Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2025

Assessment as of November 29: 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on November 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian state media is leveraging Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent statements to intensify the false narrative that the frontline in Ukraine will imminently collapse, likely in an effort to coerce the West and Ukraine into capitulating to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure itself militarily. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger observed that the Russian state media, following Putin's November 27 press conference, is widely spreading false claims that the frontline in Ukraine is collapsing as Ukrainian forces desert and surrender en masse and leave large areas undefended; that Russian forces will soon drive on Kyiv City; and that Russian forces have already defeated Ukrainian forces and only have to "finish them off."[1] The milblogger accused Russian state media of fabricating some territorial successes and amplifying Putin's exaggerated claims, using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate fake videos of Ukrainian forces surrendering, and deliberately targeting social media users. Russian state media is also trying to reinforce the Kremlin's efforts to create a perception that Russian forces will inevitably collapse sectors of the frontline in Ukraine, destroy Ukraine’s most combat-capable elite units, and degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large — and that Ukraine and the West should therefore immediately concede to Russia’s demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.[2]

The milblogger affirmed that the frontline is not collapsing; that Russia is far from victory; that Russian forces maintain the initiative at high personnel and materiel costs; that Ukrainian and Russian forces are engaged in positional warfare along the entire frontline; and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking — all of which coheres with all available open-source evidence from the battlefield.[3] The milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces continue defending in Kharkiv Oblast, including attempting to counterattack in eastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and fiercely resisting Russian assaults in Kupyansk and Borova directions (on the east [left] bank of the Oskil River). The milblogger's battlefield assessment notably contradicts Putin's November 27 claim that Russian forces have completed the seizure of Kupyansk and seized most of Vovchansk, and that Ukrainian forces are unable to defend against Russian assaults near the Oskil River. The milblogger also undermined Putin's claim that Russia is actively pursuing several encirclements and is forcing Ukrainian forces to abandon entire defensive lines. The milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces are retreating from certain tactical areas, but that these instances do not mean that Ukrainian forces are entirely abandoning defensive lines. The milblogger explained that the Ukrainian military command sometimes withdraws Ukrainian forces to reinforce other sectors of the frontline or in other to avoid encirclement - all tactics that Russian forces also actively use on the battlefield in line with standard warfighting practices. ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the frontline is serious, particularly in Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, Putin’s and Russian state media's assertions are exaggerated and do not correspond to the battlefield reality they claim to represent. It is notable that the Kremlin’s misrepresentation of the situation on the ground was so far from reality that a prominent pro-war Russian blogger felt compelled to issue his own corrective statement.

Russia launched another combined missile and drone strike primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast overnight on November 28 and 29, killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 52.[4] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 36 missiles — five Kinzhal and four Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and 23 Kh-101/Iskander-K and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles — and 596 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 558 drones and one Kinzhal missile; 12 Kh-101/Iskander-K, four Iskander-M, and two Kh-59/69 missiles — but that 35 Russian drones and an unspecified number of missiles struck 22 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force added that debris of intercepted missiles and drones fell in 17 locations. Ukrainian officials, including Ukraine's Ministry of Energy, stated that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure facilities in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts, leaving over 500,000 energy customers in Kyiv City, 100,000 in Kyiv Oblast, and nearly 8,000 in Kharkiv Oblast without power.[6] Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that Russian strikes against civilian infrastructure killed at least three people and injured at least 52, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the cargo terminal of the Nova Poshta postal service in Kyiv City.[7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes aim to undermine Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025 to 2026.[8]

Russian forces are supporting offensive operations along the frontlines and appear to be targeting Ukrainian aircraft involved in air defense operations with modified Shahed (Geran) drones. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported that Russian developers recently modernized communications and navigation systems in Geran-2 strike drones, allowing Russian forces to pilot these drones in real time.[9] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Innovation Lieutenant Colonel Yurii Myronenko told the Business Insider in an article published on November 27 that Russian forces recently started using operator-controlled Shahed drones, which communicate via antennas in occupied Ukraine, in strikes near the frontlines (as opposed to Shahed drones with preplanned routes and targets that Russian forces have historically used in strikes against Ukraine's deep rear areas).[10] Myronenko stated that it is more challenging for Ukrainian forces to counter these Shaheds because Russian drone operators can quickly react and engage with Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, which Ukrainian forces have been using to shoot down Russian drones. Business Insider noted that there have been no confirmed instances of Russian Shahed drones intercepting Ukrainian aircraft at this time. A serviceman of the Ukrainian 4th Special Purpose Regiment told Business Insider that increased Russian Shahed production rates are enabling Russian forces to increasingly use Shaheds to support offensive operations along the frontline. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) also reported that Russian forces are actively using the new Iranian-produced Shahed-107 drones on the battlefield in Ukraine.[11] ISW reported that Russian forces augmented their offensive operations against Pokrovsk with Shahed drone strikes over Spring-Summer 2025 and began to pursue moving targets, such as trains, with modified Shahed drones as early as October 2025.[12]

