Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6, 2025

October 6, 2025, 9:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on October 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia appears to be accelerating the informational and psychological condition setting phase — "Phase 0" — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on October 6 that the United Kingdom (UK) is planning for a group of pro-Ukrainian Russians fighting for Ukraine to conduct an attack on a Ukrainian Navy ship or a foreign civilian vessel in a European port.[1] The SVR claimed that the saboteurs will claim they were acting on orders from Moscow and that the UK plans to equip the group with Chinese-made underwater equipment in order to blame the People's Republic of China (PRC) for supporting Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The SVR's October 6 claim follows similar SVR false flag claims targeting European states, such as Poland, Moldova, and Serbia, and the SVR has been issuing such statements more frequently in recent weeks that constitute a new concerted pattern of activity.[2]

Russia appears to be conducting concerted preparations as part of the physical and psychological condition-setting phase for war contingencies. Russia has been engaged in a variety of overt and covert attacks against NATO states, such as sabotage missions, electronic warfare (EW) interference, GPS jamming, and arson, in recent years.[3] Russia has dramatically increased these attacks on NATO states in recent weeks since Fall 2025 — most notably with the drone incursions into NATO airspace.[4] This pattern of organized activity suggests that Russia has entered the first phase of preparations — "Phase 0” — to move to a higher level of war than the one Russia is currently engaged in, such as a future NATO-Russia war. ISW is not assessing at this time whether the Kremlin has decided to engage in such a higher level of war or on what timeline the Kremlin may expect to do so. Russia has been undertaking longer-term plans that ISW assesses may be part of preparation for a NATO-Russia war in the future, such as the restructuring of Russia's military districts on its western border and the buildup of military bases on the border with Finland.[5] ISW has not observed indicators that Russia is actively preparing for an imminent conflict with NATO at this time.

Russia's overt and covert attacks and false flag claims serve multiple purposes for Moscow both internationally and at home. Russia aims to create fear throughout the European population and fragment NATO’s resolve. The wide range in the type and location of the attacks and false flag claims aims to foster a sense that the threat of violence is pervasive throughout all of Europe. Russia aims to use fear in Europe to gain concessions in its war against Ukraine and a possible future NATO-Russia war. Russia is trying to push Europeans to decrease their support of Ukraine out of fear that continued support will increase Russia's overt or covert attacks. Russia is also trying to push Europe to decrease or cease its ongoing efforts to shore up its defenses out of fear that these efforts will provoke Russian attacks. These efforts are part of Russia's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push Russia's opponents to make policy decisions that actually benefit Russia. The Kremlin's use of the SVR’s repeated false flag claims aims to affect the Russian population's views of the West, framing Western actors — not Russia — as responsible for attacks or threat of attacks. The Kremlin is setting conditions to justify and rally public support for any possible future Russian aggression against NATO.

European officials continue to report drone sightings in European airspace. Norwegian officials reported a possible sighting of unidentified drones over the Gardermoen International Airport in Oslo, Norway, on the night of October 5 to 6.[6] The Norwegian Eastern Police District reported that a pilot and other unspecified actors spotted between three and five drones.[7] Airport authorities delayed several plane landings and temporarily closed the airport after the sightings.[8] Norwegian law enforcement has not yet confirmed the possible sighting and has not attributed the event to any specific actor.[9]

German officials attributed recent drone flights over the Munich Airport to Russia. German Chancellor Friederich Merz stated on October 5 that he "assumes" that Russia was behind "most" of the drone flights that forced German authorities to close the Munich Airport on the nights of October 2 to 3 and October 3 to 4.[10] Merz stated that the likely Russian drone incursions were conducting espionage and reconnaissance and aimed to spread fear among the German population.[11] Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder stated that Russia meant for the drones over the Munich Airport to make Germans nervous or to scare the population.[12] Neither Merz nor Söder have attributed the drone sighting over Frankfurt Airport on October 2 to Russia so far.

