Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25, 2025

October 25, 2025, 9:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on October 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is attempting to leverage the visit of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev to the United States to spread Kremlin narratives in the US information space. Dmitriev gave interviews to CNN, Fox News, and US journalist Lara Logan on October 24 and 25 during his visit to the United States.[1] Dmitriev's visit comes against the backdrop of recent US sanctions against Russian oil, the reported US authorization of Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strikes into Russia, and the ongoing debate about the provision of US Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.[2] The Kremlin's deployment of Dmitriev to conduct a press tour within the United States indicates that Russia is concerned about the impact of these US policies. Kremlin officials have in recent weeks attempted to downplay the effects of Western sanctions on the Russian economy and the battlefield effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes — narratives that Dmitriev repeated in his interviews on October 24 and 25.[3]

Dmitriev effectively acknowledged that Ukraine has made compromises in its negotiating position while reaffirming that Russia's maximalist demands from 2021 and 2022 remain unchanged. Dmitriev acknowledged that Ukraine has altered its negotiating position and offered compromises by agreeing to a ceasefire along the current line.[4] Dmitriev said that Russia wants a "final solution" to the war to prevent its resumption — paralleling language that Kremlin officials have used to talk about Russia's demand that any peace settlement address the alleged "root causes" of the war. Dmitriev also said that the United States needs to take Russia’s “national interest” into account when discussing peace in Ukraine; that NATO expansion poses an “existential threat to Russian security;” and that a settlement must take account of Russia’s need to protect Russian-speakers living in eastern Ukraine.[5] Dmitriev's statements paraphrase the Kremlin's so-called "root causes" of the war, which Russian officials have repeatedly defined as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[6] The Kremlin uses this “root causes” narrative to demand the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian puppet government, Ukraine’s commitment to neutrality, and the revocation of NATO’s Open Door Policy.[7] Dmitriev’s and other Kremlin officials' statements are references to long-standing Russian demands of NATO and Ukraine dating back to December 2021 and February 2022.[8]

Dmitriev also implicitly reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of Trump's call for a ceasefire along the current front line. Dmitriev claimed that Ukraine can break a ceasefire and that Ukraine could use it for rearmament and preparation to continue the war — the standard Russian excuse for refusing to accept a ceasefire.[9] Dmitriev claimed that the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska was not about just a ceasefire but about finding a final solution to the war to prevent its resumption. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and other senior Kremlin officials have repeated statements as recently as October 21 about how Russia has not changed its position since the August 2025 Alaska summit and rejects a ceasefire that “leads nowhere” and does not resolve the alleged “root causes” of the war.[10] Dmitriev notably did not directly use the "root causes" phrasing or explicitly list Russia's demands of Ukraine and the West in his interviews with US media outlets. The Kremlin appears to be adapting its informational efforts targeting the United States in the wake of reports that the Trump administration cancelled in-person meetings between US and Russian officials, including the planned summit in Budapest between Trump and Putin, after the Kremlin demonstrated its continued insistence on all of its longstanding demands.[11] Dmitriev’s statements, however, are indeed a reiteration of Russia’s maximalist demands and disinterest in negotiations that amount to anything less than Ukraine’s full capitulation.[12]

Dmitriev attempted to appeal to what he perceives to be Trump administration interests in order to distract from Dmitriev’s statements, which demonstrate Russia's continued unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war. Dmitriev claimed that Russia and the United States are aligned in their respect for "traditional values."[13] Dmitriev claimed that the Biden administration destroyed US-Russian dialogue and that the Trump administration, in contrast, values bilateral dialogue. Dmitriev is attempting to appeal to the Trump administration to distract from Russia’s repeated rejection of Trump's proposal for a ceasefire on the current line and Russia's commitment to its original war demands.

Russian State Duma deputies continue to publicly state that Russia has not changed its maximalist demands — contradicting Dmitriev's attempts to obfuscate his reiteration of unchanged Russia's demands in his interviews with US media outlets. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on October 24 that Russia’s position "remains unchanged" and attempted to blame Ukraine and Europe for stalling the negotiations process.[14] Chepa claimed that Russia is interested in eliminating the "root causes" of the war. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Alexei Zhuravlyov claimed on October 24 that US provisions of weapons to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia have no effect.[15] Such Kremlin statements from Duma deputies that are largely for domestic audiences continue to show that Putin remains committed to ensuring that the Russian population is primed to support his continuation of the war rather than softening Russia's demands.