Ukrainian forces recently struck two Russian shadow fleet oil tankers in the Black Sea — the first time Ukrainian forces attacked shadow fleet vessels. Ukrainian forces also struck a marine terminal with unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) amid continued drone strikes against Russian oil refineries and military infrastructure. A source in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on November 29 that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy conducted a joint strike against the KAIRO and VIRAT oil tankers — both of which are sanctioned as being part of Russia’s shadow fleet — in the Black Sea with modernized Sea Baby USVs.[13] The source shared footage showing the USVs striking the tankers and stated that the strike caused critical damage and effectively decommissioned the tankers. The source stated that the oil tankers were empty and were heading towards the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai at the time of the strike. Geolocated footage published on November 28 and 29 shows the KAIRO tanker burning northeast of Istanbul in the Black Sea.[14] Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported on November 29 that the Turkish General Directorate of Coastal Safety evacuated 25 personnel from the KAIROS tanker and that evacuation teams are waiting at a safe distance to begin rescue operations for personnel on the VIRAT tanker.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Gambian-flagged tankers and accused Ukraine of violating an informal "non-aggression pact" with Russia for the grain corridor in the Black Sea in an effort to falsely portray Ukraine as an untrustworthy negotiator amidst the peace deal negotiations.[16] Russia formally withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17, 2023, which allowed safe exports of grain through the Black Sea, not operations of the Russian shadow fleet.[17] Other Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Black Sea Fleet command for failing to defend against Ukrainian recurrent USV strikes and for withdrawing vessels from ports in occupied Crimea.[18]

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) international oil transportation initiative reported that Ukrainian USVs damaged one of the outrigger mooring devices at the CPC marine terminal near Novorossiysk on November 29.[19] The CPC reported that Novorossiysk suspended loading and other operations at the terminal and that the CPC towed tankers from the terminal. The CPC stated that emergency protection systems shut down oil pipelines and that no oil spilled into the Black Sea as a result of the strike.

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that USF and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) elements jointly struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 28 to 29.[20] The USF reported that Afipsky Oil Refinery is a key oil refining enterprise in southern Russia that has a refining capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year — or 2.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining capacity. Geolocated footage published on November 29 shows a fire at the Afipsky Oil Refinery, and the USF reported that Ukraine is clarifying the outcome of the strike.[21] A local Krasnodar Krai source reported that Ukrainian drone strikes started a 250-square-meter fire at the refinery and damaged technical equipment but did not damage the fuel storage tanks.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on November 29 that Ukrainian strikes destroyed a RV-5000 vertical tank at the Tuapse Marine Oil Terminal in Krasnodar Krai on November 25.[23]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Beriev Aircraft Repair Plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast overnight on November 29, causing a fire at the repair shop for the Tu-95 strategic bomber aircraft.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia uses the repair plant to modernize the Tu-95s and the A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. Footage published on November 28 also shows the storage facility for Shahed batteries on fire at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, but the cause of the fire is unclear.[25]

The Russian economy continues to show signs of fracturing as Russia continues to prioritize its war time economy over stability. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on November 27 increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT), a federal tax imposed on most Russian goods and services domestically, from 20 to 22 percent, likely to buttress federal budget deficits.[26] The Russian government reportedly could generate an additional one trillion rubles annually (roughly $11.9 billion), or 0.5 percent of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by increasing the VAT to 22 percent, and therefore placing the burden of making up this deficit directly on the Russian population. Putin also signed into law approving the 2026 to 2028 federal budget which allocates 235.067 trillion rubles (roughly $3 trillion) for 2026, 255.498 trillion rubles (roughly $3.3 trillion) for 2027, and 276.346 trillion rubles (roughly $3.56 trillion) for 2028, and has a target inflation rate of no more than four percent per year.[27] The Kremlin has struggled with high inflation since Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent noted on October 26 that Russia has an inflation rate of over 20 percent — a stark contrast to the Russian Central Bank’s official statistics claiming that Russia’s annual inflation rate is only 8.2 percent.[28] Putin also signed a law on November 28, increasing the minimum salary to 27,093 rubles per month (approximately $349) starting on January 1, 2026.[29] Raising the minimum Russian salary indicates that Russia's ongoing counter inflationary measures are stagnating and that consumer purchasing power is weakening across Russia, forcing Russia to raise the minimum wage to keep up with rising prices of goods. An increase in the VAT will likely cause inflation to rise further while simultaneously lowering cash flow in the Russian economy and further stagnating Russian economic growth.

