Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 16, 2025

October 16, 2025, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 m ET on October 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on the phone on October 16. Trump stated that the two leaders had a "very productive" call and that the two largely discussed potential bilateral economic prospects to pursue after a resolution to the war in Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that the two agreed that there will be a high-level advisor meeting at an unspecified date next week (between October 19 and 25) and an unspecified location with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio leading the US delegation. Trump stated that he and Putin will then meet in Budapest to discuss a resolution to the war. Trump noted that he will discuss the contents of his October 16 phone call with Putin with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during Zelensky’s visit to Washington on October 17. Trump told reporters on October 16 that he will be meeting with Putin in "two weeks or so" and that Rubio will be meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov "pretty soon."[2] Trump suggested that he, Zelensky, and Putin may coordinate "separate but equal" meetings.[3] Trump stated that Putin "really did not like the idea" of the United States sending "a couple thousand Tomahawks" to Ukraine when Trump raised the question.[4]  

Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov attempted to obfuscate Russia's deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in his statement on the October 16 Trump-Putin call. Ushakov claimed that the Trump-Putin call discussed how Ukrainian forces are allegedly using "terrorist methods" to strike civilian and energy infrastructure in Russia since Russia maintains the strategic initiative on the battlefield.[5] Ushakov claimed that the Ukrainian strikes are "forcing" Russia to respond "accordingly." Ukraine’s recent long-range strike campaign is targeting Russia's energy sector in order to degrade Russia’s capacity to fund its war against Ukraine and to fuel its fighting forces[6] Russian forces, in contrast, have been deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure, including by conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes systematically targeting civilians in Kherson Oblast since late 2023, long predating Ukraine’s recent long-range strike campaign against Russian energy[7] Open-source investigative outlet Tochnyi reported on September 28 that Russian drone strikes have resulted in 2,877 Ukrainian civilian casualties in Kherson City alone since 2023.[8]

Ushakov also claimed that US Tomahawk sales to Ukraine would not affect the battlefield situation and would “significantly damage” bilateral US-Russia relations.[9] Ushakov’s claims are a continuation of the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign to deter US sales of Tomahawks to Ukraine.[10] ISW continues to assess that the US deliveries of Tomahawk missiles would not lead to a significant escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, given Russia’s own frequent use of comparable long-range cruise missiles against Ukraine but could make a notable contribution to Ukraine's efforts to defend itself, as ISW has noted.[11]

Russia is intentionally muddying the information space with false flag claims and information operations in an attempt to generate cover for overt and covert attacks against Europe in the past several years, including the recent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikovon on October 16 falsely accused the United Kingdom (UK) of fueling "hysteria" about the threat Russia poses to Europe and claimed that "NATO intelligence services" participated in the recent drone incursions over European countries that Russia actually conducted.[12] Bortnikov accused the UK of trying to establish a naval blockade of Kaliningrad Oblast and the Baltic Sea and attempted to discredit recent UK sanctions against the Russian oil industry and shadow fleet as part of the alleged "blockade" campaign.[13] Bortnikov also accused the UK of planning sabotage operations with Ukrainian special services against the TurkStream pipeline and Russian critical infrastructure.[14] Bortnikov's accusations against the UK follow an October 6 claim by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) that the UK is planning for a group of pro-Ukrainian Russians fighting for Ukraine to conduct an attack on a Ukrainian Navy ship or a foreign civilian vessel in a European port.[15] The SVR has been releasing similar claims more frequently in recent weeks, constituting a new concerted pattern of activity that is likely part of Russia's "Phase Zero" informational and psychological condition setting phase for a higher level of NATO-Russia conflict.[16] The FSB and SVR are likely engaged in a cognitive warfare campaign aimed at sowing confusion among the European population and the international community about the actor responsible for a variety of overt and covert attacks against NATO states, such as sabotage missions, electronic warfare (EW) interference, GPS jamming, drone incursions, and arson. Officials from several European states have identified Russia as responsible for many of these attacks, including many of the drone incursions into European airspace in the past few weeks.[17] The European Parliament also passed a resolution on October 9 identifying Russia as responsible for many of the recent "escalatory actions" and deliberate drone incursions.[18]

