Ukraine Invasion Updates, May 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2025

Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement and claimed that every day that Ukraine delays a diplomatic solution to the war worsens the conditions for Ukraine.[1] Russia may illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts annexed, especially should Russian forces launch offensive operations to seize these regional centers. Russia notably did not — and still does not — occupy Zaporizhzhia City when the Kremlin annexed Zaporizhia Oblast in September 2022. Kartapolov’s statement indicates that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — in line with Russian officials' calls for Russia to seize Sumy City, claims that Kharkiv and Odesa cities are "Russian" cities, and increasing rhetoric about Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya" (which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine).[2] Kartopolov's statement also indicates that the Kremlin continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to fight a protracted war against Ukraine to achieve these territorial goals and is not interested in good-faith negotiations to achieve a diplomatic settlement to the war. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely.[3]

The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare Russian society and the Russian defense industry base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 30 allowing the Russian government to revoke the rights of shareholders of defense industrial enterprises in the event that the enterprise fails to fulfill state defense orders during martial law.[4] The decree enables the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade to appoint a management company to act as the sole executive body of the enterprise in order to fulfill contractual obligations to the Russian government. The decree applies to civilian aviation and shipbuilding companies, military development and production companies, and government subcontractors. Putin is likely setting legal conditions to allow the Russian government to commandeer elements of Russia's economy and DIB should the Kremlin introduce full martial law in order to transition the country to a full wartime footing. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is preparing Russian society and economy for a protracted war in Ukraine, indicating that Russia is not interested in engaging in good faith negotiations to reach a diplomatic settlement to its war in Ukraine.[5]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed.
• The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare Russian society and the Russian defense industry base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30, 2025

Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya claimed during a UN Security Council meeting on May 30 that Russia is prepared to fight Ukraine for as long as necessary and that Ukraine can either accept peace, presumably on Russia's terms, or face inevitable battlefield defeat.[1] Nebenzya stated that the United States recently "opened its eyes" to the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine and reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that the West stop arming Ukraine and that Ukraine cease force generation efforts as preconditions to a ceasefire.[2] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev also called for officials to eliminate the conflict‘s "root causes" in an English-language post to X on May 30.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[4] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 29 that Russia’s delegation to the proposed bilateral discussion in Istanbul on June 2 will be the ”same” as Russia's delegation at previous talks held in Istanbul on May 15 and 16.[5] Russia sent a low-level delegation led by Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky and consisting of Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin to the May 15-16 Istanbul talks.[6]

Russian officials' decision to reiterate long-standing demands and send the same low-level delegation to the next Istanbul meeting indicates that Russia remains disinterested in engaging in good-faith negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains dedicated to protracting peace negotiations to support continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[7]

Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 30 that Kremlin officials are encouraged by the Trump administration's understanding of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about further eastward expansion of NATO and that Russia has previously shared these concerns with the United States during closed-door negotiations.[8] Peskov stated that the US position on further NATO expansion is "very appealing" to Russia, given that the United States continues to play a mediating role in negotiations to end the war.

US officials previously indicated a willingness to consider Russia’s objections to Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership – a long-standing Russian demand that officials frequently claim to be a "root cause" of the war in Ukraine – in exchange for Russia making concessions on other demands.[9] Peskov’s statement indicates that Russian officials assess that the United States supports Russia's demand for NATO to alter its foundational open-door policy.[10] Such a commitment would effectively grant Russia a veto over elements of the NATO charter, disproportionally benefit Russia’s desired postwar security posture, and undermine US President Donald Trump‘s stated objectives of achieving a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian officials are pocketing US concessions regarding negotiations and potential postwar security arrangements and are failing to make any comparable concessions, such as relinquishing Russia’s claim to currently unoccupied Ukrainian territory like Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29, 2025

Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on May 28 that Russia is prepared to present its memorandum on terms for peace negotiations during the next bilateral meeting with Ukraine and suggested that Russian and Ukrainian representatives should meet in Istanbul on June 2.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russia's memorandum proposes how to "reliably" overcome the Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov has previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[ii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the last Russian delegation in Istanbul, claimed on May 28 that he spoke with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and proposed a date for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their memoranda.[iii] Umerov responded to the Russian proposal on May 28 and stated that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire and further negotiations and that Ukraine has already presented its memorandum to Russia.[iv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 29 that Russia has not received a copy of Ukraine's memorandum and that Ukraine has not responded to Lavrov's proposal, however.[v]

Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin initially suggested on the night of May 10 to 11 "resuming" the 2022 bilateral peace negotiations in Istanbul but later rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation for an in-person, one-on-one meeting in Istanbul.[vi] Ukraine's willingness to attend the May 15 to 16 talks in Istanbul with Russian officials was itself a significant concession, as holding the talks in Istanbul fit into Putin's narrative that the current talks are a resumption of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols in which Russia demanded that Ukraine effectively capitulate to Russia.[vii] US President Donald Trump previously suggested that Russia and Ukraine could move peace talks to the Vatican, but Russian officials rejected this offer and continue to suggest meetings in Istanbul.[viii] Putin unilaterally announced Easter and Victory Day ceasefires in April and May 2025, and Russia is now again unilaterally imposing timelines and terms on Ukraine.[ix] Ukraine, the United States, and European states have repeatedly called for Russia to agree to a renewable ceasefire in Ukraine before Russia and Ukraine begin negotiations for an enduring peace, calls that the Kremlin has repeatedly rejected. Russian officials are instead demanding that negotiations address both a ceasefire and long-term peace agreement in Ukraine. Russian forces will continue to press along the frontline until Ukraine accepts Russia's terms or they are no longer able to do so, and Russian officials will attempt to leverage any additional battlefield gains to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West during negotiations.

ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" the terms for peace and present a memorandum for a possible future ceasefire in the future, but did not specify a deadline.[x] Putin told journalists on May 19 that Russia would present Ukraine with a "memorandum" detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations, but also did not specify a deadline.[xi] Lavrov claimed on May 23 that Russia would present its memorandum to Ukraine as soon as Russia and Ukraine completed their large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 25.[xii] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 23 that Ukraine expected Russia to present a draft proposal for an unconditional ceasefire agreement after the third and final POW exchange on May 25.[xiii] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States received Ukraine’s memorandum of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[xiv] Russian officials appear to be withholding their memorandum and may attempt to withhold the memorandum until the June 2 meeting. Russian officials may assess that Ukraine will refuse to attend the June 2 meeting if Russia does not provide its memorandum in advance as Ukraine has done and likely intend to seize on Ukraine's refusal to blame Ukraine for stalling peace negotiations.

Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on May 29 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that the PRC stopped selling DJI Mavic quadcopter drones, which Russian and Ukrainian forces have used for surveillance and strike missions, to Ukraine and other European countries while continuing to sell the quadcopters to Russia.[xv] Zelensky stated that Russia has domestic DJI Mavic production lines, and that "Chinese representatives" are present at these production facilities. An unnamed European official told Bloomberg that Zelensky's statements are consistent with European assessments and stated that the PRC appears to have reduced deliveries of some drone components to Western buyers while simultaneously increasing deliveries to Russia. ISW has observed recent reporting that Russian forces are fielding Chinese-made equipment, that the PRC is likely aware of and choosing not to stop Russian military recruitment efforts of PRC citizens, and that Russia has established joint production lines with PRC manufacturers for Shahed-like long range strike drones, underscoring the extent of the PRC's support for Russia's war effort.[xvi]

A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI). Forbes reported on May 26 that Ukrainian startup company Strategy Force Solutions Chief Technology Officer "Andrii" stated that Ukrainian forces fielded the company's artificial intelligence (AI) powered "mothership" drone – the GOGOL-M – on autonomous missions against Russian military targets for the first time.[xvii] The GOGOL-M mothership drone can reportedly deploy two first-person-view (FPV) drones with automated target acquisition and strike capabilities, and the mothership drone reportedly has a range of 300-kilometers for one-way operations and a range of 100-kilometers to return for reuse.[xviii] The GOGOL-M mothership and compatible FPV drones reportedly use Strategy Force Solutions' SmartPilot system that leverages a combination of advanced sensors and AI to self-orient and execute predefined missions autonomously. The mothership and FPV drones notably do not rely on global positioning systems (GPS), thereby optimizing their electronic warfare (EW) resistance. "Andrii" told Forbes that Strategy Force Solutions is able to produce up to 50 GOGOL-M mothership drones and up to 400 compatible FPV drones per month. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on May 29 that Ukraine fielded the GOGOL-M mothership drone for the first time.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations.
• Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations.
• ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.
• Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
• A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2025

Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged. Reuters reported on May 28 that three Russian sources familiar with the peace negotiations stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Western states to submit a "written" pledge stipulating that NATO will not expand eastward; Ukrainian neutrality; sanctions relief; the unfreezing of Russian assets in the West; and unspecified protections for Russian speakers in Ukraine.[1] Kremlin officials have repeatedly used allegations that the Ukrainian government is discriminating against Russian-speakers in Ukraine to justify Russia's calls for Ukrainian regime change and the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet regime.[2] Russia's demands for a ban on NATO expansion, Ukrainian neutrality, and regime change are the same demands that Russia issued before the war in 2021 and when Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022.[3]

Kremlin officials have consistently and publicly called for the demands that Reuter's insider sources outlined. Russia has demanded since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to change its constitution and NATO to change its "open-door" policy.[4] Russian officials have also repeatedly claimed that any future peace settlement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Russian officials have previously defined as NATO's alleged violation of unofficial commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[5] Kremlin officials explicitly highlighted the "root causes" of the war and Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality again on May 28.[6] ISW continues to assess that these demands are part of the Kremlin's efforts to force the West into surrendering Ukraine and breaking the NATO security alliance.[7]

Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts. A Reuters source reportedly stated that Putin is less inclined now to make territorial compromises and continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[8] The source stated that "Putin has toughened his position" about territory. Putin first demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts, and Russian officials have often reiterated this demand since.[9] The Washington Post reported on May 27 that Ukrainian military intelligence assesses that the Russian military command has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed.[10] Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast since May 2024.[11] Russian forces also recently launched attacks to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, with Russian officials calling for Russia to seize Sumy City, likely to set conditions for Russia to annex the oblast.[12] Russia will likely struggle to seize the entirety of the four illegally annexed oblasts, especially as the seizure of the heavily fortified fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and the forcing of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast will require significantly larger force groupings than the forces currently deployed in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian military command would have solely concentrated its efforts on seizing all of the four oblasts if the Kremlin's territorial ambitions were truly limited to the four oblasts, but the deployment of significant forces to attack in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts suggests that Russia intends to increase its territorial demands. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains significant territorial ambitions in southern and eastern Ukraine, and Russian officials within Putin's innermost circle have even called for Russia to take control of most of the country.[13]

Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances. One of Reuters' sources reportedly stated that Putin will try to use military victories to show Ukraine and Europe that "peace tomorrow will be even more painful" if Putin is unable to secure his desired terms in a peace deal.[14] The source stated that Putin would take advantage of any tactical battlefield opportunities to advance further into Ukraine and that Putin believes that Russia can fight for years in the face of any sanctions or other economic measures the West might place on Russia in the future. ISW has long assessed that Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and to outlast and overcome Western military aid to Ukraine and Ukraine's own efforts to mobilize.[15]

Russia will likely be able to continue its current tactics that are resulting in gradual, creeping advances as long as Russia is able to replenish its losses on the frontline. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 28 that almost 175,000 people have arrived at military units and that more than 14,000 people have joined volunteer units since the start of 2025, for a total of roughly 1,285 people per day.[16] Medvedev also reiterated Putin's May 13 claim that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[17] Putin's claimed recruitment rate is notably higher than Medvedev's, and ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Reports from the Ukrainian General Staff about Russia's daily losses indicate that Russian suffered a daily loss rate of 1,550 per day in January 2025; 1,261 in February 2025; 1,312 in March 2025; 1,219 in April 2025; and 1,140 between May 1 and May 28.[18] Medvedev's May 28 claim that 175,000 soldiers have joined Russian military units since January 2025 indicates that Russia is replenishing its units at about a one-for-one ratio to its loss rate. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces, supported by Western aid, can inflict higher personnel loss rates on the battlefield that could push Putin to make difficult decisions and force Putin to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war.[19]

The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Russia is alarmed by the accumulation of NATO troops along Russia's border and that NATO's eastern expansion and discussions to bring Ukraine into the alliance triggered Russia into launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[20] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that NATO has deployed 34,200 troops on its "eastern flank" — which runs from Finland to Turkey — since February 2022.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russia had deployed over 700,000 Russian soldiers to Ukraine, in contrast.[22] NATO had not significantly progressed Ukraine's path to membership in the years since the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, in which NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no formal steps toward Ukrainian membership in late 2021 and 2022.[23] Putin explicitly admitted in December 2024 that former US President Joseph Biden offered in 2021 to postpone consideration of Ukraine's membership to NATO for 10 to 15 years — demonstrating that Ukraine's NATO membership was not an immediate prospect and undermining the Kremlin's attempts to blame NATO for Russia's 2022 invasion.[24] ISW continues to assess that Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO but because he believed that NATO was weak and aimed to destroy the alliance.[25]

The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO. Putin gave a video address at the 13th International Meeting of High Representatives Responsible for Security Issues on May 28 and advocated for the creation of his desired Eurasian security architecture based on Russia-dominated international organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[26] Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin claimed at the meeting that Russia cannot be "weak" and that Eurasian and global security are dependent on Russia's strength — placing Russia at the center of this security architecture.[27] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov attended a CSTO defense ministers meeting on May 28 where he criticized NATO's defensive posture in Central and Eastern Europe and claimed that the West does not just threaten Russia but all CSTO member states in an effort to unify CSTO members around Russia's anti-NATO sentiments.[28]

Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin announced in an English-language social media post on May 28 that Belarusian officials decided to reduce the scope of the Zapad-2025 joint military exercise and relocate the main maneuver away from the western border of Belarus towards central Belarus.[29] Khrenin claimed that Belarusian authorities made this decision to demonstrate Belarus' readiness for de-escalation, dialogue, and peace. Belarussian authorities would not have been able to make this decision independently without Russia. Russia and Belarus are attempting to posture themselves as unthreatening, reasonable, and cooperative to the West. Belarusian officials previously claimed that at least 13,000 personnel would participate in the Zapad-2025 exercise, and Russia and Belarus likely had to downsize the joint exercise as most of its forces are fighting in Ukraine.[30] ISW observed elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, MMD), and 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), as well as roughly 4,000 Airborne (VDV) personnel, including from the 7th, 76th, 98th, and 106th VDV divisions participated in the Zapad-2021 joint exercise.[31] Significant elements of these formations are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine.[32] Russian officials unexpectedly canceled the Zapad-2023 exercise, very likely due to Russia's equipment and manpower requirements for the war in Ukraine.[33]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin published a video message from Putin on May 28 for Border Guards Day, addressing Russian border guards.[34] Putin claimed that Russian border guards have developed their "legendary traditions" throughout Russia's "1,000-year history" since the times of Ancient Rus' (Kyivan Rus), a medieval state based in Kyiv. Putin's reference to Ancient Rus' is part of the Kremlin's years long attempts to claim that the modern Russian state is directly tied to Kyivan Rus and to claim that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are one people who descended from Kyivan Rus.[35] Putin similarly referred to Russia's 1,000-year history on May 22, and Putin's continued promotion of Russian nationalism is a notable departure from his usual rhetoric promoting a civic Russian identity and nationalism based on ethnic and religious diversity.[36]

Putin also attempted to use his May 28 speech in honor of border guards to justify the use of Russian conscripts to defend Kursk Oblast. Putin used the mythos of the Second World War to glorify the role of border guards to "defend the interests of the Fatherland" and claimed that border guards have "repeatedly demonstrated themselves" in the war in Ukraine.[37] Putin claimed that he is confident that border guards will continue to repel threats to Russia and attempts to cross the state border. Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly promised the Russian population that conscripts, whose military service is mandated by Russian law, will not be deployed to fight in Ukraine.[38] Conscripts made up a significant part of the forces that initially met the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, however, leading to discontent among the Russian population.[39] The Kremlin has historically responded to issues surrounding the deployment of conscripts in combat zones with great concern, and Putin is likely attempting to use narratives about Kyivan Rus and the "Fatherland" to justify Russia's use of conscripts in Kursk Oblast.[40]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 28 that Ukrainian Special Forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the Kronshtadt drone factory in Dubna, Moscow Oblast.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the plant specializes in producing drone ground-control systems for the Orion, Inokhodets, Molniya, Grom, Termin, Helios, and Sirius drones. Geolocated footage shows drones striking the Kronshtadt plant.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the SBU also struck the Raduga plant in Dubna, which manufactures cruise missiles, including Kh-101/55 missiles, Kh-69 missiles, and Kh-59MK missiles.[43] Geolocated footage shows a drone strike against the Raduga plant.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Angstrem plant in the Elma Technological Park in Zelenograd, Moscow Oblast, which is one of Russia's largest microchip manufacturing plants.[45] Geolocated footage shows Russian air defense systems downing a Ukrainian drone over Zelenograd, a drone striking the technological park, and the aftermath of the drone strikes against the technological park.[46] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, reported on May 28 that Elma Park is a critical hub for Russian import substitution.[47] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Dubna Machine Building Plant (DMZ), which produces drones, avionics, and control systems. A Russian insider source claimed that the DMZ also assembles Kh-101, Kh-5, and Kh-59 cruise missiles.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Murom Instrument Plant, which produces ignition devices, on the night of May 27 in Vladimir Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed earlier reports that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant in Kineshma, Ivanovo Oblast on May 26.[50]

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on May 28, following a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Berlin, that Germany will finance a “significant” portion of Ukraine’s Starlink satellite systems operation costs.[51] The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 28 that Germany would supply Ukraine with ammunition, small arms, and air defense and land weapon systems and invest five billion euros (roughly $5.6 billion) in Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).[52] The German MoD stated that Germany would support more robust cooperation between German and Ukrainian defense industrial companies. Merz stated on May 28 that Germany would help finance Ukrainian production of long-range weapons.[53]

Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on May 28 that Ukrainian officials and military counterintelligence identified a Russian soldier of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) suspected of executing two Ukrainian POWs on January 9, 2025, near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha).[54] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025.[55] ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[56]

Key Takeaways:

• Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged.
• Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.
• Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances.
• The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security.
• The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO.
• Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27, 2025

The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine. Greenpeace's Ukraine service reported on May 27 that satellite imagery from early February 2025 to May 23, 2025, shows that Russia has laid 90 kilometers of powerlines near the Sea of Azov in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[1] Greenpeace reported that these new powerlines are the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[2] Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Head Alexei Likhachev claimed on May 21 that Rosatom had developed a plan to bring the ZNPP to "full capacity," suggesting that Russia intends to bring the ZNPP's reactors out of their current cold shutdown state.[3] Likhachev claimed in May 2024 to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) assessment that restarting the ZNPP was currently "impossible" and that the first condition for restarting the ZNPP must be to ensure its security, either with a security guarantee or after the frontline had shifted away from the ZNPP.[4]

US President Donald Trump's April 2025 seven-point peace proposal to Ukraine included a provision for Ukraine to regain control over the ZNPP with US involvement, and the proposed Ukraine-European peace plan also contained this provision.[5] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected giving up control over the ZNPP, however.[6] Russian officials have also increased their rhetoric, invoking Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Russian occupation authorities have recently called for Russia to control areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast near the Dnipro River that Russia has not yet illegally annexed.[7] The Russian definition of Novorossiya notably includes the area directly across from the ZNPP on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. Russia's efforts to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid suggest that Russia wants to maintain its control over the ZNPP and operate it safely as Russia likely expects to significantly push the frontline away from the plant or plans to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States had received Ukraine’s list of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is now waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their versions for a possible future ceasefire, but did not specify a deadline.[9] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 27 that Russia is preparing its version of the memorandum.[10] Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated on May 27 that the success of peace negotiations will depend on the participants’ willingness to address the war’s ”root causes,” reiterating long-standing Russian demands that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation.[11] The Kremlin is likely leveraging the lack of a deadline to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract more concessions and improve Russia’s negotiating position by making battlefield advances.

Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin met with the supervisory board of the state-formed "Russia-Land of Opportunities" non-profit organization on May 27 and spoke with participants of the organization's programs during a highly scripted event.[12] Putin claimed that many foreigners see Russia as a "stronghold" of traditional spiritual and moral values. Putin claimed that Soviet citizens' "spirit of devotion to their people" formed the basis of the Soviet victory in the Second World War and stated that the "internal mobilization" of each Russian citizen and Russian society as a whole is the most important thing right now for Russia. Putin stated that the future of a state depends on its independence, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency; that Russia will not exist if it is not sovereign; and that "passion within society" is important for Russian sovereignty.

