Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2025

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on October 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia's war demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump's October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded on October 18 on his English and Russian language social media accounts to Trump's October 17 call for both Russia and Ukraine to each “claim victory” in Ukraine.[i] Medvedev claimed that this call is not applicable to Russia and that Russia needs a victory "with the conditions everyone knows."[ii] Medvedev is likely referring to the Kremlin’s consistent pre-war demands to install a pro-Russian puppet government in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality and NATO abandoning its open-door policy, and limiting the size of Ukraine's military as such that Ukraine could not defend itself against future Russian aggression.[iii]

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces broadly reacted to the October 17 meeting between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by cautiously reiterating Kremlin informational lines that aim to divide Ukraine from Western support and justify continuing its war in Ukraine.[iv] Russian officials expressed cautious optimism about Trump's reported decision against provisioning Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles at this time, but Medvedev hedged that US weapon deliveries will continue to Ukraine, however.[v] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky claimed on October 18 that Trump's reported decision against providing Tomahawks to Ukraine was due to his October 16 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which Putin offered to meet with Trump in Hungary, claiming Trump's reported decision as a victory for Putin.[vi] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev reiterated his October 16 and 17 US-Russian bilateral economic proposals following the Trump-Zelensky meeting, continuing efforts to incentivize economic cooperation in exchange for Trump giving up the peace effort and allowing Putin to continue his war in Ukraine without US pressure.[vii]

Ukraine’s October 2025 strikes against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea, appear to have significantly degraded the terminal, and it is unclear when or if Russia will be able to repair it. Planet satellite imagery captured on October 17 and published on October 18 shows significant damage to multiple fuel tanks at the Feodosia oil terminal following Ukrainian strikes against the terminal on October 6, 7, and 13.[viii] Ukraine-based open source intelligence (OSINT) organization Frontelligence Insight assessed that the October 2025 Ukrainian strikes destroyed or severely damaged at least 11 main oil storage tanks and at least six smaller day or additive tanks.[ix] Frontelligence Insight assessed that 19 total main tanks and six smaller day or additive tanks at the Feodosia oil terminal are damaged as of October 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 15 that the Ukrainian strikes damaged at least 16 oil tanks.[x] Frontelligence Insight noted that Russia will likely struggle to repair the Feodosia oil terminal and that Ukraine could strike any repaired facilities.[xi] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative journalist Mark Krutov published Planet satellite imagery from 2022 and October 2024 showing the damage that Ukrainian strikes have inflicted on oil infrastructure in occupied Feodosia since 2022, suggesting that Russia has not yet repaired facilities damaged in prior Ukrainian strikes.[xii] Ukrainian strikes on oil infrastructure in occupied Feodosia diminish the terminal's capacity to supply the Russian military with fuel and lubricant. Ukraine's sustained strike campaign on Russian oil refineries is imposing worsening gasoline shortages on occupied Crimea.[xiii]

Russian state media reported that the majority of Russian drivers expect further increases in gasoline prices as Ukraine continues its long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure. Russian state business outlet Gazeta dot ru reported on October 18 that a poll from online finance platform WEBBANKIR found that 74 percent of Russian drivers have "noticed" gasoline price increases since August 2025 and that 90 percent expect further increases.[xiv] The poll found that 56 percent of Russian drivers consider the price increases significant, and that 18.9 percent have encountered empty gas stations. The poll found that roughly 40 percent of Russian drivers have changed their driving habits due to the price increases, and that 38 percent have begun buying cheaper fuel. Gazeta dot ru noted that gasoline prices have risen 10 percent since January 2025 — the sharpest increase in 15 years.[xv] Russian Union of Auto Services Head Yuriy Valko claimed on October 16 that Russian gas stations are increasingly selling low-quality gasoline, and Chinese automaker Geely Motors blamed a series of recent vehicle breakdowns on the usage of Russian gasoline, which Geely Motors claimed has more byproducts than the gasoline its engines are designed to use.[xvi] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages, and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[xvii] It is noteworthy that Russian state media is openly admitting that gasoline shortages are impacting the majority of drivers, as it suggests that the shortages are becoming increasingly acute.

