Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2025

November 10, 2025, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on November 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area remains difficult as Ukrainian forces fight to hold the shoulders of the pocket and Russian forces continue to advance in the area. Ukrainian forces reportedly recently cleared Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), in an attempt to hold the northern shoulder of the pocket.[1] Ukrainian forces are simultaneously counterattacking within Pokrovsk and on its western outskirts to prevent further Russian advances on the southern shoulder of the pocket.[2] Russian advances in northern and western Pokrovsk have slowed in recent days, likely due to continued Ukrainian efforts to counterattack.[3] Russian forces continue to advance in eastern and southern Pokrovsk, which could indicate that Russian forces may attempt to create a sub-pocket to support Russian efforts to encircle Ukrainian forces in the town and ultimately force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the broader pocket. Russian forces also likely maintain fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the pocket, complicating Ukrainian logistics. Russian forces appear to be working simultaneously to complete the encirclement of the entire pocket and to reduce the pocket itself. The prospects and timeline for those efforts remain unclear.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 10 that Ukrainian forces cleared Rodynske, and geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Ukrainian and Russian forces both recently advanced in southern Rodynske, in part contradicting Mashovets’ report.[4] Additional geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[5] Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in southern Hnativka (east of Pokrovsk), in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[6] Ukrainian military sources reported on November 9 and 10 that Russian forces have resumed a higher intensity of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction and continue to suffer heavy losses.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 November 10 situation report, which covers activity between 0800 November 19 and 0800 November 10, reported that there were 265 combat engagements along the entire front line — 97 of which were in the Pokrovsk direction alone.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 9 that the Russian military command had committed 170,000 servicemembers to offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction but that Russian forces suffered a record 25,000 killed and wounded in the area in October 2025 alone.[9] Russian forces reportedly suffered roughly 15,000 casualties in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025, by comparison.[10]

The Kremlin continues to publicly and clearly reiterate its maximalist demands and unwillingness to engage in negotiations that result in anything less than full Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 10 that Russia will only end the war when it achieves the "goals that it set initially." Kremlin officials have routinely referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged “root causes” of the war, which Russian officials have defined as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[11] The Kremlin's original war aims include the removal of the current Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government, Ukraine’s commitment not to join NATO, and the revocation of NATO’s Open Door Policy.

The Kremlin has begun involuntary partial reserve call-ups as part of its wider initiative to build out its active reserve, likely for use in combat in Ukraine. Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on November 10 that at least 19 federal subjects are beginning to train active reservists for units that Russian authorities will deploy to protect critical infrastructure facilities.[12] The formation of reservist elements to protect infrastructure comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on November 5, allowing Russia to train reservists to defend critical infrastructure in Russia.[13] Kommersant stated that some federal subjects began forming specialized reservist units before the legislative amendments came into force and that Russia plans to use reservists in oblasts that border Ukraine to combat Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, evacuate populations, and support “counterterrorism” operations.[14] Kommersant claimed that Russia is including a provision in the contracts that reservists sign that contains language about reservists only deploying within their home regions. The recent law allowing Russia to train active reservists in wartime and peacetime did not include a provision geographically restricting reservists' deployment locations, even though Russian officials had claimed that Russian authorities would only send reservists to protect critical infrastructure within their home region.[15] The Kremlin has previously ignored contractual obligations that interfere with its ability to conduct the war in Ukraine as it chooses, and Putin has previously manipulated laws to both overtly and covertly violate contractual agreements without outright breaking the law.[16] Russian officials notably violated contract agreements as the Kremlin has forced those who signed short-term military contracts with expiration dates to serve for an indefinite period.[17]

ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the need to protect critical infrastructure as an excuse to conceal wider efforts to prepare active reservists for deployment, including to Ukraine.[18] Kommersant noted that several regions that Ukrainian forces frequently target, including the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, have begun calling up reserve units.[19] Moscow Oblast is notably absent from the list of regions that have begun to form reservist units, even though Ukrainian forces have frequently struck infrastructure in the oblast. Russian officials have previously concentrated military personnel recruitment efforts on regions in central Russia, and the Kremlin is likely similarly concentrating involuntary partial call-up efforts in central regions in order to shield larger and more politically important population centers, such as Moscow City, from force generation efforts.[20]

The head of a major Russian bank acknowledged Russia’s economic struggles in a high-level meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref told Putin on November 10 that Sberbank is growing at a “very modest pace” due to “challenging macroeconomic conditions.”[21] Gref stated that some of the bank’s portfolios are shrinking, including its consumer loan portfolio, and that growth in 2025 is “worse than [Sberbank] expected." Gref’s statements are notable as Russian officials have largely refrained from admitting to any weakness in Russia’s economy and as the Kremlin has undertaken an information campaign to portray the Russian economy as stable and strong.[22]