Russian forces are reportedly using North Korean forces operating in Russia in ways that will allow North Korean forces to take battlefield lessons learned back to North Korea. The Ukrainian General Staff released footage on October 16 showing North Korean drone operators in Kursk Oblast and reported that North Korean forces are conducting short-range quadcopter reconnaissance drone missions from Kursk Oblast to identify and adjust fires to support Russian forces conducting offensive operations in Sumy Oblast.[19] North Korean involvement in drone operations rather than the highly attritional infantry assaults that characterized North Korea’s operations in Kursk Oblast in 2024-2025 increases the likelihood that North Korean personnel will survive and be able to bring important experience in modern war back to North Korea.[20] The North Korean military command will likely integrate and disseminate the lessons that North Korean forces learn in Russia throughout the North Korean army. The Russian military command's decision to employ North Korean forces as drone operators likely allows Russian forces to avoid overcoming at scale the language barrier that reportedly plagued previous North Korean-Russian joint missions in Kursk Oblast or restructuring Russian forces to integrate North Korean soldiers.[21]

Russian forces are reportedly adapting their long-range drone and missile strike tactics targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale. Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on October 16 that Russia relied on "carpet bombing" in Winter 2022-2023, striking various targets throughout Ukraine with a high quantity of drone and missiles, but is now using "piecemeal" tactics to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure oblast by oblast.[22] Ukrainska Pravda stated that Russian forces are targeting frontline and border areas, conducting localized strikes against Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts while also regularly but less intensely striking Kharkiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Russia is reportedly trying to destroy both local energy generation capabilities and delivery and distribution systems by attacking substations. Ukrainska Pravda reported that Russian forces primarily used drones for these purposes in August and September 2025, launching 10 to 40 drones against one target in a single wave. Russian forces are reportedly now deploying a series of waves with several drones every hour and then subsequently conducting massive missile strikes. Ukrainska Pravda stated that Russia aims to create a blackout in Ukraine by creating a power deficit in eastern Ukraine, where consumption is typically higher and where Russian forces have destroyed almost all local generation capabilities, while gradually stopping the flow of electricity from west to east. One source told Ukrainska Pravda that the number of drones Russia is launching against each target is making defense difficult and that a single precise hit is enough to disable a power plant's power unit. A manager of a Ukrainian energy company reportedly stated that Russia also aims to disrupt Ukraine's gas sector such that Ukraine cannot reliably supply fuel to generate electricity and heat.

Recent Russian drone technological adaptations are likely facilitating Russia's strike campaign against Ukraine's energy sector. Russian sources recently published footage of a Russian strike in Chernihiv Oblast with an MS variant of the Shahed drone, which reportedly includes a thermal imaging camera and video stream and has a range of up to 200 kilometers.[23] Russia is also reportedly using thermobaric warheads on its Shahed drones, allowing Russian strikes to destroy facilities even in hardened shelters like the ones Ukraine is installing to protect energy facilities.[24] Russian strikes targeting power infrastructure in frontline areas, particularly Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts, may aim to achieve some battlefield effects by forcing Ukrainian forces operating in the area to rely on generators, creating vulnerabilities to further Russian strikes. Generators require large and reliable supplies of fuel, and Russia's widespread campaign to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) could inhibit Ukraine's ability to rely on generators at scale near the line of contact.[25]

Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance for Ukraine at the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte stated that 17 NATO member states committed to join the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[26] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that new PURL funding totaled at least $422 million.[27] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's PURL needs in 2026 will range from $12 billion to $20 billion.[28] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine will be able to produce up to 20 million drones in 2026 if Ukraine's partners provide the necessary funding and noted that Ukrainian drone and missile production requires over $4 billion in immediate funding.[29]