Ukraine and Russia agreed to a localized ceasefire in western Zaporizhia Oblast to repair the remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid Russian preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced on October 18 that Ukrainian and Russian forces agreed to a local ceasefire to repair damaged powerlines to the ZNPP after a four-week outage, the longest the ZNPP has ever endured.[xviii] The details of the ceasefire, including its locality and duration, are unclear. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported on October 18 that Ukrainian engineers are restoring power lines to the ZNPP.[xix] The ZNPP occupation administration claimed on October 18 that it began repairs on the Dniprovska power line, the last functioning power line for the ZNPP.[xx] Russia has long been setting conditions to transfer the ZNPP from the Ukrainian power grid to the Russian power grid to bolster Russia's claim over the ZNPP, and Russia likely used the month delay in restoring the Ukrainian power line to the ZNPP to undertake measures in support of connecting the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[xxi] A Russian social media commentator claimed on October 18 that Russian authorities continue to delay preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid and that Russian shelling cuts off power to the ZNPP, which depends on the Dniprovska power line running through Ukrainian-controlled territory.[xxii] The commentator claimed that Russian authorities are currently working to connect the ZNPP to Russia's newly constructed 201-kilometer power line that will complete the full integration of the occupied ZNPP to Russia's power grid, but noted that this will reportedly take several weeks. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s eventual integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid will pose significant risks to nuclear security at the plant and allow Russia to seize Ukrainian energy generation assets for its own benefit.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia's war demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump's October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s October 2025 strikes against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea appear to have significantly degraded the terminal, and it is unclear when or if Russia will be able to repair it.
• Russian state media reported that the majority of Russian drivers expect further increases in gasoline prices as Ukraine continues its long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure.
• Ukraine and Russia agreed to a localized ceasefire in western Zaporizhia Oblast to repair the remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid Russian preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.
• Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ulyanovsk Oblast Control Center claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a power station in Veshkaima, Ulyanovsk Oblast, overnight on October 17 to 18.[xxiv] Geolocated footage published on October 18 shows an explosion at the Veshkaima substation following sounds of a drone engine overhead.[xxv] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, insinuated that Ukrainian forces struck the Veshkaima substation.[xxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, on October 17 and 18.[xxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka.[xxviii]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), complicating reported Russian plans to attack toward Ryzhivka.[xxix] A milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone strikes up to 40 kilometers from the frontline.[xxx]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military continues to falsely claim to have seized all of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) but that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in southern Yunakivka.[xxxi] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is making battleplans based on these exaggerated reports and declared control over the settlement at least three times since July 2025. The milblogger claimed that the military command is withdrawing elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from Yunakivka and replacing them with elements of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) to defend Yunakivka and is preparing for further offensive operations in the area.[xxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian military vehicles operating along a forested road near Ivolzhanske (northeast of Sumy City) with Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones.[xxxiii] Drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xxxiv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 18 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City), as of October 1.[xxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on October 17 and 18.[xxxvi]

Zolochiv Military Administration Head Viktor Kovalenko stated on October 18 that Russian forces struck a civilian car driving along the road between Postolne and Baranivka (northwest of Kharkiv City) with a fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone, killing one civilian and injuring three.[xxxvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and on the northwestern outskirts of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xxxviii]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka and Bolohivka on October 18.[xxxix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 shows elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) holding a Russian flag in southwestern Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[xl]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Kupyansk.[xli] A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces seized Kupyansk.[xlii]

Russian forces attacked near and in Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Doroshivka and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on October 17 and 18.[xliii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Sobolivka-Myrove-Radkivka line (west to north of Kupyansk).[xliv]

A Russian milblogger posted footage of Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk).[xlv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 17 and 18 but did not advance.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Korovii Yar, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 17 and 18.[xlvii]

The Slovyansk Military Administration reported on October 18 that Russian forces have struck Slovyansk over 150 times between July 2025 and October 15, primarily with Geran-2 strike drones, marking a significant increase.[xlviii] The Slovyansk Military Administration reported that Russian forces struck Slovyansk 160 times from January 1 to June 31.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Kuzmynivka (south of Siversk) and Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[xlix]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on October 17 and 18.[l]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on October 17 that Russian forces are attacking exclusively on foot in small infantry groups with drone and artillery support instead of attacking on motorcycles.[li] The Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces have now adapted tactics to isolate Ukrainian defensive positions by interdicting their logistics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Siversk.[lii] Elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating on the southern flank of the Siversk direction.[liii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 18 that Russian forces seized Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[liv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 17 and 18.[lv]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces have yet to establish full control over Stupochky or Predtechyne (both east of Kostyantynivka), refuting claims of Russian seizure as of May 24 and July 4, respectively.[lvi] The milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces are crossing the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal toward Markove and Novomarkove (north and northeast of Kostyantynivka) and that small assault groups are bypassing Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) and heading toward Kostyantynivka through forested areas near the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway.

