Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2025

November 19, 2025, 11pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on November 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia killed at least 26 Ukrainian civilians and injured at least 139 on the night of November 18 to 19 during its combined missile and drone strikes that disproportionately impacted civilian areas. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 40 Kh-101 cruise missiles, seven Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, and 476 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 300 were Shaheds — at Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 34 Kh-101 cruise missiles, seven Kalibr cruise missiles, and 442 drones, and that seven missiles and 34 drones struck 14 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that at least one Kh-101 cruise missile struck a high-rise apartment building in Ternopil City, killing at least 26 civilians and injuring at least 93 civilians.[2] Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported that there are still 26 people missing and suspected to be under the rubble in Ternopil City.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential areas, critical infrastructure, and public transport in Kharkiv City and Kharkiv Oblast with 18 Geran-2 (Shahed-type) drones, injuring at least 46 civilians.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck industrial and energy infrastructure in Lviv Oblast; energy infrastructure in Ivano-Frankivsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; and power lines in Khmelnytskyi Oblast.[5] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure forced Ukraine to introduce emergency power outages in several oblasts, as Russian strikes have forced Ukraine to do every night for several weeks.[6]

US and Russian officials reportedly drafted a 28-point peace plan that amounts to Ukraine's full capitulation and would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. Several Western media outlets reported on November 19 that US and Russian officials worked on a draft 28-point peace plan in Ukraine.[7] The preponderance of the Western reporting suggests that the peace deal would require Ukraine to: withdraw from the unoccupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; cap its military at 50 percent of its current strength; abandon "key categories of weaponry;" and that Ukraine would receive unspecified US security guarantees.[8] Some of the Western reporting suggests that the deal would: prohibit foreign troop deployments to Ukraine; prohibit Ukraine from receiving foreign long-range weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory; force Ukraine to make Russian an official state language; and force Ukraine to grant official status to the Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (ROC-MP), which is a Kremlin-controlled organization and known tool of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit.[9] The proposed peace plan reportedly stipulates that areas of Donbas from which Ukraine would withdraw would become a demilitarized zone.[10] The proposed peace plan would reportedly freeze the current frontline in southern Ukraine and stipulate that Russia will withdraw from some unknown territory "subject to negotiations." This Western reporting remains unconfirmed, and key Kremlin officials rejected reports of this peace plan.[11]

The reported proposed peace plan would deprive Ukraine of critical defensive positions and capabilities necessary to defend against future Russian aggression, apparently in exchange for nothing. ISW continues to assess that ceding the remainder of Donetsk Oblast to Russia and freezing the frontline in southern Ukraine would disproportionately favor Russia.[12] Donetsk Oblast contains land that is vital for Ukraine, including the Fortress Belt — Ukraine's main defensive line in the oblast since 2014 — and includes cities that are vital defense, industrial, and logistics hubs for Ukrainian forces.[13] Russia has attempted to seize Ukraine's Fortress Belt unsuccessfully for over a decade, and ISW continues to assess that a Russian effort to seize the Fortress Belt would likely take several years at Russia's current rate of advance.[14] The reported peace plan would give this significant land to Russia — apparently for no specified compromise — sparing Russia the time, effort, and manpower that it could use elsewhere in Ukraine during renewed aggression. Kremlin officials have previously stipulated that a withdrawal from Donbas would be the starting point rather than the result of ceasefire and peace negotiations, providing no guarantee of peace should Ukraine conduct such a withdrawal.[15] The Kremlin has given no indication that it is willing to consider peace talks or a peace deal before Ukraine has withdrawn from the remainder of Donbas.

A Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would also provide Russian forces with more advantageous positions from which to launch renewed pushes into southern Kharkiv Oblast and further into eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[16] Such a withdrawal would also set conditions for Russian forces to advance across the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces would likely seek to later threaten Kharkiv City from multiple fronts.[17] Freezing the frontline in southern Ukraine also presents Russian forces with an opportunity to rest and reconstitute for future pushes against Kherson or Zaporizhzhia cities, both of which the Kremlin and Russian officials have identified as objectives.[18] Russia would therefore have its choice of multiple, mutually supportive offensive operations to undertake should Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia and agree to freeze the frontline in southern Ukraine, especially if there is no meaningful security guarantee mechanisms to prevent future Russian aggression and if Ukraine concedes to Russia's demand of reduced military size and capacity.

