interested in starting negotiations and "everything else is secondary."[7] Peskov claimed on April 24 that Russia would restart its war should "people...question the legitimacy" of Zelensky and stated that Russia has "no confidence" in the Ukrainian government.[8] Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are "illegitimate" and that Russia would not view any agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[9] Putin and other Russian officials have similarly claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, and have additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials.[10] The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[11] The Kremlin is deliberately coupling its purported interest in Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations with its false narrative of Zelensky's illegitimacy in order to set conditions for Russia to claim that any future peace settlement that Russia signs with Zelensky is illegitimate, to renege on the agreement, and relaunch the invasion at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Constitution.

Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Lavrov claimed on April 29 that the May 8 to 11 ceasefire will be the "beginning of direct negotiations, without preconditions," but stated that Russia considers the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire to be a "precondition."[12] Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term ceasefires, claiming that Russia cannot accept any longer-term ceasefire since such ceasefires require extensive monitoring measures. Lavrov stated that Russia does not think "honest" monitoring is possible during a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the Ukrainian government does not have full control over all Ukrainian military units and will be unable to guarantee that Ukrainian forces adhere to the May 8 to 11 ceasefire.[13] Putin similarly declared a unilateral Easter ceasefire in mid-April 2025, and Russia has consistently accused Ukraine of violating previous ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations.[14] Ukraine - unlike Russia - supports US President Donald Trump's proposals for a 30-day temporary ceasefire or more permanent ceasefires.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine and to maintain the illusion that Russia is interested in meaningful peace negotiations.[16]

Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population. Medvedev claimed that the West is attempting to use a principle of "peace through force" to harm Russia, but that Russia's only possible response to this principle is "peace through fear."[17] Medvedev claimed that other approaches do not work but that "fear still works." Medvedev claimed that the leaders in the European Union (EU) are "Russophobic" and that Russia's relations with Europe have "passed the point of no return."[18] Medvedev attempted to argue that allegations that Russia is trying to attack Europe are "nonsense."[19] Patrushev claimed that parts of Europe, including France and Germany, are "flirting with the Nazis" and "deploying the military machine against Russia."[20] Patrushev claimed that the United Kingdom (UK), the EU, and NATO leaders are threatening Russia and criticized NATO for holding large-scale exercises on its eastern flank, claiming that these exercises are practicing offensive actions against Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on April 29 at the "Great Heritage — Common Future" forum dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and claimed that Russia must prevent the revival of Nazism and the spread of destructive ideologies, including Russophobia and national or religious intolerance.[21] Putin's statements paralleled those of Medvedev and Patrushev, but were more tempered as Putin did not criticize or threaten Europe. Kremlin officials, including those within Putin's inner circle, have recently threatened European states, including NATO member states, and are setting conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Europe.[22]

Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies. Putin claimed that the world must create a new security architecture, particularly in Eurasia.[23] Putin claimed that the basis of this Eurasian security architecture could be already existing organizations, such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Patrushev similarly claimed in the April 29 TASS interview that the "Western-centric world" is no longer useful and that the popularity of BRICS and the SCO is growing.[24] Putin first proposed an alternative Eurasian and world security system in June 2024, reportedly with the support of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping.[25] The organizations that Putin listed as the possible foundation of his proposed Eurasian security architecture are mostly Russian- or PRC-dominated and are meant as alternatives to the United Nations (UN) or US-led alliances. Putin's renewed calls for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture notably come as Russian and North Korean officials abruptly started to publicly acknowledge their military cooperation in Russia's war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power.[27] These efforts aim to make Russia's geopolitical clout more resilient and to expand the space in which Russia can spread narratives and create perceptions.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea.
• Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.
• Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.
• Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population.
• Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 28, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine, this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort. The Kremlin announced on April 28 that Putin declared a ceasefire in honor of Victory Day on May 9 – when Russia celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War (while minimizing the role played by the United States) – between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[1] The Kremlin stated that Russian forces will respond to any Ukrainian ceasefire violations. The Kremlin claimed that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is exchanging information with the United States about the Victory Day ceasefire and characterized the unilateral ceasefire as a "manifestation" of Russia's goodwill.[2] The Kremlin is preparing to welcome a significant number of foreign dignitaries, including from former Soviet, Latin American, Asian, and African countries, for Russia's Victory Day celebration, and Putin likely seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations.[3]

Putin previously declared a unilateral ceasefire in honor of Easter in mid-April 2025, but Russian and Ukrainian sources repeatedly accused each other of violating the ceasefire throughout the theater in Ukraine.[4] Russia also repeatedly accused Ukraine of violating the 30-day moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes but rarely offered evidence of these alleged violations.[5] ISW previously noted that the energy strikes ceasefire and Easter ceasefire underscored the need for the details of any future ceasefire or peace agreement to be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and to include robust monitoring mechanisms.[6] Putin's proposed Victory Day ceasefire does not include any additional monitoring mechanisms, and Russian sources will likely leverage the lack of such mechanisms to again flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Russian officials appear disinterested in establishing meaningful monitoring mechanisms or a general public basis for these ceasefires, likely because Russia benefits from weaponizing the vague and unclear conditions of the ceasefires against Ukraine.

Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine. Putin appears to be opportunistically declaring ceasefires during major religious and military holidays in order to force Ukraine to accept the ceasefire or risk appearing intransigent to the West. Unilaterally declaring ceasefires also allows Putin to distract attention from his rejection of the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal and to maintain the illusion that he is interested in peace negotiations while keeping full control over the conditions and timing of any ceasefire agreements. Russian forces seized on the Easter ceasefire to shell and conduct reconnaissance of frontline Ukrainian positions and damaged vehicles along the frontline in preparation for future Russian assaults, and Russian forces will likely use the Victory Day ceasefire for similar preparatory efforts.[7] Putin likely views the Victory Day ceasefire as a chance for Russian forces to rest ahead of future frontline activity in Ukraine and as a way to ensure that Ukraine does not conduct any significant long-range strikes against Russia during Victory Day celebrations. Putin likely does not view the Victory Day ceasefire as a serious step towards lasting peace in Ukraine.

Ukraine, in contrast to Russia, continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 28 that Trump has made it clear that he wants a permanent ceasefire first (presumably before negotiations for a final end to the Russian invasion).[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on April 28 that Ukraine supported the US proposal for a full ceasefire, proposed a ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure, and proposed extending the Easter truce – all proposals that Russia has rejected.[9] Zelensky stated that there is no reason to wait for May 8 to start the temporary ceasefire and called for an immediate, full, and unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days, as this is the "foundation that could lead to real diplomacy." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha similarly called for an immediate ceasefire and questioned why Putin was "waiting" for May 8.[10] Sybiha reiterated Ukraine's support for a "long" and complete ceasefire.

Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly recently presented the United States with a proposal to end the war that called for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire – in line with Trump's continued calls for a full ceasefire.[11] Putin's continued efforts to obfuscate his previous rejections of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals run counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement, and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]

The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States. The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) published a readout of an April 27 phone call between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that claimed that Lavrov and Rubio emphasized establishing "prerequisites for starting negotiations" toward a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine.[13] The US State Department's readout of the call notably did not mention discussions of "prerequisites" to negotiations, and the Russian MFA statement notably contradicts the Kremlin's April 28 claim that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions.[14]

Putin, Lavrov, and other senior Russian officials have consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine withdraw from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] Putin stated in June 2024 that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. The Kremlin is insisting on significant Ukrainian territorial and political concessions as prerequisites to negotiations in an effort to begin negotiations from the strongest position and achieve longstanding Russian goals in Ukraine through diplomatic means that it is unable to secure on the battlefield.

Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own. Russian officials, including Putin, have repeated Russia's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war in Ukraine must include Ukrainian regime change, demilitarization, abandonment of aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc, and the cession of territory to Russia.[16] Lavrov reiterated these demands in an interview with Brazilian outlet O Globo published on April 28 and claimed that any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes."[17] Lavrov and other Russian officials have repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[18] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's invasions, occupation, and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory since 2014.

Lavrov additionally demanded during the April 28 interview that the international community recognize Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia and that the West return frozen Russian assets.[19] Lavrov also demanded that the West provide Russia with "security guarantees" against supposed threats from NATO and the EU. Lavrov's statements mirror Putin's December 2021 demands that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement; that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; that NATO refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; that NATO states refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in areas from which they could reach Russia; and that the United States refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[20] Putin's December 2021 demands notably extend beyond Ukraine and aim to roll back NATO. The Kremlin likely seeks to intensify these demands amid ongoing negotiations with the United States to manipulate Western leaders into acquiescing to Putin's demands. These demands would weaken NATO under the guise of terms of a peace negotiation to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine and allow Russia to set conditions to strengthen its position for future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.

Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 that the Russian military recently achieved its objective of pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and thanked North Korean forces for their active participation in these efforts.[21] Putin personally thanked North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and reiterated that Russia and North Korea acted in accordance with the December 2024 bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.[22] Putin also claimed that North Korea’s involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine did not violate international law. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov also recently acknowledged North Korea's participation in retaking Kursk Oblast.[23] Russian officials have previously refused to acknowledge North Korean soldiers operating in Kursk Oblast and attempted to disguise North Korean soldiers as Russian forces from the Republic of Buryatia.[24] The Kremlin's abrupt rhetorical shift suggests that Russia is no longer concerned about the possibility of Western retaliation for involving North Korean forces directly in its war against Ukraine.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 28 that North Korea's participation in operations in Kursk Oblast demonstrates the effectiveness of the Russian-North Korean Strategic Partnership Treaty and affirms that Russia is “absolutely” prepared to provide North Korea with reciprocal military assistance in the future.[25] The North Korean Central Military Commission stated on April 28 that Kim ordered the deployment of North Korean troops to Kursk Oblast in accordance with the partnership agreement and that the "sacred mission" in Kursk Oblast solidified the "friendship and solidarity" between Russians and North Koreans.[26] The United States and the wider West largely failed to meaningfully respond to Russia's growing military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Former US President Joe Biden’s decision to ease restrictions on Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using US-provided long-range missile systems in November 2024, formally cast as a response to the introduction of North Korean forces into the war, did not significantly impact the Kremlin's calculus in expanding its military cooperation with North Korea or Russia's wider military planning in Kursk Oblast and elsewhere in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[27]

Russian milbloggers reacted triumphantly to official announcements of Russian and North Korean forces concluding operations in Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that North Korea's and Russia’s announcements provide a general deterrent to future Ukrainian and Western operations on Russian territory.[28] Some milbloggers also advocated for Russia to expand military, economic, and labor collaboration with North Korea, including in the event of future military aggression against North Korea.[29] Other milbloggers emphasized the bravery of North Korea’s forces and claimed that North Korea and its people have shown themselves to be better allies than many Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states.[30]

Russian officials and milbloggers are likely leveraging Russia's recent operational and diplomatic successes in Kursk Oblast to prepare the information space for Victory Day celebrations on May 9, which a number of international partners will attend. The Kremlin likely plans to highlight Russian successes in Kursk Oblast during the May 9 celebrations, as Russian forces have not been able to achieve significant battlefield successes in Ukraine in the past year.

Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27, citing Western military and intelligence officials, that Russia is expanding military bases near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, and upgrading railway lines and other infrastructure along Russia's western border with NATO.[31] WSJ reported that the Kremlin plans to create a new army headquarters near Petrozavodsk in the next several years and that Russia is integrating roadways and railways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with infrastructure in Belarus. Sources stated that Russia intends to form new divisions on the basis of existing brigades in the Leningrad Military District (LMD) in the coming years and that Russia is constructing new barracks and training grounds and upgrading warehouses and railways near Petrozavodsk to accommodate the future influx of personnel. A senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for "later use." ISW previously assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and LMD is part of a long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO.[32]

Russian authorities are also preparing to update Russia's National Security Strategy, likely to reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin's greater territorial ambitions in Europe and ongoing efforts to justify future aggression against NATO. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 24 that Russia is preparing to update its National Security Strategy to account for the new problems and threats that Russia is facing.[33] Shoigu claimed that Russia's updated National Security Strategy must account for the "crisis" of European security, the formation of a new global order, and the challenges that the changing world presents to Russia. Shoigu stated that Russia's National Security Strategy defines Russia's "long-term, strategic goals" and the "main instruments" for achieving these goals. Russia updates its National Security Strategy every five years, and last updated the strategy in 2021.[34]

Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.[35] Černochová also announced that the initiative secured funding for further artillery deliveries to Ukraine through Fall 2025. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský stated that Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands previously provided funds to the initiative. Lipavský reported that Czechia aims to supply Ukraine with 125,000 rounds of ammunition per month in 2025, but will deliver as much ammunition as possible.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine – this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort.
• Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine.
• Ukraine – in contrast to Russia – continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire.
• The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States.
• Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own.
• Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support.
• Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.
• Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2025

Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to transform the character of warfare in Ukraine. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion, likely operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, reported on April 27 that continuous technological innovations and battlefield adaptations have increasingly transformed the character of modern conventional warfare in Ukraine into a war that primarily features "long-range, remote combat" over meeting engagements between infantry and armored vehicles.[1] The NCO noted that Ukrainian and Russian forces’ intensifying drone usage has expanded the area of contested gray zones and kill zones at the forward edge of the battle area. The NCO noted that in 2024, contested gray zones were roughly 500 meters to two kilometers in depth, but more intense drone usage since then has expanded the gray zone up to five to seven kilometers in some areas of the frontline. The NCO reported that Russian forces are improving and expanding their unmanned systems capabilities and emulating Ukrainian forces’ tactics of using drones to intercept enemy drones and conduct remote mining. Ukrainian forces have successfully leveraged superior drone capabilities to defend critical sectors of the frontline while also mitigating manpower and materiel constraints.

Ukraine maintains over 100 brigades that must defend a frontline (both within Ukraine and along Ukraine's international border with Russia) currently over 2,100 kilometers long and significantly leverages drone capabilities, in tandem with traditional capabilities, to deny Russian attacks across the frontline.[2] Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to rapidly upscale domestic drone production and foreign drone procurement that is conducive for defending the frontline as well as executing a sustained long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian critical energy and defense industrial facilities deep within Russian territory that disrupts and degrades the Russian military's production and logistics.[3] Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have more regularly been using fiber-optic drones to strike each other’s frontline positions and have successfully used first-person view (FPV) drones to intercept larger reconnaissance drones over the past several months.[4]

ISW has observed the rapid rate at which both Ukraine and Russia have managed to conceptualize, field, and implement near-continuous technological innovation and battlefield-adjusted tactics to optimize combat dynamics.[5] Ukrainian and Russian forces field new adaptations over the course of months rather than years and are constantly experimenting, further driving the feedback loop of increased reliance on technology and tactical innovation to maintain battlefield advantages. The innovation and operational concepts being forged in Ukraine will set the stage for the future of warfare.

Russian forces are attempting to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline. The NCO in the Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion stated that Russian forces are increasingly using infantry assaults and motorized assaults on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and light vehicles to advance in areas where Ukrainian forces leverage drone usage to maintain frontline positions.[6] The non-commissioned officer reported that Russian forces leverage motorcycles and other light vehicles to disperse forces to more easily avoid drone strikes. A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces have conducted 13 motorized assaults on motorcycles since March 20.[7] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction cannot drive heavy armored vehicles to frontline positions due to disrupted Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), resulting in Russian forces shifting tactics to prioritize daily infantry assaults supported by motorcycles.[8]

ISW has observed Russian forces throughout the entire theater struggling to operate heavy armored vehicles close to the line of fire without being struck by Ukrainian drones. Russian forces are likely leveraging the speed, maneuverability, and small profiles of motorcycles and other light civilian vehicles to mitigate the efficacy of Ukrainian drone capabilities and are likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and preparing to integrate motorcycle usage into Summer and Fall 2024 offensive operations.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and military command previously responded to Ukrainian drone innovations by attempting to formally integrate and centralize Russia’s drone operations and production.[10] The Ukrainian and Russian defense industrial bases (DIBs) continue to compete in the innovation of new, cost-effective systems that enhance assault and battlefield capabilities and counter each other’s innovations. Russian forces likely see a tactical opportunity in leveraging motorcycles and civilian vehicles to advance and seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible despite Ukraine’s drone defenses.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's long-standing position against making any forms of territorial concessions, undermining the US President Donald Trump's efforts to broker a lasting peace. Lavrov stated in an interview with CBS News conducted on April 24 and aired on April 27 that "Russia does not negotiate its territory" when asked about the status of Russian-occupied Crimea in ongoing negotiations.[11] Lavrov also stated that he does not ”think any change is conceivable” when asked about whether the Kremlin is willing to consider transferring control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) - reportedly one of the terms in the Trump administration‘s seven-point conflict termination plan.[12]

Russian officials adopted constitutional amendments that declared Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts as Russian territories and have since relied on a pseudo-legal framework that claims occupied Ukrainian territories are now part of Russia "constitutionally" to reject ceding any area in Russian-occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts and Crimea to Ukraine as part of a peace deal to end the war.[13] Russian officials also use this pseudo-legal framework to demand that Ukraine cede additional territory within Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts to Russia that Russia does not currently occupy.[14] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly stated on April 26 that Russian forces will seize all "territory of Russia," which she claimed includes Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[15]

Lavrov and other Russian officials' recent statements directly contradict the Trump administration's proposed peace framework, which reportedly includes mutual territorial concessions, including Ukraine regaining territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the ZNPP.[16] ISW continues to observe that Ukraine remains open to good-faith dialogue with Russia and is willing to consider territorial issues, while Russia fails to offer any concessions of its own and insists on terms tantamount to Ukraine's surrender.[17]

Russian law enforcement announced on April 26 the arrest of Ignat Kuzin, the suspect whom Russia accused of planting the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, on April 25.[18] The Russian Investigative Committee and Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that Kuzin purchased a car and installed the IED, which the Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) detonated from Ukraine. BBC Russia, citing Kremlin newswire TASS, reported that Turkish authorities detained and extradited Kuzin to Russia after he allegedly attempted to flee from Moscow to Turkey.[19] ISW was not able to identify any Turkish confirmation of this claim, and Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to transform the character of warfare in Ukraine.
• Russian forces are attempting to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's long-standing position against making any forms of territorial concessions, undermining the US President Donald Trump's efforts to broker a lasting peace.
• Russian law enforcement announced on April 26 the arrest of Ignat Kuzin, the suspect whom Russia accused of planting the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, on April 25
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2025

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Gerasimov told Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 26 that Russian forces had fully defeated Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and seized Gornal (southwest of Sudzha), the last Ukrainian-held settlement in Kursk Oblast.[i] Gerasimov credited elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) with seizing Gornal. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov was visiting a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast to hear reports from Kursk Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk when Russian forces seized Gornal.[ii] Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Gora Street in central Gornal.[iii] The Ukrainian General Staff refuted the Russian claims later on April 26 and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain unspecified positions in Kursk Oblast.[iv] The General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on April 26. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on April 26 that fighting continued near Oleshnya (northwest of Gornal), Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border), and St. Nicholas Monastery (southwest of Guyevo).[v]

Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast successfully pinned some Russian combat power, including elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units, but its long-term effects remain unclear at this time. The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry units as elite forces (even though many Russian elite units have been heavily attritted and lost their elite status over the course of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine) and deploys them to critical sectors of the frontline.[vi] ISW previously observed reports that Russia redeployed elements of each of the seven VDV formations and four of the six naval infantry formations from frontline positions in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast in the months following the incursion, although some units remained split between Kursk Oblast and occupied Ukraine.[vii] Putin claimed on April 26 that the most effective Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast included elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th airborne (VDV) regiments (all of the 76th VDV Division); 51st, 119th, and 138th VDV regiments (all of the 106th VDV Division), 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division); 11th and 83rd VDV brigades; 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment and 1434th "Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (both Chechen units); 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet); 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet); and 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD).[viii] Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast likely has continued to pin these VDV or naval infantry elements, as ISW has not observed reports of such units redeploying from Kursk Oblast to the frontline in Ukraine. ISW observed on April 18 the first reports that Russian forces redeployed unspecified drone units from the Kursk direction to the area southwest of Toretsk near Kalynove and that these units are now operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[ix] Russian forces intensified offensive operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast in early March 2025 after tactically exploiting the temporary US intelligence sharing cutoff with Ukraine and by using an underground gas pipeline and deception tactics to covertly attack behind Ukrainian positions in Sudzha.[x] Russian forces, including VDV and naval infantry elements, took almost two months since their seizure of Sudzha to advance roughly nine kilometers to the Kursk-Sumy Oblast international border — an average rate of about 200 meters per day.[xi]

Gerasimov made the first official Russian acknowledgement of North Korean troop participation in Russian operations in Kursk Oblast by thanking North Korean servicemembers for their assistance in Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the region. Gerasimov stated on April 26 that North Korean forces "provided significant assistance" in pushing Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, in accordance with the Russian-North Korean Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.[xii] Gerasimov commended North Korean officers and soldiers for demonstrating "professionalism" and "fortitude, courage, and heroism" during military operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on April 26 that Russia would never forget its "friends" from North Korea.[xiii] Neither Gerasimov nor Zakharova indicated what role, if any, North Korean forces would now play in supporting Russian military operations against Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days.[xiv] Trump told reporters on April 25 that the United States has "no deadline" to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[xv] Trump also stated on April 26 that there was "no reason" for Russia’s strikes on civilian areas and reiterated a previously stated concern that "[Russian President Vladimir Putin] is just tapping me along" by disingenuously ceasefire and peace negotiations.[xvi] Trump stated that Putin's actions make Trump think that "maybe [Putin] doesn't want to stop the war" and "has to be dealt with differently." Russian officials have repeatedly to leverage heightened US interest in negotiating a swift resolution to the war in Ukraine to make demands tantamount to Ukrainian surrender and incompatible with Trump’s stated goal of achieving a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine.[xvii] Russian forces have also conducted a string of strikes against civilian areas in recent weeks, including a devastating strike on Kyiv City on the night of April 23 to 24.[xviii] Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky met in Vatican City on April 26 to discuss the ongoing peace talks.[xix] Zelensky reported on April 26 that he and Trump discussed civilian safety, a full and unconditional ceasefire, and a lasting peace that prevents resumption of hostilities.[xx] White House Communications Director Steven Cheung stated that Trump and Zelensky had a "very productive discussion."[xxi]

Russia is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations in Ukraine for Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone capabilities. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on April 26 showing likely elements of the 299th (Airborne) VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) practicing offensive and defensive tactics on motorcycles in groups of two to three people at a Russian training ground.[xxii] The video indicates that the Russian military is likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and may be preparing to issue an increased number of motorcycles to Russian personnel in Ukraine. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Ukrainian intelligence noted that the Russian military is training its soldiers in combat tactics with motorcycles, suggesting that Russian forces will likely increasingly integrate motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer and Fall 2025.[xxiii] Shamshyn noted that motorcycles allow Russian soldiers to enhance their speed and maneuverability, which is crucial for evading Ukrainian drone strikes, but that the loud noise of the motorcycle prevents the rider from hearing approaching Ukrainian drones. ISW has observed an increased trend of Russian units conducting mechanized and combined motorized assaults and transporting infantry with motorcycles and civilian vehicles throughout the frontline as Russian command continues to adapt its tactics to offset Ukrainian drone strikes and likely to mitigate the Russian military's equipment constraints resulting from high armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024.[xxiv] Russian forces notably recently advanced during a motorized assault near Bahatyr comprised entirely of motorcycles and civilian vehicles.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
• Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast successfully pinned some Russian combat power, including elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units, but its long-term effects remain unclear at this time.
• Gerasimov made the first official Russian acknowledgement of North Korean troop participation in Russian operations in Kursk Oblast by thanking North Korean servicemembers for their assistance in Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the region.
• US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days.
• Russia is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations in Ukraine for Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka, Kurkakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2025

Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during multilateral talks in London on April 23. The Telegraph reported on April 25 that the Ukrainian-European proposal contained five points about territory, security guarantees, negotiations, refusing Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).[1] Reuters published the full text of the terms that Ukrainian and European officials reportedly developed in response to the US seven-point peace plan on April 25.[2] The proposal as presented by Reuters calls for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire concurrently with immediate technical negotiations to implement the ceasefire, involving the United States and European countries; United States-led ceasefire monitoring with support from third countries; robust Ukrainian security guarantees absent Ukraine’s NATO accession; and for Russia to unconditionally return illegally deported Ukrainian children and detained Ukrainian civilians as well as engage in an "all-for-all" prisoner of war (POW) exchange. The proposal reportedly rejects restrictions on the Ukrainian military, calls for an ad hoc group of European states and willing non-European countries to guarantee Ukraine's security, and rejects restrictions on the deployment of any friendly forces to Ukraine.[3]

The Ukrainian-European proposal states that Russia and Ukraine will negotiate territorial issues only after the implementation of a full and unconditional ceasefire and that these negotiations will use the current frontline as a starting framework.[4] The Ukrainian-European proposal would reportedly provide Ukraine with "unhindered access" to the Dnipro River and control of the Kinburn Spit and Kakhovka Dam.[5] The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to regain control over the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "with US involvement." The Ukrainian-European proposal also reportedly states that Ukraine’s partners will work toward a consensus on NATO membership, and that Ukraine will pursue joining the European Union (EU).