The Ukrainian National Police reported on October 18 that a Russian drone struck a civilian vehicle near Pryvillya (north of Kostyantynivka) on the E-40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway, injuring three civilians.[lvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[lviii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian communication equipment Andriivka, Novoandriivka, Raiske, and Rusyn Yar (all west to south of Druzhkivka).[lix] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces with Lancet loitering munitions near Kostyantynivka.[lx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 17 and 18.[lxi]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[lxii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces advanced to Prokofieva Street in central Pokrovsk and to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in Sobachivka Microraion (southeastern Pokrovsk).[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Balahan, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka, Leontovychi, and Troyanda; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 17 and 18.[lxiv] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Durniak Microraion (southwestern Pokrovsk).[lxv]

Geolocated footage published on October 18 shows Ukrainian forces attacking Russian positions south of Leontovychi in what ISW assesses was likely an infiltration mission.[lxvi] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 18 that Russian forces maintain a quantitative manpower superiority south of Pokrovsk but lack full control of the area as Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack.[lxvii] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps noted that Ukrainian forces detect and destroy Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units attempting to infiltrate Pokrovsk and that Russian forces attempted to infiltrate Novopavlivka on October 16 by leveraging poor weather conditions. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Ukrainian forces successfully conducted counter-drone measures a few weeks prior to prevent Russian strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOC) in the corps' area of responsibility (AoR), resulting in Russian forces significantly increasing their use of KAB glide bombs against Ukrainian logistics. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Russian forces launched 121 airstrikes since the start of October 2025.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk and spot for airstrikes with FAB glide bombs.[lxviii] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxix] Drone operators and infantry of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk and operate near Pervomaika Microraion (southwestern Pokrovsk), respectively.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 17 and 18.[lxxi]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northern Pryvillya (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka and Verbove and toward Vovche on October 17 and 18.[lxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sosnivka and Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxiv]

Geolocated footage published on October 17 shows that Russian forces conducted a motorcycle assault in two groups of four personnel east of Pryvillya.[lxxv] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that the second Russian assault group pushed forward while Ukrainian forces focused on repelling on the first assault group.[lxxvi] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces killed all but one of the Russian personnel who participated in the assault.

Russian milbloggers published footage of elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) conducting glide bomb strikes against bridges over the Vovcha River on Tsentralna Street in Pokrovske and the C041411 road between Dobropasove and Kolomiitsi (all west of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 657th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (29th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian logistics in Orestopil.[lxxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced and continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 18, but did not advance.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Pryvillya (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces likely recently completed the seizures of Obratne and Novoivanivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxix]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Hulyaipole near Novomykolaivka and Novohryhorivka and east of Hulyaipole near Vesele and Malynivka on October 17 and 18.[lxxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Stepove on October 17 and 18.[lxxxi]

A Russian servicemember operating in Zaporizhia Oblast told Russian opposition outlet Verstka in an article published on October 17 that some elements of the Russian military – presumably those in deprioritized sectors of the front such as Zaporizhia Oblast – experience drone shortages.[lxxxii] The Russian servicemember claimed that some Russian units steal drones or components, including blades or engines, from other units due to these shortages.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxiii] Drone operators of the 65th Airborne (VDV) Battalion (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prymorske.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on October 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky roadway bridge on October 17 and 18.[lxxxv]

The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian car near Bilozerka (west of Kherson City), injuring one civilian.[lxxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 164 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, including at least 100 Shahed drones, from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Oryol cities; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[lxxxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 136 Russian drones and that 27 drones hit 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged an energy infrastructure facility in Koryukivskyi Raion, Chernihiv Oblast, causing power outages for over 12,000 energy consumers, and another energy infrastructure object that caused power outages in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[lxxxviii] Ukrainian officials reported emergency power outages in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava oblasts following the energy infrastructure strikes.[lxxxix] Officials reported that Russian strikes also struck residential buildings in Cherkasy Oblast and Kharkiv City, and a warehouse in Poltava Oblast.[xc]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.