Shmyhal stated that several European states contributed funding toward purchases from the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB), including $600 million from Norway for drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and explosives; $106 million from the Netherlands for drones; $8 million from Canada for interceptor drones; and $4 million from Iceland within the "Danish Model" (in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military).[30] Shmyhal also announced several European packages of military aid to Ukraine, including $8 billion from Sweden for security assistance in 2026-2027; $72 million from the Czech Republic; $20 million from Canada for winter equipment and missile components; and $12 million from Portugal to the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU), a British mechanism that uses financial contributions from Ukraine’s partners to purchase military equipment for Ukraine. The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Denmark will provide Ukraine with a new military aid package worth 1.1 billion kroner (roughly $172 million), including maritime equipment and funding for training.[31] Shmyhal announced that Ukraine signed an agreement with Germany to expand bilateral technological and defense industrial cooperation.[32] Germany and Ukraine will develop joint industrial products to produce Lynx infantry fighting vehicles and ammunition, and to repair Gepard anti-aircraft guns and Leopard tanks.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on the phone on October 16.
• Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov attempted to obfuscate Russia's deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in his statement on the October 16 Trump-Putin call.
• Russia is intentionally muddying the information space with false flag claims and information operations in an attempt to generate cover for overt and covert attacks against Europe in the past several years, including the recent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace.
• Russian forces are reportedly using North Korean forces operating in Russia in ways that will allow North Korean forces to take battlefield lessons learned back to North Korea.
• Russian forces are reportedly adapting their long-range drone and missile strike tactics targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance for Ukraine at the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting.
• Russian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 16 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery on the night of October 15 to 16.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Saratov refinery had an annual capacity of 4.8 million tons as of 2023 and supplies the Russian military. This attack marks the third Ukrainian drone strike against the facility within a month.[34] Geolocated footage published on October 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces also struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, damaging the facility's L-24/300 hydrotreatment unit that removes impurities before further processing.[35]

Ukrainian forces struck several Russian substations on October 16. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed that Ukrainian drone operators struck a substation in Valuysky Raion, Belgorod Oblast, causing power outages.[36] Geolocated footage shows a drone striking the Balashovskaya substation in Novonikolaevsky, Volgograd Oblast.[37] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that Russian air defense systems repelled a "massive" drone strike against energy infrastructure in Volgograd Oblast and that drone debris caused a fire at the Balashovskaya substation and power outages in nearby areas.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[39]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[41]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on October 16 that it destroyed sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the Russian Senezh Spetsnaz Center (formerly subordinated to the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU] and now directly subordinated to the Russian General Staff) that attempted to conduct raids from unspecified areas of Belgorod Oblast into border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts.[42] The brigade reported that the Senezh Center trains fighters in Russia's Special Operations Forces (SSO) and that Ukrainian forces killed six Russian soldiers and wounded eight.

A Russian milblogger claimed that southern and central Oleksiivka are contested “gray zones” and that there is footage of Ukrainian forces in central Oleksiivka.[43]

A Russian milblogger allegedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 16 that elements of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) entered Oleksiivka.[44] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 4th Battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) have not conducted any offensive operations in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo). The milblogger claimed that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) reduced the frequency of their attacks after suffering high losses in frontal assaults.[45] The milblogger claimed that the command of the 2nd Battalion of the 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) operating in Yunakivka changed attack routes for assault groups after Russian infantry suffered heavy losses moving along predictable routes.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy Oblast border area.[47] Elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating within Yunakivka.[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe and toward Okhrimivka on October 15 and 16.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Odradne and along the Milove-Khatnie line (all east of Velykyi Burluk).[51]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Bolohivka on October 15 and 16.[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 16 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in northern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), an area which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces controlled.[53]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Kolodyzane, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on October 15 and 16.[54]

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on October 16 that Russian forces have seized most of the high-rise buildings in northern Kupyansk but that Ukrainian forces are working to clear the buildings.[55] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are seizing on rainy and foggy weather to increase the intensity of their attacks when Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance is less effective.[56] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are using anti-thermal imaging coats at nighttime and attempting to use unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) for ammunition supplies.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Masik crew of the Tiger drone detachment of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pishchane.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast near Druzhelyubivka and Hrekivka on October 16.[58]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Borivska Andriivka (east of Borova).[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) and west of Zarichne (east of Lyman).[60]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Shandryholove, and Derylove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 15 and 16.[61] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group operating near Novoselivka.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrne.[63]