The general director of "Russia-Land of Opportunities," Andrei Betin, highlighted that Putin named 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" and noted that many Russian servicemembers who are fighting in Ukraine participate in the non-profit's programs. Putin spoke during the meeting with an active duty Russian servicemember, who proposed creating additional programs that allow Russian military personnel to work with the non-profit so that the servicemembers "will say that Russia remembers [them], Russia has not forgotten [them]." Putin claimed that the Russian government is working to create conditions for the "self-realization" of Russian servicemembers returning home from the war.  Putin highlighted how many graduates of the organization's programs have gone on to become leaders and politicians in the federal, regional, and municipal government, specifically noting that many participants of the non-profit's "Leaders of Russia. Politics" program have won State Duma elections since 2020 and forecasting that more participants of the program will run in the 2026 Duma elections.

Putin and other Kremlin officials have recently focused their rhetoric on Russia's strong "traditional and moral values" and used the mythos of the Second World War to call for unity within Russian society – likely as part of an ongoing effort to foster anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and prepare the Russian population for a prolonged war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with NATO.[13] Putin's support for programs aimed at reintegrating Russian veterans into society suggests that the Kremlin fears political instability and the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society – as ISW has assessed.[14] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is engaged in a campaign to create a new cadre of militarized, loyal elites to unify Russian society against the perceived threat of the West, including by co-opting Russian veterans to participate in the 2026 State Duma elections.[15]

The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan. The EU Council announced on May 27 that it adopted a regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financial instrument to facilitate common defense procurement efforts between interested EU member states with the goal of boosting Europe's defense industrial production capacity.[16] The EU will provide up to 150 billion euros (roughly $170 billion) to member states. The package will benefit Ukraine by allowing Ukraine to join common procurement efforts and make military purchases with EU companies. Ukraine is eligible to receive financing through SAFE to purchase materiel, including ammunition; artillery systems; ground combat capabilities and their support systems; critical infrastructure protection; air defense systems; maritime surface and underwater capabilities; drone and anti-drone systems; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems; space assets protection; artificial intelligence (AI); and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The EU's five-part ReArm Europe Plan is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security and in line with US President Donald Trump's calls for Europe to shoulder more of its own defense requirements.[17]

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 26 that Sweden’s government recently approved 4.8 billion Swedish kronor (roughly $499 million) worth of funding to procure materiel to support Ukraine’s defense capabilities.[18] The package allocates 480 million Swedish kronor (roughly $50 million) to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group; over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly $104 million) to the Danish procurement model that allows foreign states to buy Ukrainian-produced materiel for the Ukrainian military; 418 million Swedish kronor (roughly $43 million) for equipment procurement to support of the development of Ukraine’s ground combat capabilities; 550 million Swedish kronor (roughly $57.1 million) and 546 million Swedish kronor (roughly $56.7 million) for the Czech and Estonian ammunition initiatives, respectively; and over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly $104 million) for air defense and long-range drone procurement for Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine.
• Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.
• Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO.
• The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan.
• Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2025

Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26 after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast and 355 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all nine Kh-101 missiles and 233 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 55 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.[2] Ukrainian officials stated that the strikes caused civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure and private residences.

Russia has launched three of its largest strike packages against Ukraine over the last three days, including its two largest combined strikes, and eight of the largest strikes of the war since January 2025.[3] Russian strikes against Ukraine continue to disproportionately impact civilians and civilian infrastructure.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russia launched over 900 drones against Ukraine over the last three days and that intensified Russian strikes have a significant political meaning.[5] Zelensky stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is choosing to continue the war rather than engage in meaningful peace negotiations and that there is no evidence that Russia is considering a diplomatic end to the war.[6] Russia may be increasing strikes against Ukraine as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Western support for Ukraine.

Russia's increased missile stockpiling, drone production, and drone adaptations demonstrate Russia's commitment to achieving its war goals through military means in a protracted war in Ukraine. The Economist reported on May 25 that Ukrainian government sources estimate that the Kremlin has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles.[7] The Economist also reported that Russia is increasing its production of Shahed drones and can currently produce approximately 100 Shaheds a day — roughly four to five times their assessed daily production rate in late 2024.[8] Ukrainian military intelligence told the Economist that Russia plans to increase its production to 500 drones a day by an unspecified future deadline. Ukrainian drone engineers reported that Russia is actively innovating and adapting its Shahed drones to circumvent Ukrainian air defenses, including by using artificial intelligence (AI) and Ukrainian internet and mobile internet networks for navigation to prevent Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. A Ukrainian officer told the Economist that Russian drones are flying at an altitude of 2,000 to 2,500 meters, which is out of range of the small-caliber guns and shoulder-fired missiles that Ukrainian mobile air defense crews use. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on May 25 that Russian forces recently set a new Shahed flight altitude record of 4,900 meters.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 26 that Russia is increasing its production of both Shahed and decoy drones and that Russian forces are flying drones at higher altitudes.[10] Ihnat reported on May 25 that Russian forces have also resumed their use of Kh-22 cruise missiles after temporarily using fewer cruise missiles in their strike packages.[11] Increasingly large Russian strike packages are consistent with reports that Russia is significantly increasing its domestic Shahed drone, decoy drone, and missile production and storage capabilities. Russia's efforts to increase domestic drone and missile production and ongoing adaptations of these strike packages are likely part of a broader Russian effort to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly a future war with NATO.[12]

Ukrainian intelligence continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its war aim of achieving complete Ukrainian capitulation and is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO — in line with ISW's assessments. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Head Oleh Ivashchenko stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform published on May 26 that Russia's strategic plans to gain full control over Ukraine remain unchanged.[13] Ivashchenko stated that the entire Ukrainian intelligence community agrees that Russia is trying to take control over all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Ivashchenko stated that Russia also has a long-term goal to establish influence over all post-Soviet states and that Russia will need two to four years after the end of hostilities in Ukraine to restore the Russian military's combat capabilities. Ivashchenko noted that Russia's ability to rearm its military after the end of its war in Ukraine will depend on Western sanctions. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full surrender and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[14] ISW also continues to assess that the Russian government and military are preparing for a possible future conflict with NATO.[15] Russian authorities recently renewed their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, likely to set conditions for Russia to deny the independence and sovereignty of other former Soviet states in the future.[16]

Ukrainian intelligence also assessed that Russia is facing a number of critical constraints in its economy and on the battlefield — in line with ISW's ongoing assessments. Ivashchenko stated that Russia's sovereign wealth fund has fallen from its pre-war level of about $150 billion to about $38 billion and that Russia's gold and foreign currency reserves are also decreasing.[17] Ivashchenko noted that Russia is suffering from serious labor shortages, which are causing problems in the Russian economy, and that Russian authorities are trying to avoid paying the financial incentives that Russia is offering new military recruits. Ivashchenko stated that roughly 80 percent of the equipment that Russian forces are using is refurbished from Russia's Soviet-era stockpiles and that only about 20 percent of the equipment is modern. Ivashchenko's statements are in line with ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia will face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in the near to medium-term if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate.[18] Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) will struggle to sustain Russia's current equipment and ammunition burn rates in the future, and Putin has mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering from increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.

Russia's own defense industrial production limitations are pushing Russia to rely on its allies and partners and to find cheap solutions to adapt to Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities. Ivashchenko highlighted North Korea's contribution of six million artillery shells, 120 M1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery systems, and 120 M1991 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Russia since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[19] Ivashchenko stated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying machines, chemicals, gunpowder, components, and aviation equipment to at least 20 Russian defense industrial enterprises and that 80 percent of the critical electronics in Russian drones are Chinese made. Ivashchenko stated that Belarus is producing ammunition for Russia and that the Belarusian and Russian DIBs are largely integrated. Russian forces have increasingly supplied frontline units with motorcycles and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies for use in assaults — a response to Ukrainian drone advantages on the battlefield and an effort to offset significant armored vehicle losses.[20] Russia's recent extensive modifications to its long-range Shahed and decoy drones demonstrate that Russia is trying to adapt to Ukraine's successful countermeasures that have been effectively repelling Russia's drone strikes.[21] Russian forces had previously used Shahed drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses so as to allow Russian missiles to hit their targets, but Russia's recent modifications to the drones suggest that Russia is attempting to restore the Shahed as an effective weapon itself.[22] Russia is likely focusing on adapting the Shaheds, increasing their production rate, and launching them in increasingly large quantities as the drones are relatively cheap and can be mass produced — unlike costly missiles that Russia can only produce at a relatively much lower rate. Russia is learning lessons about how to adapt its drone and missile strike packages to most effectively penetrate a large air defense umbrella and deplete air defense missile stockpiles, and Russia will carry these lessons into any future conflict.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent demand for Russian forces to create a "buffer zone" along the Russia-Ukraine international border, in addition to Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, ignores Russia's constraints and underscores Putin's intention to increase his territorial demands. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 26 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to reinforce the Russian force grouping attacking into northern Sumy Oblast.[23] Mashovets stated that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City) and in Gordeevka (just north of Volodymyrivka in Russia). Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment have been operating in the Borova and Lyman directions since at least mid-2024.[24] ISW has observed elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade engaged in combat in the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar direction — a priority direction for the Russian military — since mid-2023 and observed reports of the brigade operating in Chasiv Yar as recently as May 6.[25] ISW has not observed additional reports of these units operating in northern Sumy Oblast but will cover any future reports about these units.

ISW previously noted that Russian forces' inability to penetrate Ukrainian defenses west and southwest of Chasiv Yar is undermining Russia's ability to prepare for major offensive operations against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt.[26] Redeploying forces away from Chasiv Yar suggests that the Russian military command may intend to delay its offensive operation against Kostyantynivka and supports ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia does not currently have sufficient operational reserves to intensify offensive operations in several different directions simultaneously.[27] The Russian military command's decision to redeploy units away from this effort suggests that the Russian military may try to simultaneously continue advances in Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts, however. The Russian military command may assess that Russian forces have a greater chance of significant advances in northern Sumy Oblast than near Chasiv Yar. Putin recently orchestrated a meeting with Russian officials to float the idea of creating an at least 25-kilometer-wide buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, and Putin ordered Russian forces to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024.[28] ISW previously assessed that Putin likely intends to leverage buffer zones in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to justify expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory beyond Russia's long-standing claims over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[29]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises in the Republic of Tatarstan and Ivanovo and Tula oblasts on May 25 and 26. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, implied on May 26 that Ukrainian drones struck the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, and the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant in Kineshma, Ivanovo Oblast.[30] Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi published footage on May 25 showing Russian air defenses appearing to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes near the Alabuga SEZ.[31] Astra reported on May 26 that at least two drones struck a warehouse at the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant and that sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that the warehouse sustained damage.[32] The Ivanovo Oblast Operational Headquarters claimed on May 26 that a drone strike damaged a utility building in Kineshma.[33] Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows an explosion near the Scientific-Production Association (SPLAV) in Tula City, which manufactures multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), grenade launchers, ammunition, and guided and unguided missiles for the Russian military.[34] Astra also reported that Ukrainian drones on May 25 struck the Shcheglovsky Val Plant in Tula Oblast, which develops guided weapons, air defense systems, and small arms and produces vehicles for Pantsir-S and Pantsir-S1 air defense system.[35]

The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at preventing future Western military assistance to Ukraine is rooted in fear and the acknowledgement that Russia's only real hope in defeating Ukraine is by isolating Ukraine from its allies. German Chancellor Friederich Merz stated on May 26 that the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France no longer impose "any range restrictions" on Ukraine's ability to use the long-range weapons that these countries have provided and noted that Ukraine can target military positions in Russia.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Merz and stated that such "potential decisions" would be "quite dangerous" and "run counter to attempts at a [peace] settlement."[37] Pro-Kremlin voices and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers amplified similar sentiments, with some calling on Russia to respond and others claiming that Russia will achieve its war aims militarily.[38] Peskov's statement is part of a prolonged Russian effort to persuade Western states to cease military support for Ukraine, which Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has explicitly named as a condition for engaging in negotiations for a full ceasefire.[39] Russia's only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and the Kremlin likely fears the impacts of continued Western military assistance on Ukraine's military capabilities.[40] Allowing Ukraine to target military warehouses and airbases in Russia also threatens Russia's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine, particularly as Russia seeks to demoralize Ukrainian society through increasingly large and frequent strike packages that disproportionately affect civilian areas.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26, after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25.
• Russia's increased missile stockpiling, drone production, and drone adaptations demonstrate Russia's commitment to achieving its war goals through military means in a protracted war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian intelligence continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its war aim of achieving complete Ukrainian capitulation and is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO — in line with ISW's assessments.
• Ukrainian intelligence also assessed that Russia is facing a number of critical constraints in its economy and on the battlefield — in line with ISW's ongoing assessments.
• Russia's own defense industrial production limitations are pushing Russia to rely on its allies and partners and to find cheap solutions to adapt to Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent demand for Russian forces to create a "buffer zone" along the Russia-Ukraine international border, in addition to Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, ignores Russia's constraints and underscores Putin's intention to increase his territorial demands.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises in the Republic of Tatarstan and Ivanovo and Tula oblasts on May 25 and 26.
• The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at preventing future Western military assistance to Ukraine is rooted in fear and the acknowledgement that Russia's only real hope in defeating Ukraine is by isolating Ukraine from its allies.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities, aggressive rhetorical campaigns, and excessive pessimism in the West about the battlefield situation in Ukraine in a multi-pronged effort to degrade Ukrainian morale and convince the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that supporting Ukraine is futile. Russian forces have intensified long-range strikes against Ukraine over the last eight months and have conducted seven of the largest drone and missile strikes during the war to date since January 2025.[1] Russian officials are currently inundating the information space with calls for Ukraine to make concessions on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, although most of these statements are consistent with long-standing Russian war demands and in fact demonstrate that Russia's demands have not changed over the last three years of war.[2] These demands ignore the fact that the battlefield situation has shifted dramatically since early 2022, and that three years of manpower and materiel losses have significantly degraded the Russian military's ability to conquer Ukraine. Russian advances have significantly slowed as Russian forces continue to suffer personnel losses and increasingly rely on poorly trained and equipped infantry to make gains. Putin remains deeply committed to distracting from the realities of the battlefield situation, however, as bringing about the cessation of Western military assistance to Ukraine is Russia's only real hope of winning this war. 

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 25 that Russian forces launched nine Iskander-M and Kn-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast, 55 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast and the Black Sea, one Kh-22 cruise missile from the airspace over the Black Sea, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from an unspecified area of Russia and 298 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[3] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 45 cruise missiles and that two Kh-59/69 missiles were "lost in location." The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukraine shot down 139 drones and that 127 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike primarily targeted Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts and also targeted Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Sumy, Odesa, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes killed at least 12 people and injured up to 60 people.[5]

Ukrainian sources noted on May 25 that Russian forces are increasingly launching missiles from occupied Crimea after using missiles less frequently over the last five months.[6] Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak reported that Russian forces have launched more than 50 missiles from mobile missile systems in occupied Crimea since January 1, 2025. Chernyak stated that Ukrainian Forces struggle to strike the mobile missile launch systems since Russian forces can deploy the systems in 20 minutes and quickly break down and move the systems after a launch. Experts familiar with the topic reported that Russian forces have been launching Iskander ballistic missiles, Oniks supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles from Crimea. ISW assessed on May 24 that Russian forces have used fewer cruise missiles in strike packages since January 2025, likely due to increased reliance on cheaper long-range drones.[7] The May 24 to 25 overnight combined strike indicates that Russia may be stockpiling cruise missiles in order to conduct large-scale combined strikes against multiple areas of Ukraine at will. Russia may also be using highly varied strike packages in order to confuse Ukrainian forces and prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting consistently effective air defense.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev suggested that Russia will occupy most of Ukraine if the West continues to aid Ukraine. Medvedev called for Russian control over a buffer zone encompassing nearly all of Ukraine, apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland’s border, on his English-language social media accounts on May 25 and threatened that Russia will seize virtually all of Ukraine as a buffer zone if the West continues to supply Ukraine with military aid.[8] Medvedev and other Russian officials have repeatedly called for Russia to establish buffer zones in northern Ukraine, and Medvedev himself previously called for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a "buffer zone" in order to place Russian cities out of the range of Ukraine's Western-provided long-range strike systems. Russian officials routinely issue demands for Ukraine to concede significant swaths of occupied and unoccupied territory to Russia and have used Russia's illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the Kremlin-generated concept of "Novorossiya" — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all southern and eastern Ukraine — to justify these claims.[9] Medvedev's statements are part of a long-term Kremlin strategy to use prominent voices in the information space and weaponized versions of history to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the long-term occupation of Ukrainian territory.[10]

The Kremlin is attempting to leverage large strike packages and increasingly aggressive rhetorical efforts to distract from the Russian military's poor performance during this current stage of the war. Putin may assess that significant strikes against Ukrainian cities and aggressive Russian rhetoric against NATO and Eastern European states will draw sufficient attention away from Russia's slow, grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. ISW has previously noted that Russia has intensified its narrative efforts against Ukraine during critical moments when the West is discussing supplying Ukraine with additional military aid, and Putin likely views the current discussion of a possible ceasefire or peace agreement to end the war as another critical moment among Ukraine's supporters.[11] Putin likely intends long-range strikes and aggressive rhetoric to generate feelings of hopelessness in Ukraine and the West and dissuade European capitals and the US from further aiding Ukraine by falsely portraying Russian victory as inevitable. Russia is also platforming its partnerships with adversarial countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea to push back on the appearance of diplomatic isolation and posture itself as a country with powerful allies who are willing to stand against the West.

Russian officials are attempting to obfuscate the reality of Russia's compounding economic and materiel constraints, which are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to achieve significant battlefield gains. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi recently reported that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russia has prioritized rapidly deploying low quality troops with minimal training and battlefield experience for marginal gains, which further complicates Russian forces' ability to conduct complex operations.[12] Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that would offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term.[13] Russia is also facing significant challenges in balancing resource allocation between defense industrial production and civilian sectors, and is increasingly relying on migrant workers to alleviate significant labor shortages exacerbated by the war effort.[14] The Kremlin may be reassessing its ability to sustain a long-term war effort and appears to be reprioritizing its efforts to convince the West to preemptively concede to Russian demands in light of Russia's economic and military constraints.

Russian forces have eliminated the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk after a four-month-long offensive operation to level the frontline south and southwest of Kostyantynivka in order to set conditions to advance towards the settlement. Geolocated footage published on May 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Zorya and northern Romanivka (west of Toretsk) and likely seized Stara Mykolaivka and Hnativka and the fields south of Romanivka.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Romanivka, and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) participated in the advance north of Romanivka.[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the northern outskirts of Romanivka.[17] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized roughly 65 square kilometers of territory as part of their advance into Romanivka and Zorya, although Ukrainian forces likely previously withdrew from positions in the southern part of this pocket several days or weeks ago.

Russian forces intensified assaults in this area in early February 2025 and began a concerted effort to eliminate Ukrainian positions in the pocket south of Romanivka in late April 2025.[18] The Russian military command redeployed elements of two divisions of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction in mid-February and elements of the 58th CAA (SMD) and 68th Army Corps (AC) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) from the western Zaporizhia and Kurakhove directions respectively to this area in early May.[19] Russian forces have struggled to advance in this area, however, despite appearing to prioritize this sector of the frontline and reinforcing this area in early 2025.

Russian forces would need roughly a century to seize Medvedev's proposed "buffer zone" at their current rate of advance at the cost of nearly 50 million casualties at current loss rates. Russian forces advanced an average of roughly 14.3 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Russia between January 1, 2025, and May 24, 2025. At this rate of advance, it would take Russian forces approximately 3.9 years to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and approximately 91 years to seize Medvedev's proposed "buffer zone," which includes 587,459 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. ISW assessed on February 21 that Russia would need 83 years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine at their then rate of advance, indicating that the Russian rate of advance has slowed between February and May 2025.[20] Current and former Western officials told the Washington Post in an article published on May 24 that Russian forces have sustained an average of 1,500 casualties per day over the last year (since mid-2024), suggesting that Russian forces could suffer nearly 50 million casualties (approximately a third of the current Russian population) were Russian forces to sustain their current casualty rate for the 91 years that it would take to create Medvedev's "buffer zone."[21]

These estimates assume that Russian forces will be able to maintain their current assessed rate of advance and do not take into account a number of geographic and defensive barriers that Russian forces would have to overcome to seize the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine. Russian forces would need to seize Ukraine's fortress belt (a group of major cities that form a significant defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast); cross the Dnipro River and retake Kherson City in Kherson Oblast; conduct a landing operation in the Black Sea to gain positions in Odesa Oblast; and retake Sumy and Kharkiv cities and seize Kyiv and other major cities in central and western Ukraine before seizing Medvedev's "buffer zone." The Dnipro River acts as a natural barrier between current Ukrainian positions and Russian positions in Kherson Oblast and has served as a natural frontline since Ukraine retook Kherson Oblast in 2022. Russian forces failed to accomplish many of these goals during the first several months of the war, and Russian forces have not seized a major urban area since they seized Bakhmut in May 2023.[22] Russian forces have not demonstrated the ability to conduct the kind of rapid, multi-directional offensive operations necessary to accomplish these goals since early 2022 and are unlikely to significantly improve their abilities in the near future given that advancing roughly 65 square kilometers constitutes a significant success in a priority frontline area at this stage of the war.