Officials continue to report aerial incursions in Belgian airspace. Belgian authorities spotted drones over the Liège Airport and briefly suspended air traffic on the evening of November 9.[23] The spokesperson of Belgian energy provider Engie reported that authorities also spotted five drones flying over the Doel Nuclear Power Plant near the port of Antwerp on the evening of November 9 and that the drones were in the air for about an hour but did not affect the plant‘s operations. The November 9 drone overflights are the latest in a series of similar overflights over Belgian airports and military infrastructure in recent weeks.[24] Authorities have not identified the actors behind the November 9 drone overflights in Belgium, but Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken stated on November 8 that Russia may be responsible for the repeated drone incursions into European airspace as part of efforts to intimidate European states and deter continued aid to Ukraine.[25] The Russian Embassy in Belgium responded to Francken’s statement, claiming that there is no evidence of Russia’s involvement.[26] The various incursions into European airspace in recent weeks come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• The situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area remains difficult as Ukrainian forces fight to hold the shoulders of the pocket and Russian forces continue to advance in the area.
• Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction
• The Kremlin continues to publicly and clearly reiterate its maximalist demands and unwillingness to engage in negotiations that result in anything less than full Ukrainian capitulation.
• The Kremlin has begun involuntary partial reserve call-ups as part of its wider initiative to build out its active reserve, likely for use in combat in Ukraine.
• The head of a major Russian bank acknowledged Russia’s economic struggles in a high-level meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• Officials continue to report aerial incursions in Belgian airspace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast on the night of November 9 to 10. Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows a Ukrainian naval drone strike near a pier in Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai.[28] A Ukrainian reserve officer posted a photo showing a crater on a beach in Tuapse, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have used other weapons in the strike beyond naval drones.[29] Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that Russian forces neutralized four naval drones in the Black Sea near Tuapse and that one of the drones detonated near the shoreline.[30] A Ukrainian source posted footage on November 10, reportedly of a drone strike against the railway station in Likhovskoy, Rostov Oblast.[31] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported that Russia uses the railway station for military logistics and that the Likhovskaya Oil Depot is nearby.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindratrivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on November 9 and 10.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[34]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command appointed Major General Alexander Dembitsky as the head of drone operations in the Leningrad Military District (LMD).[35] Dembitsky previously served as the commander of the LMD's 44th Army Corps (AC).[36] The milblogger recently accused Dembitsky of committing elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC) to assaults to eliminate witnesses of his involvement with the Yastreb private military company (PMC).[37] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[38] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced along the T-2104 Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[40]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further in southern Vovchansk.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in central Vovchansk, east of Zelene, west of Synelnykove, and southeast of Prylipka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on November 9 and 10.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zybne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[44]

The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces denied Russian milbloggers' illogical claims about Russian advances in Vovchansk in September 2025, stating that the milbloggers' cumulative claims of Russian advances within the town totaled more than the actual size of Vovchansk.[45]

Order of Battle: Fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian tanks in Kharkiv Oblast.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Odradne, southwest and southeast of Bolohivka (both east of Velykyi Burluk), and 500 meters toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[47]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Milove and east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on November 9 and 10.[48]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported on November 9 that the Russian military command removed Lieutenant Colonel Pavlov, the commander of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), elements of which are operating near Khatnie.[49] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command sent a commission to investigate the regiment after the number of soldiers who were absent without leave (AWOL) increased and the regiment was not making significant advances.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Ukrainian forces near Horyane (just north of Velykyi Burluk).[50] The milblogger claimed that the forested terrain and Ukrainian fortifications are hindering Russian advances in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway in eastern Kupyansk, southwest of Stroivka, and near Dvorichanske (both northeast of Kupyansk).[51]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on November 9 and 10.[52] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Blahodativka (southwest of Kupyansk), and Osynovo (south of Kupyansk).[53]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on November 10 that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction continue to use small group infiltration tactics and a large number of drones to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of mobilized personnel, reportedly of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in eastern Kupyansk.[55] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove and toward Chervonyi Stav on November 9 and 10.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Druzhelyubivka (southeast of Borova).[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yarova (northwest of Lyman) and Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[59]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Yarova, Korovii Yar, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 9 and 10.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked south of Yampil.[61]

A Russian milblogger claimed that central Ridkodub is a contested “gray zone” and that Russian forces conducted unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions south of Korovii Yar.[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment and 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[63]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Siversk.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on November 9 and 10.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) and in central and northeast of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[66]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Bila Hora, Ivanopillya, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 9 and 10.[67]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) and Molniya drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and FPV drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[68]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[69]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Shakhove.[70]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Pankivka, Nove Shakhove, and Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on November 9 and 10.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, and Zapovidne.[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in Shakhove.[73] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and artillery systems near Shakhove.[74]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Ukrainian and Russian advances.

Russian forces attacked within and near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Mykhailivka, Novoekonomichne, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Hnativka, Myrnohrad, Rih, and Rivne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske on November 10 and 11.[75] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk, Rodynske, and Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[77] Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Hnativka.[78] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Myrnohrad.[79] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and artillery systems near Novopavlivka and Rodynske.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Yalta, and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai on November 9 and 10.[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka and advanced west of Vovche, north of Novooleksandrivka, and in southern Orestopil (all southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Oleksiivka.[83]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Kletsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad, Sichneve, and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Orestopil, Zlahoda, Danylivka, Verbove, and Yehorivka on November 9 and 10.[84]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Orestopil and Velykomykhailivka with unguided glide bombs.[85]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags in western Nove (northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[86] ISW assesses that the Russian servicemembers and an armored vehicle were able to operate within the settlement without encountering resistance, indicating that Ukrainian forces do not maintain positions in the settlement. The Russian MoD claimed on November 10 that Russian forces seized Nove.[87]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) raising flags in eastern Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole).[88] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA) seized Solodke.[89] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novouspenivske and advanced east of Rivnopillya (both northeast of Hulyaipole) and south of Solodke.[90]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Rivnopillya, Novouspenivske, and Solodke and toward Yablukove and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai Novouspenivske on November 9 and 10.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanske and in western Stepnohirsk (both west of Orikhiv).[92]

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Mali Shcherbaky, Stepove, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk on November 9 and 10.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]); the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division); and 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on November 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on November 9 and 10.[96]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[97] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[98]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tambov Oblast and five S-300/400 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 67 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – about 40 of which were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 52 drones and that 15 drones struck nine locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian authorities were clarifying information about the missile strikes as of 0930 local time, but that there was no information about hits. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and rail infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[100]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.