Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2025

October 14, 2025, 6:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on October 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces have conducted three company- and battalion-sized mechanized assaults in priority areas of Donetsk Oblast over the last two weeks, marking an inflection in recent Russian armor usage in Ukraine. Russian forces largely stopped conducting reinforced company-sized mechanized assaults in late 2024 and have only conducted a handful of battalion-sized mechanized assaults during 2025. Russian forces, before October 2025, most recently conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast in April 2025.[1] Russian forces have largely favored leveraging small groups of infantry to conduct infiltration missions and make slow advances throughout the frontline over conducting mechanized assaults during the first nine months of 2025.[2] Russian forces are still leveraging infantry to advance but have conducted several comparatively larger mechanized assaults in their priority Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas of Donetsk Oblast in recent weeks.

Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) around October 6, during which Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed four tanks and eight armored vehicles.[3] Russian forces conducted a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault south of Shakhove and Volodymyrivka (both immediately northeast of Pankivka) on October 9.[4] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces used 35 tanks and armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles during the assault and that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed three tanks, 16 armored vehicles, and 41 motorcycles during the assault. Ukraine's 1st Azov Army Corps [AC] reported on October 13 that Russian forces conducted another reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and that Russian forces attacked with 16 tanks and armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles.[5] Ukraine's 1st Azov AC reported that Russian forces were again attempting to seize Shakhove, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 armored vehicles, three tanks, and three motorcycles involved in the attack. Ukraine's 1st Azov AC reported that Russian mechanized assault tactics remain the same and that Russian forces are using motorcycles and armored vehicles to transport infantry to frontline positions. Ukraine's 1st Azov AC reported that Russian forces are using electronic warfare (EW) systems to suppress Ukrainian drones during mechanized assaults and that Russian infantry attack Ukrainian positions after dismounting from the armored vehicles. A Ukrainian officer stated on October 13 that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are participating in mechanized assaults in the area.[6]

Russian forces appear to be conducting larger mechanized assaults during rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations. The Ventusky weather radar recorded moderate to slightly heavy rainfall during the morning of October 9 and light rainfall on the morning of October 13 at the respective locations of the Russian mechanized assaults.[7] Another weather monitoring service indicated that the Dobropillya area had several hours of cloudy conditions and fog on the morning of October 6.[8] Several Ukrainian military sources throughout Fall 2025 have discussed how Russian forces have exploited rainy weather conditions that limit Ukraine’s drone operations.[9] An OSINT analyst on X (formerly known as Twitter) reported that Russian forces have also taken advantage of a period of limited Ukrainian drone activity caused by windy weather to create a “bridge“ through a river in the Lyman direction, indicating that Russian forces are attempting to seize on poor weather conditions to set up logistics as well as make advances in several frontline areas. The analyst noted that Russian forces moved five tanks, one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and self-propelled artillery over the bridge while Ukrainian drones were not able to operate. The lingering dampness and poor conditions that immediately follow rainfall likely degraded Ukrainian drone capabilities for several hours.

Russian forces may also be reverting back to conducting mechanized assaults in areas where Russian infantry are struggling to advance. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on October 13 that the Russian units operating in the Dobropillya salient, particularly elements of the 51st CAA, have recently struggled to seize Shakhove after advancing near the settlement.[10] Elements of the 51st CAA, including the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, conducted many of the mechanized assaults that Russian forces leveraged to advance west of Donetsk City in Summer and Fall 2025.[11] These units may be reverting back to conducting mechanized assaults in the face of more challenging Ukrainian defensive positions near Shakhove, or potentially after Russian forces assess that Ukrainian defenses are attritted following weeks of Russian infantry assaults.