This reported peace plan is fundamentally the same as Russia's 2022 Istanbul demands, which Russia presented to Ukraine when the circumstances on the battlefield appeared to favor Russia more heavily. Russia presented these demands to Ukraine in the first two months of the war when Russian forces were threatening Kyiv City from the north and northwest.[19] The frontline situation has significantly shifted since the 2022 Istanbul negotiations, though Russia's demands have not. Ukraine forced Russian forces to withdraw from northern Ukraine in April 2022, launched a counteroffensive and liberated significant swaths of Kharkiv Oblast in September to October 2022, and conducted a successful interdiction campaign in Summer 2022 that allowed Ukrainian forces to liberate west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022.[20] Ukrainian forces have liberated over 50 percent of the territory Russian forces have seized since 2022 and have forced Russian forces to undertake grinding, attritional offensives and advance at a rate no faster than footpace.[21] Russia's 2022 Istanbul demands would have amounted to Ukraine's full capitulation and permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed severe limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without imposing any restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces — all consistent with the known terms of the reported 28-point peace plan.[22] The Kremlin has consistently demonstrated and outright stated that it remains committed to achieving its original war aims, including the reduction of Ukraine’s military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself against future Russian attacks.[23] Kremlin officials have reiterated this point repeatedly since the August 2025 Alaska summit to clarify to Western audiences that Russia's negotiating stance and demands have not changed since early 2022.[24] Russian narratives following the emergence of this new reported peace plan continue revolving around Russia's commitment to these original war aims and efforts to convince the West and Ukraine that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine in a war of attrition and that Russian victory is therefore inevitable.[25]

Russia's long-held demands are dependent on the false premise that a Russian battlefield victory is inevitable. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly outlined a theory of victory based on the premise that the Russian military and economy can outlast and overcome Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine’s own ability to continue defending against Russian aggression.[26] Russian forces are currently making tactically-operationally significant advances in the Pokrovsk direction and are intensifying operations in some parts of the frontline, but are not advancing rapidly or achieving significant breakthroughs proportionate to the high losses they are suffering.[27] Ukrainian forces have also proven their ability to limit Russian mechanized advances across the theater, particularly when well-staffed and equipped. Ukrainian forces prevented Russian forces from making operationally significant advances and limited the areas where Russian forces managed to make tactically significant gains throughout 2023 and 2024.[28] Ukrainian forces are also actively rolling back Russian advances in Kupyansk, marking the first successful Ukrainian effort to push back a Russian effort to seize a settlement at this scale in recent years.[29] ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military assistance and weapon sales to Ukraine, in concert with strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, can enable Ukraine to inflict more severe battlefield losses on Russia and therefore challenge Putin’s theory of victory.[30]

Ukraine's interdiction efforts are preventing Russian forces from using vehicles and concentrating manpower in Pokrovsk and are likely slowing down Russia's rate of advance within the town. The rate of Russian advances in Pokrovsk began slowing in early November 2025, following a few weeks of relatively rapid advances into the town.[31] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 19 that Ukrainian interdiction of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk has forced Russian forces to use groups of two to three servicemembers to transport supplies into Pokrovsk on foot.[32] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces have mined roads that Russian forces repeatedly attempted to use to bring up heavy equipment into Pokrovsk.[33] The battalion commander noted that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles to move into Pokrovsk at present. Russian forces recently attempted to use heavy fog to bring supplies and personnel into Pokrovsk on vehicles from the south on the M-30 Pokrovsk-Selydove highway on November 10 and 11, and Russian milbloggers largely celebrated the effort.[34] A Russian milblogger later observed, however, that the footage of Russian forces driving into Pokrovsk exposed Russian forces to Ukrainian artillery strikes, depriving Russia of the ability to reliably conduct logistics into Pokrovsk with vehicles.[35] Russian forces continue to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction as well. The Ukrainian drone battalion commander noted that Russian forces within Pokrovsk do not hold solid lines but that their movement and the existence of a 15- to 20-kilometer ”kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) around Pokrovsk complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia killed at least 26 Ukrainian civilians and injured at least 139 on the night of November 18 to 19 during its combined missile and drone strikes that disproportionately impacted civilian areas.
• US and Russian officials reportedly drafted a 28-point peace plan that amounts to Ukraine's full capitulation and would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
• The reported proposed peace plan would deprive Ukraine of critical defensive positions and capabilities necessary to defend against future Russian aggression, apparently in exchange for nothing.
• This reported peace plan is fundamentally the same as Russia's 2022 Istanbul demands, which Russia presented to Ukraine when the circumstances on the battlefield appeared to favor Russia more heavily.
• Russia's long-held demands are dependent on the false premise that a Russian battlefield victory is inevitable.
• Ukraine's interdiction efforts are preventing Russian forces from using vehicles and concentrating manpower in Pokrovsk and are likely slowing down Russia's rate of advance within the town.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian and Ukrainian sources provided further information on recent Ukrainian long-range ATACMS missile strikes targeting military infrastructure within Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 19 that Ukrainian forces launched four ATACMS missiles against Voronezh City on November 18, but that Russian forces intercepted the missiles.[37] The Russian MoD claimed that debris from the shot down missile damaged some civilian infrastructure. Geolocated footage published on November 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces targeted the Baltimor airfield in Voronezh City.[38] Russian Aerospace Forces' (VKS) 47th Bomber Aviation Regiment, whose Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft conduct strikes against Ukraine, is stationed at the Baltimor airfield.[39] Geolocated footage also suggests that Ukrainian forces targeted Pogonovo training ground in Voronezh Oblast, which Russian forces used to accumulate forces ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 18 that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike using ATACMS missiles against unspecified military targets in Russian territory, but did not specify the targets or their locations.[41]

