Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 1 that the third round of US-Russian discussions to address "irritants" will "definitely take place before the end of autumn [2025]" but that Russia and the United States have not yet agreed on a specific date.[i] Ryabkov claimed that Russia is waiting for US President Donald Trump's response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent proposal to extend Russia's adherence to the New START Treaty, a bilateral nuclear arms limitations treaty that entered into force in 2011, for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[ii] Ryabkov further claimed that the United States must either "pursue stabilization" with Russia or engage in "a new arms race, which [Russia] opposes, even though [Russia is] guaranteed to ensure [its] own security."[iii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 1 that Russia cannot plan high-level contacts between Russia and Ukraine because Ukraine has stopped the negotiation process.[iv] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to normalizing bilateral relations with the United States for economic and political gain while protracting its war in Ukraine to make additional gains on the battlefield as the Kremlin obstructs peace efforts.[v] Russia is also attempting to discredit Ukraine by baselessly accusing the Ukrainian government of halting the negotiation process to distract from Russia's uncompromising demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation.[vi]

Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace. Norwegian public broadcaster NRK reported on October 1 that Norwegian authorities spotted an unidentified drone on September 30 near an airport in Bronnesund, prompting authorities to divert one scheduled flight and cancel remaining flights.[vii] NRK also reported that Norwegian police detained eight People's Republic of China (PRC) citizens following reports of an unidentified drone flight near the Svolvaer Airport, arrested one of the tourists, and seized drone equipment. The Norwegian police stated that there is no current apparent connection between a state actor and the Svolvaer Airport or other drone incidents. [viii] French authorities stopped the Russian Borocay shadow-fleet-linked tanker off the coast of the Saint-Nazaire port in western France on September 30 and seized the tanker and detained the captain and first mate on October 1.[ix] French President Emanuel Macron stated that the Borocay's crew committed ”very serious offenses.”[x] Maritime-focused news outlet Maritime Executive reported on September 23 that the Boracay was one of three Russian-linked vessels near the coordinated drone incursion that shut down the Copenhagen Airport on September 22.[xi] The Maritime Executive reported that European authorities are investigating three Russia-linked vessels that were sailing near the Copenhagen Airport when unidentified drone flights recently forced the airport to close.[xii] Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet reported that the Russian Ropucha-class landing ship Alexander Shabalin had been off the Danish coast for days during heavy drone flights at Danish airports and that Danish authorities are investigating the ship's role in the drone operations.[xiii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk similarly reported on September 28 and 29 that intelligence indicates that Russia is likely launching drones into NATO airspace from Russian shadow fleet tankers and is leveraging such vessels to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions in international waters.[xiv]

The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction. The commander of Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kherson direction reported on October 1 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division from near Chasiv Yar to the Kherson direction to replace elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) that redeployed from the Kherson direction to Donetsk Oblast at an unspecified date.[xv] Geolocated footage from a Russian source shows Russian forces, purportedly elements of the 98th VDV Division, striking a house in Prydniprovske, Kherson Oblast.[xvi] These are the first reports that ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating outside of the Chasiv Yar direction, where the division has operated nearly exclusively since April 2023.[xvii] ISW has observed reports that some elements of the 98th VDV Division remain active near Chasiv Yar as recently as October 1, 2025, indicating that this reported Russian redeployment is likely occurring slowly and that the division may be splitting its elements across various sectors of the front.[xviii] It is currently unclear whether the Russian military command would redeploy some or all of the 98th VDV Division from the Chasiv Yar area to the Kherson direction or other areas of the frontline.

The reason for the redeployment of the 98th VDV Division is unclear. The Russian military command may be redeploying the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction to allow it to rest and reconstitute away from active frontline ground operations. ISW has observed Russian redeployments from the Kherson and Sumy directions to the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast, including elements of its relatively elite VDV and naval infantry units, indicating that the primary Russian effort in Fall 2025 is more likely in Donetsk Oblast than in Kherson Oblast.[xix] The 98th VDV Division has been in active combat since April 2023, when it participated in the final seizure of Bakhmut and the Russian efforts to advance from Bakhmut toward and through Chasiv Yar, and this redeployment may indicate that elements of the 98th VDV Division are degraded or have limited combat capability after sustaining two and a half years of offensive operations. The redeployment of elements of the 98th VDV Division may alternatively indicate that the Russian military command intends to reprioritize offensive operations in the Kherson direction, however. This would be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces would have to ford and cross the Dnipro River into unoccupied Kherson Oblast under intense Ukrainian fires — an operation Russian forces have not attempted since Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022. Forces that have been in combat with as little rest as the 98th VDV Division would be ill-equipped for such an undertaking without significant rest. It is possible that the Russian military command intends to redeploy elements of the division slowly to prepare for a future offensive in the Kherson direction after the division has rested and reconstituted, allowing other Russian forces to fight in Russia's current priority efforts in Donetsk Oblast. ISW will continue to monitor for indications that the Russian command is redeploying elements of the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction or any other areas of the front.

Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian energy-focused outlet Seala told Russian state outlet RBK on September 30 that Russian oil refineries are temporarily facing a 38 percent decrease (roughly 338,000 tons per day) in their primary oil refining capacity as of September 28 due to Ukrainian drone strikes, which have struck more than two dozen major oil refineries in Russia since early August 2025.[xx] Seala estimated that Russia's total available capacity for gasoline and diesel fuel production fell by 6 percent in August 2025 and by another 18 percent in September 2025, reaching historic lows. Seala estimated that Ukrainian drone strikes caused approximately 70 percent of downtime in gasoline production as the strikes disabled approximately a quarter of Russia’s oil refining capacity (roughly 236,000 tons per day) by the end of September 2025, and that four more Russian refineries, including two of the top five largest Russian oil refineries, halted production after drone strikes. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the fuel crisis has impacted the Far East and occupied Crimea the hardest, where Russian authorities have banned sales of more than 30 liters of gasoline per customer since the beginning of the week (roughly September 28).[xxi] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on October 1 a limit of 20 liters of gasoline per customer in an effort to mitigate the gasoline shortage.[xxii] Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev noted that Russian oil companies have to wait months for repairs to damaged refineries, as Western sanctions have blocked the sale of equipment and replacement parts on which Russia relies and cannot easily replace with Chinese equivalents. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak outlined to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on September 24 several possible means of alleviating Russia’s desperation for gas, including a zero-rate five percent import customs duty on gasoline imported from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), South Korea, and Singapore through certain checkpoints in the Far East.[xxiii] Novak also reportedly proposed a rule that Russia will only authorize certain companies to supply fuel, which would allow Russia to export approximately 150,000 tons of gasoline from Siberian refineries westward per month to maintain supply balances in central Russia. Novak also reportedly proposed increasing gasoline imports from Belarus from 45,000 tons to 300,000 tons per month. RBK reported that Belarus began exporting gasoline to Russia in September 2025 after a pause that began in Fall 2024.[xxiv]

Russia’s problems with oil refinery capabilities will likely persist amidst more damage to Russian oil refineries. Russian authorities and sources reported on October 1 that there was a large fire at the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, located 700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[xxv] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev claimed on October 1 that the incident is unrelated to a drone attack, and neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources have attributed responsibility for the fire.[xxvi] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike overnight caused a fire at an industrial facility in Verkhnedonsky Raion, Rostov Oblast, and NASA FIRMS data indicates that there was a fire at the Sukhodolnaya Oil Pumping Station in Rostov Oblast.[xxvii]

The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid. Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported on September 30 that the ZNPP has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid since September 23 and is relying on backup diesel generators to maintain its reactor cooling systems.[xxviii] The Ukrainian officials stated that Russian shelling damaged the final operational Ukrainian power line to the ZNPP, and the IAEA stated that the damage occurred about 1.5 kilometers from the ZNPP itself. Damage to the ZNPP's power lines has disconnected the ZNPP from the Ukrainian power grid nine other times since the full-scale invasion prior to September 23, and the current power outage is the longest the ZNPP has ever endured.[xxix] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor in exile Dmytro Orlov stated that one of the diesel generators supporting the ZNPP has failed, as the diesel generators are not designed to operate for such a long period of time.[xxx] Orlov stated that continued Russian shelling of the area prevents Ukrainian authorities from repairing the power line.[xxxi] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that there is no immediate danger to the ZNPP, but that running on the diesel generators is not sustainable.[xxxii] Grossi stated that Ukraine has been ready to repair another power line to the ZNPP that has been disconnected since May 2025, but that the "military situation" has not allowed Ukraine to repair this power line. Russian officials denied the reports of Russian shelling and accused Ukrainian strikes of damaging the power line to the ZNPP.[xxxiii] Greenpeace Ukraine analyzed satellite imagery of damage to the power line since September 23 and assessed that there was no shelling of the power line, suggesting that Russian forces conducted sabotage operations against the power line.[xxxiv]