Kremlin officials continue to apply the same narratives that Russia has used to justify its invasions of former Soviet states in the past three decades to the Baltic states. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed on October 14 that Latvian authorities are "persecuting" Russian speakers in Latvia and that Russia must protect its "compatriots" in the Baltic states.[12] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky also claimed that Russians in Latvia are part of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir). The Kremlin's Russian World framework is an intentionally vague ideological idea that Russian President Vladimir Putin has defined as including any former territory of the Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation, as well as any people who feel kinship or belonging with Russia.[13] Russia has long claimed that Russia has a duty to protect its "compatriots abroad" and used this narrative to justify its invasions of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.[14] Kremlin narratives about Russia's "compatriots" in the Baltics and the wider Russian World are part of the Kremlin's years-long efforts to set conditions to justify possible Russian aggression against NATO in the future.[15]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise or engage in good-faith peace negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 14 that Russia is ready for a peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine but is continuing the war due to “lack of alternatives.”[16] Peskov claimed that Russia will ensure its interests in “one way or another” and achieve its war goals. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined its war aims as Ukrainian demilitarization, government change in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukrainian commitments barring Ukraine from joining NATO and other international alliances.[17] Peskov’s statements are in line with boilerplate Kremlin rhetoric throughout the war and negotiations process that Russia will achieve these war aims either militarily or diplomatically.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have conducted three company- and battalion-sized mechanized assaults in priority areas of Donetsk Oblast over the last two weeks, marking an inflection in recent Russian armor usage in Ukraine.
• Russian forces appear to be conducting larger mechanized assaults during rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations.
• Kremlin officials continue to apply the same narratives that Russia has used to justify its invasions of former Soviet states in the past three decades to the Baltic states.
• The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise or engage in good-faith peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[19]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Varachyne and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 13 and [20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Varachyne (both north of Sumy City)[21]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 14 that Russian forces conducted a Geran drone strike on a Ukrainian deployment point near Popivka, Chernihiv Oblast.[22] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 14 that the Russian military command are redeploying elements of the Russian 1st Specialized Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] to reinforce the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City).[23] The milblogger also claimed that elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are regrouping near Kindrativka. The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military command transferred elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) to reinforce the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) near Yunakivka.[24]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian military infrastructure, equipment, and positions in Bilopillya (northwest of Sumy City), Khotyn, and Pysarivka (both north of Sumy City).[25] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction, including in Oleksiivka.[26] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly operating in the Oleksiivka direction.[27] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[28]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[29]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on October 13 and 14.[30]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Guards reportedly struck a bridge in Udy (northwest of Kharkiv City).[31] Drone operators of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the Milove-Khatnie line (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[33]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Bolohivka on October 13 and 14.[34]

An open-source analyst on X (formerly Twitter) reported on October 14 that the Russian military command has redeployed elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD); 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], LMD); 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division); 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC); 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD); and 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) from northern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velykyi Burluk direction since the start of July 2025.[35] ISW last observed reports of elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction in late July 2025 and reports of elements of the 7th and 79th motorized rifle regiments operating in the area on October 7.[36] ISW last observed reports of elements of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in Kharkiv Oblast – possibly referring to either northern Kharkiv Oblast or the Velykyi Burluk direction – as of October 9.[37] ISW observed claims on October 13 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment from Russian border areas to northern Sumy Oblast, suggesting that the regiment may be split between northern Sumy Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) and FSB Border Guards reportedly struck a bridge in Ambarne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[39] Elements of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bolohivka.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on October 13 and 14.[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Olhivka, Andriivka, and Hrekivka on October 13 and 14.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Drobysheve, Derylove, Novoselivka, Karpivka, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 13 and 14.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that the area northeast of Yampil is a contested ”gray zone.”[45]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are deploying forces, including Spetznaz forces that signed military service contracts in September 2025, who lack training and that Russian forces are not using armored vehicles in the area.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[47]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on October 13 and 14.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that there is a five-kilometer-wide contested “gray zone” between Serebryanka, Dronivka, and Siversk.[49]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces are attacking chaotically in small infantry groups or as individuals.[] Zaporozhets noted that Russian activity has decreased in October 2025 and that Russian forces are attacking 11 times per day as compared to 21 times per day in September 2025, partially due to poor weather conditions.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions west of Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk).[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Oleksandro-Shultyne and northwest of Kleban-Byk (both south of Kostyantynivka).[51]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Oleksandro-Shultyne and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 13 and 14.[52]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka (west of Kostyantynivka).[53] Reconnaissance elements of the Shaman Crew of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Kalynove (south of Kostyantynivka).[54] Drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[55]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further into Shakhove than geolocated footage indicates.[57]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 14.[58]