The Kremlin continues to deny responsibility for recent drone incursions into NATO airspace. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used his English-language Telegram account on October 6 to deflect blame away from Russia for recent drone incursions in European airspace, including by claiming that the drones could have been a Ukrainian provocation.[13] Medvedev claimed that the reason for the incursions "is not the point." Medvedev threateningly claimed, rather, that the point is for Europeans to “get a taste of what the danger of war really means” and to feel their “imminent and excruciating end closing in.” Medvedev claimed that French President Emmanuel Macron and Merz are “scoring political points on blood” and that Europeans might "rip the heads off" of Macron and Merz if Europeans were to “understand what war means.”[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 6 that statements from European Union (EU) leaders about Russian involvement in the recent drone overflights are “sweeping and unfounded” and called on European leaders to “broaden their horizons” rather than attributing all drone sightings to Russia.[15] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko implied on October 6 that Europeans are behind the latest drone incursions, claiming that drones in EU airspace aim to increase European “military psychosis" and force European parliaments to increase military spending.[16] Medvedev's, Peskov's, and Grushko's claims are part of the Kremlin's wider effort to deny and downplay the threat that Russia poses to Europe in order to dissuade European states from continuing their efforts to bolster their own defenses. ISW continues to assess that Russia is pursuing a multipronged informational effort to deter the West from defending against hostile Russian actions and to set conditions for a potential future conflict with NATO.[17]

Russian forces conducted a fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone strike for the first time against Kramatorsk on October 5 — furthering Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics within and near the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast. Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko reported on October 5 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk with a fiber-optic FPV drone for the first time, damaging a car.[18] Geolocated footage of the strike indicates that the location of the strike was about 20 to 22 kilometers from Russia's closest frontline positions on the Chasiv Yar-Zaliznyanske line (southeast of Kramatorsk) and a few blocks from the H20 Slovyansk-Kostyantynivka highway that runs through the entirety of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[19] Russian forces are now able to conduct FPV strikes against all the cities of the fortress belt — Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka.[20] Russian strikes against logistics hubs and major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the fortress belt are part of Russia's efforts to adapt its drone technologies and tactics to generate effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[21] Russian forces are expanding their employment of fiber optic drones, including by equipping relatively cheap Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones with fiber optic cables to make the Molniyas immune to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).[22] Russia is also reportedly producing over 50,000 fiber optic drones per month.[23] Successful Russian efforts to scale up their fiber optic FPV strikes against fortress belt cities and nearby GLOCs would significantly hamper Ukrainian logistics in Donetsk Oblast. The recent strike against Kramatorsk indicates that Russian forces are attempting to disrupt Ukrainian logistics not only on the southern flank of the fortress belt near Kostyantynivka, where Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations, but also from the north.[24]

Ukraine continues to conduct long-range drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod on the night of October 5 to 6.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Sverdlov Plant is one of Russia's largest explosives manufacturers and produces ammunition for aviation and artillery shells, aerial bombs, anti-tank guided missiles warheads, ammunition for Russian engineering forces, and warheads for air defense missiles.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported and geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Naval Oil Terminal in occupied Fedosia, Crimea, which transports oil and oil products from railway cars to sea vessels and road transport vehicles, and supplies Russian forces in Ukraine.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike caused a fire at the facility. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Major Robert Brovdi reported that USF elements conducted the drone strike against the oil terminal and that the facility is the largest transshipment for oil products in occupied Crimea with a tank capacity of 250,000 cubic meters.[27] Brovdi noted that Russian forces use the terminal to supply fuel to Russian forces in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts by rail. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ayvazivska railway station in Feodosia.[28] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight, causing a fire in a security room and injuring two.[29] Footage published on October 5 reportedly shows explosions near the Tuapse refinery.[30] Krasnodar Krai authorities claimed that downed drone debris fell on the Tuapse Oil Refinery.[31]

Reuters reported on October 6 that Ukraine's October 3 to 4 overnight strike against the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, shut down its CDU-6 oil refining unit, which has a capacity of 160,000 barrels per day and accounts for 40 percent of the plant's total refining capacity.[32] Sources told Reuters that repairs will last one month and that the refinery will operate at 70 percent capacity during repairs. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian refineries is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages, and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[33]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 5 to 6, striking a maternity hospital. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 116 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[34] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense downed 83 drones and that 30 drones struck seven locations. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that Russian drones targeted a maternity hospital in Sumy Oblast with 11 children, 35 patients, and 120 employees inside, causing a fire.[35] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted energy and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia is prioritizing strikes against civilians and energy infrastructure to continue its long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2025–2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[37]

