Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 11, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on October 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 The Russian defense industry is implementing long-term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long term military threat to NATO. Ukraine-based open source intelligence (OSINT) organization Frontelligence Insight published internal documents from Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), on October 11 that reveal that UVZ aims to increase T-90 production by 80 percent by 2028, compared to 2024 levels, and launch production of the new T-90M2 (Project 188MS) variant, also referred to as Ryvok-1 (Dash-1).[1] The documents, which ISW reviewed but cannot independently verify, indicate that UVZ aims to surge tank production beginning in 2027. The documents indicate that UVZ estimates a projected 2026 output of 10 T-90M2 tanks and intends to produce a peak of 428 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks in 2028. The documents indicate that UVZ intends to produce a total of 1,118 new and modernized T-90M and T-90M2 tanks between 2027 and 2029. Ukrainian officials previously assessed that UVZ can only produce roughly 60 to 70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions, and UVZ is likely producing between three and six T-90 tanks per month.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that UVZ produced 540 to 630 T-90M tanks since February 24, 2022 (an estimated average of 13 to 15 tanks per month).[3]

The Russian defense industry may have to increase its production capacity for tank production by integrating more automation and high-precision machine tools to achieve the planned T-90 production increase, as Russia continues to face labor shortages and mounting casualties in Ukraine.[4] UVZ notably launched a program to train computer numerical control (CNC) machine operators in March 2025, likely to expand UVZ’s production capacity.[5] Russia has consistently relied on its allies to obtain high precision machine tools through sanctions evasion; the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 1 that UVZ continues to produce tank engines with European-manufactured CNC machines that Russia obtains through sanctions evasion schemes.[6]

While the T-90 production targets as described in the leaked documents are aspirational figures that Russian industry may not meet, the plans nevertheless indicate that Russia seeks to rearm and is setting conditions to pose a significant long term military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) far beyond the end of the current war in Ukraine. Frontelligence assessed that UVZ's goals to modernize the Russian armored fleet with over 2,000 T-90M, T-90M2, and T-72B3M tanks between 2026 and 2036, in addition to the tanks and armored vehicles that Russia produced in 2024 and 2025, is sufficient to fully replenish Russia’s tank fleet for another large scale war.[7] Open-source tracking indicates that Russian tank losses have decreased through 2025, and a senior Finnish military official stated on April 27 that Russia is sending “almost none” of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for “later use.”[8] The planned production increase indicates that Russia plans for military contingencies beyond the current war in Ukraine on the backdrop of its current “Phase Zero” operations against Europe and that Moscow seeks to project power against NATO.[9]

Recent open-source data indicates that Russia is also increasing its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, possibly for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term or to reestablish its tank reserve to threaten NATO in the medium term.   A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery reported on October 8 that Russia's total tank reserve has dropped from 3,106 to 2,478 in the last three to four months (since June or July 2025) and that Russia's T-72A reserve specifically has dropped from 900 to 461.[10] The source noted that the Russian military appears to be drawing T-72A tanks from previously untouched storage bases in order to refurbish the tanks and that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) appears to be cannibalizing remaining T-64 tanks. The source suggested that Russia is likely in a refurbishment phase and will likely be able to utilize these refurbished tanks in Ukraine. The source estimated that Russia has roughly 141 T-54/55, 885 T-62, 611 T-64, 492 T-72A, 287 T-72B, 44 T-80B, 82 T-80U, and zero T-90 tanks left in its reserve.[11]

ISW continues to observe a notably reduced use of Russian tanks on the battlefield compared to Russia's intensified use of armored vehicles in late 2023 and 2024, suggesting that Russia may be stockpiling tanks and is likely aiming to build out and modernize its tank reserves for both short-term use in Ukraine and for the medium- to long-term in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO.[12] The Russian military may remain reticent to increase their use of armored vehicles on the battlefield again given that Ukrainian drones have been quite successful in damaging and destroying Russian armored vehicles and that the Russian DIB appears to be pivoting to a lengthier refurbishment phase.

 Russian forces are still using tanks to advance on the battlefield during infrequent mechanized assaults when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, indicating that the tank remains and will remain a relevant weapon on the battlefield under proper tactical conditions. Russian forces recently conducted a company-sized and reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Dobropillya areas in Donetsk Oblast after largely refraining from conducting larger mechanized assaults.[13] Russian forces appear to be conducting these assaults during rainy weather conditions, as rain and high winds impede Ukrainian drone operations.[14] Russian forces will likely continue to seize on bad weather as an opportunity to advance when Ukrainian forces cannot effectively fly drones. This dynamic underscores that Ukraine’s drone defenses depend on certain weather conditions and that drones alone are insufficient to defend against ground and armored forces. Russia's reported efforts to refurbish T-72A tanks indicate that Russia will likely have sufficient armored stocks to re-equip frontline units in priority areas and continue opportunistic mechanized assaults in the short term, although Russia may also stockpile newly refurbished or produced tanks for future use in Ukraine or against a NATO member state.

Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO on a timeline much sooner than 2036 and without necessarily reconstituting its tank fleet. Russia's ongoing sabotage and drone reconnaissance activities against military bases and critical infrastructure in Europe indicate that Russia has already entered “Phase Zero,” the informational and psychological condition setting phase, of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[15] Russia's long range strike capabilities and enhanced drone production capabilities represent an immediate threat to NATO.[16] Russia's force generation efforts and reported efforts to generate a strategic manpower reserve–which Russia could choose to employ in Ukraine or in a future land war against NATO–suggest that Russia can sustain and reconstitute its manpower despite continuously heavy losses from its ongoing war in Ukraine.[17] Russia will likely have significant combat power made available within months following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, which Russia likely can rapidly deploy to NATO’s eastern flank. Russia is developing concepts of operation and warfighting tactics that allow Russia to pursue large scale combat operations without using masses of tanks or armor, while effectively denying an adversary from using tanks or armor at scale. Russia is also learning how to achieve the effects of battlefield air interdiction in an adversary’s rear without establishing air superiority or air supremacy.[18] ISW has observed no indication that the Russian military command would need to wait until the Russian military reconstitutes to its full end strength before intensifying its attacks against NATO member states, and in fact, Russia may attack before that moment if NATO fails to establish deterrence. Russia is currently gaining significant experience in modern warfare within an ever changing theater characterized by an extremely short innovation cycle while tolerating a highly attritional, infantry-led war in Ukraine–the likes of which Europe has not engaged in since the 1940s. NATO and its allies must prepare to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats that Russia will likely pose immediately following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, but also into the future.

 European authorities continue to report increased unidentified drone sightings in European airspace near military facilities. Czech General Staff Spokesperson Zdeňka Košvancová reported on October 10 that the Czech military has detected an increasing number of incidents involving unidentified drones operating near Czech infrastructure, particularly military facilities, in recent weeks.[19] German outlet Der Spiegel reported on October 9 that the German military detected an unidentified drone that entered the security perimeter of a NATO air base in Geilenkirchen on the evening of October 8.[20] Der Spiegel, citing an internal memo, reported that the drone overflew the air base's runway at low altitude. Der Spiegel noted that the NATO air base houses airborne early warning and control (AWACS) surveillance aircraft that fulfill a critical role in monitoring NATO's eastern flank. Der Spiegel reported that German authorities have not yet attributed the incident to any specific actor. ISW assesses, however, that Russia has been increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered Phase Zero of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[21] The ongoing unattributed drone incursions across Europe are part of a recently intensified pattern and therefore are likely part of Russia's broader condition setting effort.

 Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal met with Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans on October 10 and provided additional details on the recent Ukrainian-Dutch memorandum of understanding (MOU).[22] The agreement includes the launch of joint production of deep strike drones, a 110 million euro ($128 million) investment in the Build with Ukraine initiative, and 200 million euros ($232 million) for Ukrainian air defense systems. Shmyhal reported on October 11 that Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) signed an agreement on joint production of artillery and letters of intent to strengthen the LYRA program, a battlefield technology partnership between the UK and Ukraine.[23] The LYRA program aims to improve Ukraine and the UK’s defense capabilities by combining defense-industrial and scientific potential.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian defense industry is implementing long-term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long term military threat to NATO.
• Recent open-source data indicates that Russia is also increasing its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, possibly for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term or to reestablish its tank reserve to threaten NATO in the medium term.
• Russian forces are still using tanks to advance on the battlefield during infrequent mechanized assaults when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, indicating that tanks remain and will remain a relevant weapon on the battlefield under proper tactical conditions.
• Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO on a timeline much sooner than 2036 and without necessarily reconstituting its tank fleet.
• European authorities continue to report increased unidentified drone sightings in European airspace near military facilities.
• Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.      

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on October 11 amid worsening gas shortages in Russia and occupied Crimea. Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that SBU Center “A” drone operators struck the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, one of Russia's largest fuel and lubricant suppliers, on the morning of October 11.[24] The oil refinery reportedly supplies fuel and lubricants to the Russian military, and Suspilne noted that this is the third strike against a refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan in the last month (since mid-September 2025). A Ukrainian OSINT analyst reported that the facility is roughly 1400 kilometers from the international border of Ukraine and assessed that geolocated imagery indicates that the facility's AVT-5 unit, a critical component of the oil refining process, is damaged. [25]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Varachyne, and Oleksiivka, on October 10 and 11.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[27]