Balloons from Belarusian airspace continued incursions into NATO airspace in Lithuania overnight on November 28 to 29. Lithuanian authorities reported on November 29 that they detected over 60 balloons flying into Lithuanian airspace from Belarus overnight and that an unspecified number of balloons forced the Vilnius International Airport to temporarily suspend operations in the early morning of November 29, impacting 22 flights and 3,000 travelers.[30] Aerial incursions have forced Vilnius International Airport to suspend operations several times in recent months.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and the ongoing Russian airspace violations are likely part of “Phase Zero” — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[32] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, thus, Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[33]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov is leading a Ukrainian delegation to the United States. Zelensky stated on November 29 that a Ukrainian delegation departed for the United States to further develop the results of the November 23 US-European-Ukrainian talks in Geneva.[34] Umerov replaced former Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak as the head of Ukraine's negotiating team.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state media is leveraging Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent statements to intensify the false narrative that the frontline in Ukraine will imminently collapse, likely in an effort to coerce the West and Ukraine into capitulating to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure itself militarily. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse.
• Russia launched another combined missile and drone strike primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast overnight on November 28 and 29, killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 52.
• Ukrainian forces recently struck two Russian shadow fleet oil tankers in the Black Sea — the first time Ukrainian forces attacked shadow fleet vessels. Ukrainian forces also struck and a marine terminal with unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) amid continued drone strikes against Russian oil refineries and military infrastructure.
• The Russian economy continues to show signs of fracturing as Russia continues to prioritize its war time economy over stability.
• Balloons from Belarusian airspace continued incursions into NATO airspace in Lithuania overnight on November 28 to 29.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov is leading a Ukrainian delegation to the United States.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports on Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy Oblasts, including southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino and Novyi Put, northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka, north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindrativka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Oleksiivka, on November 28 and 29.[35]

A Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) unit posted footage and reported on November 28 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian KOP-2 electronic warfare (EW) systems and other military equipment in Kursk Oblast.[36]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command has shifted to dividing the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) into companies instead of battalions and allocated an extra company to the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) fighting in Oleksiivka.[37] The milblogger noted that reinforcing degraded units with battalions pulled from other units is a standard practice.

Order of Battle: Fiber optic loitering munitions operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[38]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the Harbuzivka Railway Station north of Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near and within Vovchansk and Vilcha, and near Vovchanski Khutory, Synelnykove, and Lyman.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in eastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[41]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on November 29 that Russian forces are employing fiber optic sleeper drones along roads in the Vovchansk direction.[42] A Russian milblogger posted footage on November 28 purportedly showing a Russian FAB UMPK guided glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions in Vilcha.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly struck a Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) system near Lyutivka (northwest of Kharkiv City).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Storm Detachment of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Khatnie.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) during a mechanized assault[48] A Ukrainian brigade operating near Kupyansk reported that Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced platoon-sized motorized assault on November 28 near Petropavlivka.[49] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed twelve vehicles, including an MT-LB armored fighting vehicle (AFV) and two BTR armored personnel carriers (APCs).[50]

Unconfirmed claims:  A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Petropavlivka from the north during the mechanized assault.[51] 

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on November 28 and 29.[52]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on November 28 that fighting in the Kupyansk direction remains highly dynamic and that Ukrainian forces continue to detect and destroy attempted infiltrations along the front.[53] Syrskyi refuted Russian claims that Russian forces control Kupyansk, stating that Ukrainian forces have only detected signatures for 40 Russian military radio users in Kupyansk, suggesting that Russian forces only maintain a limited presence in Kupyansk.   

Order of battle:  Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian military equipment near Kucherivka.[54] Zemledeliye remote minelaying elements of the 6th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 29 but did not make confirmed advances. 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on November 29 that Russian forces seized Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova) and advanced southwest of the settlement.[56] 

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Kruhlyakivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka; east of Borova near Shyikivka, Kopanky, and Novoyehorivka; southeast of Borova near Novovodyane, Olhivka, Druzhelyubivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Hrekivka and toward Stepove and Chervonyi Stav on November 28 and 29.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Hrekivka-Karpivka line.[58] 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Dibrova (south of Lyman).[59]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Korovii Yar, Serednie, Novoselivka, Derylove, Yarova and Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and toward Ozerne on November 28 and 29.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked  along the Hrekivka-Karpivka line.[61]