The Ukrainian military continues to transition to a corps structure. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on October 6 that it is disbanding the Dnipro Group of Forces (GoF), which was responsible for operations from Kharkiv Oblast through Zaporizhzhia City, as part of its transition to the corps structure.[38] Ukrainian forces formally began implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian military into a corps structure in February 2025.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Dnipro GoF was a temporary structure and that the corps structure eliminates the need for operational-strategic groups. Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on October 6 that Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, who headed the Dnipro GoF, will retain his post as the commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces Command and move to the northeastern direction of the frontline, reducing his area of responsibility (AoR) by roughly half.[40] Ukraine's efforts to form an echelon between brigades and operational groups of forces and to strengthen the army corps staff structure will likely improve Ukrainian command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations, assuming Ukraine can effectively develop the corps-level professional staff.[41]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia appears to be accelerating the informational and psychological condition setting phase — "Phase 0" — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.
• European officials continue to report drone sightings in European airspace.
• German officials attributed recent drone flights over the Munich Airport to Russia.
• The Kremlin continues to deny responsibility for recent drone incursions into NATO airspace.
• Russian forces conducted a fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone strike for the first time against Kramatorsk on October 5 — furthering Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics within and near the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.
• Ukraine continues to conduct long-range drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 5 to 6, striking a maternity hospital.
• The Ukrainian military continues to transition to a corps structure.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[43]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka and toward Katerynivka, north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on October 5 and 6.[44] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka and Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[45]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 6 that the Russian military command is reinforcing elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) with elements of the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) for future attacks on Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino).[46] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade previously assisted elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) near Oleksiivka but were mostly conducting aerial reconnaissance. The milblogger claimed that unspecified airborne (VDV) elements are building new bridge crossings in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast as the Russian military command continues to accumulate forces in the area. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes interdicted fuel deliveries to elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment along the 38K-006 Korenovo-Vnezapnoye road (southeast of Glushkovo).

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within western and southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[47]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Vovchanski Khutory on October 5 and 6.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur Volunteer Battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 6 shows Russian servicemembers raising a Russian flag in northern Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[50]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on October 6 that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC) seized Odradne.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division) also participated in the alleged seizure of Odradne.[52] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Odradne and along the Milove-Khatnie line (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[53]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on October 5 and 6.[54]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against bridges over the Verkhnya Dvorichna River west of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and between Hryhorivka and Obukhivka (both east of Velykyi Burluk).[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Pischchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk and toward Bolohivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[57]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Stroivka, and Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne and Bolohivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on October 5 and 6. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Kindrashivka.[58]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces have not conducted mechanized or large-group infantry assaults for a long time.[59] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces now attack Ukrainian positions in small infantry groups from multiple directions simultaneously in an attempt to distract Ukrainian reconnaissance and take advantage of the diversion to enter Ukrainian positions. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on October 5 that Russian forces struck civilian vehicles in Kupyansk with a Molniya drone and with a first-person view (FPV) drone near Kolozyazne.[60]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting strikes on Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Osynove (south of Kupyansk).[61] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions near Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and four FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova toward Cherneshchynya on October 5 and 6.[62]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Lyman direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or advanced northeast of Stavky (north of Lyman) — areas which Russian sources previously claimed to be under Russian control.[63]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Karpivka (north of Lyman) and advanced west of Shandryholove, northwest of Novoselivka (both northwest of Lyman), and in northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[64]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Derylove, Novoselivka, Shandryholove, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Stavky, Karpivka, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 5 and 6.[65]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on October 6 that Russian forces recently conducted an assault with a tank while motorcycles nearby carried electronic warfare (EW) devices set to different frequencies.[66] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are constantly innovating on the battlefield to make mechanized assaults viable again. Another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on October 6 that Russian forces are accumulating personnel in the Lyman direction.[67] The brigade reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather that limits Ukrainian drone operations to conduct ground operations.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[68]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kuzmynivka (south of Siversk).[69]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and south of Kuzmynivka and northeast of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[70]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Zvanivka and Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on October 5 and 6.[71]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are gradually cutting off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) on the eastern and southern flanks of Siversk.[72]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Vyimka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-250 glide bomb [73]against Ukrainian forces near Siversk.[74]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in northern Fedorivka.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Kleban-Byk and Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 5 and 6.[77]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces are accumulating forces from the 8th CAA (SMD), including unspecified naval infantry units attached to the 8th CAA, near Poltavka and south of Rusyn Yar.[78] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka) direction reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small groups of two to three on foot, motorcycles, bicycles, and electronic scooters.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[80]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[81]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Mashovets reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces seized Vilne (east of Dobropillya).[82] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Vesele and Hruzke (both northeast of Dobropillya) and maintain positions near Zapovidne and Pankivka (both southeast of Dobropillya).[83]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Pankivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[84] A Ukrainian drone unit posted the footage on October 5 and reported that Russian forces attempted to take advantage of poor weather conditions to conduct an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault toward Kostyantynivka.[85] The Ukrainian drone unit reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank, two armored personnel carriers, and one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and struck three tanks, one amphibious IFV, and five armored fighting vehicles. Mashovets reported that Russian forces seized Nove Shakhove and Dorozhnie (both southeast of Dobropillya) and maintain positions within Ivanivka.[86]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Zatyshok on October 5 and 6.[87]

