Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on October 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Estonian authorities temporarily closed a section of road passing through Russian territory near the Russia-Estonia border on October 10 after Estonian border guards observed a small group of Russian military personnel without insignia in the area. Meelis Saarepuu, the head of the South Prefecture of the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board, reported on October 11 that Estonian authorities closed a nearly kilometer-long section of the road between Varska and Saatse, a portion of which runs through Russian territory, for safety reasons after observing seven armed Russian servicemembers near the Russian section of the road on October 10.[i] Saarepuu stated that the servicemembers' uniforms suggested that they were not Russian border guards. Saarepuu reported that Russian border guards answered Estonian border guards' inquiries by claiming that the Russian activity in the area was routine. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsakhna stated on October 12 that Russian forces are operating “somewhat more assertively and visibly than before” but that reports that the border situation is becoming more tense are exaggerated.[ii] Tsakhna noted that Estonian authorities plan to stop using the road altogether in the future, as there are alternative routes that bypass Russian territory already available or currently under construction. Reports of a small group of Russian servicemembers operating near Estonian territory come against the backdrop of Russian military aircraft violating Estonian airspace on September 7 and 19.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia has recently intensified its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[iv] This event is the first instance of ISW observing "little green men" (a euphemism the Kremlin uses for the Russian military forces in unmarked uniforms) operating near a NATO state in the context of the “Phase Zero” campaign.

American intelligence sharing with Ukraine has reportedly been crucial in increasing the efficacy of Ukraine's long-range drone strike campaign targeting the Russian energy sector in recent months. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 11 that Ukrainian and US officials stated that the United States has been providing Ukraine with intelligence to facilitate Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russia's energy sector, including oil refineries, since at least July 2025.[v] The FT reported that the United States began providing Ukraine with the intelligence following US President Donald Trump's phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in July 2025, as Trump grew increasingly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to move toward peace. The FT reported that officials stated that US intelligence sharing has been crucial in enabling Ukraine to better prepare drone routes to evade Russian air defenses. Three sources familiar with the matter noted that the United States was closely involved in all stages of Ukraine's strike planning. One US official stated that Ukraine selected the long-range strike targets, and the United States then provided intelligence on the sites' vulnerabilities. The FT noted that sources stated that the United States had also determined target priorities for the Ukrainians. The FT noted that Ukraine's improved drone technology and increased drone production have contributed to the success of Ukraine's strike campaign, allowing Ukraine to conduct more frequent strikes. Ukrainian strikes against oil refineries deep in the Russian rear have resulted in gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine, resulting in long lines and increased prices at gasoline stations.[vi] The FT reported that the research group Energy Aspects assesses that Ukraine has struck 16 of Russia's 38 oil refineries.

The Kremlin is attempting to stabilize its domestic gasoline market to offset the consequences of Ukraine's long-strike campaign against refineries. Putin signed a decree on October 12 suspending reductions in the fuel damper payment subsidy to oil refineries from October 1, 2025, to May 1, 2026.[vii] The damper is meant to encourage oil refineries to sell their product domestically by providing government subsidies to compensate for the difference between higher export rates and the domestic market. Putin's decision reflects the efficacy of Ukraine's months-long strike campaign against Russia's oil refineries, which continues to significantly destabilize Russia's gasoline sector. Continued subsidies to the gasoline sector will increase costs on the Russian state.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed possible US sales of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in an October 12 call, as the Kremlin continues its reflexive control campaign to deter the US from sending Ukraine Tomahawks.[viii] Zelensky described the call as “very productive” and noted that Trump and Zelensky also discussed Ukrainian air defense and energy resilience. The October 12 call is the second between Zelensky and Trump in two days. Kremlin officials repeated boilerplate narratives about Russia’s opposition to Ukraine receiving Tomahawks on October 12. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 12 that the potential provision of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is causing Russia “extreme concern” and that the missile is a “serious weapon” but will not change the battlefield situation.[ix] Peskov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also continued on October 12 to blame the European Union (EU) and Ukraine — not Russia — for the lack of progress in peace negotiations.[x] Kremlin rhetoric downplaying the frontline impact of Tomahawk missiles, emphasizing the potential for Tomahawk provisions to damage US-Russia relations, and blaming Ukraine for not hindering peace efforts are part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to prevent the United States from supplying the missiles to Ukraine, just as Russia previously and ultimately unsuccessfully attempted to convince the United States to not send Ukraine F-16 fighter jets, ATACMS missiles, Abrams tanks, and several other systems.[xi]

