Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 28, 2025

October 28, 2025, 8:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on October 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), but these advances are unlikely to cause an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on October 27 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and eastern Pokrovsk and northeastern Myrnohrad.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced in eastern Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne (just northwest of Pokrovsk).[3] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported on October 28 that Russian forces do not have full control over any positions in Pokrovsk, but noted that Russian forces maintain a 10-to-one drone advantage over Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[4] Shapoval's statement is consistent with ISW's definition of the assessed Russian advances as verifiable areas in which Russian forces have operated in or conducted attacks against, even if they do not maintain control. Control is doctrinally defined as “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.”[5] Russian forces almost certainly do not currently control any positions within the city of Pokrovsk itself.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly demanded Russian forces seize Pokrovsk by mid-November 2025, although Russian forces are unlikely to meet this deadline. Ukrainian sources amplified a since-deleted Financial Times (FT) report that cited unnamed media sources reporting that Putin tasked the Russian military command with taking control of Pokrovsk by mid-November 2025.[6] Russian forces have repeatedly missed Putin's arbitrarily demanded deadlines to seize specific territory in Ukraine, including Putin's early demand to seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 2022.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa assessed on June 5, 2025 that Russian forces aimed to seize an operationally significant area of Donetsk Oblast (including Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, Kostyantynivka, and Pokrovsk) by September 1, 2025; the rest of Kherson Oblast and a ”buffer zone” in northern and southern Ukraine by the end of 2025; and all land east of the Dnipro River in northern and eastern Ukraine, as well as most of Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts by the end of 2026.[8] Russian forces have failed to seize any of these major cities in Donetsk Oblast as of late October 2025, and ISW continues to assess that seizing Ukraine's fortress belt will be a multi-year-long effort for Russian forces.[9] Putin regularly tasks the Russian General Staff with seizing operationally significant swaths of land within unrealistic timeframes, and the timeframe within which Putin aims to seize Pokrovsk is not a realistic reflection of Russian forces’ ability to seize the town.

Russian tactics in Pokrovsk have entrapped civilians within the city, intensifying the risk of indiscriminate civilian harm. The Ukrainian Pokrovsk Military Administration reported that Russian forces have fire control over all egress routes from Pokrovsk, effectively entrapping 1,200 civilians within Pokrovsk.[10] The Pokrovsk Military Administration reported that Russian forces are killing civilians who attempt to evacuate both on foot and in vehicles. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported that Russian forces are wearing civilian clothes as part of deception tactics that may amount to perfidy, a war crime that the Geneva Convention defines as “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.”[11] Russian forces' systematic resort to perfidy in Pokrovsk has added a significant degree of confusion and chaos to the area, likely putting Ukrainian civilians at even greater risk of harm. The drone saturation in the skies over Pokrovsk also poses an intensified threat to the safety of civilians, especially as Russian forces frequently use drones to purposefully target civilians.[12] ISW has previously observed reports that Russian forces indiscriminately target both civilian and military vehicles traveling in frontline oblasts and that the indiscriminate strikes on vehicles complicate or block medical services and evacuations from the frontlines.[13]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 28 that Ukraine and Sweden agreed to localize production of Swedish Gripen fighter jets in Ukraine.[14] Zelensky noted that training for Ukrainian pilots to operate Gripens lasts six months and that Gripens require a small maintenance team.[15] Zelensky announced on October 25 that Ukraine also expects Sweden to begin delivering its promised 150 Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine in early 2026. Zelensky stated on October 28 that he is also in talks with France to supply Rafale fighter jets to Ukraine.[16]

The Kremlin is resurrecting Soviet-era narratives of Russia's perpetual victimhood in the face of perceived external aggression in a dual attempt to justify Russia's future aggression against both Europe and the Asia-Pacific and the longer-term mobilization of Russian society. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) baselessly claimed on October 28 that France is preparing a military contingent of 2,000 servicemen to send to Ukraine.[17] The SVR specifically claimed that these forces are part of the French Foreign Legion, which Russian milbloggers have previously claimed are operating in Ukraine — part of the Kremlin’s concerted effort to justify claims that Russia is fighting all of NATO, not just Ukraine.[18] The Kremlin often uses the SVR to spread unfounded allegations designed to weaken support for Ukraine and sow doubt about the nature of Russia’s own provocations against NATO member states.[19] The SVR has been releasing public statements about supposed Western provocations against Russia more frequently since mid-September 2025, constituting a concerted pattern of activity that is likely part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” informational and psychological condition-setting phase for a higher level of NATO-Russia conflict.[20]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated claims on October 28 that NATO remains a significant threat to Russia, including by admitting new members and supplying Ukraine with weapons and financial and political support.[21] Lavrov claimed that NATO is artificially expanding its area of responsibility (AoR) beyond the Euro-Atlantic, including to the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, South Caucasus, and Central and South Asia, with the goal of containing the People's Republic of China (PRC), isolating Russia, confronting North Korea, and broadly expanding its influence. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed on October 28 that Russia is currently countering aggressive external pressure and anti-Russian propaganda from the West and that the West is trying to divide Russia into a series of "ethno-states."[22] These narratives are not new, and in fact call back to the Soviet Union's rhetorical justifications for the Cold War as the answer to being "surrounded by enemies."[23] The SVR's, Lavrov's, and Shoigu’s resurrection of Soviet-era narratives that Russia must protect itself against perceived global threats supports the Kremlin’s wider efforts to generate domestic support for a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against NATO.[24]