A Russian source claimed that Russian control over the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman) is enabling Russian forces to advance toward Siversk.[64]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, south of Siversk near Zvanivka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on October 15 and 16.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Siversk direction.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novemarkove and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Oleksandro-Kalynove; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on October 15 and 16.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya.[68]

Geolocated footage published on October 16 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a reduced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Volodymyrivka and Shakhove (northwest of Volodymyrivka across the Kazennyi Torets River) consisting of 22 armored vehicles, including a main column of 11 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles moving from near Malynivka (southeast of Volodymyrivka).[69] An OSINT analyst reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed nine armored vehicles and damaged four.[70] Another OSINT analyst noted that this was the fourth Russian mechanized assault within one month.[71] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces appear to be conducting larger mechanized assaults recently during rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations.[72]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Chasiv Yar reported on October 16 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement and that Russian forces lost a company's worth of soldiers killed in action (KIA) in just one week of fighting.[73] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces immediately intensified their offensive operations after recent weather changes. The spokesperson stated that the Russian forces operating in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) recently went on rotation and that elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) relieved elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division that had been operating in the area "for a very long time."

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and drone reconnaissance operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[75]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Zapovidne on October 15 and 16.[76]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dorozhnie.[77] Drone operators of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shakhove.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the intersection of Prokofiev Street and 1st of May Street in Pokrovsk itself; north and east of Novopavlivka (southeast of Pokrovsk); and north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Balahan, Promin, Myrnohrad, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on October 15 and 16.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sukhetske and Myrnohrad.[81]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 16 that Russian forces have suffered 8,402 killed in action (KIA) and 5,419 wounded in action (WIA) and that Ukrainian forces have captured 124 Russian prisoners of war (POWs) in Pokrovskyi Raion since August 21.[82] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated 182.8 square kilometers of Pokrovskyi Raion and have cleared Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups from an additional 230.1 square kilometers of territory. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have lost 1,289 pieces of weapons and military equipment, including 32 tanks, 101 armored personnel carriers, 154 artillery systems, and 435 vehicles.

Kremlin newswire TASS claimed on October 16 that the drone operator of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), which is reportedly operating north and northeast of Pokrovsk, stated that the maximum distance they have flown a Molniya-2 drone was 82 kilometers.[83] The drone operator claimed that the drone can fly long distances if the wind and battery life allow. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Molniya-2 drone's stated flight range is 44 kilometers.[84]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) struck Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk with a FAB-3000 glide bomb.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske, Ivanivka, and Zelenyi Hai on October 15 and 16.[86]

Geolocated footage published on October 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions east of Filiya in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[87] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

 Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on October 16 that Russian forces seized Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[88]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad, southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, south of Velykomykhailivka near Novomykolaivka, and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on October 15 and 16.[89]

Ukrainian Assault Forces Commander Colonel Valentyn Manko reported that Ukrainian forces cleared Oleksiivka and Stepove (both southwest of Velykomykhailivka), following evidence on October 15 that Russian forces had seized the settlement.[90] ISW cannot yet verify either claim and thus has coded the administrative boundaries of Oleksiivka as Russian claims, which ISW defines as territory that Russians have claimed to be present in without verification or evidence disproving the Russian claims.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Poltavka and eastern Novovasylivkse (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[91]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Malynivka, Poltavka, and Novohryhorivka on October 15 and 16.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[93] Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Kamyanske, Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on October 15 and 16.[95]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[96] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment and the 65th VDV Battalion (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Prymorske.[97] Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to VDV) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Stepnohirsk.[98] Drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and Orikhiv.[99] Drone operators of the 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) and elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv direction [100]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on October 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Karantynnyy Island, including Maly Vilkhovy Island.[101]