The Kremlin is also using its bilateral engagements with Ukraine and the United States to maintain the appearance of being interested in peace and delay Western discussion of additional aid to Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia concluded the 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner of war (POWs) exchange on May 25, each exchanging 303 servicemembers.[23] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin stated that Russia expects the POW exchange to establish "a favorable atmosphere for discussing a settlement" to Russia's war in Ukraine.[24] Russian officials are framing Russia's participation in the POW exchange and bilateral negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul as indicators that Russia is interested in peace.[25] The Kremlin is clearly attempting to portray Russia as amenable to negotiations despite Russian officials' consistent public statements about Russia's unwillingness to engage in ceasefire discussions or compromise on any agreement short of Ukraine's capitulation.

Russia's only real hope of winning this war is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his theory of victory, which assumes that the Russian military will be able to sustain significant personnel losses in exchange for incremental gains in Ukraine indefinitely and that Russia will be able to outlast Western support for Ukraine.[26] Putin is therefore desperately seeking to prevent the future supply of Western military aid to Ukraine, as well-resourced Ukrainian forces have consistently demonstrated their ability to inflict unsustainable losses on Russian forces and defend against significant Russian advances.[27] ISW assesses that Western aid remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and is crucial for ensuring a just and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term security in Europe.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities, aggressive rhetorical campaigns, and excessive pessimism in the West about the battlefield situation in Ukraine in a multi-pronged effort to degrade Ukrainian morale and convince the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that supporting Ukraine is futile.
• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 24 to 25.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev suggested that Russia will occupy most of Ukraine if the West continues to aid Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is attempting to leverage large strike packages and increasingly aggressive rhetorical efforts to distract from the Russian military's poor performance during this current stage of the war.
• Russian forces have eliminated the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk after a four-month-long offensive operation to level the frontline south and southwest of Kostyantynivka in order to set conditions to advance towards the settlement.
• Russian forces would need roughly a century to seize Medvedev's proposed "buffer zone" at their current rate of advance at the cost of nearly 50 million casualties at current loss rates.
• The Kremlin is also using its bilateral engagements with Ukraine and the United States to maintain the appearance of being interested in peace and delay Western discussion of additional aid to Ukraine.
• Russia's only real hope of winning this war is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2025

Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24 but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 24 that Russian forces launched 14 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from the directions of Taganrog, Rostov Oblast; Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; Bryansk City; and occupied Crimea and 250 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six Iskander-M missiles and 128 Shahed drones, and that 117 drones were “lost in location.” Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike heavily targeted Kyiv City and that drones and missiles also struck Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[ii] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed prior to the strike on March 23 that Russian forces would respond "adequately" to recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions and defense facilities.[iii] Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly attacks against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025.

Russian forces appear to be reducing their use of cruise missiles, indicating that increased Russian drone production and innovations to long-range drones and related strike tactics are providing Russian forces with a cheaper alternative to cruise missiles.[iv] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line.[v] Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi reported on February 11 that Russian forces had reduced their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles and were increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles.[vi] I ssian forces appear to be increasing their use of long-range drones and decreasing their use of cruise missiles in strikes against Ukraine, possibly to conserve the  airframes that Russian forces use to launch cruise missiles.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a second round of prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges on May 24 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian and Russian officials announced that Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 307 POWs.[viii] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian POWs included those serving in the Ukrainian Army, Naval Forces, State Border Service, and the National Guard.[ix] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Ukraine and Russia have each exchanged a total of 697 soldiers and civilians over the last two days. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian authorities are transporting the Russian servicemembers to Belarus for rehabilitation.[x]

Russian officials will reportedly submit a draft document of their conditions for peace in Ukraine following the conclusion of the POW exchanges, although Russia's conditions are unlikely to be anything short of Ukraine's full surrender. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 23 that Ukraine expects Russia to present a draft proposal for an unconditional ceasefire agreement after the third and final POW exchange on May 25.[xi] Sybiha added that Ukraine welcomes the participation of US President Donald Trump and European leaders in future peace talks and that Ukraine has not ruled out the possibility of holding a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on May 23 that Russia would be ready to present Ukraine with Russia's draft document on a "long-term settlement of the crisis" as soon as the POW exchange is completed.[xii] Lavrov's statement highlights the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force Ukraine and the West to begin long-term peace negotiations without an active ceasefire in place, in contrast to US, Ukrainian, and European efforts to first secure an unconditional ceasefire agreement prior to any long-term peace talks. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[xiii]

Russian forces have significantly expanded their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka in recent weeks and established sufficient positions to launch an offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka from the south or to support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from the northeast in the coming weeks and months. Geolocated footage published on May 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Popiv Yar (west of Toretsk) and seized the fields southeast of the settlement.[xiv] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 23 that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the advance near Popiv Yar and that Russian forces also advanced north and south of Oleksandropil (southeast of Popiv Yar).[xv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing further into Poltavka (north of Popiv Yar) and toward Rusyn Yar (northeast of Popiv Yar).[xvi] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are advancing near Novoolenivka (east of Popiv Yar).[xvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Romanivka (southeast of Popiv Yar) and that Russian forces are eliminating the remaining Ukrainian positions south and southeast of Zorya (southeast of Popiv Yar).[xviii]

The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is likely sufficient to support a future Russian offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk, but Russian forces will have to make further advances from Chasiv Yar and Toretsk and west of Pokrovsk before Russian forces will pose a significant threat to either of these towns. ISW has observed geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces have advanced roughly 14 kilometers from the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka at their closest point in this salient. Russian forces will be able to leverage this salient to advance further along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway from the south toward Kostyantynivka as Russian forces contend with Ukrainian defenses west of and along the Kleban-Byk reservoir. Russian forces must eliminate the remaining Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw north of the Kleban-Byk reservoir before Russian forces will be able to advance further along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway to support future advances up to the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.

ISW previously noted that Russian forces have struggled to break out of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, which has likely complicated Russia’s plans for an offensive against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt.[xix] Russian advances in Chasiv Yar have been slow over the last year, and Russian forces have yet to significantly reinforce the Russian grouping in this area to facilitate further advances. Russian forces will have to break through Ukrainian defenses and advance south and southwest of Chasiv Yar before Russian forces will be able to threaten Kostyantynivka from the northeast. Russia reinforced its force grouping in Toretsk in early 2025, but Russian forces continue to struggle to advance through the contested "gray zone" that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created within Toretsk and immediately west of Toretsk. Russian forces must advance in the fields north, northwest, and west of Toretsk and seize positions further along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway before Russian forces can launch a serious offensive operation against Kostyantynivka. The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is therefore only one of the three necessary areas where Russian forces must make further advances in order to seriously threaten Kostyantynivka.

Russian forces must advance further west of Pokrovsk if they intend to envelop Pokrovsk and avoid fighting through the town's urban areas in Summer 2025. Russian forces largely abandoned efforts to expand their salient southwest of Pokrovsk when Ukrainian forces conducted a series of counterattacks south and southwest of Pokrovsk in February 2025. Russian forces have not reintensified this effort and have instead prioritized advances further southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka in March, April, and May 2025. Russian forces must reintensify their efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne if Russian forces intend to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under threat of envelopment. Russian forces have recently intensified assaults immediately southeast and south of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and Russian forces may be preparing to attack into the towns themselves to support the envelopment effort - as Russian forces did in Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka over the last year. Russian forces will also have to contend with ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations throughout the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in future offensive operations. ISW continues to assess that Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months and will likely have to prioritize one direction.[xx]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24 but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a second round of prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges on May 24 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
• Russian officials will reportedly submit a draft document of their conditions for peace in Ukraine following the conclusion of the POW exchanges, although Russia's conditions are unlikely to be anything short of Ukraine's full surrender.
• Russian forces have significantly expanded their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka in recent weeks and established sufficient positions to launch an offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka from the south or to support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from the northeast in the coming weeks and months.
• The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is likely sufficient to support a future Russian offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk, but Russian forces will have to make further advances from Chasiv Yar and Toretsk and west of Pokrovsk before Russian forces will pose a significant threat to either of these towns.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23, 2025

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace agreement in Ukraine include conditions to prevent the election and establishment of future pro-Western governments in Ukraine. Lavrov insisted on May 23 that any peace agreement must include conditions preventing the "repetition of what brought putschists to power through a bloody revolution," referring to Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity, which drove out Ukraine's former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych.[i] Lavrov also reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated claim that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine and claimed that Russia could negotiate with the leadership of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada (parliament) instead of Zelensky.

Russian officials often deliberately misread the Ukrainian Constitution to claim that Zelensky's government is illegitimate since Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, although the Ukrainian Constitution and law prohibit the government from holding elections during times of martial law and external aggression.[ii] Russian officials have repeatedly characterized Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and Revolution of Dignity as a "coup," and leverage this narrative to reinforce Russia's claims that the current Ukrainian government is not legitimate and thus cannot negotiate with Russia.[iii] Lavrov's statement is also an explicit demand for regime change in Ukraine as a condition of any future peace agreement – a demand that Russian officials routinely make under the guise of demands for "denazification" in Ukraine.[iv] Russian officials will likely falsely frame any future pro-Western government in Ukraine as inheriting the illegitimacy of all Ukrainian governments since 2014 and set conditions to claim that any agreement that Russia concludes with Ukraine is non-binding.

Lavrov also rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the Vatican could host negotiations on Russia's war against Ukraine.[v] Lavrov claimed that negotiations in the Vatican would be "unrealistic" and that it would be "uncomfortable" for the representatives of "two Orthodox countries" to meet in the Vatican.[vi]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a 390-for-390 prisoner-of-war (POW) and civilian exchange on May 23 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine and Russia exchanged 390 Ukrainians for 390 Russians in the first stage of the 1,000-for-1,000 exchange and that Ukraine expects the swaps to continue on May 24 and 25.[vii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 270-for-270 POW exchange and a 120-for-120 civilian exchange.[viii]

Russian forces reportedly recently executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office stated on May 23 that it launched an investigation into reports of Russian forces executing two POWs in the Pokrovsk direction on May 22.[ix] The prosecutor's office reported that Russian forces captured, disarmed, and executed two of four Ukrainian soldiers conducting a combat operation near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk). The prosecutor's office reported that the status of the other two Ukrainian soldiers is unknown. There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025.[x] ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[xi]

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved an experimental application to monitor migrants, likely in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalist demands while continuing to leverage migrants to support force generation and mitigate labor shortages. Putin signed a law on May 23 allowing Moscow City and Oblast authorities to introduce an experimental mobile application to register and track migrants.[xii] The law forces some populations of migrants to register with Russian authorities and provide their location to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) through a mobile application. Russian state outlets reported that Russian authorities may deport migrants who attempt to conceal their location.[xiii] This experimental application system will begin on September 1 and will last until September 1, 2029. The official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta suggested that Russia would extend these registration and tracking systems throughout Russia should the test in Moscow City and Oblast prove successful.[xiv] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin stated on May 20 at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum that the Investigative Committee recently created a new division for investigating crimes that migrants commit in Russia.[xv]

ISW continues to assess that Putin is prioritizing leveraging migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages and to support force generation efforts, despite ongoing complaints from Russian ultranationalists advocating for the Kremlin to impose harsher restrictions on migrants.[xvi] Putin may be attempting to placate Russian ultranationalists by approving select harsher restrictions that ultimately allow Russia to better monitor migrants to leverage them for labor and force generation.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace agreement in Ukraine include conditions to prevent the election and establishment of future pro-Western governments in Ukraine.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a 390-for-390 prisoner-of-war (POW) and civilian exchange on May 23 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
• Russian forces reportedly recently executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved an experimental application to monitor migrants, likely in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalist demands while continuing to leverage migrants to support force generation and mitigate labor shortages.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 22, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society. Putin stated on May 22 at a likely highly scripted award ceremony that "strong family foundations" and "traditional values" support Russia's "1,000-year-old statehood."[1] Putin emphasized that Russia's "most important" task is to preserve its people, culture, and spirituality. A Russian Orthodox priest who received an award during the ceremony thanked Putin for protecting Russian traditional culture, spirituality, and language. The priest noted that Russia's celebrations of its contributions to victory in the Second World War teach Russian youth and those in the "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") to defend Russia and love Russia's culture and spiritual foundations. (The "Russian World" is a Kremlin-promoted geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly encompass those who live outside of Russia's borders but relate in some vague way to Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media). Russian State Historical Museum General Director and awardee Alexei Levikin claimed that many countries hostile to Russia are basing their policies and ideologies on the falsification of historical events and facts. A martial arts school director who received an award claimed that Russia always proves that its fighters are the best on the battlefields and in sports arenas.

Putin notably promoted Russian nationalism by emphasizing Russia's spirituality and thousand-year history and by giving only a Russian Orthodox priest — but no representatives of other faiths — an award, despite the fact that the Russian state formally regards Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as Russia's "traditional" religions.[2] Putin has previously highlighted ethnic and religious minorities' contributions to Russia at high profile events and has often promoted a civic Russian identity and nationalism.[3] Putin's departure from this rhetoric at the highly staged event on May 22 may be an attempt to appease the increasingly pro-war Russian ultranationalist community. Putin is also attempting to use the awardees' statements to reinforce the creation of an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to defeat Russia, thereby justifying a future military conflict against the West to the Russian public.[4] Putin declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," and the development of an informal Russian nationalist ideology provides an ideological foundation for the ongoing Kremlin effort to develop a new cadre of loyal elites that includes selected veterans of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[5] Putin will likely expand efforts to unify Russian society against the perceived threat of the West and to develop an elite class of militarized nationalists in order to ensure that any successor will embody similarly aggressive and dangerous ideals that perpetuate eternal conflict with the West and NATO.

Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution. Russian State Duma Deputy Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy stated on May 19 at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum that Russia may change its constitution in the future.[6] Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation Head Pavel Krasheninnikov later stated at the forum that the Russian Constitution "meets current realities" and does not need amending, however.[7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 19, in response to Tolstoy, that changing the constitution is "not on the [Kremlin's] agenda."[8] Bastrykin claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on May 22 that Russia is built on traditional values, such as patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland, and a strong family, and that these traditional values should underpin Russia's "national idea."[9] Bastrykin further claimed that Russia should enshrine this "national idea" in its constitution. Bastrykin emphasized Russia's need to protect and preserve its "historical heritage" through legal frameworks. Bastrykin routinely publicly expresses interest in an informal Russian state ideology predicated on Russian ethno-religious nationalism and opposition to the West, in contrast to other senior Russian officials.[10] The Russian Constitution notably forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology.[11] Peskov stated on May 22 that it is difficult to comment on proposals to amend the Russian Constitution because the Kremlin does not have the specifics of such proposals — a departure from his May 19 statement apparently dismissing changes to the constitution.[12] Kremlin officials most recently leveraged Victory Day, Russia's largest holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to the Second World War, to promote a new informal state ideology based on Russian unity in the face of opposition from the West.[13] The Kremlin is likely accelerating its promotion of this ideology to prepare the domestic population for a future military conflict against the West. Bastrykin is likely spearheading efforts to formally enshrine Russian nationalist ideology in the constitution as one of the most powerful and influential ultranationalists within the Kremlin elite.

Russian authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to deny Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the future. Russian State Duma Committee on the Protection of the Family, Fatherhood, Motherhood, and Childhood Head and member of the Communist Party Central Committee Nina Ostanina stated on May 22 that Duma deputies are ready to raise the issue of the alleged illegality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[14] Ostanina agreed with Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov's May 21 claim that the Soviet Union's founding body was not involved in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and that, therefore, the Soviet Union still legally exists.[15] Ostanina further claimed that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was illegal because "no one gave authority" to then Belarusian Parliament Chairperson Stanislav Shushkevich, then Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic President Boris Yeltsin, and then Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to sign the December 1991 Belovezha Accords, the internationally recognized document in which the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union.[16] Russian authorities have intermittently revived false narratives about the illegality of the Soviet Union's dissolution and calls to reestablish the Soviet Union since at least 2014, and promoted this informational effort in 2021 and 2023.[17] The Kremlin has been pursuing its strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus through the framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus and consistently denies Ukrainian sovereignty.[18] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, have frequently invoked the "trinity doctrine" — the ideological concept suggesting that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are a "triune" and forcibly separated people.[19] The Kremlin may be instructing lower-level officials to reinject the narrative about the allegedly illegal dissolution of the Soviet Union into the Russian information space in order to set conditions for the Kremlin to withdraw its recognition of Ukraine and Belarus as independent states in the future and call for a united Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian state. Russian officials have notably not acted upon past calls for the reestablishment of the Soviet Union, and the most recent iteration of this information campaign is similarly unlikely to have any near-term effects.

Russian authorities and state media continue to publicly question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Legal Department Director Maksim Musikhin claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on May 21 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has "long" lost his "internal" and "external" legitimacy so there "may be problems" with any agreements Zelensky may sign in the future.[20] Musikhin claimed that a person "who has the [Ukrainian] people's mandate" should sign any future agreements and that the Ukrainian people must choose a new leader. Musikhin claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution may grant the head of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada the power to sign agreements. TASS also amplified a source allegedly "close to the negotiations" in Istanbul claiming that Ukraine will have to change the members of its negotiating group in order to work on a memorandum for a future peace treaty because the Ukrainian delegation at the recent Istanbul talks had a "shortage of politicians."[21] The source further questioned the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian negotiating group by claiming that the group may include "spies" working for European states or the United States. Musikhin is reiterating the longstanding false Kremlin claim that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine and therefore cannot sign any agreements with Russia.[22] Musikhin is also repeating Russian President Vladimir Putin's false claim that the Verkhovna Rada is the only legitimate power in Ukraine.[23] Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that Ukraine must hold elections for its government to be legitimate even though Ukraine's constitution and law explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and prohibits the Ukrainian government from lifting martial law during invasion by a hostile country.[24] Musikhin's statements and these Russian state media reports are part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to set conditions for Russia to justify its withdrawal from any future peace agreements with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing and to support Russia's repeated demand that Ukraine acquiesce to regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian government.[25]

Recent Western reporting provided additional details in a case in which Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November 2024, supporting ISW's assessment that high-level Russian military commanders are likely involved in these executions. CNN reported on May 21 that a Ukrainian intelligence official provided drone footage and intercepted audio in which a Russian commander ordered the execution of Ukrainian POWs and that the footage and audio correspond to a credible report of a Russian execution in western Zaporizhia Oblast in November 2024.[26] CNN reported that it could not independently verify the radio intercept or its link to the execution but noted that a forensic expert and an unnamed Western intelligence official found the audio to be authentic and "consistent with previously documented brutal executions." Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told CNN that elements of a "Storm" unit of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) were responsible for the November 2024 executions and at least one other suspected execution. ISW observed additional reporting and footage that indicated that Russian forces captured and disarmed six Ukrainian POWs and executed five at close range near Novodarivka (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) on November 23, 2024, in violation of international law.[27] UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial summary or arbitrary executions Morris Tidball-Binz told CNN that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs cannot occur at such high numbers or frequency without the orders or consent of the highest Russian military commanders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin. There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[28]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev's appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely appointed Mordvichev to proliferate positional warfare tactics and operational concepts for grinding marginal advances — the main tactics Russian forces used in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction — across Russia’s Ground Forces.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society.
• Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution.
• Russian authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to deny Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the future.
• Russian authorities and state media continue to publicly question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine.
• Recent Western reporting provided additional details in a case in which Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November 2024, supporting ISW's assessment that high-level Russian military commanders are likely involved in these executions.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev's appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 21, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely orchestrated a meeting with Kursk Oblast officials on May 20 to set conditions to justify the renewal of Russian plans to seize Sumy City and illegally annex Sumy Oblast. Putin met with municipal leaders in Kursk Oblast on May 20, during which the head of Glushkovsky Raion, Pavel Zolotarev, asked Putin to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast.[1] Putin asked how many kilometers deep this buffer zone should be, and Zolotarev claimed that Russia should seize "at least Sumy (City)" and implied that Russia should be "bigger."[2] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein later responded to the interaction on his Telegram channel, claiming that his grandfather was from Sumy Oblast, so "this land is not foreign to [him]."[3] Sumy City is roughly 25 kilometers from the international border, and a buffer zone deep enough to include Sumy City would prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery and tactical drone strikes against Russian territory. Western and Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian delegation at the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul threatened to seize Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone."[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia has territorial aims beyond the oblasts that Russia has already illegally occupied or annexed and that Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations.[5]

The Kremlin likely arranged the interaction at the May 20 meeting in order to frame Putin as an effective and engaged wartime leader by responding to Russian requests to further advance in Sumy Oblast and suggesting that Russia lay claim to more territory within Ukraine. Putin's visit to Kursk Oblast on May 20 for the first time since Russia claimed military victory in the oblast on April 26.[6] ISW has observed reports that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast as fighting continues, despite official Kremlin claims that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the oblast entirely.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 21 that Ukrainian forces continue active combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[8] Putin also met with Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein and agreed to continue providing federal funding for local residents and to increase demining operations.[9] Putin's meeting with Khinshtein is part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Putin as an effective and caring wartime leader and to downplay Russian failures in the Ukraine theater.[10]

Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term given Russia's demonstrated inability to rapidly seize even much smaller settlements in Ukraine in the past three years. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 19 that elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th AC, LMD) are conducting most of the assaults in the Sumy direction and that elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are likely also operating in the Sumy direction.[11] Mashovets stated that up to four or five motorized rifle and rifle regiments of the Russian mobilization reserve are also operating in the Sumy direction.[12] These limited elements reportedly operating in the Sumy direction are insufficient to seize a city as large as Sumy City (pre-war population of 256,000), and Russian forces have not demonstrated the capability to seize large cities since the first months of the war. Russian forces have not seized a Ukrainian city with a pre-war population greater than 100,000 since capturing Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast in July 2022, but the seizure of Lysychansk was the result of a slow grinding effort that caused Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine to culminate in summer 2022, as opposed to a rapid and effective maneuver operation.[13] Russian forces have since struggled to seize much smaller settlements in subsequent campaigns despite using larger numbers of forces, especially in eastern and northern Ukraine.[14] Ukrainian officials have also previously expressed doubt that Russian forces would be able to conduct an effective offensive operation to seize Sumy City.[15]

Russia continues to promote the false narrative accusing Ukrainian forces of "neo-Nazism" as part of dual Kremlin efforts to justify continued Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite ongoing peace talks, and to prepare the Russian population for a Russian rejection of any future peace agreement. Putin also used the visit to Kursk Oblast to claim that Ukrainian forces intentionally damaged monuments to the Second World War during the Kursk Oblast incursion.[16] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces' alleged destruction of these monuments "gives [Russia] every reason to say that these are people with neo-Nazi ideology." The Kremlin has long promoted the narrative that Ukraine harbors neo-Nazi ideology in an effort to justify its military aggression against Ukraine and its calls for regime change in Kyiv. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have recently claimed that the Ukrainian government does not fully control the Ukrainian military and lacks control over alleged "neo-Nazi groups" as part of wider Kremlin efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy and present Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using its narratives about the Ukrainian government's illegitimacy to set conditions to renege on any future Ukrainian-Russian agreements, and the Kremlin may intensify this informational campaign to socialize the Russian domestic audience for such a future rejection.[18] The fact that Putin is perpetuating these narratives to justify further offensive operations in Ukraine highlights the dissonance between Putin's posturing to Western audiences versus his posturing to a domestic audience.