The Ukrainian-European proposal reportedly calls for the United States and Ukraine to implement the US-Ukraine minerals deal and economic cooperation agreement. The proposal states that US sanctions on Russia may be subject to "gradual easing" if a sustainable peace is achieved and may resume if Russia violates a peace agreement. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine’s full reconstruction and financial compensation, including using frozen Russian assets.

Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal.[6] Reuters reported that the US plan demands an immediate ceasefire and direct technical negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[7] The US plan reportedly provides Ukraine with strong security guarantees from a coalition of European and willing non-European states but also calls for Ukraine to abandon efforts to join NATO while maintaining the option to pursue European Union (EU) membership. The US plan reportedly includes "de jure" US recognition of Russian control over occupied Crimea and de facto recognition of Russian control of Luhansk Oblast and parts of occupied Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson Oblasts. The recognition of de jure Russian sovereignty over Crimea or any other areas of Ukraine under occupation since 2014 would constitute a significant concession to Russia that should be balanced by a significant Russian concession in return.

The US plan reportedly stipulates that Ukraine will regain territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which the United States would operate and which would supply electricity to both Russia and Ukraine. The proposed US plan would return the Kakhovka Dam and Kinburn Spit to Ukraine and guarantee Ukrainian passage on the Dnipro River. The US plan reportedly states that Ukraine and the United States will implement a mineral deal and economic partnership agreement, calls for Ukraine's full reconstruction, and offers financial compensation to Ukraine, but does not specify the funding source. The US proposal reportedly calls for lifting sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and resuming US-Russian economic cooperation in the energy and industrial sectors.

The newly published Reuters document supports and clarifies earlier reporting by Axios and The Telegraph of the US seven-point proposal to Ukraine, but some details remain unclear.[8] The Reuters document affirms core details, such as territorial arrangements, Ukraine's non-accession to NATO, and the US-run operation of the ZNPP. The report also clarifies that Ukraine would regain control of the Kinburn Spit, the small part of Mykolaiv Oblast that Russia currently occupies, and the Kakhovka Dam, which spans between occupied and unoccupied Kherson Oblast. The Reuters document does not address Sumy Oblast, where Russian forces recently began conducting offensive operations, or how the United States and Ukraine would gain access to the ZNPP, given that the Kakhovka Reservoir and Dnipro River are natural barriers between current Ukrainian positions and the ZNPP. Russian forces would have to partially withdraw from either east (left) bank Kherson Oblast or permit a land bridge across the Kakhovka Reservoir under the US plan, but neither option inherently provides the strategic depth Ukraine would need to defend the ZNPP against further Russian aggression, as ISW has recently reported.[9]

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a future peace deal. Witkoff met with Putin, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev, and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov.[10] Ushakov stated that the meeting lasted three hours, included discussions about possibly resuming direct Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, and claimed that the meeting brought US and Russian positions about Ukraine and other unspecified issues "closer together."[11] US officials have not reported on the details of Witkoff's meeting with Putin as of the time of this publication.

Bloomberg reported on April 24, citing people familiar with the matter, that Witkoff planned to present a demand that Russia accept Ukraine's right to develop an adequately equipped army and defense industry as part of a peace agreement with Russia.[12] This reported US demand is contrary to the Kremlin's demand for Ukrainian demilitarization – a demand that the Kremlin first made of Ukraine and the West in December 2021.[13] Russia then sought to force Ukraine into demilitarization by launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the Kremlin reiterated demilitarization as a demand in the March 2022 Istanbul negotiations, whose protocols essentially demanded Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and which the Kremlin has identified as its preferred basis for a peace deal in Ukraine.[14] Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined Ukrainian demilitarization and its other pre-war demands as prerequisites for a peace agreement, as these demands would allow Russia to launch renewed aggression from an advantageous position in the future.[15] Russia's acceptance of Ukraine's right to a developed military and defense industrial base would therefore be a significant Russian concession should the United States succeed in gaining Putin's agreement.

That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however. The initial full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine aimed to seize Kyiv in February and March 2022 in order to force Ukraine to capitulate fully, depose the current Ukrainian government, and disarm the Ukrainian military, amounting to the total defeat of Ukraine. Russia failed to achieve this objective because the Ukrainian military, with limited Western support, defeated the Russian attack on Kyiv and stalled Russian offensives in the east and south. Ukrainian forces forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in early April 2022 and from most of Kharkiv Oblast and all of west-bank Kherson Oblast later in 2022.[16] Russian forces remain unable to launch an offensive operation that could seize Kyiv or recross the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine at this time, and spent 2024 fighting desperately to seize an area nine-tenths the size of Rhode Island. Russia does not have the military power to seize the rest of Ukraine absent a full-scale mobilization of Russian society, and possibly not then, as long as Western support to Ukraine continues.

The Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist objectives, moreover. Kremlin mouthpieces, including Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev, have laid the rhetorical groundwork for Russia to eventually lay claim to most or all of Ukraine.[17] Russian officials have also doubled down on their demands for regime change in Ukraine and rhetoric intended to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government as recently as April 24.[18] Both of these efforts in concert indicate that Putin retains his objective of controlling all of Ukraine, but is limited by Russia's inability to achieve this objective militarily.

Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a report on April 25 entitled "80 Years After the Great Victory: The Shadow of Nazism Has Again Covered Europe," which accuses European states and officials of reviving Nazi ideology and creating policies that discriminate against Russian-speaking populations, especially in Lithuania, Lativa, and Estonia.[19] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova amplified this report and claimed that European states are preventing Russia from achieving its long-held objectives of demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine due to this alleged support of Naziism.[20] Russian officials regularly invoke "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government.[21] Zakharova specifically accused the Baltic States and Poland of justifying and reviving Nazism.

Russian officials have notably leveraged accusations of neo-Nazi ideology to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine, and Russian officials leveraging these narratives against European states - especially the Baltics and Poland - supports ISW's assessment that Russia may be setting informational conditions to justify future aggression against these states as well.[22] Russian officials are likely attempting to discredit European states more broadly in order to deter them from providing further assistance to Ukraine and revitalizing their defense industries in order to set conditions for future Russian aggression against a weakened Europe.[23] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to discrediting Europe in response to European leaders' reinvigorated commitment to rearming Europe in alignment with US President Donald Trump's policy goals.

Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev stated during the opening ceremony of an annual film festival commemorating Russia's Victory Day at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., on April 24 that the Soviet-US military alliance formed during World War II should serve as an example of US-Russian relations today.[24] Darchiev's remarks indicate that the Kremlin aims to portray to its domestic and foreign audiences that US-Russian relations are on the mend and simultaneously exacerbate divisions between the United States and Europe.

Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25. Unknown actors detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) filled with shrapnel, rigged to a vehicle as Moskalik passed the car.[25] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of involvement in Moskalik's assassination.[26] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication. The Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) claimed responsibility for assassinating the Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17, 2024, making this the second assassination of a Russian general in Moscow in the last five months.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during the multilateral talks in London on April 23.
• Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal.
• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a future peace deal.
• That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however.
• Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign.
• Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2025

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on April 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The official Kremlin spokesperson and Russian Security Council secretary repeated a series of long-standing Russian demands that purposely preclude the establishment of a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine and set conditions for future Russian aggression from an advantaged position. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in an interview with French news magazine Le Point published on April 23 that Russia's war goals have not changed since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that Russia will achieve these goals "peacefully or militarily."[1] Peskov claimed that Russia would restart the war should "people...question the legitimacy" of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and stated that Russia has "no confidence" in the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 24 that the Kremlin is "ready for a ceasefire, a truce, and peace talks" but only if these measures take Russia's interests into account and eliminate the "initial causes" of the war.[2] Peskov defined Russia's unchanged war aims as Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands for regime change in Ukraine, the demilitarization of the Ukrainian military, and Ukraine's neutrality and Putin's claims that Ukraine cede all of Russia's illegally annexed territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia.[3] US President Donald Trump's reported recent seven-point proposal to end the war would notably not fulfill all of Putin's demands.[4] Shoigu's claims about the "initial causes" of the war parallel Kremlin officials' consistent demand that any future peace settlement eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Kremlin officials have claimed are NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[5]

Peskov and Shoigu continued to place conditions on Russia's agreement to Trump's proposed full ceasefire that would further Putin's goal of weakening the Ukrainian military, likely to prepare for future Russian aggression. Peskov claimed that Putin supports the idea of a full ceasefire but reiterated Putin's demand that European countries stop providing Ukraine with arms as a condition to Russia's agreement.[6] Shoigu similarly claimed that a ceasefire is possible as long as it does not allow Ukrainian forces to rest and regroup.[7] Peskov and Shoigu explicitly rejected the stipulation in Trump's reported proposal to end the war that would give Ukraine "a robust security guarantee" provided by a group of European states and possibly non-European states.[8] Shoigu claimed that European peacekeepers in Ukraine could lead to a direct clash between NATO and Russia, and Peskov claimed that Russia is against the idea of European peacekeepers in Ukraine because Ukrainian authorities "do not completely control" the Ukrainian military.[9] Peskov's false allegations about Zelensky's lack of legitimacy and the Ukrainian government's inability to control the country's military directly mirror Putin's long-standing narratives along these same lines.[10] These Kremlin narratives are part of efforts to set conditions for Russia to claim that any future peace settlement Russia signs with Zelensky is illegitimate, to renege on the agreement, and to relaunch its invasion – as Peskov explicitly stated Russia would do.

Peskov and Shoigu notably gave these interviews, containing similar narratives and talking points, to a Russian and French outlet – suggesting that the Kremlin is coordinating its messaging about Russia's commitment to achieving all of its war aims now and in the future to both international audiences in Europe and at home in Russia.

Kremlin officials continue to baselessly threaten NATO states for adhering to US President Donald Trump's objective that Europe take on more of its own defense requirements. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 24 that Europe is preparing for a potential military conflict with Russia in three to five years.[11] Shoigu claimed that European states are building up their military presence near the western borders of the Union State of Russia and Belarus and are "not showing any readiness to deescalate the situation." Shoigu claimed that the European Union (EU) is trying to transform the EU into a "military organization aimed against Russia" and criticized the EU's efforts to develop Europe's defense industrial base (DIB). Shoigu claimed that the number of NATO military contingents deployed near Russia's western borders has increased by 2.5 times in the past year. Shoigu claimed that the number of military threats against Russia is growing, particularly as the Baltic states are building military bases on their own territory, Poland is purchasing armored vehicles, and various NATO states are modernizing their air defenses and purchasing American fighter jets. Shoigu complained that Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia are increasing their annual defense spending due to an "imaginary threat from the east." Shoigu claimed that the alleged threats to the security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Russia's "closest ally" Belarus remain in place and that Russia deployed Oreshnik ballistic missiles to Belarus due to these threats. Shoigu recalled that Russia's November 2024 amendments to its nuclear doctrine allows Russia to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia or Belarus, including aggression with the use of conventional weapons. US President Donald Trump has persistently asked European states and NATO members to increase their defense spending.[12] Lavrov’s and Peskov’s excoriation of European states increasing investments in their defense - as Trump has requested - is a further indicator that Moscow’s demands concerning Europe’s future security architecture are incompatible with Trump’s objectives for a strong and self-reliant Europe that contributes more equally to Europe’s collective security.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in an interview with French news magazine Le Point published on April 23 that Russia does not intend to attack anyone and that Russia did not and does not have any problems with new NATO members Finland and Sweden.[13] Peskov claimed that Finland is "little by little" building military infrastructure on its territory. Putin alleged that Russia is reacting to such moves by "taking steps to ensure its security" but "has no potential for conflict...neither in the Baltic countries nor in Finland." Peskov claimed that Russia has no territorial claims in the Baltic states, but Peskov claimed that Baltic authorities are discriminating against Russian citizens living there. Peskov proceeded to claim that Russia launched its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 because Ukrainian authorities were allegedly trying to "exterminate" Russians in the country.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly claimed that Russia had no intention of invading its neighbors on the eve of Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia, and Peskov made a similar claim on the eve of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[14] Peskov is notably using Kremlin narratives about alleged discriminations against Russian speakers in Ukraine to describe the Baltic states – a thinly veiled threat given Russia repeated use of Moscow's alleged need to protect its "compatriots abroad" to justify multiple Russian invasions of nearby states.[15] European states' efforts to increase their own defenses are in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to shoulder more of its own defense requirements, including by increasing how much European NATO states spend on defense annually. The European NATO states that Peskov and Shoigu highlighted in their complaints about Europe's alleged militarization – Finland, Poland, and the Baltics – are notably the most threatened due to their proximity to Russia. Helsinki, Finland; Tallinn, Estonia; and Riga, Lithuania are roughly 160 kilometers, 190 kilometers, and 215 kilometers from Russia's Leningrad and Pskov oblasts, respectively. Vilnius, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland are roughly 160 kilometers and 230 kilometers from Kaliningrad Oblast, respectively. Moscow, in contrast, is roughly 600 kilometers from the Russian-Latvian border – the closest NATO state border. Shoigu's thinly veiled nuclear threats against NATO are part of the Kremlin's broader reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision-making in Russia's favor and against Western states' own interests. Shoigu's nuclear threats are attempts to push European states to self-deter and reduce their buildups of their defenses – leaving NATO's eastern border largely undefended. These reflexive control efforts are in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2021 demand before launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after 1997, including Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.[16]

Peskov's and Lavrov's threatening statements against NATO members Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania parallel other Kremlin officials' statements likely intended to set information conditions to support Russian efforts to seize territory in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 14 that it is "dangerous" when "fascists seize lands that never belonged to anyone except the Russian Empire [and] Soviet Union" and do "disgusting things there."[17] Lavrov's statement indicates that the Kremlin views independent countries once colonized by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire as rightfully part of modern-day Russia. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev also recently threatened Finland using narratives resembling those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine.[18]

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 215 drones and missiles at Ukraine, including 11 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts; 37 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast; six Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast; 12 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; four Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast; and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast: Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 7 Iskander-M missiles, 31 Kh-101 missiles, 6 Kalibr missiles, 4 Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles, and 64 Shahed drones, and that 68 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s strike series injured at least 80 Ukrainians and killed 9 people in Kyiv City alone, and damaged residential areas, energy infrastructure, and other buildings in five raions of the city.[20] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, rail, and energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, and Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Sumy oblasts.[21]

Russian forces have adjusted their long-range strike tactics and weapons in recent weeks, likely to mitigate Ukrainian air defenses and inflict significant damage even when Ukrainian forces intercept some Russian drones and missiles.[22] Such adaptations disproportionately affect civilians, as ISW has previously noted.[23] US President Donald Trump stated in a post on Truth Social on April 24 that he is "not happy" with Russia's overnight strikes against Kyiv City, calling them "not necessary" and stating that Russia has "very bad timing."[24] Trump called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop such strikes and agree to his proposal to end the war.

Denmark announced a new military aid package to Ukraine for artillery ammunition procurement on April 23. Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen announced that Denmark will provide an additional 317 million Danish Kroner (approximately $30.5 million) to Ukraine in 2025 to purchase artillery shells through Estonia.[25]

A Russian military court sentenced former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov to imprisonment, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to punish Russian military commanders who weaponized the information space to advance their political goals that undermine Putin’s power vertical. The Tambov Garrison Military Court found Popov guilty of fraud and forgery of official documents on April 24 and sentenced Popov to five years in a low-security penal colony.[26] The Tambov Garrison Military Court also stripped Popov of his military rank and accolades and fined him 800,000 rubles (about $9,613). Popov publicly appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 20, 2025, proclaiming his innocence and asking to return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending trial.[27] Putin may have first granted and later rejected Popov’s appeal. Popov’s lawyer, Sergey Buynovsky, reported on April 11 that Popov signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) agreeing to command a penal assault detachment fighting in Ukraine.[28] Buynovsky told Russian state media outlet RBK on April 24 that Russian authorities did not send Popov to the battlefield due to a "lack of vacancies" at the frontline.[29] The Kremlin relieved Popov of his command in July 2023 and later arrested him in May 2024 likely due to Popov's perceived disloyalty, attempted blackmail, and criticisms of the Russian MoD.[30] Russian ultranationalists, officials, and officers have been demanding Popov's release and return to the frontlines since his arrest. The Kremlin likely decided against deploying Popov to the frontlines to prevent him from leveraging his popularity and influence in the information space to pressure Putin.[31] The Kremlin appears to be prioritizing Putin’s regime stability by sending a clear message that the Kremlin will not tolerate any actor’s attempt to weaponize the information space to achieve a political objective that undermines Putin’s total authority.

Key Takeaways:

• The official Kremlin spokesperson and Russian Security Council secretary repeated a series of long-standing Russian demands that purposely preclude the establishment of a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine and set conditions for future Russian aggression from an advantaged position.
• Kremlin officials continue to baselessly threaten NATO states for adhering to US President Donald Trump's objective that Europe take on more of its own defense requirements.
• Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025.
• Denmark announced a new military aid package to Ukraine for artillery ammunition procurement on April 23.
• A Russian military court sentenced former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov to imprisonment, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to punish Russian military commanders who weaponized the information space to advance their political goals that undermine Putin’s power vertical.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2025

The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine. The Telegraph and Axios reported on April 22 and 23 that sources familiar with the matter stated that the United States presented Ukraine with a proposal to end the war during the April 17 meeting in Paris and that the United States expected that the April 23 multilateral talks in London would discuss the proposal.[1] There have been no official statements about the reported US proposal. The Telegraph reported that the document contains seven points about an immediate ceasefire, Ukrainian-Russian talks, Ukraine's inability to join NATO, territory, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, and US-Russian relations.[2] Axios and The Telegraph reported that the plan calls for the United States to "de jure" recognize Russian control of Crimea and "de facto" recognize Russia's occupation of most of the areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy.[3] Russia would also reportedly have to withdraw from the parts of Kharkiv Oblast that Russian forces currently occupy. Axios stated that the plan would grant Ukraine "unimpeded passage" along the Dnipro River, with The Telegraph reporting that Ukraine would gain “unhindered access to the mouth” of the river. The Telegraph noted that the proposal states that Russian forces would withdraw from another unspecified area of Kherson Oblast.[4] The proposal calls for the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy, to be "considered as Ukrainian territory" but under US operation.[5] The US-operated ZNPP would reportedly supply both Ukraine and Russia with electricity. The US proposal reportedly states that the United States would promise that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO, while Ukraine could still join the European Union (EU). The proposal would give Ukraine "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states, but the document does not offer details about how this "peacekeeping operation" would operate, nor mention US participation in this peacekeeping force. The United States would also reportedly lift all US sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and would enhance US-Russian economic cooperation, especially in the energy and industrial sectors. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to receive compensation and assistance for reconstruction from an unspecified funding source.