A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 28 that forested areas west and southwest of Zarichne are hindering Russian advances in the area.[62]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced over the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway north of Svyato-Pokrovske (south of Siversk).[63]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk; northwest of Siversk near  Dronivka, Zakitne, and Platonivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on November 28 and 29.[64]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 28 that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River near Starodubivka (northeast of Siversk), Mykolaivka, and Kryva Luka (both west of Siversk).[65] Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 29 that Russian forces failed to break through to Ukrainian positions west of Siversk from Dronivka and Platonivka.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[67]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, southwest of Pleshchiivka, and to eastern and in southern Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[68]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Nelipivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 28 and 29.[69]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Khugin Drone Company of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Kostyantynivka.[70] FPV drone operators of the 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are operating near Kostyantynivka.[71] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating west and southwest of Nelipivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka) along the shore of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (just south of Nelipivka).[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove and toward Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Mayak, Zapovidne, and Dorozhnie on November 28 and 29.[73]

Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleh Apostol stated on November 29 that Ukrainian forces completed their counteroperation in the Dobropillya salient and that the Russian objective in the Dobropillya penetration was to reach Barvinkove (west of Slovyansk in Kharkiv Oblast (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline near Dobropillya) and completely encircle Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast’s fortress belt.[74] Apostol added that relatively elite Russian naval infantry elements continue attacks east and west of the Dobropillya penetration while elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division attack northward.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones over Pankivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces northwest of Pokrovsk along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway and between Pokrovsk and Rivne (east of Pokrovsk) during what ISW assesses to have been Russian infiltration missions.[76] ISW assesses that these events did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, southeast of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), and northwest of Svitle (east of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on November 28 and 29.[78] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[79]

Apostol reported on November 29 that Ukrainian forces maintain control of areas within Pokrovsk but noted that their presence will not be obvious as Ukrainian forces do not intend to conduct flag raising operations for media purposes.[80] Apostol stated that Russian forces are preparing elements of the relatively elite 76th VDV Division to deploy to Pokrovsk. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev stated on November 28 that Ukrainian drone interdiction operations are forcing Russian infantry to walk several kilometers on foot to conduct logistics.[81] Okishev reported that the Russian military command employs poorly trained Russian infantry to conduct costly reconnaissance-by-fire missions and to establish logistics routes while relatively-well trained infantry engage in urban warfare.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Headquarters Company of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[82] Assault elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly preparing to deploy to the Pokrovsk direction.[83] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and reconnaissance drone operators of the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near and within Rodynske.[84] 

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advance: Geolocated footage published on November 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[85]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka, Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, and Verbove on November 28 and 29.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1444th Motorized Rifle Regiment (74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st CAA, CMD), reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in windbreaks along the Novooleksandrivka-Tykhe line (southwest to west of Velykomykhailivka)[88]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Voskresenka, and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Zlahoda, Pryvillya, Yehorivka, and Verbove on November 28 and 29.[89]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using Kuryer unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to conduct logistics, transport troops, and conduct assaults in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely referring to the Velykomykhailivka direction.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[91] Drone operators of the Russian 657th Anti-Tank Battalion (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking targets in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[92]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced between Andriivka and Vidradne (both north of Hulyaipole) along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway, east of Varvarivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), and into eastern and southeastern Hulyaipole[93] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger rejected claims that Russian forces entered Hulyaipole, however.[94]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka and Dobropillya; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene and Vidradne; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Pryvilne, Rybne, and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya on November 28 and 29.[95] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vidradne and along the Solodke-Rivnopillya (northeast of Hulyaipole) line.[96]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Hulyaipole direction was relatively inactive on November 29 due to heavy fog constraining both Russian and Ukrainian drone operations.[97] The milblogger claimed that the fog favors Russian forces more than Ukrainian forces because Ukrainian forces have a minor first-person view (FPV) drone advantage in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole and east of Varvarivka, respectively.[98] Interceptor drone operators of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole area.[99] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) and 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Hulyaipole.[100] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Kamyanske, Stepove, Shcherbaky, Prymorske, and Novoandriivka on November 28 and 29.[102]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian offensive pace has slowed in the Prymorske-Stepnohirsk direction due to intensive Ukrainian rear drone strikes.[103]  The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have a drone advantage in this direction, and that while Russian drones can easily fly to Hryhorivka (12 km from the frontline) and Veselyanka (11 km from the frontline), Ukrainian forces operate both standard FPV drones and FPV interceptor drones that can down Russian reconnaissance drones.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 162nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[104]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on November 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 28 and 29.[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[106] ISW last observed elements of the 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment in Chasiv Yar on September 25, indicating that the Russian military command has likely redeployed the unit to the Kherson direction.[107]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports on Russian strikes in Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.