Dmitriev heavily promoted US-Russian economic cooperation while subtly alluding to Russia's status as a nuclear power. Dmitriev claimed that there is still “potential for economic cooperation” between Russia and the United States, but only if the United States is “respectful” of Russia’s interests.[16] Dmitriev reiterated Russia‘s proposal for the construction of a tunnel connecting Russia and the United States through the Bering Strait using US businessman Elon Musk’s technology.[17] Dmitriev claimed that economic relations can be the 'foundation of a "peaceful relationship” between the United States and Russia.[18] Dmitriev claimed that economic cooperation is possible after the countries overcome their “political difficulties” — that is, US President Donald Trump's refusal to capitulate to Russia’s maximalist demands.[19] Dmitriev is promoting joint economic projects to incentivize the United States to end the war quickly on Russia's terms. Dmitriev's talk of economic cooperation is an effort to posture Russia as cooperative and willing to work with the United States on a peace settlement and beyond, as the Trump administration has recently assessed Russia to be the impediment to peace negotiations.

Dmitriev’s comments about economic projects contained implied threats that Russia will escalate military actions if the U.S. does not concede to Russia’s unchanging demands. Dmitriev repeatedly stated in the interviews that he does not have a military background and that he is merely representing Russia’s economic interests in the United States.[20] Dmitriev claimed that the “security of the whole world” depends on peaceful relations between the United States and Russia, and that the Trump administration is aware of the risks of military escalation and that the “complete annihilation of humanity” is close.[21] Dmitriev’s comments are allusions to Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Dmitriev is attempting to use oblique threats to push Trump to concede to Russia's demands out of fear of escalation.

The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing met on October 24 in the UK to discuss further support for Ukraine and to put pressure on Russia.[22] UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced on October 24 that the Coalition of the Willing agreed on a new five-point plan to support Ukraine, which includes measures to remove Russian oil and gasoline from global markets; unlock billions of euros in frozen Russian assets to financially support Ukraine; increase pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin by providing Ukraine with long range weapons; and continue to work as a coalition on further security guarantees for Ukraine.[23]

Russian forces are making gains near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (directly east of Pokrovsk) that are significant but likely do not portend the imminent collapse of Ukrainian defenses in the area. Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Kozatske and Promin (both east of Pokrovsk) and advanced in eastern and southeastern Myrnohrad.[24] Ukrainian military sources operating near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda in an article published on October 24 that small Russian groups are infiltrating Myrnohrad from the south and that Russian forces seized Krasnyi Lyman (north of Myrnohrad).[25] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not consolidated positions within Myrnohrad and that the large number of Ukrainian drones is complicating Russian attempts to concentrate infantry near Myrnohrad.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Myrnohrad.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that most of Rodynske is a contested "gray zone."[29]

Russian forces reportedly continue to infiltrate Pokrovsk. Sources told Ukrainska Pravda that at least 250 Russian soldiers are in Pokrovsk, where they are engaging in firefights with Ukrainian forces.[30] The sources noted that Russian forces are particularly targeting Ukrainian drone operators — likely as part of efforts to set battlefield conditions for further Russian advances in the area. The sources stated that Russian forces re-entered Pokrovsk in mid-August 2025 following Ukrainian clearing missions in the town in July 2025. Ukrainska Pravda reported that Russian forces have established "staging areas" near the railway within Pokrovsk, between Pokrovsk and Hryshyne (just northwest of Pokrovsk), and along the Dachenske-Novopavlivka-Hnativka line (southeast of Pokrovsk). Ukrainska Pravda reported that Russian fiber optic drones are surveilling all Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. Ukrainska Pravda's sources noted that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south of Pokrovsk. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are "seeping" into Pokrovsk in groups of two to three.[31] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations, such as rain, to evacuate killed and wounded personnel. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are penetrating northern Pokrovsk from the central and western areas.[32]

Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to discuss the interspersal of forces on the front near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Ukrainska Pravda's sources noted that some Ukrainian positions are located "between Russian lines."[33] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that both sides' positions are intermingled in contested "gray zones" such that it is difficult to determine the exact contours of the front line.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 24 that Ukrainian forces recently pushed the limited number of Russian forces in Myrnohrad back from the eastern and northern outskirts of the town and that Russian forces were struggling to hold positions in eastern Rodynske and in Krasnyi Lyman.[35] Mashovets' reporting on October 24 contrasts with Ukrainska Pravda's reporting and Russian milblogger claims on October 25 about Myrnohrad, Rodynske, and Krasnyi Lyman - further highlighting the way that Russian and Ukrainian forces are occupying non-contiguous, intermingled positions in and near Pokrovsk.[36]

Russian forces are employing infiltration tactics in other areas of the front line for informational effects. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on October 25 that Russian forces used infiltration tactics to break into Bolohivka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk) with forces numbering up to 200 personnel operating in small groups.[37] The corps noted that Russian forces recently published footage showing Russian troops holding flags in the settlement but reported that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Bolohivka. Geolocated footage published on October 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[38] Additional geolocated footage published on October 25 shows Russian servicemembers holding a Russian flag in northern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[39] ISW assesses that Russian forces conducted infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka and Kurylivka and that these infiltration missions did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time. Russian infiltration missions into Pokrovsk, where Russian forces are specifically targeting Ukrainian drone operators, appear to have the tactical purpose of setting conditions for further Russian advances. Recent Russian infiltration missions into Bolohivka, Kurylivka, and Kostyantynivka, in contrast, likely aim to further Kremlin informational efforts to exaggerate the Russian rate of advance. Russia has increasingly relied on footage showing Russian flag raisings to claim advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[40] Russian authorities have used these alleged gains to support false Russian narratives of sweeping advances, such as in Kupyansk.[41] These narratives support the wider Kremlin effort to falsely portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's demands now.[42]

Russian forces continue attempts to leverage poor weather conditions to conduct larger mechanized assaults but continue to suffer high vehicle losses disproportionate to their gains. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Druzhkivka direction reported on October 25 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of five armored vehicles attacking toward Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) from Novotoretske (southwest of Volodymyrivka).[43] The brigade reported that Russian forces relied on weather conditions hindering Ukrainian drone operations to conduct the attack but that as many as three vehicles got stuck in swampy terrain, after which Russian infantry disembarked into the water. The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces disabled or destroyed all five of the vehicles. Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian brigade shows three Russian armored personnel carriers (APCs) stuck in the Kazennyi Torets River southwest of Volodymyrivka.[44] The geolocated footage also shows a fourth partially submerged vehicle in the river and a damaged APC within Novotoretske.[45] An open-source analyst on X (formerly Twitter) reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 16 vehicles in the area, suggesting that the reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault was only one wave of a larger attack.[46] ISW will continue to monitor reports with more details about the mechanized assault.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are increasing the frequency of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations.[47] The Ventusky weather radar recorded rainfall near Volodymyrivka on the morning of October 25, and ISW previously noted that the lingering dampness and poor conditions that immediately follow rainfall likely degrade Ukrainian drone capabilities for several hours.[48] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 25 that weather conditions like rain are temporarily complicating Ukrainian drone operations and that Russian forces are trying to exploit this fact to evacuate wounded and killed servicemembers from the battlefield.[49] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction similarly reported on October 25 that Russian forces recently waited for bad weather conditions when Ukrainian forces reduced their drone activity before conducting a mechanized assault in the area.[50]

The October 25 attack near Volodymyrivka is the latest in Russia's renewed efforts in the past weeks to conduct mechanized assaults in the area. Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Pankivka (immediately west of Volodymyrivka) around October 6; a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault south of Shakhove (immediately north of Volodymyrivka) and Volodymyrivka on October 9; a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Shakhove on October 13; and a reduced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Volodymyrivka and Shakhove on October 16.[51] Geolocated evidence indicated that only the October 9 attack resulted in a Russian advance.[52] Russian forces continue to suffer vehicle losses that are disproportionately high compared to the limited gains —if any — that these Russian mechanized assaults are achieving. Russia's current practice of leveraging weather conditions to suppress the effects of Ukrainian drone strikes against mechanized activity appears insufficient, as Ukrainian forces have still been able to largely stop the mechanized attacks and prevent significant Russian advances. Russian mechanized assaults, however, may allow Russian forces to dismount infantry closer to Ukrainian positions to conduct subsequent infiltration missions.

