Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 7, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on October 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues its reflective control campaign aimed at preventing the US from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 7 that the US sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine would be a “serious escalation” that would not change the situation on the frontline in Ukraine and noted that Tomahawk missiles can carry a nuclear warhead.[i] Peskov stated that Putin made his position “unequivocally” clear on how Russia would respond to such action, referring to Putin's October 2 and 5 threats against the US provision of Tomahawk missiles. Putin threateningly warned the United States against selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine on October 2, claiming that American military personnel would have to directly participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes.[ii] Putin later threatened on October 5 that US provisions of Tomahawk missiles would “lead to the destruction” of the “emerging positive trend” in US-Russian relations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to portray potential US Tomahawk deliveries to Ukraine as a dangerous escalation to deter the United States from sending such weapons to Ukraine.

Other Russian officials are echoing Putin's threats. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev absurdly claimed on October 7 that Ukraine would use US-made Tomahawk missiles to strike Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw and that US President Donald Trump ”should understand that."[iii] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky claimed that Trump would greatly increase the risk of starting a third world war if the US sold Tomahawks to Ukraine and that Russia would not be responsible for such increased risk.[iv] Russian State Duma Deputy Maksim Ivanov and Russian Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov similarly claimed that Russia would be forced to launch a “preemptive” strike against Ukraine and that “not only Ukraine will suffer” if the US sends Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.[v] The Kremlin has previously conducted similar influence operations when the United States was discussing sending Ukraine Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), F-16 fighter jets, and Abrams tanks, and has routinely successfully delayed the provision of Western weapons to Ukraine.[vi] Previous Western weapons provisions and Ukrainian strikes using US-provided long-range weapons systems, however, did not trigger an escalatory Russian reaction, and the West and Ukraine have repeatedly violated Russia’s alleged “red lines” in the past with no resulting escalation.[vii] These recent Russian threats about Tomahawk missile provisions are part of Russia’s wider reflexive control campaign that aims to coerce Russia’s opponents to make policy decisions that actually benefit Russia.[viii] 

Leaked Russian estimates of Russian killed in action (KIA) to wounded in action (WIA) rates in Ukraine underscore the impact of increased tactical drone usage in Ukraine and the extent to which drones complicate ground advances and casualty evacuation. Ukraine's "I Want to Live" initiative published leaked Russian data on October 6 detailing Russian military casualties from January to August 2025.[ix] The data indicates that Russian forces suffered a total of 281,550 casualties of which: 86,744 were killed in action (KIA), including 1,583 officers and 8,633 penal recruits; 33,996 are missing in action (MIA), including 11,427 penal recruits; 158,529 were wounded in action (WIA), including 6,356 officers and 16,489 penal recruits; and 2,311 were captured. Ukraine's "I Want to Live" initiative's data on total Russian military casualties from January to August 2025 is similar to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi's report that Russian forces had suffered 299,210 casualties since January 2025 as of September 9.[x] Ukraine's "I Want to Live" initiative reported that Russia's casualty ratio is one KIA for every 1.3 WIA, likely due to insufficient tactical medicine training and the Russian military command's frequent failure to sufficiently rehabilitate WIA. The standard KIA to WIA ratio is one-to-three, which demonstrates that the Russian forces currently appear to have an abnormally high KIA to WIA ratio (1:1.3) likely due to the efficacy of pervasive tactical-level drone strikes that have created kill zones (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) throughout the theater, complicating both sides ability to evacuate casualties and triage WIA.[xi] ISW has previously observed reports that the Russian military command is struggling to and frequently refusing to recover WIA, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes that are significantly complicating movement on the battlefield.[xii]

