Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13, 2025

October 13, 2025, 7:10 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on October 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin removed some restrictions on using Russian reservists in combat, allowing the Kremlin to employ reservists in its war in Ukraine. The Russian government approved on October 13 a draft law that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed stipulating that servicemembers of the Russian mobilization reserve can perform defensive tasks during armed conflicts, counter-terrorist operations, or deployments outside Russian territory.[i] The law proposes that the Russian president can call up reservists for special training lasting up to two months. An explanatory note to the law states that the changes will allow Russia to deploy reservists during peacetime, expanding the current legislation that only allows Russia to deploy reservists during mobilization or wartime. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated on October 13 that the law will allow the Kremlin to deploy reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[ii] ISW will review the significance of this draft law in an upcoming warning order publication.

European officials continue to note how Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. Polish National Security Bureau Chief Sławomir Cenckiewicz told the Financial Times in an article published on October 12 that Russia is using cryptocurrency to pay actors conducting sabotage in Europe in order to prevent European intelligence services from tracking the payments.[iii] Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin increasingly relies on “ad hoc” local agents for sabotage missions and that Poland discovered in 2023 a network of agents whom the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) recruited and whom Russia financed "to a high extent" with cryptocurrency. Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin increasingly relies on “ad hoc” local agents for specific missions to minimize risk to the Kremlin. Cenckiewicz stated that the Kremlin has also leveraged cryptocurrency to circumvent Western sanctions. Cenkiewicz also stated that Poland is now in a “state of war” in the cyber domain, and FT noted that Poland has accused Russia of orchestrating a recent hacking attempt to cut off the water supplies to Gdansk.[iv]

German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) President Martin Jäger stated on October 13 that the frequency of Russian attacks on Europe is a “new level of confrontation.”[v] Jäger stated that Russia is trying to probe Europe's borders, undermine NATO, destabilize European democracies, divide societies, and intimidate the population. Jäger stated that Europe must prepare for further Russian escalation and cannot assume that Russia will not launch a conventional attack against NATO until 2029. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky compared on October 12 Russia’s recent attacks against Europe to the ways in which Russian President Vladimir Putin used Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 to gauge the West's reaction.[vi] Zelensky warned that Putin is preparing the Russian population for aggression against the Baltic States and Poland. ISW continues to assess that any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for rapid redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many European officials currently expect.[vii]

The Kremlin appears to be changing tactics within its reflexive control campaign to deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, likely due to recent reporting that the United States has been sharing intelligence to help Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure. US President Donald Trump stated on October 12 that he would inform Russian President Vladimir Putin that the United States would provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles if Russia refused to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[viii] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on October 13 that Russia is unable to distinguish between Tomahawk missiles armed with nuclear or conventional payloads while the missiles are in flight and claimed that the United States would control Ukrainian Tomahawk launches.[ix] Medvedev implied that Russia would have to respond to such a scenario and threateningly claimed that US deliveries of Tomahawks to Ukraine would "not be good for anyone." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a request for clarification about Medvedev's statement, claiming that US specialists would have to participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk missile strikes and that any expert is aware of the consequences of such a decision.[x]

The Kremlin has been engaged in a campaign to deter US sales of Tomahawks to Ukraine in recent days, issuing boilerplate claims about US participation in the strikes, the threat such missile deliveries would pose to US-Russian relations, and the missiles' inability to shift the situation on the battlefield.[xi] The Kremlin's October 13 claims about the difficulties in discriminating between nuclear and conventional payloads mark an inflection in this informational campaign. The Kremlin is likely shifting its narratives following the October 12 Financial Times (FT) report about how the United States has been providing Ukraine with intelligence to facilitate Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector, including oil refineries.[xii] Kremlin officials largely did not respond to the FT article, likely because the reporting undermined the narrative that the Kremlin had been repeatedly spreading about how US participation in potential Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes would allegedly risk escalation and a Russian response.

The Kremlin is reportedly preparing to manipulate voters by dismissing unpopular government officials ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 13 that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and a political strategist working with the Kremlin's political bloc stated that the Kremlin is considering replacing select federal subject governors ahead of the 2026 Duma elections.[xiii] The political strategist source noted that dismissing governors is "more effective" closer to elections, so that "people experience a temporary positive emotion" before voting. The sources stated such a Kremlin decision would aim to allay Russian citizens' discontent with and distract from recent unpopular decisions, such as raising the value-added tax (VAT) and tightening tax regimes on small businesses. The political strategist stated that the Kremlin may also dismiss the governors to distract Russians who are "tired of the war [in Ukraine] and tired of waiting for negotiations." Sources stated that local authorities usually cause more discontent than federal ones and that citizens place the blame on the governors for issues that most often irritate them, like issues with transport, utilities, and roads. The source noted that the Kremlin must prepare for dismissals before the 2026 elections now so that the new governors have time to understand how electoral resources work in their regions, which the source emphasized is important to ensure the Kremlin's desired election results.