Russian aircraft may have violated Japanese airspace on October 24. Reuters reported on October 24 that Japan scrambled jets on October 24 to monitor Russian aircraft, including strategic bombers that flew along the edge of Japanese airspace along its western coast over the Sea of Japan.[53] The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia flew two Tu-95 bombers escorted by two Su-35 fighter jets toward Japan’s Sado Island before turning northwards.[54] Japanese Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi stated on October 24 that Russia conducts daily military operations around Japan.[55] Japanese Prime Minister Sana Takaichi had pledged to accelerate Japan's defense buildup just hours before the incident. The Russian MoD acknowledged on October 24 that unspecified “foreign countries” escorted its jets during a “routine” flight patrol over alleged neutral waters.[56]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced on October 24 that France will provide Ukraine with additional Aster missiles and new Mirage aircraft in the coming days and that the UK will accelerate the delivery of over 5,000 multi-purpose missiles to Ukraine.[57] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 25 that Ukraine expects Sweden to begin delivering its promised 150 Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine in early 2026.[58]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is attempting to leverage the visit of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev to the United States to spread Kremlin narratives in the US information space.
• Dmitriev effectively acknowledged that Ukraine has made compromises in its negotiating position while reaffirming that Russia's maximalist demands from 2021 and 2022 remain unchanged.
• Dmitriev attempted to appeal to what he perceives to be Trump administration interests in order to distract from Dmitriev’s statements, which demonstrate Russia's continued unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war.
• Russian State Duma deputies continue to publicly state that Russia has not changed its maximalist demands — contradicting Dmitriev's attempts to obfuscate his reiteration of unchanged Russia's demands in his interviews with US media outlets.
• Dmitriev heavily promoted US-Russian economic cooperation while subtly alluding to Russia's status as a nuclear power.
• The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing met on October 24 in the UK to discuss further support for Ukraine and to put pressure on Russia.
• Russian forces are making gains near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (directly east of Pokrovsk) that are significant but likely do not portend the imminent collapse of Ukrainian defenses in the area.
• Russian forces are employing infiltration tactics in other areas of the front line for informational effects.
• Russian forces continue attempts to leverage poor weather conditions to conduct larger mechanized assaults but continue to suffer high vehicle losses disproportionate to their gains.
• Russian aircraft may have violated Japanese airspace on October 24.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian energy infrastructure in Volgograd Oblast on the night of October 24 to 25. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Balashovskaya 500 kV substation in Volgograd Oblast.[59] Kovalenko stated that the substation is a key facility of the Southern Power System that supplies defense industrial facilities and transport energy hubs on the Saratov-Voronezh route. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the substation ensures electricity transit from the Volga Hydroelectric Power Station to central Russia.[60] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that Ukrainian drone debris struck the Balashovskaya substation and caused a fire.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka, on October 24 and 25.[62]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that that the Russian military command left elements of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) with no food, water and no replacements for losses.[63] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command refused to conduct rotations until the battalion completed its assault missions.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[64] Drone operators of the 1st Prizrak Territorial Defense Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Yastrubyne (northwest of Sumy City).[65] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Sumy direction.[66]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, and Tykhe (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[67]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on October 24 and 25.[68]

City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on October 25 that Russian forces used a Molniya mothership drone to carry and extend the range of two first person view (FPV) drones that struck Shevchenkivskyi Raion, Kharkiv City, and that the Molniya itself fell on a dormitory roof in Kyiv Raion, Kharkiv City.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the Chechen 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, LMD) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to northeastern Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[71]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and Bolohivka on October 24 and 25.[72]

A Ukrainian army corps operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction reported that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Bolohivka.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Bolohivka.[74]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 24 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) and advanced east of Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[75]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk.[76]

Russian forces attacked within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 24 and 25.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupyansk and near Solobivka, Myrove, Mala Shapkivka (all northwest of Kupyansk), and Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[78]

Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows Russian servicemembers holding a Russian flag in northern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[79] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to supply forces across the Oskil River under Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes as Ukrainian forces have fire control over the crossing points.[80] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Aerospace (VKS) forces conducted a FAB-250 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 25.[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 1st GTA (MMD) are reportedly operating striking Ukrainian forces near Bohuslavka.[84]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[85]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Novoselivka and advanced in southeastern Lyman, in Zarichne (east of Lyman), and near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and Stavky (north of Lyman).[86]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Shandryholove, Serednie, and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 24 and 25.[87]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on October 25 that Russian drone operators are well-trained, in contrast to the infantry in the area.[88] A Russian milblogger claimed that eastern Lyman is a contested “gray zone.”[89]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) during a recent roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault in the area.[90]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on October 24 and 25.[91]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions on the outskirts of Markove (northeast of Druzhkivka), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[92]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Shcherbynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on October 24 and 25.[93]

See topline text for reports of a Russian mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[94] Drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly struck a Ukrainian fuel depot near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[95] Reconnaissance elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) and drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Sofiivka.[96]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the fields west of Boykivka (southeast of Dobropillya), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[97]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Mayak, Zapovidne, and Dorozhnie on October 24 and 25.[98]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows Ukrainian forces raising flags in southern Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated the settlement.[99]

See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims in the Pokrovsk direction.

 Russian forces conducted offensive operations near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Zatyshok, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Promin, Hnativka, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 24 and 25.[100] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Pokrovsk and Zatyshok and near Sukhetske.[101]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction intercepted a Russian V2U autonomous strike drone with artificial intelligence (AI) that searches for and selects targets.[102] The Ukrainian corps reported that Russian forces have been actively using the drones since the start of 2025. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using armored vehicles only to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from at least 500 meters or one kilometer away from Ukrainian positions.[103] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are trying to disguise themselves with civilian clothing – an act of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) and 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[104] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[105] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly guiding Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Kotlyne.[106]

Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) and in eastern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[107]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Dachne, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 24 and 25.[108]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka (Novopavlivka) direction reported on October 24 that Russian forces continue to conduct infiltrations with fireteams of two to three soldiers and that Russian forces are conducting motorized assaults consisting of three to five motorcycles attacking from different directions at once.[109] The commander noted that Russian drones guide the Russian infantry who dismount from the motorcycles and that the Russian groups are often underequipped. The commander noted that Russian forces have insufficient water and food, suggesting that Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics are yielding results.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly guiding glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Raipole (north of Novopavlivka).[110]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[111]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Yehorivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[112]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Verbove, and Oleksiivka on October 24 and 25.[113] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sosnivka and Oleksiivka.[114]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda; northeast of Hulyaipole near Okhotnyche, Novovasylivske, Novohryhorivka, Novomykolaivka, Poltavka, and Pavlivka; and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on October 24 and 25.[115] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Poltavka.[116]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Zlahoda.[117] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[118] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone operators in Nove (northeast of Hulyaipole).[119]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, Stepove, and Novoandriivka; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 24 and 25.[120] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka.[121]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian VKS launched a glide bomb strike against Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Zaporizhzhia City along the right [west] bank of the Dnipro River) from a distance of roughly 150 kilometers.[122] ISW has recently observed reports of Russian forces conducting long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, as Russian forces are likely operating their aircraft farther from the frontline and beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems.[123]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Prymorske.[124] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with glide bombs near Novodanylivka.[125] Drone operators of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.[126]

Russian forces conducted limited attacks in the Kherson direction on October 25 as Russian milbloggers continue to claim that Russian forces maintain a bridgehead in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.

Russian forces conducted assaults in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge, on October 24 and 25.[127]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian VDV elements are clearing Karantynnyi Island (southwest of Kherson City).[128] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray Russian forces as having established a bridgehead in west bank Kherson Oblast, a new Russian cognitive warfare effort against Ukraine and its partners.[129]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov and Kursk oblasts and 62 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones - about 40 of which were Shahed-type drones - from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[130] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed four of the missiles and 50 drones, that five missiles and 12 drones struck 11 locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential areas and civilian and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kyiv oblasts.[131] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces targeted energy infrastructure in Chuhuiv and Lozova raions, Kharkiv Oblast, resulting in power outages for roughly 25,000 subscribers.[132]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 25 that Russian forces have launched roughly 770 ballistic missiles and over 50 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles against Ukraine since January 1, 2025.[133]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.