Russia’s effort to generate increased military recruitment through high financial incentives is reportedly losing momentum, indicating that Russia’s main method for recruiting volunteers for its war may be hitting diminishing returns. Independent Russian-language outlet Idel Realii reported on October 12 that employees in Russian military recruitment offices stated that the number of people signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is not increasing even in regions offering the highest financial incentives.[xii] The sources reportedly assessed that everyone who wanted to "make money from the war" had already signed up. Idel Realii noted that Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug is currently offering the highest one-time signup bonus with 3.2 million rubles (about $39,300) and that regional payouts across Russia increase on average by 500,000 rubles (about $6,100) every three to four months. Idel Realii reported that Sverdlovsk Oblast's March 2025 decision to increase its one-time payout to 3.1 million rubles (about $38,100) did not result in an influx of new recruits. Military recruitment employees in two unspecified Siberian regions reported that only recruits of "extremely advanced age" and with chronic illnesses have been signing up recently. Idel Realii reported that sources in a city in northern Irkutsk Oblast stated that there have been issues with recruitment for several months and that recruits are mostly asking questions about the financial payouts and benefits for servicemembers, such as priority education for their children, loan deferments, and debt forgiveness — demonstrating how those who are signing up are only financially motivated. A source from Irkutsk Oblast stated that the Russian MoD has been trying to recruit people with advertisements — particularly in the lead up to the US-Russia summit in Alaska on August 15 — claiming that a settlement to the war is coming soon, so recruits should "get [their] millions before peace comes." The source also noted that the Russian MoD is deceiving people by advertising how much recruits could make in one year, given the monthly salaries for servicemembers operating in the combat zone, even though Russian authorities are often sending new recruits not to the rear but on assault missions at the front, where the life expectancy is often less than one year.

ISW assessed in February 2025 that ever greater financial incentives for new recruits in the future are unlikely to dramatically increase recruitment, as a large portion of the pool of Russian citizens who are incentivized by money at levels the Russian state could afford to offer at scale have likely already volunteered to join the military.[xiii] The growing financial incentives for new recruits and social benefits for servicemembers suggest that sign up rates have been declining and that Russia has had to find new incentives to drive recruitment.[xiv] ISW continues to assess that decreases in Russian recruitment, such that Russia cannot replace its high casualty rates, could in part force Russian President Vladimir Putin to choose between conducting an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Putin has shown great reluctance to order, or coming to the negotiating table to end the war.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Estonian authorities temporarily closed a section of road passing through Russian territory near the Russia-Estonia border on October 10 after Estonian border guards observed a small group of Russian military personnel without insignia in the area.
• American intelligence sharing with Ukraine has reportedly been crucial in increasing the efficacy of Ukraine's long-range drone strike campaign targeting the Russian energy sector in recent months.
• The Kremlin is attempting to stabilize its domestic gasoline market to offset the consequences of Ukraine's long-strike campaign against refineries.
• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed possible US sales of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in an October 12 call, as the Kremlin continues its reflexive control campaign to deter the US from sending Ukraine Tomahawks.
• Russia’s effort to generate increased military recruitment though high financial incentives is reportedly losing momentum, indicating that Russia’s main method for recruiting volunteers for its war may be hitting diminishing returns.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk and Siversk. Russian forces advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure on the night of October 11 to 12.[xvi] Geolocated footage published on October 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely struck the Smolensk airfield and Aviation Plant.[xvii] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on October 12 that the Smolensk Aviation Plant produces Kh-59 precision missiles and components for Kh-101 cruise missiles that Russian forces regularly use to strike Ukraine.[xviii] ISW previously observed reports that Ukrainian partisans blew up a track leading to the Smolensk Aviation Plant on September 21.[xix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka, north of Sumy City near Varachyne and Oleksiivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 11 and 12.[xx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka and Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[xxi]

A Russian milblogger allegedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 12 that Russian forces cannot hold Oleksiivka without reinforcement due to the intensity of Ukrainian counterattacks.[xxii] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command dispatched a battalion of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and a company of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to reinforce Russian forces operating in Oleksiivka but did not coordinate their entry, leading to friendly fire incidents between the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) operating in Oleksiivka and the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade.[xxiii] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces in Kostyantynivka are without artillery support while facing constant Ukrainian counterattacks.[xxiv] The milblogger claimed Russian forces attempted to deploy mortar crews to Kostyantynivka, but North Korean forces stopped traffic near Sinyak, Kursk Oblast (north of Sumy City) due to miscommunications. The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) on the E38 Rylsk-Lgov highway (north of Sumy City in Kursk Oblast).[xxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksiivka.[xxvi] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xxvii] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian trains and railway infrastructure near Snovsk, Chernihiv Oblast (northwest of Sumy City).[xxviii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on October 11 and 12.[xxix]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently demonstrated an increased glide bomb range by striking an unspecified target near Vovchansk from a distance of 90 to 100 kilometers from the launch point.[xxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Milove and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Obukhivka on October 11 and 12.[xxxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[xxxii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Bolohivka, Dvorichanske, and Kolodyazne; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 11 and 12.[xxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk.[xxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 12 but did not advance.