See topline text for reports of Russian mechanized activity in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 14 that Russian forces seized Balahan and advanced north and west of the settlement, and advanced south of Kozatske, into eastern Myrnohrad (all east of Pokrovsk), and north of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[59]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, Mykhailivka, Myrolyubivka, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 13 and 14.[60]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 14 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in this direction, trying to capitalize on adverse weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone effectiveness, and that Russian forces suffered 18 to 20 percent higher losses over the past week (since October 7) compared to the previous week (September 20 to October 7).[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Filiya, and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske, Ivanivka, and Havrylivka on October 13 and 14.[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced north of the settlement and east of Vyshneve (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[64]

Russian forces attacked near Velykomykhailivka itself, east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad, southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone, and south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and Novomykolaivka on October 13 and 14.[65]

Geolocated footage published on October 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[66] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval stated on October 14 that Russian forces are operating in Ternove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) but that Russian forces do not control the settlement.[67] Shapoval stated that Russian attacks have intensified by 25 to 30 percent over the last 10 days (since October 4) compared to the prior 10-day period (September 24 to October 4). Shapoval stated that Russian forces intensified their activity in order to seize on rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novohryhorivka, into eastern Uspenivka, northwest of Okhotnyche (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[69]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Uspenivka, Novovasylivske, and Poltavka on October 13 and 14.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly bombing Ukrainian forces in Uspenivka.[71] Drone operators of the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet-era unit of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[72]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[73]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on October 13 and 14.[74]

The spokesperson for the Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported that Russian forces are exclusively operating in small assault groups in the Orikhiv direction.[75] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to accumulate forces to storm Ukrainian positions and infiltrate the outskirts of Mala Tokmachka but that Russian forces cannot advance since there are large areas of open fields near Mala Tokmachka with very few windbreaks, making it difficult for Russian forces to conceal their positions. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are using a large number of drones to strike Ukrainian logistics and civilians in the Orikhiv direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment near Shyroke (northeast of Orikhiv).[76] Drone operators and other elements of the 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[77] Elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on October 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near Antonivka on October 13 and 14.[79]

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha similarly reported on October 14 that Russian forces struck a United Nations (UN) humanitarian aid convoy near Bilozerka (west of Kherson City) that was delivering food and aid to local residents.[80] Prokudin added that Russian forces struck four vehicles clearly marked as “non-military equipment.”

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipro River Delta island zone.[81] Drone operators of the 31st Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in the Kherson direction.[82]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 96 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which about 60 were Shahed-type drones - from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 69 drones, that 27 drones hit seven locations, and that drone debris fell at one location. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces primarily targeted Ukraine's energy sector.[85] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drone strikes struck energy and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Sumy, and Donetsk oblasts.[86]

Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a hospital in Kharkiv City, injuring 57 people.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko positioned Belarus as ready to help in the peace process in Ukraine while repeating Kremlin narratives aimed at deterring the provision of US Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. Lukashenko claimed on October 14 that Belarus, as "Russia's closest ally," has a "definite" role to play in resolving the war in Ukraine.[88] Lukashenko claimed that Belarus is ready to participate in the peace process should the United States see "some small role" for Belarus. Lukashenko claimed that Belarus's position has always been one of peace and that Ukraine must exist as a sovereign, independent state. Lukashenko claimed that Belarus wants the war in Ukraine to stop now, "otherwise these independent, sovereign states will disappear." Lukashenko reiterated Kremlin narratives and saber-rattling about the risk that US provisions of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine allegedly pose as part of the Kremlin's wider efforts to deter such a US decision.[89] ISW assesses that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine and that Moscow is finalizing a decades-long strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus.[90] The West should continue to maintain strong sanctions against Belarus as long as Belarus continues heading towards becoming a de facto extension of the Russian economy and military machine.[91]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.