The reported US proposal suggests that the Trump administration is seeking to simultaneously achieve a full ceasefire in Ukraine, conclude a peace settlement to end the war, and develop US-Russian economic relations – a sharp contrast to the timeline of events that the administration has called for in recent weeks. The White House stated on March 25 that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides of the [war] must stop" is a "necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — demonstrating how the Trump administration viewed a full ceasefire as the first step toward securing a peace settlement.[6] Ukraine agreed to the March 18 US-proposed full ceasefire along the frontline and agreed to the US-supported extension of the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21 — in sharp contrast to Russia, which refused to accept or extend these US-proposed and US-supported ceasefires.[7] The White House also stated on April 15 that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly stated in February 2025 that US sanctions on Russia would remain in place until Russia and Ukraine had reached a peace deal to end the war — in contrast to the reported US proposal that would simultaneously put a ceasefire in place in Ukraine, lift US sanctions against Russia, and develop US-Russian economic cooperation.[8]

Significant details about the territorial swaps in the US proposal are unclear from the available reporting. Russian forces currently occupy a small part of Mykolaiv Oblast — the Kinburn Spit — and recently began conducting offensive operations into northern Sumy Oblast — two oblasts which the available reporting about the US proposal does not address.[9] It is unclear whether Ukraine would gain access only to the mouth of the Dnipro River or a wider littoral area along the river‘s left bank given differences between reporting from Axios and The Telegraph. Details about the extent of the territory near the ZNPP on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River that would be considered Ukrainian are also unspecified, but Russian forces would have to withdraw from some territory in the area according to the US plan as Russian forces currently occupy significant portions of Zaporizhia Oblast behind the Dnipro River’s east bank. The Dnipro River would nevertheless present itself as a significant barrier between the Ukrainian-controlled and US-operated ZNPP from the rest of the territory under Ukraine's control under the reported US plan, assuming Russian forces do not withdraw from territory around the Kakhovka Reservoir to permit a land bridge from Ukrainian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast to the ZNPP. The location of such a strategically important facility close to the frozen frontline would greatly complicate Ukraine's ability to defend the ZNPP due to the lack of defensive depth.[10] ISW previously conduced a terrain study and assessed that freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines — particularly those in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts — enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian operations against war against Ukraine.[11]

Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace. Zelensky recalled on April 22 that Ukraine supported and continues to support Trump's March 18 unconditional ceasefire proposal.[12] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold discussions "in any format" after the implementation of a ceasefire.[13] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov similarly stated on April 23 that the Ukrainian delegation in London discussed ways to achieve a full and unconditional ceasefire as a "first step" toward a peace settlement and that Ukraine is committed to Trump's peace efforts.[14] Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on April 23 that Ukraine is ready to negotiate and that a full ground, air, and sea ceasefire is a necessary first step toward peace.[15]

Zelensky stated on April 22 that Ukraine does not legally recognize Russia's occupation of Crimea in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution, which ensures Ukraine's territorial integrity and recognizes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as part of Ukraine.[16] Svyrydenko also noted that Ukraine cannot agree to a settlement that grants Russia a "stronger foundation" to regroup and renew its aggression in the future. ISW continues to assess that freezing the front along the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring and defeating future Russian aggression.[17] Russia's occupation of Crimea and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts will continue to threaten Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa cities, the Ukrainian southwestern coast, and Ukrainian ships attempting to transit the western Black Sea.

Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan. Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko stated on April 23 that Russia will "never participate" in any negotiations that discuss the possible deployment of European troops to Ukraine and that such a deployment is "unacceptable" to Russia, regardless of whether the peacekeeping forces deploy under the NATO framework or another "flag."[18] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an interview to French news magazine Le Point published on April 23 and similarly rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine.[19] Peskov stated that Russia rejected the full ceasefire that Trump previously proposed because the ceasefire failed to meet all of Russia's demands, including that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — all of which Russia has illegally declared annexed. Peskov claimed that the entirety of these four oblasts were "enshrined in our [Russian] Constitution as an integral part of Russia" and that the "war will end immediately" if Ukraine withdraws from these oblasts. Russian state-run and pro-Kremlin media outlets amplified Peskov's statements, as well as statements from other pro-Kremlin mouthpieces calling on Russia to refuse to give up any part of the four Ukrainian oblasts included in the Russian Constitution — in violation of international law and numerous treaties Russia previously signed with Ukraine.[20]

Russian officials continue to give no indication that the Kremlin is willing to make any concessions of its own. Peskov has reiterated multiple times in the past weeks — including on April 23 — that details about peace proposals should not be publicly available, likely as part of efforts to keep the precise terms obfuscated in hopes of further delaying negotiations and extracting concessions.[21] Russian officials have reiterated the Kremlin's demands in recent weeks, including Russia's rejection of European peacekeepers deploying to Ukraine, refusal to withdraw from any parts of occupied Ukraine, and territorial claims over areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy.[22] Russian state media recently amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial control along the Dnipro River in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — including areas that Russian forces would have to withdraw from under the reported US proposal.[23]

Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level. The UK Foreign Office announced on April 23 that the ministerial meeting was postponed for unspecified reasons but that "official level talks" would continue.[24] UK outlet SkyNews reported that the multilateral talks continued among senior officials but "at a much lower level" than planned.[25] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reported that he, Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha met with UK Foreign Minister David Lammy and UK Defense Minister John Healey in London about Ukrainian defensive capabilities and held a separate meeting with US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg on possible scenarios to end the war.[26] The Ukrainian delegation also met with UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Jens Plotner, and Umerov and Yermak reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to a just and lasting peace, including to US President Donald Trump's peace initiative.[27] Yermak stated that the April 23 meeting was a "first step" towards a full settlement process.[28]

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff originally planned to attend the April 23 talks in London but pulled out no later than April 22.[29] The Washington Post reported on April 23, citing a diplomat familiar with the talks, that European diplomats cancelled the foreign ministerial meeting after Rubio pulled out of the meeting.[30] A US official and two European diplomats familiar with the matter told CNN on April 23 that Rubio did not attend the London talks because the Trump administration did not believe talks were "at a decisive point."[31] A US official told Axios that "the decision was made" for Rubio to not travel to London after the United States observed indications that Ukrainian officials wanted to discuss a 30-day temporary ceasefire, as the Trump administration initially proposed in March 2025, rather than the most recent US proposal for an immediate and decisive settlement.[32]

The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 22 that legal consultations between the US and Ukraine regarding the mineral deal are underway, though the date for signing the deal remains "unclear."[33] US President Donald Trump told reporters on April 17 that the mineral deal could be signed as early as April 24.[34] Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent outlining steps toward completing the bilateral mineral deal, but the document did not include a specific signing date.[35]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, stated on April 23 that it was "loud" at the Alabuga SEZ and implied that there were "somewhat successful" strikes in the area.[36] Kovalenko noted that Russia produced over 6,000 Shahed drones and thousands of decoy drones at the Alabuga SEZ in 2024 and that Russia ordered the Alabuga SEZ to produce 8,000 to 10,000 Shaheds and 15,000 decoy drones in 2025.[37] Russian sources published footage purportedly showing a fire in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, near the Alabugza SEZ and showing Russian air defenses attempting to down drones in the area.[38] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated that five Ukrainian drones with 250-kilogram warheads struck the facility and that Russian forces only downed one drone.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 23 that Russian forces shot down a drone over the Republic of Tatarstan.[40] ISW recently assessed that Russia is likely increasingly adapting its drones to overcome Ukraine's mobile fire groups that have proven successful at downing Shahed drones.[41]

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian Deputy Head of the Main Department of Anti-Mine Action, Civil Protection, and Environmental Safety Colonel Valeriy Veber reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces recorded 767 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in March 2025 and 7,730 cases since February 2023.[42] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 14 that Russian forces are dropping RG-Vo hand grenades with a type of riot control agent (RCA) onto Ukrainian positions near Shcherbaky in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Russian sources openly acknowledged that Russian forces were dropping RG-Vo grenades containing tear gas from drones as early as December 2023.[44] Ukrainian military officials also reported on April 16 and 17 that they identified a capsule with concentrated chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas, a type of RCA banned under the CWC, on Russian Shahed drones and that Russia may be using these drones to disperse poisonous substances among the civilian population.[45]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace.
• Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan.
• Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level.
• The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal.
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones.
• Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2025

The Financial Times (FT) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in Ukraine on the current frontlines. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that Russia maintains its territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, while also publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond these four oblasts. The FT reported on April 22 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin told US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff during their April 11 meeting that Russia could relinquish its claims to the Ukrainian-controlled parts of the four oblasts that Russia has formally laid claim to and illegally annexed.[1] European officials briefed on the US efforts to end the war stated that Putin would probably use this to lure US President Donald Trump into accepting Russia's other demands and force these demands onto Ukraine as a fait accompli. Russia's "other demands" referenced by FT likely include Russia’s public demands for Ukrainian neutrality, regime change, and demilitarization — Putin's pre-war demands that Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout the war and during negotiations about possible ceasefires and a peace deal.[2]

Russian officials have recently repeated Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly cited Putin's June 2024 speech on April 14, and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement must include the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of the entirety of these four oblasts.[4] Russia passed constitutional amendments in October 2022 that defined the four oblasts as Russian territory, and Russian officials have recently reiterated how the Russian Constitution holds primacy over international law.[5] Russian officials have also repeatedly invoked the term "Novorossiya" when talking about Russian-occupied and Russian-claimed territory in southern Ukraine, with Putin most recently using the term on April 21.[6] Novorossiya is an invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia. A senior Russian occupation official, recently on April 21, called for Russia to control areas of southern Ukraine near the Dnipro River, including territory in oblasts that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed.[7] Russian officials. including Putin, have also labelled Odesa City a "Russian city" that has nothing to do with Ukraine."[8] Kremlin newswire TASS has notably begun, as of April 2025, to characterize any Kremlin statements about Russian-claimed territory in Ukraine as about "Donbas and Novorossiya," likely as part of Kremlin efforts to set conditions for Russian society to expect Russia to achieve extensive territorial concessions in Ukraine.[9]

The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is attempting to use economic incentives to sway US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine, as the Kremlin is not sincerely interested in US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the Moscow Times' insider reporting. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported on April 21 that five current Russian government officials, including two diplomats and three sources close to the Kremlin who are employees of three major state-owned companies, stated that the Kremlin is looking for incentives to "hold...Trump's attention."[10] One current Russian government official stated that Russian authorities are working "in full swing" to prepare proposals for Trump across "key economic sectors." One source who has participated in the Kremlin discussions on the matter stated that Russia "needs to milk Trump as much as possible, dangling the possibility of a ceasefire like a carrot before him." A Russian diplomat stated that the Kremlin's priority is to "recalibrate" relations with the United States while keeping dialogue about the war in Ukraine "alive." The Moscow Times reported that the official Russian sources see two main scenarios that could unfold: either Russia agrees to a Trump-brokered ceasefire in exchange for concessions, such as limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine, or Russia will blame Ukraine should talks collapse.[11]

Russia has recently offered the United States economic incentives that are unrelated to Russia’s war in Ukraine, likely as part of efforts to extract concessions from the United States about Russia’s war in Ukraine.[12] Russian Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev, for example, called for the United States and Russia to jointly work to solve problems in the Arctic in an April 21 article in Russian business outlet Kommersant.[13] This Russian effort goes against the Trump administration's desired timeline of events, as the White House has stated that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships.[14] Kremlin officials have claimed that Russia is willing to negotiate to end the war in Ukraine while attempting to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards ending the war.[15] Putin, however, has rejected multiple full or temporary ceasefire offers that the United States and Ukraine have proposed. Putin rejected the March 18 US-Ukrainian proposed temporary ceasefire along the entire frontline; refused to extend the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21, despite both US and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's support for such an extension; and rejected Zelensky's recent proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[16] Putin has already started to question whether Ukraine would be able to receive military aid from its allies in the event of a temporary full ceasefire — possibly to set conditions to demand the cessation of United States and likely also European weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition for accepting a full ceasefire.[17]

Any potential future Russian agreement to freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's more extensive territorial demands, especially if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine receiving Western military aid. A Russian diplomat reportedly told the Moscow Times that "the situation on the ground will dictate the next moves" in US-Russian talks about the war and that "it is all about time, patience, and staying the course."[18] The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression, as Russian forces are just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 20 kilometers from Kharkiv City.[19] Russia has notably intensified its use of armored vehicles across the frontline and appears to have started a likely years' long effort to seize Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast - likely as part of efforts to gain as much territory as possible in eastern and southern Ukraine, particularly in the four oblasts to which Russia has formally laid claim.[20] Russia may tactically and temporarily stop pushing for Putin's demands for the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the four illegally annexed oblasts in southern and eastern Ukraine in order to extract other concessions from the United States under the rubric of negotiations. Such concessions could be Russia's "other demands" of installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv and drastically shrinking the Ukrainian military in order to decrease resistance against renewed Russian aggression. The Kremlin will likely exploit any ceasefire predicated on limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine to prepare for renewed aggression.

Kremlin officials continued efforts on April 22 to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure. Zelensky reiterated on April 21 that Ukraine remains ready and willing to discuss Zelensky's recent proposal for a 30-day ceasefire on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 22, after Zelensky's April 21 statement, that Ukraine has yet to respond to Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated statements signaling Russia's willingness to discuss such a ceasefire with Ukraine and that Russia first needs to understand if Ukraine is ready for such discussions.[22] Peskov claimed that there are no plans to discuss the proposed ceasefire and that Ukraine must remove its "obstacles" to contacts with Russia before bilateral discussions can begin, in reference to Zelensky's September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin after Putin's illegal annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine.[23] Zelensky has repeatedly signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia in recent months, however.[24] Peskov reiterated Putin's April 21 claims that Russia needs to "sort out" and study cases where there have been strikes against civilian infrastructure where military personnel were operating before agreeing to Zelensky's proposal.[25] Peskov's April 22 claims are in line with the Moscow Times' reporting that the Kremlin will attempt to blame Ukraine should talks to end the war fall apart and that the Kremlin is "dangling the possibility of a ceasefire like a carrot before [Trump]."[26]

The Kremlin continues to reject Trump's stated goal of achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine before a full peace settlement to end the war — in contrast to Ukraine's continued support for a general ceasefire. US President Donald Trump expressed hope on April 20 that Russia and Ukraine would make a deal this week, possibly referring to a general ceasefire agreement that would precede future peace negotiations.[27] Zelensky stated on April 21 that a ceasefire "should be the first step towards a reliable and lasting peace" and that only after Ukraine and Russia demonstrate adherence to an agreed upon ceasefire can the parties establish the trust necessary to resolve "fundamental issues."[28] Peskov claimed on April 22 that Russia and the United States maintain communication via several channels but that "it is probably not worth setting any strict time frames" or "trying to fit a viable settlement [to the war] into short time frame" as "the topic is so complex."[29] Zelensky's and Peskov's statements continue to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to adhere to Trump's desired plans to end the war and Russia's rejection of these desired plans.[30]

Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 22 that Russian forces conducted a strike against Odesa City on April 21 with Geran-3 jet kamikaze drones (Russia's analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which reportedly has a maximum speed of 500 to 600 kilometers per hour.[31] One milblogger claimed that the Geran-3 drone may have a new compact turbojet engine or may have a slightly modified version of the previous engine.[32] Other milbloggers claimed that the Geran-3 drones flew at higher altitudes than previous drone models during the Odesa City strike, allowing them to avoid Ukrainian mobile defense units. The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces directed multiple Geran drones from different directions toward a single target in Odesa City and that the drones waited in a designated area near the target while other drones conducted additional reconnaissance for target adjustment. The drones then reportedly conducted a concentrated strike against the target, hitting simultaneously and from different directions. Ukrainian sources and German outlet BILD similarly reported in late March and early April 2025 that Russian forces are loitering long-range drones at high altitudes several kilometers from large Ukrainian cities and other targets before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[33] It is unclear if the Geran-3 that Russian forces used in the April 21 Odesa City strike is a new modified version, if Russian forces have only changed their tactics for employing the drone, or both. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on April 22 that Russia recently increased its production of Geran-type drones and has begun using swarm tactics during drone strikes.[34] ISW previously reported that Russians started producing and using their own Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 analogues (which Russia calls Geran-1 and Geran-2, respectively) with imported Iranian components and using Iranian production licenses as early as summer 2023 and began producing the Geran-3 drone in early 2024.[35] ISW also recently collected reports that Russian forces have begun to equip Shahed drones with concentrated chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas (a type of riot control agent [RCA] banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], to which Russia is a signatory), likely to inflict damage on Ukrainian forces or civilians even after Ukrainian troops shoot down the drones.[36] Ukrainian forces have proven highly effective at shooting down Russia's long-range drones using mobile air defense units, and Russia is likely looking for different ways to overcome these effective Ukrainian air defenders.[37] Russian forces will likely seek to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and Geran drones used in Russian strike packages, continuing to implement swarm strikes, and further adapting drones to penetrate Ukraine’s air defenses to inflict maximum damage.

Russia is reportedly recruiting North Korean citizens to compensate for labor shortages in Russia, indicating that Russian-North Korean cooperation continues to deepen. Ryazan Oblast news outlet Ya62 reported on February 15 that Ryazan Oblast Telegram channels reported that over 100 North Korean women signed three-year contracts to work at one of the Ryazan Oblast warehouses of Russian retail giant Wildberries (the Russian equivalent of Amazon), but Ya62 noted that this information is unconfirmed.[38] Russian opposition student journal DOXA reported that there is a video circulated among Wildberries employees reportedly showing North Korean women at a Wildberries warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast, and a local Telegram channel claimed on April 15 that former Wildberries employees reported there are "hundreds" of North Koreans working at the Elektrostal warehouse.[39] DOXA reported that a Wildberries representative did not confirm whether the workers in the Elekstrostal video were North Korean but stated that Wildberries is working with a recruiting agency to attract workers from unspecified countries.[40] Russian milbloggers amplified much of this reporting on April 21 and 22 and praised Russia's and Wildberries' efforts to recruit North Korean workers for jobs in Russia to offset ongoing labor shortages.[41] The milbloggers praised North Korean migrants as better than migrants from Central Asian countries, claiming that North Korean migrants only work in Russia on short-term contracts instead of migrating permanently, are more "disciplined" and work harder for less pay and longer hours, are less biased against Russia, and "behave decently" — a reference to frequent Russian ultranationalist and xenophobic complaints that Central Asian migrant communities in Russia fail to assimilate into Russian cultural and legal norms. ISW has observed indicators that Russia is preparing for an influx of North Korean citizens to arrive in Russia, likely to either join the Russian workforce or join the Russian military, and ease some economic constraints of Russia's war effort.[42] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023 — and that 7,887 of these North Koreans entered Russia on student visas, with the largest number entering Russia in the months immediately before the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.[43] A significant increase in the number of North Koreans working in the Russian civilian sectors could free up Russia's civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industry or fight against Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• The Financial Times (FT) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in Ukraine on the current frontlines. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that Russia maintains its territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, while also publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond these four oblasts.
• The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is attempting to use economic incentives to sway US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine as the Kremlin is not sincerely interested in US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the Moscow Times' insider reporting.
• Any potential future Russian agreement to freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's more extensive territorial demands, especially if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine receiving Western military aid.
• Kremlin officials continued efforts on April 22 to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure.
• The Kremlin continues to reject Trump's stated goal of achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine before a full peace settlement to end the war – in contrast to Ukraine's continued support for a general ceasefire.
• Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units.
• Russia is reportedly recruiting North Korean citizens to compensate for labor shortages in Russia, indicating that Russian-North Korean cooperation continues to deepen.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 21, 2025

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on the previous day to 0800 on the current day, the 1600 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600, and the 2200 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200. Any reports of Russian ground activity in the Ukrainian General Staff's April 20, 2200 SITREP are by default an accusation of Russia's 30-hour unilateral Easter truce that started at 1800 Moscow time on April 19. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in the Ukrainian General Staff's April 21, 0800 SITREP occurred after the end of the truce.]

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on April 20 that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days.[1] Putin announced the end of the Easter truce on April 21 and rejected Zelensky's proposed temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure while speaking to journalists, stating that Russia would need to "sort out" the proposed civilian infrastructure strikes moratorium.[2] Putin attempted to soften his rejection of Zelensky's ceasefire proposal by claiming that Russia and other unspecified actors need to study strikes against civilian targets where military personnel are operating and "make appropriate decisions." Putin did not suggest the possibility of creating independent monitoring mechanisms to determine the legitimacy of such strikes, and Russian officials have previously expressed disinterest in Western-led monitoring mechanisms as a condition of future ceasefires in Ukraine.[3] Putin also attempted to justify Russia's recent missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to obfuscate his ongoing rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces recently struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City — likely referring to the April 13 Russian missile strike against Sumy City — but suggested that the reported presence of Ukrainian military personnel in Sumy City constituted a legitimate military target.[4] Putin claimed that Russian forces also targeted Ukrainian military personnel during a recent Russian strike against Odesa City.

Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered. Zelensky reiterated on April 20 Ukraine's readiness to agree to a full and unconditional ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days.[5] Putin rejected the full ceasefire proposal on April 21, claiming that Ukraine was attempting to "seize the initiative and talk about expan[ding]" the ceasefire, and alleging that Russia would need to "carefully evaluate everything."[6] Ukraine and the United States initially proposed a full ceasefire on March 13, and Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the proposal over the past five weeks.[7] The US Department of State told Reuters on April 20 that the United States would welcome the extension of the Easter truce, however.[8] US President Donald Trump expressed hope on April 20 that Russia and Ukraine would make a deal this week, possibly referring to a general ceasefire agreement that would precede future peace negotiations.[9] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov appeared to respond to Trump's statement by stating that the Kremlin is not ready to discuss a time frame to end the war.[10] Putin's continued rejection of the US-Ukrainian March 2025 proposed general ceasefire and the Kremlin's refusal to commit to any time frame to end the war highlight Putin's disinterest in ending the war via peace negotiations in the near term.[11] Putin's continued rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals runs counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim. Saldo stated on April 21 to Kremlin newswire TASS that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority" for Russia.[12] Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces will continue efforts to use the east (left) bank of the river as a "lever of pressure" against Russia and that the presence of Ukrainian forces on the west bank hinders the resumption of shipping along the river. Saldo concluded that "the segment of the [Dnipro River] that passes through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts must be completely under [Russian] control" so as to guarantee the development of infrastructure "associated with the river." Russian forces only currently occupy positions on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to Russia.[13] Saldo appears to be calling for additional Russian territorial claims along the river in central Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. It is unclear how much territory along the banks of the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Saldo is claiming must be under Russian control or if Saldo is implying that Russian forces must occupy extensive territory east and northeast of the river such that Russia "completely control" the river and its immediate surrounding areas. Russian forces may want to control a minimum 25 kilometers of territory on both banks of the Dnipro River so as to prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery strikes against the area.

Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial claims along the Dnipro River is consistent with other Kremlin official statements, as Russia continues to make extensive territorial demands of Ukraine while offering no concessions of its own. Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts are notably included in the amorphous, invented region of "Novorossiya" that Kremlin officials often claim is "integral" to Russia and invoke to make additional territorial claims in southern Ukraine.[14] Putin invoked the term "Novorossiya" on April 21 at the "Service" All-Russian Municipal Award Ceremony, claiming that municipal workers are working in very difficult conditions "in the regions of Donbas and Novorossiya."[15] Putin has previously instructed Russian forces to create "buffer zones" in areas of Ukraine to which Russia has not formally laid claim, including in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[16] Saldo's call for Russian control of areas in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts along the Dnipro River to "guarantee the development of infrastructure" would be consistent with Putin's previous objectives concerning the creation of "buffer zones."

Kremlin officials continued to reiterate Russia's pre-war demands on April 21. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 21 that Ukraine's potential membership in NATO would threaten Russia's national interests and that this is one of the "root causes" of the war.[17] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that any peace settlement in Ukraine needs to eliminate the "root causes" of the war, including NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward.[18] Saldo's and Peskov's statements demonstrate how Russian officials continue to claim that Russia's pre-war demands are non-negotiable while also making increasingly extensive territorial demands of Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine.
• Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered.
• Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim.
• Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial claims along the Dnipro River is consistent with other Kremlin official statements, as Russia continues to make extensive territorial demands of Ukraine while offering no concessions of its own.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2025

The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported at 2000 local time April 20 that Russian forces in "all main frontline directions" conducted ground attacks and drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in violation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 30-hour unilateral truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21.[1] Zelensky also stated on April 20 that Russian forces conducted attacks in the Siversk, Toretsk, and Zaporizhia directions and are conducting offensive operations most intensely in the Pokrovsk direction.[2] Zelensky’s statement from 1600 local time April 20 also reported Russian truce violations in Kursk Oblast, although Zelensky stated earlier at 0000 local time April 20 that Putin did not extend the truce to Kursk or Belgorod oblasts.[3] Zelensky reiterated that an effective ceasefire agreement must provide monitoring mechanisms of potential violations and that Ukrainian forces will respond "symmetrically" to Russian assaults.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 20 that Russian forces had "strictly" observed the truce and claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and artillery strikes against Russian positions and Russian-occupied settlements since the truce began.[5] Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that fighting abated but did not fully cease in some directions, including the Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions, and that fighting in other directions temporarily ceased around 1800 on April 19 but has since resumed with variable frequency and intensity.[6] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat anomalies along the frontline on April 20 that may suggest military activity, but ISW is unable to independently verify the specific reports of violations made by Russian or Ukrainian sources.

Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[7] Zelensky stated that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and such a ceasefire is the easiest to extend. Zelensky proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Russia and Ukraine repeatedly accused each other of violating the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, but Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the March 13 joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal over the last five weeks.[8] A temporary civilian infrastructure strikes ceasefire agreement — and especially a general ceasefire agreement — would require robust monitoring mechanisms, public and formal terms, and a clearly defined time frame. The Kremlin may continue to leverage any vague future ceasefire agreements to obfuscate Russia's rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and to accuse Ukraine of violating such ceasefire terms.[9]

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 20 that Russian forces have killed or tortured 67 Ukrainian priests, pastors, and monks and destroyed 640 religious sites, most of which are Christian sites, since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.[10] ISW has previously reported on Russia's religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of worship.[11] ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Orthodox Church of Ukraine and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists, who have faced Russian brutality and other repressions throughout Ukraine.[12]

The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO. Russian state journalist Pavel Zarubin asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a question on April 20 about the EU's recommendation that European leaders refrain from attending Russia's May 9 Victory Day Parade in Moscow.[13] (Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday and commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War.) Lavrov accused the EU of stoking "neo-Nazi ideology" in Europe and stated that Russia "will make every effort to ensure that this ideology does not raise its head," and will destroy Nazism "once and for all." Lavrov's statements are part of a long-standing Kremlin effort to invoke the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany and the wider mythos of the Great Patriotic War and vilify Europe and NATO. These efforts aim to exacerbate negative sentiments among Russia's population and drum up support for the militarization of Russian society in the long term.[14] The Kremlin has previously appealed to the mythos of the Great Patriotic War to persuade the Russian population that their increasing social and economic sacrifices for the Russian war effort in Ukraine can help achieve overwhelming victory.[15]Russian President Vladimir Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials regularly invoke the vague term of "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Putin leveraged claims that supposed Nazis control the Ukrainian government to justify the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[16] The Kremlin is increasingly employing the same playbook that it used against Ukraine towards Finland and former Soviet states, including Estonia and Moldova to justify its attempts to control independent countries and set informational conditions for possible future Russian aggression.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms.
• Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians.
• The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk before the start of the Easter truce.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed extending Russian President Vladimir Putin's 30-hour unilateral truce on Russian military operations in Ukraine to a complete and unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Putin ordered Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to officially halt all Russian military actions in Ukraine on April 19, effective from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 until 0000 Moscow time on April 21.[1] Putin stated that Russia will "assume that the Ukrainian side will follow [Russia's] example" while ordering Russian forces to "be ready to repel possible violations of the truce” by Ukrainian forces. Zelensky responded to Putin's order later on April 19 and proposed that Russia and Ukraine extend Putin's 30-hour truce to a "complete and unconditional" 30-day ceasefire if Russian forces actually cease all military operations.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "mirror" Russia's response and accused Russia of imposing the 30-hour truce for "headlines" rather than demonstrating genuine confidence-building measures. Zelensky reported that, according to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Russian forces continue assault operations and shelling in several unspecified areas of the frontline. This truce is unlikely to hold given that Russian forces appear to have continued limited offensive operations and indiscriminate shelling across the frontline in the first few hours of the truce and given Russia's continued rejection of a full ceasefire. The United States and Ukraine jointly proposed implementing an immediate 30-day full ceasefire to Russia on March 13, but Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the proposal since then.[3]

Putin stated that the temporary truce will demonstrate whether Ukraine is willing to comply with agreements and participate in peace negotiations "aimed at eliminating the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis."[4] Russian officials regularly invoke the "root causes" phrase to allude to Russia's unyielding demands for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and for regime change in Ukraine.[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces will observe the Easter truce provided that Ukrainian forces reciprocate.[6] It is unlikely that Russian officials and military commanders effectively communicated plans to implement the temporary truce to frontline units or Ukrainian officials prior to Putin's announcement. Russia's prior well-evidenced behavior regarding the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure indicates that Russian officials likely intend to continue making unsubstantiated allegations of Ukrainian truce violations.[7] Russia, in this sense, is likely leveraging its unilateral implementation of a temporary truce in Ukraine to introduce informational conditions that will act as a pretext to support Russia's continued efforts to undermine and discredit Ukraine. Russia may exploit unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian truce violations to undermine support for the proposed peace framework that the United States presented in Paris, France, on April 17. Russia is also likely attempting to curry favor with the United States and portray itself as an agreeable negotiating partner in direct response to US President Donald Trump's recent remarks that the United States will reconsider its role in brokering peace in Ukraine, depending on how the peace process develops in the coming days.[8]

US officials are reportedly growing frustrated with the Kremlin's rejections of US proposals to end the war in Ukraine. The New York Times (NYT), citing European officials who were familiar with the US discussions in Paris on April 17, reported on April 18 that the US stance on a ceasefire remains largely the same but that Russian officials have "dragged their feet" and insisted on additional conditions for US President Donald Trump's proposed unconditional general ceasefire, including the "denazification" of Ukraine.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin named "denazification" as one of his main goals in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people.[10] Putin and other Kremlin officials have since reiterated this demand for "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government.[11] Axios reported on April 18 that two European diplomats stated that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told UK, German, and French diplomats that President Trump is "losing his patience" and may withdraw from the peace process if a peace deal is not concluded "soon."[12] Trump stated on April 18 that he hopes to conclude a peace deal in Ukraine "quickly" and that if either Ukraine or Russia "makes it very difficult," then "we're just going to take a pass."[13] CNN reported on April 18 that a source familiar with the Trump administration stated that the Trump administration is attempting to plan another meeting between US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Russian authorities to discuss the proposed framework.[14]

Ukraine and Russia conducted the largest prisoner of war (POW) exchange on April 19 since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 19 that Ukrainian authorities returned 277 Ukrainian POWs, comprised of members of the Ukrainian forces, National Guard, State Transport Service, and Border Guard, from Russian captivity.[15] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia and noted that Ukrainian authorities have returned a total of 4,552 Ukrainian civilians and soldiers from Russian captivity since the start of the war in February 2022. The Russian MoD claimed on April 19 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 246-to -246 POW exchange and that Russia transferred an additional 31 wounded Ukrainian POWs to Ukraine in exchange for 15 wounded Russian POWs.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed extending Russian President Vladimir Putin's 30-hour unilateral truce on Russian military operations in Ukraine to a complete and unconditional 30-day ceasefire.
• US officials are reportedly growing frustrated with the Kremlin's rejections of US proposals to end the war in Ukraine.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the largest prisoner of war (POW) exchange on April 19 since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 18, 2025

Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed on April 18 that discussing a general ceasefire in Ukraine is "unrealistic" and accused Ukraine of not observing the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure over the last month.[1] Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal during a phone call with US President Donald Trump on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then, attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and extract additional bilateral concessions from the United States.[2] ISW previously noted that any future general ceasefire agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's efforts to claim that Ukraine was violating the temporary strikes ceasefire without providing evidence, and that it is unclear if Russian officials will accept any meaningful monitoring mechanisms.[3]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18.[4] Peskov responded to a question about whether Russia will resume strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities and claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not issued further instructions. Russian officials have not expressed any interest in extending the temporary strikes ceasefire and the actual terms of the ceasefire remain unclear due to the lack of formal, publicly available, joint ceasefire documents. Russian officials accused Ukraine of violating the temporary strikes ceasefire almost daily over the last month, but provided no evidence for most of these accusations.[5]

ISW previously assessed that Russia may intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine following the end of the strikes moratorium, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned at an event for Ukrainian energy workers on April 17 that Russia may intensify strikes on Ukraine around Easter (April 20).[6] It remains unclear how the ending of the temporary strikes ceasefire may impact Russia's nightly strikes against Ukraine, as the specifics of Putin's previous order to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure also remain unclear. Putin claimed to have issued an order to the Russian military immediately following his March 18 phone call with President Trump to stop strikes on energy infrastructure facilities, but Russian officials have provided no further context about the duration or other specifics of this supposed order.[7]

Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions. Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded on April 18 to Bloomberg's report that the United States proposed freezing the war on the current frontlines, leaving occupied Ukraine "under Moscow's control," and taking Ukraine's NATO membership "off the table" as part of a plan to end the war and claimed that this plan is a "bad deal for Russia."[8] Simonyan claimed that Russia should reject this plan because the plan does not include terms for Ukraine's "denazification" or a formal recognition of occupied Ukraine as part of Russia, and additionally does not include assurances that Europe will not deploy a potential European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine. Simonyan also attempted to delegitimize Ukraine and the United States as negotiating partners and claimed that "there can be no negotiating with the insane" in reference to the plan and the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev urged the United States to "wash its hands" of the war in Ukraine and let Russia "figure it out faster" in a social media post on April 18.[9]

Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly stated that they are unwilling to accept any agreement that does not concede to all of Russia's territorial and political demands for Ukraine.[10] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on April 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been "fixated" on territorial concessions during their bilateral meetings, indicating that Russian officials likely continue to reiterate their territorial and political demands about Ukraine both in public and in private.[11] Russian officials have noted that Putin remains committed to accomplishing all his goals in Ukraine, which Putin has explicitly defined in part as the "denazification" and demilitarization of Ukraine.[12] Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and to demand the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. ISW previously noted that Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression.[13] Putin has also called for Ukraine to concede unoccupied territory to Russia, and Russian officials appear to be considering these demands as the Kremlin's standing guidance on negotiations.[14]

Russian officials' continued insistence on these demands has also set conditions for Russian society to expect these demands to be fulfilled in any conclusion of the war in Ukraine, and Kremlin mouthpieces stating explicitly that these demands must be met even in a peace deal favorable to Russia is a reflection of this long-term rhetorical line. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, and Russian officials continue to indicate and explicitly state that they are unwilling to compromise on these goals.[15]

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated during an April 17 phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio the Kremlin's demand that any US-Russian efforts to end the war in Ukraine must "comprehensively" address the so-called "root causes" of the war.[16] Lavrov has previously defined these so-called "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[17] These so-called "root causes" are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.

Kremlin officials are likely engaging in bilateral discussions with US officials to maintain the appearance of being interested in good-faith peace negotiations, but Russian officials' commitment to their pre-war demands and other efforts to prolong negotiations continue to indicate otherwise.[18] Ukraine, however, continues to indicate it is willing to negotiate a lasting peace.[19] The US Department of State (DoS) reported on April 17 that Rubio told Lavrov that US President Donald Trump wants the war in Ukraine to end and that US negotiators presented and received an "encouraging" response to "outlines of a durable and lasting peace" at meetings between representatives of Ukraine and its Western partners in Paris on April 17.[20]

Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha to discuss implementing first an unconditional ceasefire and then the broader process of establishing a just and enduring peace in Ukraine – fully in line with US President Donald Trump's stated timeline of negotiations to end the war.[21] The Ukrainian delegation reiterated Ukraine's long-standing commitment to working with the United States, Europe, and other partners to establish peace in Ukraine. Rubio stated on April 18 that the US delegation proposed a "framework" for ending the war to the Ukrainian representatives and noted that if the United States determines "within a matter of days" that the war in Ukraine can be resolved, then the United States is prepared to facilitate, but if not, then President Trump is "probably at a point where he's going to say, well, we're done."[22] It remains unclear what Rubio means, however.

The Ukrainian delegation also met with representatives of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France in the Coalition of the Willing framework to discuss the next steps for working towards peace in Ukraine.[23] The Ukrainian delegation reaffirmed its dedication to establishing an unconditional ceasefire. Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian delegations agreed that a "complete and unconditional ceasefire should be the first stage on the path to sustainable peace in Ukraine."[24]

Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 17 that Ukraine was ready to sign the memorandum of intent and proceed with the first steps towards the conclusion of a bilateral US-Ukrainian mineral deal.[25] Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko confirmed later on April 17 that Ukraine and the United States finalized and signed the memorandum of intent, and Ukraine's Ministry of Economy published the full text of the memorandum.[26]

Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks. Ukrainian officials reported on April 18 that Russian forces struck a residential area in Kharkiv City with three Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing at least one civilian, injuring at least 98, and damaging at least 21 apartment buildings, 40 houses, a civilian enterprise, two schools, and two children's centers.[27] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that the ballistic missiles were equipped with cluster munitions, which resulted in widespread damage.[28]

Russian forces have conducted several devastating strikes against Ukrainian cities since April 1. Russian ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads struck Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, causing at least 89 casualties on April 4, and Russian Shahed drones struck Kharkiv City and caused 39 casualties on the same day.[29] Russian ballistic missiles struck Sumy City on April 13 and caused at least 100 casualties.[30] A Russian ballistic missile strike on Dnipro City on April 17 caused at least 31 casualties.[31] Russian forces have been adjusting their strike tactics in recent weeks to increasingly hit civilian areas, likely intending to take advantage of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and Kremlin efforts to delay negotiations to intimidate Ukrainian civilians.[32]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.[33] Zelensky cited information from Ukrainian intelligence and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) indicating that the PRC has provided gunpowder and artillery to Russian forces and that PRC representatives are involved in weapons production within Russia. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian denied Zelensky's statement.[34]

ISW has recently observed indications that Russia and the PRC are deepening their cooperation, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine.[35] PRC military officials have reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare, and the PRC government may be disinterested in combating Russia's reported direct recruitment of PRC citizens to serve in the Russian military for this reason.[36] A Russian company also reportedly collaborated with entities in the PRC to develop and produce attack drones for use in Ukraine as of September 2024.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18.
• Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions.
• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation.
• Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2025

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for extensive territorial concessions from Ukraine while noting that ongoing peace negotiations are unlikely to achieve results quickly. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 17 that negotiations regarding Ukraine are "progressing quite difficultly," that Ukraine and Europe are to blame for the lack of progress, and that Russia is focusing "for now" on its "contacts" with the United States.[1] Peskov responded to a question about whether recognition of the Ukrainian territories that Russia has demanded is mandatory for ending the war, claiming that these regions are "integral" parts of Russia so "it is impossible to pose the question this way."[2] Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Putin's demand that Ukraine cede territory — including parts of Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy — to Russia while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to compromise on these demands.[3]

Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics. Ukrainian military officials reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a series of mechanized assaults by elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) that consisted of roughly a battalion's worth of equipment, including 320 personnel, 40 armored vehicles, three tanks, and about 10 buggies, along the Pyatykhatky-Stepove-Lobkove-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala Tokmachka line (a frontage of roughly 40 kilometers) south and southwest of Orikhiv on the evening of April 16.[4] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all three Russian tanks and 29 armored vehicles and killed or wounded 140 Russian soldiers.[5] Geolocated footage of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0515 Orikhiv-Polohy highway south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[6] ISW has not observed any other geolocated footage as of this writing to indicate any further advances along the wide front of attack. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces conducted a similar assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 13 — likely in reference to a recent Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Zaporizhia direction.[7] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces spent months preparing for these assaults and have concentrated additional assault groups for possible future assaults. Ukrainian officials have warned of the possibility of intensified Russian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast since November 2024.[8]

Russian forces fighting in Ukraine since 2023 do not usually conduct mechanized assaults spread out across a wide front. Russian forces typically conduct mechanized assaults in singular frontal assaults in narrower and more limited areas, likely intending to break through Ukrainian defenses with a greater concentration of forces in a single area, or as part of turning movements to outflank and envelop Ukrainian positions.[9] The tactical objective of this battalion-sized attack remains unclear, and the available footage and Ukrainian reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces defeated the attack. Russian forces may have intended for the April 16 mechanized assault to probe Ukrainian defenses to gauge the Ukrainian reaction and to detect possible weak points in Ukrainian positions ahead of future, more concentrated assaults. Elements of the 58th CAA may have been testing a different tactic, alternatively. ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces elsewhere along the frontline recently have implemented similar mechanized assault tactics. The decision to dedicate roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles to a broad mechanized assault with likely minimal gains is notable given Russia's extensive armored vehicle losses in the war, dwindling Soviet-era armored vehicle stockpiles, and limited capacity to produce, refurbish, and repair armored vehicles.[10]

Russian forces continue to intensify their usage of armored vehicles across the frontline amid continued negotiations to end the war. Commander of the Ukrainian National Guard, Brigadier General Oleksandr Pivnenko, reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction and that preliminary information confirms that Ukrainian forces destroyed 21 armored fighting vehicles, two other vehicles, and 96 motorcycles and killed and wounded over 240 Russian soldiers.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on the evening of April 17 that Russian forces launched an attack in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed the entire Russian grouping consisting of 115 pieces of equipment (likely including armored vehicles, other vehicles, and motorcycles), killed 200 Russian soldiers, and wounded 30 more.[12] ISW has recently observed an increase in Russia's use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025.[13] This intensification may be related to changing weather conditions and hardening terrain as Ukraine is coming out of its muddy rasputitsa season, the spring period in which melting frozen winter ground and spring rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement. This intensification may also be related to the Kremlin's continued insistence that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia and that the four oblasts be recognized as Russian territory.[14]

The Kremlin is adopting increasingly threatening rhetoric towards Europe aimed at preventing Europe from supporting Ukraine and defending itself. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned on April 17 that Russia will consider any missile strike with German Taurus missiles against Russia to be Germany's direct participation in the war in Ukraine.[15] Zakharova also threatened Estonia, mirroring Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin's recent threat that Poland and the Baltic States would be the "first to suffer" in the event of "NATO aggression" against Russia or Belarus.[16] The Kremlin has repeatedly used similar threats against Western states sending military aid to Ukraine as part of Russia's wider reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision-making and deter aid to Kyiv, including nearly identical threats against the US regarding allowing Ukraine to strike Russia with ATACMS.[17] The Kremlin likely seeks to portray European efforts to augment both European and Ukrainian defensive capabilities as provocative in order to push European countries into self-deterring from providing Ukraine with additional military support and bolstering European defensive capabilities.