The leaked estimates indicate that Russian forces suffered their highest casualties in the Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, and Lyman directions between January and August 2025, reflecting command prioritization of these sectors of the front. The “I Want to Live” documents indicate that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, responsible for the Pokrovsk direction, suffered the heaviest casualties during this period, with 43,709 killed, missing, and captured and 52,865 wounded.[xiii] These figures reflect the Russian military command’s prioritization of the Pokrovsk direction throughout 2025, as Russian forces suffered roughly 34 percent of their casualties in this direction during the first eight months of 2025. The Central Grouping of Forces' 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Central Military District [CMD]) suffered 15,310 killed, missing, and captured and 16,260 wounded, and the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) suffered 13,000 killed, missing, and captured and 14,201 wounded — the heaviest casualties out of Russia’s CAAs. The 2nd CAA has been involved in fighting mainly south and east of Pokrovsk since October 2023 and the 51st CAA redeployed to the frontline east of Pokrovsk in early 2025 and is currently responsible for Russia’s penetration toward Dobropillya.[xiv] The Central Grouping of Forces' 41st CAA, active in the Novopavlivka and Pokrovsk directions, suffered 7,544 killed, missing, and captured and 13,335 wounded. Russian forces have failed to seize Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Novopavlivka, or Druzhkivka after months of fighting despite sustaining significant casualties.

The documents reveal that Russia’s Northern Grouping of Forces, which eliminated much of Ukraine’s penetration into Kursk Oblast in early 2025 and is responsible for Russia’s ongoing efforts to create buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, suffered 53,572 casualties, second only to the Central Grouping of Forces. Russian forces may have sustained a significant portion of these casualties during the intensified Russian effort to retake Kursk Oblast in February and March 2025. The Western Grouping of Forces, responsible for the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Borova directions, suffered 47,410 casualties. The 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), primarily active in the Lyman and Kupyansk directions, suffered casualties of 9,987 killed, missing, and captured and 11,411 wounded — the third highest figure among Russia's CAAs fighting in Ukraine — underscoring the intensity of fighting in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions in recent months. The Western Grouping of Forces’ 20th CAA (MMD), active in the Borova and Lyman directions, suffered casualties of 6,410 killed, missing, and captured and 5,712 wounded. The Western Grouping of Forces has failed to seize any of the major settlements in its area of responsibility (AoR) — Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman — in 2025.

Russian forces also sustained significant casualties in lower priority frontline areas in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Southern Grouping of Forces, active in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and the Siversk direction, suffered 32,740 casualties, with the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) around Siversk suffering 13,055 casualties, the highest in the grouping of forces. The Southern Grouping of Forces has made minimal progress since seizing Toretsk in June 2025. The Eastern Grouping of Forces, responsible for eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and the Velykomykhailivka direction, suffered 38,011 casualties, with the 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]), responsible for Russia’s grinding advance toward and into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, suffering 16,980 casualties, the highest in the grouping of forces. The documents indicate that fighting in the Dnepr Grouping of Forces' AoR, which includes the Kherson direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast, remains relatively desultory amid ongoing Russian efforts to reactivate the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast with the Dnieper Grouping of Forces suffering 13,243 casualties.

Russian forces appear able and willing to sustain these casualty rates despite achieving limited tactical advances. A Russian insider source that has consistently provided accurate reports about changes in the Russian military command previously reported that the Russian MoD recruited 292,000 people between January 1 and September 15, 2025 — an average of 31,600 recruits per month.[xv] The leaked documents indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 281,550 casualties between January and August 2025 — an average of 35,193 casualties per month.[xvi] Russian casualty rates thus far in 2025 appear slightly higher than current monthly Russian recruiting rates, but Russian casualty rates have been decreasing over the last four months. The Russian General Staff may assume that casualty rates will continue to decrease in Ukraine if Russian forces can improve their ability to counter the kill zone, and this reasoning may explain why Russia is reportedly beginning to form a strategic reserve for future deployment.[xvii] ISW previously assessed that Russian casualty rates marginally decreased and gains became less costly during Summer 2025 compared to Fall 2024 and Spring 2025, likely due in part to Russia’s renewed emphasis on using UAVs to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in rear areas.[xviii] Russia has proven its ability to recruit enough people to sustain losses in Ukraine over the last three years while possibly beginning to generate a strategic reserve, and the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon or decrease the pace of operations in Ukraine so long as Russia can continue to more than sustain such losses.