Russian officials also appear to be setting conditions to justify further militarization and full-scale mobilization of Russian society. Shoigu later claimed during a meeting in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast that foreign intelligence agencies are attempting to infiltrate critical Russian infrastructure — including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, transportation facilities, and energy companies — to commit sabotage and steal strategic information from Russia.[25] Shoigu noted that Russia may call up reservists to protect critical Russian infrastructure. Russian authorities previously claimed that Russia intended to mobilize reservists to protect critical infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes and appear to be broadening this justification to also defending against alleged Western spies.[26] Russian authorities will likely leverage the threat of Western agitators in Russia to justify greater societal repressions and garner additional support for mobilizing reservists.

The Russian State Duma approved a bill on October 28 allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia's "human mobilization reserve" to protect Russian critical facilities and infrastructure.[27] Russia's "human mobilization reserve" is Russia's higher-readiness active reserve in which Russian citizens sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up.[28] The bill states that reservists will participate in special training sessions to ensure the production of critical facilities and that the Russian government will establish the training procedures for reservists. Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate, Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky, stated on October 22 that Russian authorities will send reservists to training camps to prepare to protect critical infrastructure and defend against drones.[29] Tsimlyansky clarified that this bill does not require reservists to participate in military operations or missions outside of Russia. The October 28 bill differs from the Russian MoD's October 13 draft amendment that requests permission for the Russian military to use members of Russia's "human mobilization reserve" in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or state of war, which the State Duma has not approved as of this report.[30] It is unclear if the Kremlin will use the October 28 bill to deploy reservists to rear areas of occupied Ukraine, as Russian officials continue to falsely insist that occupied Ukraine is part of Russia.[31] The Kremlin may leverage the October 28 bill as a stepping stone toward mobilizing reservists on a rolling basis to fight in Ukraine, as ISW previously forecasted.[32]

European authorities recently reported unidentified drones near airports in Spain and a military base in Estonia. Authorities at the Miguel Hernández Airport in Alicante, Spain, reported that unidentified drones flying near the runway forced the airport to close on the evening of October 27.[33] Spanish authorities have launched an investigation to determine the drone launch point and the actors responsible. Spanish authorities also reported that the Palma de Mallorca Airport suspended operations on the evening of October 19 after an unidentified drone sighting in the airport's airspace.[34] Estonian General Staff Spokesperson Liis Waxmann reported that authorities detected two unidentified drones flying near the Camp Reedo military base of the Estonian 2nd Infantry Brigade in southern Estonia on the afternoon of October 17.[35] Authorities reportedly shot down one of the drones but could not find the wreckage. Camp Reedo also houses the US 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment (5-7 CAV). Neither Spanish nor Estonian authorities have identified the drones as Russian as of this writing.

European officials continue to report on Russian hybrid operations in Europe over the past several years. The Latvian State Security Service (VDD) proposed on October 17 that the Latvian Prosecutor's Office initiate criminal prosecution against four individuals who planned and committed arson attacks against Latvian facilities in 2023 and 2024.[36] The VDD investigation, which began in June 2024, found that the group conducted an arson attack against a private company that was working on a defense-related project in Fall 2023 and prepared an arson attack against a truck with Ukrainian license plates at a critical infrastructure facility in early 2024. The four individuals reportedly conducted the attacks at the initiative of Russian special services and sent reconnaissance data about potential targets to organizers in Russia. Russia has been setting conditions to confront the West for several years, and Russian sabotage and intelligence activities from years past likely support Russia’s effort to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war.[37] ISW assesses that Russia‘s intensified “Phase Zero” effort, Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war, began in early September 2025.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), but these advances are unlikely to cause an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Russian tactics in Pokrovsk have entrapped civilians within the city, intensifying the risk of indiscriminate civilian harm.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 28 that Ukraine and Sweden agreed to localize production of Swedish Gripen fighter jets in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is resurrecting Soviet-era narratives of Russia's perpetual victimhood in the face of perceived external aggression in a dual attempt to justify Russia's future aggression against both Europe and the Asia-Pacific and the longer-term mobilization of Russian society.
• Russian officials also appear to be setting conditions to justify further militarization and full-scale mobilization of Russian society.
• The Russian State Duma approved a bill on October 28 allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia's "human mobilization reserve" to protect Russian critical facilities and infrastructure.
• European authorities recently reported unidentified drones near airports in Spain and a military base in Estonia.
• European officials continue to report on Russian hybrid operations in Europe over the past several years.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and the Pokrovsk direction and marginally advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 28 that Ukrainian strikes have depleted over 20 percent of Russia's oil refining potential and between 22 and 27 percent of its domestic gasoline supplies.[39] Zelensky stated that Ukraine uses domestically produced weapons in 90 to 95 percent of its long-range strikes into Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 28 but did not advance.[40]

