Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26. 2025

October 26, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on October 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continue to make exaggerated claims of battlefield victories while demonstrating that the Kremlin remains committed to seizing the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin held a meeting on October 26 with Gerasimov and the commanders of the Russian groupings of forces.[1] Putin notably wore a military uniform for the meeting, only the third time he has worn a uniform to a public event since the start of the full-scale invasion, and only a few weeks after the second time he did so on September 16.[2] Gerasimov opened his report to Putin by stating that Russian forces continue to carry out tasks to seize Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Gerasimov's statement reiterates Putin's longstanding demand that Ukraine hand over the entirety of the four illegally annexed regions to Russia while undermining recent Russian offers to exchange territory in southern Ukraine for full control over Donetsk Oblast.[3] Gerasimov claimed - very likely falsely - that Russian forces have surrounded up to 5,500 Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk direction and blocked a group of 31 Ukrainian battalions near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk). Gerasimov claimed that elements of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are advancing along converging axes and have completed the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the area. Gerasimov claimed that Russia's efforts to isolate the combat zone to disrupt Ukrainian supplies facilitated the alleged encirclement, a reference to Russian efforts in recent months to use adaptations to drone tactics and technology to conduct strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[4] Gerasimov claimed that Russian authorities have tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with destroying the allegedly encircled Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Gerasimov similarly claimed that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces have encircled Kupyansk after assault detachments of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) conducted a flanking maneuver, seized crossings over the Oskil River south of Kupyansk, and worked with elements of the 47th Tank Division and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) to block Ukrainian forces on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River east of Kupyansk.[5] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces have encircled a total of 18 Ukrainian battalions in Kupyansk. Putin similarly falsely claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and later claimed in March 2025 that Russian forces had "isolated" Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it was “impossible” for small groups of Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast.[6] Russian forces did not encircle significant numbers of Ukrainian forces during the Russian operations to retake Kursk Oblast in late 2024 and early 2025, despite Putin’s claims.

Gerasimov also claimed that Russian forces have advanced in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and seized over 70 percent of the town.[7] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are completing the seizure of Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and have seized Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) and Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka). Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces continue urban combat in Siversk and Kostyantynivka.

Russian milbloggers widely denied Gerasimov's claims. Several milbloggers claimed that Gerasimov was lying and that Russian forces had not encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk and Pokrovsk.[8] One milblogger stated that there is still a multi-kilometer corridor between Russian groups operating west and north of Pokrovsk, and another noted that Russian fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs does not mean that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in the area.[9] Milbloggers pointed to the porous nature of the front, highlighting the way Russian forces are infiltrating into Ukrainian flanks and rear.[10] One milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces often maintain positions in settlements that Russian sources claim that Russian forces have seized and stated that Pokrovsk and Kupyansk are "100 percent chaos."[11] Another milblogger assessed that Gerasimov is "getting ahead of himself again" and expects reality on the ground to "soon catch up with his reports."[12] The milblogger assessed that Gerasimov's report aims to provoke US President Donald Trump to "request mercy" for the encircled Ukrainian forces and to give Trump the impression of serious Ukrainian problems on the front, as the milblogger assessed Putin's claims about encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in March 2025 aimed to do. Gerasimov similarly presented exaggerated territorial claims in late August 2025, including about Kupyansk, that Russian milbloggers heavily criticized.[13]

ISW has not observed evidence to support Gerasimov's claims. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 23 percent of Vovchansk. ISW has only observed footage from October 24 showing limited Russian forces operating in eastern Kostyantynivka after a likely infiltration mission and has not observed evidence of Russian forces operating within Siversk.[14] The Kremlin is also portraying the seizures of small settlements that are not operationally significant as major successes for informational effects. Dronivka is under six square kilometers in size, and Pleshchiivka is under four square kilometers. Both had a pre-war population of about 600 people.

