Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2025

October 22, 2025, 8:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast. 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on October 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a large combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of October 21 and 22 and struck a Ukrainian kindergarten on the morning of October 22. The Ukrainian Air force reported that Russian forces launched 405 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — roughly 250 of which were Shahed drones — from Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Rostov oblasts and occupied Donetsk Oblast; nine Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and occupied Crimea; four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace above Rostov Oblast; and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 333 drones, eight Iskander-K cruise missiles, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, and two Kh-59/69 missiles; that 12 missiles and 55 drones hit 26 locations; and that drone debris fell on 19 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that 17 drones did not reach their targets as they were "lost in location” (likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare [EW] interference). The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strikes primarily targeted Kyiv Oblast and also affected Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Odesa Oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[2] Kyiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian forces conducted strikes against civilian and energy infrastructure, killing four civilians, including a 12-year-old girl and a six-month-old baby, and injuring 29, including five children.[3] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy announced that it enacted emergency power shutdowns throughout most Ukrainian oblasts and that Ukrainian officials are working to restore power.[4] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that Romanian forces scrambled two F-16 fighter jets to investigate air targets moving toward the Danube Delta area and that two German Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft took off from Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base to carry out Enhanced Air Policing missions during the overnight Russian strikes on Ukraine.[5]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a kindergarten in Kharkiv Oblast on October 22, killing one and injuring seven.[6] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Head Amil Omerov told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on October 22 that Russian forces may have used jet-powered Geran-2 drones in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time to strike densely built-up civilian infrastructure, including the kindergarten.[7] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that Russia used three Shahed (Geran) drones to strike a building in which a kindergarten operated.[8] Terekhov noted that all teachers and children evacuated in time to the basement shelter.

The United States announced new economic and military levers in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's persistent reticence to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The US Treasury announced on October 22 that its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is imposing further sanctions on Russia as a result of Russia’s lack of serious commitment to the process to end the war in Ukraine.[9] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the United States is sanctioning Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil - Russia’s two largest oil companies - and that the US Treasury is prepared to take further action if necessary to support US President Donald Trump’s effort to end the war. OFAC also blocked all entities of which Rosneft or Lukoil directly or indirectly own 50 percent or more.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 22 that US officials stated that the Trump administration lifted restrictions on Ukraine's use of Storm Shadow missiles, which use US intelligence for targeting, to strike Russian territory.[10] A source reportedly stated that the decision to lift the restrictions occurred before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump on October 17. The WSJ reported that two US officials stated that the Trump administration had not approved any Ukrainian Storm Shadow strikes until recently, when the authority for such strikes moved from US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to US Commander of European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich. US officials reportedly stated that they expect Ukraine to conduct more Storm Shadow strikes against Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that elements of the Ukrainian Air Force, Ground Forces, and Navy struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Bryansk Oblast with Storm Shadow missiles on October 21.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the plant produces gunpowder, explosives, and components for rocket fuel. ISW continues to assess that economic instruments coupled with measures that allow Ukraine to maintain pressure on the battlefield are vital to push Putin to reconsider his theory of victory.[12]

Western reporting indicates that the United States called off the planned meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin after Russia continued to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise on its long-standing war demands in Ukraine. Fox News reported on October 22 that Trump called off a meeting with Putin in Budapest after Russia rejected Trump's push for a ceasefire in Ukraine.[13] Trump stated on October 21 that he does not want to have a "wasted meeting."[14] A White House official stated that there are no plans for a Trump-Putin meeting "in the immediate future."[15] The Wall Street Journal reported that officials stated that the October 20 call between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov showed that the Kremlin was not compromising on its long-held demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to Russia and that Rubio subsequently briefed White House officials after the call, stating that a summit between Trump and Putin was unlikely to yield positive results.[16] Reuters reported that two US officials and a person familiar with the situation stated that Russia sent a non-paper (an informal diplomatic document) to the United States over the weekend of October 18-19 outlining Russian demands.[17] One US official stated that the communique reaffirmed Russia's demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, an implicit rejection of Trump's call for an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline. Reuters reported that Russia also re-emphasized its demand that a future peace agreement not include the deployment of NATO troops to Ukrainian territory. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 22 that Putin has "repeatedly" and "clearly" stated Russia's position and that Russia's stance is "well-known."[18] Peskov's October 22 statement is a continuation of recent Kremlin statements demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to agree to US- and Ukrainian-backed proposals for an immediate ceasefire and Russia's commitment to its maximalist war demands.[19]