Russia is increasingly adapting its drones to facilitate chemical weapons strikes against the frontline and rear areas of Ukraine — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command and Center for Countering Disinformation reported on April 16 and 17 that Ukrainian authorities identified a capsule with concentrated chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas, a type of riot control agent (RCA) banned under the CWC, on Russian Shahed drones and that Russia may be using these drones to disperse poisonous substances among the civilian population.[18] The Center for Countering Disinformation noted that reports that Russian forces are coating Shahed drones with poisonous substances are unconfirmed.[19] Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin similarly reported on April 16 that Russian forces had equipped Shahed drones that fell in Donetsk Oblast with capsules filled with "concentrated irritant gas."[20] Filashkin urged Ukrainian citizens to not approach downed Shahed debris and noted that Russian forces have previously equipped Shaheds with grenades with delayed detonation mechanisms. Russian forces have reportedly extensively used CS gas in grenades dropped from drones on Ukrainian positions throughout the frontline and have reportedly equipped Shaheds with cluster munitions.[21] Ukrainian forces have proven effective at shooting down Shahed drones, and Russia likely seeks to equip Shahed drones with weapons to still cause damage even when Ukrainian forces shoot down the drones before striking their intended targets.[22] These Russian adaptations are highly likely to cause disproportionate damage to civilians, however.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the United States and Ukraine are making progress towards signing a bilateral mineral deal. Zelensky stated on April 16 that the Ukrainian team working with the United States on the mineral deal has achieved "good results" and that the parties have almost finalized the "basic legal matters."[23]

European countries continue to increase their domestic defense production, including in support of Ukraine. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger stated on April 17 that the Rheinmetall AG Unterlub plant will produce 350,000 artillery shells in 2025 — 150,000 more than the 200,000 originally planned for 2025 — and that the company has so far invested about €600 million (roughly $682 million) in the Unterlub site.[24] Papperger stated that he expects Rheinmetall to earn €300 billion (roughly $340 billion) in sales in the next five years (until roughly 2030). The Czech engineering company PBS Group announced on April 16 that it will increase its production capacity of aircraft jet engines by 220 percent in 2025 in response to increased demand from global customers, including Ukraine.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for extensive territorial concessions from Ukraine while noting that ongoing peace negotiations are unlikely to achieve results quickly.
• Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics.
• The Kremlin is adopting increasingly threatening rhetoric towards Europe aimed at preventing Europe from supporting Ukraine and defending itself.
• Russia is increasingly adapting its drones to facilitate chemical weapons strikes against the frontline and rear areas of Ukraine — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the United States and Ukraine are making progress towards signing a bilateral mineral deal.
• European countries continue to increase their domestic defense production, including in support of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16, 2025

The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump made it "very clear" that US-Russian economic partnerships could be an incentive for Russia to end its war against Ukraine, but that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" — likely in reference to a temporary or permanent full ceasefire in Ukraine.[1] The Trump administration has previously characterized a temporary full ceasefire as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement in Ukraine.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal when Trump called Putin on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then by attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and secure additional bilateral concessions from the United States.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 16 that Ukraine's decision to extend martial law and continue general mobilization until August 6, 2025 is an attempt to preserve Ukraine's "unstable structure" and implied that Ukraine's ban on negotiations with Russia is inhibiting progress towards ending the war.[4] The Ukrainian government is legally prohibited from lifting martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine, however. Russian authorities also appear to be intensifying their recruitment efforts, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain its current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding.[5] The Kremlin is continuing efforts to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Trump's desired full ceasefire. Ukraine has already agreed to Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal, while Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for regime change in Ukraine, extensive territorial concessions, and limitations on Ukraine's military that would render Ukraine defenseless as conditions must be met before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire.[6]

Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine. Reuters published a joint investigation with UK-based research organization Open Source Center (OSC) on April 15 detailing the extent of Russia's dependence on North Korean artillery and the evolution of North Korean forces' participation in fighting alongside Russian forces.[7] Reuters and the OSC tracked 64 shipments from North Korea to Russia from September 2023 to March 2025 that involved 16,000 containers carrying millions of North Korean artillery rounds and recorded a shipment from North Korea as recently as March 17, 2025. Reuters and the OSC reported that four Russian-flagged ships — the Angara, Maria, Maia-1, and Lady R cargo ships — transported the ammunition from North Korea's port of Rajin to the Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai. Reuters reviewed Russian military documents of everyday Russian artillery usage that showed that some Russian units depended on North Korean artillery shells for half or more of their shells used in daily fire missions. Reuters reported that an unspecified Russian unit fighting in Zaporizhia Oblast reported that nearly 50 percent of its 152mm D-20 howitzer rounds and 100 percent of its 122mm rockets fired came from North Korea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Reuters that North Korea has provided Russia with three million artillery rounds and an unspecified number of mortar rounds since mid-2023 and that half of all of Russia's artillery rounds come from North Korea. The GUR also stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles as of January 2025.

Ukrainian military commanders and intelligence continue to indicate that North Korean forces have innovated their training and battlefield tactics following their participation in Russia's war. A Ukrainian regimental commander fighting in Kursk Oblast told Reuters that 3,000 additional North Korean forces that arrived in Kursk Oblast in mid-February 2025 were better prepared and more "adapted to modern combat" than the original contingent of North Korean forces that began fighting alongside Russian forces in November 2024.[8] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak stated on April 15 that North Korean forces have changed tactics from conducting assaults in large groups to attacking in groups of one or two people, have learned drone and electronic warfare (EW) tactics, and are successfully using Russian weapons and tactics on the battlefield.[9] Chernyak indicated that Russian and North Korean forces are somewhat compensating for language barriers that were causing friction during combat operations, as North Korean forces now receive orders and conduct assaults without communicating with Russian units.

Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian law enforcement officials told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 16 that Russian authorities detained Smirnov and former Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Alexei Dedov on suspicions of fraud and will seek their arrests.[10] Russian law enforcement authorities claimed that Smirnov and Dedov are under investigation for embezzling funds from the state-owned Kursk Oblast Development Corporation (KODC) meant for constructing defensive fortifications in the Kursk Oblast border area.[11] Russian authorities previously detained KODC executives in December 2024 on similar charges of embezzlement, in what ISW assessed at the time to be a concerted Kremlin effort to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for failing to repel Ukraine's incursion.[12] Russian officials notably arrested former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in May 2024 on similar charges of embezzling funds dedicated to constructing fortifications due to his perceived disloyalty and criticisms of the Russian military high command.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Smirnov as Kursk Oblast Governor with then Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee Head Alexander Khinshtein on December 5, 2024, and claimed that Smirnov resigned "at his own request."[14] Senior Russian officials emphasized in December 2024 that Putin appointed Khinshtein because Smirnov did not adequately communicate with or support Kursk Oblast residents regarding housing issues but did not accuse Smirnov of corruption at that time.[15] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin refrained from replacing Smirnov directly following the Ukrainian incursion or during Russian regional elections, likely in support of efforts to downplay the societal impacts of the incursion.[16] The Kremlin likely detained Smirnov and Dedov now since Russian forces have mostly pushed Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.[17]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka). The Ukrainian General Prosecutor's Office and Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on April 16 that there is footage of Russian forces taking three Ukrainian servicemembers prisoner near Rozdolne on April 11 and executing one of the unarmed Ukrainian POWs.[18] ISW has observed a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions in violation of international law.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire.
• Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2025

Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement ending Russia's invasion of Ukraine must include terms concerning Ukraine's neutrality; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the Ukrainian state; the abolition of Ukrainian laws that allegedly discriminate against Russian-speakers in Ukraine; and the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 14 that the current Ukrainian government is "unconstitutional" and that Russia "cannot give [Russian speakers living in occupied Ukraine] up" following the illegal and sham referendums Russia conducted in the four oblasts to join Russia in Fall 2022.[2] Lavrov reiterated that Putin "very clearly outlined" Russia's demands for a future peace agreement to end the war during Putin's speech on June 14, 2024, and stated that these June 2024 demands were "not some kind of request." Lavrov stated that there are "no secrets" about Russia's demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the "root causes" of the war in a future peace agreement.

Russian officials are using Putin's June 2024 speech as the Kremlin's current standing guidance on negotiations and the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Putin demanded on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations.[3] Putin stated that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. Putin also demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event of a resolution to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin reiterated his calls for Ukraine to agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" and abandon its aspirations to join any external security blocs. These demands would preclude the bilateral security agreements Ukraine has negotiated and is negotiating with several European states.

Putin and other Kremlin officials have routinely issued these same demands, including by using vague language to obfuscate Russia's most extreme demands.[4] Russian officials, including Putin, use this language to articulate their overarching demand that the West acknowledge Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and force Ukraine to concede not only territory but also its future sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Kremlin officials have consistently demanded that:

• Ukraine must demilitarize. Putin named "demilitarization" as one of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and stated on July 4, 2024, that Ukraine should undergo "irreversible" "demilitarization" in the event of a future ceasefire.[5] Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression.[6] Russia demanded in the protocol that the Ukrainian military should be confined to fewer than 85,000 active-duty personnel, fewer than 15,000 National Guard personnel, and fewer than 1,400 tanks and armored vehicles. The pre-2022 Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, 60,000 National Guard personnel, and over 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles.
• Ukraine must "denazify" and install a "legitimate" government. Putin named "denazification" as another of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people.[7] Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. Putin has routinely labeled all Ukrainian governments since 2014 as "illegitimate" and claimed on January 28 that Russia will not view any agreements it concludes with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[8]
• Ukraine must abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc in the future. Putin's demand for Ukraine's “neutrality” remains one of the central justifications for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[9] Russia demanded in the Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel or systems in Ukraine.[10]
• Ukraine must concede occupied Ukrainian territory and "Novorossiya" to Russia. Putin stated on June 14, 2024, that Russia will not be content with ending the war on the lines it currently holds and explicitly called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of "peace" negotiations with Ukraine.[11] Kremlin officials have indicated that they have territorial ambitions beyond the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and often invoke the term "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) to lay claim to other areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[12]
• Any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes." Lavrov has repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[13] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2025

Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently seized Oleksandropil, Panteleymonivka, and Valentynivka (all southwest of Toretsk) and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil highway.[i] Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 highway, seized Valentynivka, and are attacking Sukha Balka (north of Valentynivka).[ii] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) continue to attack north of Vozdvyzhenka (west of Oleksandropil and east of Pokrovsk) in the direction of Nova Poltavka and Novoolenivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk).[iii] Russian milbloggers recently credited elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[iv]

The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions in February 2025 and likely intended to leverage these redeployments to break out of Toretsk and advance towards Kostyantynivka along or parallel to the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[v] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) previously operating in these two areas failed to break through Ukraine's defense in Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025 , likely prompting the Russian military command to introduce elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions – potentially prematurely – into combat in order to maintain the operational tempo in these areas. Russian forces marginally advanced along the frontline between Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Sukha Balka in February and March 2025, but have made more tactically significant advances near Kalynove and along the Sukha Balka-Oleksandropil line since early April 2025.[vi] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in order to level out their southern flank ahead of a planned push on Kostyantynivka, and recent Russian redeployments and tactical activity supports this assessment.[vii] Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka. Russian forces must break out of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, advance toward Kostyantynivka broadly from the east, or advance roughly 24 kilometers from Pokrovsk along the T-0504 highway to Kostyantynivka’s southwestern flank before Russian forces will pose any notable threat to seizing Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka, and a Russian offensive to seize the city or Ukraine's wider fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely be a years' long effort - assuming that the West continues to bolster Ukraine's defense.[viii]

Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles, several civilian vehicles, and an unspecified number of motorcycles on April 12.[ix] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with over 20 armored vehicles, including over 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and several tanks.[x] The Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces attempted to advance in a wave of motorcycles ahead of the attacking armored vehicles to swiftly reach Ukrainian positions. Another Ukrainian brigade operating nearby stated that the Russian assault occurred near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and 12 IFVs.[xi] The Ukrainian National Guard published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with three tanks, 18 IFVs, an unspecified number of MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 41 motorcycles in an unspecified area of the Zaporizhia direction.[xii] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and destroyed two IFVs and one AFV

Russian forces have been augmenting mechanized assaults with civilian vehicles, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) since late Fall 2024 after limiting their use of armored vehicles across the entire frontline, likely due to concerns about unsustainable armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024.[xiii] Russian forces largely relied on small infantry groups to advance in Ukraine and used armored vehicles to transport infantry to the frontline and as fire support for infantry assaults in late Fall 2024 through Winter 2024-2025.[xiv] Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups along the frontline but may be recommitting armor to frontline assault operations as part of a general intensification along the entire frontline. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov noted on April 14 that Russian forces are using more civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction due to their high degree of maneuverability for evading Ukrainian drones compared to slower armored vehicles.[xv] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian drone operations are rendering Russian armored vehicle usage ineffective in the Pokrovsk direction, which is consistent with a long-term trend of Ukrainian drones discouraging Russian armored vehicle usage in this direction.[xvi] ISW has previously assessed that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term, and Russian forces are likely using these alternative civilian vehicles in assault operations to bolster mechanized assaults amid concerns about dwindling supplies of Soviet-era armored vehicles.[xvii] The recent intensification in Russian armor usage suggests that the Russian military command may be growing less concerned about dwindling armored vehicle stores or at least may be willing to accept additional armored vehicle losses if Russian forces can secure additional gains before a possible future ceasefire.

A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on April 11 that the Second Western District Military Court rejected an appeal against a February 28 ruling that changed Popov's house arrest to two months of pre-trial detention.[xviii] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad claimed on April 11 that Popov's lawyer stated that Russian authorities had not yet considered Popov's petition to suspend court proceedings and send Popov to fight in Ukraine.[xix] Popov's lawyer stated on April 9 that Popov signed a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and would return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending criminal trial.[xx] A Russian security official stated to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 9 that Popov would assume command of an unspecified “Storm Z” penal detachment operating in Ukraine. Popov publicly appealed to Putin in March 2025 to reinstate him in active military service, and Popov's support base, particularly within the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities, widely supported the appeal. The court's seeming reversal of the decision to send Popov to the war in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin continues to struggle to respond to situations in which the Kremlin's desired outcome is at odds with that of the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities. The Kremlin may be conflicted about how to punish Popov for weaponizing the information space in July 2023 when he attempted to reverse his removal from command. The Kremlin likely fears that allowing Popov to return to the battlefield at his request would set a precedent in which popular commanders and officials could threaten to blackmail the Kremlin into accepting their demands.

Read more about Popov's arrest in ISW’s latest special edition.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.
• Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025.
• A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2025

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future. Peskov told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on April 13 that "everything is moving very well" regarding US-Russian bilateral talks and discussions about the war in Ukraine but that there will likely not be immediate results.[1] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director Alexei Polishchuk gave an interview to Russian state media group Rossiya Today (RT) and stated that Russia is willing to engage in negotiations that “take into account the modern realities” of the war and eliminate the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[2] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that any peace process in Ukraine must address these so-called “root causes."[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov previously defined "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[4] These so-called ”root causes” are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[5] Peskov's and Polishchuk's comments also reflect the Kremlin's continued rejection of President Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and the Kremlin's commitment to war aims that are incompatible with President Trump’s goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms. Peskov and Polishchuk reiterated ongoing Russian claims on April 13 that Ukraine is violating the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure.[6] Russian officials, led by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), have accused Ukraine of violating the temporary ceasefire almost every day since March 29 but have not provided evidence to substantiate most of these claims.[7] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces are striking energy infrastructure along Ukraine's northern border with Russia, although it remains unclear if strikes with tactical first-person view (FPV) drones or routine shelling would be a violation of the energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire as the terms of the ceasefire are publicly unclear. Russian officials appear to be weaponizing the vague conditions of the ceasefire and exploiting the absence of independent monitoring mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims about supposed Ukrainian ceasefire violations.

Russian officials may attempt to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in the future if a general ceasefire does not include robust independent monitoring mechanisms. Russian forces may conduct false flag attacks along the frontline in the event of a future general ceasefire in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the ceasefire and justify reigniting the conflict. ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate are setting conditions to legitimize future Russian ceasefire violations.[8] The Kremlin is weaponizing the lack of monitoring mechanisms for the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, and any future general ceasefire must have more robust monitoring mechanisms to deter, adjudicate, or at least properly record future violations.

It is unclear if Russian officials will agree to any meaningful monitoring mechanisms, however, as Russian officials continue to reject the possible future deployment of a European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine.[9] Polishchuk responded to a question about whether Russia will agree to sending peacekeepers to Ukraine on April 13 and stated that peacekeeping deployments are "not on the agenda."[10] Polishchuk insinuated that Russia and Ukraine must conclude a peace or ceasefire agreement before considering the issue of peacekeepers and claimed that the French- and British-led "Coalition of the Willing" is attempting to intervene in Ukraine by forming what it is calling a "reassurance force." Polishchuk accused the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine of falsifying reports on Russian violations of the Minsk agreement between 2014 and 2022, despite indications that Russia itself maintained significant influence over the OSCE and seriously hindered the OSCE's monitoring and enforcement mandates during this time.[11] The Kremlin's ongoing refusal to engage with US and European proposals to establish a peacekeeping force in Ukraine and Polishchuk's accusation that the OSCE has previously acted in Ukraine's — and not Russia's — favor underscores the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to accept any kind of monitoring mechanisms that could undermine Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future.

Russian officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue. Peskov claimed on April 13 that Ukraine is "either unable or unwilling to" honor the terms of the moratorium on energy strikes between Russia and Ukraine.[12] Polishchuk also claimed without evidence that Ukrainian forces have violated the moratorium on energy strikes over 60 times since Russia asserted that the agreement entered into force on March 18 and are striking or attempting to strike Russian energy facilities "several times a day."[13] Polischuk claimed that Ukrainian authorities have either failed to order Ukrainian forces to halt strikes against Russian energy facilities or that Ukrainian forces are simply ignoring such an order and insinuated that the Ukrainian government may not be in full control of the Ukrainian military. Polischuk's and Peskov's statements reinforce the Kremlin's effort to portray Russia as open to negotiations and committed to honoring agreements, while portraying Ukraine as the intransigent party. ISW continues to observe instances in which Russian actions and official statements contradict this professed willingness to engage in good faith negotiations, even as Ukrainian officials consistently emphasize their openness to dialogue and their readiness to offer compromises in future peace agreements.[14]

Russian forces conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100 casualties. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck the center of Sumy City with two missiles on the morning of April 13, killing at least 34 civilians and injuring at least 118.[15] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported that elements of the Russian 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 448th Missile Brigade (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) launched the two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles that struck Sumy City from near Liski, Voronezh Oblast and Lezhenki, Kursk Oblast.[16] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Russian missiles were equipped with cluster warheads.[17] Images and footage of the aftermath show fires, casualties, and extensive damage in central Sumy City.[18] The BBC Russian Service reported that Russian forces struck the Sumy State University’s Congress Center and noted that locals reported that the Congress Center hosts various classes and clubs, including classes for children.[19]

US Special Envoy for Ukraine and retired General Keith Kellogg condemned the Russian ballistic missile strike against Sumy City and stated that the strike “crosses any line of decency.”[20] US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink acknowledged that Russian forces used ballistic missiles equipped with cluster warheads against Sumy City and expressed condolences.[21] UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, European Council President Antonio Costa, European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas, EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarina Maternova, French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, Spanish Ambassador to Ukraine Ricardo Lopex-Aranda, the Irish Embassy in Ukraine, and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and a host of other Western officials condemned the Russian strike against Sumy City.[22]

Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on April 12 that the Russian military command is using a "thousand cuts" tactic against Ukraine to the detriment of Russian forces and complained that deploying poorly equipped and poorly trained Russian infantry to attack Ukrainian defensive positions only results in marginal gains and heavy losses.[23] The milblogger argued that the Russian military command is attempting to present high manpower and materiel losses as necessary by falsely portraying the preceding combat engagements as evidence of Russia‘s coordinated "grinding" down of Ukrainian defenses.[24] The milblogger claimed on April 12 and 13 that the Russian military command is ignoring the fact that Russian forces are facing shortages of materiel necessary for offensive operations, which contributes to issues conducting assaults and to the failure of small group assaults along the frontline in Ukraine.[25] The milblogger claimed that frontline Russian commanders are under significant pressure from their superiors to conduct more infantry assaults, do not have sufficient time to plan new assault routes, and that some frontline commanders order assaults simply to be able to report something back to their superiors. ISW previously assessed that these grinding assaults will likely degrade available Russian manpower and materiel significantly enough that Russian forces will have to decrease offensive tempo on lower-priority sectors of the front.[26] The milblogger speculated that Russian forces are in a self-perpetuating cycle, where poorly trained infantry killed or injured in failed assault attempts are replaced with similarly poorly trained infantry, who are again sent into doomed assaults.[27] The milblogger’s claims reflect the general trend of slowing Russian advances along the frontline recently and highlight some of the critical issues that Russian forces will have to address if they intend to make significant territorial gains or conduct more sophisticated offensive operations in Ukraine in the future.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future.
• Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms.
• Russian officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue.
• Russian forces conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100 casualties.
• Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Borova, and Chasiv Yar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 12, 2025

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.[i] The Times reported on April 11 that Kellogg expressed support for a "partition" of Ukraine between European, Ukrainian, and Russian forces; the deployment of a European "reassurance force" in western Ukraine; and establishing an 18-mile-wide "demilitarized zone" along the current frontline.[ii] Kellogg clarified later on April 11 that he supports the presence of a "reassurance force" that does not include US troops to support Ukrainian sovereignty, but that none of his statements during the interview suggested "a partitioning of Ukraine."[iii] Kellogg noted that the Times misrepresented some of his statements referencing possible areas of responsibility (AORs) of a future European "reassurance force."

Kellogg's clarification regarding the deployment of a "reassurance force" in Ukraine's rear areas is consistent with several statements from Ukrainian and European leaders about a possible future peacekeeping contingent deployed to Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 9 that a putative peacekeeping contingent would not deploy to the frontline.[iv] European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on April 10 that a future peacekeeping contingent would be likely to deploy not to the frontline but rather deeper within Ukraine or even outside of Ukraine.[v] Bloomberg reported on April 10 that UK Defense Secretary John Healey and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated that the Coalition of the Willing aims to develop more detailed plans within the next two weeks about how the coalition will help secure Ukrainian airspace, coastline, and land.[vi] People familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that the coalition hopes that the United States will agree to "backstop" any future European deployments to Ukraine with air power, border surveillance, and intelligence.

Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik responded to Kellogg's statements on April 12 and reiterated the Kremlin's objection to the presence of any peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine following a possible future ceasefire or peace agreement because a peacekeeping force would preserve the "level of toxicity" that supposedly prompted Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[vii] Russian state-owned and pro-state media widely amplified Miroshnik's statement.[viii] Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the idea of a possible future peacekeeping force in Ukraine or any European involvement in post-war Ukraine.[ix] Miroshnik's accusation of "toxicity" in Ukraine is an indirect reference to the Kremlin's continued demands that any conclusion to the war in Ukraine must address Russia's so-called "root causes" of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[x] Russian officials frequently directly invoke these "root causes" to justify Russia's continued war effort and pre-war demands amounting to total Ukrainian capitulation, and Miroshnik's April 12 statement is an indirect restatement of this concept.[xi]

Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025. Russian forces conducted notably larger strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025 but have launched strike packages more comparable to trends last observed in January and early February 2025, albeit using fewer missiles, in recent weeks. Russian forces notably conducted no strikes against Ukraine on April 7 - the day after conducting their largest strike in over a month on April 6 — but have since resumed daily strikes.[xii] Russian officials have thus far refused to engage with or have outright rejected the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff presumably proposed to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting on March 13.[xiii] The proposed long-range strikes ceasefire on energy infrastructure would not require Russia to cease all long-range drone and missile strikes, but the proposed general ceasefire along the current frontline and in the air and sea would likely require Russia to end all strikes on Ukraine. Russian forces are likely delaying negotiations on a general ceasefire in order to continue making gains along the frontline in Ukraine and continue devastating long-range strikes against Ukrainian defense industrial and civilian areas in order to intimidate civilians and undermine Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.

Russian forces have reportedly adjusted their long-range strike tactics in recent weeks, likely as part of an effort to inflict significant damage with strike packages of sizes similar to those they had been using earlier in the year and to intimidate Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian sources and German outlet BILD reported in late March and early April 2025 that Russian forces are loitering long-range drones at high altitudes several kilometers from large Ukrainian cities and other targets before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones.[xiv] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are flying Shahed drones in the densest possible formations in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and that Russian forces concentrate a group of 10 to 15 Shahed drones outside of a city before striking the city. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on April 6 that Russian forces are constantly modernizing their Shahed drones, ballistic missiles, and strike tactics, complicating Ukrainian forces' ability to shoot them down.[xv] Russian forces previously launched Shahed long-range drones in a series of waves against various targets each night, and this reported effort to operate drones in denser formations suggests that Russian forces believe this new tactic will overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses more effectively.