The Kremlin is exploiting Russia's recent reliance on infiltration missions and the absence of contiguous front lines in some tactical areas, as well as the resulting interspersal of forces to make exaggerated battlefield claims. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged on October 26 that the situation near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad remains difficult and noted Russia's use of infiltration missions into Pokrovsk.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces quantitatively outnumber Ukrainian forces in the area and have increased their offensive efforts. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are conducting small group infiltration missions between Ukrainian positions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that about 200 Russian troops are operating within Pokrovsk, but that Ukrainian counter-sabotage missions are preventing Russian forces from advancing deeper into the town and gaining a foothold. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are making gains near and within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad that are tactically significant but likely do not portend the imminent collapse of Ukrainian defenses in the area.[16] Ukrainian and Russian sources have noted how both sides' positions are intermingled, making it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact contours of the frontline.[17] Russian forces have been increasingly leveraging infiltrations between Ukrainian positions to make false claims of advances and consolidated gains.[18] Putin's and Gerasimov's claims of battlefield victories are part of the ongoing Kremlin cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's demands now.[19]

Putin attempted to justify Russia's slow pace of advance because of Russian concern for civilian safety and casualties. Putin falsely claimed that Russian forces will not be working toward any specific deadlines but will put the safety of Russian servicemembers first – setting conditions to justify continued slow Russian advances in the future.[20] Putin asked Russian forces to ensure Ukrainian forces can safely surrender and claimed that Russian forces have "historically always treated defeated enemies with mercy." Putin called for Russian forces to ensure the safety of the civilian population when clearing territories. ISW has observed ample evidence of Russia's blatant disregard for civilian safety and deliberate murders of Ukrainian civilians, including prolific first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against civilians in Kherson Oblast since late 2023 and recent murders of civilians in Pokrovsk and Zvanivka, Bakhmutsky Raion.[21] ISW has also observed repeated reports of Russia executing surrendering Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders are fully complicit in and explicitly order extreme atrocities, including summary executions.[23]

Russia continues to issue explicit nuclear threats as part of a multi-pronged effort seeking to deter continued US pressure on Russia and support for Ukraine. Putin recalled on October 26 the recent annual recurring Russian Grom exercises with all three components of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad.[24] Putin emphasized the “reliability of Russia’s nuclear shield” and claimed that Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces “exceed” the abilities of all other nuclear states. Putin claimed that Russia’s nuclear strategic forces are capable of “fully ensuring” the national security of Russia and the Union State (the political union between Belarus and Russia that a Kremlin-dominated federated government rules as a single polity). Putin and Gerasimov also discussed a test of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, which Putin claimed has an “unlimited” range and which Gerasimov claimed has "guaranteed accuracy against highly protected targets at any distance.” Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev claimed that he relayed information about the Burevestnik tests to US officials.[25] Putin's and Gerasimov's claims are only the latest in Russia's ongoing nuclear saber-rattling campaign, and Dmitriev notably issued oblique nuclear threats during his various interviews with US media outlets on October 24 and 25.[26] Putin and Gerasimov highlighted the missile’s alleged technical capabilities, likely to amplify these nuclear saber-rattling efforts. Russia has been trying to use a combination of carrots and sticks unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral arms control talks, to push the United States to give in to concessions about the war.[27]

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev stated outright that Russia has not deviated from its 2021-2022 original war aims and that Russia continues to seek control of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Dmitriev claimed in Russian on his channels on Telegram and the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX on October 26 that any peace settlement must address the alleged “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have repeatedly defined as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[28] Dmitriev also claimed that the Russian economy is in good condition with low debt and a strong ruble. Dmitriev also directly referenced Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces must “completely withdraw” from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must abandon its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[29] Dmitriev’s reiteration of Putin’s 2024 demands underscores Russia’s unchanged position and unwillingness to compromise on its maximalist demands. Dmitriev's statement also indicates that Russia’s recent offers to cede parts of southern Ukraine in exchange for all of Donetsk Oblast are disingenuous proposals.[30] Dmitriev notably avoided directly discussing Russia’s uncompromising position during his recent statements to US media outlets.[31] Dmitriev’s rhetoric continues to show the marked difference in Kremlin narratives meant for Russian domestic audiences and those meant for American audiences. The Kremlin continues to prime Russian audiences to support a protracted war to achieve all of Russia's original demands.