European states continue to provide humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine and conclude joint agreements with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). Slovakian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák and Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on October 6 that Slovakia will provide five Božena demining vehicles, engineering vehicles, and medical stretchers as part of Slovakia’s 14th aid package to Ukraine.[xix] This is the first Slovakian aid package to Ukraine since Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico's election on October 1, 2023.[xx] The Estonian company Milrem Robotics announced on October 7 that it will deliver over 150 THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to Ukraine and that the Netherlands is funding the UGV purchase.[xxi]

Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin announced on October 7 that Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom concluded cooperation agreements for "float and fly" drone concepts with US-based drone manufacturer LeVanta Tech at the Third International Defense Industry Forum (DFNC3) in Kyiv.[xxii] Smetanin also announced that Ukroboronprom signed agreements with Spanish defense firm Escribano Mechanical & Engineering related to air defense and armored vehicles.[xxiii] Shmyhal announced on October 6 that Ukraine and Denmark signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that will enable Ukrainian companies to launch new joint production projects in Denmark, create joint capacities and exchange technologies with Denmark, and attract European Union (EU) funding for joint projects.[xxiv]

The Russian military command reportedly appointed Former Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel as the deputy commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces. A Russian insider source, who has accurately reported on Russian military command changes in the past, reported on October 6 that Kisel became the deputy commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces under the recently appointed Northern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[xxv] The Northern Grouping of Forces currently oversees operations in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. The insider source reported that Kisel was serving in Syria and organizing the evacuation of Syria's military-political leadership and military personnel after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, before returning to the Ukrainian theater. Kisel commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Russian authorities reportedly suspended Kisel in Spring 2022 for his failure to seize Kharkiv City and sent Kisel to serve in Syria.[xxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed in late 2024 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) removed Kisel as the commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria for unspecified reasons.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues its reflective control campaign aimed at preventing the US from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.
• Leaked Russian estimates of Russian killed in action (KIA) to wounded in action (WIA) rates in Ukraine underscore the impact of increased tactical drone usage in Ukraine and the extent to which drones complicate ground advances and casualty evacuation.
• The leaked estimates indicate that Russian forces suffered their highest casualties in the Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, and Lyman directions between January and August 2025, reflecting command prioritization of these sectors of the front.
• Russian forces appear able and willing to sustain these casualty rates despite achieving limited tactical advances.
• European states continue to provide humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine and conclude joint agreements with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Russian military command reportedly appointed Former Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel as the deputy commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas and near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike and sabotage campaign against Russian oil and railway infrastructure on the night of October 6 to 7. A local Telegram channel claimed on October 6 that a powerful explosion occurred at the Tyumen Oil Refinery on the night of October 6 to 7 and published footage purportedly showing emergency services responding to the incident.[xxviii] The Tyumen Oblast Government Information Center claimed on October 6 that Russian authorities destroyed three drones at an unspecified enterprise in Tyumen and denied local reports of a fire at the refinery.[xxix] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, confirmed the strike and reported that the Tyumen oil refinery has an annual crude oil production capacity of nine million tons.[xxx] Russian opposition outlet ASTRA confirmed on October 7 that at least two drones struck the refinery on October 6, damaging a fractionating column and part of the water supply system.[xxxi] A Ukrainian OSINT analyst reported that the refinery is located over 2,000 kilometers from Ukraine, making the Ukrainian strike as the farthest since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion.[xxxii] Russian state outlet RBK reported that the refinery processes 7.5 million tons of oil annually.[xxxiii] Russian state media outlets cited military experts who speculated that Ukrainian forces may have launched the drones from trucks on Russian or Kazakh territory, similarly to Ukraine‘s June 1 Operation Spiderweb deep strikes, and local news reported that authorities inspected suspicious vehicles in Tyumen City.[xxxiv] Sources in Ukrainian intelligence told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on October 7 that "unknown partisans" detonated a section of the St. Petersburg-Pskov railway between Stroganovo and Mshinskaya in Leningrad Oblast.[xxxv] Russian Railways announced that it rerouted trains around the section on October 7 for “technical reasons.”[xxxvi] Ukrainian Special Forces (SSO) and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) units previously detonated a section of the railway between Stroganovo and Mshinskaya on September 14.[xxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Volfyne and north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka October 6 and 7.[xxxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Novyi Put, Bezsalivka (both northwest of Sumy City), Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxix]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 7 that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) holding positions in Yunakivka have not received water for eight days and have to collect rainwater due to Ukrainian drone interdiction of all Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and supply routes.[xl] The milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces seized Yunakivka. milblogger claimed that the Russian military command in the Yunakivka area consists of recently graduated officers who lack combat experience, prefer to remain at rear headquarters 20 kilometers behind the line of contact, and refuse to evacuate wounded and killed servicemembers. The milblogger claimed that elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) operating in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) are accumulating in preparation to attack Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast), likely with elements of the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]).[xli]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast border areas.[xlii] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Milaevka and Velyka Rybytsia (both northeast of Sumy City).[xliii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[xliv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City), along the western shore to the Travyanske Reservoir (east of Hlyboke), and in the Synelnykove forest area (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on October 6 and 7.[xlvi] A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast published footage on October 7 and reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian  mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon in the Vovchansk direction and destroyed at least five motorcycles and several MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Vovchansk direction.[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xlix]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Dovhenke and Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on October 6 and 7.[l]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC) are reportedly operating in Odradne.[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and southern Kupyansk.[lii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Stroivka, and Kamyanka, and toward Bolohivka and Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane; and southwest of Kupyansk toward Novoplatonivka on October 6 and 7.[liii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone operators have intensified activities and deployed more units to the Kupyansk direction in recent months.[liv] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are remote mining and using fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drones that Ukrainian forces cannot counter along logistics routes. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces continue to use sabotage and reconnaissance groups for both infiltration efforts and to conduct drone or mortar strikes on rear areas The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to deliver supplies, provisions, and ammunition to the front lines and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units have resumed efforts to cross the Oskil River using ropes and inflatable boats in fireteams of one to three. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to expand bridgeheads and transport equipment on the western (right) bank of the Oskil River, which is preventing Russian forces from attacking and providing logistics.[lv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Pishchane.[lvi] Drone operators of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Bohuslavka and Novoplatonivka on October 6 and 7 but did not advance.[lviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Shandryholove, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 6 and 7.[lix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Kolodyazi.[lx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Torske and Zarichne and that Ukrainian forces in this direction are increasingly observing and capturing foreign mercenaries that signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[lxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Rubtsi direction (northeast of Lyman).[lxii]