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on October 15, including southwest of Kherson City near Karantynnyy Island.[102]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 15 and 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 320 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including 200 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[103] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Ryazan Oblast; 26 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh Oblasts and occupied Crimea; two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea, and seven Kh-59 cruise missiles from an unspecified location. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 283 drones and five Kh-59 cruise missiles and that 18 missiles were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force announced that 14 missiles and 37 drones struck 14 locations and that drone and missile debris fell in two locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces primarily targeted Poltava and Kharkiv oblasts. Ukrainian outlets reported that the Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure and a logistics warehouse in Chernihiv Oblast.[104] A Ukrainian official reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv Oblast with Molniya drones.[105]

Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported on October 16 that Russian strikes left roughly 5,000 consumers in Poltava Oblast without power.[106] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes left consumers in several oblasts without power and noted that Russian strikes have previously forced Ukrainian authorities to launch emergency shutdowns in Kyiv City and Oblast and Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy oblasts.[107]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115384956858741387

[2] https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/16/politics/putin-trump-hungary-ukraine-war

[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/trump-and-putin-to-speak-ahead-of-zelensky-meeting-a1846a93

[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/trump-and-putin-to-speak-ahead-of-zelensky-meeting-a1846a93

[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78237

[6]   https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025/;

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuTo94TnMPo; https://www.dw.com/en/russias-drone-attacks-target-civilians-in-ukraine/a-70043788

[8] https://maps.tochnyi dot info/humansafari/

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78237

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2025/;

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2025/

[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/25361669; https://tass dot ru/politika/25361895; https://tass dot ru/politika/25361483;   https://t.me/tass_agency/344148; https://t.me/tass_agency/344149; https://t.me/tass_agency/344150; https://t.me/tass_agency/344151; https://t.me/tass_agency/344152

[13] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1052961; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cew418r5rxdo

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/25361669

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/warning-russia-may-be-planning-violent-protests-after-the-moldovan-elections/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2025/

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2025/

[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30340

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-august-27-2025/

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against/

[22] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/articles/2025/10/16/8002928/

[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-technological-adaptations-update-october-9-2025/

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025/; https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-drones-with-thermobaric-bombs-are-worsening-threat-ukrainians-say-2025-7

[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/

[26] https://suspilne dot media/1140064-rutte-vze-17-derzav-nato-kupuvatimut-amerikansku-zbrou-dla-ukraini/

[27] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/11797

[28] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/11766; https://suspilne dot media/1139932-ukraina-potrebue-60-mlrd-zovnisnogo-finansuvanna-dla-pokritta-oboronnih-vitrat-smigal/

[29] https://mod.gov dot ua/en/news/air-defense-missiles-drones-and-long-range-weapons-denys-shmyhal-outlines-priorities-at-the-ramstein-meeting

[30] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/11797

[31] https://suspilne dot media/1140050-dania-ogolosila-pro-novij-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-ukraini-na-11-mlrd-kron/; https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2025/danmark-donerer-11-mia.-kroner--til-at-styrke-ukraines-kampkraft/

[32] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/11788; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/16/ukrayina-ta-nimechchyna-posylyuyut-spivpraczyu-u-sferi-oboronnoyi-promyslovosti-denys-shmygal/

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30337

[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2025/

[35] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12178?; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-attacked-lukoil-nizhegorodnefteorgsintez-facility-shut-down-and-on-fire/

[36] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1978817927387226208 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1978761814549606806 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1978721635508039872  ; https://t.me/vvgladkov/16715   

[37] https://t.me/astrapress/94817

[38] https://t.me/rgn_34/10241

[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43335; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35044

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/29893; https://t.me/severnnyi/5408

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35044; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43335; https://t.me/severnnyi/5405

[42] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17bCDZpDpn/; https://armyinform. dot com.ua/2025/10/16/elita-rf-u-chornozemi-voyiny-tro-likviduvaly-grupu-specznazu-syenyezh-razom-iz-komandyrom-na-sumshhyni/; https://www.businessinsider.com/mark-galeotti-putins-wars-book-excerpt-russia-spetsnaz-forces-2023-4