Russia has been setting conditions to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid for months. Russia has been constructing power lines into occupied southern Ukraine that could connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid, and Russian officials have announced their intention to bring the ZNPP to its full operational capacity under Russian control.[xxxv] Transferring the ZNPP to the Russian power grid requires that the ZNPP remain disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid. The ZNPP's six nuclear reactors have remained in a cold shutdown mode since April 2024 to mitigate the risk of nuclear disaster in wartime conditions, and restarting the ZNPP under conditions of occupation and war would very likely introduce significant risks.[xxxvi] Russia's occupation of the ZNPP has significantly degraded the security of the plant, and Russia's integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid will exacerbate security risks, degrade Ukraine's future power generation capacity, and serve as a tool that Russia can use to legitimize its occupation of Ukraine.[xxxvii]

The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets. The EC announced on October 1 that its Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan program issued Ukraine its ninth tranche of funds worth four billion euros (roughly $4.7 billion) secured by proceeds from frozen Russian revenues.[xxxviii] The EC noted that its overall support to Ukraine is now approaching 178 billion euros (roughly $209 billion). EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 30 that two billion euros (roughly $2.3 billion) of the earmarked funds are for drone production.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.
• Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace.
• The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction.
• Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
• The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid.
• The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on September 30 and October 1.[xl] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynivka, Varachyne, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka (all north of Sumy City).[xli] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are persistently infiltrating forested areas near Oleksiivka.[xlii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 2nd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[xliii] Drone operators of the 1st Prizrak (Ghost) Territorial Defense Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian positions near Yastrubyne (northwest of Sumy City).[xliv] Artillery elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly targeting Ukrainian quadcopters operating in the Sumy direction.[xlv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and in the Synelnykove forest area (west of Vovchansk).[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on September 30 and October 1.[xlvii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 1.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Piratov Moryaka (Pirates of the Sea) Detachment (7th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xlviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Kupyansk.[xlix]

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on September 30 and October 1.[l] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southern Kupyansk and near Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk) and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[li]

The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on October 1 that Russian forces are leveraging poor weather conditions to conduct assault operations in small groups of two to three servicemembers with drone and artillery support.[lii] The Ukrainian commander noted that Ukrainian reconnaissance identify and destroy these fireteam-sized Russian assault groups. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are constantly conducting infiltration operations with one or two soldiers into Kupyansk itself and that Russian forces only maintain positions on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk.[liii] The commander stated that Russian forces are using infiltration tactics to exploit gaps in Ukrainian defensive lines and noted that Russian forces continue to wear civilian clothes stolen from local houses, which aligns with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces regularly commit acts of perfidy as part of their infiltration missions - a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory.[liv] The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces operating in Kupyansk struggle with low motivation.

Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed two Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems in the Kupyansk direction on October 1.[lv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Zelenyi Hai and in eastern Boriivska-Andriivka (both northeast of Borova).[lvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and Boriivska-Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 30 and October 1.[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zarichne (east of Lyman), in northern Yampil, and north and east of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[lviii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Novoselivka, Shandryholove, Serednie, and Karpivka, and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and toward Novyi Myr and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and the Yampil forest area on September 30 and October 1.[lix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Yampil.[lx]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on October 1 that Russian forces are attempting to penetrate the Yampil forest area using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles daily, but that Ukrainian forces are successfully detecting Russian forces with aerial reconnaissance and first-person view (FPV) drones.[lxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on September 30 that Russian forces advanced in fields north of Siversk and northwest of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[lxii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, south of Siversk near Pereizne and toward Zvanivka, and southwest of Siversk toward Bondarne on September 30 and October 1.[lxiii]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction and that Russian forces are using armored vehicles and small groups of four to six soldiers on motorcycles.[lxiv] Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces are relying more on tube artillery while reducing mortar strikes due to Russian troop rotations. Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces decreased offensive operations in the Kramatorsk direction (southwest of Siversk) due to poor weather conditions and are accumulating forces in preparation for future assaults while maintaining a high volume of artillery strikes to disrupt Ukrainian troop movements. Unspecified Russian security forces claimed that Russian forces have interdicted Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around Siversk, significantly hampering Ukrainian forces' ability to resupply troops in the city.[lxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces established fire control over the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway and most roads north, east, and south of Siversk and are disrupting Ukrainian troop rotations.[lxvi] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces between Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), Pereizne, and Siversk.[lxvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating within Rudynk Microraion (in northern Siversk just east of Dronivka).[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing north of Poltavka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxix]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Bila Hora; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Dyliivka, Shcherbynivka, Toretsk, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Poltavka, Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 30 and October 1.[lxx] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have recently increased counterattacks near Kostyantynivka.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Volodymyrivka.[lxxii] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxiii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southern Pankivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized most of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya) and advanced in fields south of the settlement.[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 30 and October 1.[lxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukrainian forces from counterattacking near Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya) and that Russian forces are threatening to encircle Ukrainian forces near the settlement.[lxxvii]

Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces are inflicting serious losses on Russian forces in the Dobropillya tactical area, forcing Russian forces to retreat.[lxxviii] Trehubov noted that Ukrainian forces are exploiting the Russian forces' overextension in the area, which has prevented Russian forces from establishing sustainable GLOCs to supply Russian forward positions.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Shakove.[lxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, Novotoretske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Zvirove on September 30 and October 1.[lxxx]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 1 that strong winds are complicating drone use for both Ukrainian and Russian forces in the area.[lxxxi] The NCO reported that Russian forces are losing huge numbers of infantry daily, in an attempt to envelop Pokrovsk, as Russian forces did not have time to bring up sufficient firepower and that Russian forces are experiencing unspecified logistical problems.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxxii] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating first-person view (FPV) drones in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on September 30 and October 1.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on October 1 indicates that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently advanced in central Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxxv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Verbove and Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced south of Verbove, north and northwest of Sichneve, and southwest of Sosnivka (south of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone and Ternove; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Berezove, Sosnivka, and Kalynivske on September 30 and October 1.[lxxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into eastern Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxxviii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novohryhorivka, in northeastern Poltavka, and east of Poltavka (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxxix]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Novomykolaivka, Poltavka, and Olhivske on September 30 and October 1.[xc]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly dropping bombs on Hulyaipole.[xci]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Steponohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on September 30 and October 1.[xcii]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 30 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian drone launch site with Shahed drones near Tavriiske (northwest of Orikhiv).[xciii]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas in the Kherson direction on September 30 and October 1.[xciv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 30 to October 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Oryol Oblast; one Oniks anti-ship cruise missile from the airspace over occupied Crimea; and 49 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 44 drones and that five missiles and drones struck six unspecified locations.[xcv]

Ukrainian broadcaster Suspline reported on October 1 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Chernihiv City and Nosivka and in Semenivska, Koryukivska, Novhorod-Siverska, and Ripkynska hromadas, Chernihiv Oblast.[xcvi] Ukrainian and Russian opposition sources reported on October 1 that Russian forces’ drones struck Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with drones between the nights of September 30 and October 1, killing one civilian and injuring 30 others and damaging civilian infrastructure.[xcvii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 1 that two Russian Shahed-type drones damaged an electrical substation in Slavutych, Kyiv Oblast, causing power outages.[xcviii] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on October 1 that Russian forces conducted a missile and guided glide bomb strike against Kharkiv City, injuring six and damaging residential infrastructure.[xcix]

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported on October 1 that Russian forces are using modernized Shaheds equipped with night vision cameras and radio control capabilities to strike railway infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast.[c]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Slovakia articulated its intent to strengthen bilateral relations with Belarus amid heightened tensions with Ukraine following Ukrainian strikes against the Druzhba pipeline that supplies Russian oil to various European countries, including Slovakia.[ci] The Slovakian Ambassador to Belarus, Jozef Migaš, announced on September 30 that Slovakia and Belarus are resuming cooperation after a nearly five-year hiatus.[cii] Migaš claimed that sanctions currently limit bilateral relations, but that Slovakia intends to develop friendly relations.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.