Russia continues to reject American proposals to establish a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting negotiations to end the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on May 20 that the United States is waiting for Russia to present a document outlining the "terms that [Russia] would require in order to reach a ceasefire that would then allow for broader negotiations."[19] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov directly rejected on May 21 the idea that Russia and Ukraine should come to "a truce and then we'll see," apparently disparaging the United States and its partners' attempts to facilitate negotiations.[20] Lavrov claimed that Russia does not want to repeat the Istanbul 2022 Ukrainian-Russian talks. Lavrov's May 21 statement is an explicit rejection of the US proposal for the establishment of a ceasefire first and then peace talks.[21] ISW has long assessed that Russia attempted to use the Istanbul 2022 talks to frame Russia's demands for Ukraine's full surrender as legitimate and reasonable.[22] Lavrov's statements indicate that Russia continues to conflate the ceasefire and peace settlement processes, as Russia remains committed to making incremental gains on the battlefield indefinitely.

Russian officials are setting conditions to refuse Western involvement in peace negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine and for Russia to deny the independence and sovereignty of other former Soviet states. Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov claimed on May 21 that the Soviet Union's founding body, the Congress of People's Deputies, was not involved in dissolving the Soviet Union, so the Soviet Union still legally exists and the war in Ukraine is therefore an "internal process."[23] Kobyakov further claimed that the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics did not have the legal authority to ratify the December 1991 Belovezha Accords, the internationally recognized document in which the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union.[24] The parliament of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic elected Boris Yeltsin president of the Russian republic in 1990, and it is in this capacity that he legally signed the Belovezha Accords.[25] Article 72 of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union, however, notably already gave each republic the right to freely secede from the USSR.[26] The Soviet republics formalized the dissolution of the Soviet Union with Declaration No. 142-N in December 1991.[27] Russia has long recognized the independence of and established diplomatic relations with the former Soviet republics.[28] Russia has since entered into a number of treaties with Ukraine, explicitly acknowledging Ukraine's legitimacy.[29] Russia has also long claimed the right to protect its "compatriots abroad" in former Soviet states and created simplified pathways for citizens of former Soviet states to obtain Russian passports – implicit acknowledgments of these states' independence from Russia.[30]

Kobyakov's claims are likely part of efforts to set conditions for the Kremlin to present its full-scale invasion of Ukraine as an "internal Russian affair" in which foreign states should not be involved, including during peace negotiations to end the war. Kobyakov's statements notably also further set conditions for Russia to deny the legitimacy of all the former Soviet republics and to claim the right to violate the territorial integrity of other former Soviet countries beyond Ukraine. The Kremlin has long claimed that Russia is the legitimate successor state to both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, and ISW continues to assess that Russia seeks to reconstitute the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire.[31]

Russian security services continue to conduct hybrid operations against the United States and its allies in preparation for a larger future war with NATO. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), along with the intelligence services of Germany, Czechia, Poland, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, and the Netherlands, issued a cybersecurity advisory on May 21 warning that a Russian state-sponsored cyber campaign has been targeting Western logistics and technology companies for over two years.[32] The report stated that the 85th Main Special Service Center (Unit 26165) of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) has targeted the defense, transportation, and IT service verticals of both government and commercial entities within NATO member states, Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Unit 26165 actors reportedly exploited systemic vulnerabilities and leveraged spearfishing, brute guessing, and impersonation campaigns to access information on Western aid shipments to Ukraine, including vessel numbers, routes, and cargo contents. The actors also likely gained remote access to private cameras near key logistics hubs and through public sources, such as traffic cameras, to track the movement of materials into Ukraine. IP camera attacks are largely targeted at cameras within Ukraine, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia.

The recent establishment of the first formal motorcycle unit within the Ukrainian military demonstrates the rapid technical adaptation cycle that has become typical in Ukraine and that will become a key characteristic of future wars. Ukraine’s 425th “Skala” Separate Assault Regiment reported on May 20 that the Ukrainian military command formed Ukraine’s first assault motorcycle company within the regiment and tasked the company with conducting adaptable assault operations and quickly breaking through Russian positions.[33] Ukraine is likely developing its own motorcycle units in response to the recent Russian formalization of its use of motorcycles — a tactic Russian forces have increasingly used on the battlefield since late 2024.[34] Russian forces have grown increasingly reliant on light vehicles such as motorcycles, buggies, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) due to successful Ukrainian drone strikes that have damaged and destroyed Russian armored vehicles and exacerbated Russia's vehicle shortages.[35] Russian forces appear to be undergoing a transition period and moving towards regularly conducting assaults exclusively on motorcycles.[36] Ukraine’s formation of its motorcycle unit demonstrates the rapid proliferation of technical adaptations throughout the frontline in Ukraine, with major changes implemented across a thousand-kilometer frontline in as few as two to three weeks.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin likely orchestrated a meeting with Kursk Oblast officials on May 20 to set conditions to justify the renewal of Russian plans to seize Sumy City and illegally annex Sumy Oblast.
• Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term given Russia's demonstrated inability to rapidly seize even much smaller settlements in Ukraine in the past three years.
• Russia continues to promote the false narrative accusing Ukrainian forces of "neo-Nazism" as part of dual Kremlin efforts to justify continued Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite ongoing peace talks, and to prepare the Russian population for a Russian rejection of any future peace agreement.
• Russia continues to reject American proposals to establish a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting negotiations to end the war.
• Russian officials are setting conditions to refuse Western involvement in peace negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine and for Russia to deny the independence and sovereignty of other former Soviet states.
• Russian security services continue to conduct hybrid operations against the United States and its allies in preparation for a larger future war with NATO.
• The recent establishment of the first formal motorcycle unit within the Ukrainian military demonstrates the rapid technical adaptation cycle that has become typical in Ukraine and that will become a key characteristic of future wars.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20, 2025

Senior Russian officials continue to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in peace negotiations to end the war. Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev claimed during the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum on May 20 that there are currently no Ukrainian officials with the authority to conclude a peace treaty with Russia and that Russia may need to consult Ukraine’s Constitution to identify authorized negotiation partners.[1] Medvedev questioned Ukraine's sovereignty and claimed that Ukraine is a "failed state" whose leaders’ lack of legitimacy raises "serious questions" about who Russia can negotiate with during future peace negotiations.[2] Medvedev‘s claims directly contradict Putin’s reported agreement with US President Donald Trump to immediately begin bilateral negotiations with Ukraine.[3] Medvedev’s statements indicate that Russia is, in fact, not interested in engaging with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian government officials who are key to bilateral negotiations to end the war.

Russian officials have repeatedly promoted the false narrative that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate to justify Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and further Russia's long-standing war goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv.[4] Ukraine's Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[5] Zelensky also recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude him from negotiating with Putin.[6] Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko recently stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.[7] ISW continues to assess that any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia’s explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian Constitution.[8]

Medvedev also reiterated long-standing Russian demands tantamount to Ukraine’s complete capitulation. Medvedev falsely claimed that Russia’s illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea was legitimate under international law, underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make any concessions in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[9] Medvedev also demanded that Ukraine demilitarize the current frontline, refuse foreign military aid, and reject European peacekeeping deployments to Ukraine.[10] Medvedev stated that Russia would consider the deployment of European forces to be a military threat and categorize future deployments of European forces in Ukraine as legitimate military targets.[11] Medvedev’s statements indicate that Russia has not abandoned its original goals in Ukraine, which include the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine, securing international recognition of large parts of southern and eastern Ukraine as Russian territory, and a permanent non-aligned status for Ukraine.[12] Medvedev's threats against future European peacekeepers are also part of an ongoing effort to frame the current war in Ukraine as an existential conflict between Russia and the West.[13] Medvedev’s statements indicate that Putin has not ordered Russian officials to abandon ongoing narrative efforts to discredit Ukraine in response to promises that Putin allegedly made to Trump and that Putin likely does not intend to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense industry. Italian media reported in mid-May 2025 that Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto announced that Italy approved an eleventh military aid package for Ukraine, which will include one SAMP/T air and missile defense system, 400 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and ammunition.[14] Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom reported on May 20 that it signed a memorandum of cooperation with Belgian ammunition manufacturer KNDS Belgium to coordinate the joint assembly of medium-caliber ammunition for automatic cannons.[15]

The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20.[16] The package is the EU's largest targeting Russia's shadow fleet and the Russian energy and military-industrial sector.[17] The EU also sanctioned the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops; the 27th Scientific Center; and the Russian Ministry of Defense's 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute for Russia's use of chemical weapons in Ukraine.[18] The UK also announced new sanctions against Russia's military, energy, and financial sectors on May 20.[19]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20.[20] Solodchuk most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[21] Solodchuk is replacing Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev, who reportedly recently replaced General Oleg Salyukov as Russian Ground Forces Commander.[22] 

Key Takeaways:

• Senior Russian officials continue to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in peace negotiations to end the war.
• Medvedev also reiterated long-standing Russian demands tantamount to Ukraine’s complete capitulation.
• Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense industry.
• The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and in the Zaporizhia direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2025

US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call on May 19 to discuss ceasefire and peace negotiations regarding Russia's war in Ukraine. Trump stated that he and Putin agreed that Russia and Ukraine will immediately begin bilateral negotiations about both a ceasefire and a peace agreement.[1] Trump also said that he called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen after his conversation with Putin and informed them that bilateral negotiations will begin immediately. Trump stated that the Vatican is "very interested in hosting the negotiations." Trump also expressed interest in reviving US–Russian trade after Ukraine and Russia agree to a peace deal and said that Ukraine could also benefit from trade during the reconstruction process. Putin spoke to journalists following the call on May 19 and stated that he and Trump agreed that Russia would present Ukraine with a "memorandum" detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations.[2] Putin also stated that Russia’s "main" concern is the elimination of the war’s "root causes," reiterating a long-standing Kremlin narrative calling for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian proxy government and Ukraine's commitment to neutrality.[3] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov told journalists on May 19 that Trump and Putin also discussed a possible nine-for-nine US–Russian prisoner exchange.[4]

Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump before Trump's call with Putin and spoke with Trump, Macron, Meloni, Merz, Stubb, and von der Leyen following the Trump–Putin call.[5] Zelensky reaffirmed Ukraine's readiness for a full unconditional ceasefire as Trump has previously proposed. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready for direct negotiations with Russia "in any format" and offered Turkey, the Vatican, or Switzerland as possible venues for talks. Zelensky called for the negotiation process to involve both American and European representatives "at the appropriate level." Russia must break its pattern of protracting negotiations and failing to offer any meaningful concessions to Ukraine in order for legitimate and good-faith negotiations to lead to a lasting and sustainable end to its war against Ukraine.

Russia must explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty in order to engage in meaningful, good-faith negotiations. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly falsely claimed that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader according to the Ukrainian Constitution and that all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are also illegitimate.[6] Ukraine's Constitution and law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[7] Russia and Ukraine cannot engage in meaningful negotiations so long as Russia refuses to recognize the negotiating authority of Ukraine. Russian officials have forwarded the narrative about the Ukrainian government's alleged illegitimacy as recently as May 17, and ISW continues to assess that this Russian effort is aimed at setting conditions for Russia to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.[8] Any future peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution.

Russia must agree that ceasefire negotiations must precede peace settlement negotiations. The United States, Ukraine, and Europe have repeatedly called for the establishment of a ceasefire to allow for diplomatic talks to end Russia's war in Ukraine to proceed.[9] Russia has consistently rejected this sequence of events as part of efforts to hold any ceasefire talks hostage to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as to continue making battlefield advances.[11] Peace talks ahead of an established ceasefire would allow Russia to continue to make advances in Ukraine, which Russia would likely try to leverage in Ukrainian–Russian talks to extract further concessions. Any future ceasefire will require Russia and Ukraine to engage in separate negotiations to agree on the necessary robust monitoring mechanisms, and conflating ceasefire talks with peace settlement talks will likely delay the implementation of a ceasefire.

Russia must show its willingness to make concessions of its own in any future bilateral negotiations, especially as the Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to expand its list of demands amid the peace talks.[12] Russian officials have called for Ukraine to cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — even the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy — before Russia can agree to a ceasefire.[13] Territorial demands are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, not ceasefire talks. Russia has reportedly already started to increase its demands, with Western and Ukrainian sources reporting that the Russian delegation threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed or claimed — during the May 16 talks in Istanbul.[14] This tactic suggests that Russia will make additional, more extreme territorial demands during war termination talks should Ukraine agree to Russia's ceasefire preconditions.

Russia reportedly continues to expand its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and Estonia, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO. The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 19 that recent satellite imagery, which NATO officials confirmed, shows that Russia is building bases and military infrastructure near the Finnish and Estonian borders.[15] The NYT reported that Russian forces are building and renovating tents, vehicle storage warehouses, fighter jet shelters, and helicopter bases at Olenya and Alakurtti air bases in Murmansk Oblast, Kamenka Air Base in Komi Republic, and Petrozavodsk Air Base in the Republic of Karelia. A senior NATO official stated that Russia will likely redeploy troops further north when its war in Ukraine ends and that Russia assesses that its access to the Arctic is key for its great power status. The NYT stated that Finnish defense officials predict that it will take Russia roughly five years to build up its forces to threatening levels after the war in Ukraine is over, possibly tripling the number of Russian forces on the Finnish border. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) similarly reported in April 2025 that Western military and intelligence officials stated that Russia is expanding military bases near Petrozavodsk and upgrading railway lines and other infrastructure along Russia's western border with NATO.[16] Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev recently used narratives similar to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to threaten Finland.[17]

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on May 18 and confirmed the provision of Abrams tanks to Ukraine, and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported on May 19 that the first of 49 Abrams tanks are en route to Ukraine.[18] Denmark announced on May 17 a military aid package for Ukraine worth 4.2 billion Danish kroner (about $632 million) for 2025–2028 that includes artillery systems and ammunition, equipment for fighter jets, and funding for Ukrainian Air Force training facilities.[19] The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 19 that it signed an agreement with the European Commission to supply Ukraine with materiel and heavy ammunition worth 90 million euros (about $101 million) using the profits from Russian frozen assets.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call on May 19 to discuss ceasefire and peace negotiations regarding Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Russia must explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty in order to engage in meaningful, good-faith negotiations.
• Russia must agree that ceasefire negotiations must precede peace settlement negotiations.
• Russia must show its willingness to make concessions of its own in any future bilateral negotiations, especially as the Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to expand its list of demands amid the peace talks.
• Russia reportedly continues to expand its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and Estonia, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.
• Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2025

Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 – in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 273 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[ii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 88 drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine; that 128 decoy drones were "lost in location;" and that one drone was still in Ukrainian airspace as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike largely targeted Kyiv Oblast and that drones struck Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts.[iii] Russian forces launched 267 drones (and three ballistic missiles) in their overnight strike series against Ukraine on the night of February 22 and 23.[iv] Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly strikes against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025. A Russian milblogger claimed that the May 17-18 record-breaking strike was effective due to Russia's use of the "Geran-3" drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which is reportedly equipped with a turbo jet and 300-kilogram warhead.[v] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are innovating their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units and overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[vi]

The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on May 18 excerpts of an allegedly "new" interview with Putin, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical" conclusion with the "necessary" results for Russia.[vii] Putin reiterated long-standing Kremlin narratives about the necessity that peace negotiations address the war’s "root causes" and "protect" of Russian-speakers of Ukraine, whom Putin claimed consider Russia their "motherland." Ukrainian outlet The Kyiv Independent and Russian state media reported on May 18 that the excerpts that Zarubin published on May 18 are unaired footage from the documentary "Russia.Kremlin.Putin.25 Years" that the Kremlin published on May 4 in which Putin repeatedly promoted claims about Russia’s ability to bring the war to its "logical conclusion."[viii] The Kremlin's decision to delay publishing these clips until May 18 suggests that the Kremlin is trying to project a strong, militarily superior Russia to the West and to domestic Russian audiences ahead of Putin’s May 19 phone call with Trump. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky recently stated that Russia is prepared to fight for "however long it takes," and Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev recently made thinly veiled nuclear threats in reference to what Medvedev categorized as "negotiating ultimatums."[ix]

Putin is attempting to distract from Russia's military and economic challenges with this rhetoric. Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated during an interview with UK outlet the Guardian published on May 18 that the Kremlin is falsely posturing its economy and military as strong.[x] Stubb noted that Russia has depleted its financial reserves and that the Russian interest rate is over 20 percent. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are sustaining significant battlefield losses at rates that are likely unsustainable in the medium- to long-term and that Putin has mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering from unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.[xi] The continued depletion of Russian materiel, personnel, and economic resources at the current rate will likely present Putin with difficult decision points in 2026 or 2027.[xii]  

Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort. The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 17 that interviews with 11 Russian soldiers who are currently fighting or have fought in Ukraine demonstrate that some Russian troops are against an unconditional ceasefire and believe that Russia should keep fighting until Russian forces have seized the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[xiii] Russian soldiers reportedly called for Russia to continue the war until it reaches its territorial goals and not offer any concessions to Ukraine or the West so that Russia does not have to fight Ukraine again in five or 10 years and so that Russian casualties thus far in the war will not have been in vain.

