Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on October 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Russian official threatened to supply nuclear missiles to Venezuela and Cuba and called the United States a Russian enemy. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov said on October 29 that Russia can deliver nuclear-capable missiles to “Venezuela or Cuba,” which Zhuravlyov noted are located near Russia’s "main geopolitical adversary” - the United States.[i] Zhuravlyov said that Russia has an “entire range” of missiles at its disposal and will use “what is needed.” Zhuravlyov said that the United States is “not a friend or partner" of Russia but is an “enemy.”[ii] Zhuravlyov’s threats are meant to evoke memories of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as Russian officials have done in the past.[iii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to tout new Russian nuclear missiles to threaten the United States. Putin announced on October 29 that Russia tested the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle on October 28 and touted the vehicle’s alleged speed and power.[iv] Putin also recalled Russia’s recent test of the Burevestnik missile, which is similarly nuclear-powered and has similar characteristics. Putin's announcements of even more newly tested nuclear-powered weapons defy US President Donald Trump's call on October 27 for Putin to focus on ending the war in Ukraine, not testing missiles.[v] Putin is detailing the alleged attributes of the weapons to add weight and urgency to his nuclear threats to enact concessions from the United States on Ukraine. Putin is raising the specter of nuclear war to get Trump and European officials to concede to Russian demands that Russian forces cannot secure on the battlefield. The alleged features of the weapons that Putin touted may be novel, but the systems do not change the underlying framework of deterrence that has prevented nuclear war since 1945. The United States and its French and British NATO allies still retain strong nuclear triads to deter nuclear attack.

Russia continues to use Belarus to threaten Europe with the Oreshnik missile. Belarusian Presidential Press Secretary Natalya Eismont told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 28 that Belarus will put the Oreshnik missile system on combat duty in December 2025.[vi] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 29 that Russia and Belarus do not feel safe given European officials’ “Russophobic statements” and militaristic aspirations and hysteria.[vii] Peskov claimed that statements from the Baltics, Poland, France, and the UK show "how dear" the Oreshnik is to Belarus and Russia. Putin announced in August 2025 that Russian and Belarusian specialists were working to identify future Oreshnik deployment locations by the end of 2025.[viii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is leveraging the Oreshnik system as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at undermining Western resolve to militarily support Ukraine.[ix]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is performatively offering an hours-long micro-ceasefire in Pokrovsk likely in part to claim that Russia is not the impediment to the peace process. Putin continued to claim on October 29 that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk and Pokrovsk and proposed a ceasefire lasting two to six hours to allow journalists into Pokrovsk.[x] ISW does not assess that Russian forces have encircled either town at this time. Putin claimed that Russia is mainly concerned about Ukraine executing a provocation during the proposed ceasefire to blame Russia. Putin is likely trying to use micro-ceasefire proposals to show that Russia is interested in a ceasefire, particularly as Russia has publicly rejected US President Donald Trump's proposed ceasefire on the current frontline. Putin's proposed ceasefire would be a staged media opportunity to portray the situation in a way that benefits Russia. He announced the offer in a staged fashion to call attention to his exaggerated claims about Russian progress in Pokrovsk. Putin likely assesses that Ukraine would not agree to this strange and disingenuous proposal, furthering the long-standing Kremlin narrative that Ukraine is the obstacle to peace.[xi]

Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction but remain unlikely to immediately collapse the Ukrainian pocket. Geolocated footage published on October 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Pokrovsk and in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[xii] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces have begun infiltrating into northern Pokrovsk past the railway station in central Pokrovsk, and some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached the northern outskirts of the town.[xiii] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence noted that the frontline remains porous and that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in southern Pokrovsk.[xiv] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Hnativka, entered Rih (both immediately east of Pokrovsk), and advanced west of Pokrovsk.[xv] Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows a Russian flag on the western entrance to Pokrovsk, and Russian sources claimed that there are large contested "gray zones" within Pokrovsk and west of the town.[xvi] Ukrainian Eastern Command Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported on October 28 that Russian forces entered the outskirts of Myrnohrad, but the Ukrainian Eastern Command stated on October 29 that Russian forces are not operating within Myrnohrad and that Shapoval was referring to the Pokrovsk situation instead.[xvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian assault groups conduct infiltration missions into the town and engage Ukrainian drone and mortar crews in firefights to inhibit Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces are struggling to distinguish between civilians and Russian soldiers disguised as civilians – considered perfidy under international law -- making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct defensive operations.[xviii] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting heavy drone and artillery strikes and airstrikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and that Ukrainian forces are relying on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to support logistics to forward positions and conduct some strikes against Russian positions.[xix]