The Kremlin is setting conditions to exculpate itself for the likely failure of future peace negotiations due to its own unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 22 that Russia and the United States have not set the date of the Putin-Trump summit and that there are mostly untrue "rumors and gossip” surrounding the summit.[20] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev, on October 21, accused Western media of distorting news about the summit to undermine it.[21] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky claimed on October 22 that Russian officials continue to prepare for the summit, which Slutsky accused the EU of attempting to disrupt.[22] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on October 22 that the meeting will take place, but that the number of days over which the summit will take place is undetermined.[23] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 22 that Russia and the United States did not agree on a meeting between Rubio and Lavrov in Budapest, but that preparations for the Trump-Putin summit continue.[24] Ryabkov accused those who oppose a peace agreement of attempting to present the situation as having changed in the past few weeks. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to deflect blame for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement onto the EU and the West, despite Russia's continued adherence to its maximalist war aims that amount to Ukraine’s total capitulation.[25] The Kremlin has recently publicly and privately underscored its refusal to make concessions on its demands, as seen in Kremlin officials' recent statements and the reported non-paper that Russian officials sent to the US.[26]

The Kremlin is using pre-planned strategic missile tests to further its ongoing rhetorical effort to push the United States to agree to concessions on the war in Ukraine in return for US-Russian arms control talks. Russian President Vladimir Putin directed a strategic nuclear forces exercise involving their land, sea, and air components on October 22.[27] Russian forces launched a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Plesetsk Cosmodrome, a Sineva ballistic missile from the Bryansk nuclear-powered submarine in the Barents Sea, and cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers. These exercises are annual and routine: Russia conducted similar exercises on October 26, 2022; October 25, 2023; and October 29, 2024.[28] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov used the backdrop of the strategic missile tests on October 22 to claim that NATO’s alleged "aggressive policies" forced Russia to adopt ”compensatory military-technical measures” and that Russia will not allow NATO to drag it into a ”very costly arms race.”[29] Ryabkov claimed that there are no opportunities for dialogue between Russia and the United States ”on any issues related to non-proliferation.”[30] Ryabkov demanded that the United States reciprocate Russia's proposal to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and claimed that the United States bears responsibility for Russia's decision to withdraw from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Ryabkov’s invocation of multiple arms control treaties against the backdrop of the strategic missile test is likely part of a concerted and deliberate Kremlin effort. The Kremlin has been using defunct US-Russian arms control treaties to cater to the bilateral Russia-US relationship in the hopes of securing future concessions on Ukraine. Russia has been moving to withdraw from multiple arms control treaties in recent months, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), while offering to extend New START for one year.[31] Russia's use of both carrots and sticks aims to push the United States to turn its attention away from the war and toward US-Russian bilateral relations.

Ukraine and its European allies are reportedly developing a 12-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine that includes multiple points that the Kremlin has already designated as non-starters. Bloomberg and the Telegraph reported on October 21 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Ukrainian and European leaders are developing a peace plan and that a "peace board" that US President Donald Trump would chair would oversee its implementation.[32] The sources stated that the plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of further territorial advances.[33] The proposal calls for Russia to repatriate all deported Ukrainian children and for both sides to exchange prisoners. The sources stated that the proposal also calls for Ukraine to receive security guarantees, funding for reconstruction, and a path towards “rapid” EU accession. Bloomberg stated that unspecified actors would gradually lift sanctions against Russia if Russia agreed to the plan, but did not specify which sanctions. The plan proposes that the West return Russia’s roughly $300 billion in frozen assets only if Russia contributes to Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. Western states would reportedly reinstate sanctions and freeze Russian assets if Russia attacks Ukraine again. The plan calls for Russia and Ukraine to negotiate the governance of occupied territories, but noted that Europe and Ukraine will not legally recognize any occupied territory as Russian. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte met with Trump on October 22, reportedly to present the proposal to Trump.[34]