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35044

[44] https://t.me/severnnyi/5405

[45] https://t.me/severnnyi/5407

[46] https://t.me/severnnyi/5408

[47] https://t.me/epoddubny/25149

[48] https://t.me/severnnyi/5408

[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35046

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309; https://t.me/severnnyi/5400; https://t.me/dva_majors/81372

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35046

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309

[53] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1978860558691475901; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/26256; https://t.me/operationall_space/7073

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35096 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/81372 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29893 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14392

[55] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1978744691601309718

[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/10/16/vorozha-pihota-otrymuye-svoyu-kupu-kul-i-gyne-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-robotyzovani-transporty/

[57] https://t.me/pionergrupa/8767; https://t.me/dva_majors/81350

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344

[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/57583 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/21928

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35076

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344 ;  https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35076

[62] https://t.me/ab3army/6036; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/16/syly-oborony-ne-dala-vorozhij-drg-stvoryty-placzdarm-dlya-forsuvannya-oskolu-kadry-z-gopro/ ;

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35076

[64] https://t.me/tass_agency/344098

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35088 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29893

[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43334

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29893 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/16/vijna-pid-vplyvom-droniv-duzhe-speczyfichna-v-rajoni-chasovogo-yaru-vorog-vtrachaye-rotu-soldat-za-tyzhden/ ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35042

[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/29893

[69] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1978794613172470052 ; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1978796862523252965 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1978801322544492783  ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1978797093654348002

[70] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1978797093654348002

[71] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1978796862523252965

[72] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/

[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/16/vijna-pid-vplyvom-droniv-duzhe-speczyfichna-v-rajoni-chasovogo-yaru-vorog-vtrachaye-rotu-soldat-za-tyzhden/

[74] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14431

[75] https://t.me/rusich_army/26327

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35042 

[77] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14428

[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/183489

[79] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68195; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/183471; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35098; https://t.me/rusich_army/26327

[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35042; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309; https://t.me/dva_majors/81372; https://t.me/rybar/74399; https://t.me/wargonzo/29893; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35098; https://t.me/rusich_army/26327;

[81] https://t.me/rybar/74399; https://t.me/rusich_army/26327

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30339

[83] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/25360943

[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35083

[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35098

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309

[87] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10256; https://t.me/oaembr46/1808

[88] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1978744691601309718

[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309  

[90] ttps://t.me/Valentyn_Manko/61; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/16/vtraty-voroga-kolosalni-zsu-zachystyly-na-zaporizhzhi-oleksiyivku-ta-stepove/

[91] https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/747; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10255; https://www.facebook.com/reel/785902420956343; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10254

[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309; https://t.me/wargonzo/29893

[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/17252  

[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/17255

[95] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309; https://t.me/wargonzo/29893; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35056; https://t.me/dva_majors/81372

[96] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/101869

[97] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35054; https://t.me/dva_majors/81372; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35070

[98] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7708

[99] https://t.me/wargonzo/29904; https://t.me/dva_majors/81421

[100] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35056; https://t.me/dva_majors/81381

[101] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/29644

[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30344; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30309

[103] https://t.me/kpszsu/44843

[104] https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1139950-e-vlucanna-u-magazin-novu-postu-ta-budinki-vijska-rf-atakuvali-nizin-bezpilotnikami/;  https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1978799487989510628; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/51362; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/16/na-chernigivshhyni-vorog-atakuvav-vnochi-logistychnyj-obyekt-ta-bagatokvartyrnyj-budynok/

[105] https://t.me/synegubov/17766

[106] https://t.me/dtek_ua/2689 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1140162-rosia-zavdala-masovanogo-obstrilu-po-poltavsini-poskodzena-gazova-infrastruktura/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/94800; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/51402; https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2025/10/16/vorog-zavdav-raketnogo-udaru-po-ob%ca%bcyektah-naftogazovoyi-promyslovosti-na-poltavshhyni/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/27859;

[107] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4204