Russian forces will likely expend large amounts of manpower and equipment to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction, as they have during the past 18 months of fighting for Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 29 that Russian forces have concentrated 11,000 personnel for the Pokrovsk effort and deployed a total of 29,000 personnel to the corps' area of responsibility (AoR).[xx] The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps published a map indicating that Russian forces are currently attacking in three different areas: north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske, east of Pokrovsk into Myrnohrad and eastern Pokrovsk, and into Pokrovsk from the south. The corps assessed that Russian forces entering southern Pokrovsk aim to attack into northwestern Pokrovsk and then into Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and eastern Pokrovsk. Russian forces are primarily conducting infiltration missions into Pokrovsk and do not currently exercise the degree of control necessary to push Ukrainian forces entirely from the town and establish enduring positions. Russian forces will likely need to threaten the entire Ukrainian pocket with imminent encirclement in order to seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad without fighting all the way through both settlements. Russian forces have struggled to advance on the eastern and northeastern flanks of the Pokrovsk area to support this larger encirclement effort over the entire pocket, however.[xxi] Russian forces have been fighting to seize Pokrovsk since February 2024 and have expended significant amounts of manpower and materiel in fighting – losses largely due to the Ukrainian drone strikes that have staved off Russian advances in the area for much of the Russian campaign.[xxii]

A recent US intelligence assessment reportedly concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is more determined than ever to gain a battlefield victory in his war in Ukraine, consistent with ongoing statements by senior Russian officials. NBC News reported on October 28, citing two senior US officials, that a US intelligence assessment given to Congress in October 2025 concluded that Putin is more committed than ever to gaining a battlefield victory in Ukraine and is showing no willingness to compromise.[xxiii] The assessment reportedly found that Putin is committed to securing more Ukrainian territory to justify the human and financial losses he has imposed on the Russian people. The recent assessment is in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s continued commitment to his maximalist war aims.[xxiv] Senior Russian officials continue to indicate that Russia is prepared to continue the war indefinitely until Ukraine and its partners capitulate to Russia's demands.[xxv] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 28 rejected US President Donald Trump's proposal for a ceasefire along the current frontline to precede negotiations and indicated that Russia's demands are unchanged.[xxvi] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apti Alaudinov stated on October 29 that Russian forces' task is to seize as much territory as possible to strengthen Russia's position at the negotiating table.[xxvii] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.[xxviii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian State Duma deputies are using imperial Russian and Soviet ideologies to call for Russian society to unite against alleged internal and external threats – likely to set conditions for further repressions and intensified involuntary mobilization for the war against Ukraine or a future war against NATO. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin gave an address to the Russian State Duma on October 29 in which he claimed that a "strong president means a strong Russia" and that "if there is Putin, then there is Russia."[xxix] Volodin called on Russians to "consolidate around Putin, win, and preserve the traditions of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia." Volodin claimed that membership in the Soviet Communist Party was initially an honor and that the party was full of people "who were true moral and ethical beacons," but that the party then relegated these people to the background due to the lack of "threats," causing the party to collapse. Volodin claimed that the Soviet Union also collapsed due to a move toward "sycophants and traitors" such that modern-day Russia must work to "respect people who selflessly serve their country and fight against those who cause [Russia] harm." Volodin claimed that Russian "foreign agents" in the "fifth column" receive money from abroad, have betrayed their country, and are trying to harm the state.[xxx] Volodin claimed that Russia must consolidate society and prevent foreign agents from operating within Russia. Volodin specifically criticized Russians who left Russia to live in Europe. Volodin claimed that Russia must prevent its destruction "from within" and that external challenges "bring everyone together."[xxxi] Volodin called for stricter legislation on "foreign agents" that would be "in the interests of [Russian] citizens."

Putin visited a military hospital on October 29 and spoke with a wounded Russian servicemember about the "continuity of the tradition of service in Russia."[xxxii] The soldier and Putin reminisced about uncovering stories about their ancestors' military service in archives. Putin claimed that the soldier is "fighting just like [his] grandfather" and that "it is in our genes without even knowing." Soldiers at the hospital gifted Putin armor plates upon which they had painted Orthodox saints and which they had worn on the battlefield under fire. Volodin's and Putin's statements allude to a central strongman on whom the state's entire existence rests, deference to the Orthodox Church, and the unity of the Russian people and history, calling back to the 19^th century Russian imperial ideology of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (Narodnost').