The NYT noted that an unpublished mid-April 2025 poll by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles found that roughly half of respondents said that they would not support a peace deal that falls short of Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial war aims of Ukrainian "denazification," demilitarization, and neutrality. Russian opposition outlet Verstka conducted a poll of 100 Russian military personnel in April 2025 in which only 18 percent said they would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin's stated war goals and only about a fifth of respondents indicated that they thought the war would end in the coming months.[xiv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has not been preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war.[xv] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to justify Putin's war aims as existential to the Russian state and to garner societal support for the protraction of the war until Russia achieves these goals. Kremlin officials are increasingly publicly stating that Russia is prepared to continue fighting until Ukraine accepts Russia's demands, likely because the Kremlin assesses that it has adequately prepared Russian society and the Russian military for such a scenario.[xvi]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine. Zelensky spoke with US Vice President JD Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Rome on May 18 and highlighted the importance of an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine and Ukraine's willingness to engage in meaningful diplomacy.[xvii] Zelensky underscored that the Russian delegation presented unrealistic and unacceptable terms during the May 16 Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul. Rubio had a call on May 17 with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during which Rubio reiterated the Trump administration's call for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine.[xviii] Ukraine continues to demonstrate its willingness to establish meaningful peace dialogues and commit to an unconditional ceasefire.[xix] Russia, however, continues to demonstrate that it is not interested in a ceasefire or in good faith negotiations to end the war.[xx]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 — in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19.
• Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2025

The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan. Sources familiar with the May 16 Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul reported to Bloomberg that the Russian delegation demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea to Russia and that the international community recognize the four oblasts and the peninsula as Russian territory before Russia will agree to a ceasefire.[1] The Russian delegation also reportedly demanded that Ukraine adopt a neutral status, that no foreign troops be allowed on Ukrainian territory, and that Ukraine abandon its demands for war reparations from Russia. Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin stated on May 17 that the Russian delegation maintained Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demands, including that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts and abandon its NATO aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[2] The United States reportedly presented Russia in April 2025 with a seven-point peace plan that offered Russia "de jure" US recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over the parts of Ukraine that Russian forces currently occupy.[3] The US proposal also reportedly included "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states as a likely peacekeeping force. The Russian delegation's demands in Istanbul outright reject these aspects of the US peace proposal.

ISW continues to assess that Russia's war aim remains full Ukrainian capitulation.[4] Russia is reframing its territorial demands — typically the subject of war termination negotiations — as preconditions for a ceasefire.[5] Russia is attempting to posture itself as open to negotiations but is putting forward demands that Ukraine cannot reasonably accept while offering no compromises of its own. ISW continues to assess that Putin will continue to refuse to offer compromises until Ukraine and the West are able to alter his theory of victory, which posits that Russia will win a war of attrition through indefinite creeping advances that prevent Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations.[6]

Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may meet only if the Russian and Ukrainian delegations reach unspecified agreements and underscored that all talks should be conducted behind closed doors.[7] Peskov's statements are likely intentionally vague in order to further delay progress in Russian-Ukrainian talks. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 17 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated the Kremlin viewed discussions between Putin and Zelensky as "out of the question" as Moscow knew that the conditions it was pushing Ukraine to accept were non-starters for Kyiv.[8] Another Verstka source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) similarly stated that Russian officials do not plan to discuss preparations for a Putin-Zelensky meeting. Russia has doubled down on its efforts to protract peace processes by continuing to present Ukraine with ultimatums that Ukraine cannot accept. The Verstka source close to the Presidential Administration added that Russia's demand that the Ukrainian–Russian talks occur without a mediator shows that the Kremlin seeks to demonstrate that it is capable of demanding that the United States limit the influence of Ukraine's Western partners. Peskov's comments and Verstka's report cohere with ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia remains committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as to continue making battlefield advances and to extract additional concessions from the West.[9] Ukraine has continually demonstrated its willingness to compromise and engage in good-faith negotiations in contrast.

Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia is prepared to continue or even escalate its war against Ukraine should Ukraine and the West not agree to Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 17 on his English-language X account that "all enemies of Russia that issue negotiating ultimatums" should remember that peace negotiations do not always lead to the end of hostilities and that unsuccessful negotiations can even lead to a "more terrible stage of war with new weapons and participants."[10] Medvedev's statement is a thinly veiled threat of possible Russian nuclear weapons use, the introduction of Russian allied forces in the war, or even Russian attacks against Europe. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is extremely unlikely to use nuclear weapons or to attack NATO states at this time.[11] Russia has demonstrated that it will not accept any terms less than Ukraine's full capitulation and would likely view any negotiations that do not fulfill these war aims as "unsuccessful." The threat that Russia could continue its war against Ukraine and even escalate it should Russia not achieve its goals mirrors Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky's May 16 statement that Russia is ready to fight for "however long it takes."[12] Medvedev's threat is part of Russia's reflexive control campaign meant to push Ukraine and the West to accept Russia's demands for Ukrainian surrender.

Russia continues to deny the current Ukrainian government's legitimacy and is likely setting conditions to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian peace agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 17 that it is important for Russia to understand exactly who from the Ukrainian government will sign the documents that may result from any future Russian-Ukrainian agreement.[13] Peskov's comments are likely part of the Kremlin's long-standing narrative rejecting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and the legitimacy of all post-2014 Ukrainian governments.[14] This rhetorical campaign is part of efforts to set conditions for Russia to withdraw from any future peace agreements at a time of Russia's choosing and to support Russia's repeated demand that Ukraine acquiesce to regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government.[15] Any future peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the Ukrainian government's and the Ukrainian Constitution's legitimacy.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan.
• Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement.
• Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia is prepared to continue or even escalate its war against Ukraine should Ukraine and the West not agree to Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender.
• Russia continues to deny the current Ukrainian government's legitimacy and is likely setting conditions to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian peace agreement.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 16, 2025

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine. The Russian delegation reportedly formally demanded that Ukraine cede territory to which Russia has informally been laying claim, while asserting that Russia is ready to continue the war for years. Russia may again formalize previously informal territorial claims in the future as part of Russia's effort to secure full Ukrainian capitulation. Turkish, Ukrainian, and American delegations met on the morning of May 16 in Istanbul, after which Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met.[i] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation, likely met with US State Department Director of Policy Planning Staff Michael Anton before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[ii] The Ukrainian delegation, including Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg, UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Gunter Sautter to coordinate positions before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[iii] Umerov and Medinsky announced that Ukraine and Russia would exchange 1,000 prisoners of war (POWs) each in the near future.[iv] Medinsky stated that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their visions for a possible future ceasefire and that bilateral negotiations will continue after this presentation.[v] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that an unspecified source stated that there was no specific date set for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their ceasefire plans.[vi]

Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come. Medinsky claimed that those "who do not know history" say that there should be a ceasefire first, then negotiations to achieve peace.[vii] Medinsky claimed that war and negotiations should be conducted simultaneously, and Carroll reported that Medinsky stated that Russia is "ready to fight for a year, two, three – however long it takes."[viii] Medinsky reportedly referenced the Great Northern War (1700-1721) when asking "how long [is Ukraine] ready to fight?" and claimed that "Russia is prepared to fight forever."[ix] Russia state media confirmed that Medinsky spoke about the 18th-century war with Sweden during the meeting.[x]

Ukrainian diplomatic sources told various Western and Ukrainian outlets that the Russian delegation made "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" demands that went "far beyond" any demands Russia has previously discussed.[xi] The delegation reportedly repeated the Kremlin's demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before the start of a ceasefire. The Economist foreign correspondent Oliver Carroll reported that a source stated that the Russian delegation additionally threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko similarly reported that the Russian delegation threatened to annex Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone."[xii]

The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy – but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.[xiii] Russian officials have informally claimed all of Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russia and launched offensive operations to create buffer zones in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts in May 2024 and March 2025, respectively, that are likely part of Russian territorial expansion efforts, however. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in early February 2025 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia and that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect itself from Ukrainian shelling.[xiv] Ganchev further claimed that Kharkiv Oblast would have held a "referendum" to become the "fifth oblast to join Russia" in September 2022 had it not been for the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast at that time. Russian forces launched attacks across the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border in April 2025 to create a buffer zone and possibly press further toward Sumy City in order to expand Russian territorial demands in Ukraine.[xv] Russian forces similarly launched offensive operations in May 2024 to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated at that time that Russia's envisioned "buffer zone" should encompass all of Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin's concept of the buffer zone is a thinly veiled justification for Russia's intent to subsume larger portions of Ukraine.[xvi]

Russian officials have long been informally laying claim to additional territories in Ukraine beyond Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have consistently claimed that "Novorossiya" – an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all southern and eastern Ukraine – is an "integral" part of Russia and that Odesa City is a "Russian" city."[xvii] Novorossiya geographically encompasses Kharkiv Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority."[xviii] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. The Kremlin may increasingly adopt this pattern of informally discussing additional Russian territorial claims and then formally introducing these claims as demands in peace negotiations in the future.

ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory. Putin articulated his theory of victory for his war in Ukraine in June 2024, which posits that Russia will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine by continuing gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and preventing Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations, assuming Russia’s war effort outlasts Western support for Ukraine.[xix]

ISW previously assessed that Russia faces a number of compounding materiel, defense industrial, manpower, and economic issues that threaten Russia's ability to continue the war in Ukraine in the long term.[xx] Putin is likely prioritizing dividing Ukraine's Western allies and weakening Western support to Ukraine in order to secure his desired end state in negotiations, rather than effectively addressing Russia's domestic problems. Putin’s decision to intensify offensive operations throughout Ukraine in March and April 2025 is only exacerbating these issues and underscores his commitment to pressuring Ukraine in negotiations. ISW continues to assess that increased Western – especially US – military aid and economic sanctions are necessary to enable Ukraine to inflict significant battlefield losses on Russia and force Putin to either change his theory of victory or make an economically painful and unpopular decision to implement another partial involuntary reserve call-up.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 15 to appoint former Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General Oleg Salyukov as Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.[xxi] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, citing an unspecified source, reported on May 15 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces to replace Salyukov.[xxii] Mordvichev most recently served as the commander of both the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and Central Military District (CMD) and oversaw Russia's seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024.[xxiii] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD also appointed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as the new CMD commander, and Russian outlet Ura reported that a high-ranking source in Russian military circles confirmed these reports.[xxiv] Solodchuk most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[xxv] Russian insider sources and milbloggers welcomed Mordvichev's appointment and interpreted it as a sign that the Kremlin is initiating a modernization effort to enhance Russia's ability to plan and execute operations in Ukraine and beyond.[xxvi]

The Kremlin is likely appointing Mordvichev to proliferate positional warfare tactics and operational concepts for grinding marginal advances – the main tactics Russian forces used in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction – across Russia’s Ground Forces. Mordvichev’s appointment indicates that the Kremlin approves of the tactics developed under Mordvichev’s command – namely, the use of grinding, highly attritional, infantry-led assaults – and aims to institutionalize these tactics that the CMD used to advance in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction since late 2023.

Mordvichev is one of the few Russian commanders to have achieved tactical penetrations of the Ukrainian line in the last two years and one of Russia’s most celebrated commanders at the moment, but these limited tactical penetrations have come at great costs.[xxvii] Russian forces suffered significant personnel and equipment losses in exchange for approximately 60 kilometers of penetration since elements of the CMD first redeployed to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction in October 2023.[xxviii] Mordvichev’s appointment is likely also an effort to distill lessons learned and tactics from the CMD to the rest of the Russian military, as ISW has previously observed Russian units in the Kupyansk and Velyka Novosilka directions implementing the attritional assaults that the CMD utilized to seize Avdiivka in February 2024.[xxix]

Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025. Geolocated footage published on May 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and seized Myrolyubivka and Mykhailivka (just west of Myrolyubivka).[xxx] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 16 that Russian forces advanced further north and southwest of Myrolyubivka and northwest of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[xxxi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Myrolyubivka, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger insinuated that the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade is subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces.[xxxii] The brigade was likely previously subordinated under the Southern Grouping of Forces, as the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade from the Kurakhove direction to reinforce offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) in January 2025.[xxxiii] ISW has not observed reports of the brigade engaged in combat since March 2025, however. Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and other elements of the 51st CAA appeared to culminate in Toretsk in February and March 2025, but the brigade may be reentering combat after a period of rest and reconstitution.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 16 that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near and within Yelyzavetivka (east of Myrolyubivka) that are complicating Russian advances towards Myrnohrad (west of Yelyzavetivka and just east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[xxxiv] Russian milbloggers also recently acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Yalyzvetivka, and ISW is therefore expanding Ukrainian advances in the area, although these advances are likely not recent.[xxxv] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) and 51st CAA are attempting to advance from Malynivka toward Novoekonomichne and north of Nova Poltavka (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in order to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Yelyzavetivka and to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[xxxvi]

Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations northeast and east of Pokrovsk after largely abandoning this area in favor of advances further northeast of Pokrovsk toward Kostyantynivka and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka in early 2024.[xxxvii] Ukrainian officials recently reported that Russia is reinforcing its units in the Pokrovsk direction, and ISW recently observed reports that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently redeployed from the Kurakhove direction to near Malynivka.[xxxviii] These recent redeployments and the reported appointment of Valery Solodchuk as Central Military District (CMD) commander after his recent success in Kursk Oblast indicate that the Russian military command may refocus on the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the coming weeks and months. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may attempt to advance along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line to envelop Pokrovsk instead of fighting through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.[xxxix] The Russian military command may redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast or additional elements of the 51st CAA to the CMD’s area of responsibility (AoR) around Pokrovsk and reintensify efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk should the Russian military command prioritize seizing Pokrovsk over pushing further toward Kostyantynivka from the southwest during Summer 2025.

The Russian military command may alternatively choose to continue prioritizing advances toward Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025. Russian forces intensified offensive operations aimed at eliminating the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in February and March 2025, and recent Russian advances into Novoolenivka and near Zorya (both southwest of Toretsk) will likely force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their limited positions remaining in the pocket in the near future.[xl] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are currently attempting to attack along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[xli] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are the main force attacking between Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Nova Poltavka and that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are attacking in other areas southwest of Toretsk, including toward Romanivka.[xlii] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka.[xliii] ISW recently observed reports that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) redeployed from western Zaporizhia Oblast to the Stara Mykolaivka area and that unspecified drone operators recently redeployed from the Kursk direction to near Kalynove (south of Stara Mykolaivka).[xliv] The Russian military command may continue to reinforce the Russian force grouping southwest of Toretsk and attempt to advance further along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway toward Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk) in the coming weeks if they intend to prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025.

Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months. Russian advances southwest of Toretsk currently support both of these efforts, but the Russian military command will likely have to choose to prioritize one direction in the coming weeks due to near-term constraints in Russia’s manpower and materiel reserves.[xlv] Recent Ukrainian estimates suggest that Russia is recruiting enough forces to slowly grow their force grouping in Ukraine, but ISW has not observed indications that the Kremlin has generated a sufficient operational reserve to support multiple intensified operations as of this report.[xlvi]

Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, which has likely complicated Russia’s plans for an offensive against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt. Russian forces may conduct an operational pause after they level the frontline southwest of Toretsk in order to give Russian units in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk time to make more significant advances before beginning a concerted offensive against Kostyantynivka. The recent intensification in Russian activity northeast, east, and south of Pokrovsk suggests that Russian forces may assess that Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk are becoming increasingly vulnerable and that Russian forces should renew their efforts to envelop the town. The Russian military command may attempt to pursue the envelopment of Pokrovsk and significant advances toward Kostyantynivka simultaneously, but pursuing both operations will expedite the timeline for a likely Russian culmination and will undermine Russian forces’ ability to accomplish either goal. Russian forces also must continue to balance offensive operations near Toretsk and Pokrovsk with the manpower and materiel demands of ongoing efforts to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, seize Kupyansk, and push toward Borova, Lyman, Sumy City and Kharkiv City.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come.
• The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy - but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.
• ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.
• Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025.
• Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in the Zaporizhia direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 15, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire for at least 30 days beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" on May 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine "interrupted" in 2022 in Istanbul. Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.[2] Zelensky stated that he would personally wait for Putin in Turkey and arrived in Turkey on May 15.[3] Putin assigned several Russian officials, who are notably not in Putin's innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on May 15 that Putin will not travel to Istanbul.[4] Putin's rejection of Zelensky's invitation demonstrates Putin's continued resistance to making any concessions and engaging in legitimate, good-faith negotiations at the highest level.

The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin announced on the night of May 14 that Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is leading the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[5] The delegation also includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky similarly headed the delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin's predecessor participated in the 2022 talks.[6] Kostyukov is the only 2025 participant who did not attend the 2022 talks.

The 2025 Russian delegation also includes four experts from the Presidential Administration, GRU, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that correspond with the four leading delegation members: Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration for State Policy in the Humanitarian Sphere Elena Podobreevskaya, Director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexei Polishchuk, First Deputy Chief of Information of the GRU Alexander Zorin, and the Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation in the Russian MoD Viktor Shevtsov.[7]

Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Medinsky told journalists on May 15 in Istanbul that Russia considers the May 2025 negotiations a "continuation" of previous negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022, which he claimed Ukraine interrupted.[8] Medinsky is reiterating Putin's May 11 framing that the new bilateral negotiations in Istanbul would be based on the April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression.[9] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the Istanbul protocols draft agreement.[10] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of its full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making significant gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Medinsky is purposefully attempting to frame the May 2025 talks as a continuation of the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations to portray Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender as legitimate, despite the fact that Ukraine is now in a much stronger battlefield position on the battlefield than in April 2022 and the Russian military is much weaker than in the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Medinsky claimed that Russia's goal for the May 2025 Istanbul negotiations is to "establish long-term peace by eliminating the root causes" of the war.[11] Russian officials routinely demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes," which Russian officials define as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[12] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers in Ukraine to justify the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine, the establishment of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Medinsky's attempt to frame May 2025 Istanbul negotiations as peace talks contradicts stated Ukrainian, US, and European efforts to first establish a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations.[13] Medinsky's framing echoes consistent Russian rejections of this sequence of events, which Ukraine and the United States have consistently supported.[14]

Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul.[15] The manual reportedly instructed Russian media to explain Medinsky's participation in the Russian delegation as "logical" since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in 2022 and is continuing this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin told Meduza that Russian officials overseeing domestic policy assess that the Istanbul talks will end in "deadlock" and that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such "deadlock." The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a "new package of sanctions" while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia's development as Russia "successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions." Russian media should reportedly vaguely say that "negotiations are taking place on worse terms for Ukraine" than three years ago, but the manual does not explain how current battlefield realities where Russia controls much less of Ukraine are "worse terms." The Presidential Administration's claim that the May 2025 negotiations are taking place on "worse terms" for Ukraine compared to 2022 is an attempt to posture Russian military strength and battlefield successes while ignoring Ukraine's significant battlefield successes and ability to slow Russian advances in the last three years of the war. This claim also ignores significant Russian losses among elite forces and increasing reliance on poorly trained recruits. The Presidential Administration's reported framing of the negotiations demonstrates that Russia expects Ukraine to refuse the terms the Russian delegation will present in Istanbul as Ukraine would not accept terms tantamount to its surrender. Russia similarly issued ultimatums to Ukraine, the West, and NATO in 2021 before it launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 certainly knowing that NATO and Ukraine would not undergo the transformations to their core charters, constitutions, and principles required to meet the Russian demands.[16] The West rejected Russia's pre-war ultimatums, allowing Russia to establish superficial justifications for its subsequent full-scale invasion. Russia's continued insistence on its 2022 Istanbul demands in May 2025 demonstrates that Russia continues to only be interested in a full Ukrainian surrender, is unwilling to offer compromises in any good-faith negotiations, and is prepared to continue the war to achieve its goal of Ukrainian surrender.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine.
• The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul.
• Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO.
• Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2025

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the 2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a 30-day minimum general ceasefire.[2] Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the 2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances — including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin continues to pursue.[3] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[4] The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of the Istanbul protocols to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.[5]

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul. Ryabkov stated on May 13 that the upcoming Istanbul discussions would need to address the "primary sources" of the war in order to achieve a sustainable end to the war, likely alluding to Russia's continued demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes."[6] Ryabkov also reiterated the claim that Ukraine must continue to "denazify." Russian officials repeatedly invoke the term "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv.[7] Russian officials have defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[8] Ryabkov's statements reflect the Kremlin's long-standing effort to achieve its pre-war demands that call for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and for the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, despite recent Kremlin efforts to feign interest in good-faith negotiations.

Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published a survey conducted from May 2 to 12 that showed that 74 percent of respondents trust Zelensky — an increase from 69 percent in March 2025.[9] The May 2025 KIIS poll showed that 71 percent of respondents do not support holding elections after a ceasefire, even if Ukraine receives security guarantees, and instead think that Ukraine should hold elections only after the establishment of a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war. KIIS noted that the majority of respondents in all regions of Ukraine support Zelensky and do not support holding elections until after the end of the war. The poll's majority opinion that elections should not occur until after the end of the war is in line with Ukraine's law on martial law and the Ukrainian Constitution, which stipulate that Ukraine cannot hold elections during martial law and cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to weaponize Zelensky's alleged "illegitimacy" to reject and delay ceasefire proposals and negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future agreements Russia may sign with Ukraine.[11] The Kremlin has also repeatedly attempted to justify its invasions of Ukraine by claiming that large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine want to join Russia.[12] The KIIS poll — the results of which were relatively consistent across all regions of Ukraine - undermines these Kremlin narratives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul.
• Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 13, 2025

The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[1] Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates.[2] Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to "maintain this momentum."[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue.[4] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later.[5] Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025.[6] Syrskyi's and Putin's figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.

Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025.[7] Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement rate and increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[8] The Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attritional infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.

The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli informed the US Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2025 that the Russian military is reconstituting and expanding its force structure and materiel production at a faster rate than most Western analysts anticipated, despite suffering approximately 790,000 casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[9] Cavoli stated that the Russian military command has deployed over 600,000 soldiers to the frontlines in Ukraine, which is nearly double the size of Russia's initial invasion force and is consistent with Syrskyi's report that there are 623,000 Russian military personnel in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree in September 2024 ordering the Russian military to establish a 1.5 million combat-ready force, indicating his long-term interests in increasing the size of the Russian military.[10] Cavoli's report coheres with recent indicators signaling that Russia is expanding and upgrading military bases, barracks, training grounds, warehouses, and railways near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, to support a future influx of personnel.[11] Russia is also integrating railways and roadways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with Belarusian infrastructure. ISW has long assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and Leningrad Military District (LMD) is part of the Kremlin's long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential large-scale conventional war against NATO.

The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 13 that the Russian military command has developed a series of standards in equipping frontline units with motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies.[12] Mashovets stated that Russia is working to equip every battalion with up to 30 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; every platoon with up to nine motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; and every "Storm V" penal recruit assault company with up to 15 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to three buggies. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is struggling to source enough motorcycles to equip every unit to the standard level and that equipment rates between frontline units vary considerably as a result. Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) had up to 1,125 motorcycles, up to 975 ATVs, and 210-215 buggies as of end of April and beginning of May 2025 and noted that other Russian CAAs have varying equipment allocations depending on the number of assault companies and platoons within the CAA. Ukrainian and Russian sources previously suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working to formalize Russian motorcycle usage, and the appearance of a defined doctrinal organization and allocation for motorcycle units within the Russian military is consistent with this effort.[13]

Russian forces currently appear to be utilizing motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles, although Russian units may begin conducting assaults exclusively with motorcycles in the future. Mashovets stated that Russian units currently prefer to use motorcycles in tandem with infantry and armored vehicles.[14] The Russian military appears to be undergoing a transition period and moving towards regularly conducting assaults exclusively on motorcycles, although Russian forces may also continue to conduct these combined assaults if Russian commanders assess that motorcycle assaults are less successful. The Russian military may also continue to rely on combined assaults if the Russian MoD cannot improve its abilities to supply Russian units with motorcycles; however, as Mashovets noted that Russian servicemembers are continuing to rely on volunteer organizations to supply some units with motorcycles.[15] ISW previously noted that Russian motorcycle usage is a response to Ukrainian drone innovations and an attempt to offset the significant armored vehicle losses that Russian forces sustained in 2024 and possibly conserve some tanks and armored vehicles for future use.[16] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker, unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[17] The Russian military will likely retain its lessons learned in Ukraine beyond the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Zelensky signed a decree on September 30, 2022, prohibiting Ukrainian negotiations with Putin.[18] Zelensky told journalists during a press briefing on May 13 that Russian officials are misrepresenting the decree as an obstacle to negotiations as the decree is intended to prevent Ukrainian persons besides Zelensky from negotiating with Putin on Ukraine’s behalf, rather than restricting Zelensky from exercising his “[constitutional] rights and duties,” as Ukraine’s head negotiator.[19] Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko reiterated this point to Ukrainian English-language news outlet Kyiv Independent on May 13 and stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.[20] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on May 13 that Zelensky will only negotiate with Putin in Istanbul, as lower-level officials from either country would lack the authority to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[21] Russian officials routinely cite this decree as an "obstacle" to negotiations despite ongoing Ukrainian outreach to Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.
• The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.
• Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 12, 2025

Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations. Russian Federation Council Deputy Speaker Konstantin Kosachev responded to Zelensky on May 12 and claimed that Zelensky’s invitation is "pure spectacle” and “comedy.”[1] Kosachev claimed that high-level meetings are not organized in “such a difficult situation” and accused Zelensky of trying to blame Russia for what he claimed was Ukraine's disinterest in negotiations. Russian Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik questioned the intentions behind Zelensky's invitation to Putin to meet in Istanbul.[2] Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Deputy Chairperson Alexei Chepa expressed doubt on May 12 that Putin will travel to Istanbul to meet with Zelensky.[3] Chepa insinuated that Russia cannot trust Ukraine in any negotiations because Ukraine has violated previous agreements and unilaterally imposed Russian ceasefires. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 12 that Zelensky is trying to co-opt the ongoing discussion around negotiations by inviting Putin to Istanbul and making Putin seem intransigent if he does not attend.[4] Kremlin-level officials have not formally responded to Zelensky's invitation as of this report, although statements from lower-level Russian officials indicate that Putin will likely not travel to Istanbul and meet with Zelensky.

Putin has engaged in significant rhetorical efforts to prepare the Russian public for a long-term war effort — and not a near-term peace agreement — including by promoting the false narrative that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate.[5] Putin and Russian officials often use this narrative to justify Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and to further Russia's strategic war goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv. Putin may assess that the Kremlin would need to adjust or completely retract this narrative in order to rhetorically prepare the Russian public for direct negotiations with Zelensky before such meetings. Putin notably referred to the "Kyiv authorities" rather than Zelensky or the Ukrainian government in his invitation to negotiate in Istanbul.[6] Senior Kremlin officials most recently reiterated this false narrative in late April, and Russian media continues to reiterate this narrative in publications as of May 12.[7] ISW has not observed any indications that the Kremlin will alter or abandon this rhetoric. Putin may instead choose to let this narrative lie dormant for now and intensify this rhetoric should Russia and Ukraine sign a peace agreement in order to set conditions for Russia to justify reneging on any future peace agreement and relaunching the war at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian Constitution.

Russia has reportedly deployed a largely ceremonial regiment of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, likely in an effort to generate fear of more rapid future Russian advances. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on May 12 that elements of the elite Russian FSB Presidential Regiment are reinforcing Russian forces attempting to seize Chasiv Yar.[8] This regiment reports directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin and is primarily responsible for fulfilling honor guard duties at state functions and guarding Russian officials, the Kremlin, and the Eternal Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin Wall.[9] ISW has not previously observed the regiment operating in Ukraine. Russian state media reported in 2014 and 2016 that the unit is approximately the size of a motorized rifle brigade and is composed of conscripts and contract soldiers.[10] Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly promised the Russian population that conscripts, whose military service is mandated by Russian law, will not be deployed to fight in Ukraine after utilizing conscripts in combat operations during the initial months of the war.[11]

Russian state media reporting suggests that elements of the Presidential Regiment likely lack the training and combat experience necessary to successfully reinforce Russian operations near Chasiv Yar and the longer-term Russian effort to seize the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command’s decision to deploy the Presidential Regiment to fight in Ukraine is likely part of a larger Russian effort to intimidate Ukraine and the West through intensified battlefield activity and portray Russian forces as elite and fully capable of achieving significant successes in Ukraine in the near future. The Russian military command may also be trying to feed any manpower available into the Chasiv Yar area due to its apparent effort to prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in recent months.[12] Russian forces are currently prioritizing quickly replenishing frontline units with new recruits to maintain the battlefield initiative in Ukraine over building up a pool of well-trained operational reserves, which is in turn hindering Russian forces' ability to conduct sophisticated operations and penetrate Ukrainian defenses.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces lack the capacity to make significant battlefield advances in the near future, however, and that Russian officials are leveraging Russia's retention of the battlefield initiative to strengthen their negotiating position.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations.
• Russia has reportedly deployed a largely ceremonial regiment of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, likely in an effort to generate fear of more rapid future Russian advances.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 11, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" the direct negotiations that he claimed "[Ukraine] interrupted" in 2022 on May 15.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia will soon announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations should account for "developments of the 2022 talks."[3]

Putin and Ushakov are referring to Russia's April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression.[4] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[5] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia also demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded to limit the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire and instead continues to demand Ukrainian surrender in an attempt to secure his strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.

Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated during the press conference that the purpose of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations would be to "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[6] Putin suggested that Russia and Ukraine could pursue a ceasefire as part of these renewed negotiations, but claimed that a "real truce" should not enable the "rearmament" and "replenishment" of the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into Eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[7] Kremlin officials recently claimed that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive Western military aid, while failing to offer similar concessions for Russia to limit its own force generation and defense production efforts.[8] Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" and limitations on Ukraine's force generation capabilities are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian neutrality, as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.[9]

Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have recently intensified their engagement with Western media in an effort to message directly to the Trump administration and American public and portray Russia's terms for Ukraine's surrender as reasonable.[10] Putin's May 11 press conference and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's recent interviews with Western media are part of an attempt to inject Kremlin narratives into the Western information space aimed at convincing the West that Russia is able to conquer all of Ukraine militarily and scaring Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia's demands.[11] Putin's rhetorical posturing is an attempt to conceal limitations in the Russian military's capabilities and distract from Russia's failure to make any significant progress on the battlefield over the last two years. Putin and other Kremlin officials firmly maintain their war aims that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and have thus far refused to consider any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia's demands.[12] The Kremlin is falsely portraying itself as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine while continuing to attack frontline Ukrainian positions and setting conditions for further military aggression against Ukraine and NATO in the coming years.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15. Zelensky stated that he will personally wait for Putin in Turkey and that Ukraine is waiting for Russia to agree to the US-Ukrainian-European general ceasefire proposal.[13] Putin discussed renewing the 2022 Istanbul negotiations in a call with Erdogan on May 11, and Erdogan expressed support for resuming talks.[14] Erdogan noted during his call with Putin that a comprehensive ceasefire would "create the necessary environment" for peace talks.[15] European officials largely called on Putin to agree to a comprehensive ceasefire agreement before beginning bilateral peace negotiations with Ukraine.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
• Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.
• Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the northern Kharkiv and Novopavlivka directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10, 2025

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 0 to 0800 on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 10. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced following the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kyiv on May 10 that he, European officials, and US President Donald Trump are proposing a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[i] Zelensky called on Russian officials to respond to the proposal and stated that Europe and the United States should impose additional sanctions on Russia's energy and banking sectors if Russia fails to agree to the ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded by claiming that Ukraine has not responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous ceasefire proposals and that pressuring Russia is "useless."[ii] Peskov claimed during an interview with ABC News published on May 10 that Putin supported the idea of a ceasefire but has "questions" about how a ceasefire will account for recent and possible future Russian advances in Ukraine, Ukrainian mobilization, and Western military assistance to Ukraine.[iii] Peskov reiterated Putin's previous demands for the West to stop all military aid to Ukraine and force Ukraine to stop mobilizing and training servicemembers as a condition of a ceasefire. Putin criticized the initial March 13 US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal and insinuated that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive military aid.[iv]

Putin, Peskov, and other Russian officials have not yet offered any comparable concessions, such as stopping Russia's own force generation and defense industrial efforts, as part of a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials appear to be trying to define the conditions of any and all ceasefires in a way that facilitates further Russian battlefield gains in the short term and supports Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future. Peskov also claimed that Ukraine is trying to leverage ceasefire proposals to "escape from negotiations," questioning Trump's stated objective of using a general ceasefire as a building block to precede peace negotiations.[v]

The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the Coalition of the Willing during a semi-virtual summit on May 10, consisting of officials from Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Australia, Croatia, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the European Commission, and the European Council.[vi] Zelensky welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Kyiv for the summit.[vii] The Coalition of the Willing and NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte expressed support for the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.[viii] Macron stated that the coalition is working on a proposal to deploy a military contingent to Ukraine and that the coalition will hold a series of meetings in the coming weeks.[ix] NBC News reported that Ukraine, the United States, and European partners formulated a term sheet with a list of conditions for Russia to consider.[x] The document, according to an unspecified Western official, contains 22 proposals, including the 30-day general ceasefire. Reuters reported on May 9 that a French diplomatic source stated that US and European partners are finalizing the 30-day ceasefire proposal and new sanction packages if Russia refuses the proposal.[xi]

Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine. Reuters reported on May 10, citing two Western security officials and a regional official, that Iran is preparing to provide Russia with an unspecified number of Fath-360 launchers in the near future.[xii] The officials stated that Russia likely intends to use these launchers with the short-range ballistic missiles that Iran provided to Russia in Fall 2024. A Ukrainian military source told The Times in September 2024 that Iran provided over 200 Fath-360 ballistic missiles to Russia.[xiii] US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated in April 2024 that Iran has provided over 400 short-range ballistic missiles and "hundreds of thousands" of artillery shells to Russia.[xiv] ISW has not observed reports of the Russian military launching Iranian-provided missiles against Ukraine, however. Iran began providing Russia with Shahed drones in Fall 2022, and Russia began producing and using its own Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 analogues (which Russia calls Geran-1 and Geran-2, respectively) with imported Iranian components and using Iranian production licenses as early as summer 2023.[xv] Russia continues to deepen military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia's use of Iranian missiles against Ukraine would mark a significant intensification of Russian-Iranian relations.[xvi]

The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.[xvii] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 10 that the Russian government plans to close the airspace over Volgograd and Saratov oblasts near the Kapustin Yar missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast, where Russian forces reportedly store Oreshnik missiles, from 0600 May 12 to 1600 May 13 Moscow time.[xviii] Russian milbloggers asserted that the airspace closure is typical for combat and test launches of ballistic missiles and claimed that the closure suggests Russia might conduct an Oreshnik strike on Kyiv City.[xix]

US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression. Deputy Head of the Verkhovna Rada's Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, Yehor Chernev, told The New York Times (NYT) in a May 10 article that Ukraine is "running low" on long-range missiles, artillery, and ballistic missile defense systems.[xx] An unspecified congressional official told the NYT that the United States recently approved Germany’s transfer of 125 long-range artillery rockets and 100 Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine. A Western intelligence official stated that the Ukrainian military has improved its ability to "ration" Patriot air defense missiles by using cheaper interceptors to target smaller threats. Patriot air defense systems are essential to maintaining Ukraine's air defense umbrella, as Soviet-era and other Western-provided air defense systems are unable to intercept Russian ballistic missiles.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing.
• The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10.
• Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine.
• The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.
• US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2025

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 8 to 0800 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 9. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.]

Click here to read ISW's in-depth coverage of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday.

US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected. Trump stated on May 8 that the United States calls for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire that “must ultimately build toward a peace agreement.”[1] Trump noted that he is committed to securing a Ukrainian-Russian peace with the Europeans. US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 8 that Russia asked for “too much” because Russia perceives that it is winning the war on the battlefield.[2] Vance stated that Russia cannot expect Ukraine to cede territory to Russia that Russian forces have not seized — in reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand that Ukraine cede territory in eastern and southern Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[3] Vance reiterated that the United States wants Ukraine to remain a sovereign country. US President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 9 that he is working together with European states to achieve a ceasefire at least 30 days long.[4] Zelensky reported that his May 8 phone call with Trump demonstrated that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe are “on the same page” about the necessity of a full ceasefire. The Kremlin has consistently rejected Ukrainian and American proposals for 30-day ceasefires while blaming Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace negotiations.[5]

Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and 9 but claimed that all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine.[6] Russian forces have not seized any significant towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war population of 5,000).[7] Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces were trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by Victory Day on May 9.[8] Russian forces did not accomplish any of those objectives, and have in fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk for roughly a year.[9]

Ukrainian long-range strikes and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive operations and counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support — have slowed, and in some places stalled, Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early 2025.[10] Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian forces have also intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating Russia’s shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and forcing the Russian military to redeploy troops from other frontline areas to defend against the incursion.[12]

The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin thanked and highlighted North Korean troops at the Victory Day parade on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking North Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast attended the parade.[13] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[14] Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk Oblast as a significant military achievement, and ISW previously forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk operation as part of the Victory Day celebrations.[15] Russian officials’ praise of the Kursk operation ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over retaking Russian territory.[16] Russian officials are also ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.[17]

Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations. Russian state media posted footage on May 9 showing Russian forces displaying Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Zala reconnaissance drones; Lancet-51 and Lancer-52 loitering munitions; and Geran and Garpiya long-range strikes drones during the Victory Day parade in Moscow City.[18] Russia state news outlet RIA Novosti posted footage showing Russian forces riding in Chinese-made all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and Russian-made buggies during a Victory Day parade in Khabarovsk City, Khabarovsk Krai.[19] Russian media also posted footage of Russian forces showcasing tanks equipped with counter drone netting at a Victory Day parade in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[20] Russia’s use of counter drone netting, ATVs, buggies, and motorcycles are all tactical adaptations in response to Ukrainian drone operations. Russian forces have increasingly leveraged reconnaissance and strike drones to destroy frontline Ukrainian positions and damage Ukrainian cities throughout the war in Ukraine. Russian officials appear to be highlighting these weapons, vehicles, and counter-drone adaptations to the Russian public to frame these innovations as a form of “victory” in Ukraine. Russian officials’ willingness to highlight these adaptions during Victory Day parades suggests that the Russian military intends to preserve these adaptions in future military operations rather than reverting to pre-2022 forms of combat.

The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea. The Kremlin indicated that heads of state and senior representatives of at least 30 states, the heads of the Palestinian Authority and Kremlin-backed separatist region of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the heads of several international organizations — including the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — travelled to Russia for the Victory Day parade and subsequent events on May 9.[21] The Kremlin reported that 55 military units and over 11,500 military personnel in total participated in the parade in Moscow, including military personnel from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Egypt, the PRC, Laos, Mongolia, and Myanmar.[22]

Russian officials specifically praised the PRC and North Korea for their support, including of the war in Ukraine. Putin gave a speech at the parade in Moscow highlighting the contribution of the “courageous people of China” in Russia’s victory in the Second World War, and Putin sat next to PRC President Xi Jinping at the Victory Day parade.[23] Putin and Xi issued a joint statement on May 8 that referenced Putin’s original war aims in Ukraine and called for the resolution of the war in Ukraine to eliminate the “root causes” of the war — a long-standing Russian talking point and demand for the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[24] ISW noted that this joint statement was a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric. Putin expressed well-wishes to North Korean soldiers and hugged a North Korean military veteran at the parade, and Russian state media highlighted this gesture.[25] North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, his daughter Kim Ju-ae, and several North Korean officials visited the Russian embassy in Pyongyang to commemorate the May 9 Victory Day holiday.[26] Russia is likely attempting to emphasize its deepening relationships with the PRC and North Korea in particular to posture itself as possessing broad international support, including for its war in Ukraine, to a domestic Russian audience and the wider international community.

Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians. Putin claimed on May 8 at a dinner with foreign delegations in Moscow that May 9 is a “sacred date” for the “multinational people” of Russia.[27] Putin also claimed on May 9 in a speech at the Victory Day parade that the Soviet Union’s “truly iron unity” prevented Nazi Germany from seizing the country.[28] Putin claimed that Russia defends the honor of all Red Army soldiers from different nationalities and that all of the republics in the Soviet Union bore a common burden in the Second World War. Putin additionally said that Central Asia and the South Caucasus made “enormous” contributions in the Second World War. Putin’s efforts to highlight Russia’s and post-Soviet countries’ diverse population as equal contributors to the Soviet war effort are part of an effort to promote an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population. Putin routinely attempts to posture Russia as an ethnically diverse and harmonious country in an attempt to balance among Russian ultranationalist demands for restrictions against migrants and assimilation of ethnic minorities.[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages while also disproportionately targeting migrants and ethnic minorities in Russian military recruitment efforts.[30] Putin’s choice to promote multiculturalism at Russia’s largest national holiday demonstrates that Putin continues to support an informal state ideology that supports Russian civic nationalism. This manifestation of Russian nationalism is notably at odds with Russian ultranationalists’ attempts to create an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[31] Putin will likely continue to struggle to balance Russia’s need to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages and long-term demographic decline with placating the increasingly influential pro-war Russian ultranationalist community.

Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.[32] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that the delegations would hold a meetings of EU foreign ministers and the Core Group on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.[33] The Core Group announced on May 9 the creation of a special tribunal within the Council of Europe to investigate and prosecute Russian officials for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.[34]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB). The EU, Denmark, France, and Italy agreed on May 9 to transfer one billion euros (roughly $1.1 billion) from proceeds from frozen Russian assets to the European Peace Fund to purchase weapons from the Ukrainian DIB for the Ukrainian military.[35] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that the EU also allocated 600 million euros-worth (roughly $675 million) of artillery and ammunition to Ukraine and more than 200 million euros (roughly $225 million) to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses.[36] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted on May 9 that the EU has committed to supply Ukraine with over 1.35 million artillery shells in 2025.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.
• Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day.
• The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations.
• The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea.
• Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians.
• Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2025

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 8, and any reports of Russian ground activity in this SITREP are by default an accusation that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 7 to 0800 on May 8. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in the 0800 SITREP occurred after the start of Russia's ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 7 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 7 before Russia's implementation of its unliteral ceasefire on May 8.]