]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka, northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove, and east of Borova near Kopanky on October 11 and 12.[xxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Derylove, Serednie, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 11 and 12.[xxxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Pereizne (south of Siversk).[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on October 11 and 12.[xxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating east of Pereizne.[xxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xl]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Bila Hora; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Kleban-Byk; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on October 11 and 12.[xli]

The Ukrainian Armed Forces' Border Guard Command provided additional details on October 11 on the Russian reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault near Volodymyrivka on October 9, stating that the mechanized assault comprised six tanks, nearly 40 armored personnel carriers, over 40 motorized vehicles, and several hundred infantry.[xlii] The Ukrainian Armed Forces' Border Guard Command reported that the first wave of the assault consisted of motorcyclists followed by tanks and armored personnel carriers. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area confirmed on October 12 that Russian forces have yet to fully seize Chasiv Yar (north of Kostyantynivka) and that Russian forces are deploying single infantry from various directions simultaneously to conduct infiltration missions near the city.[xliii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military officials are falsifying combat reports on the frontline situation near Volodymyrivka.[xliv]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 11 that the Russian military command recommitted unspecified naval infantry units previously operating on the left flank of the area of responsibility of the 8th CAA (SMD) to reinforce the Russian offensive near the Poltavka-Volodymyrivka and Volodymyrivka-Novotoretske (south of Volodymyrivka) areas.[xlv] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command of the 8th CAA (SMD) and the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) will soon make another attempt to dislodge Ukrainian forces from the Sofiivka-Volodymyrivka-Pankivka-Shakhove (southwest of Druzhkivka) area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Shaman Crew of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade are reportedly coordinating with elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (both 8th CAA, SMD) to strike Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Pankivka and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 11 and 12.[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya).[xlviii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xlix]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Balahan (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced south of Balahan, south of Rodynske, and within central Pokrovsk, purportedly seizing the Pokrovsk Railway Station.[l]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novomykolaivka, Krasnyi Lyman, Zatyshok, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Sukhetske, and Boykivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrnohrad, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on October 11 and 12.[li] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Lazurnyi Microraion in southern Pokrovsk and near Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[lii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly providing fire adjustment support near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[liii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on October 11 and 12.[liv]

Mashovets reported on October 11 that the Russian military command has started a significant redeployment of forces between the Central and Eastern groupings of forces.[lv]

Order of Battle: Aerial reconnaissance and air defense elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely referring to the Novopavlivka direction.[lvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Novoselivka, Oleksandrohrad, and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on October 11 and 12.[lvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military analyst Oleh Petrenko reported that Russian forces advanced in eastern Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Poltavka, and Pavlivka, and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and Zelenyi Hai on October 11 and 12.[lix]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian fiber optic drones are striking vehicles along Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near the Zaporizhia-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in a systematic effort to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.[lx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet-era unit of the 35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[lxi] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Pryvilne (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Ukrainian battalion operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast and Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Mali Shcherbaky (southwest of Orikhiv).[lxiii] Geolocated footage published on October 12 shows elements of the Ukrainian battalion raising flags in the settlement.[lxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[lxv]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Kamyanske, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on October 11 and 12.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka.[lxvii]

Open-source analysts on X (formerly Twitter) reported on October 11 that elements of the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade to Kamyanske from the Kherson direction.[lxviii] ISW observed reports of elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade operating in the Kherson direction as of October 2.[lxix]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the southern outskirts of Prymorske are a contested "gray zone."[lxx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have quantitative drone superiority over Russian forces near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske, complicating Russian advances in the area.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) and 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxii] Reconnaissance elements of the 162nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 247th VDV Regiment (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly coordinating strikes against Ukrainian drone crews near Stepnohirsk.[lxxiii] Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to VDV) reportedly recently arrived in the Stepnohirsk-Prymorske area and are striking Ukrainian drone crews in the area.[lxxiv] The Russian military notably uses BARS-Sarmat for specialized drone technological research and development and tactical innovation with unmanned systems.[lxxv] This deployment can indicate a Russian tactical prioritization in the Stepnohirsk-Prymorske area.

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on October 12 but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 12 that fighting continues on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[lxxvi]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck seven vehicles along the M14 Kherson City-Mykolaiv City highway in unspecified areas in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast and are remotely mining the road.[lxxvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-31 cruise missile from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and 118 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including roughly 50 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 103 drones and that 15 drones and one missile struck 10 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential areas and civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts, leaving 9,607 households in Kyiv oblast without electricity.[lxxix]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 12 that Russian forces struck Ukraine with over 3,100 drones, 92 missiles, and around 1,360 glide bombs since roughly October 5.[lxxx]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian military command continued its evaluation of the Belarusian Armed Forces and implemented lessons learned in Russia's war in Ukraine. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich claimed on October 12 that Belarusian Armed Forces combat readiness checks announced on October 11 involved bringing forces to combat readiness, deployments to staging areas, training with engineer equipment and fortifications, and defense against airstrikes, drone attacks, and sabotage and reconnaissance groups while incorporating lessons learned from Russia's war in Ukraine.[lxxxi] Volfovich claimed that the second stage of the checks conducted on October 12 involved armored vehicle movement and simulated crossings of water obstacles.[lxxxii]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.