People's Republic of China (PRC) military officials reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare amid reports that at least 155 Chinese nationals are fighting in Ukraine. An unnamed former Western intelligence official told Reuters in an article published on April 11 that the PRC authorized an unspecified number of PRC military officers to visit the frontline in Ukraine alongside the Russian military to gain tactical insights from the war in Ukraine but did not specify when these visits may have occurred.[xvi] ISW cannot independently verify this report. Two unnamed US officials familiar with US intelligence and the former Western intelligence official told Reuters that roughly 100 to 200 Chinese nationals are fighting for the Russian military as "mercenaries" independent from the Chinese government. The sources further noted that the Chinese fighters appear to have minimal training and are not having any discernable impact on Russian military operations. ISW has observed reports that these Chinese nationals likely signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of their own accord rather than at the direction of PRC officials.[xvii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently reported that Ukrainian intelligence discovered that at least 155 Chinese nationals were fighting for the Russian military in Ukraine.[xviii] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian recently stated that the PRC MFA is unaware of the more than 155 Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine, however.[xix] The Guardian recently reported that Russian entities are actively operating recruitment campaigns across several Chinese social media networks, further suggesting that the PRC government may be aware of Russian military recruitment efforts targeting Chinese citizens and may be disinterested in combating these efforts.[xx]

Ukraine’s European partners announced additional military aid packages within the context of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on April 11 that Norway will provide 100 million euros (roughly $113 million) of financing for the United Kingdom’s (UK) 450-million-pound (roughly $588 million) drone and repair aid package to Ukraine.[xxi] The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on April 3 that it will provide Ukraine with an additional military aid package worth 6.7 billion Danish kroner (over $1 billion) between 2025 and 2027.[xxii] The Danish aid package will provide Ukraine with air defense, artillery systems, and ammunition, support the drone and information technology (IT) coalitions, and support the development of a financial framework for Ukraine’s Air Force.[xxiii] Norwegian Defense Minister Tore Sandvik stated that Norway will allocate an additional 10 billion Norwegian kroner (roughly $938 million) for joint Norwegian-Baltic training and provisioning of a new Ukrainian brigade.[xxiv]

 Key Takeaways:

• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in the rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.
• Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12.
• Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025.
• People's Republic of China (PRC) military officials reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare amid reports that at least 155 Chinese nationals are fighting in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced additional military aid packages within the context of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11, 2025

Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on April 11 that Germany will provide Ukraine with four IRIS-T air defense systems, 33 missiles for the systems, 120 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 15 Leopard tanks, 14 artillery systems, and 130,000 155mm artillery shells.[1] Pistorius stated that Germany recently provided 30 Patriot missiles to Ukraine as well. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 11 that Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are establishing an electronic warfare (EW) coalition for Ukraine.[2] The UK MoD announced a military aid package worth 450 million pounds (about $588 million) drones, radars, and anti-tank mines.[3] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that Estonia will deliver 10,000 155mm artillery shells and 750,000 rations packages to Ukraine; Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated that the Netherland will provide 150 million euros (about $170 million) to strengthen Ukraine's air defenses; and Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced that Lithuania will allocate 20 million euros (about $22 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of ammunition.[4]

US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting would continue discussions about the war in Ukraine, that Putin would listen to the points that Witkoff delivers from US President Donald Trump, and that the meeting is a good chance for Russia to convey its "main concerns" to Trump via Witkoff.[6] Peskov claimed that the officials may discuss a future meeting between Trump and Putin and that Trump and Putin could "theoretically" have a phone call following the Putin-Witkoff meeting.[7] Peskov claimed that one should not "expect any breakthroughs" during the Putin-Witkoff meeting and that Russia and the United States are in the process of normalizing relations and "searching" for a way to settle the war in Ukraine.[8] Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting and the April 10 US-Russian bilateral meeting in Istanbul are not related but are "two different tracks with one common process."[9] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 11 that the Putin-Witkoff meeting is another step in the negotiating process toward a ceasefire and an "ultimate peace deal" in the war in Ukraine.[10] Dmitriev stated that his meeting with Witkoff was "productive."[11]

Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace settlement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on April 11, following a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) foreign ministers meeting in Almaty, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will have to accept territorial concessions and that it is "impossible" for Ukraine to return to its 1991 borders – Ukraine's internationally recognized borders.[12] Lavrov attempted to deflect blame for Russia's intransigence onto Zelensky and Ukraine's alleged mistreatment of Russian speakers in Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to explicitly demonstrate its unwillingness to make compromises and cede Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine as part of any future peace negotiations – in contrast to Ukrainian officials who have expressed their willingness to make territorial compromises in a future peace agreement.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin has even demanded that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy and claimed that Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts are "historically Russian lands."[14]

Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on April 11 that commercial air services between Russia and the United States should only resume as the "consequence" of the United States lifting sanctions imposed on Russian state-owned airline Aeroflot.[15] Lavrov claimed that the United States agreed to Russia’s proposal during talks in Riyadh on February 27, but that the United States has not taken any corresponding action. Lavrov’s recent statements demanding sanctions relief from the United States directly contradict CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev’s April 3 statements on Fox News that Russia is not requesting sanction relief and further showcases the Kremlin’s inconsistent messaging.[16]

Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will prioritize in Spring and Summer 2025. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa told Reuters on April 10 that Russian forces will likely intensify offensive operations in Ukraine in April and May 2025 and that Russia will continue to prioritize offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction in coming months.[17] Palisa noted that Russian forces could also attempt to advance near Kupyansk, Lyman, or Novopavlivka in eastern Ukraine or towards Zaporizhzia City in southern Ukraine but reiterated that he assesses that the Pokrovsk direction will be Russia's "absolute priority." A source in the Ukrainian General Staff told BBC's Ukraine Service on April 11 that Russian forces intend to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast and threaten Sumy City in the coming months.[18]

Russian forces are currently attempting to advance throughout the frontline in northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine, although Russian forces currently appear to be prioritizing the Toretsk and Novopavlivka directions. ISW recently noted that Russian forces appear to be pursuing several diverging tactical efforts in the Pokrovsk direction, and ISW is reorganizing the eastern axis section in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to account for the concerted Russian push towards Novopavlivka.[19] Russian forces also appear to be conducting a concerted offensive operation aimed at advancing further into northern Sumy Oblast in the direction of Sumy City after eliminating most of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast in March 2025.[20] ISW will continue reporting on Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and possible future activity along Ukraine's northern border in the new Northern axis section in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia's large-scale and long-term investments in Russia's navy and naval strategic nuclear forces. Putin held a meeting on April 11 to discuss Russia's development strategy for the Russian Navy through 2050.[21] Putin claimed that the Russian Navy plays a "vital role" in ensuring Russia's security and defense and in protecting Russia's national interests in the "World Ocean." Putin stated that one of Russia's priority tasks is to strengthen its naval strategic nuclear forces. Putin stated that Russia has allocated "significant funds" towards constructing 49 vessels in the past five years and that Russia has allocated 8.4 trillion rubles (about $100.9 billion) toward the construction of new vessels in the coming decade. Putin noted that Russia has introduced four Borei-A class nuclear submarines and four Yasen-M class nuclear submarines into the navy between 2020 and 2024.

Putin specifically highlighted the Zircon cruise missile, claiming that the missile has a range of over 1,000 kilometers and a speed of nearly Mach 10. Putin also called for Russia to develop ship-based unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned underwater and surface boats and to integrate these unmanned systems into a "single reconnaissance and strike [system], linked to [Russia's] satellite group." Russian forces have launched a limited number of Zircon cruise missiles in ground attack mode against Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces have successfully shot down some of the Zircon missiles.[22]

Russian forces recently executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war. The Associated Press (AP) reported on April 10 that it obtained a video from Ukrainian and Russian drones showing Russian soldiers executing Ukrainian POWs surrendering in Pyatykhatky (northwest of Robotyne).[23] Ukrainian officials reacted to the footage confirming the executions and reiterated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs are "systematic."[24] ISW observed a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs in violation of international law.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11.
• US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace settlement.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will prioritize in Spring and Summer 2024. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia's large-scale and long-term investments in Russia's navy and naval strategic nuclear forces.
• Russian forces recently executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian opposition media provided additional details regarding Russia's efforts to recruit Chinese citizens to serve in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian invasion.[1] Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine recently proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the potential US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[2] Zelensky stated that he recently told US President Donald Trump that Ukraine wants to buy at least 10 air defense systems to "help [Ukraine] after the end of the war" and that Ukraine will consider the provision of these air defense and weapons systems as a "security guarantee."[3] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[4]

Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of the energy strike ceasefire —despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement — demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which Ukraine and the United States have already agreed. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed without evidence on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in "Russian regions" 32 times between April 4 and 7.[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed without evidence on April 10 that Ukraine conducted 11 strikes against energy facilities in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts in the past day.[6] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in the Russian near rear and rear in occupied Ukraine, including in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly six kilometers from the frontline) and Holoprystanskyi Raion, Kherson Oblast (just south of the Dnipro River and inclusive of areas immediately on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River). It is unclear if frontline energy infrastructure in the Russian near rear and rear are covered under the strikes ceasefire as the terms of the agreement have not been published. ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are using the lack of a clearly defined and public ceasefire agreement to cast Ukraine as a disingenuous participant in the peace negotiation process.[7] Russian officials’ continued insistence that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire underscores the importance of a signed and publicly available ceasefire agreement that includes monitoring and adjudication processes -elements that will be even more important in the potential future ground ceasefire to which the United States and Ukraine have already agreed.

Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war. The US Department of State (DoS) reported that US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on April 10 to discuss the finalization of "an understanding to ensure the stability of diplomatic banking for Russian and US bilateral missions."[8] The US DoS stated that the US delegation reiterated concerns about the current Russian policy prohibiting the US Embassy in Moscow from employing local staff, which the United States sees as a barrier to the embassy's stable and sustainable staffing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 10 that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the US DoS would only discuss bilateral relations and would not discuss Ukraine.[9] Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev stated on April 10 that the United States and Russia agreed to measures to facilitate the movement of diplomats and accelerate the granting of diplomatic visas.[10] Darchiev also stated that the Russian delegation prioritized discussions about the return of confiscated Russian diplomatic property in the United States.[11] Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to discuss issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, even as US President Donald Trump continues efforts to achieve the temporary ground ceasefire upon which both the United States and Ukraine have agreed.[12] The talks in Istanbul suggest that Russia is using diplomatic engagements with the United States to distract from the war and to obfuscate its own disinterest in productive peace negotiations.

Russia is reportedly using social media and financial incentives to recruit Chinese nationals to voluntarily join the Russian military. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukrainian authorities have identified 155 Chinese citizens fighting with Russian forces in Ukraine but that there are likely many more.[13] Zelensky stated that Chinese nationals are fighting as part of the Russian 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD). Elements of the 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments are currently operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[14] Zelensky stated that Russian forces are posting advertisements on TikTok and other Chinese social networks to recruit Chinese citizens and that the Chinese nationals traveled to Moscow, where they underwent medical examinations and one to two months of military training before deploying to Ukraine.[15] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on April 9 that a Russian representative directly recruited one of the Chinese citizens, whom Ukrainian forces recently captured in Ukraine, in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and that the Chinese citizen signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) upon arriving in Moscow in February 2025.[16] The SBU reported that another captured Chinese citizen went to Russia for tourism in December 2024 and signed an MoD contract after seeing an internet advertisement offering two million rubles (about $24,000) for joining the Russian military. Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on April 9 that it viewed a Ukrainian intelligence document that stated that at least 163 Chinese citizens are serving in the Russian military as of early April 2025.[17] The Kyiv Independent reported that another document showed photos and passport details of 13 Chinese citizens fighting in the Russian military as of April 2. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian stated on April 10 that the PRC MFA is unaware of the more than 155 Chinese citizens fighting with Russian forces in Ukraine.[18]

Russian forces reportedly recently executed a wounded Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in the Lyman direction. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on April 8 that Russian sources published footage of two soldiers of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) executing a wounded Ukrainian soldier near Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman) recently on an unspecified date.[19] ISW has observed a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs in violation of international law.[20]

The Kremlin continues to use narratives it has historically used against Ukraine to set conditions to justify possible future aggression against Estonia. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Estonia of conducting a "hunt" against Orthodoxy, and the MFA amplified the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Holy Synod's accusations of Estonia's persecution and oppression against Orthodox followers.[21] The Russian MFA and ROC claims come after the Estonian Parliament on April 9 passed amendments to the Churches and Congregations Act that would legally force the Estonian Orthodox Church to sever its affiliation with the ROC — Moscow Patriarchate (MP).[22] ISW has extensively reported on the Kremlin's use of the ROC as a tool for its hybrid operations, particularly in occupied Ukraine and in former Soviet Union states, in order to repress religious freedom and promote pro-war and pro-Kremlin ideology.[23] The Kremlin has long been setting information conditions for hybrid operations against the Baltic states in the name of protecting Russian "compatriots abroad," including against religious-based persecution, and may seek to combine and intensify these rhetorical efforts should Estonia codify these amendments into law.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian invasion.
• Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of the energy strike ceasefire - despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement – demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which Ukraine and the United States have already agreed
• Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war.
• Russia is reportedly using social media and financial incentives to recruit Chinese nationals to voluntarily join the Russian military.
• Russian forces reportedly recently executed a wounded Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in the Lyman direction.
• The Kremlin continues to use narratives it has historically used against Ukraine to set conditions to justify possible future aggression against Estonia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities are preparing a dedicated position in Russian regional governments that will oversee veterans' affairs, and the federal government may include similar positions in the future.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 9, 2025

Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the near term without receiving significant reinforcements. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during an interview with Ukrainian outlet LB UA published on April 9 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in "all main directions" and begun offensive operations in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[1] ISW has observed gradual but consistent Russian gains and attacks along the Volodymyrivka-Zhuravka-Novenke line (north to northeast of Sumy City) in northern Sumy Oblast and ongoing Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions south of Sudzha in southern Kursk Oblast since early March 2025.[2] Russian forces made rapid advances in Kursk Oblast in early March 2025 as the United States temporarily paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine, but Russian gains slowed as Ukrainian forces retreated into Sudzha and later resumed use of HIMARS long-range strike systems.[3] Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Sudzha in mid-March 2025 but have continued to attack the remaining Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast while starting attacks into northern Sumy Oblast over the past month.[4]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 9 that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division and 83rd VDV Brigade recently seized Basivka (south of Novenke) and are attempting to advance towards Loknya (further south of Novenke) and interdict the H-07 Yunkivka-Sudzha highway.[5] Mashovets stated that unspecified Russian units are also attacking in the Volodymyrivka-Veselivka area (north of Sumy City) and are trying to advance toward and merge at the Russian salient near Basivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division and 11th VDV Brigade are attacking from Gogolevka and near Oleshnya (both west of Sudzha) in Kursk Oblast and the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border, and that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) with support from North Korean troops are pushing Ukrainian forces from any remaining positions near Guyevo and Gornal (both south of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed on April 8 and 9 that Russian forces have marginally advanced in eastern Oleshnya and southeast of Guyevo in Kursk Oblast.[6]

Mashovets estimated that there are roughly 62,000 to 65,000 Russian troops and border guards currently operating in Kursk Oblast, and Syrskyi estimated in January 2025 that Russian forces had concentrated roughly 67,000 Russian troops and 11,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast.[7] Russian forces have likely sustained some losses during intensified attacks in March and early April 2025, and ISW has observed several claims that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade redeployed from Kursk Oblast to Belgorod Oblast in order to respond to ongoing Ukrainian attacks in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.[8] The Russian military command does not appear to be significantly bolstering its force grouping in Kursk Oblast — which would be a leading indicator for a larger offensive operation against Sumy Oblast — and in fact appears willing to redeploy small numbers of troops away from the Sumy effort — suggesting that the command believes that it can achieve its operational goals with the forces it has already gathered in Kursk Oblast.

The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would not attempt to advance further into northern Sumy Oblast or attack Sumy City so long as Ukrainian forces maintained their salient in Kursk Oblast.[9] Recent Russian attacks into northern Sumy Oblast indicate that the Russian military command may attempt to capitalize on the collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast salient in order to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast or launch an offensive on Sumy City. Russian President Vladimir Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border.[10] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that Russia form a similar buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast in order to justify the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast in March 2024, and Putin's statement indicates that the Russian military command is either considering or actively working towards creating a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast.[11]

Putin likely intends to use a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast and an offensive towards Sumy City to justify expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory. Russian officials are currently demanding that Ukraine cede unoccupied territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of a future peace agreement to end the war, and Russian officials have previously claimed that Mykolaiv Oblast (which Russia occupies a miniscule part of on the Kinburn Spit) and Kharkiv Oblast (which Russian occupies limited areas of) are "historically Russian lands."[12] Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast and pressure on Sumy City to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations. The Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is unlikely to be sufficiently combat capable to seize a major Ukrainian city after eight months of combat operations unless it receives significant reinforcements from another frontline area — which would require Russia to abandon a major operational effort in another area of Ukraine and possibly leave that area vulnerable to Ukrainian forces — and is therefore unlikely. Russian forces likely intend to establish a limited and defensible "buffer zone" in northern Sumy Oblast and advance within artillery range of Sumy City in order to pressure the city and make it uninhabitable for civilians. The Russian military command may also intend to establish limited, defensible positions in northern Sumy Oblast and then transfer these forces to reinforce other operational efforts in Ukraine, although the informational and political pressure that a push on Sumy City could generate may be more enticing for Putin than advances in other frontline areas.

Russia continues to utilize North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not yet observed indications that North Korean troops are operating as combat forces in Ukraine. Syrskyi stated that Ukraine has observed at least two waves of North Korean forces training and replenishing their forces, presumably on the frontline or in near-rear areas, and that North Korean forces continue to operate against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast.[13] Syrskyi noted that North Korean forces are improving their training, weapons, and equipment after suffering significant losses in battle and that North Korean forces have "effectively switched to the standards of the Russian military." Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that up to four "brigades" of North Korean forces — which Mashovets reported as roughly equivalent to two motorized rifle brigades — are operating in Kursk Oblast.[14] Mashovets reported that Russian forces either use North Korean forces to reinforce Russian assault units or allocate North Korean forces to separate areas for operations in their regular units, usually at the company to battalion levels. The presence of North Korean forces in occupied Ukraine or on the frontline within Ukraine would be a notable inflection in the degree of North Korean participation in the war. North Korean forces fighting in Ukraine itself would likely mark a decision point for Western and Pacific countries concerned about North Korean escalation in the war in Ukraine and the continued combat experience North Korean forces gain fighting alongside Russian forces.[15]

Syrskyi stated that there are currently 623,000 Russian military personnel fighting against Ukraine.[16] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025 to 623,000 just over three months later. Syrskyi attributed these recruitment numbers to the financial incentives that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian federal subjects have offered to Russians who sign contracts with the Russian MoD. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on March 3 that there were 620,000 Russian soldiers operating against Ukraine and that there were about 580,000 Russian soldiers operating against Ukraine in November 2024.[17]

Syrskyi also spoke about Ukraine's efforts to further develop its tactical and long-range drone capabilities. Syrskyi stated that Ukraine has developed long-range strike drones with ranges of over 1,700 kilometers and noted that a Ukrainian drone recently struck a Russian Tu-22M3 long range bomber worth $100 million as it landed at a Russian airbase after a combat operation. Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces have also developed tactical fiber-optic strike drones with a range of up to 20 kilometers and that Ukraine plans to scale up production of these drones over the next one to three months (until about July 2025). Syrskyi noted that Ukraine continues to develop its Unmanned Systems Forces and that Ukrainian brigades are integrating drone units. Ukrainian frontline and long-range drones are crucial parts of Ukraine's defensive capabilities, and Ukrainian forces have leveraged these drones to defend against Russian offensive operations and inflict significant economic cost on Russia's war effort.[18] Syrskyi noted that long-range Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition arsenals forced Russian forces to roughly halve the number of artillery shells fired in Ukraine daily to around 20,000 and that Russian forces currently fire 27,000 to 28,000 artillery rounds per day. ISW has also observed Russian milblogger complaints that frontline Ukrainian drone operations have blunted recent Russian offensive operations south of Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and strikes have inflicted heavy Russian vehicle losses throughout 2024.[19]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) denied sending military personnel to fight in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports of Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian stated on April 9 that the PRC did not deploy military personnel to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, emphasizing that the PRC consistently urges its citizens to avoid involvement in armed conflicts.[20] Lin noted that the PRC is currently verifying the situation with Ukrainian authorities. Lin's statement comes amid official Ukrainian reports on April 8 that Ukrainian forces captured several Chinese "fighters" who were fighting for Russia near Bilohorivka (east of Siversk) and Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent attacks and that there are likely more PRC citizens in the Russian military.[21] A Ukrainian brigade confirmed on April 9 that its soldiers were responsible for capturing the PRC citizens fighting in Ukraine.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the near term without receiving significant reinforcements.
• The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future.
• Russia continues to utilize North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not yet observed indications that North Korean troops are operating as combat forces in Ukraine.
• Syrskyi stated that there are currently 623,000 Russian military personnel fighting against Ukraine.
• Syrskyi also spoke about Ukraine's efforts to further develop its tactical and long-range drone capabilities.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) denied sending military personnel to fight in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports of Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian federal government and Russian federal subjects are increasingly focused on veteran rehabilitation and reintegration.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 8, 2025

Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several areas of Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces captured several Chinese "fighters" who were fighting for Russia near Bilohorivka (east of Siversk) and Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent attacks and that Ukrainian intelligence indicated that there are "significantly more Chinese nationals" in the Russian military.[1] Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces came into contact with a group of six Chinese fighters during several recent attacks and captured two. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the Chinese charge d'affairs in response to the incident.[2] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce characterized the Chinese nationals' involvement as "disturbing" on April 8 and stated that "China is a major enabler of Russia" that "provides nearly 80 percent of the dual use items Russia needs to sustain the war."[3]

ISW has observed reports of various unspecified Russian entities recruiting vulnerable migrant workers into the Russian military to fight in Ukraine both in Russia and abroad. Indian authorities revealed in 2024 that unspecified Russian entities were managing a human trafficking network that lured Indian citizens to Russia under false pretenses and then coerced them into signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to fight in Ukraine.[4] Indian and Russian authorities partnered to repatriate Indian citizens who had involuntarily joined the Russian military in October 2024, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) could demonstrate that its government was not involved in the participation of its citizens in this war by undertaking a similar effort in the future.[5] Beijing has not yet offered any formal response to these reports.