The reported plan is in line with Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline, to which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has already agreed and which Ukraine’s European allies support.[35] The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly expressed its opposition to a ceasefire and continues to reiterate Russia’s commitment to achieving its original war goals - as evidenced by the non-paper that Russia reportedly sent to the United States, outlining its demands for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and rejecting Trump's proposed freezing of the frontline.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war aims and is refusing to engage in good-faith negotiations - in contrast to Ukraine.[37]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced plans to deploy active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear, in part to obfuscate likely Kremlin efforts to prepare to deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine in the future. Deputy Chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky claimed on October 22 that Russian authorities will use reservists to protect critical infrastructure facilities in the deep Russian rear, such as energy and transportation infrastructure and oil refineries, from Ukrainian drone strikes.[38] Reservists are members of Russia's "human mobilization reserve," an active reserve in which Russian citizens sign a contract with the Russian MoD on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up. Tsimlyansky claimed that mobile fire teams made up of reservists, who were employees of the enterprises and understood the facilities' vulnerabilities and terrain, have successfully repelled drone strikes in the past. Tsimlyansky claimed that the recent MoD-initiated draft law on reservists (which would permit the Russian military to use reservists from Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war) does not mean that Russian authorities will call them up for military service, deploy them to the war in Ukraine, or deploy them outside of Russia.[39] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov notably stated on October 13 that the law will allow the Kremlin to deploy reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[40] Tsimlyansky further claimed that there is "no mention" of mobilization.

The Kremlin is using the deployment of reservists to protect critical infrastructure in the Russian rear to appear as if it is addressing a longstanding sensitive issue, while apparently setting conditions to mobilize reservists for combat in the future. Russian milbloggers have complained throughout the war that Russian authorities have not only failed to protect Russian infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes but have been trying to deflect blame for these failures.[41] Russian mobile fire groups across Russia are unlikely to offer sufficient protection against Ukrainian strikes, and Ukraine notably pairs its effective mobile fire groups with other air defense means to protect against Russian drones — an approach Russia would have to adopt to optimize defense of critical infrastructure. A Russian milblogger responded to Tsimlyansky's announcement, noting how this is not a "game-changing solution" but is "just one cog in the overall security system."[42] The milblogger stated that mobile fire groups without denser radar coverage and more air defense systems will not be effective. Russian authorities are likely trying to downplay the intended effects of the draft law on reservists, which ISW assesses will allow Russia to mobilize members of the active reserve on a rolling basis to sustain combat operations in Ukraine.[43]

Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial enterprises overnight on October 21 and 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a processing unit of the Makhachkala Oil Refinery in the Republic of Dagestan, which has an annual production capacity of one million tons and provides fuel for Russia's Caspian Flotilla naval base.[44] Footage published on October 22 shows an explosion at an industrial area in Makhachkala.[45] Republic of Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov acknowledged on October 22 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified enterprise in the region.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Saransk Mechanical Plant in the Republic of Mordovia, which produces anti-personnel engineering ammunition and mining kits, ammunition detonators, and initiation units.[47] Geolocated footage published on October 22 shows an explosion at the Saransk Mechanical Plant, and Republic of Mordovia Governor Artem Zdunov claimed that an overnight Ukrainian strike damaged an unspecified facility in the region.[48] Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlets on October 21 and 22 that an overnight explosion occurred at a section of the Pskov-St. Petersburg railway line, which the Russian military frequently uses, and stated that the explosion caused significant damage and disrupted logistics.[49]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of October 21 and 22 and struck a Ukrainian kindergarten on the morning of October 22.
• The United States announced new economic and military levers in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's persistent reticence to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Western reporting indicates that the United States called off the planned meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin after Russia continued to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise on its long-standing war demands in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is setting conditions to exculpate itself for the likely failure of future peace negotiations due to its own unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations.
• The Kremlin is using pre-planned strategic missile tests to further its ongoing rhetorical effort to push the United States to agree to concessions on the war in Ukraine in return for US-Russian arms control talks.
• Ukraine and its European allies are reportedly developing a 12-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine that includes multiple points that the Kremlin has already designated as non-starters.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced plans to deploy active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear, in part to obfuscate likely Kremlin efforts to prepare to deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine in the future.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial enterprises overnight on October 21 and 22.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces advanced near Lyman.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued attacks in northern Sumy Oblast on October 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), on October 21 and 22.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City), Sadky, and Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[51]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that relatives of about 200 servicemembers from the Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are asking the Russian military command to evacuate the group, including the bodies of servicemembers killed in action (KIA).[52] The milblogger claimed that the servicemembers have been operating near Kurilovka, Kursk Oblast (south of Sudzha) since September 2025. The milblogger also claimed that Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov ignored the Russian General Staff‘s ban on the use of elements of territorial control motorized rifle regiments (likely intended for defensive operations) formed from Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) personnel in assaults.[53] The milblogger claimed that Nikiforov sent VKS motorized rifle elements to replace elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) to participate in offensive operations to try to seize Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino). The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) advanced to Stepne (northwest of Sumy City) but then retreated to their original positions.[54] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are suffering heavy losses crossing water features in Kindrativka (northeast of Sumy City) and have insufficient medical care to combat winter illnesses.[55] The milblogger claimed that it is unclear if Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Oleksiivka, where elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are attacking and facing friendly fire incidents. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are withdrawing territorial control elements from Yunakivka.

