Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2025

October 21, 2025, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on October 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is unwilling to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine that does not result in Ukraine’s complete capitulation. Lavrov stated that Russia has not changed its position since the August 2025 Alaska summit, and that Russia does not need a short-term ceasefire that “leads nowhere,” but a “long-term stable peace.”[1] Lavrov responded to American demands for an immediate end to Russia’s war in Ukraine by claiming that a ceasefire would not resolve the alleged “root causes” of the conflict — which Lavrov has continued to identify as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[2] Lavrov’s statements emphasize the Kremlin’s determination to achieve its original war aims despite American demands for an immediate end to the conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly stated that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire until Ukraine and the West meet Russia's demands of Ukrainian neutrality, the removal of the legitimate government in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO’s Open Door Policy.[3] Lavrov’s statements are a continuation of the Kremlin’s attempts to signal to US President Donald Trump that Trump’s demands for an immediate end to the war are incompatible with Russia’s war aims.[4]

Ukraine and its European allies signaled their support for U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friederich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Portuguese President António Costa, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Støre, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez published a joint statement on October 21 expressing support for Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire and to leverage the current frontline in Ukraine as a "starting point" for peace negotiations.[5] The European leaders noted that Ukraine is the “only party serious about peace” and that Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position “before, during, and after any ceasefire.” The European leaders reiterated their intent to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine and “ramp up the pressure” on Russia’s economy and defense industrial base (DIB). ISW continues to assess that economic pressure alone is an insufficient tool to bring Russia to the negotiating table and that ending the war in Ukraine also relies on continued robust military support to Ukraine.[6]

Recent Russian war crimes in Pokrovsk highlight the humanitarian cost of Russian advances in more populated areas. Ukrainian volunteer Denys Khrystov published on October 19 geolocated footage showing several civilians that Russian forces murdered near the railway line in central Pokrovsk.[7] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on October 21 that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group committed the murders in violation of international humanitarian law.[8] Donetsk Oblast Police Spokesperson Pavlo Diachenko reported on October 21 that Ukrainian authorities are still determining the exact number and nature of civilian casualties from the Russian attack.[9] Diachenko noted that Russian drone strikes prevent humanitarian volunteers from entering Pokrovsk and impede evacuation efforts. The recent murders reflect Russian forces’ policy of deliberately killing Ukrainian civilians, and the death toll will only increase should Russian forces continue to advance into populated urban areas such as Pokrovsk.[10]

Russia's long-range strike campaign continues to target critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 21 that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; four S-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles from Kursk Oblast; and 98 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones - of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea on the night of October 20 to 21.[11] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 58 drones and that all six missiles and 37 drones struck 10 locations and that downed debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts and noted that Russian forces are striking such infrastructure daily ahead of winter.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and energy infrastructure and caused power outages in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Kyiv oblasts.[13]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that all Ukrainian oblasts are introducing power outage schedules following the Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[14] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian forces are circling drones over damaged power facilities to prevent Ukraine from repairing its energy facilities and that there are no military targets near the energy facilities that Russian forces are striking.[15] Ukrainska Pravda previously noted that recent Russian strikes aim to create a blackout in Ukraine by creating a power deficit in eastern Ukraine, where consumption is typically higher and where Russian forces have destroyed almost all local generation capabilities, while gradually stopping the flow of electricity from west to east.[16] Bloomberg previously reported that Russian strikes had taken out roughly 60 percent of Ukraine’s natural gas production as of October 3, which will likely force Ukraine to spend 1.9 billion euros on fuel imports in Winter 2025-2026.[17] Russia has conducted a series of intensified strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure each fall and winter since 2022, in what ISW continues to assess as Russia effort to degrade Ukraine’s energy security and industrial capacity and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[18] Russia’s ongoing and ever-intensifying long-range strike campaign against Ukraine is just one indicator of the Kremlin's disinterest in peace.

Ukrainian Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed as the commander of the newly formed Joint Forces Task Force. Ukraine’s new Joint Forces Task Force announced on October 20 that Drapatyi, who commanded the Dnipro Group of Forces, will command the newly-created Joint Forces Command and its subordinate Joint Forces Task Force.[19] The Joint Forces Task Force has an area of responsibility (AoR) of Kharkiv Oblast and replaces the disbanded Dnipro Group of Forces, which had an AoR from Kharkiv Oblast through Zaporizhzhia City, as part of the Ukrainian military's transition to the corps structure. This is  Drapatyi’s second time commanding Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast, after heading Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group during the Spring 2024 Russian offensive into Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force noted that the new Joint Forces Task Force will exercise joint operational control over all Ukrainian units and formations that are operating in the Kharkiv direction,  including elements of Ukraine’s regular armed forces, the Ukrainian National Guard, and the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service.