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a rare Russian R-330Zh "Zhitel" electronic warfare (EW) station in occupied Luhansk Oblast, estimated to be worth roughly $10 million.[lxiii] The USF stated that this was the 23rd confirmed Ukrainian strike against a "Zhitel" station since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Siversk.[lxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 7 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk).[lxv] The Russian MoD previously claimed on September 2 that Russian forces seized the settlement, suggesting that the settlement remains a contested area and has potentially changed hands several times since early September.[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; and south of Siversk near Kuzmynivka on October 6 and 7.[lxvii]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces continue to improve the positions near the Siverskyi Donets River (runs east to west to the north of Siversk) and that Russian forces rarely use equipment.[lxviii] The servicemember assessed that Russian forces are likely stockpiling equipment for use after weather conditions worsen, potentially referring to the use of wheeled or tracked vehicles once the ground freezes and becomes more solid.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxix]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kleban-Byk (southeast of Kostyantynivka), north of Oleksandro-Kalynove (south of Kostyantynivka), northwest of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka), and within central Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxx]

Russian forces attacked north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 6 and 7.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian GUF drone unit of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with Vandal drones near Ivanopillya.[lxxii] Drone operators and other elements of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north of Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the  Dobropillya tactical area on October 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Mayak, and Zapovidne on October 6 and 7.[lxxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the Hruzke-Vesele-Zolotyi Kolodyaz line (northeast of Dobropillya), northeast of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya), and near Zapovidne.[lxxv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian assault groups interdicted Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Shakhove and Volodymyrivka (east of Dobropillya) and between Dobropillya and Rodynske (southwest of Zapovidne).[lxxvi]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Mykolaivka (east of Pokrovsk).[lxxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Shakhtarskyi Microraion (southeastern Pokrovsk) and advanced in southeastern Pokrovsk, north of Troyanda, and northwest of Leontovychi (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxviii]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Boykivka, Krasnyi Lyman, Razine, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 6 and 7.[lxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[lxxx]