Russian and US authorities announced a second round of US-Russia bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions but not on discussing the ceasefire agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in Istanbul on April 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on April 8 that Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter will lead their respective delegations and that the meetings will follow the same format as the February 27 meeting.[6] Unnamed diplomatic sources told Russian outlet RBK that the discussions will be held on April 10.[7] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce confirmed that the bilateral discussions will occur on April 10 and will solely focus on normalizing US and Russian diplomatic operations and that discussions about Ukraine are not on the agenda.[8] The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its refusal to substantively engage with the United States on proposed ceasefire agreements and future peace negotiations in Ukraine.[9]

Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction, but Ukrainian drone operations and localized counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances in the area. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on April 7 that Russian forces are trying to cut the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Pokrovsk, bypass Pokrovsk from the west, and attack in the Novopavlivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) direction.[10] Russian forces are making limited gains northeast of Pokrovsk toward the T-0504 highway and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka but appear to be struggling to advance immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk — where Ukrainian forces have focused most of their counterattacks in February, March, and early April 2025.[11]

Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support both the ongoing Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the east and west and the effort to pressure Kostyantynivka from the south by advancing along the T-0504 highway and eliminating the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.[12] The Russian military command reportedly introduced additional units to offensive operations east and northeast of Pokrovsk in early 2025, but Russian forces have only made marginal gains toward Kostyantynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent months. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Russia redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) in January 2025 and elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) to the area in February 2025.[13] The Russian military command likely intended to leverage these units and elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) in Toretsk to exploit anticipated Russian breakthroughs in these areas and make significant advances towards Kostyantynivka.[14] Russian units previously operating in these two areas failed to breakthrough Ukraine's defense and culminated as the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions arrived near Vozdvyzhenka and in Toretsk respectively, however, prompting the Russian military command to prematurely introduce the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions into combat in order to maintain their operational tempo in these areas. Russian forces have not made significant advances northeast of Pokrovsk as a result and only advanced five to seven kilometers north of Vozdvyzhenka over the last two months. Russian forces recently advanced beyond the western outskirts of Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil, and Russian forces may allocate additional troops and reprioritize offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk if Russian forces begin to make more significant advances from Toretsk toward Kostyantynivka.[15]

The situation immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk remains extremely dynamic amid intensified Russian offensive operations and localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction in mid-March 2025 aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk and seizing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) but have not made significant advances since late Fall 2024 due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area.[16] Geolocated footage published on April 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and additional geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northeastern Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[17] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone detachment operating in the area stated on April 8 that Russian forces are attacking "non-stop" in the Pokrovsk direction and occasionally attack with armored vehicles.[18] Ukrainian forces began localized counterattacks and made marginal advances south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Pishchane and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Nadiivka in late January and early-to-mid February 2025.[19] Ukrainian forces have not been able to establish enduring positions in the area, however, and Russian forces have slowly retaken most of Ukraine's marginal advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk in recent weeks. Ukrainian forces are continuing to conduct sporadic, localized counterattacks in the area, likely in an effort to complicate Russian advances and threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Russian salient immediately southwest of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian tactical group operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 8 that Russian forces recently conducted a company-sized mechanized assault near Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) in an attempt to seize Bohdanivka, Troitske, and Horikhove (all west of Yasenove) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks, two armored personnel carriers, four all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), four motorcycles, and 50 Russian troops during the assault.[20] Additional geolocated footage published on April 7 shows that Ukrainian forces repelled another company-sized Russian mechanized assault near Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk) on April 6 and damaged three armored vehicles and five tanks during the assault.[21] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 8 that Russian forces have recently begun using more armored vehicles in the area but have also resorted to using motorcycles and golf carts to make advances.[22] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated on April 2 that Russian equipment losses have tripled in the area since the start of negotiations (likely referring to mid-February 2025).[23] Russian forces have advanced marginally closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk administration border as a result of mechanized assaults in the area in recent weeks, particularly west of Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk), but Russian forces have not advanced the remaining three kilometers into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as of this report.[24]

Russian forces have only made marginal advances throughout the Pokrovsk direction due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces. The Russian military command has historically struggled to conduct and connect multi-directional offensive operations in Ukraine, and Ukrainian drone operations are further complicating this effort. Russian milbloggers have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian drones have low altitude air superiority and are forcing Russian forces to conduct rotations on foot over 10 kilometers and complicating Russian supplies of ammunition, water, and gasoline.[25] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are preventing Russian forces from operating more than three kilometers north and west of Selydove (currently 10 kilometers south and 30 kilometers east of the frontline) and that Ukrainian drones are monitoring and restricting access to all roads in this direction.[26] A Ukrainian battalion command operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported in February 2025 that Ukrainian drone operators hold some areas of their defense lines in the Pokrovsk direction almost completely independently from infantry support.[27] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian drone operations have been key in defending against Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and throughout the frontline over the last year, although Ukraine must address its morale, force generation, and training issues to completely stall the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast.[28]

Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and thousands of troops attacking towards Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town. Ongoing Russian offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka highlight Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to seize all of Ukraine through military means at whatever cost if he cannot do so through negotiations. Trehubov estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces were losing 14,000 to 15,000 casualties, including roughly 7,000 killed in action (KIA), each month in the Pokrovsk direction — suggesting that Russian forces lost up to 45,000 casualties in the Pokrovsk direction in the first three months of 2025.[29] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces have lost over 15,000 Russian KIA in Toretsk since mid-July 2024 and estimated that Russian forces have lost over 50,000 total casualties in this direction.[30] ISW previously reported that Russian forces had lost at least five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion as of early October 2024, and Russian forces have only sustained further losses over the last six months.[31] ISW has previously assessed that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term.[32] Russian forces temporarily fielded fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction in late 2024, likely in response to concerns about dwindling armored vehicle supplies, although the recent uptick in Russian armored vehicle use in these areas highlights Russia's desperation to make further gains at any cost. Future Russian attacks on and into Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka would only generate greater manpower and materiel losses if the Russian military is even capable of conducting such operations after having suffered significant armored vehicle and personnel losses over the last three years of fighting.

Putin and the Russian military command appear determined to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka despite these losses, however. Ongoing Russian attacks towards Kostyantynivka from several directions highlight Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the fortress belt, despite the fact that an offensive operation against the wider Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely take Russian forces several years to complete, assuming that the West continues to provide aid to Ukraine.[33] ISW previously assessed that Russian commanders are likely willing to undertake these long-term operations because they are operating under the assumption or with direct knowledge that Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future.[34] Putin has previously articulated a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely and has repeatedly indicated that he has no interest in a resolution of the war on any terms but those he dictates.[35] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual Threat Assessment assessed in March 2025 that Putin remains committed to pursuing Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means.[36] ISW continues to assess that Putin has no interest in ending the war and intends to continue fighting until he accomplishes his objectives in Ukraine, which are the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and the categorical destruction of the Ukrainian military.[37]

Russian forces renewed long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 7 to 8 following a brief pause on April 6 to 7.[38] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 46 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Primorsko-Aktarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[39] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed nine drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 31 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian sources reported that the Iskander-M missile struck a recreation center in Vysoky, Kharkiv Oblast.[40] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also struck Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts.[41]

Russian forces continue to innovate with long-range Shahed strike drone tactics to maximize the impact of strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian military journalist and aviation expert Vadim Kushnikov gave an interview to Ukrainian outlet Suspilne published on April 8 noting that Russian forces are now attempting to fly Shahed drones in the densest possible formations to hit targets simultaneously, whereas Russian forces previously dispersed Shahed drones widely to make it more difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept the drones.[42] Kushnikov stated that Russian forces will concentrate a group of 10 to 15 Shahed drones outside of a city before striking the city, and that Russian forces launch a set number of drones, accumulate them in a group, and fly the drones along a set route in that formation. German outlet BILD recently reported that Russian forces have altered their strike drone tactics and are loitering drones several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones.[43] Kushnikov stated that Russian forces have also increased the number of drone launch sites from three to five and are focusing on Ukrainian targets closer to the border in northeastern Ukraine, giving Ukrainian air defenses less time to react and intercept the drones. Kushnikov noted that Ukrainian forces are developing countermeasures against Russian drone strikes, including using first person view (FPV) drones as interceptors along with combat lasers. Russian forces may be leveraging increased Shahed production rates to facilitate denser and more focused strike tactics as part of ongoing Russian efforts to innovate their long-range strike packages.[44]

European states continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Prime Minister's Office announced on April 7 that Norway will provide four billion kroner (approximately 365.3 million USD) in grants to Czechia's artillery ammunition initiative for Ukraine in 2025, as well as one billion kroner to the European Peace Facility (EPF) financing mechanism.[45] The Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever stated on April 8 that the Belgian government will allocate one billion euros to Ukraine in 2025.[46] De Wever also stated that Belgium will deliver two F-16s to Ukraine in 2025 to be used for spare parts and will deliver at least two operational F-16s to Ukraine in 2026.[47] De Wever stated that Ukrainian and Belgian military industrial companies signed four unspecified contracts and that Belgian entities are interested in starting the production of unspecified weapons in Ukraine.[48]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced an initiative ostensibly aimed at securing medical treatment and rehabilitation for wounded Russian troops, but the MoD may weaponize this initiative against wounded servicemembers in practice. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov signed a decree on April 8 ordering the establishment of mobile medical commissions to examine wounded Russian forces in frontline positions and identify soldiers requiring treatment and rehabilitation.[49] The Russian MoD noted that the mobile medical commissions will include senior medical specialists, surgeons, therapists, neurologists, and nurses. Russian authorities may be introducing this initiative to portray that the MoD is working to resolve long-standing front-line issues related to the pervasive allegations of abuse of wounded Russian personnel.[50] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian military command is currently forming a battalion of mobilized prisoners with incurable diseases to conduct future assaults in the Zaporizhia direction.[51] Ukrainian officials have repeatedly reported that the Russian military command is sending wounded and medically unfit soldiers on assaults to draw Ukrainian fire and expose Ukrainian positions before better trained Russian forces attack.[52] Belousov could issue an order to stop all such abuses if the Russian MoD prioritized addressing this issue. The Kremlin may also be attempting to mitigate budgetary concerns by centralizing control over medical evaluations for wounded servicemembers and possibly limiting the number of future veterans of the war in Ukraine who qualify for state support.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several areas of Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian and US authorities announced a second round of US-Russia bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions but not on discussing the ceasefire agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in Istanbul on April 10.
• Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction, but Ukrainian drone operations and localized counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances in the area.
• Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support both the ongoing Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the east and west and the effort to pressure Kostyantynivka from the south by advancing along the T-0504 highway and eliminating the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
• The situation immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk remains extremely dynamic amid intensified Russian offensive operations and localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area.
• Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces have only made marginal advances throughout the Pokrovsk direction due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces.
• Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and thousands of troops attacking toward Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town. Ongoing Russian offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka highlight Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to seize all of Ukraine through military means at whatever cost if he cannot do so through negotiations.
• Russian forces renewed long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 7 to 8 following a brief pause on April 6 to 7.
• Russian forces continue to innovate with long-range Shahed strike drone tactics to maximize the impact of strikes against Ukraine.
• European states continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced an initiative ostensibly aimed at securing medical treatment and rehabilitation for wounded Russian troops, but the MoD may weaponize this initiative against wounded servicemembers in practice.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Kremlin is considering passing a bill that may incentivize volunteer recruitment for conscription-age men ages 18 to 30 years old.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 7, 2025

The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim that Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and demilitarization. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin supports the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine but claimed that several issues "are hanging in the air."[1] Peskov claimed that these issues include the "lack of control" over the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian government's alleged inability to control the actions of unspecified extremist and nationalist units that "simply do not obey" the Ukrainian government's orders. Peskov claimed that these units are connected to "plans for the further militarization" of Ukraine. Peskov is promoting Putin's March 28 narrative falsely claiming that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and incapable of combatting neo-Nazi groups, which Putin claimed have the "actual power in their hands."[2] These Kremlin statements are part of a broader effort to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy and repackage Russia's long-standing demands for regime change and demilitarization in Ukraine. Putin and other Russian officials previously temporarily paused promoting claims about Ukraine's alleged illegitimacy following Putin's phone call with US President Donald Trump on February 12, but later resumed these claims on March 28.[3] Trump recently expressed dissatisfaction with Putin's disparaging remarks attacking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and expressed a willingness to impose additional sanctions on Russia if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal."[4]

Ukrainian officials did not report any Russian long-range missile or drone strikes on the night of April 6 to 7 or during the day on April 7 following Russia's largest strike package in over a month on the night of April 5 to 6. It remains unclear why the Russian forces did not conduct any long-range strikes, after having done so daily since December 12, 2024.[5] Russia used the large-scale missile and drone strike series on the night of April 5 to 6 to experiment with its strike packages to increase their effectiveness, and Russia may be preparing to conduct another large-scale strike package in near future.[6]

Ukraine's European allies continue to ramp up domestic materiel production and address shortages inhibiting artillery ammunition production. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on April 7 that the company will acquire and repurpose German nitrocellulose producer "Hagerdorn-NC" for weapons production as part of ongoing efforts to increase Rheinmetall’s capacity for manufacturing ammunition propellants, particularly for 155mm artillery shells.[7] Nitrocellulose, also known as guncotton, is a crucial component of propellants for modern artillery ammunition and other munitions that use gunpowder.[8] Rheinmetall currently produces nitrocellulose at facilities in Switzerland, Spain, and South Africa and plans to increase its production of gunpowder by over 50 percent by 2028.[9] Rheinmetall subsidiary Nitrochemie Aschau — which produces nitrocellulose, other gunpowder components, and dynamite — has increased its production capacity by 60 percent since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and plans for another 40 percent increase by mid-2025.[10] Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger and Saab CEO Micael Johansson warned in April 2024 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) supplied an overwhelming majority of European ammunition components, including those necessary for nitrocellulose, resulting in bottlenecks inhibiting European artillery ammunition production.[11] Bloomberg reported in March 2025 that Rheinmetall expanded its sourcing of cotton linters — a key component for nitrocellulose production that faced a critical shortage in Spring 2024 — from Europe and countries friendly to the European Union (EU) and built up a stockpile of several years' worth of linters.[12] NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte told CBS News on April 7 that he has urged US and European leaders to ramp up defense spending and defense industrial production amid concerns of future Russian aggression against Europe.[13] Rutte noted that NATO states combined manufacture four times fewer ammunition rounds than Russia manufactures on its own, despite the fact that NATO’s combined economy is 20 times larger than Russia’s.

Russian authorities likely facilitated the removal of a prominent Russian insider source from Telegram as part of continued efforts to crack down on the Russian information space. Russian insider channel VChK-OGPU-Reserve claimed on April 7 that Telegram administrators deleted the original VChK-OGPU channel and several other channels at the behest of Russian authorities.[14] The other affected channels reportedly include pro-Ukrainian channels and channels publishing information about Kursk Oblast and migrants in Russia — two topics the Kremlin has previously sought to censor.[15] Telegram denied taking down the VChK-OGPU channel and stated that the channel's administrators deleted their own channel.[16] Other Russian sources claimed that only Telegram has the ability to take down the channel, and one milblogger claimed that the VChK-OGPU administrators may have fallen victim to a phishing scam — a claim which the VChK-OGPU-Reserve channel denied.[17] VChK-OGPU is reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement and has offered purported insights into Kremlin factional dynamics, internal assessments of Russian government policies, significant changes in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and leaks of information regarding the MoD and Russian military.[18] Russian authorities arrested an alleged administrator of VChK-OGPU in February 2023 and designated the VChK-OGPU channel a "foreign agent" in July 2024 at a time when the Kremlin was intensifying its effort to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels and take more direct control over the Russian information space.[19] The Kremlin, if responsible for the channel's removal, is likely aiming to exert control over the remaining facets of the Russian information space that publish criticisms of the Kremlin or information deemed sensitive. Many Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded positively on April 7 to the removal of the VChK-OGPU channel, demonstrating the extent to which the Kremlin has already coopted much of the ultranationalist information space and conditioned many milbloggers to accept and promote the Kremlin's censorship.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim that Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and demilitarization.
• Ukrainian officials did not report any Russian long-range missile or drone strikes on the night of April 6 to 7 or during the day on April 7 following Russia's largest strike package in over a month on the night of April 5 to 6.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to ramp up domestic materiel production and address shortages inhibiting artillery ammunition production.
• Russian authorities likely facilitated the removal of a prominent Russian insider source from Telegram as part of continued efforts to crack down on the Russian information space.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Belogorod Oblast and near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to militarize regional governments and society in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2025

The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 5 that Russian forces advanced 143 square kilometers in Ukraine in March 2025 as Ukrainian forces conducted successful tactical counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction.[1] The UK MoD reported that the rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased each month since November 2024, as Russian forces seized roughly 730 square kilometers in November 2024, 393 square kilometers in December 2024, 326 square kilometers in January 2025, and 195 square kilometers in February 2025.[2]

ISW has observed geolocated footage to concur in the assessment that the monthly rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased since November 2024.[3] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces in Ukraine gained roughly 627 square kilometers in November 2024, 569 square kilometers in December 2024, 427 square kilometers in January 2025, 354 square kilometers in February 2025, and 203 square kilometers in March 2025. The UK MoD likely uses a different methodology or sources to assess Russian advances in Ukraine, but the UK MoD's report is consistent with evidence ISW has observed of decreasing monthly Russian advances between November 2024 and March 2025. Ukrainian forces have conducted localized counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions in recent weeks, regaining lost positions in these areas and contributing to slowing Russian advances in Ukraine.[4]

Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and 6.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that preliminary data states that Russian forces launched nine Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft from the airspace over Saratov Oblast; eight Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; six Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; and 109 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, six Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, and 40 Shahed drones and that 53 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that five Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck Kyiv Oblast.[7]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on April 6 that Russian forces are changing their strike tactics and constantly modernizing their Shahed drones and ballistic missiles, complicating Ukrainian forces' ability to shoot them down.[8] Ihnat noted that the US Patriot air defense system is effective against ballistic missiles. Russian forces have repeatedly experimented with different strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and ensure that Russian missiles – particularly the ballistic missiles that are more difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to shoot down – are able to reach their intended targets.[9] Russian forces likely launched missiles and drones on the night of April 5 to 6 from various locations in the Black Sea, Russia, and occupied Crimea, as part of these experimentation efforts.

Ukrainian officials highlighted the fact that Russia is leveraging its naval vessels in the Black Sea to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine as Russia continues to stall the Black Sea moratorium on military operations that Ukraine and the United States have jointly proposed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 6 that Russian forces launched missiles from the Black Sea during the April 5 to 6 overnight strike and that Ukraine's partners have identified the Russian vessels and launch sites involved.[10] Zelensky stated that Russia has not agreed to the Black Sea moratorium on military operations in order to maintain its ability to strike Ukraine from the Black Sea. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Russia launched a total of 10 Kalibr cruise missiles from an unspecified frigate and submarine, marking the fourth time in the past four months that Russia has used ships to launch missiles at Ukraine.[11]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 25, after the United States and Ukraine first proposed the temporary Black Sea moratorium, that all Russian military vessels' movement "outside of [the] eastern part of the Black Sea" will constitute a violation of the spirit of this agreement.[12] It is unclear from where Russian forces launched the Kalibr missiles during the April 5 to 6 strike and where the boundary of the "eastern part of the Black Sea" lies. The United States, Ukraine, and Russia continue to negotiate the exact terms of a temporary moratorium in the Black Sea, as Russia continues to hold its moratorium talks with the United States hostage in an effort to extract sanctions relief from the West – a demand that European officials have refused and that is not necessary to implement the maritime truce.[13]

The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukraine as consistently violating the proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure without providing evidence, in stark contrast to the pattern of Russian reporting about successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the ceasefire proposal. Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), have consistently made detailed claims about Ukraine's alleged violations of the temporary ceasefire since the start of discussions about the ceasefire.[14] Russian officials repeatedly downplayed successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the start of discussions about the energy infrastructure ceasefire. Russian local and regional officials would previously often claim that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian drone strikes or that "debris" from downed drones damaged infrastructure facilities, despite geolocated footage showing hits or subsequent fires at energy infrastructure facilities in Russia, and would only occasionally admit to successful Ukrainian strikes when the resulting damage was high.[15]

ISW has neither observed local or regional Russian official reporting about Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure nor footage of such strikes that would corroborate the Russian MoD's or MFA's repeated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly denied Kremlin claims that Ukraine is striking Russian energy infrastructure. The Kremlin likely aims to undermine Ukraine's credibility and prolong ongoing negotiations about the energy infrastructure ceasefire, the Black Sea moratorium, and a frontline ceasefire.

Key Takeaways:

• The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and 6.
• Ukrainian officials highlighted the fact that Russia is leveraging its naval vessels in the Black Sea to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine as Russia continues to stall the Black Sea moratorium on military operations that Ukraine and the United States have jointly proposed.
• The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukraine as consistently violating the proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure without providing evidence supporting these claims, in stark contrast to the pattern of Russian reporting about successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the ceasefire proposal.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2025

European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte gave an interview to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 and stated that the "first level" of security guarantees for Ukraine should be the Ukrainian military, which Rutte stated is the "first line of defense in deterrence."[1] Rutte added that Ukraine's European partners, including France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, are also looking for ways to provide security guarantees to Ukraine following the conclusion of a peace agreement. The French General Staff similarly emphasized that the Ukrainian military is Ukraine's primary security guarantee for a lasting peace.[2] The French General Staff added that France and the UK will work to define and develop "reassurance operations" to deter Russia from future aggression after the implementation of a peace deal. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[3] Russian demands for Ukraine's "demilitarization" such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself against future Russian aggression are counter to US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. Delegations from the British and French general staffs met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian military leaders on April 4 and 5 in Kyiv to discuss details about how the first contingent of partner state forces could deploy to Ukraine.[4] Zelensky stated that the meetings resulted in "tangible details" about this possible deployment, established Ukraine's needs, and identified geographical vulnerabilities that may require support.[5] Zelensky stated that the group still needs to decide where the forces would deploy, their responsibilities, and their authority to respond in case of a breach of a future peace agreement.[6] Zelensky stated that it might take one month or longer to finalize additional details and that the group would meet weekly. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 that it is best to wait to deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine until after the conclusion of a peace agreement but that countries need to keep developing ideas now to implement after peace is achieved.[7]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables that are vital for Russian forces' fiber optic drones. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on April 5 that unspecified drones hit the Fiber Optic Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia.[8] Kovalenko stated that the plant produces materials for control, communication, and data transmission systems, including drone control in the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on April 5 shows an explosion and fire in Saransk.[9] The Fiber Optic Systems plant is the first and only plant manufacturing optical fiber in Russia.[10] A Russian insider source claimed that the plant produces all the Russian military's fiber optic cables.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones over the Republic of Mordovia overnight, and the Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov claimed that a drone struck an enterprise in the republic.[12] ISW cannot independently verify the damage to the Fiber Optic Systems plant, but successful Ukrainian strikes against the enterprise would likely reduce the Russian military's ability to supply troops with fiber optic cables to use with first-person view (FPV) drones on the battlefield.

Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on April 5 that sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that the SBU conducted drone strikes against the Promsintez enterprise in Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast on the night of April 4 to 5, causing at least 20 explosions and several fires.[13] The sources reported that Promsintez produces industrial explosives, including ammonal, ammonite, and granulite, and that the plant stopped operations after the strike. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed six drones over Samara Oblast overnight, and Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against an industrial enterprise in Chapayevsk, causing a fire.[14]

Ukraine's European partners continue to provide technical support to Ukraine. Reuters reported on April 4 that French commercial satellite communications provider Eutelsat CEO Eva Berneke stated that Eutelsat has been providing Ukraine with its high-speed satellite internet service for roughly one year funded by the German government.[15] Berneke stated that there are fewer than 1,000 terminals connecting Ukraine to Eutelsat's network but that Eutelsat hopes to increase the number of terminals to between 5,000 and 10,000 "within weeks." Eutelsat Spokesperson Joanna Darlington added that it is unclear whether the EU collectively or individual states will fund additional Eutelsat efforts for Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe.
• Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables that are vital for Russian forces' fiber optic drones.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to provide technical support to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2025

CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered. Dmitriev spoke with Fox News and Newsmax while visiting Washington, DC, and attempted to paint Russia as an attractive market for American investment, claiming that the Russian economy is strong and growing despite Western sanctions.[1] Dmitriev also claimed that Russia is ready to collaborate with the United States on unspecified projects involving the Arctic, rare earth minerals, and liquified natural gas (LNG). Dmitriev has recently been at the forefront of Kremlin efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russia mining projects and other avenues of economic and financial cooperation, as ISW previously reported.[2] Dmitriev notably claimed that Russia "is not asking for lifting of sanctions" and "not making any preconditions for specific sanction relief" in response to a question about whether Russia considers sanctions relief a necessary precondition to a ceasefire agreement.[3] The Kremlin, in contrast, has explicitly demanded sanctions relief from the United States as a precondition for entering into a Black Sea strikes ceasefire.[4]

Dmitriev made several other statements that diverge from recent statements by other Kremlin officials, for example, saying that "some security guarantees may be possible" for Ukraine.[5] ISW recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not accept Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine because their acceptance will represent a major concession, and the Kremlin has rejected the idea of making any concessions on its maximalist territorial and security demands from Ukraine.[6] Dmitriev's attempt to present Russia's interests in Ukraine as predominantly economic and financial is also disingenuous. Kremlin officials frequently make demands to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine (NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine) as preconditions for any sort of peace agreement.[7] The Kremlin's negotiating position has not changed despite Dmitriev's attempts to soften and deflect from Moscow's demands, and Dmitriev is attempting to use the promise of financial benefits to distract from the Kremlin's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 4 that the US is closely monitoring Russia's actions in Ukraine and hopes that Russia is "serious" about resolving the war rather than simply dragging out negotiations.[8] Rubio noted that, while the United States remains optimistic about facilitating a peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine, it will consider implementing additional sanctions against Russia and may reassess its role in the negotiations and its support for Ukraine if Russia proves to be "unserious" and undermines the negotiation processes. Rubio met Dmitriev on April 4 to convey this message directly.[9] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not genuinely interested in negotiations but is instead prolonging the negotiation process to extract concessions and maximize territorial gains, while it continues to pursue its maximalist ambitions of total Ukrainian capitulation rather than engaging in good-faith negotiations or offering compromises.[10]

A Russian ballistic missile struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 4, killing at least 16 people, including children.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the missile damaged residential buildings and a playground, amongst other civilian infrastructure.[12] Kryvyi Rih Military Administration Head Oleksandr Vilkul reported that the strike damaged 29 apartment buildings and damaged the gas supply to some nearby areas.[13] ISW previously noted that continued Russian strikes on Ukraine's critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy strikes are detrimental to the establishment of a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.[14]

Russia continues to employ strike packages predominantly comprised of drones amid reports that it is growing its missile stockpile. Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko noted in an April 2 report that Russia used 83 missiles in total throughout March 2024, the lowest number of missiles used in a month since February 2022.[15] Kovalenko assessed that Russian forces are focusing on singular, massive missile strikes accompanied by drone waves, an approach that has hindered Ukraine's ability to intercept incoming missiles. An analysis done by The Telegraph found that the number of Russian drone strikes against Ukraine rose by over 50 percent since February 2025 compared to January 2025, partially as a result of Russian efforts to use massive drone strikes to secure concessions from Ukraine during ongoing negotiations with the United States.[16] An unspecified NATO official stated on April 3 that NATO intelligence indicates that Russia is producing a significant number of missiles domestically and purchasing additional missiles from North Korea to increase missile stockpiles in preparation for future large-scale missile strikes against Ukraine.[17] These assessments are consistent with ISW's observation of recent Russian strike packages, which were composed predominantly of drones.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on April 4 that Russian forces launched 78 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai overnight on April 3 to 4.[18] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones over the northern, eastern, and central parts of Ukraine and that 22 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[19]

Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia signed two contracts with Chinese rail producers in January 2025 as part of efforts to support the development and repair of Ukrainian rail infrastructure. Ukrzaliznytsia announced the agreements on April 4 and reported that People’s Republic of China (PRC) producers will provide Ukrzaliznytsia with 32 thousand tons of rail, which is enough to build or repair about 245 kilometers of railway.[20] The first 16 thousand tons of rail are expected to ship from the PRC sometime in April and arrive within three months. Ukraine’s railway network spans about 19,772 kilometers.[21] These contracts are the result of Ukrzaliznytsia’s first open-bid competition since 2021 and indicate Chinese interest in some level of direct economic cooperation with Ukraine.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi had reiterated on April 1 that the PRC is willing to play a "constructive role" in ending the war in Ukraine, which is consistent with previous PRC efforts to pose as a neutral mediator despite its growing ties with Russia.[22] A Russian milblogger expressed frustration with the PRC's refusal to fully realize Moscow's desired "no-limits" partnership with the PRC on April 4, claiming that Ukraine is flaunting its cooperation with "Russia’s partner.”[23] The Russian milblogger also noted that this deal reflects PRC's "real" attitude towards Russia to be of a "nothing personal, just business" nature, and warned that Russia should not expect "self-sacrifice" from the PRC’s government.

Russia is reinforcing its strategic ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas in a concerted effort to enhance Russian influence in Africa. Russia, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso agreed on April 3 at an AES summit in Moscow to establish a strategic partnership and strengthen the recently established AES joint armed forces, making Russia the first country to recognize the trilateral joint forces established on July 6, 2024.[24] Russia and AES member states expressed a willingness to jointly combat regional instability and enhance ongoing counterterrorism efforts, with Russia agreeing to provide modern weapons and military training for a planned 5,000-strong joint force that will deploy to the central Sahel region.[25] Bloomberg reported on April 3 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia will utilize military instructors already in the area to conduct such training – likely referring to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Africa Corps, which transported large convoys of equipment into Mali via Guinea in 2025.[26] Russia and the AES also agreed to cooperate in the fields of infrastructure, trade, economics, investment, and banking.[27]

Russia's support for the AES is a long-term strategic endeavor aimed at advancing the Kremlin's geopolitical goals of undermining Western influence in Africa and threatening NATO's southern flank, as the Critical Threats Project's Africa File has routinely assessed.[28] Russia’s leading role in AES’s military training and weapons procurement may yield additional lucrative benefits in the form of either plausibly deniable illicit or legitimate resource concession agreements that would grant the Kremlin access to the energy- and mineral-rich region with potentially vast amounts of gold, uranium, and other valuable natural resources.

Key Takeaways:

• CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine.
• The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 4 that the US is closely monitoring Russia's actions in Ukraine and hopes that Russia is "serious" about resolving the war rather than simply dragging out negotiations.
• A Russian ballistic missile struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 4, killing at least 16 people, including children.
• Russia continues to employ strike packages predominantly comprised of drones amid reports that it is growing its missile stockpile.
• Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia signed two contracts with Chinese rail producers in January 2025 as part of efforts to support the development and repair of Ukrainian rail infrastructure.
• Russia is reinforcing its strategic ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas in a concerted effort to enhance Russian influence in Africa.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Russian military reportedly continues to expand its conventional force end-strength.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2025

Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy. Bloomberg reported on April 3, according to sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that the Kremlin is "counting on US President Donald Trump to deliver an acceptable peace deal in Ukraine," but is prepared to continue the war if it is not able to secure its goals through negotiations with the United States.[1] The sources also claimed that the Kremlin is not concerned by Trump's recent statement that the United States is willing to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire.[2] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual Threat Assessment stated that Russia is leveraging its control of the theater-wide initiative and ongoing political and information efforts amid negotiations to end the war in Ukraine to achieve significant concessions from Ukraine and the West.[3] The ODNI report assessed that Putin is "probably" more willing to incur the risks of a longer war than to agree to an end to the war that is unfavorable to Russia. The ODNI report further assessed that Putin "appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to prevail in what he sees as a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States, world history, and his personal legacy." The ODNI assessment that Putin remains committed to pursuing Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means is consistent with ISW's assessment that Putin is leveraging ongoing negotiations to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the West as part of its long-term pursuit of total Ukrainian surrender.[4]

Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible. The ODNI report assessed that Russia has suffered significant casualties in Ukraine and that Russia must contend with the poor quality of its new recruits.[5] The ODNI report assessed that the Russian economy is facing significant challenges as Russia continues to balance resource allocation between defense industrial production and civilian sectors. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated on April 3 that Russian forces have lost over 4,000 tanks in Ukraine.[6] Cavoli stated that Russia started the war with a total of 13,000 tanks and are "starting to approach near the end" of the viable tanks in storage. Cavoli noted that Russia has expanded its capability to produce shells, cruise missiles, and first-person view (FPV) drones and that Russia is preparing either to continue offensive operations in Ukraine or to launch a future campaign against a NATO member state. Cavoli stated that the war in Ukraine has "distorted" the Russian economy and "turbocharged" the Russian defense industry at the expense of Russia's civilian economic sector and that it may be difficult for Russia to "unwind" this imbalance. Cavoli assessed that Russia will be able to replace the significant personnel losses incurred in Ukraine ahead of a future conflict in Europe but noted that Russia's ability to replace materiel losses is contingent on Ukraine's ability to inflict greater losses. ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[7] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris Rotenberg.[8] The Treasury Department did not provide an explanation for lifting sanctions against Karina Rotenberg. Boris Rotenberg, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is the co-owner of the Stroygazmontazh group — Russia's largest construction company for gas pipelines and electrical power supply lines.[9] The US first sanctioned Boris Rotenberg in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy.
• Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible.
• The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris Rotenberg.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in Kursk and Belgorod and near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations that fought in Kursk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2, 2025

Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire.[1] Peskov claimed that Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire "essentially" and that Russia intends to discuss this with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that Russia forwarded a list of Ukraine's alleged ceasefire violations to US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian forces are "systematically" conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.[3] The exact contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not appear to have formally agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of strikes prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[4] It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate a temporary ceasefire that it has "not joined."

US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on April 1 that senior Trump administration officials have discussed the likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new plans to pressure Russia and Ukraine into an agreement.[5] The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that Putin is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement in Ukraine and used a series of meetings and calls over the weekend of March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump administration is considering levying additional tariffs and sanctions against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump believes that Putin is "slow-rolling" negotiations on a general ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the negotiating table.[6] Trump recently told NBC News that he is considering additional sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press conference on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire agreement.[7] ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic tools alone as Russia's ongoing and forecasted future economic struggles are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield.[8] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev's trip told CNN on April 1 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington, D.C., and sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to grant him a visa to visit the United States.[9] Sources told CBS on April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump administration has not published information about the meeting.[10] It is unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that Dmitriev's visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively responded to US reporting on his possible visit with "maybe."[11]

The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 2 that the Russian military command may be reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) such that both armies would have three “motorized” rifle divisions each.[12] The 51st CAA currently includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades. The 3rd CAA also includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 4th, 6th, 7th, 85th, 88th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades. Mashovets stated that some unspecified brigades in the 51st and 3rd CAAs are already staffed at levels significantly higher than a typical brigade, at least on paper.[13] Mashovets noted that the brigades are already operating at the front and have control over a number of other units – usually rifle or motorized rifle regiments and battalions – attached to the brigade. Mashovets stated that "it is assumed" that each of the new motorized rifle divisions in the 51st and 3rd CAAs will consist of two assault regiments, two "reinforcement" regiments, and an artillery regiment as well as organic logistics support units at the division-level, but that the divisions‘ are unlikely to have combat engineer or anti-aircraft missile units at the regimental level, as is normal for most Russian motorized rifle divisions. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to create the 1st, 110th, and 132nd motorized rifle divisions within the 51st CAA. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to form the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division on the basis of the 101st and 109th motor rifle regiments and plans to consolidate the 269th, 270th and 272nd rifle battalions into the 103rd Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that the only truly mechanized "motorized rifle" unit in the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division will be the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that it is unclear if each new division will include a tank regiment and that the situation with tanks "will be very tense," likely given Russia’s shortage of main battle tanks. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command may be making these changes to improve the organizational and staff structure in the 51st and 3rd CAAs in order to "streamline" their command and control processes. Mashovets stated that these changes are unlikely to significantly increase the number of troops in the CAAs or their combat capabilities beyond that of an army corps.[14] ISW has not observed other reports of the Russian military command restructuring the 51st and 3rd CAAs.

The Russian military command reorganized the 1st DNR AC and 2nd LNR AC into the 51st and 3rd CAAs, respectively, in Summer 2024 as part of wider efforts to integrate irregular forces into the Russian Armed Forces.[15] Elements of the 51st CAA are currently operating in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions, and elements of the 3rd CAA are currently operating in the Siversk and Chasiv Yar directions and in Belgorod Oblast.[16] The Russian military command has especially attempted to leverage elements of the 51st CAA in offensive operations in the Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions in recent months.[17] Most CAAs in the Russian military include less than three divisions, with only the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) including three divisions.[18] Mashovets’ report suggests that the Russian military does not seek to  equip the divisions of the 51st and 3rd CAAs  to a normal Russian motorized rifle division’s the full doctrinal end strength, suggesting that the restructuring is in response to specific command and control of force structure challenges afflicting the former DNR 1st and LNR 2nd Army Corps given their hasty reorganization into CAAs.[19]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces recorded 767 cases of Russian forces using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned under the CWC in March 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have used banned chemical agents a total of 7,730 times since February 2023.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms.
• US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2.
• The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2025

Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on April 1 that Russian forces shelled energy infrastructure in Kherson City on the morning of April 1, leaving at least 45,000 Kherson residents without electricity.[1] Sybiha stated on April 1 that Russian forces have recently violated the energy infrastructure ceasefire several times.[2] The ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes is reportedly a moratorium on long-range strikes, but it remains unclear whether the moratorium's terms prohibit striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Ukraine proposed a "temporary ceasefire in the sky" that would include "missile, bomb, and long-range drone" strikes.[4] US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for a temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure on March 25 but not provide details on whether the ceasefire is exclusively limited to longer-range weapons.[5] Russian forces will likely continue to leverage their positions along the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and other frontline areas to shell and destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure in near rear areas unless the energy infrastructure ceasefire includes provisions against such shelling. Russian shelling against Ukrainian energy infrastructure violates the spirit of the ceasefire and US President Donald Trump's intention to utilize the energy infrastructure ceasefire as a confidence-building measure to work towards a general ceasefire in the future. Ukrainian, Russian, and US officials have yet to formalize the ceasefire or present its exact terms.

Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on April 1 that the Trump administration is attempting "some kind of scheme" to first achieve a ceasefire and then move to "other models and schemes" to end the war.[6] Ryabkov further claimed that the Trump administration's plan to resolve the war in Ukraine does not address the "root causes" of the war and that Russia, therefore, cannot accept the US proposal. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[7] The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for the full capitulation of Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and long-term commitments of Ukrainian neutrality — the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently intensified efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine's role as a legitimate participant in discussions about the resolution of the war.[9] Putin and Russian diplomats made thinly veiled demands in late March 2025 for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).[10] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 31 that Trump did not appreciate Russia's suggestion to establish a "temporary administration" in Ukraine.[11] Bruce also noted that Trump understands that negotiations will "require both Russia and Ukraine to make tough decisions and compromises." Russia has so far refused to make any concessions and rejected the US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire when Trump called Putin on March 18.

Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months. Footage published on March 28 and geolocated on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and likely seized Novolyubivka itself.[12] Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Nove (west of Novolyubivka), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northwest of Novolyubivka).[13] Russian forces advanced across the Zherebets River onto the west (right) bank in early January 2025 and have slowly expanded their bridgehead on the right bank over the last three months.[14] Russian forces began efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their positions on the east (left) bank of the Zherebets River in late 2023 and have only recently established a relatively stable bridgehead from which Russian forces can launch further offensive operations.[15] Russian milbloggers and Mashovets have consistently credited elements of the Russian 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with making the initial advances onto the west bank and then expanding this bridgehead.[16]

Russian forces appear to be leveraging a significant manpower advantage to make advances in the area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 31 that Russian forces have almost exclusively conducted infantry assaults in the area since January 2025 and rarely use armored vehicles in the area.[17] ISW has also not observed footage of any notable Russian mechanized assaults in the area in 2025. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on March 31 that Russian forces intensified infantry attacks in the Lyman direction and have significantly more infantry in the area, mostly including well-trained contract servicemembers (kontraktniki).[18] Another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 24 that Russian forces have a 10-to-one manpower advantages over Ukrainian forces in some areas of this direction.[19] The Russian military command appears to be reinforcing and replacing manpower losses among frontline units of the 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions, as these formations have been in the area since at least 2023 and do not appear to have withdrawn for rest and reconstitution at any point.[20]

Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of Borova or Lyman in the coming months. Russian forces initially focused on advancing from Ivanivka towards Kolodyazi (southwest of Ivanivka) in the general direction of Lyman but recently appear to have refocused their efforts on advancing northwest of Ivanivka towards Nove and Katerynivka in the general direction of Borova.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 that Russian forces are attempting to connect their bridgehead near Novolyubivka with a smaller bridgehead on the west bank near Makiivka (approximately eight kilometers away).[22] Russian forces may be attempting to unite these bridgeheads to create a stable salient to support attacks southeast of Borova. Russian forces have recently struggled to advance east and southeast of Borova after advancing northeast of the settlement in January 2025, and the Russian forces may be creating the salient northeast of Lyman to support future offensive operations against the southern tip of the Novoserhiivka-Druzhelyubivka-Novyi Myr line (east to southeast of Borova).[23] The Russian military command may attempt to outflank Ukrainian defenses in these settlements in order to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw and enable Russian advances east of and into Borova in the coming months.

Russian forces may also attempt to leverage the expansion of the bridgehead on the west bank of the Zherebets River near Ivanivka to support future Russian operations to seize Lyman. Russian forces may attempt to advance toward Karlivka from Nove and toward Drobysheve from Kolodyazi in an effort to establish defensible positions along the Karlivka-Shandryholove-Drobysheve line (on the east bank of the Nitrius River). Russian forces could attempt to leverage such advances along the Nitrius River to challenge Ukrainian positions in Lyman from the northeast. Russian forces may also simultaneously attempt to intensify offensive operations near Torske (east of Lyman) to push on Lyman from the east. Further Russian advances towards Borova and Lyman are part of an enduring Russian effort to push Ukrainian forces from positions on the east bank of the Oskil River and attack further into western Kharkiv Oblast and set conditions to attack the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the north.[24]

Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces have been trying to seize the last one percent of Luhansk Oblast (about 266 square kilometers) since late November 2024. Russian forces first seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast on July 3, 2022, but Ukrainian forces later pushed Russian forces back from the Luhansk Oblast administrative border during Ukraine’s Fall 2022 counteroffensive.[25] Russian officials have long cited the seizure of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a goal of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and have repeatedly demanded international recognition of Russia’s annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as a condition of peace, although Russian forces do not fully control any of these oblasts.[26] The Kremlin would likely exploit the second seizure and retention of Luhansk Oblast to gain leverage during ongoing ceasefire negotiations and future peace negotiations, which ISW continues to assess as a key motivating factor for Russian forces recently intensified ground activity in Ukraine.[27] The Kremlin could also leverage the seizure of Luhansk Oblast as a significant victory to its domestic audience and to justify years of brutal personnel losses in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are intentionally stalling the ceasefire and peace negotiations in hopes of gaining more territory to leverage during future peace negotiations.[28]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 1 to raise salaries for Russian governors starting January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.[29] The delayed salary increase in 2026 likely seeks to further secure loyalty from regional leaders amid Russia's continued uncertainty about Russia’s future, in particular, Russia’s sustained war efforts and the Russian economy’s macroeconomic health. The decision to implement this change in 2026 as opposed to immediately could provide the Kremlin time to rebalance its budget and gather resources to sustain the spending increase, as the Russian government already approved Russia’s 2025 budget in late 2024. Putin signed a decree in December 2024 approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget, which would prioritize spending on Russia's national security and defense.[30] Putin did not sign such a decree sooner likely due to Russia's ongoing economic strain from the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia. Russia continues to face staggering costs required to maintain its war effort against Ukraine, with mounting economic strain, labor shortages, and systemic corruption threatening the sustainability of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire’s vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones.
• Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of Borova or Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 1 to raise salaries for Russian governors starting January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

Previous Updates

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