Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 9, 2025

October 9, 2025, 7:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on October 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

EU and NATO states continue to take steps to increase European defenses against covert and overt Russian attacks. The European Parliament overwhelmingly voted on October 9 in favor of a resolution condemning Russia's recent "escalatory actions" in violating Polish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Romanian airspace.[i] The resolution passed the parliament with 469 votes in favor, 97 against, and 38 abstentions. The parliament noted that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for the actions in Polish, Estonian, and Romanian airspace. The European Parliament denounced Russia's deliberate drone incursions aimed at critical infrastructure in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The resolution did not mention the recent drone flights over the Munich Airport, but German officials recently attributed the incursions to Russia.[ii] The resolution encouraged initiatives enabling EU states to take action against airspace violations, including by shooting down the threats, and welcomed the EU's "drone wall" and Eastern Flank Watch initiatives.[iii] The resolution called for the EU to "substantively" increase its defense and industrial cooperation with Ukraine, especially in the fields of drone technology and countermeasures. European parliament members advocated for sanctions against entities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) supplying dual-use goods and military items that are essential for Russia's production of drones and missiles, and called for punitive measures against all states enabling Russian actions, such as Belarus, North Korea, and Iran. The European Parliament stated that the range of Russia's sabotage and "hybrid" activities against the EU amounts to state-sponsored terrorism, "even if they fall below the threshold of an armed attack." ISW assesses, however, that Russia has been increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase 0” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[iv]

The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 9 that four NATO officials stated that NATO states are discussing more forceful responses to Russia's increasingly provocative actions.[v] Proposals reportedly include arming reconnaissance drones that collect intelligence on Russian military activity, reducing limits on pilots' ability to shoot down Russian threats, and conducting NATO exercises at more remote and unguarded areas near the Russian border. Two NATO official sources told the FT that the talks aim to streamline rules of engagement among NATO states, as some require pilots to visually confirm threats before engaging, while others allow pilots to open fire based on radar data or perceived danger, given the direction or speed of the object. The officials stated that the talks aim to raise the costs for Russia and to clearly define countermeasures.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky added more details about Russia's use of its shadow fleet to conduct recent drone incursions into European airspace. Zelensky stated on October 9 that intelligence indicates that the Russian shadow fleet consists of more than 500 tankers and that Russian special services were on board the Russian Borocay tanker that French authorities stopped off the coast of France on September 30 and seized on October 1.[vi] Maritime-focused news outlet Maritime Executive reported on September 23 that the Boracay was one of three Russian-linked vessels near the coordinated drone incursion that shut down the Copenhagen Airport on September 22.

The Kremlin continued its reflexive control campaign aimed at deterring the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, including by threatening to deploy Russian missiles to Cuba. Kremlin officials repeated on October 9 recent Kremlin narratives claiming that the United States would have to directly participate in future Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes.[vii] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev also referenced Russia's recent military cooperation agreement with Cuba and implied that Russia can deploy missiles to Cuba close to the United States.[viii] Zhuravlev's statements come against the backdrop of similar Russian claims on October 8 about Russia potentially supplying Iskander and Oreshnik ballistic missiles to Cuba in response to US provisions of Tomahawks to Ukraine.[ix] The Kremlin is trying to invoke memories of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to threaten the United States. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is pursuing various multi-pronged information efforts to deter the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.[x]

Kremlin officials continue to indicate that US-Russian relations are deteriorating to levels similar to those during the Biden administration. Zhuravlev claimed on October 9 that the West is unlikely to change its behavior and "embrace reconciliation" with Russia.[xi] Zhuravlev claimed that Russia's relations with the Trump administration have returned to the level of those under former US President Joseph Biden. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 9 that Russian-US dialogue is experiencing a "serious pause."[xii] Peskov claimed that Russia has yet to receive a response from the United States to Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) for one year past its expiration in February 2026.[xiii] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 9 that US-Russian dialogue paused after Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in New York City on September 25.[xiv]

Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK Valerii Zaluzhnyi highlighted a Russian cognitive warfare effort to spread false information about future Ukrainian elections. Zaluzhnyi denied claims on October 8 that he supports holding elections in Ukraine during wartime or is preparing to run for president.[xv] Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian propaganda is spreading false narratives and targeting the Ukrainian information space. Russia's informational efforts targeting Ukrainian media likely aim to split Ukrainian society.

Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly admitted that Russian air defenders shot two missiles at an Azerbaijan Airlines civilian plane in December 2024. Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on October 9 and apologized that the plane crash "occurred in [Russian] skies" — continuing his refusal to take responsibility for downing the plane.[xvi] Putin claimed that the "first cause" of the plane crash was a Ukrainian drone. Putin claimed that the "second reason" for the crash was a Russian air defense system technical failure. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces launched two missiles and said that they did not hit the plane directly. Putin stated that the missiles exploded, "perhaps" self-detonating, near the aircraft. Putin claimed that the plane's pilot received instructions from Russian air traffic controllers to land in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan, but decided to return to Baku and then flew to Kazakhstan. Putin correctly described air defense missile proximity fuses, which detonate upon reaching a certain distance from the target — implicitly acknowledging that Russian air defense missiles were the cause of the crash. Putin is trying to leverage technical jargon to cover the facts about what happened. Leaked transcripts of the conversation between the pilot and Russian air traffic controllers revealed that Russian authorities did not allow the plane to land in Russia even after the crew requested an emergency landing — refuting Putin's claim that Russian authorities offered Makhachkala as a landing site but that the pilot himself refused.[xvii]

Russian elites are reportedly expressing concerns over the Kremlin’s years long efforts to nationalize assets. Reuters reported on October 8, citing unnamed sources, that the Russian Central Bank ruled that Russia violated the rights of minority shareholders by seizing some assets related to its war in Ukraine, including seizing assets from foreign companies and domestic Russian enterprises.[xviii] Three sources close to the Central Bank and Moscow Stock Exchange (MOEX) told Reuters that MOEX lodged an official complaint with the Central Bank over the Russian state's legal violations in the seizure of a majority stake in gold mining company Uzhuralzoloto Group of Companies (UGC). Sources told Reuters that there are signs of backlash within parts of the Russian elite, especially among market-friendly technocrats credited with saving the Russian economy from collapse amid ongoing Western sanctions. Reuters reported that Russian authorities have seized roughly $50 billion in assets, roughly two percent of Russia’s GDP, since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Sources told Reuters that some business executives and Central Bank and Russian Ministry of Finance officials are privately questioning what they see as a move toward a “Soviet-style command structure” with the state increasingly mobilizing resources in order to achieve a military victory in Ukraine. Western sanctions have severely limited the financial and material resources available for Russia to fund its war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has increasingly relied on nationalizing assets to secure resources for the war since 2022, while also consolidating state control over the business sector. The recent MOEX complaint and Central Bank ruling indicate that Russia’s elite is growing resentful of the fiscal problems that such nationalization efforts are having on Russia’s economy.

Russia is increasingly conducting Shahed-type drone strikes against frontline areas, but will likely continue to conduct less precise guided glide bomb strikes as well due to their larger payloads. Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on October 8 that Ukrainian soldiers and experts noted that Russia is increasingly relying on Shahed-type drones to strike Ukrainian frontline positions.[xix] Ukrainian soldiers reported that Russian forces actively conducted Geran-type drone strikes (a Russian variant of Iranian Shahed drones) against frontline areas near Kostyantynivka in September 2025 and have recently increased their Geran-type drone strikes closer to the front in northern Sumy Oblast, particularly targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and concentration areas 10 to 15 kilometers from the front. Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi stated that Russia is increasingly employing Shahed-type drones near the frontline instead of KAB guided glide bombs, but stressed that Russia is not suffering from a KAB shortage. Khrapchynskyi noted that Shahed-type drones only have a 90-kilogram warhead — significantly smaller than the smallest KAB warhead at 250 kilograms — but that Shahed-type drone strikes are more precise. Khrapchynskyi also noted that Russia can produce a Shahed-type drone for about $20,000 to $50,000, whereas KAB costs about $25,000. Khrapchynskyi assessed that Russia is anticipating that Ukraine will be able to more effectively counter KAB strikes, which Russian forces launch from aircraft, particularly with the arrival of additional F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine.