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of October 12 to 13. Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspline on October 13 that Ukrainian forces struck at least five tanks at the Feodosia Offshore Oil Terminal, a 220kV electrical substation in Feodosia, and a 330kV substation in occupied Simferopol.[xiv] The sources stated that the strikes started a fire at the oil terminal. Geolocated footage and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data confirm that Ukrainian forces struck the three targets in occupied Crimea.[xv] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian strikes damaged 11 fuel tanks at the oil terminal, including eight tanks holding diesel fuel with capacities of 5,000 to 10,000 metric tons, two tanks holding gasoline, and one empty tank.[xvi] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in occupied Feodosia overnight and caused fires.[xvii]

Select Russian industries are showing signs of steep decline that risk lasting damage with potentially deep socio-economic repercussions. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 12 that sanctions, rising costs, and low prices have plunged Russia’s coal industry into its worst crisis in over 30 years.[xviii] FT reported that data from Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) shows that Russia’s coal sector had $2.8 billion in losses in the first seven months of 2025 — doubling the total of all of 2024 and a stark decline from 2023 when Russia’s coal industry generated nearly $4.6 billion in profits. FT reported that the Russian coal industry directly employs more than 140,000 people and remains critical in some oblasts, both as a source of employment and funding for local budgets. FT noted that prices of thermal coal hit multiyear lows globally in 2025 — down 78 percent from 2022 highs — but that the problem has been more severe for Russia as it deals with Western sanctions and logistics bottlenecks. FT reported that the coal sector in occupied Donbas is experiencing significant issues, with Russian investors starting to return mines that the Russian state had given them after they struggled to make the mines profitable. The Russian government has designed its wartime economy to prioritize investment in Russia's domestic industrial base (DIB), which in turn is having negative effects — many of which are potentially long-term — on many civilian sectors and the Russian economy as a whole.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin removed some restrictions on using Russian reservists in combat, allowing the Kremlin to employ reservists in its war in Ukraine.
• European officials continue to note how Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.
• The Kremlin appears to be changing tactics within its reflexive control campaign to deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, likely due to recent reporting that the United States has been sharing intelligence to help Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure.
• The Kremlin is reportedly preparing to manipulate voters by dismissing unpopular government officials ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections.
• Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of October 12 to 13.
• Select Russian industries are showing signs of steep decline that risk lasting damage with potentially deep socio-economic repercussions.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area, near Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Kostyantynivka, and Oleksiivka, on October 12 and 13.[xx] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka.[xxi]

A scout from a Ukrainian battalion operating in Sumy Oblast reported on October 13 that Russian forces are suffering heavy casualties in the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area).[xxii] The scout stated that Russian forces have significantly fewer armored vehicles and artillery systems compared to 2022-2023. The scout stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups on foot but are sometimes using light vehicles to move toward the frontline. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 28th Separate Rifle Battalion (127th Motorized Rifle Division, reportedly under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) from Russian border areas, where they were operating far from the first line of Russia's border defenses, to Oleksiivka to reinforce Russian forces.[xxiii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the area are still having issues with coordination or joint planning.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly struck and destroyed a Ukrainian truck mounted Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) in Sumy Oblast.[xxiv] Drone operators of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xxv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on October 12 and 13.[xxvi] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that counterattacked in Vovchansk.[xxvii]

Ukraine's Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on October 13 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a school dormitory in Kyivskyi Raion, Kharkiv City.[xxviii] Ukrainian news outlet Suspline reported that the strike was the first Russian FPV strike against central Kharkiv City.[xxix] The deputy general director of a Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) equipment manufacturer and Ukrainian Air Force reserve officer, Anatoliy Khrapchinskyi, reported to Suspline that Russian forces may have used a mothership drone to carry the FPV drone about 10 to 20 kilometers away from the target. Khrapchinskyi stated that Russian forces may have used an FPV drone with about 2.5 kilograms of explosives. Khrapchinskyi assessed that the strike was part of Russia's terror tactics and efforts to increase the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) since Russian forces are too far away to use traditional tube artillery or mortars against Kharkiv City.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[xxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Milove and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka and Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske and Kolodyazne; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 12 and 13.[xxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[xxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Tiger drone detachment of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pishchane.[xxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 13 that Russian forces seized Borivska-Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[xxxiv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 12 and 13.[xxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman); north of Stavky (north of Lyman); south of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman); west, south, and southwest of Zarichne (east of Lyman); and in central Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[xxxvi]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Novoselivka, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 12 and 13.[xxxvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on October 12 and 13.[xxxviii]