The Kremlin is likely trying to convince Russians that Russia is facing threats both externally and internally in order to justify future intensified repressions and the implementation of a permanent wartime footing like the one the Communist Party imposed on the Soviet Union for most of its existence. The Kremlin has long claimed that it is fighting the West and that foreign actors are trying to conduct sabotage within Russia – claims that Kremlin officials repeated today and in recent days.[xxxiii] The Kremlin’s claims are callbacks to the Soviet Union’s rhetorical justifications for enormous military mobilization during the Cold War as the answer to being “surrounded by enemies” as well as to Stalin's justification for his repressions and purges in the 1920s and 1930s as necessary to fight against "anti-Soviet" elements, wreckers, and saboteurs. The Kremlin may be preparing society and setting conditions for intensified crackdowns and repressions. The Kremlin has already intensified its control over the Russian information space and cracked down on Russian society in recent years, particularly after the failed Wagner rebellion in June 2023. These comments suggest that the Kremlin has wider plans and intentions that it fears will invoke domestic backlash even in the current repressive conditions.

The Kremlin may plan to intensify repression ahead of possible involuntary mobilization. A future involuntary mobilization may start with the callup of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure (as the Kremlin is starting to do), but may expand to the use of reservists in fighting in Ukraine.[xxxiv] The Kremlin may aim to use claims that Russia is facing intensified external and internal threats to demand more sacrifices from Russian society and to implement a permanent military and economic mobilization.

European officials continue to report aerial incursions in European airspace. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken reported on October 29 that authorities spotted several unidentified drones operating near the Marche-en-Famenne military base overnight on October 25 to 26.[xxxv] Francken noted that investigations are ongoing and did not attribute responsibility for the drones to any actor at this time. Lithuanian Minister of the Interior Vladislav Kondratovičius reported on October 29 that the Lithuanian government is extending the partial closure of the Medininkai border crossing and full closure of the Salcininkai border crossing with Belarus until November 30.[xxxvi] The closures follow several recent incidents involving Belarusian smuggling balloons violating Lithuania's airspace. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on October 29 that two Polish fighter jets intercepted a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea on October 28.[xxxvii] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that the Russian aircraft was operating without a registered flight plan or an active transponder but did not violate Polish airspace.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian official threatened to supply nuclear missiles to Venezuela and Cuba and called the United States a Russian enemy.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to tout new Russian nuclear missiles to threaten the United States.
• Russia continues to use Belarus to threaten Europe with the Oreshnik missile.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is performatively offering an hours-long micro-ceasefire in Pokrovsk likely in part to claim that Russia is not the impediment to the peace process.
• Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction but remain unlikely to immediately collapse the Ukrainian pocket.
• Russian forces will likely expend large amounts of manpower and equipment to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction, as they have during the past 18 months of fighting for Pokrovsk.
• A recent US intelligence assessment reportedly concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is more determined than ever to gain a battlefield victory in his war in Ukraine, consistent with ongoing statements by senior Russian officials.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian State Duma deputies are using imperial Russian and Soviet ideologies to call for Russian society to unite against alleged internal and external threats – likely to set conditions for further repressions and intensified involuntary mobilization for the war against Ukraine or a future war against NATO.
• European officials continue to report aerial incursions in European airspace.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine continued its long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector and defense industrial base on the night of October 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian SSO elements struck the Mariysky Oil Refinery near Tabashino, Republic of Mari El; the Novospassky Oil Refinery near Novospasske, Ulyanovsk Oblast; and the Budyonnovsk Natural Gas Processing Plant near Budyonnovsk, Stavropol Krai overnight on October 28 and 29.[xxxviii] The SSO reported that the Mariysky Oil Refinery produces 10 types of petroleum products and has an annual oil refining capacity of 1.6 million tons. The SSO reported that the Novospassky Oil Refinery has an annual oil refining capacity of 600,000 tons and that the Budyonnovsk plant has an annual design capacity of 2.2 billion cubic meters of gas and supplies the Budyonnovsky Thermal Power Plant and state-owned Lukoil enterprises. Footage published on October 28 shows a fire near the Stavrolen petrochemical plant, one of Russia's largest, and in Budyonnovsk, Stavropol Krai near the oil refinery in the area.[xxxix] Footage published on October 29 shows a fire at the Novospassky Oil Refinery.[xl] Footage published on October 28 shows explosions near the Kanchurinsk underground gas storage facility in the Republic of Bashkortostan.[xli]

Actors likely affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence recently killed a Rosgvardia lieutenant colonel implicated in war crimes in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on October 29 showing a person detonating an explosive in a car, which the GUR stated carried Rosgvardia Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) Lieutenant Colonel Veniamin Mazherin.[xlii] The GUR stated that Mazherin served in the OMON Obereg special unit, which the GUR stated committed war crimes in Kyiv Oblast in February to March 2022.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 29 but did not advance.