Russia's use of Shahed-type drones to strike frontline areas is likely enabling Russia to conduct precision strikes against targets for which KABs are not optimized. Russia is unlikely to cease its use of KABs despite their increased production costs due to the larger payload that allows Russia to destroy hardened targets that Shahed-type drones cannot. Russia's increased Shahed-type drone production is likely allowing Russia to increasingly strike frontline areas while also expanding its long-range strike campaign. Russia's frontline Shahed-type strikes, particularly those against Ukrainian GLOCs, are likely contributing to Russia's ability to generate some battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects and enabling Russian advances as ISW has previously assessed.[xx]

Russia continues to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on October 9 that it identified the commander of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), Andrey Syrotyuk, who ordered Russian forces to shoot three Ukrainian civilians at close range as they were evacuating Kupyansk on October 2.[xxi] The SBU reported that the Russian soldiers disguised themselves in civilian clothing — an act of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory. The execution of civilians very likely constitutes a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[xxii] The SBU report coheres with ISW's longstanding assessment that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• EU and NATO states continue to take steps to increase European defenses against covert and overt Russian attacks.
• The Kremlin continued its reflexive control campaign aimed at deterring the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, including by threatening to deploy Russian missiles to Cuba.
• Kremlin officials continue to indicate that US-Russian relations are deteriorating to levels similar to those during the Biden administration.
• Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK Valerii Zaluzhnyi highlighted a Russian cognitive warfare effort to spread false information about future Ukrainian elections.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly admitted that Russian air defenders shot two missiles at an Azerbaijan Airlines civilian plane in December 2024.
• Russian elites are reportedly expressing concerns over the Kremlin’s years long efforts to nationalize assets.
• Russia is increasingly conducting Shahed-type drone strikes against frontline areas, but will likely continue to conduct less precise guided glide bomb strikes as well due to their larger payloads.
• Russia continues to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in the Kherson direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian energy infrastructure on the night of October 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 9 that Ukrainian forces struck and started a fire at the Korobkovsky Gas Processing Plant in Kotovo, Volgograd Oblast.[xxiv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant is one of Russia’s largest facilities processing natural gas and associated petroleum gas in southern Russia, with a capacity of 450 million cubic meters of natural and associated gas per year and 186,000 tons of wide fraction of light hydrocarbons per year. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported that a significant portion of the plant's production is for export.[xxv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck and started a fire at the Efimovka line production control station in Efimovka, Volgograd Oblast.[xxvi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility serves several truck lines for the transport of oil and oil products in Volgograd Oblast with a throughput capacity of 50 million tons per year. Militarynyi reported that the station is a key hub of the Kuybyshev-Tikhoretsk oil pipeline, which exports Russian oil through the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[xxvii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 9 that Russia is facing a gasoline shortage of 13 to 20 percent due to recent Ukrainian strikes.[xxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Andriivka (north of Sumy City), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely advanced, as Russian milbloggers do not have an incentive to report false Ukrainian gains.[xxix]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Andriivka and that Russian forces seized Varachyne (both north of Sumy City).[xxx]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Varchyne, and Novomykolaivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Yablunivka, on October 8 and 9.[xxxi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), Andriivka, Kindrativka, and Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).[xxxii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting in the Sumy direction is mostly positional and that the high quantity of Ukrainian drones in the area is hindering Russian advances.[xxxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Andriivka.[xxxiv] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xxxv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on October 8 and 9.[xxxvi]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are experimenting with attacks using heavy equipment and motorcycles.[xxxvii] The servicemember stated that Russian forces are also conducting infantry raids through dense forests, sending one or two servicemembers "at random" in an attempt to penetrate Ukrainian defenses. The servicemember stated that Russian forces sometimes send one or two servicemembers to walk through a field or along roads during the day to divert Ukrainian attention from the main assault group attacking along the flanks with two to three personnel.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and artillery elements of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[xxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Dovhenke and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on October 8 and 9, but did not advance.[xxxix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kupyansk.[xl] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 9 that Russian forces advanced within central Kupyansk, in southern Tyshchenkivka, and south of Myrove (both northwest of Kupyansk).[xli]