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[56]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk, to the northern outskirts of Synelnykove, and near Tykhe (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[57]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on October 21 and 22.[58]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces have intensified artillery and guided glide bomb strikes and ground assaults in this area in recent weeks..[59] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are testing the use of armored fighting vehicles to quickly transport infantry across open areas.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[60]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Bolohivka on October 21 and 22.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove, Khatnie (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk), and Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction stated that Russian forces are increasing attacks as the weather worsens and that Russian infantry are moving on light vehicles, buggies, and motorcycles.[63]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and in Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Stroivka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on October 21 and 22.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupyansk itself and from Myrove (north of Kupyansk) toward Kupyansk.[65]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that drone operators of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) used a Kub-1 loitering munition with a purported average range of 50 kilometers to strike Ukrainian forces in unspecified areas of Kharkiv Oblast.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Udaya Drone Group of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk.[67] Drone operators of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Company of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and intercepting Ukrainian reconnaissance drones in the Kupyansk direction.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 21 and 22.[69]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BTR-82A armored personnel carrier (APC) north of Stavky (north of Lyman) during an October 20 Russian mechanized assault, indicating that Russian forces advanced north of the settlement during the assault.[70] A Ukrainian servicemember reported on October 21 that Ukrainian drone operators repelled a Russian mechanized assault in the area, destroying two BTR-82A APCs and a T-72B tank of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD).[71]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in western Zarichne (east of Lyman) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[72]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Yarova, into central Novoselivka, west of Serednie, southeast of Drobysheve (all northwest of Lyman), and southwest of Torske (east of Lyman).[73]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Derylove, Serednie, Karpivka, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Kolodyazi; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 21 and 22.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Drobysheve and Stavky (both north of Lyman).[75]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian infantry avoid engaging Ukrainian forces directly during small group infiltration missions and hide in basements and dugouts to wait for reinforcements to conduct further attacks.[76] The spokesperson reported that the Russian military command tasks servicemembers with flag-raising missions for propaganda purposes and to present the appearance of numerical superiority to Ukrainian forces. The spokesperson noted that the Russian military command recently deployed several unspecified elite drone units (likely from the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies) to the Lyman direction to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The spokesperson reported that the Ukrainian brigade’s electronic warfare (EW) operators suppressed roughly 1,200 Russian first-person view (FPV) drones in this direction in the month of September alone, an increase from roughly 1,000 in August.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Zarichne.[77]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; north of Siversk near Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Novoselivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka, Pereizne, and Fedorivka on October 21 and 22.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, north of Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka), south of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka), and north of Rusyn Yar and Poltavka (both south of Druzhkivka).[79]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Pleshchiivka, Bila Hora, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on October 21 and 21.[80]