The Sumy Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on October 28 that a Russian drone struck a civilian car and injured the driver in Esmanskyi Hromada.[41]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 27 and 28 that Russian authorities recently arrested the commander of the 1st battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) for disobeying an order to send his subordinates to conduct an infantry assault.[42] The milblogger noted that Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov previously forbade commanders from using VKS troops in infantry assaults and that Russian authorities should arrest Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov for issuing an order that violated Gerasimov's ban. The milblogger claimed on October 27 that Ukrainian drone operators recently destroyed elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade attacking near Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[43]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[44]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), in an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[45]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk, west of and within Synelnykove, and near Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Bochkove on October 27 and 28.[47]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that recent Ukrainian strikes on the Belgorod Reservoir dam (southeast of Belgorod City and 11 kilometers from the international border) along the Siverskyi Donets River are causing floods at Russian accumulation and assault areas, affecting Russia's combat capability in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[48] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to bypass Vovchansk from the west. Trehubov noted that the dam breach will not stop Russian assaults near Vovchansk but will reduce the intensity of Russian assaults and complicate logistics. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are holding flooded positions but may have to evacuate soon.[49] The milblogger claimed that sources on the ground are reporting that the flooding is "only the beginning," in contrast to reports that Russian authorities have stabilized the situation with the dam.

Order of Battle: Molniya drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Batya Group are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[51]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka and Odradne on October 27 and 28.[52]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command is deploying elements of the 18th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[53] ISW observed reports that elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division's 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment were operating near Odradne as of early October 2025, and reports that elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division's 11th Tank Regiment redeployed from northern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velykyi Burluk direction.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[55]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 27 and 28.[56]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 28 that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) continue to encircle Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk and cleared buildings in Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and Nadiya and toward Shyykivka on October 27 and 28 but did not advance.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the T-0513 Lyman-Yampil highway between Lyman and Yampil (immediately southeast of Lyman) and west of Zarichne (east of Lyman).[59]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Novoselivka, Korovyi Yar, Drobysheve, Serednie, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 27 and 28.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Zvanivka on October 27 and 28.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Predetchyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[62] Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southeastern Kostyantynivka, but that Ukrainian forces later pushed Russian forces back to the administrative boundaries of the settlement.[63] ISW assesses that there is currently no Russian presence in Kostyantynivka.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; northeast of Druzhkivka near Zaliznyanske and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on October 27 and 28.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[65]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) during a battalion-sized mechanized assault.[66] Ukraine’s 1st Azov National Guard Corps, which posted the footage, reported that Russian forces deployed 29 armored vehicles near Shakhove and Volodymyrivka (just southeast of Shakhove on the opposite bank of the Kazennyi Torets River) on October 27.[67] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks, 12 armored fighting vehicles, and one lightly armored vehicle and that Ukrainian drone operators eliminated disembarked Russian infantry. The corps reported that the assault had more tanks compared to other recent mechanized attacks. The corps stated that Russian forces launched the assault in waves of four to five vehicles along different routes and at different times, exploiting bad weather conditions that hamper Ukrainian drone operations.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Pankivka and Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 27 and 28.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne.[69]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the western part of the Dobropillya salient is a contested "gray zone."[70]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery guns near Shakhove.[71]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian Advances: See topline text for reports of Russian advances and additional Russian activity in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 27 and 28.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone control points within Myrnohrad, and drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking rotating Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on October 27 and 28.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove, Vyshneve, and Oleksiivka on October 27 and 28.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[76] Fiber optic drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the South Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[77]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Novomykolaivka, Novohryhorivka, Pavlivka, and Uspenivka, and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and Zelenyi Hai and toward Vesele and Vysoke on October 27 and 28.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Luhivske and Mala Tokmachka and toward Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Prymorske, Shcherbaky, Stepnohirsk, and Kamyanske on October 27 and 28.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk.[81]

Geolocated footage published on October 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Prymorske after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[82] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including the Nemets Group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, the Shaman detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 74th Motorized Rile Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka and Novoandriivka.[83] Drone operators of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[84]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on October 27 and 28, but did not advance.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River.[86]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 38 total Shahed-type and Gerbera-type drones from Kursk and Oryol cities – 25 of which were Shahed-type drones.[87] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 26 Russian drones, that 12 drones struck four locations, and that drone fragments fell in one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Chernihiv and Kharkiv cities and gas infrastructure in Poltava Oblast.[88] Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz reported that Russian forces struck civilian gas infrastructure in Ukraine for the seventh time so far in October 2025.[89]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 28 that Russian Shahed-type drones are becoming more dangerous than ballistic missiles in some instances, as Ukraine has to rely on multiple systems to down significant numbers of Shahed-type drones.[90] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is increasing production of interceptor drones and is aiming to produce between 500 and 800 interceptor drones per day as of November 2025. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is also working to train people to operate interceptor drones.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.