Unconfirmed claims: Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly 70 percent of Kupyansk.[xlii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, Dvorichne, and Stroivka, and toward Dvorichanske, Kolodyazne, and Bolohivka; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Doroshivka, and toward Kutkivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Ivanivka, and toward Kurylivka on October 8 and 9.[xliii]

Mashovets stated on October 9 that small Russian infantry groups have penetrated Ukrainian positions in multiple areas within and northwest of Kupyansk.[xliv] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are penetrating Ukrainian lines, entrenching in the Ukrainian near rear, and accumulating reinforcements for further attacks. Mashovets stated that the size of Russian infantry groups ranges from one to six personnel. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are operating strike and reconnaissance drones over Kupyansk from their bridgehead in the northern part of the town and are conducting mortar strikes to prevent Ukrainian counterattacks in Kupyansk. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces may adapt their tactics to the upcoming changes in the weather and foliage, but that weather changes are unlikely to decrease the intensity of their activity.[xlv] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using improved thermal imaging cloaks at nighttime and are not suffering from personnel shortages. The spokesperson stated that often only one Russian soldier out of 10 reaches the intended location during attacks and that the Russian military command can put a company's worth of personnel into attacks to take one position. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are conflicting reports about Russian advances within Kupyansk, with earlier reports claiming that Russian forces seized northern and central Kupyansk and an area in western Kupyansk, but Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on October 7 that Russian forces were already fighting in southern Kupyansk.[xlvi] The milblogger noted that there is no footage confirming Gerasimov's claim. The milblogger claimed that Stepova Novoselivka is a contested "gray zone."

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), unspecified Spetsnaz elements, and elements of the mobilization reserve are operating in northern and central Kupyansk.[xlvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Borova near Pershotravneve and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on October 8 and 9.[xlviii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Mashovets reported on October 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced in western and southern Zarichne (east of Lyman) and that Russian forces only maintain positions in southern and eastern Zarichne.[xlix]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Mashovets stated that Russian forces only maintain positions within Zarichne around the area between Kleverna and Poshtova streets, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in areas that Russian sources previously claimed to be under Russian control.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly half of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[l] Mashovets reported that Russian forces only maintain positions near the railway station in northeastern Yampil and nearby blocks.[li]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Shandryholove, Drobysheve, and Derylove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novomykhailivka, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 8 and 9.[lii] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking south of Karpivka and likely successfully counterattacked near Yampil in recent days.[liii]

Mashovets reported that Russian forces have infiltrated into northern Zarichne at several points.[liv] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces aim to cut off Ukrainian logistics at the junction of the Siverskyi Donets River with the Nitrius River near Novoselivka and Derylove and with the Zherebets River near Yampil and Dronivka (east of Yampil). A Russian milblogger claimed that northeastern Yampil is a contested "gray zone."[lv]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), with reinforcements from elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD), are attacking near Novoselivka and Drobysheve.[lvi] Mashovets stated that elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 25th CAA), with up to a battalion's worth of reinforcements from elements of the 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA), are attacking near Yampil and Dronivka. Mashovets reported that elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division are attacking within Zarichne. Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in the Lyman direction.[lvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[lviii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Novoselivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne, Zvanivka, and Kuzmynivka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on October 8 and 9.[lix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southern Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lx]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Volodymyrivka and advanced east of Ivanopillya, north of Kleban-Byk, and within southern Pleshchiivka (all southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxi]