Polish and Romanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to attempted acts of sabotage aimed at undermining European Union (EU) support to Ukraine. The Polish National Prosecutor’s Office announced on October 21 that Polish authorities detained a Ukrainian citizen on October 17 who shipped packages with explosives and incendiary devices to Ukraine at the behest of Russian military intelligence to undermine EU support for Ukraine.[20] The Polish National Prosecutor's Office noted that the suspects intended for these packages to detonate spontaneously during transport and that Romanian authorities intercepted the packages. The Romanian Intelligence Service announced on October 21 that it detained two Ukrainian citizens - whom Polish authorities stated were close collaborators of the individual detained in Poland - after they deposited packages containing homemade remotely detonated incendiary devices at the headquarters of Ukrainian courier company Nova Post in Bucharest in an attempt to burn down the building.[21] The Romanian Intelligence Service reported that this incident is part of a broader campaign targeting Nova Post infrastructure. This incident is very likely a continuation of a Russian military intelligence effort to ship incendiary packages throughout Europe that Lithuanian authorities reported in September 2025.[22]

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Minister of Internal Affairs Tomasz Siemoniak announced on October 21 that the Polish Internal Security Agency detained eight other persons suspected of preparing acts of sabotage, including reconnaissance of military facilities and critical infrastructure.[23] ISW previously forecasted on September 30 that Russia could conduct false flag sabotage attacks against Poland when Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) ”warned” that Western intelligence services are preparing to blame Russia for false-flag attacks in Europe and deflect blame for actual Russian sabotage and hybrid operations.[24] These operations are likely associated with Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is unwilling to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine that does not result in Ukraine’s complete capitulation.
• Ukraine and its European allies signaled their support for U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.
• Recent Russian war crimes in Pokrovsk highlight the humanitarian cost of Russian advances in more populated areas.
• Russia's long-range strike campaign continues to target critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026.
• Ukrainian Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed as the commander of the newly formed Joint Forces Task Force.
• Polish and Romanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to attempted acts of sabotage aimed at undermining European Union (EU) support to Ukraine.
• Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Two industry sources told Reuters in an article published on October 20 that the Ukrainian drone strike against the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery on the night of October 19 and 20 forced the plant to halt primary crude processing for the second time in a month.[26] The sources reported that the plant may resume operations in early November.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 21 but did not advance.

Fighting continued in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 20 and 21.[27]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 21 that the command of the Russian 3rd Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), which is operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), is planning to address issues related to poorly trained and unmotivated reinforcements by conducting attacks with a large number of assault groups from different directions, including by crossing the reservoir near the settlement.[28] The milblogger claimed that the insufficient number of trained medical personnel in a motorized rifle regiment formed from Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) personnel is forcing civilian volunteers and conscripts to treat wounded servicemembers in overcrowded conditions at rented buildings of the Belgorod City Clinic.[29] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command relies on civilian volunteers to provide medical necessities for the wounded servicemembers and accused unspecified actors of stealing credit cards, documents, and money from the wounded.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Sumy direction.[30] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and energy infrastructure in border areas of Chernihiv Oblast.[31]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Synelnykove and in central and southern Vovchansk (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[32]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on October 20 and 21.[33]

Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Synelnykove in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[34] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).

Order of Battle: Drone operators likely of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly remotely mining Ukrainian positions in Synelnykove.[35] Drone operators of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk toward Bolohivka on October 20 and 21.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove and Khatnie (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bolohivka.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk, in northwestern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), southeast of Pishchane, and west of Stepova Novoselivka (both southeast of Kupyansk).[40]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on October 20 and 21.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pishchane and the western side of Kupyansk.[42]

Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southern Kupyansk after Russian forces conducted what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[43] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka, northeast of Borova near Borivska-Andriivka and Nova Kruhlyakivka, and east of Borova near Kopanky on October 20 and 21.[45]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 96th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Senkove (northeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the C051021 road between Drobysheve and Stavky (north to northeast of Lyman).[47]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Derylove, Shandryholove, Novoselivka, Serednie, Karpivka and toward Yarova; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 20 and 21.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yampil and between Drobysheve and Stavky (north to northeast of Lyman).[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Novoselivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka, Pereizne, and Fedorivka on October 20 and 21.[50]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka detachment are reportedly coordinating airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in Nykyforivka (southwest of Siversk) with glide bombs.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Toretsk, Pleshchiivka, Bila Hora, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on October 20 and 21.[52]

The commanding officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area stated on October 21 that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions, particularly fog, to infiltrate Ukrainian positions both at night and during the day.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian servicemembers recently took advantage of poor weather conditions to advance near Volodymyrivka and Rusyn Yar.[54] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to cut off Ukrainian supply routes and push Ukrainian forces out of Sofiivka and Toretske to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and eventually capture all of Pokrovsk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north of Chasiv Yar.[55] Drone operators and other elements of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[56] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sofiivka.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and advanced north of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[58]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on October 20 and 21.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya).[60]

Russian forces likely recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid ongoing Russian infiltration missions into the town.