Mashovets stated that Russian forces re-entered Zolotyi Kolodyaz and that a small Russian infantry group infiltrated Ukrainian defenses north of the settlement.[88] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also infiltrated Ukrainian defenses northeast of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya). Mashovets stated that Russian forces are accumulating infantry near Dorozhnie to attack toward Bilytske (southwest of Dorozhnie)[89]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are attached to the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) and attacked toward Bilytske.[90] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st, 114th, and 132nd brigades unsuccessfully attacked toward Vilne a few days ago and had to retreat back to Nove Shakhove. FPV drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[91] FPV drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Shakhove.[92]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported that likely elements of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD), 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[93] Mashovets reported that elements of the 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA), likely with support from the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC), seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern, western, and southern Pokrovsk.[94]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, Razine, and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Zvirove on October 5 and 6.[95]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are intensely shelling Pokrovsk, attacking in small infantry groups of two to three servicemembers, and using fiber optic drones in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR).[96] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using mothership drones to carry and extend the range of FPV drones to strike deeper into the Ukrainian near rear and are attempting to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are trying to create a numerical advantage and force Ukrainian forces to retreat. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are trying to attack using civilian vehicles, motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and electronic scooters but do not use armored vehicles. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces for the first time destroyed a Russian Kuryer unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) equipped with an AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher.[97]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) are attacking toward Rodynske and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and that likely elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are attacking the railway on the western outskirts of Pokrovsk.[98]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on October 5 and 6.[99]             

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced north of Stepove (south of Velykomykhailivka), an area which Russian sources previously claimed to be under Russian control.[100]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Stepove and toward Vyshneve (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[101]

Russian forces attacked toward Velykomykhailivka itself; north of Velykomykhailivka toward Havrylivka; northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Novoselivka, Sichneve, and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Berezove, Vorone, Ternove, Novomykolaivka, Komyshuvakha, and Maliivka; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Kalynivske on October 5 and 6.[102] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sosnivka and Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[103]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[104] Drone operators of the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion; 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade; 19th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Regiment (all three of the 29th CAA, EMD), and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces north of Stepove.[105] Elements of the 14th Engineer Brigade (EMD) are remotely mining areas north of Stepove.[106] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka) with glide bombs.[107] Artillery elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleksiivka.[108]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Novohryhorivka (northeast of Hulyaipole), within central Novohryhorivka, north of Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole), and within central Poltavka.[109]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Novoivanivka, and Poltavka and toward Uspenivka on October 5 and 6.[110]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Nove (northeast of Hulyaipole).[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Zaporizhia direction on October 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Plavni and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 5 and 6.[112]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on October 6 that Russian forces are attacking near Stepove on motorcycles and trying to use infiltration tactics to penetrate Ukrainian defenses near Prymorske, Plavni, and Kamyanske in small groups and accumulate in the Ukrainian near rear.[113] Voloshyn reported that Russian commanders have ordered their soldiers to use scorched earth tactics to destroy buildings in frontline settlements, including Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv), and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), to prepare for more active offensive operations and deny Ukrainian forces cover and concealment from Russian drone and artillery strikes.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on October 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on October 5 and 6.[114]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces will attempt to eliminate Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northwestern Kherson City by intensifying multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and air strikes.[115]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[116] Drone operators of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[117]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in occupied Crimea belonging to a separate material support battalion of the 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]).[118]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports on Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.