Ukrainian forces are reportedly continuing to target Russian oil refineries. Russian social media users reported explosions near the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsk, Krasnodar Krai, on November 19.[42] Krasnodar Krai officials claimed on November 19 that Ukrainian drone debris damaged civilian infrastructure in Ilsk.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on November 18 and 19.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka and Varachyne (both north of Sumy City).[45]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck unspecified targets in Sumy City with Geran-2 strike drones.[46]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian military equipment near Mykilske (northeast of Sumy City).[47] FPV drone operators of the 1st Battalion of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian servicemen in the Sumy direction.[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk on November 18 and 19.[49]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted Kharkiv City with Geran-2, Molniya fixed-wing drones, and heavy fiber-optic drones over the past two weeks.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie; east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne; and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kamyanka and Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on November 18 and 19.[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently conducted a Geran-2 strike against Ukrainian positions near Velykyi Burluk.[53]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and vehicles near Khatnie.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway in northern Kupyansk.[55]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on November 19 that claims that Russian forces are demining southern Kupyansk and recently struck Ukrainian armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) in Sadove (west of Kupyansk) contradict October 30 Russian MoD claims that Russian forces seized Sadove.[56] The milblogger claimed that footage allegedly showing the discussion of a Ukrainian command post in Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) refutes claims of Russian advances in the area.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka and Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and toward Osynovo on November 18 and 19.[57] The Russian MoD and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Kutkivka, Holubivka (all north of Kupyansk), Sadove, and Blahodativka (southwest of Kupyansk).[58]

Russian forces appear to struggle to reinforce troops in Kupyansk due to Ukrainian efforts to sever Russian logistics in the area. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on November 19 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear remaining Russian servicemembers who infiltrated into northern parts of Kupyansk but were cut off from supply lines.[59] Trehubov noted that Russian forces continue attempts to bypass Kupyansk from different directions, but that Russian forces have failed to advance in Kupyansk itself. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command is preparing to deploy the Russian 3rd Battalion of the 1432nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) near Tabaivka and Novoosynove (both southeast of Kupyansk).[60] The milblogger noted that elements of the 1st Battalion's 7th Company complained that the road towards the frontline is dangerous due to persistent Ukrainian strikes and that many servicemembers are refusing to deploy. The milblogger claimed that Russian command sent around 100 servicemembers of the 112th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) to attack in the Kupyansk direction and that 80 of these servicemembers refused to fight as part of assault groups. The milblogger stated that Russian forces have lost over 300 servicemembers in Kupyansk since the end of September 2025, and that only 150 to 200 Russian servicemembers remain in Kupyansk. The Russian milblogger claimed that the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) is at a little more than half strength and the regiment has 200 servicemembers in the Hlushkivka area (southwest of Kupyansk), of which around 100 servicemembers are on the frontlines.

A commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 19 that Russian forces are committing significant manpower and materiel to the Kupyansk direction and continue to employ small group infiltration tactics.[61] The commander stated that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction with drone strikes and remote mining. The Ukrainian commander stated that Russian forces are adapting their fiber-optic drones to fly further with heavier payloads.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kupyansk direction.[62] Assault detachments of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in southern Kupyansk.[63] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kharkiv Oblast.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Borivska-Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[65]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and toward Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and toward Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka on November 19.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kolisnykivka and Zahryzove (both north of Borova).[67]

Geolocated footage published on November 19 shows elements of the Russian Ghostly Spartans Drone Group striking Ukrainian GLOCs in central Borova.[68] ISW continues to assess that Russian strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs near Borova aim to weaken Ukrainian logistics in the near rear and are likely part of Russia’s wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign.