Assessed Russian advances: ISW assesses that Russian forces have likely advanced up to the southern urban boundary of Pokrovsk due to the number and depth of Russian infiltration missions into central Pokrovsk since October 13. ISW defines the Assessed Russian Advance layer as areas which Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against, even if they do not maintain control. ISW is continuing to refine its methodology to address Russia's ongoing effort to exploit open-source mapping ideology via infiltration missions and raising flags in settlements that Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions in.[61] ISW is currently depicting Russian infiltration missions in rural and urban areas with the same symbol, although infiltration missions are a common characteristic of urban warfare.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Promin (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced west of Pokrovsk.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are expanding the contested "gray zone" through infiltration.[63]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions northeast of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and at the Pokrovska mine north of Udachne – an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske, Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 20 and 21.[65]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian assault groups continue to operate in Pokrovsk.[66] The battalion commander noted that Russian forces previously infiltrated into Pokrovsk in small groups but are now operating in relatively large groups and that Russian infantry are engaging Ukrainian drone operators and mortar crews withf with small arms. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian infantry are mostly untrained and that the time period from when these personnel sign military service contracts to when Ukrainian forces encounter them in battle is three months.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone operators are making it difficult for Russian forces to accumulate in Pokrovsk.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Storm Special Purpose Detachment of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka and Muravka (both northeast of Novopavlivka).[70] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Dachne and north of Filiya (both south of Novopavlivka).[71]

Russian forces continued attacking toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Molodetske, Novomykoliavka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Zaporizhzhia, and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on October 20 and 21.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Sosnivka (south of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced north of Khoroshe (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and to the eastern bank of the Vovcha River north of Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[73]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and  Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Kalynivske and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and toward Oleksiivka on October 20 and 21.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the "South Dnipropetrovsk direction" (likely referring to the Velykomykhailivka direction).[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Novomykolaivka, Olhivske, and Poltavka and toward Pryvilne on October 20 and 21.[76]

A Russian milblogger posted footage on October 20 showing drone operators and engineer elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) striking a bridge over the Yanchul River west of Pavlivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[77]

A Ukrainian source reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces repelled three Russian attacks of three columns of motorcycles near Vesele (east of Hulyaipole).[78] The source published footage showing Ukrainian strikes against three groups of five to six motorcycles each.

Ukrainian and Russian sources provided additional information on recent Russian mechanized assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 20 and 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) during a recent reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault.[79] Ukrainian sources credited elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) with conducting one wave of the mechanized assault near Mala Tokmachka and elements of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) with conducting another wave near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[80] A Russian milblogger also credited elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) with participating in the wave near Mala Tokmachka.[81] A Ukrainian brigade operating near Mala Tokmachka reported that Russian forces conducted the mechanized assault at 1400 local time on October 20 and that Russian forces attacked from Verbove (southeast of Mala Tokmachka) and Novoprokopivka (south of Mala Tokmachka) with roughly 26 tanks and other armored vehicles.[82] The brigade reported that Russian forces attacked in several waves of five to eight vehicles over the course of several hours and that Ukrainian forces damaged 22 armored vehicles. Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces reported that another Ukrainian brigade operating near Novoandriivka repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault, destroying or damaging all 12 tanks and armored vehicles involved and eight of the twelve motorcycles.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 21 that Russian forces seized on poor weather conditions that complicated Ukrainian drone operations to conduct the mechanized assaults - in line with ISW's ongoing assessment.[84] The Ventusky weather radar recorded precipitation near Orikhiv on the morning and afternoon of October 20.[85]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Shcherbaky and Maly Shcherbaky (both west of Orikhiv) and advanced southwest of and in Mala Tokmachka, south of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), northwest of Stepove, northeast of Kamyanske, and west of Stepnohirsk (all west of Orikhiv).[86]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, Plavni, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk and toward Novoandriivka on October 20 and 21.[87]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces used a Kub-1 loitering munition to strike Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[88]

Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) striking two Russian light aircraft modified to intercept drones at an airfield west of occupied Pryazovske (southeast of Melitopol in the Russian rear).[89]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1152nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th CAA) and drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces [VDV]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[90] Artillerymen and drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA); drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, including of its 417th Reconnaissance Battalion and Unmanned Systems Company; and Molniya-2 loitering munition operators of the Russian Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and forces near Mala Tokmachka.[91]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on October 21 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions on Karantynnyy Island (immediately southwest of Kherson City).[92] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction denied Russian claims that Russian forces recently advanced near Kherson City.[93]

Russian forces continued assaults near the Antonivskyi railway and roadway bridges east of Kherson City on October 20 and 21.[94]

Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated that Russian Shahed-type drones struck Kherson City on the night of October 20 to 21, injuring civilians and damaging residential infrastructure.[95]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th VDV Division reportedly struck Ukrainian servicemembers northeast of Antonivka (east of Kherson City).[96] Elements of the Naval Spetsnaz Detachment of the 88th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near the coast of occupied Crimea.[97]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.