A Ukrainian non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on October 13 that Russian forces recently conducted rotations, resupplied forces in the area, and are accumulating personnel and equipment in the rear, likely in preparation for a possible mechanized assault.[xxxix] The NCO reported that the Russian military command recently deployed 500 servicemembers to the area from training grounds. The NCO added that Russian forces are trying to reduce the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area), including by using infiltration tactics to reach the frontline faster.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently struck a railway overpass in the northern outskirts of Siversk with a VT-40 fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone.[xl]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the northern outskirts of Shcherbynivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[xli]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[xlii] Geolocated footage published on October 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember moving along the Severskyi Donets-Donbas Canal southeast of Novomarkove after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xliii] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the area based on the infiltration mission.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 12 and 13.[xliv]

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Russian forces conducted an FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[xlv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Shcherbynivka.[xlvi] Drone operators of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces near Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[xlvii] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the southern Kostyantynivka direction.[xlviii] Drone operators of the Russian 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[xlix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces seized Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[l]

Mashovets stated that the Russian military command committed unspecified naval infantry elements, which were previously operating near Poltavka and Popiv Yar (both east of Dobropillya in the Russian near rear), into battle near Volodymyrivka (east of Dobropillya on the west bank of the Kazennyi Torets River) in order to support elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) operating within the Dobropillya salient.[li] Mashovets stated that some naval infantry elements in the area are contending with "exhausting" Ukrainian counterattacks.[lii] Mashovets assessed that Russian command structures, especially on the adjacent flanks of the 8th CAA (SMD) and 51st CAA between the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas, are cooperating poorly. Mashovets stated that Russian forces — likely elements of the 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) — are trying to accumulate assault groups near Dorozhnie and in the area between Ivanivka and Nove Shakhove (both just north of Dorozhnie).[liii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove; and northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Kucheriv Yar on October 12 and 13.[liv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[lv]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Mykhailivka (east of Pokrovsk).[lvi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced in southern Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[lvii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces entered eastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[lviii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Balahan Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske on October 12 and 13.[lix]

Mashovets stated that small Russian infantry groups maintain positions along the railway north of Rodynske.[lx] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces started counterattacking in the Rodynske-Razine direction (north to northeast of Pokrovsk), likely in part causing Russian forces to significantly reduce their activity west of the Kazennyi Torets River.[lxi] A commander within a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have started to use heavy equipment recently, but are still mostly attacking with infantry.[lxii] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) who were still in Russia only two weeks prior, and that the training levels of Russian personnel in the area vary. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have fire control over western Pokrovsk.[lxiii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Promin and that earlier claims that Russian forces seized Rodynske are unconfirmed.[lxiv] The milblogger claimed that Russian drone operators are consistently disrupting Ukrainian logistics on the approaches to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD), with support from elements of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), are accumulating forces near Novoekonomichne and Mykolaivka (just east of Novoekonomichne) while simultaneously attacking from Mykolaivka.[lxv] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st, 5th, and 110th motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) operating in the Sukhetske-Rodynske and Fedorivka-Krasnyi Lyman directions (all northeast of Pokrovsk) had to temporarily halt their attacks as Ukrainian forces had started to actively counterattack in the past few days in the Krasnyi Lyman direction.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and north of Novoukrainka (south of Novopavlivka).[lxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxvii]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on October 12 and 13.[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[lxix]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sicheneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on October 12 and 13.[lxx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[lxxi]

[lxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxiii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxiv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka and Poltavka on October 12 and 13.[lxxv]

Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported on October 13 that Russian forces struck a civilian car in Zaporizhia Oblast, killing two civilians.[lxxvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Novohryhorivka.[lxxvii] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) with guided glide bombs.[lxxviii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Ukrainian military spokesperson announced on October 12 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[lxxix]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Ukrainian Assault Forces Commander Colonel Valentyn Manko reported that Ukrainian forces partially liberated Stepove (west of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in areas that Russian sources previously claimed were under Russian control.[lxxx]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on October 12 and 13.[lxxxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Shaman detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novodanylivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[lxxxii] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxiii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 13.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are launching Molniya-2 drones to strike Ukrainian air defenses in right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[lxxxiv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 82 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 50 were strike drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[lxxxv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 69 drones, that 13 drones struck seven locations, and that downed debris fell on two locations.[lxxxvi] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Donetsk oblasts.[lxxxvii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.