The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an article on May 8 in which he argued that Russia's war in Ukraine will go down in history as a feat of courage and significance equal to the victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World War.[i] Belousov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a continuation of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet bravery and heroism and of the Soviet people's enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the war effort. Belousov claimed that Russia's victory in Ukraine is "inevitable." Belousov said that domestic unity is a necessity for Russia's victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union's "moral and spiritual unity" was a critical factor for its victory in the Second World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov's statements comparing the Second World War to Russia's war in Ukraine in their coverage of his 10-page essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve its goals in its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and supportive.[ii] Kremlin officials have recently seized on the mythos of the Second World War to form the basis of a new pseudo-state ideology that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to justify potential future aggression against the West.[iii]

Belousov reiterated the Kremlin's oft-repeated fallacious narrative that Russia had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because the situation was "life or death." Belousov claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for the collective West's "crusade" against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of "eternal Russophobia" and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech from February 24, 2022, announcing the full-scale invasion.[iv] Belousov amplified Putin's accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy of "containment" against Russia and created a situation in which Russia had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend Russia's interests.[v] The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin's anti-Western claims to the mythos of the Second World War in order to heighten the existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims Russia is currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative that the West is conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet Union) and that the conflict will be unending.

Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.[vi] Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has reformed and augmented its military specifically in response to NATO expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the Russian 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia's Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former military academies and establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing, and equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed aviation corps, and 50 other formations and units.[vii] ISW has long assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms of the LMD and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against NATO.[viii]

Medvedev threatened that European countries must "remember" the "crushing defeat of Nazi Germany" when supporting Ukraine.[ix] Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X account, indicating that Medvedev intended this threat for international audiences.[x] Other senior Russian officials have also intensified accusations against European states for supporting "Naziism" in recent days.[xi] Medvedev's threat and Russian claims of European "Nazism" are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push European countries into refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine.[xii] Kremlin officials have also recently framed European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts) as threatening to Russia, and the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign likely also aims to prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned in an interview with Politico published on May 8 that Russia's most threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets towards Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states.[xiii] Reesink stated that Russia appears to be producing more artillery than the Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published an investigation on May 8 revealing that Russia has been constructing a significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum Plant in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives annually.[xiv] Reuters noted that this would be enough explosive to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024, suggesting that this new production line could expand Russia's artillery shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.

Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 Russia's ceasefire starting at midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and ending at midnight on the night of May 10 to 11 in honor of Victory Day on May 9.[xv] Russia's Victory Day celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War while minimizing the role of the United States. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely ceased combat operations and remained at their current positions at midnight Moscow time on May 8 in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral ceasefire.[xvi] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces did not stop combat operations "despite the announcement of the ceasefire." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack across the entire frontline.[xvii] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces shelled Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts after the start of the ceasefire.[xviii] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that servicemembers from three Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk direction and in southern Ukraine confirmed that they received instructions to open fire only in response to Russian combat operations.[xix]

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump on May 8 about the concrete steps needed to achieve peace.[xx] Zelensky reiterated to Trump that Ukraine is ready for an immediate 30-day ceasefire and for talks "in any format." Zelensky reported that Trump supported a 30-day ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Ukraine can only start peace negotiations after the implementation of an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and that the United States and Ukraine's European partners agree with this timeline.[xxi] Yermak noted that Russia and Ukraine can agree on a format for peace negotiations and appoint delegations after a longer-term ceasefire is in place.

The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 7 that Ukraine does not want to seriously discuss a long-term ceasefire.[xxii] Zakharova claimed that Russia's support for the previous US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure and Russia's unilateral Easter truce shows that Russia has never been against a ceasefire, even though the Kremlin has continued to protract and delay meaningful negotiations to establish a comprehensive ceasefire.[xxiii] Zakharova accused Ukraine of repeatedly violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires and claimed that there could be progress toward a long-term ceasefire should Ukraine observe shorter-term ceasefires. Zakharova repeated recent Kremlin narratives that Ukraine cannot control its own military and Putin's rejection of previous US and Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposals on the grounds that there are "nuances" about enforcement mechanisms and weapons provisions to Ukraine that the parties would need to work out prior to implementation.[xxiv] Russia previously accused Ukraine of violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations, and Russian officials will likely do the same during the unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in order to distract from Russia's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.[xxv]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.[xxvi] These engagements mark the third official meeting in 2025 between Putin and Xi. Putin and Xi signed a package of bilateral intergovernmental and interdepartmental cooperation documents and issued a joint statement on May 8.[xxvii] Xi travelled to Russia to attend Russia's Victory Day celebrations on May 9. Putin and Xi discussed the roles that China and the Soviet Union played in the Second World War, emphasized the importance of their countries' contributions to the defeat of fascism, highlighted significant Chinese and Soviet losses in the war, and claimed that China and the Soviet Union were the "main theaters" in the war.[xxviii] Russian officials repeatedly use the mythos of the Soviet Union's sacrifice during the Second World War to persuade the Russian population that their increasing social and economic sacrifices for the Russian war effort in Ukraine can lead to victory.[xxix] Russian officials are likely overemphasizing World War II mythos to bolster support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine in part due to Russia's inability to showcase battlefield successes for Victory Day 2025.

The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war. The Russian–Chinese joint statement asserted that Russia and the PRC are "convinced" that a long-term and sustainable settlement in the war in Ukraine requires the elimination of the "root causes" of the war.[xxx] The joint statement claimed that Russia and the PRC will work to counter attempts to "rehabilitate" Nazism and the rise of militarism that contribute to discrimination and intolerance. The joint statement noted that Russia "positively evaluates" the PRC's position on the war in Ukraine and that Russia welcomes the PRC's desire to play a role in the political and diplomatic efforts towards settling the war. The PRC and Brazil — two members of BRICS — have notably put forth peace proposals for the war in Ukraine that heavily favored Russia.[xxxi] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[xxxii] Putin named Ukraine's "demilitarization" and "denazification" as Russia's main goals when he launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022, and Russian officials have consistently used these terms to call for the removal of the current legitimate Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself in the future.[xxxiii] Russia has attempted to exploit diplomatic meetings with PRC and Iranian officials in recent months to publicly reiterate these original war aims and posture Russia's allies as supportive in these efforts.[xxxiv] The PRC has previously publicly attributed talk of Russia's alleged need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine only to Kremlin officials — not PRC officials.[xxxv] The May 8 joint Russian–Chinese statement declaring that "the parties" are "convinced" of the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war is a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric.

The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc. Russia and the PRC reiterated their mutual interest in establishing a multipolar world order in which the UN plays a central role.[xxxvi] Xi further claimed that both Russia and the PRC bear a special responsibility as permanent members of the UNSC and great powers to oversee the creation of a new multipolar world.[xxxvii] The joint statement underscored both parties' commitment to the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - a reference to the architecture that Putin first proposed in June 2024 with Xi's support.[xxxviii] The joint statement highlighted the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS - organizations that Kremlin officials have previously labelled as the foundation of Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture.[xxxix] The joint statement paradoxically called for an end to confrontational bloc mentality and specifically cited NATO expansion as an example of such bloc mentality. The statement noted that Russia and the PRC find the construction of military blocs that are anti-Russian and anti-Chinese in nature unacceptable. The statement emphasized the need to eliminate the "root causes" of interstate conflicts before the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - the first time Russian officials have publicly linked their calls for the elimination of "root causes" with Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture. ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power and that Putin's Eurasian security architecture proposal is part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc to further Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weaking the West and its allies.[xl]

The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties increased 23 percent between March 2025 and April 2025 and increased by 84 percent between April 2024 and April 2025.[xli] The UN HRMMU reported that at least 209 civilians were killed and 1,146 civilians were injured in the war in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that 97 percent of these civilian casualties were in unoccupied Ukraine and that April 2025 had the highest number of civilian casualties since September 2024. The HRMMU reported that almost half of these casualties were due to missile and loitering munition strikes and noted several Russian drone and missile strikes in urban areas of Kryvyi Rih and Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv cities in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that short-range drone strikes accounted for 23 percent of civilian casualties, most of which were in Kherson Oblast. The UN HRMMU noted that a drone strike against a civilian bus in Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the east [right] bank of the Dnipro River immediately across from the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant) significantly contributed to these casualties.

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US–Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.[xlii] The United States and Ukraine signed the bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.[xliii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society.
• Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.
• Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks.
• The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.
• The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war.
• The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc.
• The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 7, 2025

US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated on May 6 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's refusal to agree to a 30-day ceasefire is the main impediment to  establishing peace in Ukraine and that Russia will be hurt if the parties do not agree to a comprehensive ceasefire, as "Russia is not winning the war."[1] Kellogg noted Russia's failure to secure positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, its inability to reach Kyiv and Odesa cities, and Russian forces' high attrition rates — all in line with ISW's assessment that Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since 2022.[2] US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 7 that Russia is "asking for a certain set of requirements" and "concessions in order to end the conflict," but that the United States thinks that Russia is "asking for too much."[3]

Kellogg reiterated that Ukraine has agreed to a renewable comprehensive sea, air, and land ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days and that Ukraine is willing to immediately sign the agreement.[4]  Kellogg stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept a "ceasefire in place" that will require both Russia and Ukraine to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline in order to establish a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone that could fall under an unspecified monitoring mechanism. Kellogg stated that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are willing to deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River that will patrol and reinforce the comprehensive ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Kellogg's statement on May 7, claiming that Russia has not received any Ukrainian proposals to establish a demilitarized zone.[5]

Russia is likely attempting to prolong and delay discussions about a comprehensive ceasefire to obfuscate its continued rejection of the United States' ceasefire proposals. ISW continues to assess that Russia likely remains opposed to any sort of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, as Russia would likely weaponize the absence of such mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations, as it has done before.[6] The Kremlin has also repeatedly outright rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, claiming that such deployments would be unacceptable for Russia.[7] Russia remains committed to its long-standing effort to prolong peace negotiations in order to make battlefield gains and attempt to secure additional concessions from the United States.[8]  

Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a building in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely seized positions in Tetkino.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southern Tetkino and continued to claim on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[10] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tetkino, however.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian mechanized assaults against Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) on May 7 and that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to use mine-clearing equipment to create paths through Russian minefields in the area.[12] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi Put, but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the area.[13] ISW has not observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered Novyi Put. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[14]

Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck and seriously damaged the Fiber Optic Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia.[15] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the plant.[16] The Fiber Optic Systems plant is the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables, which Russian forces are increasingly relying on for the operation of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones on the battlefield in Ukraine.[17] Ukraine notably struck the same plant on April 5.[18] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian strikes on May 7 caused a second fire near the Fiber Optic Systems plant, likely at the Saranskkabel machine-building enterprise.[19] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian defense enterprises in Tula City, including the Instrument-Making Design Bureau, which produces anti-tank systems, small arms, and combat modules, and the Scientific-Production Association (SPLAV), which produces Grad, Uragan, and Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[20] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted drone strikes that hit the SPLAV plant and the Bazalt weapons and ammunition plant in Krasnoarmeysk, Moscow Oblast.[21] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows smoke near the Fiber Optic Systems and SPLAV plants.[22]

Kovalenko further reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Shaykovka Airbase in Kaluga Oblast, where Russia bases and stores Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Kh-22 cruise missiles, and the Kubinka Airbase in Moscow Oblast, where Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter jets are based.[23] Russian milbloggers, including a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Kubinka Airbase.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down at least nine drones over Kaluga Oblast, at least six drones over Tula Oblast, and at least two drones over Moscow Oblast.[25]

Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations. Officials in the republics of Chuvashia and Tatarstan and in Voronezh and Tver oblasts warned on May 7 that authorities may restrict mobile network usage to "ensure security" on May 9.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned on May 7 that Moscow City and Oblast authorities may place "limitations" on mobile internet operation during Victory Day celebrations "for obvious reasons" and stated that Russians "must treat this with absolute understanding."[27] Several Russian banks and internet giant Yandex warned that the disconnection will likely affect Russians' access to banking, taxi, courier, and public transportation services, particularly in Moscow City and Oblast.[28] Russian authorities have been periodically testing their Sovereign Internet system, which allows Russia to completely disconnect itself from the global internet and increasingly censor Russians' ability to communicate and access information.[29] Reports of significant Russian internet outages have increased in the first months of 2025, and Russian authorities likely seek to take advantage of the May 9 holiday to conduct a widespread test of the Sovereign Internet system without encountering significant opposition from Russians.[30] The Kremlin also likely seeks to prevent Russians from circulating imagery and footage of damage and fires from any possible Ukrainian long-range strikes on May 9 to avoid shattering the facade that Russia's victory in Ukraine is near on Victory Day itself — even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt for the 2025 holiday.[31]

Russian authorities have already tested the ability to temporarily disconnect from the internet during recent Ukrainian long-range drone strikes against Russia and likely intend to informationally link these planned May 9 disconnections to actual Ukrainian drone strikes as part of efforts to mitigate any opposition to the disconnection ahead of May 9. Russian media reported that over 30 Russian cities, including in Yaroslavl, Tver, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Tula, Leningrad, Kaluga, and Kursk oblasts, experienced difficulties connecting to the internet during the Ukrainian drone strikes on May 7 and that all of Saransk and several other settlements in the Republic of Mordovia were completely disconnected from the internet.[32] Moscow City residents have been complaining about widespread mobile internet outages since May 5, which Russian authorities have explained as preparations for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations.[33] A Russian Telegram source claimed on April 25 that Russian authorities shut down mobile internet access in occupied Crimea due to Ukrainian drone strikes and alleged that the measure was ineffective, only causing issues for Russian authorities who rely on the internet for communications.[34] Russian authorities will likely continue disconnecting large areas of Russia from mobile internet networks during Ukrainian long-range strikes to continue testing the Sovereign Internet system and, secondarily, prevent Russians from immediately circulating reports, imagery, and footage of the results of these Ukrainian strikes. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.[35] The agreement addresses enhanced defense cooperation and coordination; the "legacy and falsification" of colonialism; arms control and non-proliferation, including in space; organized crime and internationally sponsored terrorism; international information security and the regulation of the information space; and energy and economic cooperation. The agreement notably includes a provision for the development of military-technical cooperation between Russia and Venezuela. This strategic partnership agreement coheres with Russian efforts to strengthen relations with Venezuela over the past several years, in large part to contest US influence in the Western hemisphere and to paint Russia as a competitive and capable world power.[36] Russia and Venezuela previously signed 17 agreements, including eight strategic-level agreements, in November 2024 that include intelligence sharing, counterespionage, drone use, and petroleum technologies.[37]  Maduro is in Moscow for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations, and Russia is likely attempting to showcase its allies, partners, and diplomatic successes to international audiences.[38]

Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Current Time outlet reported on May 6 that the European Council prepared a new sanctions package against the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, 27th Scientific Center, and 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute.[39] The sanctions package will reportedly reference November 2024 and February 2025 reports from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) detailing how Russian forces used chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas — a type of riot control agent (RCA) banned under the CWC — near Marivka and Ilinka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River across from Enerhodar and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant [ZNPP]) in 2024. The OCPW found traces of CS gas in soil and water tests following Russian strikes, which explains its presence in areas beyond the current frontline. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 6 that Russian forces executed three surrendering Ukrainian POWs on May 3 near Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[40] ISW continues to observe a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in, or directly enabling, their subordinates to conduct these executions in violation of international law.[41]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post. Putin and Kadyrov met on May 7 to discuss socioeconomic issues in the Chechen Republic.[42] Kadyrov ended the meeting by thanking Putin for his positive assessment of Chechen force generation efforts and Chechen forces' participation in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Kadyrov stated that "we will not let [Putin] down," to which Putin replied, "I have no doubt," suggesting that Putin expects Kadyrov to continue leading the republic. Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post on May 5 in an interview with Chechnya Segodnya, but noted on May 6 that only Putin can authorize this decision.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire.
• Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7.
• Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.
• Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2025

Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks near Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that fighting continued near the railway station in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southwestern Tetkino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are defending near Tetkino.[3]

Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian position in southwestern Tetkino, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions near the Tetkino Railway Station.[4] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian units near Tetkino.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have interdicted and maintained fire control over an unspecified section of the 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzh highway.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.[7]

Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West. Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu published an op-ed in the official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on May 6, arguing that military and political unity against a common enemy is Russia's only path to a strong and victorious future.[8] Shoigu repeatedly juxtaposed the Red Army's defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Shoigu extolled the Soviet State Defense Committee's (an executive governing body established following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union) "strictly centralized framework" that ensured effective coordination and implementation of orders on the frontline and the home front. Shoigu stated that Russian public consciousness experienced a national identity crisis following the fall of the Soviet Union and underscored the importance of preserving and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values to resolve this crisis and form an unofficial Russian state ideology (the Russian constitution forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology).[9] Shoigu reiterated Russian narratives designed to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and accused the collective West of preparing for a direct military conflict with Russia and seeking to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.

The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia. The Kremlin is leveraging government-wide initiatives to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in positions of power in Russia and long-term rhetorical campaigns to disseminate the belief that the world is divided into two groups (the West and the Russian-led "multipolar world") seeking to destroy one another — mirroring the Soviet Union's framing of geopolitics as an existential conflict between communism and capitalism.[10] Russia's evolving informal state ideology includes aspects of the Soviet Union's ideology, such as a strong centralized government and a unified perception of the state enemy, but lacks the greater justification for why Russia must destroy its enemies.[11] The Kremlin is attempting to unify Russian society, particularly elites, under this world view in order to ensure that any successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin will embody similarly aggressive and dangerous ideals that perpetuate eternal conflict with the West and NATO.

Putin's envisioned informal state ideology is somewhat at odds with that being developed by Russian ultranationalists — one of Putin's key constituencies. Putin is promoting an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population.[12] Russian ultranationalists, whose perspective is often voiced most clearly by Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, appear more interested in an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[13] Putin is likely resistant to such an ideology as it risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic and religiously-diverse population and could pose a threat to regime stability. Russian officials are struggling to balance placating the increasingly influential ultranationalist community with offsetting critical economic issues and labor shortages with migrant labor, and the war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with the West will only exacerbate these issues.[14]

Shoigu also underscored the importance of the Kremlin's development of military-patriotic education programs — such as the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), Yunarmiya, and the Russian Military Historical Society — and noted that they are designed to prepare Russian citizens for military service.[15] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin's efforts to centralize control over and expand multi-generational youth programs as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[16] The Kremlin may intend to leverage these military-patriotic education programs to workshop a future state ideology and socialize Russian citizens to this ideology from a young age.

Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II. Shoigu noted in the May 6 article that the Soviet Union made "mistakes" when planning for a war with Nazi Germany, including failing to properly equip and manage Soviet troops, and suffered from poor strategic planning and ineffective military doctrine.[17] Shoigu claimed that Nazi Germany was able to exploit these mistakes to make significant advances early in the war (to the gates of Moscow, in fact), but that the Soviet Union was able to improve its capabilities and mobilize society to support an eventual victory. Shoigu's article notably ignores the role that the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which Joseph Stalin used to seize the Baltic States and part of Poland while Adolf Hitler invaded the rest of Poland in 1939, played in Stalin's unwillingness to prepare for war with Nazi Germany. Shoigu's comments are likely an attempt to use references to the Second World War to tacitly acknowledge the Russian military's shortcomings at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for which Shoigu was to a considerable extent responsible as Defense Minister. Shoigu's retelling of the Second World War mirrors Russia's unpreparedness for a long war at the start of the full-scale invasion and significant setbacks in 2022 when Ukraine forced the Russian military to withdraw from around Kyiv and from northern Ukraine and liberated significant swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Shoigu is also attempting to draw parallels to the Second World War to frame the Russian military as having secured the permanent initiative on the battlefield and portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable to both the international community and the domestic Russian populace. Shoigu is likely attempting to draw on the mythos of the Second World War to signal to domestic audiences that Russian victory is near and requires united societal support, even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt on Victory Day 2025.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime. Kadyrov told Chechen news outlet Chechnya Segodnya on May 5, in response to rumors of his resignation, that he asked to be "relieved" from his post as Chechen Republic head and hopes that his request "will be supported" but that unspecified others "will have their own initiatives, their own vision."[18] Kadyrov stated on his Telegram channel on May 6 that "many" misunderstood his May 5 statement and clarified that only Putin can decide whether Kadyrov can leave his post and that Kadyrov can only ask to leave or offer his resignation.[19] Kadyrov emphasized that he is a "team man" and will follow Putin's orders, implying that he will retain his post if that is what Putin decides.[20] It is currently unclear how serious Kadyrov is about this request, as Kadyrov has periodically expressed his desire to resign as Chechen Republic head since 2016 and has consistently walked back these statements.[21]

Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on March 27, citing a source in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), that Kadyrov's relations with Putin have deteriorated in recent months as Putin was displeased with Kadyrov's "frequent and uncoordinated negotiations" with monarchies in Middle Eastern countries.[22] One source told investigative outlet Novaya Gazeta that Kadyrov helped Putin negotiate with Qatar about the fate of Russian military bases in Syria and that Kadyrov "carried out even more delicate orders from the Kremlin" in the Middle East, however.[23] Kadyrov has acted as a stabilizer within the Chechen Republic and elsewhere in the North Caucasus during particularly tense moments since the early 2000s, particularly moments that could pose threats to the stability of Putin's regime.[24] Kadyrov's death or departure from office, should it occur during or immediately after the war in Ukraine, could leave Putin's interests in the North Caucasus unguarded unless Kadyrov and Putin appoint a suitable successor.