A Russian milblogger allegedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on October 11 that the 1st and 2nd companies of the Russian 1st Specialized Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) reportedly relieved unspecified Russian paratrooper (VDV) units operating near Bezsalivka (northeast of Sumy City) in late July 2025.[28] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian units encircled elements of the regiment's 3rd company in Bezsalivka two months ago (mid-August 2025) and that Russian forces are still trapped in the settlement.   The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military command will rotate the regiment out of their frontline position by October 18 or 26, as the Russian military command has reportedly recently decided that Russian units will rotate every six months.[29]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 20th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kursk Oblast border area.[30]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Synelnykove, on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk, and near Tykhe (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[31]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vochanski Khutory on October 10 and 11.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and Pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv direction.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced along the Milove-Khatnie line (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[34]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Dovhenke and east of Velyki Burluk near Odradne on October 10 and 11.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

 Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka (both east of Kupyansk).[36]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Dvorichna and toward Kolodyazne and Bolohivka; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on October 10 and 11.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 11 but did not advance.

 Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka, northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on October 10 and 11.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Proryv (Breakthrough) Tank Battalion are reportedly operating in the Borova direction.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Zarichne (east of Lyman) and east of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[40]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Serednie, Derylove, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 10 and 11.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Kuzmynivka on October 10 and 11.[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Hryhorivka.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kostyantynivka toward Vyrolyubivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk and Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk, and Pleshchiivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 10 and 11.[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) during a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault.[45] Ukraine's 1st Azov National Guard Corps reported on October 10 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault comprised of 35 tanks and armored vehicles toward Shakhove from Ocheretyne (south of Kostyantynivka).[46] The army corps reported that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed three Russian tanks, 16 armored vehicles, and 41 motorcycles in the assault. The army corps reported that 20 Russian troops advanced into Volodymyrivka (south of Shakhove across the Kazenyi Torets River) because of the assault, but that Ukrainian forces have not observed Russian troops operating in Volodymyrivka as of the morning of October 11. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Kostyantynivka tactical area reported on October 9 that Ukraine repelled a Russian, reinforced company-sized mechanized assault toward Kostyantynivka on October 9, possibly referring to the mechanized assault near Shakhove.[47]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Zatyshok on October 10 and 11.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Toretske (east of Dobropillya), and drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya).[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk), in central Balahan (east of Pokrovsk), and in the northern outskirts of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and seized Kozatske (east of Pokrovsk).[51]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 10 and 11.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Maksim Krivonos Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 11 but did not make confirmed advances.  

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 10 that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka.[54]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, south of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on October 10 and 11.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the Novomykolaivka-Orikhove-Dachne line (southeast of Novopavlivka).[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Stepove (south of Velykomykhailivka) and east of Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Oleksiivka farther than geolocated data indicates.[58]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevstove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove, Stepove, and Berezove and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka on October 10 and 11.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[60]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

 Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on October 10 and 11 that Russian forces advanced north and south of Novohryhorivka, to the western outskirts of Okhotnyche, and within the southeastern outskirts of Poltavka (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[61]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Malynivka, Poltavka, Uspenivka, Novohryhorivka, Okhotnyche, and Novovasylivske on October 10 and 11.[62]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements and drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[63] Drone operators of the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet-era unit of the 35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, and Plavni; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 10 and 11.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve), and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance in the Orikhiv direction.[66] Elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[67]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on October 10 and 11, but did not advance.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[69]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 78 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including over 40 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 54 drones and that 21 drones struck six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential areas and civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts.[71]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 10 that Ukrainian utilities restored power to over 725,000 households on October 10 in Kyiv City and Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv oblasts, but that the situation in Sumy Oblast remains difficult.[72] Zelensky reported that continued Russian strikes are complicating electrical repairs in Kharkiv, Kherson, and Donetsk oblasts. Zelensky reported that Ukrainian utility workers also restored water supply to Kyiv Oblast and continue to work in Kirovohrad Oblast.

Novhorod-Siverskyi Raion Military Administration Head Oleksandr Seliverstov reported on October 11 that Russian forces struck civilian vehicles at the Chernihivoblenegro Oil Refinery near Zhadove, Chernihiv Oblast, injuring one and killing another.[73] The Bakhmach City Council in Chernihiv Oblast reported on October 11 that Russian forces then conducted a “double tap” drone strike against Ukrainian rescue workers responding to the Chernihivoblenegro oil refinery strike, injuring four first responders.[74] The Bakhmach City Council reported that one of the injured first responders later died. Russian forces use double tap strikes to spread fear among the Ukrainian populace, and these strikes very likely constitute a serious violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[75]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko ordered an evaluation of the Belarusian military's combat readiness. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 11 that Lukashenko ordered the Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich to conduct a combat readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces.[76]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.