Fighting continued in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City toward Ryzhivka (on the international border southwest of Glushkovo) and north of Sumy City near Varachyne, on October 28 and 29.[xliii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[xliv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on October 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 28 that Russian forces advanced south of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[xlv]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Tykhe on October 28 and 29.[xlvi]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battery operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are struggling to advance due to the autumnal reduction in foliage, depriving Russian forces of concealment from Ukrainian drone strikes.[xlvii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces near Vovchansk continue to struggle with flooding from the collapse of the Belgorod Reservoir dam (southeast of Belgorod City and 11 kilometers from the international border) following October 28 Ukrainian strikes.[xlviii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone and Molniya-2 loitering munition operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[xlix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Bolohivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[l]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie on October 28 and 29.[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kupyansk.[lii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the railway line south of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[liii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on October 28 and 29.[liv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk and Myrove (north of Kupyansk).[lv]

Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southern Kupyansk in what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[lvi] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

The Ukrainian Joint Task Force and Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko refuted claims that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian units in Kupyansk.[lvii] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on October 29 that Russian forces are experimenting with infrequent night and motorcycle attacks to offset the prevalent Ukrainian drone threat.[lviii] The commander reported that Ukrainian forces’ first-person view (FPV) drones equipped with thermal imaging cameras effectively repel Russian night attacks and force Russian forces to conduct logistics operations during the day when they can see the drones ahead of a strike rather than at night when they cannot.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zelenyi Hai and east of Borova toward Shyikivka on October 28 and 29 but did not advance.[lix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[lx]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Korovii Yar, Novoselivka, Derylove, and Drobysheve and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southwest of Lyman near Yampil on October 28 and 29.[lxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[lxii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Zvanivka on October 28 and 29.[lxiii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Oleksandro-Kalynove (south of Kostyantynivka) and northeast of and into northern Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) during an October 27 battalion-sized mechanized assault.[lxiv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske and toward Vyrolyubivka and Fedorivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on October 28 and 29.[lxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[lxvi]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian mechanized brigade reported that Russian forces are only operating in Kostyantynivka in groups of two to three personnel and that there are not enough Russian personnel in the city for significant operations.[lxvii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the contested "gray zone" is expanding in and near Kostyantynivka and that Russian forces within Kostyantynivka are operating in small numbers.[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rusyn Yar.[lxix] Drone operators of an anti-tank artillery battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxx] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northern Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on October 28 and 29.[lxxiii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[lxxiv]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the area between Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya), Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and Shakhove is a contested “gray zone”.[lxxv]

Ukrainian sources provided more information on the Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 27.[lxxvi] A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 vehicles, including two BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), one MT-LB amphibious armored fighting vehicle (AFV), and four tanks.[lxxvii] The drone unit reported that Ukrainian forces killed over 40 Russian servicemembers from sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The drone unit added that Russian forces lost 92 armored vehicles in the area during October 2025, including 24 tanks, eight BMPs, five MT-LBs, four BTR armored personnel carriers (APCs), and one BMD IFV. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Russian forces employed a tank with a mine trawler to lead the October 27 mechanized assault.[lxxviii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian Advances: See topline text for reports of Russian advances and additional Russian activity in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces continued ground attacks near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Rih, Hnativka, Kozatske, Promin, Myrnohrad, Myrolyubivka, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 29 and 30.[lxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and Rodynske.[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 75th Motorized Rifle Regiment (201st Military Base, Central Military District [CMD]) and Storm Spetsnaz Detachment of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxi] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly fighting in eastern Myrnohrad.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction, including southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, on October 28 and 29.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags in Vyshneve (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces advanced into central Vyshneve.[lxxxiv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Vyshneve.[lxxxv]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Novoselivka and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Ternove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Vyshneve and toward Pryvillya, Danylivka, and Myrne on October 28 and 29.[lxxxvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Danylivka (north of Hulyaipole).[lxxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Novohryhorivka, Pavlivka, Pryvilne, Stepove, and Uspenivka and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai on October 28 and 29.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Novoivanivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxxix]

Drone operators of an electronic warfare (EW) platoon of the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating on the Zaporizhia front.[xc]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, Stepove, Novoandriivka, Prymorske, and Shcherbaky on October 28 and 29.[xci]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Troitsk Group of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[xcii] Elements of the 40th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Regiment (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[xciii]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on October 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi road bridge, on October 28 and 29.[xciv]

The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on October 29 that Russian forces shelled the Kherson Oblast Children's Hospital in central Kherson City, which injured nine civilians, including four children and three medical staff.[xcv]

Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on October 29 that Ukrainian drone operators struck a Russian Pantsir-S2 air defense system, worth roughly $20 million, and two radar stations in an unspecified location in occupied Crimea and an oil depot in occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[xcvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 126 total Shahed-type and Gerbera-type drones from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea – about 80 of which were Shahed-type drones.[xcvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 93 Russian drones and that 32 drones struck 10 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv City and Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts, injuring three civilians.[xcviii] Geolocated footage published on October 28 shows a Russian drone strike against an electrical substation east of Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast.[xcix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.