It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death. Novaya Gazeta reported on May 5, citing a Russian Telegram channel and several other sources familiar with the matter, that Kadyrov has "changed priorities" and spent a lot of time receiving health treatment and largely delegated his external engagements since February 2025.[25] Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov's daughter and former Chechen Deputy Prime Minister and Culture Minister Aishat Kadyrova suddenly resigned in early February 2025 and that sources in the Chechen government reported that Kadyrov's other two daughters, Khutmat and Khadizhat Kadyrova, also stopped working in civil service positions at the same time. Novaya Gazeta reported that Aishat Kadyrova travelled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late February 2025 to identify investment opportunities for the Kadyrov family in the wake of Kadyrov's reportedly declining health.

Novaya Gazeta reported that only two of Kadyrov's 14 children "play a significant role" in Kadyrov's future plans: 26-year-old Aishat Kadyrova and 17-year-old Adam Kadyrov.[26] A Novaya Gazeta source reported that Kadyrov would not have "had the headache of appointing a successor" if "Aishat [Kadyrova] had been born a man," given Aishat's success in political and business roles. Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov has positioned Adam Kadyrov as his obvious successor, including by instructing Chechen officials to treat Adam as Kadyrov's main heir. ISW has previously observed reports of Kadyrov giving favorable appointments to Adam, arranging meetings between Adam and Putin, and appearing to prefer him as heir over his elder son, Akhmat Kadyrov.[27] Adam Kadyrov famously stoked interethnic tensions after footage emerged in September 2023 of Adam beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, an act which Ramzan Kadyrov praised and subsequently rewarded.[28]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of almost all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[29] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported on May 6 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 205-for-205 POW exchange.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino.
• Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West.
• The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia.
• Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.
• It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6.
• Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2025

Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces attacked across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino and Popova-Lezhachi (far west of Sudzha and southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) on the evening of May 4 and morning of May 5.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used mine clearing equipment to create a path through Russian minefields along the border, but that Ukrainian forces have not made significant advances in the area thus far.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in a small arms clash near the Tetkino Railway Station in southern Tetkino and that Ukrainian forces later withdrew back into Sumy Oblast.[3] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have not seized Tetkino or broken through Russia's defenses near Novyi Put.[4] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, likely referring to the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, other Russian military personnel, and Russian border guards are defending against the Ukrainian attacks.[5]

Ukrainian forces are attempting to isolate Russian units near Tetkino and throughout Glushkovsky Raion. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian reconnaissance and strike drone command post near Tetkino and killed up to 20 Russian servicemembers.[6] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces have been training drone operators at a school in Tetkino since 2022.[7] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified drone strikes and artillery fire against Tetkino in the night of May 4 before attacking toward the settlement.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.[9] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also using drones to interdict Russian logistics in the area.[10]

The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions. Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern and southern Myrne (southwest of Toretsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[11] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the advance and were attacking in the direction of Malynivka (just west of Myrne).[12] ISW first observed reports that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade redeployed to the Toretsk direction in late March 2025 after operating in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove directions.[13] Elements of the brigade may be currently deployed across several sectors of the front. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in Stara Mykolaivka and Oleksandropil and conducting clearing operations near Kalynove (all southwest of Toretsk). Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division have been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since at least Summer 2023 during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area.[14] ISW observed reports that elements of the division were operating in the Zaporizhia direction as of May 4, and the division is likely currently split between the Zaporizhia and Toretsk directions.[15] The Russian military command previously reinforced offensive operations southwest of Toretsk with elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both part of the 8th CAA, SMD) in early 2025, and the repeated reinforcing of this effort from three different sectors of the frontline indicates that the Russian military command views this as a priority frontline sector.[16]

A Russian milblogger speculated on May 4 that Russian attacks near Nova Poltavka (northwest of Myrne and northeast of Kalynove) are part of long-term Russian efforts to advance toward Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) and envelop Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk from the east and west.[17] Russian forces re-intensified offensive operations in mid-March 2025 aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk and seizing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad but have not made significant advances in the area since late Fall 2024 due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations.[18] Russian forces appeared to shift their focus toward the Novopavlivka direction in an attempt to reach the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in recent months.[19] Russian forces have not been able to advance the remaining three kilometers to the border in the past month, however, and may be pursuing opportunistic advances in other areas, such as near Nova Poltavka.[20] Russian forces may attempt to leverage recent redeployments to Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions as part of a mutually reinforcing effort aimed at eliminating the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk to facilitate advances toward Kostyantynivka from the south and enveloping Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[21]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Czech President Petr Pavel announced on May 4 that Czechia will work with Ukraine to establish a school to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets outside of Ukraine.[22] Pavel added that Czechia and members of the French- and British-led Coalition of the Willing will train Ukrainian pilots. The US Department of State announced on May 4 that it approved $310.5 million for F-16 training, equipment, and support services for Ukraine.[23] Zelensky stated that the Czech Ammunition Initiative could deliver 1.8 million artillery shells to Ukraine in 2025 and that Ukraine is expecting its allies to deliver three million artillery shells in total this year.[24] Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová stated in April 2025 that the Czech initiative had secured funding for artillery deliveries to Ukraine through Fall 2025.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Czech President Petr Pavel announced on May 4 that Czechia will work with Ukraine to establish a school to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets outside of Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains the initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published a documentary on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 about Putin on May 4, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs."[1] Putin also claimed that Russian reconciliation with the Ukrainian part of the Russian people is "inevitable." Putin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian people are simply a subset of Russians rather than a distinctly separate nation to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the occupation of Ukrainian territory and people.[2] Russian state media notably highlighted that Putin has previously made the false claim that Russians and Ukrainians are one people.[3] Putin’s statements indicate that Russia continues to assess that it can achieve its original objectives of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which include demilitarizing Ukraine, installing a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join NATO and other security blocs, and forcing Ukraine to make massive territorial concessions to Russia, including parts of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy.[4] These demands amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation. Russia will likely continue efforts to achieve these goals through military and diplomatic means, as Russian officials continue attempts to leverage battlefield gains to strengthen their negotiating position.

Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West. Putin told Zarubin that Russian society reacted positively to the invasion of Ukraine and that each citizen realized that "he is the state" and Russia's survival depends on each individual.[5] Putin stated that Russia is a country of "moral and ethical values" and that the basis of the Russian conscience is "the family, the state, and the future of Russia."[6] Putin is notably attempting to frame the Russian public's support for the war through shared values despite the Kremlin's reliance on financial incentives to recruit the majority of its military personnel and to maintain its war effort.[7] Putin accused the West once again of "deceiving" Russia following the 2015 Minsk agreements, likely in an effort to convince the Russian domestic audience that Russia cannot negotiate with the West and needs to continue the war.[8]

Putin's statements throughout the documentary indicate that Putin likely does not intend to slow offensive operations or transition to defensive operations in Ukraine and instead is attempting to ideologically prepare domestic Russian society for a long war. ISW has previously assessed that Russian officials are setting conditions to maintain a long war and to justify future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.[9] Russian officials have also consistently intensified efforts to militarize Russian society since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, further indicating that Russia is preparing for a protracted conflict. Russian officials are engaged in long-term efforts to consolidate control over Russia’s veteran civil society and elevate a cadre of loyal veterans to positions in Russia's regional and federal government.[10] Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," following the launch of myriad militaristic initiatives in 2023 and 2024 to provide veterans with social and financial support and reinforce the Russian state narrative that veterans are the new "elite" class[11] Russia is also investing heavily in military-patriotic education for Russia’s youth, demonstrating the Kremlin's interest in creating a new generation of militarized, loyal citizens in the medium to long term[12]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2. Budanov reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles fired from Magura-7 naval drones.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains its initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States.
• Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal. Zelensky referred to Putin's May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire demand as a "theatrical production" that does not appear to be serious and is designed to create a sense of comfort and safety for participants of Russia's Victory Day celebration.[1] Zelensky once again articulated Ukraine's willingness to extend a short-term ceasefire to 30 days and stated that an effective ceasefire requires high-quality monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that any joint ceasefire should be comprehensive and last for at least 30 days with the possibility for renewal.[2] Kovalenko noted that shorter ceasefires with vague terms and a lack of monitoring mechanisms afford Russian forces the opportunity to seize on tactical pauses to better prepare ahead of a future summer offensive in Ukraine. Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Russia celebrates Victory Day on May 9. Putin first announced on April 28 Russia's intention to implement a Victory Day ceasefire between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[3] Putin's decision to unilaterally impose a fleeting ceasefire during Russia's Victory Day celebration is a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia to both domestic and international audiences. Putin likely also seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations by imposing such an agreement.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the purpose of Russia's unilateral Easter and Victory Day ceasefires is to "test" Ukraine's readiness to pursue paths towards a sustainable peace.[4] Peskov claimed that Russia will wait for "final," unambiguous statements from Ukraine and will look for Ukrainian actions aimed at de-escalating the war during the holiday. Ukraine and the United States have previously proposed a 30-day general ceasefire to Russia, but Russian officials continue to ignore or outright reject these general ceasefire proposals.[5] Ukraine has also repeatedly called for longer ceasefires so as to pave the way for negotiations toward a durable peace settlement — which is in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts to leverage a ceasefire as the foundation for a lasting peace agreement in Ukraine.[6] Russia is very likely to continue its pattern of leveraging short-term ceasefires to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in an effort to discredit Ukraine and to create tactical or operational pauses to conduct troop rotations, resupply units, and prepare for future offensive operations, as evidenced by the Easter and long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefires.[7] Russia's continued rejection of Ukrainian and US ceasefire proposals of any reasonable length with necessary monitoring mechanisms showcases Russia's disinterest in peace in Ukraine in the near term.

The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on May 2 that the US State Department approved and notified the US Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of equipment and maintenance services for Ukraine’s F-16s worth an estimated $310.5 million.[8] The DSCA reported that the sale will include aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and sustainment support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; ground handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; studies and surveys; and US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services.

Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3. Ukrainian forces launched an aerial drone, a naval drone, and missile strike against Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and surrounding areas on May 3.[9] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that Ukrainian forces used a SAM fired from a Magura naval drone to down a Russian Su-30 fighter jet over the Black Sea near Novorossiysk.[10] Ukrainian forces used missiles attached to a Magura naval drone to shoot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in December 2024, but this is the first time that Ukrainian forces have downed a fixed-wing aircraft using this tactic.[11]

Russian milbloggers responded to the May 3 strike, claiming that Russia is lagging behind Ukraine on naval drone development and complaining that Russia has previously lost aircraft over the Black Sea due to Ukrainian drone dominance.[12] The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have the means to combat Ukrainian naval drones and protect Russian aircraft from missile strikes, but that Russian leadership is unwilling to prioritize Russian drone development and innovation. The milbloggers called for Russian coastal defense units and drone operators in the Black Sea to integrate lessons learned from Russian infantry fighting in Ukraine in order to integrate first-person view (FPV) drones with aerial reconnaissance.

Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states. Independent Russian media outlets Meduza and Agentstvo reported on May 2 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov authored the foreword of a new book titled "History of Lithuania," which the "Foreign Relations" publishing arm of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) published in March 2025.[13] Lavrov‘s foreword claimed that the national policies of Baltic countries, including modern Lithuania, leverage "falsified” historical narratives to "stimulate" Russophobic and anti-Russian sentiments in their domestic audiences.[14] Lavrov claimed that the book seeks to analyze the development of the "lands that were associated with Lithuania at different times." Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys stated that the book is a Russian propaganda tool designed to provide the Kremlin with scholarly literature to support its denial of neighboring countries’ statehoods and histories separate from that of Russia.[15] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently intensified their threats against Europe — particularly the Baltic States — due to Europe's alleged "Russophobia."[16] Kremlin officials have also indicated that Russia views independent states that were once part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union as part of modern-day Russia.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal.
• The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3.
• Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka. 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2025

Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025.[1] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.

Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken.[2] Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024.[3] Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.

Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[4] The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia's long-term warfighting capabilities.[5] The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command's decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia's ability to create a pool of such forces.[6]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[7] Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely, however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian servicemembers.[8] ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[9] The United States can better leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment. CNN reported on May 1 that new intelligence reviewed by US and Western officials suggests that Putin may be pivoting his immediate focus to shorter-term objectives of cementing Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory and boosting Russia's economy.[10] CNN reported that Putin may be concerned by the Trump administration's threats to apply more sanctions on the struggling Russian economy. An unnamed official told CNN that Putin's willingness to settle for more limited objectives in Ukraine depends on whether Putin can portray Russia's gains in Ukraine as an acceptable victory domestically. The source insinuated that Putin likely remains committed to revisiting his longer-term goals of subjugating all of Ukraine and undermining NATO after taking a "significant pause," however.

ISW has observed a variety of indicators suggesting that Putin is not reconsidering his short-term objectives in Ukraine, however. Russian forces have increased the intensity of offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly redoubling efforts to advance deeper in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions and launching a limited offensive operation in Sumy Oblast.[11] Russian forces are rapidly integrating tactical innovations to optimize timely gains in response to Ukrainian drone operators, including integrating motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is also leveraging legal, financial, and socioeconomic measures to increase Russia's force generation capabilities and boost Russia's drone production capabilities to support the war in Ukraine.[13]

A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory. Putin could choose to pivot toward shorter-term objectives on account of mounting economic and manpower constraints that are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to perpetuate its war in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces could slow the tempo of offensive operations and work to implement policies and tactics to mitigate casualties if Putin issues an order to prioritize consolidating Russia's hold over occupied Ukraine instead of making further gains. Russian forces would likely shift to defensive operations with the aim of fortifying and consolidating current positions on the frontline, largely in an effort to safeguard battlefield gains and preserve increasingly limited manpower and materiel reserves, in response to such an order. Russian forces could begin constructing fortifications near frontline positions in response to such an order. ISW would observe such indicators and will continue to monitor Russian and Ukrainian reporting for these indicators.

ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO. Senior US officials reportedly remain skeptical that Putin has eased his intransigence regarding a peace agreement and told CNN that Russia may resume the war and try to seize more Ukrainian territory even after agreeing to a US peace proposal.[15] CNN reported that unspecified officials maintain the belief that Russia will retain its aims of seizing the maximal amount of Ukrainian territory even if Putin signs a peace agreement. Ongoing Russian efforts to seize Lyman and Pokrovsk and advance north of Toretsk toward the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka indicate that Putin maintains his long-standing goals of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[16] The Russian government's efforts to expand Russia's force generation capabilities in the short- and long-term and Russia's ongoing military restructuring efforts suggest that Russia is not only responding to a drawn-out conflict in Ukraine but also preparing for a future conflict on Russia's western borders.[17] The Russian government also continues to prioritize long-term investment in Russia's domestic industrial base (DIB), despite the significant economic cost of this wartime economy to Russia’s population.[18] These factors indicate that Putin is not abandoning his territorial ambitions in Ukraine but is in fact preparing for a long war of attrition against Ukraine and likely the collective West.

Russian officials are also continuing to condition Russian society to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine and against NATO. Russian officials, including Putin, have consistently leveraged false claims about the war in Ukraine to make maximalist territorial demands, including that Ukraine give up "Novorossiya" — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia that Ukraine must concede for Russia to end the war.[19] Putin invoked the term "Novorossiya" as recently as April 21, indicating that the Kremlin has not abandoned this territorial objective.[20] Russian state media previously cautioned Russian domestic audiences in March 2025 against expecting "big agreements" from recent peace negotiations between Putin and US President Donald Trump.[21] A Verstka poll of 100 Russian military personnel published on April 29 indicates that only 18% of career Russian military personnel and officers, most of whom have been fighting in Ukraine for over two years, would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin's stated goals (likely referring to the demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine).[22] Only about a fifth of surveyed Russian military personnel and civilians indicated that they believe the war will end in the coming months. Verstka’s polling indicates that the Kremlin is not preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war. This pattern of Kremlin informational activity and the resonance it has achieved in Russian society will make it much harder for Putin to present any long-term ceasefire, let alone peace agreement, that falls far short of his stated aims as any kind of victory to his domestic audience.

Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on May 1 that the war in Ukraine will not end "any time soon" and that it is "up to the Russians and Ukrainians now that each side knows what the other’s terms are for peace."[23] US Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio told Fox News on May 1 that US President Donald Trump will need to prioritize other issues if Ukrainian and Russian negotiating positions remain too far apart for reconciliation but that the United States will continue "helping" wherever possible.[24] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce echoed Rubio’s statements during a press briefing on May 1 and noted that the matter of resolving the conflict in Ukraine is "now“ between Russia and Ukraine, as the United States is changing its "style" and "methodology" and will no longer "fly around the world at the drop of a hat" to mediate negotiations."[25] Bruce reiterated that the United States is "still committed" to a lasting peace in Ukraine

The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.[26] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering the proposal.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.
• Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024.
• Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse.
• Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment.
• A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory.
• ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.
• Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
• The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2025

The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.[i] The Trump administration and the Ukrainian government published the joint text of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on May 1 and reported that the agreement is a "fully collaborative partnership" that will fund Ukraine's long-term reconstruction and modernization. The agreement establishes a joint fund that the United States and Ukraine will equally pay into to fund development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials noted that Ukraine will retain full control over "subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources" and the right to determine the terms of use for Ukraine's natural resources.[ii] Ukrainian officials stated that United States can make monetary contributions or supply additional military assistance to Ukraine as part of the fund, and that Ukraine will allocate 50 percent of its state budget revenues from rent payments, license fees, and other revenue from national resource extraction projects to the fund.[iii] The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada must ratify the agreement, and it appears that the United States and Ukraine will also have to sign a series of more technical agreements that will define the terms of the investments and projects in the future.[iv]

The Trump administration noted that the agreement signals US commitment to "Ukraine's long-term success" and noted that the United States and Ukraine will not allow any person, company, or state that supplied the Russian war effort to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine.[v] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also noted during an interview on Fox News on May 1 that the agreement is a "strong signal" to Russian officials that there "is no daylight" between the United States and Ukraine.[vi] Ukraine's participation in this agreement underscores Ukraine's continued willingness to make compromises in pursuit of a long-term, sustainable resolution of the war in Ukraine despite consistent Russian disinterest in US and Ukrainian peace proposals.

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine. Kellogg told Fox News on April 29 that Ukrainian representatives repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to negotiate during talks with senior US and European officials in London on April 23, and it is now "up to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin" to achieve a peaceful resolution to the war.[vii] Kellogg stated that Ukrainian representatives in London agreed to 22 "concrete" terms including a "permanent, comprehensive" ceasefire, for which US President Donald Trump has long advocated. Kellogg also stated that US officials previously presented Putin with a roadmap for ending the war in Ukraine and that Putin should directly engage with the US proposal if he "really" wants to end the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo published on April 28 that "the ball is not in [Russia’s] court" in terms of ceasefire negotiations because Ukrainian officials have not shown "readiness" for peace negotiations.[viii] Lavrov’s statements indicate that Russian officials are uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war and are prolonging negotiations to facilitate battlefield gains. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to hold ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States by falsely shifting the blame onto Ukraine for stalling negotiations to end the war.[ix]

Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated on April 30 during a BRICS foreign ministers' summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil that Russia will consider Western peacekeeping contingents in Ukraine as legitimate military targets and that such contingents are unacceptable.[x] Shoigu added that Russia has observed signs that the West is planning to introduce "pseudo-peacekeepers" into Ukraine, and another Russian official recently insinuated that Russia would not accept the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a monitoring mechanism for a ceasefire or permanent peace.[xi] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected Western overtures to implement any sort of monitoring mechanisms in Ukraine, weaponizing unclear and unilateral Russian ceasefire terms to blame Ukraine ceasefire violations.[xii] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on May 1 that Russia will "take all necessary measures" to prevent Ukraine and its Western allies from restoring Ukraine to its 1991 internationally recognized borders.[xiii] Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly demanded that Ukraine acquiesce to territorial concessions while Russia remains steadfast in its refusal to offer any concessions of its own.[xiv]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Previous Updates

• April 2025
• March 2025
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• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
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• June 2024
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• April 2024
• March 2o24
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• December 2023
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