Russian forces attacked toward Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 8 and 9.[lxii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction (southeast of Kostyantynivka) reported on October 9 that Russian forces are focusing on infiltration missions and that individual Russian personnel are entering Kostyantynivka.[lxiii] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces continue to commit acts of perfidy to advance within Kostyantynivka and hide in basements. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are aiming to exhaust Ukrainian forces and that the Russian military command redeployed an unspecified artillery regiment to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The officer reported that Russian artillery strikes are complicating evacuation efforts and movement in and near Kostyantynivka. The spokesperson stated that elements of the Russian artillery regiment also started to use fiber-optic drones en-masse when they arrived in the area and are targeting vehicles.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[lxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[lxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Zatyshok on October 8 and 9.[lxvi]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 8 that Russian forces have suffered 12,000 casualties, including 7,000 killed in action (KIA), in the Dobropillya area since the start of the Russian penetration in the area on August 21.[lxvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and in central Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[lxviii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Mine No. 1 north of Udachne and advanced to the Donetska rail line and the T-0506 Pokrovsk-Mezheva highway south of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[lxix]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, Krasnyi Lyman, Novotoretske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, Myrnohrad, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne on October 8 and 9.[lxx]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using radio-controlled and fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones, and lightly armored vehicles and motorcycles for transportation.[lxxi] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces continue to attack in groups of two to three personnel and are using anti-thermal imaging cloaks. The chief of staff stated that Russian forces are conducting diversionary measures to try to gain a foothold within the Ukrainian near rear. The chief of staff assessed that Russian forces are improving, changing tactics after analyzing their losses. An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using infiltration tactics rather than frontal assaults.[lxxii] The officer stated that Russian forces attempt to infiltrate the gaps between Ukrainian positions, "blurring" the frontline. The officer stated that Russian forces typically move on foot but sometimes attack on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). The officer reported that Russian drones are striking Ukrainian frontline areas and the near rear in an effort to destroy Ukrainian logistics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian GLOCs near Pokrovsk.[lxxiii] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxiv] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Balahan.[lxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 9, but did make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka and north of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[lxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, Novomykolaivka, and Novoserhiivka, east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on October 8 and 9.[lxxvii]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 9 shows a Ukrainian tank raiding and likely destroying Russian positions in southern Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or advanced in southern Oleksiivka in areas that Russian sources previously claimed to be under Russian control.[lxxviii] ISW assesses that Russian forces no longer hold positions in southern Oleksiivka.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and Andriivka-Kletsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Vorone, Komyshuvakha, Verbove, and Berezove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and toward Oleksiivka on October 8 and 9.[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Velykomykhailivka.[lxxx]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka and Poltavka and toward Novovasylivkse, Novomykolaivka, Uspenivka, and Okhotnyche and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on October 8 and 9.[lxxxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade and drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly coordinating strikes against Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepove, Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Kamyanske on October 8 and 9.[lxxxiii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on October 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pishchanivka (east of Kherson City on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River).[lxxxv]

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on October 8 and 9.[lxxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed, Gerbera, and other drones — of which about 70 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[lxxxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 87 drones and that 22 drones struck 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit residential, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts, leaving at least 30,000 people without power.[lxxxviii] Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsya) denied claims that Russian forces struck a civilian train in Chernihiv Oblast.[lxxxix]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 8 that Russian forces have intensified their strikes against energy infrastructure and railways in Chernihiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts in order to leave Ukrainians without electricity, create chaos, and put psychological pressure on civilians.[xc] Bloomberg reported that sources stated that Russian strikes on Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts on October 3 took out about 60 percent of Ukraine's natural gas production and that Ukraine will likely have to spend 1.9 billion euros on fuel imports in Winter 2025-2026.[xci] Sources told Bloomberg that Ukraine expects that it will need to buy roughly 4.4 billion cubic meters of gas by the end of March 2026, nearly 20 percent of Ukraine’s annual consumption. Ukrainian volunteer Serhii Sternenko stated on October 9 that Russian forces have intensified strikes on Chernihiv Oblast since at least July 2025 and are now striking transformer and nodes more often than thermal power plants, generation facilities, and other objects that Russia used to target more frequently.[xcii] Sternenko stated that it is more difficult for Ukraine to repair the network nodes than generation facilities and noted that Russian strikes often concentrate on destroying power systems in one or two oblasts or cities. Sternenko stated that Russian forces conduct more reconnaissance drone missions in Chernihiv Oblast, where no fighting is ongoing, than in Sumy Oblast — likely contributing to Russia's ability to successfully target Chernihiv Oblast.

Ukrzalinytsya Head Oleksandr Pertsovskyi reported that Russian forces are trying to cut off railway connections in the Ukrainian near rear, namely in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.[xciii] Pertsovkyi added that Russian forces are trying to cut off main and reserve railway lines and that rail passengers traveling to Sumy City, Konotop, and Shostka in Sumy Oblast will need to take buses. Russian forces recently began prioritizing strikes on railways and moving trains in Chernihiv Oblast with modified Shahed (Geran) drones.[xciv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.