The Russian economy is showing its first signs of stagnation manufacturing sectors critical to the Russian defense industrial base. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on October 26 that US sanctions are already affecting the Russian economy, as India and many Chinese refineries have stopped purchasing Russian oil.[32] Bessent noted that the Russian economy is in a wartime state with virtually no growth and that Russia has an inflation rate of over 20 percent, in stark contrast to the Russian Central Bank’s official statistics claiming that Russia’s annual inflation rate is 8.2 percent as of October 20.[33] Kremlin officials' continual false portrayal of the Russian inflation rate is part of efforts to claim that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[34] Bessent stated that Russian oil profits are down 20 percent year-on-year and that US sanctions could reduce Russian profits by an additional 20 to 30 percent.[35] Russia’s oil and gas revenues accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia’s total federal revenues in 2024 and are critical to Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine.[36] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov recently acknowledged that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales funding the Russian federal budget to fall roughly by 30 percent in 2026.[37]

Independent Russian outlet The Moscow Times reported on October 25 that Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data indicate that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) showed signs of stalling in September 2025 for the first time since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.[38] Rosstat data shows that fabricated metal production, which surged in 2023 and 2024 and grew 21.2 percent in August 2025, dropped 1.6 percent year on year in September 2025. Transport equipment output growth, which includes tanks and armored vehicles, reportedly slowed to six percent in September 2025, down from 61.2 percent in August 2025.[39] The Moscow Times reported that Russia’s machine building sector, which is heavily dependent on state defense orders, similarly fell by 0.1 percent in September 2025 after surging 15.7 percent in August 2025. The Russian Central Bank notably lowered its key interest rate on October 24, likely to increase capital available for the Russian DIB and reverse recent stagnation.[40] Russian President Vladimir Putin has intentionally designed Russia’s wartime economy to rely on military spending by investing trillions of rubles in Russia’s DIB. The Russian DIB accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production and has largely propped up the Russian industrial sector and broader Russian economy. The Rosstat data, which ISW cannot independently verify, if true, indicates significant signs of deeper economic fracturing amidst ever growing sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending.

Russian regional authorities continue reducing one-time recruitment payments, supporting ISW’s forecast that Russia may begin compulsory recruitment of reservists in the face of mounting economic strain. Russian budgetary constraints appear to be permeating throughout several sectors of Russia’s wartime spending. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on October 26 that regional Russian authorities have been quietly reducing one-time payments to Russians signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over the last several months, including in Nizhny Novgorod and Ulyanovsk oblasts; Tatarstan, Mari El, Bashkortostan, and Chuvashia republics, and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.[41] Sever Realii noted that authorities in some regions cut one-time payments by over two million rubles (roughly $25,000) due to budgetary constraints. ISW has repeatedly assessed that Russia would not be able to sustain increasingly high payments to recruits in the long term, and the decision to substantially decrease one-time regional payments confirms Russia's inability to fund expensive recruitment efforts.[42] Regional governments’ decisions to curtail recruitment incentives are a supporting indicator for ISW’s forecast that Russia may begin compulsory recruitment of reservists.[43] ISW assesses that ongoing Western sanctions against Russian oil and gas exports and unsustainably high payments to soldiers are further destabilizing the Russian economy, regardless of Kremlin claims of economic stability.

Russian forces continue to launch long-range glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian cities. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 25 that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) launched a glide bomb strike against Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Zaporizhzhia City along the right [west] bank of the Dnipro River) from a distance of roughly 150 kilometers.[44] Kryvyi Rih Mayor Oleksandr Vilkul reported on October 26 that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[45] ISW has recently observed reports of Russian forces conducting long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities.[46] Russian forces are likely operating their aircraft farther from the frontline and beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems, exploiting Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems.