The Ukrainian 19th Army Corps (AC) reported on October 21 that pro-Russian accounts are spreading false claims about Russian advances in the Kostyantynivka direction.[81]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing on drone, artillery, and airstrikes against Kostyantynivka as opposed to conducting ground assaults.[82] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces will not seize Kostyantynivka until at least 2026.[83] A third Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted a FAB-3000 guided glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[84]

Order of battle: Drone operators of the Russian 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment (former 13th Assault Detachment of Wagner Group) of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Ivanopillya.[85] Elements of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (both 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ivanopillya.[86] Elements of the 3rd Assault Company of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka).[87] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Volodymyrivka.[88] Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kleban-Byk.[89] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[90] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[91]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[92] The Ukrainian Air Assault Forces reported that Ukrainian forces captured over 50 Russian prisoners of war (POWs) during the liberation of the settlement.[93]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Shakhove (east of Dobrobillya).[94]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Mayak on October 21 and 22.[95]

Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), during an at least reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault that consisted of at least one armored vehicle.[96] The Ukrainian 7th Air Assault Corps reported on October 22 that it repelled a Russian mechanized assault on the eastern approaches to Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces destroyed all Russian equipment.[97] Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Balahan (north of Myrnohrad).[98]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced near O0525 street in western Pokrovsk — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[99]

Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows Russian servicemembers raising a Russian flag in eastern Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) in what ISW assesses to be an infiltration event.[100] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 21 and 22.[101]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 22 that Russian forces are conducting more frequent mechanized assaults in the direction and are attempting to leverage worsening weather conditions that hamper Ukrainian drone operations.[102] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces conducted mechanized assaults with 10 pieces of equipment this week (at an unspecified date between October 15 and 22).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly employing anti-thermal imaging cloaks near Molodetske and operating within Pokrovsk.[103] Artillery elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[104] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating within Rodynske.[105] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized and advanced north, west, and east of Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and north of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[107] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) with seizing Ivanivka, whose seizure Russian milbloggers claimed as of October 4.[108]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on October 21 and 22.[109]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove on October 21 and 22.[110]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction reported on October 22 that Russian forces continue to use light equipment for ground assaults.[111]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pavlivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) and advanced south of the settlement to the northern bank of the Yanchur River and west of Okhotnyche (southeast of Pavlivka).[112] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 60th and 57th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Pavlivka.[113]

Geolocated footage published on October 22 shows elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade raising Russian flags in central and western Pavlivka in what ISW assesses to be an infiltration event.[114] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne, Zlahoda, Uspenivka, Poltavaka, Pavlivka, Malynivka, Novovasylivka, Novohryhorivka, and Novomykolaivka on October 21 and 22.[115]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[116]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Kamyanske, and Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 21 and 22.[117] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka.[118]

Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov confirmed on October 22 that an October 15 Ukrainian strike against the command post of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) in Zaporizhia Oblast killed battalion intelligence chief Vasily Marzoev, reportedly the son of Russian 18th CAA (SMD) Commander Lieutenant General Arkady Marzoev.[119]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, including the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 4th Military Base (all of 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[120] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shyroke and Yehorivka (both northeast of Orikhiv).[121] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhzhia City.[122]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on October 22.[123]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in Korabelnyi Raion of Kherson City on Karantynnyy Island (immediately southwest of Kherson City) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[124] ISW recently observed that a Ukrainian brigade refuted exaggerated claims of Russian advances near Kherson City.[125]

A Russian military source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on Karantynnyy Island.[126]

The Kherson Military Administration reported on October 22 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian car in Dniprovskyi Raion, Kherson City, injuring an elderly man.[127]

Satellite imagery taken on October 21 indicates that a Ukrainian drone strike against an oil depot belonging to the Atan gas station network in occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea on October 17 destroyed at least five fuel tanks and caused a fire that continues to burn as of October 21.[128]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Armed Forces will begin their fall conscription cycle on October 23. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 22 that the Belarusian Armed Forces will begin their Fall 2025 conscription cycle on October 23 and plan to conscript 10,000 men over 18 for military service between October and November, in addition to sending an additional 500 servicemembers to continue service in the Belarusian Armed Forces reserve.[129]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.