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the command of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) is forcing Russian servicemembers to infiltrate Ukrainian positions through the Aidar-Shebelinka natural gas pipeline near Lozova and Borivska-Andriivka (both northeast of Borova) despite Ukrainian forces’ anticipation of such operations.[69] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces can detect and easily repel such pipeline infiltrations.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Korovii Yar, Shandryholove, and Novoselivka and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Maslyakivka; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and toward Dibrova on November 18 and 19.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), including its 237th Tank Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[71]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 19 shows Russian servicemembers in central Siversk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[72]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of and in central and southern Siversk and northwest of Pereizne (south of Siversk).[73]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka, Vasyukivka, and Zvanivka on November 18 and 19.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 123rd, 7th, 88th, and 85th motorized rifle brigades, and of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (all of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Siversk direction.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Zaliznyanske (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and northeast of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Chasiv Yar and toward Bondarne; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Bila Hora; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Toretsk; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Volodymyrivka, and Novoolenivka on November 18 and 19.[77]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces continue to attempt to infiltrate in small infantry groups and attack on cars and motorcycles.[78] The spokesperson noted that weather degrades both sides’ drone capabilities. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian tactical drone ranges cover the distance from Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut, while Russian tactical drone ranges cover Chasiv Yar to Kostyantynivka.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[79] Loitering munitions operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian depots, servicemembers, and vehicles near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka) and Kramatorsk.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Toretske and in central Shakhove (both east of Dobropillya).[81]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Pankivka and Zapovidne on November 18 and 19.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nove Shakhove.[83]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian depots, servicemembers, and vehicles near Zatyshok (southeast of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember north of Pokrovsk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[85] Geolocated footage published on November 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian infiltration areas along the O0525 highway on the northwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or FEBA.[86] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of infiltration of Russian forces to the area on the northwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[87]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne and Myrnohrad; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 18 and 19.[88] Russian milbloggers and the Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrnohrad, Hryshyne, Rodynske, and Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[89]

Footage published on November 19 shows Russian forces striking Myrnohrad with a purported FAB-3000 glide bomb.[90]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles near Pokrovsk.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions along Molodizhna Street in northern Novopavlivka in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[92] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time. ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of infiltration of Russian forces to Molodizhna Street in northern Novopavlivka.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northward along the T-04-28 Novopavlivka-Dachne highway in eastern Novopavlivka.[93] Another Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces seized western and northern Novopavlivka and claimed that Russian forces have not yet degraded Ukrainian defenses in the town.[94]

Russian forces attacked within and near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai.[95]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating in the northwestern outskirts of Novopavlivka on the north (right) bank of the Solona River.[96] The milblogger claimed that there are conflicting reports of Russian attacks from Molodetske toward Novopidhorodne and from Muravka toward Bilyakivka (all northeast of Novopavlivka)and assessed that Russian forces may intensify offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on November 18 that Russian forces seized Tykhe (west of Velykomykhailivka).[97]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Sosnivka; southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka; and west of Velykomykhailivka near Tykhe on November 18 and 19.[98] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe.[99]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones over southern Kolomiitsi (west of Velykomykhailivka).[100] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[101]

Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian Zemledeliye remote minelaying system near occupied Panteleimonivka, Donetsk Oblast, on November 15.[102]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 19.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Pryvillya (northeast of Hulyaipole).[103] ISW assesses that this change did not occur within the past 24 hours.

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole near Yehorivka, Rivnopillya, and Yablukove and toward Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Zlahoda, Pryvilne, Krasnohirske, Rybne, and Pavlivka; and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka, Zelenyi Hai, Vesele, and Zatyshshya on November 18 and 19.[104] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka and Yablukove and from Radisne and Nove Zaporizhzhia (both north of Hulyaipole).[105]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on November 18 that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), injuring two civilians.[106]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating toward Dobropillya and Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole).[107] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate toward Hulyaipole.[108] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[109]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, southwest of Orikhiv in an area north of Nesteryanka, and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Novoandriivka, Prymorske, Kamyanske, and Stepnohirsk on November 18 and 19.[110]

Geolocated footage published on November 19 shows that Ukrainian forces conducting an Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (AASM) Hammer strike on a reported Russian command post and drone control point in southern Dolynka (southwest of Orikhiv in the Russian near rear).[111]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators and assault elements of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone operators of the Fobiya detachment of the 1st Kuban Battalion of the 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[112]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[113]

A Russian milblogger published footage on November 17 of Russian forces conducting an FPV drone strike on a civilian car in Kherson City and claimed that Russian forces will consider any civilian vehicle a legitimate military target.[114]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Fobos drone group of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in Kherson Oblast.[115] Elements of 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City).[116]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 19 that Ukrainian F-16 and Mirage-2000 fighter jets have intercepted over 1,300 air targets since August 2024, including at least 10 Russian missiles only on the night of November 18 to 19.[117] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian F-16 pilots have struck over 300 Russian ground targets -- including equipment, command posts, drone control points, ammunition depots, and logistics nodes -- presumably since August 2024.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.