European officials have continued to report on Russian hybrid operations in Europe over the past several years. British news outlet Sky News reported on October 24 that a British court sentenced several members of a gang who participated in an arson attack on a British warehouse providing aid to Ukraine.[47] Sky News reported that the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) recruited the arsonists and that the gang planned the attack on industrial units in East London in March 2024. The arson attack reportedly inflicted damage worth around one million pounds (roughly $1.3 million). Several German outlets reported on October 25 that Russia’s Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) installed technical equipment on the wreckage of the Estonia ferry, which sank in the Baltic Sea in 1994, “a few years ago.”[48] The technical equipment reportedly allowed Russian robots and drones to navigate underwater with high precision. The outlets reported that NATO countries have information about the Russian operations and that Western security sources think that Russian military units have repeatedly trained in diving, salvage, and underwater operations in prohibited areas near the wreckage. Russia may have installed sensors to monitor ship and submarine movements or to record propeller noises and other characteristics of NATO warships and submarines. Russia has been setting conditions to confront the West for several years, and Russian sabotage and intelligence activities from years past likely support Russia's effort to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war. ISW assesses that Russia‘s intensified “Phase Zero,” Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war, began in early September 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continue to make exaggerated claims of battlefield victories while demonstrating that the Kremlin remains committed to seizing the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
• Russian milbloggers widely denied Gerasimov's claims.
• The Kremlin is exploiting Russia's recent reliance on infiltration missions and the absence of contiguous front lines in some tactical areas, and the resulting interspersal of forces to make exaggerated battlefield claims.
• Putin attempted to justify Russia's slow pace of advance because of Russian concern for civilian safety and casualties.
• Russia continues to issue explicit nuclear threats as part of a multi-pronged effort seeking to deter continued US pressure on Russia and support for Ukraine.
• Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev stated outright that Russia has not deviated from its 2021-2022 original war aims and that Russia continues to seek control of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
• The Russian economy is showing its first signs of stagnation in manufacturing sectors critical to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian regional authorities continue reducing one-time recruitment payments, supporting ISW’s forecast that Russia may begin compulsory recruitment of reservists in the face of mounting economic strain.
• Russian forces continue to launch long-range glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian cities.
• European officials continue to report on Russian hybrid operations in Europe over the past several years.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka and advanced south and southwest of Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[49]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Oleksiivka, on October 25 and 26.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka and Kostyantynivka.[51]

Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported on October 26 that Russian forces struck a civilian truck on the outskirts of Bilopilska Hmromada (northwest of Sumy City), injuring a man transporting groceries.[52] Bilopillya Mayor Yuriy Zarko reported that Russian forces struck an energy supply facility with a Molniya loitering munition on the evening of October 25.[53]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the command of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) is sending small groups to infiltrate Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka to accumulate forces for subsequent assaults.[54]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleksiivka.[55] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division [ADCON]), and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka.[56]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on October 25 and 26.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bolohivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[58]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on October 25 and 26.[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions east of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[60]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) and Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and advanced within Kupyansk.[61] ISW observed geolocated footage on October 25 indicating that Russian forces infiltrated into Kurylivka but likely did not establish enduring positions.[62]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Stroivka and toward Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on October 25 and 26.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kurlylivka.[64]

Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevych reported on October 26 that Russian forces conducted four guided glide bomb strikes against Starovirivka (west of Kupyansk).[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[66]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions east of Kopanky (east of Borova), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[67]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 25 and 26.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions east of Kopanky.[69]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Lyman-Druzhelyubivka O0526 highway north of Stavky (north of Lyman).[70]

Unconfirmed claims: The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated on October 26 that Ukrainian forces liberated Zarichne (east of Lyman), have liberated and cleared eastern and southern Torske (just east of Zarichne), and started to clear central Torske.[71] The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[72]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Koroviy Yar, Shandryholove, Serednie, and Karpivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 25 and 26.[73]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on October 26 that there is no clear frontline in the Lyman direction due to the frequent infiltration missions on both sides.[74] Trehubov reported that Russian advances in the Lyman direction aim to threaten the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the north and east. Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on October 26 that Russian forces are amassing to attack toward Yampil.[75] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces increased their activity near Yampil after Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group in the settlement.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) and southeast of Siversk.[76]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne and Fedorivka on October 24 and 25.[77]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on October 26 that Russian forces are amassing to attack toward Siversk.[78]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka) during a recent, roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the area.[79]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate south of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (south of Kostyantynivka) due to effective drone resupply efforts, hindering Russian attacks toward Kostyantynivka.[80] The milblogger's statement refutes claims from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers from September 24 that Russian forces enveloped Ukrainian forces south of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir.[81] Another Russian milblogger refuted on October 25 Russian claims that Russian forces gained footholds in Kostyantynivka itself, and the milblogger noted that Russian troops who entered the city were part of sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[82] ISW previously assessed that geolocated footage published on October 24 showed Russian infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka.[83] Another Russian milblogger stated on October 26 that small Ukrainian groups continue to operate in the northern outskirts of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka), refuting Russian MoD claims on October 18 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[84]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on October 25 and 26.[85] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ivanopillya, Kostyantynivka, and Volodymyrivka.[86]