An officer of a Ukrainian formation operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to rely on small infantry-led infiltration tactics to bypass Ukrainian defenses and are increasingly relying on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to mitigate logistical challenges caused by the pervasive threat of Ukrainian drone strikes.[lxxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces established fire control over the O-0525 Pokrovsk-Hryshyne highway (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxxii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[lxxxiii] FPV drone operators of the Russian AirNomads Group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[lxxxiv] Elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Uspenivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxxv]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[lxxxvi]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxxxvii]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and toward Marivka and Bilyakivka; east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on October 6 and 7.[lxxxviii]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian company operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces have insufficient weapons and food supplies  but that each solider has a Russian flag to raise in settlements - likely to claim advances or seizures.[lxxxix] The NCO stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather that limits Ukrainian drone visibility to move toward Ukrainian positions. The NCO stated that the front is "dynamic" and that Ukrainian and Russian positions are often interspersed across several tens of meters in a forest or within the same house.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Irbis Drone Company of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Muravka.[xc]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[xci]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad, Voskresenka, Sichneve, and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone, Sosnivka, Novoheorhiivka, and Zaporizke; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and Kalynivske; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove on October 6 and 7.[xcii]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements and drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xciii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 7 shows Russian forces raising flags in central Novovasylivske (northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[xciv]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Novovasylivske and credited elements of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[xcv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novomykolaivka (just south of Novovasylivske), east of Okhotnyche, and southeast of Poltavka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[xcvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Okhotnyche, and Poltavka and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on October 6 and 7.[xcvii]

A Ukrainian source amplified footage on October 7 of a Russian servicemember claiming that his unit suffered significant casualties and that only six of 100 troops in his unit survived an infantry assault near Novopil (northeast of Hulyaipole).[xcviii]

Order of Battle: Fiber optic drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[xcix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepove, and Kamyanske and northwest of Orikhiv near Plavni and toward Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on October 6 and 7.[c]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[ci] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zaporizhzhia City.[cii] Drone operators of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Plavni.[ciii]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on October 6 and 7 but did not advance.[civ]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[cv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and 152 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[cvi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 88 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that two missiles and 52 drones struck 10 locations and that drone debris fell in two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit residential areas and civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Poltava oblasts.[cvii]

Russian forces reportedly continue efforts to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses while increasingly targeting smaller, regional energy facilities ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The deputy general director of a Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) equipment manufacturer, Anatoliy Khrapchinskyi, reported to Ukrainian outlet RBK Ukraine in an article published on October 7 that Russian forces have changed their strike tactics, conducting combined drone and missile strikes at an increased density.[cviii] Khrapchinskyi stated that Russian forces are launching more missile and drones from multiple directions simultaneously and are focusing on key targets. Khrapchinskyi stated that Russian forces use decoy drones to distract air defenses and fly Shahed drones and missiles over populated areas to complicate Ukraine's ability to safely intercept the projectiles. Krapchinskyi reported that Russian forces have intelligence about Ukrainian air defense system locations and their reload and preparation times, which helps Russian forces time their strikes to maximally overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Hennadiy Ryabtsev, the director of the Ukrainian Psychea Scientific-Technical Center, a Ukrainian organization analyzing Ukrainian energy markets, noted that Russian forces have shifted from targeting Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo to targeting regional electricity supply companies. Ryabtsev noted that the shift in Russian targeting is dangerous since the local enterprises are typically underfunded and lack sufficient  air defense.  Ryabtsev assessed that Russian forces may have adapted their targeting after gathering and assessing intelligence from effective strikes against Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts. Ryabtsev assessed that Chernihiv Oblast is the most vulnerable to Russian strikes as it is the least protected. Ryabtsev predicted that Russian forces may target Ukrainian gas import and storage facilities, power generation facilities, or Ukrenergo facilities next. ISW continues to assess that Russia is prioritizing strikes against civilians and energy infrastructure to continue its long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2025–2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[cix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarussian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on October 7 that the Belarusian regional executive committees will hold annual state-wide mobilization readiness training sessions from October 7 to 10.[cx] The Belarussian MoD stated that the training sessions will focus on preparing local government bodies to form territorial troops and people's militia units in the event of mobilization.

Russia's Central Suburban Passenger Company conducted a test run and reported on October 6 that Belarus and Russia plan to launch the diesel commuter railway line between Vitebsk, Belarus and Smolensk, Russia by 2026.[cxi] Russia has reportedly been integrating roadways and railways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with infrastructure in Belarus – likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.[cxii]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.