Ukrainian sources provided more information on the Russian roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 25. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that Russian forces exploited heavy rain that hindered Ukrainian drone operations to conduct an assault consisting of 15 heavy armored vehicles near Volodymyrivka.[87] The drone unit reported that Ukrainian forces struck one tank and 13 other armored vehicles and killed about 50 Russian servicemembers escaping from the vehicles. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 26 that Russian forces conducted at least five waves of mechanized assaults on October 25 and 26.[88] Mashovets noted that Russian forces attacked in small, dispersed groups of one to six vehicles instead of one massed column. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command failed to consider fall weather conditions when planning the assault routes, at least half of which passed through muddy terrain that disabled the vehicles. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed up to eight BTR armored personnel carriers and MT-LB amphibious armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and one out of two tanks. Mashovets noted that Russian infantry dismounted their AFVs at a predetermined location in only one assault and that Ukrainian interdiction threats forced Russian infantry to dismount earlier than planned in another.

Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in northern Shcherbynivka after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[89] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

The Kramatorsk City Military Administration reported on October 26 that Russian strikes against Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka) have destroyed 36 apartment buildings and houses and damaged over 1,000 residences since the start of 2025.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted their third drone strike against wind turbines in Kramatorsk since October 19 as part of a deliberate campaign targeting wind turbines to which Ukrainian forces allegedly attach radars and communication systems.[91]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Shcherbynivka.[92] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian logistics near Kostyantynivka.[93] Orlan-30 reconnaissance drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade continue to coordinate artillery strikes with elements of the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) against Ukrainian forces near Ivanopillya.[94] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka) with Lancet loitering munitions.[95]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[96] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya salient from the west.[97]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Pankivka, and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka and Mayak on October 25 and 26.[98] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kucheriv Yar and Shakhove.[99]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 26 that Ukrainian forces liberated Kucheriv Yar in the past ten days and have retaken a total of nine settlements in the Dobropillya tactical area and cleared nine more since August 21.[100] A Russian milblogger claimed that Kucheriv Yar is a contested “gray zone.”[101

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mayak.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Pokrovsk and along the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva highway west of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[103]

Russian forces attacked in Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Zatyshok, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Promin, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 25 and 26.[104] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zatyshok, Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), and Sukhetske.[105]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 26 that Russian forces conducted two mechanized and motorized assaults near Pokrovsk and Balahan on October 25 and that Russian forces lost all vehicles involved, two armored personnel carriers and two motorcycles.[106]

A Russian milblogger published footage reportedly showing Russian forces conducting a FAB-3000 unguided glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad.[107]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 439th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), the 9th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, SMD), and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[108]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[109]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Dachne, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 25 and 26.[110]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Verbove, and Oleksiivka on October 25 and 26.[111]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction reported that Russian groups of two to three infantry are attempting to infiltrate between gaps in Ukrainian positions and consolidate positions in the Ukrainian near rear.[112]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda; northeast of Hulyaipole near Novovasylivske, Novohryhorivka, and Pavlivka and toward Rybne; and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and toward Zelenyi Hai on October 25 and 26.[113]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Pavlivka.[114]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, Stepove, and Novoandriivka; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 25 and 26.[115]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and 4th Military Base (both 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[116] Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 65th VDV Battalion (both 7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[117]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on October 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge on October 25 and 26.[118]

A Russian milblogger continued to claim that Russian VDV elements are clearing Karantynnyi Island (southwest of Kherson City).[119] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray Russian forces as having established a bridgehead in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, a new Russian cognitive warfare effort against Ukraine and its partners.[120]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the Dnipro River.[121]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 101 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, including about 60 Shahed drones, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[122] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 90 drones, that five drones struck four locations, and that drone debris impacted five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and Kyiv City, killing three and injuring 32 in Kyiv City.[123]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.